Appendices — Hoechst Celanese Corp. v. United States

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APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-2003

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Plaintiff-A ppellant,

HOECHST CELANESE CORPORATION,

Defendant-A ppellee.

CHEMICAL MANUFACTURER'S ASSOCIATION; CORPORATE

ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT COUNCIL: NATIONAL

ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS: PHARMACEUTICAL

RESEARCH AND MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA: Com-

MONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA; VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY; SCIENCE & ENVIRONMEN-

TAL PoLicy PRoJECT; TEXAS INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCE-

MENT OF CHEMICAL TECHNOLOGY INCORPORATED:

NATIONAL SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS;

TEXAS NATURAL RESOURCE CONSERVATION CoMMIS-

SION (TNRCC),

Amici Curiae.

No. 96-2051

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

Plaintiff-A ppellee,

V.

HOECHST CELANESE CORPORATION,

Defendant-A ppellant.

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CHEMICAL MANUFACTURER'S ASSOCIATION; CORPORATE

ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT COUNCIL; NATIONAL

ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS; PHARMACEUTICAL

RESEARCH AND MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA; COM-

MONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA; VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY; SCIENCE & ENVIRONMEN-

TAL PoLicy PROJECT; TEXAS INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCE-

MENT OF CHEMICAL TECHNOLOGY INCORPORATED;

NaTIONAL SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS;

TEXAS NATURAL RESOURCE CONSERVATION COMMIS-

SION (TNRCC),

Amici Curiae.

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the District of South Carolina, at Rock Hill.

Joseph F. Anderson, Jr., District Judge.

(CA-92-1879-0-17)

Argued: May 5, 1997

Decided: October 27, 1997

Before NIEMEYER and MOTZ, Circuit Judges, and

STAMP, Chief United States District Judge for the

Northern District of West Virginia, sitting by designation.

OPINION

DIANA GRIBBON MOTZ, Circuit Judge:

In 1984, pursuant to its authority under the Clean Air

Act, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) pro-

mulgated regulations governing fugitive emissions of ben-

zene, a carcinogenic pollutant posing significant risk to

human health. This case involves the proper interpreta-

tion of those regulations, which impose numerous preven-

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tative and reporting requirements on industrial plants

emitting benzene, but exempt plants designed to use less

than 1,000 megagrams of benzene a year from these re-

quirements. The issue here is whether a plant owned by

Hoechst Celanese Corporation (HCC) is exempted from

the requirements of the regulations. If not, that plant

(one of the largest sources of fugitive benzene emissions

in the United States from 1987 through 1993) indisput-

ably violated the regulations in numerous respects.

The district court sustained EPA’s interpretation of its

own regulations, an interpretation that did not exempt the

HCC plant. United States v. Hoechst Celanese Corp..,

964 F. Supp. 967, 971-76 (D.S.C. 1996). Nevertheless.

because the court concluded that the EPA did not pro-

vide HCC with “fair notice” of EPA’s interpretation, the

court declined to find HCC liable for any regulatory viola-

tions. Id. at 979-986. Both EPA and HCC appeal. In

most respects, we affirm tlhe judgment of the district court.

That court correctly concluded that EPA’s interpretation

of its own regulations is entitled to deference. The district

court also correctly held that EPA did not initially afford

HCC fair notice of that interpretation and so the company

cannot be held liable for violations of the regulations dur-

ing the period (1984 to 1989) when it lacked fair notice.

However, the court erred in concluding that HCC could

rely on a fair notice defense for violations that occurred

after 1989—-when EPA provided the company with ac-

tual notice of EPA’s interpretation of the regulations.

Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the district court

in this single respect and remand the case for further pro-

ceedings consistent with this opinion.

I.

The United States, on behalf of EPA, initiated this ac-

tion against HCC for alleged violations of. the National

Emission Standard for Equipment Leaks ( Fugitive Emis-

sion Sources) of Benzene (“/ESHAP or regulations), 40

C.F.R. pt. 61, subpts. A, J, and V (1996), at HCC’s

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Celriver plant in Rock Hill, South Carolina. The

NESHAP provides controls on the amount of benzene

that can be emitted into the atmosphere. EPA propounded

these controls because it concluded that they could sub-

stantially “reduce the estimated annual incidence of leuke-

mia” for persons living within 20 kilometers of plants

with equipment that leaked benzene—roughly twenty to

thirty million people. NESHAP preamble, 49 Fed. Reg.

23, 498, 23,501 (1984). Specifically, the NESHAP re-

quires industrial plants that are designed to produce, use,

or otherwise have in service benzene to monitor equip-

ment regularly for leaks, repair leaks promptly, and install

equipment that prevents, captures, or destroys benzene

emissions. The regulations include reporting and record-

keeping requirements and provide that violations are to be

punished by civil penalties.

The regulations. however, exempt “[a]ny equipment in

benzene service that is located at a plant site designed to

produce or use less than 1,000 megagrams of benzene per

year.” 40 C.F.R. §61.110(c)(2) (1996) (emphasis

added).' The exemption reflects EPA’s conclusion that

the benefit achieved by regulating small volume users of

benzene does not justify the cost involved. See NESHAP

preamble, 49 Fed. Reg. at 23,510. The question that

divides the parties is what does “use” mean in the ex-

emption.

The EPA defines “use” broadly to mean utilization,

employment, or putting in place; this definition includes

but is not limited to “consumption” of benzene, i.e., the

overall amount needed to keep processes operational. The

Celriver plant was designed to utilize benzene as a

“quench” to cool hot ketene gases and as a “reflux agent”

to help separate water and other compounds from acetic

anhydride and acetic acid; after each of these uses the

benzene was cooled, purified, and then recirculated as a

“quench” or “reflux agent.” Under EPA’s definition of

1 One megagram is equivalent to approximately 2,200 pounds.

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“

use,” counting each time benzene circulated through

pipes and valves capable of leaking, the Celriver plant

was designed to “use” more than a million megagrams of

benzene a year, and was not exempt from the NESHAP.

Indeed, the Celriver plant not only “used” vast amounts

of benzene, it also leaked substantial amounts of the car-

cinogen: as the district court noted, “the Celriver plant

ranked in the top 5% of all plants reporting benzene fugi-

tive emissions in every year between 1987 and 1993.”

Hoechst Celanese, 964 F. Supp. at 974.

Nevertheless, HCC claims the Celriver plant was ex-

empt from the NESHAP. The company asserts that “use”

in the exemption has only a single narrow meaning—

“consumption.” Since the Celriver plant continually re-

cycled benzene, the total quantity it “used,” under the

company’s theory, never exceeded 1,000 megagrams a

year and thus the plant qualified for the exemption under

40 C.F.R. § 61.110(c)(2). The company concluded that

the exemption was self-executing and for this reason HCC

neither filed reports for the Celriver plant nor complied

with any of the monitoring or other requirements of the

regulations.

Because HCC never applied for an exemption for the

Celriver plant or filed any reports as to its benzene usage,

EPA did not become aware of the possibility of sub-

stantial benzene emissions at the Celriver plant until

1989. At that time, EPA’s Region 4 office, which exer-

cised enforcement authority over plants located in South

Carolina, expressly notified the company in writing that

if “benzene is recycled or reused in any process . . . the

total cumulative flow through the process rather than net

benzene consumption or usage” is to be counted as “use”

of benzene for purposes of the regulations. After further

communications between the parties, EPA determined that

the Celriver plant had violated the NESHAP and so ini-

tiated this action.

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EPA alleged that HCC, at its Celriver plant, violated

NESHAP leak detection and repair requirements as well

as requirements related to the installation of control de-

vices, reporting, and recordkeeping. EPA asserted the

Celriver plant did not qualify for the exemption and, even

if it did, HCC could not claim this protection because it

never applied to EPA for the exemption. In response,

HCC argued that EPA’s interpretation of the exemption

was erroneous and merited no deference. Alternatively,

HCC contended that if EPA’s interpretation were ac-

cepted, HCC should not be held responsible for any viola-

tions of the regulations because it lacked fair notice of

that interpretation. On cross-motions for summary judg-

ment, the district court sustained EPA’s interpretation of

the regulations, but concluded that HCC lacked fair

notice of this interpretation both before and after EPA’s

direct contacts with HCC in 1989. The court therefore

refused to find HCC liable for any violations of the regu-

lations.

II.

The Clean Air Act unquestionably provides EPA with

broad powers to promulgate regulations necessary to iden-

tify and control hazardous air pollutants. See 42 U.S.C.A.

§§ 7401-7671q (West 1995 & Supp. 1997). HCC makes

no claim that the benzene regulations in any way violate

or are contrary to EPA’s statutory authority. Cf. Chevron,

U.S.A., Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (rejecting

appellant’s contentions that agency’s interpretation con-

flicts with language and legislative history of statute).

Nor does the company assert that either the Clean Air

Act or the NESHAP contravenes any constitutional provi-

sion. Finally, HCC does not contend that EPA’s proce-

dures in promulgating the regulations were flawed. Thus,

the initial question before us is simply whether EPA’s

interpretation of its own authorized, and properly promul-

gated, regulations should be accorded deference.

The Superme Court has continually reaffirmed that an

agency’s interpretation of its own regulations is entitled

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to substantial deference. See, e.g., Thomas Jefferson Univ.

v. Shalala, 512 U.S. 504, 512 (1994) (“We must give

substantial deference to an agency’s interpretation of its

own regulations.” ); Stinson v. United States, 508 U.S. 36,

45 (1993) (“[PJrovided an agency’s interpretation of its

own regulations does not violate the Constitution or a

federal statute, it must be given controlling weight unless

it is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regula-

tion.”). When an agency applies its “regulation to com-

plex or changing circumstances,” the Court has explained,

this “calls upon the agency’s unique expertise and policy-

making prerogatives” and courts must “presume that the

power authoritatively to interpret its own regulations is

a component of the agency’s delegated lawmaking

powers.” Martin v. OSHRC, 499 U.S. 144, 151 (1991).

At least implicitly, HCC acknowledges that generally

EPA’s interpretation of property promulgated, statutorily

authorized, regulations is entitled to deference. HCC con-

tends, however, that “[t]his is not a deference case.” Brief

of Appellee at 22. The company asserts that the plain

language of the NESHAP does not permit EPA’s inter-

pretation. It further argues that EPA’s interpretation

merits no deference because the agency assertedly did not

espouse its present interpretation when it originally pro-

mulgated the regulations, but only “created” that inter-

pretation “during this litigation.”

A.

In resolving this question, we begin with the plain lan-

guage of the regulations. The NESHAP itself does not

indicate any intent to limit the meaning of the term “use”

to consumption. Indeed, EPA’s decision to give “use”

a more expansive treatment than that advocated by HCC

is consistent with the ordinary meaning of “use.” See

Black’s Law Dictionary 1541 (6th ed. 1990) (defining

“use” to include “to make use of, to employ” as well as

“to put into action or service, to utilize”).

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Nor is the agency’s broad interpretation nonsensical.

After all, recycled benzene is just as likely to create a

health threat as new benzene; each time benzene passes

through a valve or pipe, it can potentially leak. Regula-

tions designed to reduce the risk posed by this carcinogen

should logically treat new and recycled benzene alike.

Thus, EPA’s interpretation of its own regulatory exemp-

tion harmonizes with the purpose of the authorizing stat-

ute, the Clean Air Act: “to protect and enhance the

quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to promote the

public health and welfare and the productive capacity of

its population.” 42 U.S.C.A. § 7401(b)(1) (West

1995). Congress mandated that EPA set emission stand-

ards that promote the public health and welfare with “the

maximum degree in reduction in emissions of the hazard-

ous air pollutants” subject to the Act, including cancer-

causing benzene. 42 U.S.C.A. §7412(d)(2) (West

1995). A broad reading of “use” certainly best achieves

this goal.

Moreover, EPA’s interpretation of its exemption ac-

cords with the purpose of the exemption itself. As the

preamble to the regulations notes, the exemption was

designed as a “small plant exemption” intended to exclude

“most research facilities, pilot plants, and intermittent

users of benzene.” 49 Fed. Reg. at 23,510. EPA drafted

the exemption in response to comments that the proposed

NESHAP (which contained no exemption) was not cost

effective for small plants, explaining:

EPA believes it is reasonable to exempt plants from

the standard when the cost of the standard is unrea-

sonably high in comparison to the achieved emission

reductions. Therefore, EPA decided to determine a

cutofi for exempting these plants based on a cost and |

emission reduction analysis.

Office of Air Quality, EPA, Pub. No. 450/3-80-032b,

Benzene Fugitive Emissions - Background Information for

Promulgated Standards 2-104 (1982) (BID). F

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The agency recognized that industrial plants with the

fewest pieces of equipment, and so the fewest sources of

leaks, were probably the least likely to emit emissions.

But it determined that it could not define the exemption

in terms of number of pieces of equiqment or sources of

leaks because such an approach “could not be applied

readily to small or intermittent users of benzene” whose

“facilities often require frequent repiping.” BID at 2-104.

Instead, EPA conducted studies and found that when the

design production of a plant was about 1,000 megagrams

per year, the plant contained 87 pieces of equipment and

would be expected to emit only about 6 megagrams of

benzene per year, applying the proposed regulations to

such plants would only result in a reduction of 4 mega-

grams of benzene emissions per year. EPA concluded that

the cost of imposing the regulatory requirements to such

small plants was “unreasonably high in comparison to the

achieved emission reductions” and so those plants could

Properly be exempted from the regulatory requirement.

Id. (emphasis added) 2

Accordingly, in formulating the exemption, EPA used

the 1,000 Mg cut off rate as a proxy to exempt plants

that had so few sources of leaks that they would be ex-

pected to emit only 6 megagrams of fugitive benzene per

year. The Celriver plant most decidedly does not fall

within that category. Rather. it had thousands of sources

of benzene leaks (nearly 17,000 as of November 1990)

and was one of the largest sources of benzene emissions

in the nation during the period at issue in this suit, with

annual emissions reaching 226 megagrams (nearly

500,000 pounds). Thus, HCC’s Celriver plant was not

* HCC asserts that this regulatory history only demonstrates that

the purpose of the exemption “was to exempt facilities from imple-

menting the standards of the benzene NESHAP where the eoet

would be unreasonably high.” Brief of Appellee at 26 (emphasis

added). That argument, of course, overlooks the remainder of the

language from the administrative record, which is quoted and em-

phasized above.

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the kind of plant that EPA envisioned in creating the

exemption.

In sum, EPA’s interpretation accords with the plain

language of the NESHAP, as well as the purposes of the

Clean Air Act and of the exemption itself.

B.

Nevertheless, HCC asserts that EPA's interpretation

merits no deference because it was one “created” after

the fact for this litigation. HCC principally relies on

isolated language in the preamble, BID, and EPA cor-

respondence.* This scattered language hardly compels the

company’s interpretation of the regulations.

For example, in the preamble, EPA does occasionally

employ the term “consume” in lieu of “use” in a discus-

sion of the operations of pharmaceutical companies. See

NESHAP preamble, 49 Fed. Reg. at 23,510. However,

as the district court explained, this scarcely proves that

3 HCC erroneously asserts that “there are over 100 places in the

rulemaking record where EPA uses the terms ‘use’ and ‘consume’

interchangeably.” Brief of Appellee at 8. In fact, there are only a

few occasions in the rulemaking record in which EPA employs

“consume” in lieu of “use” and, as explained in text above, those

instances are ambiguous. The additional references on which HCC

relies are not contained in the rulemaking record at all. See 42

U.S.C.A. § 7607 (d)(7) (A) (West 1995) (defining rulemaking

“record” for purposes of judicial review) ; 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412(e) (4)

(West 1995) (applying § 7607 standards to emissions standards).

Rather, they appear in correspondence with various EPA regional

offices or state environmental agencies after the NESHAP was

promulgated. Many of the references in this correspondence were

authored by plant owners and operators, not EPA or other environ-

mental agencies; furthermore, the agencies’ use of “consume” in

lieu of “use” even in the post-promulgation correspondence is sub-

ject to differing interpretations. See infra n.6.

HCC also refers to its interpretation of use as a “single counting”

approach and denominates EPA’s interpretation as a “multiple

counting” approach. Although the district court adopted this nomen-

clature, it does not appear anywhere in the NESHAP or in the rule-

making record. Accordingly, we do not employ it here.

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EPA limited the meaning of “use” in the regulations to

“consume”,

These passages from the [administrative] record . . .

do not lead inevitably to the conclusion that EPA

intended the word “use” in the exemption to mean

only “consume”.

Hoechst Celanese, 964 F. Supp. at 976. (emphasis

added). Clearly, one type of “use” is “consumption;” EPA

does not claim to the contrary. The agency simply as-

serts that “use” also includes utilization or employment.

Although the preamble contains evidence that “use” in-

cludes “consumption,” it in no way requires the conclu-

sion that “use” is limited to “consumption.”

Similarly, EPA describes the exemption in the rule-

making record as establishing a cut off for “a plant design

usage or throughput rate of benzene equal to or less than

1,000 Mg/yr per plant” and explains that “throughput” is

“determined by a mass balance during the design stages of

Process operation, accumulating all benzene processed in

1 year.” BID at 2-105. HCC asserts that “throughput” in

this context can only refer to a “plant’s overall net produc-

tion or consumption . . . not recirculation rates.” But

again, the district court recognized that “ ‘throughput’ and

‘consumption’ are not synonymous... . ‘throughput can

describe, for example, the flow of benzene through equip-

ment like the quench chamber and main still”—just as

EPA asserts.

