Reply Brief — Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. United States

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IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

HOECHST CELANESE CORPORATION,

_ Petitioner,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fourth Circuit

REPLY TO BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

ANDREA BEAR FIELD

Counsel of Record

MAIDA O. LERNER

Davip S. HARLOW

LEE A. CASEY

HUNTON & WILLIAMS

1900 K Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 955-1500

DOUGLAS W. DAVIS

JOHN CHARLES THOMAS

acanmnagguains CYNTHIA S. CECIL

HUNTON & WILLIAMS

tiverfront Plaza, East Tower

951 East Byrd Street

Richmond, Virginia 23219

June 5, 1998 (804) 788-8200

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................................. enieuhte

An NTE ssi iicninrsciahicitnlihainiitiiiannnciadlaassiiileai

THE MANNER IN WHICH THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

“DEFERRED” TO EPA IS COMPLETELY AT ODDS

WITH THE PURPOSE AND INTENT OF DEFER-

ENCE AS ARTICULATED BY THIS COURT .

UNLESS LIMITS ARE PLACED ON THE APPLI-

CATION OF SEMINOLE ROCK’S DEFERENCE

STANDARD, SEMINOLE ROCK SHOULD BE

OVERTURNED, AND THIS IS THE VEHICLE FOR

DOING So ....... hacia hbcdinieeidnsaeediaadh Fa AEN SARE ANI RN ae

EPA MISSES THE POINT OF HCC’S ARGUMENT

THAT ONCE A COMPANY GETS GOOD NOTICE,

IT IS ENTITLED TO A REASONABLE TIME IN

WHICH TO COMPLY .....

CONCLUSION .

»

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10

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Bowls S Vv.

(1945)

Che

Page

Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325

» VLD U.S. 110

2, d, 6, 7, 10

vron U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defens.

Council, 467 U.S.

837, reh’a denis d, 468 U.S.

1227 (1984)

General Electric Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324 (D.C.

Cir. 1995) |

Spencer v. Kemna, —— U.S. —~—, 118 8. C

(1998) ...

6

FEDERAL STATUTES

Administrative Procedure Act. 5 U

seq.

a,

s

t

o

Ciean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401, et seq

}. 5, 8

ARTICLES

John F. Manning, stitutional Structure and

J idicial dD. f¢ rence

Agency Rules, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 612

(1996)

IN THE

Supreme Cowt of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1997

No. 97-1578

HOECHST CELANESE CORPORATION,

- Petitioner,

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Respondent.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fourth Circuit

REPLY TO BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

INTRODUCTION

EPA has it wrong. This seemingly “little case’”—which

the government would dismiss out of hand—is much more

important to the nation than EPA will ever admit. The

point of this case is that EPA—though pursuing the

worthy goal of environmental protection—has far ex-

ceeded any power it has or could ever have under our

system of government. This case is about separation of

powers; about who says what the law is: about the remedy

that a citizen is entitled to once a court has ruled that the

federal government has infringed his rights.

EPA has every incentive to say to this Court, “don’t

look at this case” because this case demonstrates that

EPA has found a way to make itself a law unto itself.

And EPA does not want to be “found out” even though

the result of its actions is that there is greater uncertainty

a i

2

about what its rules mean and more obstacles in the paths

of those that want to comply.

THE MANNER IN WHICH THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

“DEFERRED” TO EPA IS COMPLETELY AT ODDS

WITH THE PURPOSE AND INTENT OF DEFERENCE

AS ARTICULATED BY THIS COURT.

The present day incarnation of the deference standard

dates back to Bowles v. Seminole Rock & Sand Co., 325

U.S. 410 (1945), where this Court said that an agency’s

“interpretation [of its own regulations] becomes of con-

trolling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent

with the regulation.” Jd. at 414. In the 53 years since

Seminole Rock was decided, the essence of the “plainly

erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation” phrase has

been eaten away until today the Fourth Circuit—and

other circuits—act as if Seminole Rock stands for the raw

proposition that, in almost all circumstances, an agency’s

interpretation of its own regulations must be given “con-

trolling weight.”

