Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Harris County Appraisal District v. Virginia Indonesia Co.

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FILED (~-’

BS 1528 MAR 20 199%

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

LLL, SLA EN ET eR EEE IESE

NO.

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1995

HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT AND

HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL REVIEW BOARD,

Petitioners,

Vv.

VIRGINIA INDONESIA COMPANY,

Respondent.

Petition For A Writ of Certiorari To

The Supreme Court of Texas

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

KENNETH WALL

Three Allen Center, Suite 3485

333 Clay Street

Houston, Texas 77002

Telephone (713) 759-0696

Fax (713) 759-0342

March 20, 1996

Counsel of Record for Petitioners

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

l. Whether the Import - Export Clause prohibits

state and local ad valorem property taxation of goods in

transit in the stream of export even if the tax offends none of

the policies underlying the Clause, a question which the

Court has deferred deciding. Department of Revenue v.

Association of Washington Stevedoring Companies, 435 U.S.

734, 757 n.23 (1978).

y Whether an ad valorem property tax usurps the

Federal Government’s ability to “speak with one voice when

regulating commercial relations with foreign governments”

for the sole reason that it is levied on goods in transit in the

stream of export.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTIONS PRESENTED: sock 3G Hew OOS bar i‘

TABLE OF COMINGS .... ..n:cilacand. erwin cst Su ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .... .@iiiiecs, iti

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI ........ l

OPINIONS BELOW: 2.6 cséiick. Linea. wtsias i

JURISDICTION . nce cc cesses ce se tA NN 2

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED ..... 2

STATEMENT OF THE CABE .. 2. ccc ccs 3

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ......... 9

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES PAGE

Barclays Bank PLC vy. Franchise Tax Board,

U.S. : , 114 S.Ct.

SED bo. Heb Be: BE cok PHEW BN a e's 13

Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,

Co ee Oe a are 5, 11-13

Department of Revenue v. Association of

Washington Stevedoring Companies, 435 U.S.

TE ees 6 co we MOVIE. Ce ee i, 6, 11, 13

Empressa Siderurgica v. County of Merced,

Bee es ME Ss PRE Rw ce wes 7

Itel Containers International Corporation v.

Huddleston, 507 U.S. , 113 S.Ct. 1095,

RIE Fe eae 6, 11, 12

Japan Line, Lid. v. County of Los Angeles,

a 5, 12

Kosydar v. National Cash Register Co..,

ES 0:7, 43

Louisiana Land and Exploration Company. v.

Pilot Petroleum Corporation. 900 F.2d 816

(Sth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S.

eee 7, 8

Limbach v. Hooven & Allison Company,

a a a a 9

iV

Low v. Austin,

oF Wes ie ee BA, EE CROTED Conk és 0 ee hae 9

Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages,

423 US: Zre (ieee: tas Va 04 OT Sack ae 6-13

Richfield Oil Corporation v. State Board of

Education, 329 U.S. @B CIDSB) ow we tt ee 6, 7

CONSTITUTIONS AND STATUTES

Federal

U.S. CONST. artidy §BycloeOics. 2 ccs eervice 4

ie Ree oe BS Saree oe 13

U.S. CONST.t. OC Mi. 2... 824 Vas 2,3

ee Sins © APO 6 Oe RO ee 2

Texas

TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 6.01 (Vernon 1992) ..... 3

TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 6.41, 41.41 (Vernon 1992 and

Vernal Supp. 3996)-02604 sitiaciaR ees bea Lanvin 3

TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.251 (Vernon 1992) ....5

TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 42.01, 42.21 et seq. (Vernon

1992 and Vernon Supp. 1996) ..............6.. 4

TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.23 (Vernon 1992) ....4

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1995

HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT AND

HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL REVIEW BOARD,

Petitioners,

Vv.

VIRGINIA INDONESIA COMPANY,

Respondent.

Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To

the Supreme Court Of Texas

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Petitioners, Harris County Appraisal District and

Harris County Appraisal Review Board, respectfully pray that

a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment and opinion

of the Supreme Court of Texas, entered in the above-entitled

proceeding on October 27, 1995.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the Supreme Court of Texas is

reported at 910 S.W. 2d 905 and is reprinted in the Appendix

hereto, p.49a, infra.