Finally, numerous EPA letters issued in the summer

and fall of 1984, shortly after the initial promulgation of

the NESHAP in June 1984, severely undermine HCC’s

entire post-hoc argument.* For example, on August 20,

* Recognizing the impact of these EPA documents, HCC urges

(somewhat inconsistently with its claim that EPA’s interpretation

is an after-the-fact creation for litigation) that these documents

demonstrate EPA’s attempt immediately after promulgation of the

NESHAP to narrow the exemption by broadening the meaning of

“use.” Brief of Appellee at 15. To prevail on this argument, HCC

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1984, EPA answered an inquiry from a Texaco plant

manager stating that “use” was to be determined by “the

overall quantity of benzene used in equipment,” not “con-

sumption.” On October 5, 1984, EPA told an applicant

seeking an exemption, “the 1000 megagrams per year cut

off limit is applicable to total processing rates rather than

net consumption (usage) or net production, of all affected

equipment at an entire plant site.” (emphasis in original).

That same month. EPA informed another exemption ap-

plicant that the “1,000 megagrams per year cut off limit

is applicable to total processing rates, rather than net con-

sumption (usage) or net production.” A few days later,

EPA wrote still another applicant that the “1,000 mega-

gram per year cut off limit is applicable to total processing

rates of all affected equipment at an entire plant site.”

(emphasis in original). The next month, EPA informed

its regional offices that “We have determined the cut-off is

based on the throughput or processing rate, rather than

consumption.” There are a number of other contempo-

raneous letters from EPA to the same effect. In view of

this evidence, it is simply impossible to conclude, as HCC

argues, that EPA formulated its broad interpretation of

the exemption as a strategy for litigation initiated in 1992,

eight years after the regulation was originally promul-

gated.

For all of these reasons, we agree with the district court

that EPA’s interpretation of its own regulations deserves

deference.*

would have to have demonstrated that “use” in the NESHAP neces-

sarily meant only “consume.” As noted above, the district court

concluded and we agree that this conclusion is unwarranted.

5In reaching this conclusion, we give no weight to the 1995

affidavit of a former EPA employee, Robert Ajax, which was pre-

pared and submitted on HCC’s behalf for this litigation. Like

similar affidavits from individual legislators, it is entitled to no

weight as to the meaning of legislation enacted, or in this case a

regulation promulgated, eleven years earlier. See Consumer Prods.

Safety Comm’n v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 118 n.13

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Il.

The more difficult question is whether, and if so when,

HCC was afforded fair notice of the EPA’s interpretation.

Due process requires that a party must receive fair

notice before being deprived of property. Mullane v.

Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314

(1950). Moreover, it is well established in criminal law

that no punishment can be imposed without notice. See,

e.g., United States v. National Dairy Prods. Corp., 372

U.S. 29, 32-33 (1963); United States v. Bennett, 984

F.2d 597, 605 (4th Cir. 1993). Although the Supreme

Court has not directly addressed the question, we have

concluded that because civil penalties are “quasi-criminal”

in nature, parties subject to such administrative sanctions

are entitled to similar “clear notice.” See First American

Bank v. Dole, 763 F.2d 644, 651 n.6 (4th Cir. 1985).

A “regulation[ ] which allow[s] monetary penalties against

those who violate [it], . . . must ove... fair warning of

the conduct it prohibits or requires, and it must provide

a reasonably clear standard of culpability to circumscribe

the discretion of the enforcing authority and its agents.”

Id. (quoting Diamond Roofing Co. v. OSHRC, 528 F.2d

645, 649 (Sth Cir. 1976) (citation omitted ) ).

To determine if a party has received fair notice, we

must examine the relevant facts of each case. See Bennett,

984 F.2d at 605. In this case, that requires separate

examination of two time frames: (1) the period from

1984 (when the exemption was Originally promulgated )

to 1989 (when EPA became aware of the operations of

the Celriver plant and directly contacted HCC); and (2)

the period after the 1989 contacts between EPA and HCC

until 1992, when HCC finally complied with the regula-

tion). We address each period in turn.

(1980) (“Such history does not bear strong indicia of reliability .. .

because as time passes memories fade and a person’s perception of

his earlier intention may change.”).

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A.

In support of its claim that HCC had fair notice of

EPA’s broad interpretation of the regulations from the

time they were originally promulgated in 1984, EPA of-

fers two interrelated arguments.

1.

First, the agency asserts that the plain language of the

NESHAP and the rulemaking record should have put

HCC on notice that the Celriver plant did not qualify for

an exemption. For example, EPA contends that HCC

should have known that its Celriver plant with nearly

17,000 pieces of equipment and substantial benzene emis-

sions could not possibly be exempt. In support of this

argument, EPA points out that “use” is a broad term,

and that what is at issue here is an exemption and exemp-

tions are to be narrowly construed. See, e.g., Duquesne

Light Co. v. EPA, 698 F.2d 456 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (nar-

rowly construing a Clean Air Act exemption). EPA also

notes that-the rulemaking record indicates that this was

intended to be a “small plant” exemption designed to

accommodate companies with limited use and emissions

of benzene. See NESHAP preamble, 49 Fed. Reg. at

23,510. EPA maintains that if HCC had any doubt on

the matter because of EPA’s reference to “consume” in

lieu of “use” in some portions of the rulemaking record, it

had an obligation to contact the agency for clarification.

See, e.g., Texas E. Prods. Pipeline Co. v. OSHRC, 827

F.2d 46, 50 (7th Cir. 1987) (finding fault with com-

pany’s failure to make any inquiry of the administrative

agency responsible for the regulations at issue).

EPA’s argument is not without force and in another

case might well carry the day. Generally, “ignorance of

the law or a mistake of the law is no defense,” Cheek v.

United States, 498 U.S. 192, 199 (1991), and a claim

of lack of notice “may be overcome in any specific case

where reasonable persons would know that their conduct

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is at risk.” Maynard v. Cartwright, 486 U.S. 356, 361

(1988). However, as EPA recognizes, “it is crucial to

examine the particular situation of the defendant, and

whether it lacked reasonable notice.” Brief of Appellant

at 29 (emphasis in original). Examination of the partic-

ular facts of this convinces us that, prior to 1989, HCC

did not have fair notice of the EPA’s broad interpretation

of the term “use.”

Although as noted above, nothing in the NESHAP it-

self or the rulemaking record forecloses EPA’s interpreta-

tion of the exemption, at the same time nothing mandates

it. Indeed, some of the language in the preamble (e.g.,

EPA's references to “consume” in lieu of “use”) supports

HCC’s narrower interpretation. Moreover, as the district

court noted, just because the Celriver plant was not a

small plant with few emissions, it was not necessarily put

on notice that it was subject to the regulations, given that

even under EPA’s interpretation of “use,” some plants

with many pieces of equipment and significant emissions

theoretically could be exempt. Thus, we cannot hold that

the regulations, their preamble, or purpose clearly put

HCC on notice that the Celriver plant did not qualify for

an exemption.°®

We need not determine if, as EPA maintains, the

NESHAP and rulemaking record at least provided HCC

with “reason to know that its exemption claim rested on

®* HCC also contends, and the district court held, that EPA re-

gional offices assertedly interpreted the exemption inconsistently

and that this provides additional support for the company’s claim

that EPA failed to provide it fair notice. See Hoechst Celanese,

964 F. Supp. at 981. Some of the EPA documents on which HCC

relies can be read, as the company asserts, as providing conflicting

interpretations of “use.” Most, however, can at least as easily be

read as consistently requiring EPA’s broad interpretation whenever

that question was raised and/or relevant. But given our conclusion

that EPA failed to provide fair notice to HCC from 1984 to 1989,

we need not reach the question of whether these documents con-

stitute a proper additional basis for a grant of summary judgment

on that question.

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16a

extremely shaky grounds” and so triggered an obligation

to ask for clarification of the meaning of “use.” Brief of

Appellant at 31. If HCC did have such an obligation, it

fulfilled it by communicating with the Texas Air Control

Board (TACB), the state agency that EPA had em-

powered to implement and enforce the NESHAP in Texas.

The undisputed facts are as follows: in August 1984 (a

few months after promulgation of the NESHAP), HCC

sought information from the TACB as to whether an

HCC plant located in Bishop, Texas, which also recycled

benzene, was exempt under 40 C.F.R. § 61.110(c)(2).

The TACB referred HCC to an August 1984 letter that

EPA’s Region 6. office sent to a Texaco facility in Texas

that used recycled benzene. This letter stated that “use

is not meant to imply consumption, but rather is meant to

reflect the overall quantity of benzene used in equipment

at a facility.” This letter does seem, as EPA maintains, to

support EPA’s broad definition of “use.” Indeed, contem-

poraneous HCC internal communications indicate that

HCC itself so interpreted EPA’s response; for example.

one HCC official hand wrote on the Texaco letter “Read

it and weep” and another HCC official wrote a memo not-

ing “EPA recently advised . . . that ‘use’ of benzene in-

cludes recycle.” However, the TACB interpreted EPA

Region 6’s letter to Texaco as indicating that overall in-

ventory was the determinant factor. Thus, the TACB

concluded that the Bishop plant qualified for an exemp-

tion because it did not maintain an inventory of more than

1,000 megagrams of benzene. In December 1984, the

TACB sent a short letter to HCC informing the company

that the Bishop plant was “exempt from the requirements

of Section 61.112,” the section mandating source complli-

ance with the NESHAP. Although EPA Region 6 re-

ceived a copy of that letter, it took no action to rescind

or invalidate the exemption. HCC then concluded that

the Celriver plant, which used benzene in a manner simi-

lar to the Bishop plant, was also exempt.

SE

amma eae aa

17a

In addition to the Bishop plant, HCC operated another

plant in Pampa, Texas. That plant, like the Celriver and

Bishop plants, continually recycled benzene through a

closed loop system but because the Pampa plant “con-

sumed” more than 1,000 megagrams of benzene per year

even under HCC’s interpretation of “use,” it was not ex-

empt from the NESHAP requirements. For this reason, in

September 1984, HCC applied to the TACB for a two-

year waiver from compliance with the NESHAP for the

Pampa plant so that HCC could “reduce the quantity of

benzene consumed in the plant to less than 1,000 mega-

| grams” and thus become exempt. In April 1985, the

TACB approved the waiver request; copies of that request

| and TACB’s approval were sent to EPA Region 6, which

took no action to invalidate the waiver.

These undisputed facts demonstrate that, although HCC

made no direct inquiry as to the application of the exemp-

tion to the Celriver plant, it did not fail to make any

inquiry as to the meaning of the NESHAP. Cf. Texas

| E. Prods., 827 F.2d at 50. Rather, it asked TACB for

an exemption and wavier of the regulation for two HCC

plants located in Texas, which recycled benzene just as the

Celriver plant did. In response, TACB issued the re-

quested exemption and waiver, with copies to EPA’s

Region 6. We recognize that although Region 6 received

copies of TACB’s letters granting the exemption and

waiver to the Bishop and Pampa plants respectively, those

letters were short and may not have fully informed the

Peer) eee ae Sen a ee ee

PONE IS Vieille Fe

agency of their impact. But in addressing whether a party

has received fair notice, we look at the facts as they

3 appear to the party entitled to the notice, not to the

: agency. On the basis of the TACB’s actions and the inac-

tion of EPA Region 6, the company had reason to believe

3 that its interpretation of the exemption—equating “use”

i to “consumption”—was accurate. When these facts are

/ viewed in the context of a rulemaking record that in-

: cluded some references to “use” in lieu of “consume,” we

18a

must conclude that HCC did not receive fair notice of

EPA’s broader interpretation of the term in the 1984-89

period.

y 2

As a corollary to the above argument, EPA asserts that

the NESHAP required a plant owner to apply for an

exemption and file an initial report and that HCC’s failure

to do either prevents it from now claiming a right to the

exemption. As noted above, immediately after EPA issued

the NESHAP in 1984, numerous other plant owners in-

quired as to the meaning of “use,” applied for exemptions,

and filed initial reports. HCC, in contrast, never applied

for an exemption or filed reports.

The district court held that HCC’s contacts with TACB

constituted as “indirect[],” informal application for an

exemption for the Celriver plant. Hoechst Celanese, 964

F. Supp. at 979. We cannot agree. Whatever the author-

ity of the TACB or EPA Region 6 in Texas, they had no

authority to grant an exemption in South Carolina and no

ability to grant an exemption (by implication) to a plant

about which they knew nothing. Thus, if the NESHAP

had clearly mandated that the owner of a plant seeking

an exemption apply for the exemption, HCC’s Celriver

plant failed to meet this requirement.

Accordingly, we turn again to the relevant regulatory

language. The NESHAP provides in pertinent part:

Any equipment in benzene service that is located at

a plant site designed to produce or use less than 1,000

megagrams of benzene per year is exempt from the

requirements of § 61.112.

§ 61.110(c)(2) (emphasis added). Thus, the plain lan-

guage of the regulation suggests that the exemption is

self-executing and provides no discretion to the EPA ad-

ministrator to determine whether or not to grant an

exemption. Section 61.110(c)(1) does state that “filf

a i

IVS AOE OE EASE Eas Caren

19a

an owner or operator applies for one of the exemptions in

this paragraph,” he must maintain certain records. (em-

phasis added). But it is impossible to conclude that this

reference clearly requires a plant owner or operator to

file an application for an exemption, in view of the

absence of any explicit directive in § 61.110(c)(2), or

any instructions in any other portion of the regulations

as to how, where, when, or in what form such applications

for exemptions are to be made. We note that elsewhere in

the same regulations when EPA requires an application

for a waiver of the NESHAP’s requirements, it specifies

in detail the procedures for the application. See 40 C.F.R.

§§ 61.10(b), 61.11 (1996); see also § 61.112(c) (1996)

(setting out procedures for application for an alternative

method for attaining compliance). Thus, we do not be-

lieve the NESHAP provides fair notice that a plant owner

or operator must apply for an exemption.

Nor do we believe the regulations provide fair notice

that the owner of exempt equipment must file an initial

report. The NESHAP requires an “owner or operator of

[an] existing source” of benzene emissions to file an

initial report within 90 days of promulgation of the regu-

lations. 40 C.F.R. § 6.10(a) (1996). EPA asserts that

the exemption in § 61.110(c)(2) does not allow an

Owner or operator to avoid the initial report requirement

because that exemption only exempts “equipment,” i.e.,

“sources,” and does not eliminate reporting obligations

imposed in other portions of the NESHAP on owners and

operators of such equipment. EPA may be correct that

this is what is intended. But we cannot hold that the plain

language of § 61.10(a) provides clear notice of this

intent. As EPA concedes, the reporting requirement is

linked to the exemption provision: by requiring exempt

companies to file reports, EPA can determine continued

eligibility for that exemption. Since we have determined

that HCC lacked fair notice of the need to apply for an

exemption, we can not now hold it should have known to

20a

submit reports to monitor continued eligibility for an

exemption.

In sum, we agree with the district court that prior to

1989, HCC did not have fair notice of EPA’s interpreta-

tion of the NESHAP or of a regulatory obligation to

apply for an exemption or file reports.

B.

Finally, we must determine whether HCC continued to

lack fair notice after 1989, when EPA’s Region 4 office,

the office responsible for enforcement of the NESHAP in

South Carolina, directly informed officials at HCC’s Cel-

river, South Carolina plant of the proper interpretation of

the regulations.

l.

On June 13, 1989, EPA Region 4 wrote the HCC offi-

cial responsible for regulatory compliance at the Celriver

plant, informing him that “[i]f benzene is recycled” then

“use” for purposes of the exemption must be calculated

on the basis “of total cumulative flow through the process

rather than net benzene consumption or usage.”” The EPA

letter stated that “it appears that [HCC] may be subject”

to the NESHAP requirements and asked HCC to forward

information necessary “to determine the full extent and

duration of all benzene emissions” within thirty days.

Two weeks later, on June 26, HCC responded. Asserting

that the Celriver plant recycled benzene and so under

HCC’s definition of “use,” i.e., consumption, the plant was

exempt, the company did not forward the requested

information.

However, on July 28, 1989, senior HCC Celriver offi-

cials met to discuss the EPA’s June 13 letter. Minutes of

that July meeting indicate that by that time, HCC officials

well understood that EPA did not accept the company’s

interpretation of “use.” The minutes of the July meeting

note in pertinent part:

raat

2la

The EPA standard for fugitive benzene emissions

may be applied to Celriver. The limit of 1000 mega-

grams benzene per year (2,205,000 pounds per year)

is applied to throughput instead of consumption.

Process throughput or recycle is considerably greater

than this limit. Stringent EPA controls would thus

apply to existing process equipment. The full impli-

cation of this interpretation must be determined and

steps taken to meet compliance.

(emphasis added).