Had the federal courts consistently followed the actual

holding in Seminole Rock, they would have retained the

ability to look at objective criteria in determining the

propriety of agency conduct. In this case, that would have

meant an examination of the actual language of the rule,

what the Administrator actually said in the accompanying

preamble, and the actual examples used by EPA at the

time of promulgation.

The preamble to the final benzene NESHAP, in fact,

describes the types of sources that were to be covered by

the exemption: both “small process units” and “process

units that use minor amounts of benzene.”? HCC’s

Celriver Plant—with thousands of pieces of equipment in

benzene service—is clearly not a small unit. But Celriver

1 See App. 112a. The government’s opposition to HCC’s petition

for certiorari noticeably fails to acknowledge that part of the pre-

amble that says the exemption applies to process units that use

minor amounts of benzene. See Opp’n at 9.

3

was a user of a minor amount of benzene when compared

to the key targets of the original benzene NESHAP rule-

making: benzene producers and feedstock users. At the

time EPA was developing the benzene NESHAP, produc-

tion facilities and feedstock users of benzene annually pro-

duced and used millions of megagrams of benzene and

were responsible for 99.5% of all benzene emissions.”

Compared to such sources, a facility like Celriver—that

had on site only a few hundred megagrams of benzene per

year—was indisputably a user of “minor amounts” of

benzene.

Even more importantly, the preamble to the final ben-

zene NESHAP contains a specific example of how the

exemption applied to a user of minor amounts of benzene.

(App. 113a.) The example concerned a pharmaceutical

company that, just like HCC’s Celriver Plant, used re-

cycled benzene as a solvent and had far more than a

thousand pieces of equipment in benzene service. Simi-

larly, the pharmaceutical company’s facility used a lot

more than 1,000 megagrams of benzene if the benzene

were to be counted over and over again as it recycled

through the facility’s processes. And, like Celriver, that

pharmaceutical company’s facility was designed to con-

sume (i.e., “use up”)* several hundred megagrams of

benzene (but less than 1000 megagrams of benzene) per

year.* In the preamble, EPA established that facilities that

used or consumed benzene in this way and in these

amounts were exempt from the NESHAP.

2 See 4th Cir. J.A. at 392, 402, 552-55.

3 Despite the government’s claim to the contrary (Opp’n at 9),

HCC has repeatedly explained that, while the word “use” can admit

of more than one interpretation, EPA in the preamble to the rule

resolved any ambiguity in this regard by establishing that, in the

context of the exemption, ‘‘use” of benzene means a single counting

of benzene. See Cert. Pet. at 3; App. 42a.

4 To maintain their financial viability, benzene-recycling processes

must remain efficient, t.e., they have to minimize their leakage of

benzene. Thus, before EPA developed its own program in the 1984

4

These authoritative statements by the Administrator—

presented in the final rule—should have been binding upon

EPA and should have led to a quick disposition of this

case in favor of HCC. After all, that is what EPA had

said the rule was.

Yet, EPA has—in six years of litigation—been able to

slip the constraints of its own published rule by piecing

together snippets of the rulemaking record to present a

story that reads well but is so out-of-kilter with what EPA

actually said at the time of NESHAP promulgation that:

* All four judges who have reviewed this case have

concluded that EPA’s “story” could not have been

gleaned by HCC from the regulatory language,

the preamble, or the rest of the record (App. 17a-

18a, 28a, 62a);

Regulators from EPA’s own staff and from Vir-

ginia and Texas failed to comprehend what EPA

now says its rule means (App. 54a-57a); and

It conflicts with the unrebutted expert testimony

about the plain meaning of the technical terms

that underlie the rule.