The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the

Fourteenth District of Texas is reported at 871 S.W. 2d 864

and is reprinted in the Appendix hereto, p. 49a, infra.

2

The judgment of the 333rd Judicial District Court of

Harris County, Texas has not been reported. It is reprinted

in the Appendix hereto, p.96a, infra.

JURISDICTION

The Supreme Court of Texas entered its judgment on

October 27, 1995 reversing the judgment of the Court of

Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas and rendering

judgment in favor of respondent and against petitioners.

On December 22, 1995, the Supreme Court of Texas

overruled petitioners’ timely filed motion for rehearing. See

p. 78a, infra.

Petitioners invoke the jurisdiction of this Court to

review the judgment of the Supreme Court of Texas under 28

U.S.C. § 1257(a).

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED

United States Constitution, Article I, § 10, cl. 2

No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress,

lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except

what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection

LM -0 as

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is an ad valorem property tax case in which the

Supreme Court of Texas held that the Import - Export

Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 2, prohibits ad valorem

property taxation of goods in transit in the stream of export.

3

Petitioner, Harris County Appraisal District, is a

political subdivision of the State of Texas responsible for

appraising property within its boundaries for ad valorem tax

purposes. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 6.01 (Vernon 1992).

Appraisal districts in Texas do not levy taxes. Rather, they

furnish appraisal rolls listing taxable property to units of

government within their boundaries which impose ad valorem

property taxes. Petitioner, Harris County Appraisal Review

Board, is a separate legal entity whose responsibilities

include determination of property owner protests. TEX. TAX

CODE ANN. §§ 6.41, 41.41 (Vernon 1992 and Vernon Supp.

1996). Respondent, Virginia Indonesia Company, is a

Delaware corporation authorized to do business in Texas.

For convenience, this petition refers to petitioner, Harris

County Appraisal District, as “district”, to petitioner, Harris

County Appraisal Review Board, as “board”, and to

respondent as “VICO.”

The parties do not dispute the material facts. VICO

is the operator of an Indonesian joint venture that explores

for oil and gas in the Republic of Indonesia. It purchases

goods for use by the joint venture from vendors throughout

the United States. Upon notification that certain goods are

needed, VICO issues a request for quotation to an Indonesian

purchasing agent which forwards the request to another agent

who solicits bids. VICO evaluates the bids and selects the

vendor. VICO’s standard purchase order is marked

“FOREIGN PURCHASE ORDER” and states “Ultimate

destination for all items on this order is Indonesia.”

Generally the vendors ship the goods directly to an

independent export packer in Houston, Texas. The goods

are committed to export to Indonesia at the time of purchase

and are never used in Texas or any other state.

At the export packer’s yard in Houston, the goods are

inspected for quality and correctness. If the goods are

4

damaged or otherwise incorrect, VICO or its export packer

resolves the irregularities with the vendor. VICO then

requests approval from Indonesia to import the goods. When

import approval is granted, an international inspection agency

in Houston inspects the goods on behalf of Indonesia. Local

inspection enables the goods to avoid customs inspection

upon their arrival in Indonesia. VICO’s export packer then

packs the goods for shipment. A separate freight forwarder,

not related to the export packer, arranges for shipment of the

goods. The freight forwarder notifies the export packer

when and where to deliver the goods for shipment.

Most items are exported within 45 days of their

arrival at the export packer’s yard. In some cases, however,

goods may remain with the export packer for 90 days or

longer. VICO has goods at the export packer’s yard

throughout the year.

Prior to 1991, the district exempted VICO’s goods in

its export packer’s yard from taxation. In 1991, the district

determined that the goods were taxable and notified VICO

that the appraised value of its property as of January 1, 1991

was $380,260.00. VICO protested the taxability of its goods

before the board. The board, by written order following

hearing, determined the protest in favor of the district and

adverse to VICO.

VICO then brought suit against district and board in

the 333rd Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas

under TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 42.01, 42.21 ef seq.

(Vernon 1992 and Vernon Supp. 1996). See p. 80a, infra.

Judicial review of an appraisal review board order

determining a property owner’s protest is by trial de novo.

TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.23 (Vernon 1992). VICO

alleged that taxation of its property violated the Commerce

Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, the Import - Export

5

Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2, and various

provisions of Texas law not applicable here. See pp. 87a-

92a, infra.

Ail parties moved for summary judgment. The trial

court granted VICO’s motion and entered its final judgment

in favor of VICO and against district and board. See p. 96a,

infra. In its final judgment, the trial court held that VICO’s

property is immune from taxation under the Import - Export

and Commerce Clauses and the Texas Tax Code. District

and board appealed the trial court’s judgment to the Court of

Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas.

The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s

judgment and remanded the case to that court for

determination of the amount of exemption to which VICO

was entitled under TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.251 (Vernon

1992). See p. 77a, infra. The court of appeals, however,

held that taxation of VICO’s goods violated neither the

Commerce Clause nor the Import - Export Clause.

VICO contended that its goods were in transit in the

stream of export and were, therefore, immune from state and

local property taxation under both the Commerce Clause and

Import - Export Clause. The court of appeals heid that the

Supreme Court of the United States has abandoned the

“mechanical in transit” analysis of state taxation under the

Commerce Clause. The court of appeals applied the six-part

test established by the Court in Complete Auto Transit, Inc.

v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977), and Jay .1 Line, Lid. v.

County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979).

Taxation of VICO’s goods did not run afoul of the

Commerce Clause because the tax was applied to an activity

with a substantial nexus to the State of Texas, was fairly

apportioned, did not discriminate against interstate

6

commerce, was fairly related to services provided by the

State of Texas, did not create a substantial risk of multiple

international taxation, and did not prevent the federal

government from speaking with one voice when regulating

international commercial relations. See pp.55a-59a, infra.

The court of appeals likewise rejected VICO’s

argument that its goods were immune from taxation under

the Import - Export Clause because they were in transit in

the stream of export. The court of appeals applied the

modern Import - Export Clause approach first announced by

the Court in Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276

(1976). Prior to Michelin, the Court’s analysis of state taxes

under the Import - Export Clause focused on the status of the

goods being taxed as “imports” or “exports.” Goods were

“exports,” and immune from state taxation, if they had

entered the “export stream” in a continuous journey out of

the country. Kosydar v. National Cash Register Co., 417

U.S. 62, 70-71 (1974); Richfield Oil Corporation v. State

Board of Education, 329 U.S. 69 (1946).

Michelin changed the Court’s focus from the status of

the goods as “imports” or “exports” to the nature of the tax

as an “impost” or “duty.” If the tax offended none of the

purposes underlying the Clause, the Import - Export Clause

did not preclude the tax. Michelin, 423 U.S. at 286, 293.

Although Michelin involved a tax on imported goods, the

Court extended its approach to exports in Department of

Revenue v. Association of Washington Stevedoring

Companies, 435 U.S. 734, 758 (1978).

Although neither Michelin nor Washington

Stevedoring involved taxation of goods in transit, the court

of appeals held that the question of the applicability of the

Michelin analysis to a state tax on goods in transit was

resolved by this Court’s recent decision in /tel Containers

7

International Corporation v. Huddleston, 507 U.S.

113 S.Ct. 1095, 1106 (1993). See p. 60a, infra. Since the

tax at issue offended none of the policies underlying the

Clause, it was not prohibited by the Import - Export Clause.

VICO sought discretionary review of the opinion and

judgment of the court of appeals in the Supreme Court of

Texas. The supreme court granted VICO’s application for

writ of error to the court of appeals, reversed the judgment

of the court of appeals, and rendered judgment that VICO’s

property was immune from taxation under the Import -

Export Clause. See p. 21a, infra. Two justices dissented.

See p. 22a, infra. The Supreme Court of Texas decided the

case solely on Import - Export Clause grounds. It did not

reach VICO’s additional arguments that the tax violated the

Commerce Clause or the Texas Tax Code. There is no

independent state law basis for its decision.