Moreover, unaware of HCC’s internal discussions of

the matter, on August 18, 1989, EPA Region 4 responded

to HCC’s June 26 letter noting that “it appears that you

are unaware of EPA’s interpretation of benzene usage as

the term is used to determine applicability.” In this letter,

EPA proceeded to explain carefully and in no uncertain

terms that benzene usage equaled “total cumulative flow

through equipment in benzene service rather than net

consumption.” The letter contained an explicit example

of how to determine usage in the exemption and asked

HCC to forward the information originally requested in

mid-June within thirty days. In September, still noting its

objection to EPA’s interpretation, HCC finally forwarded

the requested information—pursuant to EPA’s interpreta-

tion of “use,” the Celriver plant’s use of benzene exceeded

2.5 million megagrams of benzene per year. On February

20, 1990, EPA Region 4 issued HCC Celriver a notice

of violation and in April 1990, HCC submitted a plan to

redesign its Celriver plant to bring it into compliance with

the NESHAP.

In short, HCC received in June 1989 a letter from

EPA Region 4 unequivocally setting forth the agency’s

interpretation, and the record establishes that at least by

July 1989 HCC well understood EPA’s position. More-

over, in August 1989 EPA Region 4 expressly reiterated

the interpretation stated in its June letter. Further, these

1989 letters from EPA Region 4 to HCC Celriver must

ee ee

22a

be regarded as representing the agency’s authorative inter-

pretation of the benzene exemption as it affected the

Celriver plant. In its appellate brief, HCC itself concedes

as much. See Brief of Appellee at 45 n.29 (“HCC does

not dispute the fact that EPA Region IV is authorized to

communicate the agency’s interpretations of its own regu-

lations to the regulated community.” ).

ye

In spite of these uncontroverted facts, the district

court held that HCC “did not have actual notice” of

EPA’s interpretation “in the summer of 1989.” Hoechst

Celanese, 964 F. Supp. at 984. The court reasoned that

EPA Region 4’s 1989 letter to HCC were contrary to

“statements” in the rulemaking record (e.g., “consume”

in lieu of “use”) and to other letters from EPA and state

environmental agencies interpreting the NESHAP. 17d.

For this reason, the court concluded that HCC had a

“legitimate basis for believing” that the 1989 letters from

EPA Region 4—the region charged with supervision of

the Celriver plant—did not “speak[ ] for the Administra-

tor” of the EPA. /d. The district court further held that

even the notice of violation could “not be deemed as hav-

ing provided Hoechst Celanese an authoritative interpre-

tation of the benzene exemption.” /d.

With regard to the asserted conflict between EPA

Region 4’s 1989 letters to HCC Celriver and statements

in the rulemaking record, the district court’s conclusion

is at odds with its earlier holding deferring to EPA’s inter-

pretation of the NESHAP. The district court initially

held that it should and would defer to EPA’s interpreta-

tion inter alia because the rulemaking record did not

conflict with that interpretation. We believe, as explained

above, that the district court correctly analyzed this issue

at the outset of its opinion, when it concluded that

“[t]hese passages from the record . . . do not lead in-

evitably to the conclusion that EPA intended the word

‘use’ in the exemption to mean ‘consume.’” Jd. at 976.

23a

Accordingly, we necessarily must reject the argument that

Statements in Region 4’s 1989 letters to HCC conflicted

with the rulemaking record.

Nor can HCC rely on letters from EPA and state en-

vironmental agencies to other owners or operators about

other facilities that allegedly adopt an interpretation of

the exemption contrary to that which EPA directly con-

veyed to HCC Celriver in 1989. First, no communication

from EPA Region 4—the office charged with enforcement

of the NESHAP in South Carolina—conflicts with Region

4’s definitive 1989 letters to HCC Celriver.”

As to the asserted contrary interpretation of “use” by

other EPA offices or state agencies, HCC presents no

evidence that the company knew of any contrary inter-

pretations issued during or after 1989. Without contem-

poraneous knowledge of and reliance on these allegedly

inconsistent interpretations, HCC had no reason to believe

EPA Region 4 was providing it with anything other than

EPA’s definitive interpretation of the NESHAP.

Finally, the fact that previous letters from state environ-

mental agencies concerning HCC plants in Texas and

Virginia * assertedly conflict with Region 4’s 1989 letters

to HCC Celriver does not in anyway undermine the force

of the latter. Whether a state environmental agency had

previously supplied advice that may appear to conflict

with EPA Region 4’s definitive instruction to the Celriver

™Thus, HCC’s reliance on Region 4’s communications with the

Department of Energy’s Savannah River Site (SRS) is misplaced.

Based on information SRS initially supplied in 1989, the EPA

could not determine whether the not-yet-built consolidated incinera-

tion facility (CIF) would be exempt. Subsequently, in 1995, upon

learning that the CIF would recirculate benzene in amounts greater

than 1,000 mg/yr, EPA concluded the operation would be subject

to the benzene NESHAP.

* There is little evidence in the record as to the circumstances of

the Virginia exemption. However, there is no evidence that any

EPA regional office approved that exemption.

24a

plant in the summer of 1989 is immaterial. In 1989,

EPA Region 4, indisputably the office responsible for

enforcement of the NESHAP in South Carolina, provided

the HCC Celriver, South Carolina plant with unequivocal,

actual notice as to how the regulation pertained to that

plant’s operations, i.e., benzene usage applied to “total

cumulative flow through equipment in benzene service

rather than net consumption.” It is well established that

“even if the agency has not given notice in the statutorily

prescribed fashion, actual notice will render that decision

harmless.” Riverbend Farms, Inc. v. Madigan, 958 F.2d

1479, 1487 n.7 (9th Cir. 1992); Shelton v. Marsh, 902

F.2d 1201, 1206 (6th Cir. 1990) (same); New York

v. Bowen, 811 F.2d 776, 780 (2d Cir. 1987) (same);

Small Refiner Lead Phase-down Task Force v. EPA, 705

F.2d 506, 549 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (same) (dicta). See

also Maryland v. Antonelli Creditors’ Liquidating Trust,

F.3d , No. 96-1111, 1997 WL 523681 (4th

Cir. Aug. 26, 1997); Greene v. Whirlpool Corp., 708

F.2d 128, 131 (4th Cir. 1983).

It would be another matter if different officials within

EPA Region 4 had issued conflicting interpretive letters

to HCC Celriver. But that is not the case here. The HCC

Celriver plant received but one message from EPA Region

4—recycled benzene must be counted in determining how

much benzene a plant is designed to use. Letters from the

EPA regional office responsible for the State of South

Carolina—regardless of any conflict with previous guid-

ance received by another HCC plant from an agency with

no authority in South Carolina—placed the HCC Celriver

plant on actual notice of EPA’s interpretation.

For these reasons, we must conclude that EPA Region

4’s 1989 communications with HCC Celriver not only

should have put the company officials at the Celriver plant

on notice, but did put them on notice of EPA’s inter-

pretation of the NESHAP. Minutes from HCC’s July 28,

1989 meeting convened after receipt of the first EPA

letter supports this conclusion. These minutes unequivo-

nen er nr een ee

25a

cally demonstrate that HCC officials understood that

“[t}he limit of 1,000 megagrams benzene per year... is

applied to throughput instead of consumption.” Moreover,

if HCC had had any remaining doubts after receipt of

EPA’s first letter, EPA’s second (August 1989) letter

would have eliminated them.

x

We also reject the district court’s alternative grounds

for refusing to find HCC Celriver liable for any violations

of the NESHAP after August 1989. The district court

apparently believed that imposition of liability was in-

appropriate for two additional reasons: (1) EPA did not

object to the redesign schedule that HCC Celriver sub-

mitted in April 1990 to bring the plant in compliance

with the NESHAP and the company made significant ex-

penditures pursuant to that plan to reduce overall benzene

use by August 1992; and (2) if HCC had applied for a

waiver for the Celriver plant, it would likely have re-

ceived one. Hoechst Celanese, 964 F. Supp. at 984-85.

At oral argument, HCC conceded, as it had to, that

the present litigation solely addresses liability. Congress

has directed that a court should address a “violator’s full

compliance history and good faith efforts to comply” not

at the liability phase of the litigation but at the penalty

phase. See 42 U.S.C.A. § 7413(e) (West 1995): see also

United States v. B & W Inv. Props., 38 F.3d 362, 368

(7th Cir. 1994) (applying § 7413(e) criteria in penalty

deliberations). Thus, the district court erred when it

factored in compliance efforts as a reason for denying

liability.

Moreover, nothing in the NESHAP provides that upon

receiving a proposed compliance schedule, EPA is deemed

to accept that schedule if the agency does not respond

within a certain period of time. Nor did EPA’s lack of

response to the proposed compliance schedule preclude it

from imposing civil penalties on HCC. The only possible

Pe

26a

legal basis for such a result would be an estoppel of some

sort, and it is well-established that with rare exceptions

“equitable estoppel will not lie against the Government

as it lies against private litigants.” OPM v. Richmond,

496 US. 414, 419 (1990); see also United States v.

Agubata, 60 F.3d 1081, 1083 (4th Cir. 1995), cert.

denied, 116 S. Ct. 929 (1996).

Finally, HCC cannot rely on the NESHAP waiver pro-

vision which states:

Based on the information provided in any request

. the Administrator may grant a waiver of com-

pliance with a standard for a period not exceeding

two years after the effective date of the standard.

40 C.F.R. § 61.11(a) (1996) (emphasis added). The

regulatory language unambiguously provides that the

grant of a waiver is within the EPA Administrator's dis-

cretion. EPA might—or might not—have granted the

HCC Celriver plant a waiver if the plant had not met

NESHAP’s standards within ninety days, but HCC had no

right to expect one. We will therefore not presume here

that the company would have received a waiver.

Officials at the HCC Celriver plant had actual notice

of EPA’s interpretation of the NESHAP at least by the

time they received EPA’s August 1989 letter. The

NESHAP mandates full compliance from an existing

source within ninety days of the standard’s effective date.

See 40 C.F.R. §61.05(c) (1996). Since HCC lacked

fair notice of EPA’s interpretation at the time of promul-

gation of the benzene NESHAP, the ninety-day period

does not commence until HCC’s received actual notice of

that interpretation in August 1989. By failing to comply

with the NESHAP’s requirements within ninety days after

receiving EPA’s August 1989 letter, HCC Celriver neces-

sarily violated the regulations. These violations continued

at least until August 1992. We remand the case to the

district court for consideration of the proper penalties, if

any, for those violations.

27a

IV.

We affirm the district court’s order in all respects, ex-

cept as to whether after August 1989, HCC Celriver had

notice of EPA’s interpretation of the NESHAP exemp-

tion. We hold that by August 1989, EPA had provided

HCC actual notice that the Celriver, South Carolina plant

did not qualify for that exemption. We remand the case

to the district court so that it can determine if, and in

what amount, penalties should be imposed for the post-

August 1989 violations of HCC’s Celriver plant.

28a

No. 96-2003—AFFIRMED IN PART AND RE-

VERSED AND REMANDED IN

PART

No. 96-2051—AFFIRMED

NIEMEYER, Circuit Judge, concurring in part and dis-

senting in part:

I concur in Parts I., If., and III.A., but I find that I

must dissent from Part III.B. I believe not only that the

regulatory scheme was ambiguous but also that the EPA

interpreted its regulations with considerable ambivalence,

denying any person seeking to comply with them a con-

sistent and clear course to follow. To penalize a com-

pany that, by concession of the majority opinion, was not

given fair notice of any EPA interpretation at least until

1989 and then thereafter chose to follow one EPA Re-

gion’s interpretation over another would be, in my judg-

ment, fundamentally unfair. I have no difficulty with en-

forcing any consistent and rational EPA interpretation

prospectively, but to impose penalties in the circumstances

of this case is tantamount to punishment on the unfocused

whim of a bureaucracy that could not itself agree on the

proper reading of its own regualtion.

The Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7401 et seq., creates a

diverse regulatory scheme to lessen air pollution and con-

fers broad power on the EPA to draft regulations to

implement the statute. In 1984, the EPA published regu-

lations to control the emission standards for equipment

leaks of benzene, requiring industrial plants producing or

using benzene to monitor for leaks, to repair leaks, and

to install equipment to capture benzene emissions. The

regulations also impose reporting and record keeping re-

quirements. Violations are subject to civil penalty. In-

tending to exempt small volume producers and users of

benzene because of cost concerns, the regulations exempt

those plants that are designed “to produce or use less than

1,000 megagrams of benzene per year.” 40 C.F.R.

|

29a

§ 61.110(c) (2) (emphasis added). The issues in this

case are whether Hoechst Celanese’s Celriver (South Caro-

lina) Plant produces or uses 1,000 megagrams of ben-

zene per year and whether the EPA’s interpretation of

“produces or uses” was sufficiently clear to Hoechst Cela-

nese in 1989 so as to justify imposing on it penalties for

not complying with an EPA official’s interpretation of the

regulation within 90 days.

Reading the regulation on its face, the words “produces

or uses” are complementary terms designed to provide a

basis of measurement for the amount of benzene manu-

factured by or employed at a plant. The amount of ben-

zene that a plant produces would seem to be a straight-

forward calculation measured by the amount of benzene

that exits from a plant’s manufacturing process. To meas-

ure the amount of benzene that a plant “uses” in a year

would appear to require a measurement of the amount of

benzene introduced into the manufacturing process during

the course of a year. This natural reading would thus

include in the amount all inventory of benzene in use at

a plant during the entire year plus any amounts consumed

by the process. If that total were less than 1,000 mega-

grams per year, one would expect that the plant would be

exempt from regulation.

At different times and in different contexts, the EPA

has shared in part my natural reading of the regulation.

When the EPA first published its regulations, it appears

to have assumed that its own regulations were to be read

so that “use” means “consumption.” This is reflected in

the preamble to the regulation as originally published,

where the EPA stated:

The possibility that pharmaceutical operations could

be adversely affected by the standard is very small.

This is true for several reasons. First, most pharma-

ceutical plants use very little benzene. According to

estimates contained in Market Input/Output Studies

—Benzene Consumption as a Solvent (EPA-560/6-

i

30a

77-034, October 1978, p. 41), 1978 benzene con-

sumption by pharmaceutical manufacturers was about

0.72 Gg. No companies consumed more than 1,000

Mg/yr in 1978. The commenter states that they

consumed about 325 Mg/yr during 1981. Thus, it

is unlikely that pharmaceutical operations would be

affected by the standard because the final standard

exempts equipment at plant sites that are designed to

produce or use 1,000 Mg/yr or less of benzene.

Second, Benzene consumption by the pharmaceutical

industry is declining rapidly. The market input/

output study just noted estimates that consumption

declined from 2.14 Gg in 1976 to 0.72 Gg in 1978,

a decline of about 66 percent over the 2-year period.

49 Fed. Reg. 23,510 (June 6, 1984) (emphasis added).

But when individual representatives of the EPA inter-

preted EPA regulations, they recognized that if benzene

was introduced into a manufacturing process and exited

it, the “throughput” should be the basis for measurement

in determining “use.” For example, on October 16, 1984,

an internal memorandum from the EPA Standard Devel-

opment Branch to another section provided:

As you requested, I will articulate our position on

the 1,000 Mg/yr plant site cut-off in the benzene

equipment leak standard. This cut-off is based on an

analysis showing plants having few [pieces of] equip-

ment in benzene service should not be covered by

the standard. This analysis relates the low number

of [pieces of] equipment to a process rate in Mg/yr.

This process rate is not based on consumption of |

benzene but rather throughput through the equip-

ment in all process units of a plant site. The stand-

ard requires owners/operators to demonstrate the de-

sign capacity for each process unit in a plant, and we

should sum these capacities and compare this sum

to the 1,000 Mg /yr.

(Emphasis added). This position was reiterated a month

later by the EPA’s Office of Air Quality Planning and |

Ee

3la

Standards which issued a memorandum to all EPA Re-

gional Air Program Branch Chiefs as follows:

The question is whether the cut-off total is based on

consumption or processing rate. We have determined

the cut-off is based on the throughput or processing

rate, rather than consumption.

While various persons at the EPA were debating whether

“consumption” of benzene or the “throughput” was to be

the basis for measurement, the EPA Regional Director

from Region VI took the position that the benzene used

was to be quantified in the same way as any inventory

of a plant normally would be quantified:

After review of [the regulatory provision], and

based on our discussion with Headquarters’ staff, we

differ from you [Texaco] in our interpretation of the

provision. It is EPA’s position that the word use is

not meant to imply consumption, but rather is meant

to reflect the overall quantity of benzene used in

equipment at a facility. In determining the en-

vironmental, health economic and energy impacts

in setting the benzene standard, estimates were

based on the number of pieces of equipment utilizing

benzene and the quantity of benzene in use, rather

than on the overall plant consumption (conversion)

rate of benzene. Therefore, to determine if a plant

produces or uses greater than 1000 megagrams per

year of benzene, the total quantity of benzene in

use at the facility needs to be considered. not the

consumption.

(Emphasis in original). Region VI, thus, required the

amount of benzene used to be measured by the “total

quantity in use” at the facility—i.e., an inventory meas-

urement. This letter, Originally written to Texaco, was

provided to Hoechst Celanese by the Texas Air Control

Board in the course of giving Hoechst Celanese an exemp-

tion for its Bishop Plant in Texas, as it was authorized to

do under the Act.

32a

The EPA thus had at least three different approaches

for measuring use: (1) the consumption of benzene in

a year, (2) the throughput of benzene through a plant

for a year, and (3) the total quantity in use at the plant.