EPA has glossed over all these inconsistencies by claim-

ing that its current interpretation is consistent with the

NESHAP, Celriver had in place a benzene leak detection and repair

program. As a result of that program, Celriver’s annual consump-

tion of benzene was far less than the 1,000 megagram exemption

cut-off (see 4th Cir. J.A. at 296). Indeed, it was significantly less

than the 325 megagrams consumed by the preamble-discussed phar-

maceutical facility. (App. 113a.)

5 See Cert. Pet. at 15 n.13. For example, although EPA now

claims that the exemption was based upon a plant’s design produc-

tion capacity (Opp’n at 3), that concept—like nameplate capacity—

is a single count concept. (App. 185a.) “Indeed, none of the capac-

ity data studied by EPA [during the rulemaking] involved quan-

tities inflated by some form of multiple counting of internal recycle.

This is despite the fact that virtually all producers and most

benzene-using facilities, by their very nature, have internal recycle.”

(App. 185a-186a.)

5

alleged “purpose” of the rule. (Opp’n at 9 n.5.) And

the Fourth Circuit deferred to EPA’s interpretation be-

cause that interpretation “harmonizes with the purpose of

[the Clean Air Act].” (App. 8a.)

It is irrelevant to the proper disposition of the instant

case, though, that regulation of the Celriver Plant can be

“harmonized with the purposes” of the Clean Air Act.

That means only that EPA could have promulgated an

exemption to the benzene NESHAP that is based on mul-

tiple counting. Because that is not what EPA said it was

doing—in either its regulatory language or the accompany-

ing preamble—that is not a permissible way to interpret

the exemption now before the Court.®

The Court should grant certiorari in this case to make

clear to the federal courts that there are real limits to

deference and that this Court did not in 1945—nor does

it today—intend for deference to mean that federal agen-

cies can engage in the kind of “revisionist rulemaking”

evident in this case.

UNLESS LIMITS ARE PLACED ON THE APPLICATION

OF SEMINOLE ROCK’S DEFERENCE STANDARD,

SEMINOLE ROCK SHOULD BE OVERTURNED, AND

THIS IS THE VEHICLE FOR DOING SO.

EPA argues in its Opposition that overturning Seminole

Rock is essentially unthinkable because that decision has

been in place since 1945 and its progeny has built up over

the years. HCC disagrees because, in HCC’s view, the

longer a faulty legal concept is allowed to stand, the more

compelling is the reason to swat it down. As members of

this Court have observed, “[w]isdom too often never

6 Nor is it appropriate for EPA to try to distance itself from the

Administrator’s explanation of the exemption at the time of pro-

mulgation by claiming that explanation was a “mistake” or “acci-

dent.” See 4th Cir. J.A. at 65-66, 72-73. If it was a mistake, EPA

should have used notice-and-comment rulemaking procedures to

correct its mistake, as required by the Administrative Procedure

Act and Clean Air Act. See Cert. Pet. at 5.

6

comes, and so one ought not to reject it merely because

it comes late.” See, e.g., Spencer v. Kemna, USS.

, 118 S.Ct. 978, 990 (1998) (Ginsburg, J., con-

curring), quoting Henslee v. Union Planters Nat. Bank

& Trust Co., 335 U.S. 595, 600 (1949) (Frankfurter, J.,

dissenting).

EPA contends that HCC has not given a good reason for

overturning Seminole Rock and its progeny. But HCC

argued in its Petition (Cert. Pet. at 19-24) and repeats

here that EPA is being allowed to usurp the judicial func-

tion, i.e., violate separation of powers. HCC is not the

first or only one to see the harm that Seminole Rock has

led to and to call for a new look by this Court at that

decision. In his article, Constitutional Structure and Judi-

cial Deference to Agency Interpretations of Agency Rules,

96 Colum. L. Rev. 612 (1996), Professor John F. Man-

ning discusses the need for this Court to revisit Seminole

Rock. He argues that Seminole Rock and its progeny,

“contradict[] a major premise of our constitutional scheme

and of contemporary separation of powers case law—that

a fusion of lawmaking and law-exposition is especially

dangerous to our liberties.” /d. at 617 (footnote omitted).