Although it recognized the change in focus of Import

- Export Clause analysis originated by the Michelin decision,

the supreme court applied the “stream of export rule” to

taxation of VICO’s goods. It did so because this Court has

not expressly overruled the pre-Michelin line of cases holding

that taxation of goods in transit in the stream of export

violates the Import - Export Clause. See p. 13a, infra;

Kosydar v. National Cash Register Co., 417 U.S. 62 (1974);

Empressa Siderurgica v. County of Merced, 337 U.S. 154

(1949); Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board of Equalization,

329 U.S. 69 (1946); see also, Louisiana Land and

Exploration Company v. Pilot Petroleum Corporation., 900

F.2d 816 (Sth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 897 (1990).

The court held that VICO’s goods were in transit in

the stream of export at the time of their taxation. Because

the goods were in transit, their taxation violated the Import -

Export Clause. See p. 18a, infra. Although district and

8

board vigorously contested the “in transit” status of the

goods, they accept, for purposes of this petition, the lower

court’s determination of the issue.

The court further held that taxation of VICO’s goods

was contrary to one of the purposes of the Import - Export

Clause identified by the Court in Michelin. Relying on

Louisiana Land and Exploration Company v. Pilot Petroleum

Corporation, 900 F.2d 816 (Sth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498

U.S. 897 (1990), the court found that the tax “impairs the

federal government’s ability to speak with one voice in

matters of foreign commerce.” See p. 18a, infra. Since the

tax is levied on exports that will become Indonesian

property, it may interfere with commercial relations with

Indonesia because Indonesia might buy its goods from other

countries or levy retaliatory taxes on its goods destined for

the United States.

The dissent would hold that the tax at issue is not

inconsistent with the policies advanced by the Import -

Export clause. See p. 24a, infra. According to the dissent,

the court’s “adherence to the ‘export stream’ rule as an

exclusive test conflicts with both the rule and the spirit of

Michelin.” See pp. 23a-24a, infra. According to the

dissent, foreign purchasers cannot reasonably expect to avoid

payment for governmental services benefiting their

purchases. See p. 43a, infra.

The dissent distinguished the tax at issue in this case

from that before the court in Louisiana Land . The tax in

Louisiana Land was an excise tax levied on aviation fuel.

The tax here is a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax

like the one before the Court in Michelin. Since the tax is

not contrary to the purposes of the Import - Export Clause

identified in Michelin, it does not violate the Clause.

9

The question presented was first raised by VICO in

the trial court. See p. 87a, infra. District and board raised

the @ sstion in the court of appeals. See p. 59a, infra.

VICO raised the question in the Supreme Court of Texas.

See p. 2a, infra. District and board again raised the question

in their motion for rehearing in the Supreme Court of Texas.

See p. 79a, infra.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The court below incorrectly decided an important

constitutional question: does the Import - Export Clause give

“bright line” immunity from state taxation to exports in

transit? Because this Court has not expressly overruled its

pre-Michelin decisions so holding, the Supreme Court of

Texas followed those decisions and struck down the tax at

issue. Beginning in 1976 with its Michelin decision, this

Court dramatically altered its Import - Export Clause analysis

of state taxation, and there is no reason why the Michelin

approach should not be applied to goods in transit.

In Michelin, the Court upheld against an Import -

Export Clause challenge a nondiscriminatory ad valorem

property tax on an inventory of imported tires stored in a

wholesale distribution warehouse. Michelin, 423 U.S. at

279. It expressly overruled its decision in Low v. Austin, 13

Wall. 29, 20 L.Ed. 517 (1872), which held that the Import -

Export Clause prohibited ad valorem property taxation of

imported goods until they were no longer imports. In

Michelin, the Court changed the focus of its Import - Export

Clause analysis from whether the challenged tax was a tax on

“imports” to whether the tax was an “impost” or “duty”.

See Limbach v. Hooven & Allison Company, 466 U.S. 353,

360 (1984).

10

In Michelin, the Court identified three principal

concerns of the Framers which underlie the Import - Export

Clause.

...[1] the Federal Government must speak

with one voice when regulating commercial

relations with foreign governments . . .; [2]

import revenues were to be the major source

of revenue of the Federal Government and

should not be diverted to the States, and [3]

harmony among the States might be disturbed

unless seaboard states . . . were prohibited

from levying taxes on citizens of other States

by taxing goods merely flowing through their

ports to the other States... .

Michelin, 423 U.S. at 285-286.