In June 1989, the EPA Regional Director in Region IV,

which included jurisdiction over Hoechst Celanese’s Cel-

river Plant, wrote Hoechst Celanese that the Celriver

Plant “may be subject” to benzene regulation and re-

quested data on Celriver’s benzene “throughput on an an-

nual basis.” When Hoechst Celanese responded that the

Celriver Plant was exempt because it consumed less than

1,000 megagrams per year, the Region IV Director sent

a letter stating that “it appears that you are unaware of

EPA’s interpretation of benzene usage as the term is used

to determine applicability.” The Region IV Director then

explained: ,

[B]enzene usage is intended to mean total cumulative

flow through equipment in benzene service rather

than net consumption[.] [Y]Jou reported your ben-

zene usage for the years 1984 through 1989 in terms

of the amount of benzene added to maintain the

levels in your closed recirculation system. Therefore,

the paragraph below provides an example of how to

calculate benzene usage for a hypothetical example.

After reviewing the example, you should have a better

understanding of how the term benzene usage is to

be interpreted.

The letter then described how in a closed recirculation

system, the benzene should be measured at a single point

so that it is counted every time it passes a fixed point. The

Region IV Director considered that this form of measure-

ment was an acceptable interpretation of “throughput.”

Up until this point, the EPA as an agency had not ad-

dressed how to measure benzene in a closed recirculation

system. While the EPA Region VI Director applied the

regulation to a closed system by directing the measurement

33a

of the “total quantity in use” at the plant, the Region IV

Director was interpreting it as the rate of flow through

a single point in a closed system. Thus, Region IV pro-

posed recounting the benzene every time it passed the

single point. EPA Region IV did not, however, explain

how many measuring points should be utilized. In a com-

plex recirculation system made up of a grid of thousands

of pieces of equipment, as was involved at the Celriver

Plant, there are theoretically an unlimited number of

measuring points at each joint and valve. Under this

method, virtually any plant with a closed recirculation

system would never qualify for the 1,000-megagram-per-

year usage exemption.

| While I agree with the majority that Hoechst Celanese

| had notice of the position of the EPA Region IV in Au-

| gust 1989, this notice should not, against the background

| of inconsistent EPA interpretations over time and through-

| out the different regions, constitute a definitive agency-

wide EPA notice such that penalties could be imposed for

| non-compliance with one interpretation. For these rea-

| sons, I firmly believe that the district court properly con-

cluded that the 1989 Region IV notice should not be con-

sidered the “authoritative interpretation” of the EPA.

| I would go yet further and question whether the Region

| IV Director’s notice is at all meaningful in view of the

ambiguity about his interpretation.

For the foregoing reasons, I would affirm the district

court’s findings in their entirety.

34a

APPENDIX B

[Filed May 19, 1996]

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

ROCK HILL DIVISION

C/A No. 0:92-1879-17

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

-VS.-

HoECHST CELANESE CORPORATION,

Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Introduction

The question presented in this case is whether Hoechst

Celanese Corporation’s Celriver Plant in Rock Hill, South

Carolina, was required to comply with the National Emis-

sion Standard for Equipment Leaks (Fugitive Emission

Sources) of Benzene (Benzene NESHAP), 40 C.F.R.

Part 61, subpart J, during the period 1984 to 1991. The

Company implemented the NESHAP in 1991 and sub-

sequently eliminated the use of benzene altogether from

the Celriver plant. Thus, the focus of this litigation is the

1984-1991 time period.

On behalf of the Environmental Protection Agency

(EPA), the United States initiated this action against

Hoechst Celanese for allegedly violating the Clean Air

Act. 42 U.S.C. $ 7401 et seq., and the benzene NESHAP

at Celriver. These regulations prescribe standards for

35a

equipment in certain stationary sources that produce, use,

or otherwise have in service benzene, a hazardous air pol-

lutant, by requiring subject plants to monitor equipment

regularly for leaks, to repair leaks promptly, and to install

(in some circumstances) equipment that prevents, cap-

tures, or destroys benzene emissions. The regulations also

include reporting and record keeping requirements. In

its complaint, the United States seeks civil penalties of up

to $25,000 for each violation.

The pertinent regulation provides an exemption for

“any equipment in benzene service” that is “located at a

plant site designed to produce or use less than 1,000

megagrams of benzene per year.” 40 C.F.R. § 61.110

(c)(2). The EPA contends that the Celriver Plant was

designed to use more than two million megagrams of ben-

zene per year, and therefore was not exempt from the reg-

ulation. Hoechst Celanese contends that the Celriver

Plant was designed to use ( and, in fact, used) less than

1,000 megagrams of benzene per year, and therefore was

exempt. The dramatic difference between the two calcula-

tions is caused by the different ways the parties count the

benzene for purposes of the exemption.

The two approaches produce vastly different results be-

cause the Celriver Plant recycled benzene, continuously

using the same benzene. The total quantity of benzene at

the Celriver Plant site never exceeded 1,000 megagrams

per year. Hoechst Celanese maintains that the benzene

should be counted only once, and therefore the Celriver

Plant was exempt under the regulation. EPA argues that

the benzene should be counted each time it cycles through

two separate points inside the system, and therefore the

Celriver Plant was not exempt.

Hoechst Celanese further argues that, even if the exemp-

tion contemplated what it calls the “multiple count”? ap-

1 The government disagrees with the use of the words “multiple

count” in describing its interpretation of the regulations. Whether

36a

proach, the Company still should not be required to pay

the civil penalty sought by the government because the

Company did not receive the constitutionally required fair

notice of the “multiple count” interpretation of the regu-

lation.

The matter is now before the court on pivotal cross mo-

tions for summary judgment. The United States moved

for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability for

violations allegedly occurring between June 1986 and

August 1992. The United States contends that Hoechst

Celanese violated virtually all of the leak detection and

repair requirements in the regulations, failed to install

equipment designed to reduce fugitive benzene emissions,

and failed to keep records and make reports to EPA. In

total. the United States alleged thousands of violations of

the Benzene Leaks NESHAP. Hoechst Celanese has cross

moved for summary judgment on all claims. Oral argu-

ment was heard on both motions on February 2, 1996.

For the reasons set forth below, the court will grant

the plaintiff's motion in part, by finding plantiff’s interpre-

tation of the applicable regulation to be reasonable. The

court will also grant, in part, defendant’s motion, conclud-

ing that because the Company was not afforded fair no-

tice of the EPA’s interpretation of the regulation, no civil

penalty should be awarded in this case.

Summary judgment may only be granted under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 56 when there are no genuine

issues of material fact and the moving party demonstrates

that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. The

court must inquire into the genuineness and materiality

of all purported factual issues and view all facts and in-

ferences in a light most favorable to the party opposing

the motion. Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d 774, 778 (4th

Cir, 1993); Ross v. Communications Satellite Corporation,

the government’s gloss on the regulation is denominated “multiple

count”, “internal recycle’, or something else is not significant for

purposes of this decision.

37a

759 F.2d 355, 364 (4th Cir. 1985). When no genuine

issue of material fact exists, the court has a duty to award

summary judgment. Drewitt v. Pratt, 999 F.2d at 778-79.

The Celriver Plant was exempt under 40 C.F.R.

§ 61.110(c)(2) if it was designed to produce or use less

than 1,000 megagrams of benzene annually. The facts

regarding benzene at the Celriver Plant are essentially un-

disputed. Until March 1993, the Celriver Plant used ben-

zene in, among other things, the production of acetic

anhydride.* Hot ketene gases flowed into a quench cham-

ber and were cooled with a continuous stream of benzene,

with some of the ketene thereby being converted to acetic

anhydride. The benzene used to cool ketene gases was

called a “quench.” The substances in the quench chamber

then moved to a main still. In the main still, benzene,

water, and other substances rose to the top and exited,

while acetic anhydride and acetic acid left from the bot-

tom of the still. A stream of benzene flowed into the still

to make this separation process more efficient. Benzene

used to increase the efficiency of the main still was called

a “reflux agent.”

* The facts in this section describing the Celriver Plant’s design

and use of benzene were derived from U.S. Mem. at 27-31, United

States’ Response to the Defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment

and the Defendant's Opposition to the United States’ Motion for

Partial Summary Judgment (U.S. Resp.”) at 3-6, and Hoechst

Celanese’s Initial Brief at 26. The court’s description of benzene

use at Celriver focuses specifically on one of two process units at

the plant, the acetic anhydride manufacturing process. A_ full

description of this process is too technically complex to warrant its

inclusion here, but the parties have provided a useful. if greatly

simplified, depiction of certain of the most pertinent features of

that process. The court notes that benzene was also used in another

process unit at the Celriver Plant, the acid recovery unit. The

Government does not discuss how benzene use would be calculated

in this other process unit.

38a

Benzene entering the quench chamber and main still

had a prescribed temperature and purity. After it entered

the quench chamber and main still, the benzene became

hotter and less pure. For this reason, some of the benzene

leaving the main still went through a series of steps that

removed impurities and cooled the benzene back to its

original temperature, while other portions of the benzene

were recirculated immediately back to the main still. When

the purification process was complete, the benzene that

had been purified also recirculated back to the quench

chamber and main still.

II

EPA contends that the Celriver Piant was not exempt

because it was designed to use more than 1,000 mega-

grams of benzene annually. The court has jurisdiction to

review EPA’s interpretation, but “the scope of its review

is limited to whether EPA’s interpretation is plainly erro-

neous.” Potomac Elec. Power v. U.S. EPA, 650 F.2d

509, 513 (4th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 455 U.S. 1016

(1982). EPA’s interpretation need not be the only rea-

sonable one, or even the interpretation the court would

have preferred if the question had first arisen in a judicial

proceeding. Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1, 16-17 (1965).

Rather, the “agency’s interpretation of its own regulation

is of ‘controlling weight unless it is plainly erroneous or

inconsistent with the regulation.’” Talley v. Mathews,

550 F.2d 911, 919 (4th Cir. 1977), quoting Bowles v.

Seminole Rock Co., 325 U.S. 410, 413-14 (1945). See

also Ford Motor Credit Co. v. Milhollin, 444 U.S. 555,

566 (1980).

Courts defer to an agency’s interpretation of its own

regulation for pragmatic and constitutional reasons. Def-

erence to the agency’s view ensures that a nationally uni-

form interpretation prevails without the need for the Su-

preme Court to opine on the meaning of every regulation.

Homemakers North Shore, Inc. v. Bowen, 832 F.2d 408,

412 (7th Cir. 1987). An agency is also more suited than

ne ee

3

5

q

:

oe ee Poe Ee, ee eee

39a

a court to make policy and scientific judgments within the

agency's area of expertise. Chevron U.S.A. v. Nat. Re-

sources Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844-45 (1984) (de-

ferring to EPA’s interpretation of the Clean Air Act);

Citizens Against Refinery’s Effects v. U.S. EPA. 643 F.2d

178, 181-83 (4th Cir. 1981). Furthermore, courts recog-

nize that Congress often confers upon an agency, rather

than the courts, the province of “filling the interstitial

silences within a statute or a regulation.” Milhollin, 444

U.S. at 565.

A court’s review of regulations under Section 112 of

the Clean Air Act, such as the Benzene Leaks NESHAP,

is particularly limited because of the broad discretion Con-

gress gave EPA to control hazardous air pollutants. Un-

der the Clean Air Act in effect when EPA promulgated

the Benzene Leaks NESHAP, Congress delegated author-

ity to EPA to identify hazardous air pollutants and their

sources, to determine methods of controlling emissions

from these sources, and to determine the level of control

hecessary to protect public health.* Through its exercise

of these powers, EPA has developed considerable scientific

and policy expertise in the regulation of hazardous air

pollutants. Natural Resources Defense Council v. U.S.

EPA, 824 F.2d 1146, 1163 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (en banc).

This court treads lightly when construing the scope of an

exemption that allows a source of hazardous air pollutants

to go unregulated. The court will not substitute its own

judgment on the scope of the exemption unless EPA’s in-

terpretation is plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the

regulation.

* Clean Air Act, sec. 4(a), §§ 111(b)(1)(A) and 112(b) (1), 84

Stat. 1676, 1684-85 (1970), sec. 110, § 112(e), 91 Stat. 685, 703

(1977), and sec, 13(b), § 112(e) (5), 92 Stat. 3443, 3458 (1978)

(current version at 42 U.S.C. §§ 7411-12 (Supp. V 1993)).

|

40a

Il

A. The Language of the Regulation

The exemption that Hoechst Celanese claims reads as

follows:

§ 61.110(c) ,, , (1) If an owner or operator applies

for one of the exemptions in this paragraph, then the

owner or operator shall maintain records as required

in § 61.246(1).

(2) Any equipment in benzene service that is lo-

cated at a plant site designed to produce or use less

than 1,000 megagrams of benzene per year is exempt

from the requirements of § 61.112.

The government argues that Hoechst Celanese does not

qualify for the exemption provided for in section 61.110

(c)(2). Additionally, the government argues that even

if Hoechst Celanese qualifies for the exemption, it never-

theless cannot claim the exemption in this case because

it never affirmatively applied for the exemption. The court

will address these issues seriatim.

ee

1. The Interpretation of the Exemption

Interpretation of the exemption at issue in this litigation

tzimus on the phrase “designed to . . . use” in section

61.110(c)(2).

EPA claims to give the word “use” its broad, ordinary

meaning: to put into service, to employ, to utilize, to

consume. In EPA’s view, a plant is not exempt if, under

its design, it uses benzene in one of these ways at a rate

greater than or equal to 1,000 megagrams per year.

EPA maintains that the Celriver Plant was not exempt

because it was not designed to use less than 1,000 mega-

grams of benzene annually. The Agency relies on the

flow of benzene through two internal pieces of equipment

in one process unit at the plant (namely, the main still

4la

and the quence chamber in the acetic anhydride manu-

facturing process) in reaching that conclusion. As EPA

Sees it, that equipment in the Celriver Plant was not “de-

signed to consume” benzene. Rather, the equipment was

designed to “utilize” benzene as a quench and as a reflux

agent in the manufacture of acetic anhydride. The acetic

anhydride manufacturing unit of the plant was designed

to use benzene as a quench by putting it into service in

the quench chamber, and to use benzene as a reflux agent

by putting into service in the main still According to

EPA, these two pieces of equipment in the acetic anhy-

dride unit at the Celriver Plant were designed to put ben-

zene into service at the rate of 1,517,700 megagrams per

year. Because these rates exceeded the exemption thres-

hold of 1,000 megagrams, EPA concludes that the Cel-

river Plant as a whole was designed to use more than 1,000

megagrams per year and, hence, did not qualify for the

exemption.

Hoechst Celanese reads the exemption far differently.

The Company agrees that the exemption is phrased

in terms of a rate Beyond that, however, EPA’s and

Hoechst Celanese’s analyses diverge significantly.

At the very outset, Hoechst Celanese alleges that the

Government's emphasis on the words “designed to use”

is a litigation position embraced by the Government post

hoc, and that the Government's explanation of the exemp-

tion can be found only in the Papers it has filed in this

litigation. As such, the Company contends, the “designed

to use” argument is entitled to no deference from this

court. According to the Company, “designed to use”

merely indicates that a plant site’s benzene usage is to be

calculated on the basis of its maximum “design” or “name-

plate capacity,” rather than its “actual” capacity for any

Particular year. This is made clear. according to Hoechst

Celanese, both from the context of the phrase as it is

used in the exemption itself and from the rulemaking

record.

a a

42a

Moreover, Hoechst Celanese argues, the Government's

multiple counting explanation of the exemption strays far

from any common understanding of the word “use.” To

illustrate, the Company gives the example of how much

oil an automobile might be said to “use” in a year. An

automobile that circulates several quarts of oil in its en-

gine might plausibly be viewed as using either those sev-

eral quarts of oil, or perhaps the amount of oil needed

as “makeup” for that lost from the engine over the course

of the year. Under multiple counting, however, the auto-

mobile would be said to “use” hundreds of thousands,

if not millions, of quarts of oil per year.

Hoechst Celanese claims that, unlike the Government’s

multiple counting explanation, its interpretation of the ex-

emption provision gives the word “use” its ordinary mean-

ing. According to the Company, there are two dictionary

definitions of the word that might apply in the context of

the exemption: (1) to “expend or consume by putting

to use,” and (2) to “put into action or service: have

recourse to. . .: to carry out a purpose or action by

means of.*

At Celriver, Hoechst Celanese contends, the amount

of benzene “used” in a year could thus mean either the

amount of benzene the plant is designed to “use up” (/.e.,

consume) over the course of a year, or the amount of

benzene that the plant is designed to “utilize” or “put into

service” over the course of year (i.e., the amount used up

during the year plus the amount remaining in equipment

at year’s end). Either of these definitions is a “single

counting” approach, the Company notes, contrasting them

with the so-called “multiple counting” interpretation that

the Government advances. The distinction is critically

important, as it is not disputed that the Celriver Plant was

exempt under either single counting interpretation.

4 Hoechst Celanese’s Initial Brief at 53 quoting Webster's Third

New International Dictionary, p. 2523-24 (1976).

43a

2. The Administrative Record

Both sides assert that the administrative record sup-

ports their respective reading of the exemption language.

Hoechst Celanese argues that the administrative record

establishes that the exemption is based on the single count-

ing concept of plant nameplate capacity or consumption,

terms that are wholly incompatible with EPA’s multiple

counting approach.