Also, despite the commonly perceived close association

between deference to agency interpretations of their own

regulations under Seminole Rock and the deference courts

give to agency interpretations of statutes they are charged

with implementing under Chevron U.S.A. v. Natitral Re-

sources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), the logic

of Chevron runs contrary to the notion that an agency,

having adopted a rule whose meaning is unclear, should

be deemed as also having the authority to state virtually

conclusively what that meaning is through a_ post-

promulgation interpretation. For whereas “Chevron re-

tains one independent interpretive check on lawmaking by

Congress, Seminole Rock leaves in place no independent

interpretive check on lawmaking by an administrative

agency.” Manning at 639 (emphasis in original).

EPA is similarly wrong in claiming that to depart from

Seminole Rock would “encourage litigation and prolong

5

uncertainty concerning the meaning of regulations.” (Opp’n

at 11.) The instant case concerns a regulatory provision

first promulgated 14 years ago. It is hard to imagine that

departing from Seminole Rock could “prolong uncertainty”

over the “meaning of regulations” any longer than is now

the case.

Nor is there any merit to EPA’s contention that to

depart from Seminole Rock would “encourage litigation.”

HCC submits that getting rid of the Seminole Rock line

of cases could well serve to curb litigation: once agencies

know that the federal courts will no longer give “knee-

jerk” deference to agency interpretations of their rules,

those agencies would try harder to promulgate clearer,

more readily understandable rules. And that would lead

to less litigation.

EPA MISSES THE POINT OF HCC’S ARGUMENT THAT

ONCE A COMPANY GETS GOOD NOTICE, IT IS EN-

TITLED TO A REASONABLE TIME IN WHICH TO

COMPLY.

The Fourth Circuit ruled in HCC’s favor with respect to

“fair notice,” agreeing that HCC’s Celriver Plant did not.

at the outset, receive the notice of the meaning of the rule

that the Constitution calls for. Rather, said the Fourth

Circuit, Celriver did not receive notice of the meaning of

the rule until five years later, in the summer of 1989.7

HCC submits that once the Fourth Circuit concluded

that fair notice came late in the day, it should have fash-

7 Despite the government’s claims to the contrary (Opp’n at

11-12), HCC has never conceded that it had violated the benzene

NESHAP, although the company had substantially met (and, in

some instances, exceeded) the terms of NESHAP by September

1991. Moreover, for the reasons explained by both Judge Anderson

(App. 69a) and Judge Niemeyer (App. 33a), nothing that HCC

received from EPA Region 4 in or after the summer of 1989 con-

stituted “actual notice” that multiple counting was the Agency’s

authoritative interpretation since it conflicted with the preamble

and, even after the summer of 1989, EPA representatives continued

to espouse differing interpretations of the exemption.

8

ioned a remedy that would have put HCC in at least no

worse a position than HCC would have been in had HCC

received good notice from the start. But the Fourth Cir-

cuit did just the opposite. Its remedy with respect to “fair

notice”—saying that HCC would be liable for violating

EPA’s rule if it did not meet the numerous terms of that

rule within just 90 days—puts HCC in a much worse

position than it would have been in had it gotten proper

notice at the outset.

Contrary to what EPA says, HCC’s position is not that

it “was entitled to a waiver of the [NESHAP] require-

ments for two years after receiving EPA’s letters in the

summer of 1989.” (Opp’n at 12.) Rather, HCC contends

that, under basic principles of due process, a regulated

party—upon being given actual notice of an agency’s

regulatory interpretation—is entitled to a reasonable pe-

riod of time in which to conform to that interpretation.

Absent that, the “fair notice” concept, as most recently

expressed in such cases as General Elec. Co. v. EPA, 53

F 3d 1324, 1328-31 (D.C. Cir. 1995), is shorn of most,

if not all, of its meaning and effect.