A tax which does not create the evils at which the

Import - Export Clause is directed is not an “impost” or

“duty” prohibited by the Clause. Michelin, 423 U.S. at 293.

The nondiscrimin; ‘ory ad valorem property tax before the

Court in Michelin was not the type tax considered by the

Framers to be an “impost” or “duty,” and its prohibition

would not promote the purposes underlying the Import -

Export Clause. Michelin, 423 U.S. at 283, 293.

Like the tax upheld by the Court in Michelin, the tax

at issue here is a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax.

The tax which the lower court struck down was, however,

levied not on imported goods no longer in transit but on

exports in transit in the stream of export. The Court noted

that to the extent a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property

conflicts with the Import - Export Clause purpose of

prohibiting taxes which may be imposed only because of a

State’s peculiar geographic location, the Clause may prohibit

11

a tax on goods merely in transit through the taxing state.

Michelin, 423 U.S. at 290.

Two years after its decision in Michelin, the Court

held that Michelin’s Import - Export Clause analysis applied

to taxation of exports as well as imports. Department of

Revenue v. Association of Washington Stevedoring

Companies, 435 U.S. 734, 758 (1978). The tax at issue in

Washington Stevedoring was imposed not on goods but on

the business of loading and unloading ships’ cargo, both

imports and exports. The Court specifically declined to

reach the question of Michelin’s application to goods in

transit, imports or exports, deferring decision until faced

with appropriate facts. Washington Stevedoring, 435 U.S. at

757 n.22. The Court also noted that a tax on goods in transit

would not be valid “under traditional Commerce Clause

analysis.” (emphasis added) Perhaps the Court foresaw the

dramatic change in its Commerce Clause jurisprudence that

began the following term. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.

Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).

Since Michelin, the Court has not decided an Import -

Export Clause case involving ad valorem property taxation

of goods in transit. It has not, therefore, been required to

decide whether the Michelin approach applies in such cases.

Although it has not decided the question, it has recently

implied that Michelin altered its prior approach to taxation of

exports in transit. /tel Containers International Corporation

v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. , 113 S.Ct. 1095, 1106

(1993).

The “bright line” rule of Import - Export Clause tax

immunity for goods in the stream of export may have the

virtue of simplicity. Kosydar v. National Cash Register Co.,

417 U.S. 62, 71 (1974). There is little, if anything, else to

commend it after Michelin. So long as the tax in issue does

12

not offend its purposes, the Import - Export Clause should

not be a barrier.

That is not to say, however, that the in transit

character of taxed goods is immaterial. As pointed out by

the dissent in the lower court, taxed goods’ presence in a

taxing unit may be so transitory that the tax constitutes

nothing more than a transit fee. See p. 40a, infra; see also,

Michelin, 423 U.S. at 290. Further, depending upon the

circumstances, taxation of goods in transit may fail to satisfy

the Commerce Clause requirements of nexus and fair

relationship to services provided. Complete Auto Transit,

Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).

The tax at issue here, even though imposed on goods

in the stream of export, did not offend any of the purposes

underlying the Import - Export Clause. The first policy

consideration identified by Michelin, the ability of the

Federal Government to speak with “one voice” when

regulating international commercial relations, is the same as

the “one voice” component of the Foreign Commerce Clause

test established by Japan Line, Lid. v. County of Los

Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979), Itel Containers Internatinal

Corporation v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. BAe et.

1095, 1150 (1993). The lower court believed the tax

transgressed the “one voice” policy of the Clause. See p.

18a, infra. It was concerned that, because of the increased

cost of goods resulting from the tax, Indonesia might buy its

goods from other countries. Further, Indonesia might levy

retaliatory taxes on goods it exports to the United States.

See p. 20a., infra.

Of course, the lower court would have allowed the

tax if the goods were not in the stream of export. Had they

been taxed prior to entry into the stream of export, their cost

to Indonesia would reflect that tax resulting in the same

ADoser astra

13

potential harm which the lower court found in this case.