For its part, EPA relies on the administrative record

to support its claim that its interpretation is consistent

with the purpose of the exemption. Typically, that por-

tion of the administrative record formally adopted by the

EPA Administrator (i.e., the Preamble and rulemaking

documents incorporated by reference in the Preamble) is

to be read in harmony with the language of the regulatory

Provision so as to provide guidance as to the Agency’s

true meaning. I turn, then, to an examination of the ad-

ministrative record.

Deference to an agency’s interpretation is particularly

warranted when the interpretation harmonizes with the

purpose of the statutory scheme and the purpose of the

regulations. Mourning v. Family Publication Service, Inc.,

411 U.S. 356, 369-72 (1973): United States v. Unitank

Terminal Service, 724 F.Supp. 1158, 1165-66 (E.D. Pa.

1989) (interpreting the Benzene Leaks NESHAP).

One purpose of the Clean Air Act is “to protect and

enhance the quality of the Nation’s air resources so as to

promote the public health and welfare and the productive

capacity of its population. . . .” 42 U.S.C. § 7401(b).

To fulfill this purpose, Congress required EPA to prom-

ulgate emission standards for hazardous air pollutants

that protect the public with an ample margin of safety.

42 U.S.C. $7412. EPA promulgated the Benzene Leaks

NESHAP under this authority in order to protect the

public from benzene that leaks from equipment, a type of

pollution known as “fugitive emissions.” EPA believed

44a

that these controls would significantly reduce the inci-

dence of leukemia for people living within twenty kilom-

eters of leaking equipment. 49 Fed. Reg. 23,501 (June

6, 1984). As discussed below, the exemption was in-

tended to reach only plants that were not cost-effective to

regulate because they had few pieces of equipment and

low emissions from leaking equipment.

EPA drafted the exemption in response to a comment

that Benzene Leaks NESHAP proposed in 1981 was not

cost-effective for some plants. EPA agreed that an exemp-

tion for such plants was appropriate. In a document sup-

porting the final regulations, the agency wrote: “EPA

believes it is reasonable to exempt plants from the stand-

ard when the cost of the standard is unreasonably high in

comparison to the achieved emission reductions. There-

fore, EPA decided to determine a cutoff for exempting

these plants based on a cost and emission reduction ana-

lysis.” Benzene Fugitive Emissions—Background Infor-

mation for Promulgated Standards, EPA 450/3-80-032b

(“BID”), at 2-104.

EPA performed a cost and emission reduction analysis

by analyzing actual data from plants that produced ethy-

lene, cumene, and vinyl acetate.° Based on its review of

five data points provided by the three studied production

facilities, PES plotted lines purporting to make correla-

tions between cost-effectiveness and (1) the nameplate

capacity of plants producing so-called “synthetic organic

chemical manufacturing industry (“SOCMI”) chemicals,

(2) emissions from such facilities, and (3) the number

of pieces of equipment at the facilities.

5 EPA’s description of this cost and emission reduction analysis

appears in U.S. Mem. at Appendix B. The court notes that, while

the PES Memo was part of the rulemaking record, it was not itself

published in the Federal Register, nor were its contents fully

explicated in the BID. Rather, interested persons had to be able to

identify the PES memo as being relevant to the benzene exemption

and could then obtain a copy only by writing to EPA and request-

ing it.

45a

According to EPA, the data show a rough correlation

between a plant’s equipment count, emissions from leak-

ing equipment, and plant production nameplate capacity,

in that plants with higher production rates had more

equipment and thus more fugitive emissions.

After assuming that the data it had derived from five

data points was an accurate reflection of SOCMI produc-

tion facilities generally, and by relating the data to ben-

zene production plants, EPA’s consultant plotted a corre-

lation between plants with nameplate capacity producing

1,000 megagrams of benzene per year and benzene emis-

sions of approximately 6 megagrams before regulation and

emission reductions of about 4 megagrams after regula-

tion. On the graph plotted by PES, emissions at these

levels corresponded to plants having fewer than 87 pieces

of equipment, such as valves, pumps, and pressure relief

devices.

EPA determined that plants designed to use 1,000

megagrams of benzene per year would have approximately

the same equipment count and emissions as plants that

produced 1,000 megagrams of benzene annually. In the

BID, EPA stated:

For plants in which the benzene emission reduction

achieved by implementing the standard is about 4

Mg of benzene per year, EPA has determined that

the cost of achieving this emission reduction is un-

reasonable. In order to exclude plants on this basis,

EPA selected a minimum cutoff of 1,000 Mg/year

per plant site based on a benzene design usage rate

or throughput.

BID at 2-105. The BID further explained that “[t]wo

approaches for setting the [1,000 megagram per year] cut-

off were considered: (1) number of sources at a plant

site and (2) benzene usage per plant site.” BID at 2-104.

EPA said it rejected a “cutoff based on the number of

sources at a plant site” because such a cutoff “could not

46a

be applied readily” to small or intermittent users of ben-

zene. Id. Rather, a cutoff “based on benzene design us-

age” was chosen “because it is easily understood and can

be applied readily to a plant site.” Id. The BID also in-

dicated that it would be reasonable to exempt from the

NESHAP plants emitting benzene in “significant quan-

tities” when the “cost of the standard is unreasonably high

in comparison to achieved emission reductions.” BID at

2-104.

The Preamble to the Benzene Leaks NESHAP sim-

ilarly explains that the exemption was based indirectly

upon an analysis of equipment count and emissions. The

Preamble states:

EPA is exempting from the standard equipment at

plant sites that are designed to produce or use 1,000

Mg/yr or less of benzene. This cutoff is based on

the amount of equipment in a process unit and re-

lates this amount to a design production rate. The

1,000 Mg/yr exemption would exclude most research

facilities, pilot plants, and intermittent users of ben-

zene from the standard.

And finally, even though pharmaceutical operations

that are designed to use benzene in excess of 1,000

Mg/yr are subject to the standard, they have substan-

tial equipment inventories in benzene service, and,

therefore, emit benzene in enough quantity to war-

rant coverage by the final standard.

49 Fed. Reg. 23,510 (June 6, 1984).

EPA contends that its position that the Celriver Plant

did not qualify for the exemption is consistent with the

purpose of the regulation. Unlike plants that EPA in-

tended to exempt, EPA says, the Celriver Plant had thou-

sands of pieces of equipment and high fugitive benzene

emissions. Between June 1984 and February 1991, for

example, the Celriver Plant operated almost 17,000 pieces

Piven ee ee 5

47a

of equipment allegedly covered by the Benzene Leaks

NESHAP. Between 1984 and 1993, the Celriver Plant’s

fugitive benzene emissions ranged between 69 and 226

megagrams annually. According to EPA’s Toxic Release

Inventory, the Celriver Plant ranked in the top 5% of all

plants reporting benzene fugitive emissions in every year

between 1987 and 1993,

EPA raises other arguments to support its claim of

consistency with guidance in the administrative record on

applying the exemption. In the BID, EPA drew a parallel

between benzene use and benzene “throughput.” Accord-

ing to EPA, the term throughput generally refers to the

rate at which material is put through something, whether

it be a system, a process, or a piece of equipment. In-

stead of looking at the “throughput” for the plant as a

whole—which, as it explained below, Hoechst Celanese

and its engineering experts contend is the only way for it

to be consistent with the plant nameplate capacity ele-

ment of the PES analysis and other aspects of the admin-

istrative record—the Government’s multiple count ap-

proach would base eligibility on the throughput for one

or more pieces of equipment inside the plant process. To

accomplish this, EPA equates “throughput” with the term

“processing rate,” which, in turn, is more typically used

when referring to the flow of material through a piece of

equipment. This precise term, however, does not itself

appear in the administrative record.

The BID states, “EPA selected a minimum cutoff of

1,000 Mg/year per plant site based on a benzene design

usage rate or throughput. Throughput is determined by

a mass balance during the design stages of process opera-

tions, accumulating all benzene processed in 1 year.”

BID at 2-15. This passage, EPA explains, describes both

how throughput should be determined (by a mass bal-

ance),° and what benzene should be included (all benzene

* A “mass balance” is a technique based on the scientific principle

that matter can never be destroyed. To apply a mass balance, one

48a

processed in one year). The Government argues that the

“mass balance” referred to in the BID was not intended

to be conducted on the plant manufactuing process as a

whole, but rather should really have been understood to

contemplate one or more mass balances to measure the

accumulated flow through pieces of equipment inside the

plant manufacturing process selected by Agency staff

after reviewing plant process diagrams.

Notwithstanding the fact that the term “processing rate”

does not appear in the rulemaking record, EPA argues

that the BID reiterates the connection between “use” and

processing rate or throughput in several other places as

well. In a summary section under the heading “Benzene

Usage Cutoff,” EPA stated:

An analysis by EPA indicated that the cost effective-

ness of the standard for equipment at plant sites

processing less than 1,000 Mg/yr is unreasonably

high. Because this cost is unreasonably high in com-

parison to the minimal emissions reduction, achiev-

able, EPA provided an exemption for plants designed

for low benzene usage.

accounts for all mass or material entering, leaving, and remaining

in a defined area. Typically, the accounting of a material is ex-

pressed in a mathematical equation, When all material is accounted

for, the equation “balances.” While both EPA and Hoechst Celanese

agree with this general definition of the term “mass balance,” they

disagree profoundly over the scope of the “defined area” on which

this mass balance is to be performed under the exemption. At

Celriver, EPA instructed Hoechst Celanese to provide benzene

usage figures derived from mass balance calculations on individual

process streams. The Company contends that both the plain lan-

guage of the exemption and rulemaking record indicate that the

mass balance is to be »verformed on the “plant site” as a whcele.

Such a calculation, Hoechst Celanese maintains, is specifically in-

tended to eliminate any multiple counting resulting from internal

flow. For most facilities that use benzene in their manufacturing

process, it would generally result in the measurement of a plant’s

consumption.

eespemaeiaiiiaiiiiea is aid

49a

BID at 1-10. In response to a comment that research and

development plants should be exempt, the agency stated:

a plant design usage rate or throughput rate of ben-

zene equal to or less than 1,000 Mg/yr per plant

has been selected as a cutoff. Based on the minimal

amount of benzene processed at laboratory facilities

and pilot plants, the 1,000 Mg/yr cutoff is likely to

exempt most of these sources from the standard.

Large-scale pilot plants or commercial tests might

process more than 1,000 Mg/yr. If this happens,

these plants would not have difficulty in achieving

the standard since there are no major equipment re-

quirements and the work practice requirements are

reasonable, considering costs and emissions reduc-

tions available.

BID at 2-105. In response to a comment from a pharma-

ceutical company seeking an exemption, EPA stated:

And finally, even though pharmaceutical operations

with a benzene throughput in excess of 1,000 Mg/yr

are subject to the standard, they have substantial

equipment inventories in benzene service and, there-

fore, emit benzene in enough quantity to warrant

coverage by the final standard.

BID at 2-91.

EPA relies on these passages in support of its view that

the Celriver Plant was not exempt. EPA contends that

the Celriver Plant was not exempt based on the flow rate

of benzene through two pieces of equipment inside the

manufacturing process—the quench chamber and main

still. EPA obtained this flow from among the mass bal-

ances that Hoechst Celanese prepared, at EPA’s direction,

On various benzene streams in Celriver’s internal proc-

esses to show those streams’ “throughput,” which the

Agency then defined as meaning “total cumulative flow

50a

through equipment in benzene service rather than net

consumption.” *

Some parts of the administrative record provide support

for the Defendant’s “consumption” interpretation. Chief

among these is a paragraph from the Administrator’s Pre-

amble which uses the word “consumed” or “consumption”

four times, and appears to use the concept synonymously

with the word “use”. This paragraph reads as follows:

The possibility that pharmaceutical operations could

be adversely affected by the standard is very small.

This is true for several reasons. First, most pharma-

ceutical plants use very little benzene. According to

estimates contained in Market Input/Output Studies

—Benzene Consumption as a Solvent . . ., 1978 ben-

zene consumption by pharmaceutical manufacturers

was about 0.72 Gg [gigagrams]. No companies con-

sumed more than 1,000 Mg/yr in 1978. The com-

menter states that they consumed about 325 Mg/yr

during 1981. Thus, it is unlikely that pharmaceutical

operations would be affected by the standard because

the final standard exempts equipment at plant sites

that are designed to produce or use 1,000 Mg/year

or less of benzene. Second, benzene consumption by

the pharmaceutical industry is declining rapidly.

49 Fed. Reg. 23,510 (June 6, 1984) (emphasis added).

In its brief the government explains that the placement

of the words “consumed” and “consumption” in close prox-

imity with the word “use” in both the Preamble and the

7 Elsewhere in this same communication, the Agency observed

that it “may be time-consuming to calculate actual annual benzene

usage as interpreted by EPA,” and indicated that the Agency

“would be willing to review any estimation methods [Hoechst]

Celanese might use in formulating a response” to the Agency’s

request, “Any response that relies that on estimation methods,”

EPA continued, “should contain enough backup information to allow

us to evaluate the method used and the results obtained with it.”

S5la

BID is ‘accidental” and that EPA could have drafted

these passages “more exactly”.

Hoechst Celanese contends that the Preamble indicates

that EPA intended to exempt small users of benzene, but

EPA’s multiple counting interpretation would virtually

eliminate the exemption in even the simplest and smallest

of recycle operations. Hoechst Celanese asserts, for ex-

ample, that a research facility that intermittently recycles

one gallon of benzene through an aquarium pump at a

design flow rate of one gallon per minute would not be

exempt.

Additionally, the precise term “processing rate,” (the

term relied upon by some EPA staff as the basis for a

multiple count interpretation) is not mentioned anywhere

in the record. Hoechst Celanese argues that EPA adopted

nameplate capacity and specifically rejected “processing

rate,” a version of multiple counting, as unsuitable for

this type of exemption. Moreover, it cites to a parallel

EPA rulemaking to establish other standards for the syn-

thetic chemical manufacturing industry where the use of

that term was specifically rejected because it was “difficult

to establish.” The government argues that although the

words “processing” and “rate” do not appear together in

the BID, the BID does describe the scope of the exemp-

tion in terms of the rate at which benzene is processed.

Hoechst Celanese also points to the 1980 BID which

listed the types of processes which were being considered

for benzene regulation. The listed processes included

those that produced benzene (refineries) and those that

used benzene in the production of benzene derivatives.

The 1980 BID had information on 133 sites, but did not

list any of Hoechst Celanese’s plants, some of which had

been operating for decades.

These passages from the record, however, do not lead

inevitably to the conclusion that EPA intended the word

“use” in the exemption to mean only “consume.” As the

52a

Defendant concedes, a mass balance can be used to de-

termine the flow of benzene through equipment. The De-

fendant prepared such a mass balance for EPA in order

to show the flow of benzene through various parts of its

plant, including the quench chamber and main still. Ben-

zene throughput sometimes refers to a plant’s benzene

consumption, but the words “throughput” and “consump-

tion” are not synonymous. The word “throughput” can

describe, for example, the flow of benzene through equip-

ment like the quench chamber and main still. Further-

more, EPA maintains that the Defendant has not shown

how its consumption interpretation squares with the pur-

pose of the Benzene Leaks NESHAP, which according to

EPA was to control fugitive benzene emissions at all

plants except those with few pieces of equipment and low

emissions.’ In sum, the passages cited by the Defendant

from the administrative record do not establish that EPA’s

interpretation is plainly erroneous.

The court concludes that EPA’s interpretation of the

regulation is permissible and should be sustained by the

court. Although Hoechst Celanese’s interpretation of the

regulation is also reasonable, the court must “refer to the

reasonable judgment of the agency to which Congress has

entrusted the development of rules and regulations to en-

sure [the protection of the environment].” General Elec-

tric Co. v. EPA, 53 F.3d 1324, 1328 (D.C.Cir. 1995).

EPA’s interpretation of 40 C.F.R. § 61.110(c)(1) is not

“plainly erroneous or inconsistent with the regulation.”

Tally v. Mathews, 550 F.2d 911, 919 (4th Cir. 1977).

3. The “Application” Argument

EPA’s other argument is that Hoechst Celanese never

applied for the exemption it now claims for itself. Hoechst

Celanese contends, on the other hand, that the exemption

is self-implementing because the plain language of Section

8 The Benzene Leaks NESHAP also exempts coke byproducts

plants. 40 C.F.R. § 61.110(b).

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53a

61.110(c)(2) provides that a plant designed to use less

than 1,000 megagrams of benzene per year “is exempt

from the requirements.” 40 C.F.R. § 60.110(c)(2) (em-

phasis added).

Courts look to the language and design of the whole

law when construing the meaning of particular phrases,

U.S. Nat. Bank of Oregon y. Independent Ins. Agents,

113 S.Ct. 2173, 2182 (1993), and avoid constructions

that render words superfluous. Ratzlaf v. United States,

114 S.Ct. 655, 659 (1994). The paragraph containing

the exemption begins, “[i]f an owner or operator applies

for one of the exemptions in this paragraph... .” 40

C.F.R. § 61.110(c) (1). Elsewhere, the NESHAP re-

quires that applications made pursuant to Part 61 should

be sent to the appropriate EPA regional offices. 40 C.F.R.

§ 61.04.