Thus, rather than contending it had a “right” to a

waiver, HCC asserts that in deciding whether HCC had

met the terms of the NESHAP “within a reasonable time”

following receipt of actual notice, it was fitting and proper

for the district court to take into account the compliance

time-frame set out by $112 of the Clean Air Act and

EPA’s own rules. Those provisions gave regulated enti-

ties at least 90 days in which to comply and the opportu-

nity to obtain a waiver for up to two years in which to

achieve compliance. See 4th Cir. J.A. at 78a-79a, 156a.

Those two provisions establish that a two-year compliance

period is reasonable for someone who got good notice at

the start of the process.* Because it is undisputed that

8 Had HCC received notice that it was subject to the NESHAP

at the time the rule was promulgated, it would have been prepared

to move promptly to apply for the waiver that was then available.

9

HCC met virtually all the terms of the benzene NESHAP

at its Celriver Plant within the two-year time frame that

both Congress and EPA have defined to be reasonable,

HCC should not be subject to liability within that two-year

period. If it is subject to liability starting 90 days from

receipt of good notice, HCC is in a much worse position

than it would have been in with good notice from the

Start.

The district court understood and agreed with this rea-

soning. Indeed, the court found that HCC “acted respon-

sibly to meet—and far exceed—the terms of the NESHAP

in advance of EPA-accepted deadlines” and thus that a

finding of liability for its compliance within that stipulated

time frame would be inconsistent with “fundamental con-

siderations of fairness.” (App. 69a-70a. )

The Fourth Circuit’s majority holding to the contrary—

a holding that HCC was “necessarily” required to have

been in compliance in no more than 90 days—is unjust.

It penalizes HCC for EPA’s failure to have provided fair

notice of its multiple counting interpretation in 1984,

when there were procedures in place which would have

allowed HCC to seek additional time to comply.

It is important that the Court take this case and reverse

the Fourth Circuit, not only to correct an injustice but to

clarify how the concept of “actual notice” is to work in

relation to the “fair notice” principle. As best HCC can

determine, there are no other decisions in which a court

has grappled with the issue of how much time should be

considered reasonable for a regulated entity to come into

compliance with a regulation after an agency has sup-

Five years later, that waiver was no longer available—the chance

to seek it expired in September 1984 (see App. 156a)—and it was

unclear what procedures HCC was supposed to follow in order to

secure a reasonable time in which to meet the standards. So HCC

did the best it could: it met with EPA representatives and followed

a compliance course consistent with the one it set out for EPA and

to which EPA never objected. See App. 69a-71la.

10

posedly provided that entity with “actual notice” of a

regulatory interpretation.

It is inevitable, though, that the federal courts will face

more regulatory enforcement cases construing General

Electric’s “fair notice” principles. Indeed, this would ap-

pear all the more certain if the Court declines to revisit

Seminole Rock or otherwise fails to impose some meaning-

ful restrictions on courts that would otherwise give defer-

ence to any not “nonsensical” agency interpretation,

thereby elevating the importance of “fair notice” as the

last line of defense for the regulated community. At a

minimum, therefore, this case provides the Court with the

opportunity not only to correct the Fourth Circuit's error,

but also to resolve and clarify other important fair notice-

related issues that lower courts will be facing in the future.

CONCLUSION

The Petition for a Writ of Certiorari should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

ANDREA BEAR FIELD

Counsel of Record

MAIDA 0. LERNER

DAVID S. HARLOW

LEE A. CASEY

HUNTON & WILLIAMS

1900 K Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20006

(202) 955-1500

DOUGLAS W. DAVIS

JOHN CHARLES THOMAS

CYNTHIA S. CECIL

HUNTON & WILLIAMS

Riverfront Plaza, East Tower

951 East Byrd Street

Richmond, Virginia 23219

June 5, 1998 (804) 788-8200

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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