The criteria that must be met for the exemption is

specified in 40 C.F.R. § 61.110(c)(2). The regulatory

language does not give EPA discretion in determining

who qualifies for the exemption; a plant qualifies for the

exemption if it meets the criteria set forth in the regula-

tion. EPA still maintains, however, that this lack of dis-

cretion, does not make an application unnecessary.

The word “apply” in the regulation cannot be ignored.

The EPA acknowledges, however, that the regulation does

not specify the content of an application, nor does it give

any real guidance as to an application procedure. Hoechst

Celanese maintains that the regulation is self-executing and

that the EPA has advanced the application argument only

for the purposes of litigation and that in actual practice,

the regulated community has not been applying for, nor

have they been required to apply for this exemption.

Hoechsi Celanese also argues that key EPA staff have con-

firmed that there is no obligation to apply for the exemp-

tion.

EPA acknowledges that the ordinary meaning of the

verb “apply” in 40 C.F.R. § 61.110(c)(1) means at least

S$4a

that plants seeking the exemption must “communicate”

their request to EPA.® Because of this, an examination

of the communications between EPA representatives and

the Company after promulgation of the NESHAP in 1984

is appropriate. The relevant facts, derived from the un-

disputed evidence in the record, are as follows.

In 1984 Hoechst Celanese operated two Texas plants

that recycled benzene: the Bishop and Pampa Plants.

Following the June 1984 promulgation of the NESAP,

Hoechst Celanese undertook to determine the scope of the

“use” exemption. The initial evaluation was made by

Jaime Garza, a senior environmental engineer at Bishop.

Mr. Garza considered a full range of: regulatory interpre-

tations—both plausible and implausible. He also asked

for a review of the matter by in-house counsel, who evalu-

ated the rulemaking record including the regulatory Pre-

amble and the BID. After these evaluations, Mr. Garza

concluded that “use” meant “consumption” and that Bis-

hop was exempt because it consumed less than 1,000

megagrams per year of benzene.

On August 31, 1984, Mr. Garza wrote a letter seeking

confirmation of Bishop’s exempt status from the Texas

Air Control Board (TACB), the agency to which EPA

had delegated the authority to implement and enforce the

benzene NESHAP in Texas.

Mr. Garza provided the TACB a detailed breakdown

of annual bezene consumption and purchases for Bishop.

His letter and attachments showed that Bishop recycled

benzene and that its total consumption and purchases of

benzene for each of the prior six years were less than

1,000 megagrams.

In response to Mr. Garza’s letter, another TACB rep-

resentative (Mr. Rodgers) informed Mr. Garza about an

® The definition of the verb “apply” includes, “To ask or seek aid,

employment, or admission.” Webster’s II New Riverside University

Dictionary.

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55a

August 20, 1984 letter sent from EPA Region VI (EPA’s

regional office for Texas) to a Texaco Chemical Com-

pany facility in that same EPA Region. The letter to

Texaco said that the term “use” was “not meant to imply

consumption,” but rather was “meant to reflect the overall

quantity of benzene used in equipment at a facility,” and

that the “total quantity in use at a facility needs to be

considered” not just consumption.

After receiving a copy of that letter in September 1984,

Mr. Garza called the TACB and discussed the matter

with Mr. Palmer, the director of the TACB region re-

sponsible for the Bishop Plant. After reviewing the Tex-

aco letter and checking with EPA, the TACB told Mr.

Garza that the TACB wanted additional information re-

garding the amount of benzene “kept at the Bishop Plant

site at any point in time.” In response, on October 22,

1984, Mr. Garza sent another letter to the TACB, ex-

plaining that the maximum amount of benzene present at

Bishop, both in equipment and Storage, was less than

1,000 megagrams a year.

Before responding to Mr. Garza’s letters, Sabino

Gomez, then Director of TACB’s Compliance Division,

conferred with EPA Region VI about EPA’s interpreta-

tion of the word “use” in the exemption. From those

conversations, Mr. Gomez understood that EPA. inter-

preted the exemption to be based not on benzene con-

sumption at a plant site, but rather on what a plant’s

inventory of benzene was. Mr. Gomez also specifically

asked EPA Region VI “whether ‘designed’ is the key

word in this rule.” EPA Region VI staff, after consulting

with EPA’s Office of Air Quality Planning and Standards

in North Carolina, informed Mr. Gomez, “design capa-

city, irrespective of actual use. is the operating factor.” *°

1° The government has not set forth any evidence which indicates

that EPA told Mr. Gomez or anyone else at the TACB that “de-

signed to use” was to be interpreted consistent with the multiple

counting approach.

56a

On the basis of those conversations with EPA and

based on the information in Mr. Garza’s August and

October 1984 letters, the TACB confirmed—by letter of

December 7, 1984—that Bishop was exempt from the

benzene NESHAP. Significantly (for purposes of this liti-

gation), as soon as Hochest Celanese received the con-

firmation letter from the TACB, it circulated the informa-

tion to company personnel whose responsibilities included

the Celriver Plant.

TACB sent EPA a copy of the December 7, 1984 let-

ter confirming the exempt status of the Bishop Plant.

After receiving the letter on December 21, 1984, EPA

did not seek further information from either the TACB

or Hoechst Celanese, nor did EPA indicate that it dis-

agreed with the TACB’s confirmation of the exempt status

of a plant that recycled benzene as Bishop (and Celriver)

did.

During this same period, Hoechst Celanese was also

evaluating the terms of the exemption for its Pampa

Plant. Like Celriver and Bishop, Pampa then recycled

benzene continuously through a closed-loop system. Un-

like Celriver and Bishop, however, in 1984 Pampa was

consuming more than 1,000 megagram of benzene per

year. Consequently, in September 1984, the Pampa Plant

applied to the TACB for a two-year waiver from com-

pliance with the benzene NESHAP so that the plant could

become exempt from the benzene NESHAP by reducing

“the quantity of benzene consumed in the plant to less

than 1,000 megagrams.” The TACB approved the waiver

request for Pampa on April 9, 1985, stating that if ben-

zene consumption were reduced to 1,000 megagrams per

year by June 1986, the exemption would apply. Copies

of both the waiver request and TACB approval were sent

to EPA Region VI.

In June 1986, the Pampa Plant reported to the TACB

that the facility had reduced its benzene consumption to

less than 1,000 megagrams per year and was therefore

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57a

entitled to the exemption. The Company provided EPA

Region VI with a copy of the letter. On December 9,

1986, EPA Region VI inspector George Marusak con-

ducted a compliance monitoring inspection at the Pampa

Plant, during which he and the TACB evaluated whether

Pampa was in compliance with the benzene NESHAP.

Dr. Marusak’s Compliance Monitoring Report concluded

that Pampa was exempt because it had reduced its “con-

sumption of benzene to less than 1,000 Mg per year.”

This report was received and approved by Dr. Marusak’s

supervisors at EPA Region VI.”!

As discussed later in this opinion, the Company did

not communicate with EPA about an exemption specifi-

cally for the Celriver Plant until 1989. The facts reveal,

however, that it was confirmed to the Company by EPA

representatives that Hoeschst Celanese’s other plants

Which used benzene in identical processes were exempt.

Although the Company did not formally apply to the EPA

for an exemption for Celriver, it did so indirectly through

its communications with EPA regarding its Texas plants,

which used essentially the same process as Celriver.

Therefore, the court declines to accept the EPA’s asser-

tion that a formal application was a necessary prerequisite

to qualifying for the exemption and concludes that the

communications with EPA were sufficient to qualify for

an exemption for the Celriver Plant.

IV.

The second issue before the court is whether Hoechst

Celanese received fair notice of the government’s inter-

pretation of the benzene NESHAP exemption, as re-

quired under constitutionally based principles of due

In addition to these two Texas plants, Hoechst Celanese also

operated the Celeo Plant in Virginia. In 1984, Virginia’s State

Air Pollution Control Board confirmed that the Celco Plant was

exempt from the NESHAP based on a single counting of benzene

at the plant site.

58a

process. Hoechst Celanese is not liable and is not sub-

ject to penalties if the multiple counting interpretation

described and deferred to above™ is not “ascertainably

certain” from the regulatory language and the Adminis-

trator’s statements in promulgating the rule. See General

Electric, 53 F.3d at 1328-29, 1333-34. For the reasons

discussed below, the court determines that Hoechst Cel-

anese is not liable and is not subject to penalties.

A. The “Fair Notice’ Standard ™

Where an agency has provided no pre-enforcement

warning of its interpretation, the question facing a review-

ing court is “whether the regulated party received, or

12 During the past 12 years, the government has provided several

different, inconsistent articulations and applications of a multiple

counting approach. Hoechst Celanese argues that none of those is

a cogent explanation of how to apply a multiple counting approach in

a manner that will consistently provide the same result at the same

plant. In fact, although the government has calculated Celriver’s

“use” of benzene based on the benzene flow through two specific

internal pieces of equipment at that plant, it is not clear why the

government chose those particular pieces over the many other

flanges, valves, and other pieces of equipment in benzene service

at Celriver.

18 The government contends that Hoechst Celanese is in actuality

asserting a defense of estoppel. It is well-settled that estoppel gen-

erally does not run against the United States. Office of Personnel

Management v. Richmond, 496 U.S. 414 (1990). This principle is

grounded on the separation of powers doctrine. U.S. v. Marine

Shale Processors, 1996 WL 185815 (5th Cir. 1996). (“Judicial

adoption of estoppel based on agency misrepresentation would ...

vest authority in [government] agents that Congress would be

powerless to constrain.”) “Fair notice” on the other hand, is a

principle rooted in the due process clause of the United States

Constitution. See Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,

339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950) (The due process clause “prevents defer-

ence from validating the application of a regulation that fails to

give fair warning of the conduct it prohibits or requires.’”’). In

determining that Hoechst Celanese should not be sanctioned in this

case, the court relies on the fair notice doctrine, not principles of

estoppel.

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59a

should have received, notice of the agency’s interpretation

in the most obvious way of all: by reading the regula-

tions.” General Electric Co., 53 F.3d at 1329. Fair

notice is not provided unless a regulated party acting in

good faith is able to identify with “ascertainable cer-

tainty,” on the face of regulations and other public state-

ments issued by the agency, the standard to which the

regulating agency expects it to conform. Id. Without

such fair notice, the regulated entity does not commit a

wrong when it fails to meet the regulatory standard.

Unclear or ambiguous regulations do not provide the

requisite notice. If a violation of a regulation subjects pri-

vate parties to criminal or civil sanctions, a regulation

cannot be construed to mean what an agency intended but

did not adequately express. Gates & Fox, 790 F.2d 154,

156 (D.C. Cir. 1986), quoting Diamond Roofing Co. v.

OSHRC, 528 F.2d 645 (5th Cir. 1976). The test is

“not what [the agency] might possibly have intended, but

what [was] said.” U.S. v. Trident Seafoods Corp., 60

F.3d 556, 559 (9th Cir. 1995) (brackets in Original).

A regulated party may also be found to have been

given fair notice of the agency’s interpretation in those

situations where, prior to the commencement of enforce-

ment efforts, the regulated party was given actual notice

of the interpretation. See General Electric. Co., 53 F.3d

at 1329. However, such notice must be an “authoritative

interpretation of the regulation” from the regulating

agency. Gates & Fox Co., 790 F.2d at 157.

Particularly compelling evidence that fair notice of a

rule has not been given exists where the agency itself has

not provided a definitive or consistent reading of the regu-

lation. See, e.g., General Electric Co., 53 F.3d at 1332:

Diamond Roofing Co., 528 F.2d at 649. When the

“agency itself is uncertain of the meaning of its regula-

tion” and “agency personnel give conflicting advice to pri-

vate parties about how to comply with it,” it is “arbitrary

60a

to find the regulation ‘clear.’” Rollins v. Envtl. Services

v. EPA, 937 F.2d 649, 653 (D.C. Cir. 1991).

Due process concerns are clearly raised when unpub-

lished “clarifying” interpretations cause the regulatory lan-

guage and published guidance to be misleading. Mislead-

ing regulatory language, even if “clarified” with the best

of intentions, is itself an ongoing cause of noncompliance

and confusion. Unlike the unpublished clarification, the

Official :anguage is clearly authoritative and available to

the public. Only the agency can amend the regulation

and publish guidance when correcting an “accident” to

ensure that they clearly communicate the meaning that

will be enforced. Awarding penalties where the problem

is the language chosen by the agency, rather than any un-

willingness to comply would only “delay the day when

. regulations will be written in clear and concise lan-

guage” so that regulated parties “will be better able to

understand and observe them.” Diamond Roofing Co. v.

OSHRC, 528 F.2d 645, 650 (5th Cir. 1976).

B. Information in the Regulatory Record

Even though the court has deferred to the EPA’s inter-

pretation of the NESHAP exemption as permitting a mul-

tiple counting of recycled benzene, the court believes that

the regulatory record in this case “* does not provide fair

notice of that interpretation. Indeed, Hoechst Celanese

has provided numerous examples of ways in which rule-

'4 The record includes the rule itself, the Preamble, and documents

referred to and incorporated into the Preamble as part of the Ad-

ministrator’s further description and interpretation of the regula-

tion. See 5 U.S.C. §551(4) (definition of “rule” in the APA); 44

U.S.C. §1507(4) (contents of the Federal Register “shall be

judicially noticed”). Never having been superseded by a subsequent

rulemaking, the Preamble is as much a current statement of what

the regulation means today as it was when the benzene NESHAP

was published on June 6, 1984. It provides evidence of the Admin-

istrator’s intent. See State cf Vermont v. Thomas, 850 F.2d 99,

103 (2nd Cir. 1988).

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6la

making record statements fail to give notice of a multiple

count meaning. These examples and the court’s analysis

thereof, have been set forth on pages 19-21 of this memo-

randum opinion and order.

Additionally, Hoechst Celanese provides an affidavit

from Robert Ajax, Chief of the EPA unit that actually

developed the benzene NESHAP. Mr. Ajax states that

EPA chose to have the exemption on benzene “use,”

based on single counting, because it was an easy-to-apply

surrogate for the cost-effectiveness policy that EPA wanted

the exemption to implement. It is “unequivocally clear,”

Mr. Ajax says, that “internal recycle”’—i.e., multiple

counting—was never “considered [nor suggested as the

basis for the NESHAP exemption.”

Similarly, the rulemaking record is inconsistent con-

cerning EPA’s claim that a multiple counting approach

would ensure that facilities with low fugitive emissions or

few pieces of equipment in benzene service would be ex-

empt while those with higher emissions and more equip-

ment would be subject to the NESHAP. As noted in At-

tachment F of Hoechst Celanese’s Initial Brief, under the

government’s approach, some very large emitters of ben-

zene would be exempt and some plants with very low emis-

sions and very few pieces of equipment in benzene service

would not be exempt.

In addition, the rulemaking record is somewhat incon-

sistent as to EPA’s claim that it intended to exempt only

small sources. The Preamble shows that EPA also in-

tended to exempt users of small amounts of benzene—a

category that would include all those that recycled ben-

zene as a solvent or quenching agent, as was done at

Hoechst Celanese’s Celriver Plant and at the pharmaceuti-

cal facility described by—and declared to be exempt in—

the NESAP Preamble, 49 Fed. Reg. 23510 (June 6,

1984).

'® According to Hoechst Celanese, when EPA was developing its

benzene NESHAP, refineries and feedstock users of benzene pro-

62a

In this regard, the court also finds compelling that in

the months (and years) following promulgation of the

NESHAP, because of the confusion precipitated by EPA

staffers’ conflicting internal communications, various EPA

offices understood the exemption in a variety of different

ways."° In fact, the record in this case establishes that on

various occasions from 1984 through at least 1990, EPA

advised some facilities that they were exempt based on a

single counting of recycled benzene and in other cases,

EPA did not dispute state exemption decisions based on

single counting. If the rulemaking record did not give

EPA staffers notice of a multiple counting interpretation,

it cannot reasonably be said that Hoechst Celanese should

have understood that to be what the Administrator meant.

The court concludes from all this that although the

multiple counting approach is reasonable enough to be

sustained when deference is given to the government’s

present interpretation, the regulatory language and admin-

istrative record do not afford sufficient notice of the EPA

interpretation.

C. Actual Notice from Events in 1984-1986

EPA argues that, apart from anything contained in the

public record, Hoechst Celanese had actual notice that

EPA was interpreting the benzene NESHAP exemption

as requiring a multiple counting of recycled benzene. Ac-

cording to EPA, this defeats Hoechst Celanese’s reliance

on a “fair notice” defense. EPA’s actual notice argu-

duced or consumed millions of megagrams of benzene annually, In

contrast, those that recycled benzene as a solvent or quenching agent

—as Hoechst Celanese’s Celriver Plant did—collectively used or

consumed a total of only 1,500 megagrams annually.

'® Hoechst Celanese points out that at least some of that confu-

sion was generated by EPA staff’s issuance of guidance documents

that contradicted the Administrator’s clear language in the benzene

NESHAP Preamble (calling for single counting) and tried to de-

velop alternative approaches.

|

.

;

63a

ments are based largely on the previously described events

that occurred in Texas after promulgation of the NESHAP,

in particular Hoechst Celanese’s receipt of a copy of the

Texaco letter, which stated that the word “use” was to

mean the “total quantity in use at a facility.” "" Although

the Texaco letter cannot reasonably be said to have pro-

vided Hoechst Celanese with actual notice that its benzene

usage was to be determined by multiple counting,’* EPA

argues that the Texaco letter did give Hoechst Celanese

notice that the Agency did not intend to equate “use” with

“consumption” and that, in turn, should have prompted

Hoechst Celanese to ask EPA staff—rather than the

TACB-——whether its plants were exempt. Instead of seek-

ing such confirmation, the government suggests that

Hoechst Celanese chose to remain ignorant of EPA’s read-

ing of the regulation.

The court disagrees. This argument ignores that

Hoechst Celanese sought—and received—confirmation of

the exempt status of its plants from both State regulators

'’ The government attaches significant weight to a handwritten

phrase at the top of Hoechst Celanese’s copy of the Texaco letter

which stated “Read it and Weep”. The words were written by Mr.

Garza and the memo was sent to Jim Mullins, Garza’s counterpart

at Hoechst Celanese’s Pampa Plant. The government maintains

that this comment is affirmative proof that Mr. Garza knew that

EPA had adopted the multiple counting approach. After reviewing

this letter as a whole, the court declines to make this bold presump-

tion. Rather, the court finds that the most plausible explanation for

this comment was that Mr. Garza read this letter to mean that the

EPA might be reading the exemption as calling for an evaluation

of the overall quantity of benzene used at a plant—that is, the

plant’s consumption of benzene plus the amount of benzene in

service at the plant. Mr. Garza testified that he believed this

approach would not affect his plant, but would affect Mr. Mullins’

Pampa Plant and thus, would require his colleague to work harder.

‘8 Hoechst Celanese points out that according to the testimony

of both the author of the EPA Region VI letter and the recipient

of that letter, neither read it as saying that “use” is to be deter-

mined based on a multiple counting benzene at a plant site.

64a

and EPA Region VI. In fact, Hoechst Celanese received

a copy of the Texaco letter only because the Company

went to the appropriate agency (the TACB*) and asked

it to confirm the exemption’s applicability. TACB re-

sponded to Hoechst Celanese’s inquiry only after first

conferring with EPA about the matter.

Nor does the court find merit in EPA’s argument that

the TACB’s reading of the regulation was irrational and

thus should have prodded the Company to seek further

guidance from EPA. The TACB’s single count applica-

tion of the Texaco letter—although not based on just

consumption—was still consistent with a single count

“nameplate capacity” concept, which the NESHAP rule-

making record suggests may be the basis of the exemp-

tion.”

Other government arguments that the TACB’s interpre-

tation was invalid are not relevant here. The TACB was

not saying that it advocated that interpretation. Rather,

as explained by Mr. Gomez in his affidavit and by Mr.

Garza in his deposition, the TACB was simply stating the

interpretation that it thought was being advocated by EPA

staff. The court finds unreasonable EPA’s suggestion that

Hoechst Celanese had an affirmative obligation to ques-

tion its exempt status further when its plants were exempt

based on (1) a “use equals consumption” reading of the

rule, (2) an alternative (“use equals inventory”) reading

which both the TACB and Hoechst Celanese believed to

be how EPA was reading the rule, and (3) any other

19 As noted above, EPA had delegated to the TACB the authority

to address these issues. The TACB did so, continually informing

EPA what it was doing. There is nothing in the record to indicate

that EPA at any time advised the TACB—or Hoechst Celanese—

that the TACB’s actions were improper as to either the Bishop or

Pampa Plants.

20 TACB had before it information reflecting not just consump-

tion, but the “overall quantity of benzene” physically available to be

used in one year—the amount on site at the beginning of the year

plus all benzene added during the year to make up for consumption.

65a

reading of the exemption that called for a single counting

of benzene at a plant site. The whole point of the “fair

notice” line of cases is that, as a matter of due process,

the regulatory obligations to which persons are subject

flow from what the regulations themselves say, with ascer-

tainable certainty. Companies are not obliged to seek

“clarifications” from agency staff of every conceivable

ambiguity that might be lurking in regulatory language.

An “actual notice” argument can be predicated only upon

notice that Hoechst Celanese actually received, not upon

notice it might have received if it had continued to make

unlimited additional inquiries.

The court also finds compelling that even if Hoechst

Celanese had asked more individuals within EPA about

the meaning of the exemption, it is far from clear that the

Company would have been told about EPA’s multiple

counting interpretation of the rule. As noted above, be-

cause of confusion generated in large part by internal

memoranda from EPA staffers seeking to implement a

multivle counting approach, EPA’s regional offices were

inconsistent as to how the regulation should be applied

and, on various occasions from 1984 through at least

1990, told inquiring companies that the exemption was

to be based on a single counting of recycled benzene.

D. Evaluating Actual Notice After Commencement of

Enforcement Against the Celriver Plant

Finally, the Government argues that Hoechst Celanese

cannot rely on its “fair notice” defense for any violations

that occurred after the summer of 1989, when EPA Re-

gion IV (EPA’s regional office in Atlanta) sent letters

to the Celriver Plant concerning its compliance with the

benzene NESHAP. The facts relevant to this argument,

again derived from undisputed record evi nce, are the

following.

In June 1989, EPA Region IV sent a letter to Hoechst

Celanese, stating that Celriver “may be subject” to the

66a

benzene NESHAP and asking for information on Celriv-

er’s benzene “throughput on an annual basis.” The letter

defined “throughput” as the “total cumulative flow through

the process rather than net benzene consumption or us-

age.” Hoechst Celanese replied on June 26, 1989, re-

porting that Celriver was exempt because the plant’s con-

sumption of benzene was far less than 1,000 megagrams

annually.

On August 18, 1989, in reply to Hoechst Celanese’s

June 26 letter, EPA Region IV sent a second letter stat-

ing, “it appears that you are unaware of EPA’s interpre-

tation of benzene usage as the term is used to determine

applicabiilty . . . .” Attempting, in its words, “to clarify

what is meant by benzene usage,” EPA gave an example

of how to calculate usage in a closed-recirculation system.

In the example, benzene was considered “used” each time

it was recycled. The letter indicated that this “interpreta-

tion of the term benzene use” was “based upon EPA

Headquarters guidance provided shortly after [the ben-

bene NESHAP] was promulgated” and that the basis for

whatever was in that guidance (copies of which were not

provided to Hoechst Celanese) was in the Agency’s final

BID.

In a September 1989 cover letter indicating that it did

not then agree that multiple counting was a part of the

benzene NESHAP exemption, Hoechst Celanese neverthe-

less provided the “throughput” calculations in the manner

that Region IV had requested, by using flow rates at sev-

eral points inside the process. This produced a Region

[V-requested “throughput” calculation of over 2.5 million

megagrams of benzene per year—a number that was

orders of magnitude higher than the amount that the Cel-

river Plant ever had on site. While awaiting a response

from EPA, Celriver also began work to determine what

would need to be done to implement the NESHAP at the

Celriver Plant if that was determined to be necessary.

2

67a

On February 20, 1990, EPA Region IV sent the Cel-

river Plant a formal notice that EPA considered that plant

to be in violation of the benzene NESHAP “based upon

information provided by the [Celriver Plant] in response

to EPA letters . . . dated June 13, 1989 and August 18,

1989.” The Company set up a meeting with Region IV

to discuss the exemption interpretation. At that April

1990 meeting, the Company affirmed that although it con-

tinued to believe Celriver was exempt, it would meet the

terms of the benzene NESHAP at the Celriver Plant.

EPA Region IV then asked for—and within a few days

received from Hoechst Celanese—the schedule that

Hoechst Celanese intended to follow in meeting the terms

of the NESHAP at Celriver. That schedule showed that

while Hoechst Celanese could have implemented the

NESHAP between 1990 and 1992 at a cost of between

$2 and $3 million, the Company planned another much

more expensive—approach, parts of which could be im-

plemented more promptly. Specifically, Hoechst Celanese

described a program to phase out the use of benzene en-

tirely at one of its processes in less than one year, at an

additional cost of $8 million. Hoechst Celanese estimated

that it would be able to meet all remaining terms of the

NESHAP no later than December 3 1, 1992.

The Celriver Plant then met the terms of the NESHAP

by September 1991—i.e., within approximately eighteen

months of the time that Hoechst Celanese gave its com-

pliance schedule to EPA and within approximately two

years of the time the Government contends the Company

was given actual notice of EPA’s interpretation." Later

71 By August 1991, the Company believed that it had imple-

mented all the terms of the NESHAP except for one pressure relief

device, which Hoechst Celanese apparently did not begin operating

in conformity with the NESHAP until the following month. Fol-

lowing that tir’ as explained by counsel for Hoechst Celanese

during oral argument, Hcoechst Celanese conducted a voluntary

environmental audit at Celriver to determine if all plant equipment

in benzene service was meeting the terms of the NESHAP. As a

68a

Celriver completely phased-out benzene usage at a cost

of more than $40 million.

Based on these facts, the court concludes that it is in-

appropriate to find Hoechst Celanese liable or to impose

penalties for actions it took between 1990 and 1992.

The court bases this conclusion on several factors.

First. the court concludes that Hoechst Celanese did

not have actual notice of EPA’s multiple counting inter-

pretation in the summer of 1989. The interpretation in

the letters from EPA Region IV were, after all, contrary

to statements in the Preamble and contrary to the inter-

pretations of the exemption that the Company had re-

ceived from EPA Region VI, and state agencies in Texas,

and Virginia. Thus, even if Hoechst Celanese may have

known from its correspondence that individuals in the

Atlanta regional office were then subscribing to a multiple

counting interpretation of the exemption, Hoechst Celan-

esc had a legitimate basis for believing that EPA’s Region

IV office was not speaking for the Administrator. In fact,

the multiple counting reading of the exemption was not

an authoritative reading even within Region IV since,

during the same time period, other individuals within

EPA Region IV were interpreting the exemption as call-

ing for a single counting of benzene at a plant site.”

Hoechst Celanese could not have been put “on notice”

that EPA had adopted a multiple counting interpretation

result of that self-audit, Hoechst Celanese discovered a single valve

(out of a total of 174) that was not meeting the terms of the

NESHAP: the Company replaced that valve by August 1992. The

court. concludes that Hoechst Celanese’s treatment of this single

valve does not warrant a finding of liability. Whatever the explana-

tion. cven this task was completed before the December 1992 dead-

line specified in the compliance schedule which Hoechst Celanese

submitted to EPA.

22.On June 26, 1989, EPA Region IV concluded that the U.S. De-

partment of Energy’s Savannah River facility (which recirculated

benzene) would be exempt based on a its “ ‘design’ benzene con-

sumption rate.”

Gieicn acacia ame

69a

when, at the same time, the Agency itself was not consist-

ently embracing such an interpretation.

Similarly, this court concludes that none of EPA Re-

gion IV’s communications with Hoechst Celanese—up to

and including the issuance of a notice of violation (NOV)

on February 20, 1990—can be deemed as having pro-

vided Hoeenst Celanese an authoritative interpretation of

the benzene exemption, when that interpretation is con-

tradicted on its face by the language used by the Admin-

istrator in promulgating the final rule and was not com-

municated to Hoechst Celanese by the Agency as a

whole.~ Even though the court today concludes that the

multiple counting interpretation is a “permissible” read-

ing of the benzene exemption, that ruling does not reach

back in time to establish that multiple counting was the

Agency’s consistently held interpretation in 1989, 1990,

or even in 1992, by which time the Celriver Plant was

meeting all the terms of the benzene NESHAP.

In any case, this court need not decide whether (and.

if so, when) Hoechst Celanese was given authoritative

actual notice of the Agency’s present interpretation. For

even if Hoechst Celanese received actual notice, it is un-

disputed that Hoechst Celanese acted responsibly to meet

—and far exceed—the terms of the NESHAP in advance

of EPA-accepted deadlines. In fact, by spending an addi-

tional $8 million, it did so within the two-year compliance

period that was available to qualifying sources under the

waiver provisions in the NESHAP.

It is also undisputed that EPA never objected to the

compliance schedule submitted by Hoechst Celanese in

23 Hoechst Celanese has pointed out that just one week after EPA

Region IV issued its NOV for the Celriver Plant, EPA gave another

company a conflicting single count interpretation of the exemption.

A February 28, 1990 EPA Region VI inspection report for the

Howell Hydrocarbons facility (which recycled benzene in a manner

similar to that at Celriver) indicated that facility was exempt from

the benzene NESHAP because less than 1,000 megagrams per year

of benzene was “purchased as make-up material.”

70a

April 1990. This is significant because had EPA at any

point wished to compel Hoechst Celanese to meet the

terms of the benzene NESHAP more expeditiously, it had

options at its disposal that it never exercised.“ In such

circumstances, where Hoechst Celanese never conceded

that it was subject to the NESHAP but nonetheless agreed

to implement the requirements of the rule and where EPA

never objected to—or took steps to shorten—the com-

pliance schedule that Hoechst Celanese submitted, funda-

mental considerations of fairness argue against a finding

of liability for that time period.

Underscoring this conclusion is the fact that the Clean

Air Act did not contemplate immediate compliance with

the benzene NESHAP. Section 112(c) of the Act—as it

read at the time of promulgation of the benzene NESHAP

—specified that those subject to a hazardous pollutant

emission standard had 90 days from the effective date of

the rule to come into compliance. This 90-day period,

though, could be extended for up to an additional 21

months (a total of two years) upon satisfaction of the

standards for a waiver. EPA’s benzene NESHAP contains

provisions mirroring the statute’s two-year waiver require-

ment. See 40 C.F.R. § 61.11.

In summary, had the benzene exemption provided fair

notice that the Celriver Plant was not exempt when the

rule was first promulgated, .ae Company would have been

able to apply for and likely obtain a waiver for Celriver—

as it did for its Pampa Plant—giving it up to two years

in which to come into compliance. And, the facts show,

the plant would have been able to come into compliance

within a two-year period. It was not the Company's fault

that the opportunity to obtain a waiver may have passed

by the time Hoechst Celanese was finally given actual no-

2% For instance, EPA could have issued an administrative order

pursuant to §113(a) of the Clean Air Act or the Agency could

have pursued a civil enforcement action for an injunction under

§ 113(b).

————

ESR nse One eNO ne

Tila

tice by EPA that the Celriver Plant was not exempt.”

The Company’s efforts to meet the terms of the NESHAP

should be evaluated in light of the additional time for com-

pliance to which it would likely have been entitled in

1984,

In light of the above facts, due process precludes a

finding of liabiilty in this case. As one of EPA’s own

administrative law judges aptly put it:

In order to continue to enjoy the confidence of the

regulated community, the public, and the courts in

the conduct of its enforcement activities, the govern-

ment must “occasionally bear the consequences of

unclear wording in the extensive and detailed im-

plementing regulations for its Statutory responsibili-

ties. This should be regarded as a small price to pay

for the maintenance of credibility and public trust,

and for a reputation of fairness in dealing with the

regulated community.”

> During oral argument, counsel for the government disputed

whether the Celriver Plant would have qualified for a waiver, sug-

gesting that waivers were not available for coming into compliance

with leak detection and equipment tagging requirements. This

ignores that Hoechst Celanese submitted to EPA, in April 1990,

a comprehensi’'e and coordinated plan for going beyond the terms of

the benzene NESHAP and phasing out the use of benzene alto-

gether in one of two process units at Celriver. Even if the court

were to assume that extensions of time in order to comply solely

with the leak detection and equipment tagging requirements were

not generally contemplated under the waiver provision, the court

is unwilling to conclude that the Agency would have been without

discretion to grant Hoechst Celanese a waiver for the time neces-

sary for the Company to implement its overall compliance plan,

which included the additional environmental benefit of eliminating

the plant’s use of benzene in one process. Cf. Monsanto Co. v.

EPA, 19 F.3d 1201, 1207 (7th Cir. 1994) (The Clean Air Act’s

“waiver” provision does not require the source to install the con-

trols that will achieve compliance at the earliest possible date,” and

if a company “has a choice between two control strategies, the

EPA has authority to grant a waiver for a pollution prevention

strategy even if that strategy would take slightly longer to imple-

ment than a less desirable strategy.”).

i as

72a

In Re Phibro, 1994 CAA LEXIS 18 (Oct. 5, 1994) (Ex.

110), quoting In the Matter of K. O. Mfg., Inc., Docket

No. EPCRA-VII-89-T-611 at 17 (Feb. 28, 1993).

Conclusion

For all of the foregoing reasons, the court hereby deter-

mines that the EPA’s interpretation of 40 C.F.R. § 61.110

(c)(2) is permissible and that interpretation is hereby

sustained by the court. The government’s motion for sum-

mary judgment is granted to this extent only. The court

also grants, in part, the motion for summary judgment by

Hoechst Celanese Corporation, awarding no civil penalty

to the plaintiff because Hoechst Celanese did not receive

fair notice of the EPA interpretation during the time

period it was using benzene at the Celriver Plant. Each

side shall bear its own costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

/s/ Joseph F. Anderson, Jr.

JOSEPH F. ANDERSON, JR.

United States District Judge

May 10, 1996

Columbia, South Carolina

[Order Omitted in Printing]

73a

[Filed May 10, 1996]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

ROCK HILL DIVISION

C/A No. 0:92-1879-17

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

V.

HOECHST CELANESE CORPORATION,

Defendant.

JUDGMENT

Decision by the Court. This action came to hearing be-

fore the court. The Court having duly heard and granted

in part the parties’ cross motions for summary judgment.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that summary

judgment is entered for the plaintiff, United States of

America, as to the issue of the EPA’s interpretation of 40

C.F.R. §$ 61.110(c)(2) and such interpretation is sus-

tained by the court.

IT IS FURTHER ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that

summary judgment is entered for the defendant Hoechst

Celanese as to the issue of awarding no civil penalty to

the plaintiff.

Each side shall bear its own costs.

Date May 10, 1996 LARRY W. PROPES

Columbia, South Carolina Clerk

/s/ Gail D. Hayden

By: Gait D. HAYDEN

Deputy Clerk

ee

74a

APPENDIX C

Filed December 23, 1997

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-2003

CA-92-1879-0-17

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-A ppellant

HOECHST CELANESE CORPORATION,

Defendant-A ppellee

CHEMICAL MANUFACTURE’S ASSOCIATION; CORPORATE

ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT COUNCIL; NATIONAL

ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS; PHARMACEUTICAL

RESEARCH AND MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA; COM-

MONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA; VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY; SCIENCE & ENVIRONMEN-

TAL PoLicy PROJECT; TEXAS INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCE-

MENT OF CHEMICAL TECHNOLOGY INCORPORATED;

NATIONAL SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS;

TEXAS NATURAL RESOURCE CONSERVATION COMMIS-

SION (TNRCC), Amici Curiae

No. 96-2051

CA-92-1879-0-17

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff-A ppellee

V.

HOECHST CELANESE CORPORATION,

Defendant-A ppellant

75a

CHEMICAL MANUFACTURER’S ASSOCIATION: CORPORATE

ENVIRONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT COUNCIL; NATIONAL

ASSOCIATION OF MANUFACTURERS; PHARMACEUTICAL

RESEARCH AND MANUFACTURERS OF AMERICA; Com-

MONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA; VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF

ENVIRONMENTAL QUALITY: SCIENCE & ENVIRONMEN-

TAL POLICY PROJECT; TEXAS INSTITUTE FOR ADVANCE-

MENT OF CHEMICAL TECHNOLOGY INCORPORATED;

NATIONAL SOCIETY OF PROFESSIONAL ENGINEERS;

TEXAS NATURAL RESOURCE CONSERVATION ComMISs-

SION (TNRCC), Amici Curiae

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING WITH

SUGGESTION FOR REHEARING IN BANC

The appellee’s petition for rehearing and suggestion for

rehearing in banc were submitted to this Court. As no

member of this Court or the panel requested a poll on

the suggestion for rehearing in banc, and

As the panel considered the petition fo: rehearing and

is of the opinion that it should be denied,

IT IS ORDERED that the petition for rehearing and

suggestion for rehearing in banc are denied.

For the Court,

/s/ Patricia S. Connor

Clerk

iii

76a

APPENDIX D

FILED December 31, 1997

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

No. 96-2003

CA-92-1879-0-17

US

v.

HoECHST CELANESE

No. 96-2051

CA-92-1879-0-17

US

v.

HOECHST CELANESE

MANDATE

The judgment of this Court dated 10/27/97 takes

effect today.

PATRICIA S. CONNOR

Clerk

See eT en eT

77a

APPENDIX E

Excerpt from Section 112 of the Clean Air Act (Pre-1990)

§§ 7412. National emission standards for hazardous air

pollutants

(a) Definitions

For purposes of this section—

(1) The term “hazardous air pollutant” means an

air pollutant to which no ambient air quality stand-

ard is applicable and which in the judgment of the

Administrator causes, or contributes to, air pollution

which may reasonably be anticipated to result in an

increase in mortality or an increase in serious irre-

versible, or incapacitating reversible, illness.

(2) The term “new source” means a stationary

source the construction or modification of which is

commenced after the Administrator proposes regula-

tions under this section establishing an emission

standard which will be applicable to such source.

(3) The terms “stationary source”, “modifica-

tion”, “owner or operator” and “existing source”

shall have the same meaning as such terms have

under section 7411(a) of this title.

(b) List of hazardous air pollutants; emission standards;

pollution control techniques

(1)(A) The Administrator shall, within 90 days after

December 31, 1970, publish (and shall from time to time

thereafter revise) a list which includes each hazardous

air pollutant for which he intends to establish an emis-

sion standard under this section.

(B) Within 180 days after the inclusion of any air

pollutant in such list, the Administrator shall publish pro-

posed regulations establishing emission standards for such

pollutant together with a notice of a public hearing within

thirty days. Not later than 180 days after such publica-

78a

tion, the Administrator shall prescribe an emission stand-

ard for such pollutant, unless he finds, on the basis of

information presented at such hearings, that such pol-

lutant clearly is not a hazardous air pollutant. The Ad-

ministrator shall establish any such standard at the level

which in his judgment provides an ample margin of safety

to protect the public health from such hazardous air

pollutant.

(C) Any emission standard established pursuant to this

section shall become effective upon promulgation.

(2) The Administrator shall, from time to time, issue

information on pollution control techniques for air pol-

lutants subject to the provisions of this section.

(c) Prohibited acts; exemption

(1) After the effective date of any emission standard

under this section—

(A) no person may construct any new source or

modify any existing source which, in the Administra-

tor’s judgment, will emit an air pollutant to which

such standard applies unless the Administrator finds

that such source if properly operated will not cause

emissions in violation of such standard, and

(B) no air pollutant to which such standard ap-

plies may be emitted from any stationary source in

violation of such standard, except that in the case of

an existing source—

(i) such standard shall not apply until 90

days after its effective date, and

(ii) the Administrator may grant a waiver

permitting such source_a period of up to two

years after the effective date of a standard to

comply with the standard, if he finds that such

period is necessary for the installation of con-

trols and that steps will be taken during the

period of the waiver to assure that the health of

79a

persons will be protected from imminent en-

dangerment.

(2) The President may exempt any stationary source

from compliance with paragraph (1) for a period of not

more than two years if he finds that the technology to

implement such standards is not available and the opera-

tion of such source is required for reasons of national

security. An exemption under this paragraph may be

extended for one or more additional periods, each period

not to exceed two years. The President shall make a

report to Congress with respect to each exemption (or

extension thereof) made under this paragraph.

(d) State implementation and enforcement

(1) Each State may develop and submit to the Admin-

istrator a procedure for implementing and enforcing emis-

sion standards for hazardous air pollutants for stationary

sources located in such State. If the Administrator finds

the State procedure is adequate, he shall delegate to such

State any authority he has under this chapter to implement

and enforce such standards.

(2) Nothing in this subsection shall prohibit the Ad-

ministrator from enforcing any applicable emission stand-

ard under this section.

(e) Design, equipment, work practice, and operational

standards

(1) For purposes of this section, if in the judgment

of the Administrator, it is not feasible to prescribe or en-

force an emission standard for control of a hazardous air

pollutant or pollutants, he may instead promulgate a de-

sign, equipment, work practice, or operational standard,

or combination thereof, which in his judgment is adequate

to protect the public health from such pollutant or pol-

lutants with an ample margin of safety. In the event the

Administrator promulgates a design or equipment stand-

ard under this subsection, he shall include as part of such

Standard such requirements as will assure the proper

80a

operation and maintenance of any such element of design

or equipment.

(2) For the purpose of this subsection, the phrase “not

feasible to prescribe or enforce an emission standard”

means any situation in which the Administrator deter-

mines that (A) a hazardous pollutant or pollutants can-

not be emitted through a conveyance designed and con-

structed to emit or capture such pollutant, or that any

requirement for, or use of, such a conveyance would be

inconsistent with any Federal, State, or local law, or (B)

the application of measurement methodology to a particu-

lar class of sources is not practicable due to technological

or economic limitations.

(3) If after notice and opportunity for public hearing,

any person establishes to the satisfaction of the Adminis-

trator that an alternative means of emission limitation will

achieve a reduction in emissions of any air pollutant at

least equivalent to the reduction in emissions of such air

pollutant achieved under the requirements of paragraph

(1), the Administrator shall permit the use of such alter-

native by the source for purposes of compliance with this

section with respect to such pollutant.

(4) Any standard promulgated under paragraph (1)

shall be promulgated in terms of an emission standard

whenever it becomes feasible to promulgate and enforce

such standard in such terms.

(5) Any design, equipment, work practice, or opera-

tional standard, or any combination thereof, described in

this subsection shall be treated as an emission standard

for purposes of the provisions of this chapter (other than

the provisions of this subsection).

(July 14, 1955, ch. 360, title I, § 112, as added Dec. 31,

1970, Pub. L. 91-604. §4(a), 84 Stat. 1685, and

amended Aug. 7, 1977, Pub. L. 95-95, title I, §§ 109

(d)(2), 110, title IV, § 401(c), 91 Stat. 701, 703, 791;

Nov. 9, 1978, Pub. L. 95-623, § 13(b), 92 Stat. 3458.)

i acta i

GR i.

8la

Excerpt from Section 112 of the Clean Air Act

(After 1990 Amendments)

(f) Standard to protect health and environment

(1) Report

Not later than 6 years after November 15, 1990,

the Administrator shall investigate and report, after

consultation with the Surgeon General and after op-

portunity for public comment, to Congress on—

(A) methods of calculating the risk to

public health remaining, or likely to remain,

from sources subject to regulation under this

ection after the application of standards under

subsection (d) of this section;

(B) the public health significance of such

estimated remaining risk and the technologically

and commercially available methods and costs

of reducing such risks;

(C) the actual health effects with respect to

persons living in the vincinity of sources, .any

available epidemiological or other health studies,

risks presented by background concentrations of

hazardous air pollutants, any uncertainties in

risk assessment methodology or other health

assessment technique, and any negative health

or environmental consequences to the commu-

nity of efforts to reduce such risks; and

(D) recommendations as to legislation §re-

garding such remaining risk.

(2) Emission standards

(A) If Congress does not act on any recommen-

dation submitted under paragraph (1), the Admin-

istrator shall, within 8 years after promulgation of

standards for each category or subcategory of sources

pursuant to subsection (d) of this section, promul-

gate standards for such category or subcategory if

Cee ee enn none nae ere ee oe

82a

promulgation of such standards is required in order

to provide an ample margin of safety to protect

public health in accordance with this section (as in

effect before November 15, 1990) or to prevent,

taking into consideration costs, energy, safety, and

other relevant factors, an adverse environmental

effect. Emission standards promulgated under this

subsection shall provide an ample margin of safety

to protect public health in accordance with this sec-

tion (as in effect before November 15, 1990), unless

the Administrator determines that a more stringent

standard is necessary to prevent, taking into consid-

eration costs, energy, safety, and other relevant fac-

tors, an adverse environmental effect. If standards

promulgated pursuant to subsection (d) of this sec-

tion and applicable to a category or subcategory of

sources emitting a pollutant (or pollutants) classified

as a known, probable or possible human carcinogen

do not reduce lifetime excess cancer risks to the indi-

vidual most exposed to emissions from a source in

the category or subcategory to less than one in one

million, the Administrator shall promulgate standards

under this subsection for such source category.

(B) Nothing in subparagraph (A) or in any

other provision of this section shall be construed as

affecting, or applying to the Administrator’s interpre-

tation of this section, as in effect before November

15, 1990, and set forth in the Federal Register of

September 14, 1989 (54 Federal Register 38044).

(C) The Administrator shall determine whether

or not to promulgate such standards and, if the Ad-

ministrator decides to promulgate such standards,

shall promulgate the standards 8 years after promul-

gation of the standards under subsection (d) of this

section for each source category or subcategory con-

cerned. In the case of categories or subcategories for

which standards under subsection (d) of this section

are required to be promulgated within 2 years after

|

aT Th oe PY

ek ener Oks Oe PR ud te eee

zB

z

=

83a

November 15, 1990, the Administrator shall have

9 years after promulgation of the standards under

subsection (d) of this section to make the determina-

tion under the preceding sentence and, if required, to

promulgate the standards under this paragraph.

(3) Effective date

Any emission standard established pursuant to this

subsection shall become effective upon promulgation.

(4) Prohibition

No air pollutant to which a standard under this

subsection applies may be emitted from any station-

ary source in violation of such standard, except that

in the case of an existing source—

(A) such standard shall not apply until 90

days after its effective date, and

(B) the Administrator may grant a waiver

permitting such source a period of up to 2 years

after the effective date of a standard to comply

with the standard if the Administrator finds that

such period is necessary for the installation of

controls and that steps will be taken during the

period of the waiver to assure that the health

of persons will be protected from imminent en-

dangerment.

(5) Area sources

The Administrator shall not be required to con-

duct any review under this subsection or promulgate

emission limitations under this subsection for any

category or subcategory of area sources that is listed

pursuant to subsection (c) (3) of this section and for

which an emission standard is promulgated pursuant

to subsection (d)(5) of this section.

(6) Unique chemical substances

In establishing standards for the control of unique

chemical substances of listed pollutants without CAS

84a

numbers under this subsection, the Administrator

shall establish such standards with respect to the

health and environmental effects of the substances

actually emitted by sources and direct transformation

byproducts of such emissions in the categories and

subcategories.

Excerpt from Section 301 of the Clean Air Act

Administration

(a) Regulations; delegation of powers and duties; regional

officers and employees

(1) The Administrator is authorized to prescribe such

regulations as are necessary to carry out his functions

under this chapter. The Administrator may delegate to

any officer or employee of the Environmental Protection

Agency such of his powers and duties under this chapter,

except the making of rcgulations, subject to section

7607(d) as he may deem necessary or expedient.

* * * *

NER EN a TM TAPING ah SIR BODE

85a

APPENDIX F

BENZENE LEAKS

NESHAP REGULATION AND PREAMBLE

ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY

40 CFR Part 61

[AD-FRL-2538-4]

National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air

Pollutants; Benzene Equipment Leaks

(Fugitive Emission Sources)

AGENCY: Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

ACTION: Final rule.

SUMMARY: The Environmental Protection Agency

(EPA) listed benzene as a hazardous air pollutant under

Section 112 of the Clean Air Act on June 8, 1977 (42

FR 29332). A standard was subsequently proposed for

benzene fugitive emission sources (46 FR 1165, January

5, 1981). This Federal Register notice responds to com-

ments on and promulgates the standards for benzene fugi-

tive emission sources.

EFFECTIVE DATE: June 6, 1984. Under section

307(b)(1) of the Clean Air Act, judicial review of na-

tional emission standards for hazardous air pollutants

(NESHAP) is available only by filing a petition for re-

view in the United States Court of Appeals for the District

of Columbia circuit within 60 days of today’s publication

of these rules. Under section 307(b)(2) of the Clean Air

Act, the requirements that are the subject of today’s notice

may not be challenged later in civil or criminal proceed-

ings brought by EPA to enforce these requirements. The

director of the Federal Register approves the incorpora-

tion by reference of certain publications in 40 FR effec-

tive on June 6, 1984.

Fee ee fn Onan ea en

86a

ADDRESSES: Background Information Documents. The

background information documents (BID’s) may be ob-

tained from the U.S. EPA Library (MD-35), Research

Triangle Park, North Carolina 27711, telephone number

(919) 541-2777. For background information on today’s

promulgated standard, please refer to “Benzene Fugitive

Emissions—Background Information for Promulgated

Standards,” EPA-450/3-80-032b. The BID for the pro-

mulgated standard contains: (1) A summary of all public

comments on the proposed standard and the Administra-

tor’s response to the comments; (2) a summary of changes

to the standard since proposal; and (3) the final environ-

mental impact statement (EIS), which sumarizes the im-

pacts of the standard.

Dockets. Docket No. A-79-27 contains technical infor-

mation considered in developing the promulgated standard

for benzene fugitive emissions. Docket No. OAQPS 79-3

(Part 1) contains information considered on the health

effects, listing, and regulation of benzene. These dockets

are available for public inspection between 8:00 a.m. and

4:00 p.m., Monday through Friday, at EPA’s Central

Docket Section (LE-131), West Tower Lobby, Gallery 1,

401 M Street, S.W., Washington, D.C. 20460. A reason-

able fee may be charged for copying.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT:

For further information concerning the background tech-

nical information supporting the promulgated standard,

contact Mr. James F. Durham, Chemicals and Petroleum

Branch, Emission Standards and Engineering Division

(MD-13), U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Re-

search Triangle Park, North Carolina 27711, telephone

number (919) 541-5671. For further information on the

regulation of benzene and the promulgated standard, con-

tact Mr. Gilbert H. Wood, Standards Development

Branch, Emission Standards and Engineering Division

(MD-13), U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, Re-

eee caamrramnacemmmmmmll

i a ata

87a

search Triangle Park, North Carolina 27711, telephone

number (919) 541-5578. |

SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION:

Background Information on Health

Effects of Benzene

On June 8, 1977, the Administrator announced his

decision to list benzene as a hazardous air pollutant under

section 112 of the Clean Air Act (42 FR 29332). Supple-

mentary background information regarding the health

effects and listing of benzene as a hazardous air pollutant

may be obtained from Docket No. OAQPS-79-3 (Part 1).

A public hearing was held on August 21. 1980, to discuss

the health effects and listing of benzene as a hazardous air

This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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