Further, Congress, not the courts, is given the power to

regulate foreign commerce. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise

Tax Board, __U.S. - , 114 S.Ct. 2268, 2285

(1994). Neither VICO nor the lower court has identified any

Congressional policy which might prohibit the tax. See /tel,

507 U.S. at , 113 S.Ct. at 1105.

The second policy underlying the Import - Export

Clause, protection of federal revenues, is not implicated by

a tax on exports because the Constitution prohibits federal

taxation of exports. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5;

Department of Revenue v. Association of Washington

Stevedoring Companies, 435 U.S. 734, 758 (1978).

The third policy identified by Michelin, preservation

of state harmony, parallels the four-prong Commerce Clause

test established by Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S.

274 (1977). Itel, 507 U.S. at , 113 S.Ct. at 1105-

06. VICO has goods on hand at its export packer throughout

the year. They receive governmental services, particularly

fire and police protection. See p. 45a, infra. There is no

indication in the record that VICO pays more than its fair

share for the services received.

Where, as here, a nondiscriminatory ad valorem

property tax on goods in the stream of export offends none

of the policies underlying the Clause, the courts should not

apply a “bright line” rule whose sole virtue is its simplicity

to invalidate a tax on Import - Export Clause grounds.

14

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, the Court should grant this

petition for certiorari.

Respectfully submitted,

KENNETH WALL

Three Allen Center, Suite 3485

333 Clay Street

Houston, Texas 77002

Telephone (713) 759-0696

Fax (713) 759-0342

March 20, 1996 Counsel of Record for Petitioners

la

APPENDIX A

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

No. 94-0245

VIRGINIA INDONESIA COMPANY, PETITIONER

v.

HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT AND

HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL REVIEW BOARD,

RESPONDENTS

ON APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF ERROR TO THE

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FOURTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS

Argued on December 15, 1994

JUSTICE CORNYN delivered the opinion of the

Court in which CHIEF JUSTICE PHILLIPS, JUSTICE

GONZALEZ, JUSTICE HIGHTOWER, JUSTICE ENOCH,

JUSTICE SPECTOR, and JUSTICE BAKER join.

JUSTICE HECHT, joined by JUSTICE OWEN,

dissenting.

In this case we consider whether goods purchased by

the Virginia Indonesia Company (VICO) on behalf of an

Indonesian joint venture are exempt from a state ad valorem

tax. The trial court granted VICO’s motion for summary

judgment on the basis that the goods are exempt from

taxation under the import-export and commerce clauses of

2a

the United States Constitution and under section 11.01 of the

Texas Tax Code. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10 (import-export)

& art. 1, § 8 (commerce). The court of appeals reversed.

871 S.W.2d 864. We reverse the judgment of the court of

appeals and render judgment that the tax at issue violates the

import-export clause of the United States Constitution.

VICO, a Delaware corporation, is the operator and

agent for an Indonesian oil and gas exploration joint venture.

As one of its duties as operator, VICO purchases goods from

vendors throughout the United States on behalf of the joint

venture. Pursuant to a production sharing agreement

between the joint venture and Pertamina, a state enterprise of

the Republic of Indonesia, the goods become the property of

Pertamina upon arrival in Indonesia. WICO is reimbursed

for its costs, but it receives no additional compensation.

VICO uses a standard purchase order marked

"FOREIGN PURCHASE ORDER" that includes the notation

"Ultimate destination for all items on this order is

Indonesia." At the time of purchase, the goods are

committed to foreign export and cannot thereafter be diverted

to domestic use. The goods are transported from the vendors

directly to an independent export packer in Houston, Harris

County, Texas. Upon arriving at the export packer’s

facility, the goods are checked to confirm that the proper

items were shipped, and that they meet specifications

required for import to Indonesia. Any dispute over the items

are resolved at that time. VICO then requests approval from

Indonesia to import the goods. When approval is granted, an

international inspection agency inspects the goods on behalf

of Indonesia and clears the goods for shipment. The goods

are then packed and shipped abroad on the next available

vessel.

3a

In most instances, the goods remain with the export

packer no longer than 45 days while these procedures are

being performed. In exceptional cases, however, this period

may be somewhat longer: if the goods received from the

vendor are damaged or defective, or if VICO encounters

problems obtaining approval for import to Indonesia, the

goods may remain with the export packer for up to 175 days.

VICO has some quantity of goods present at the export

packer’s facility year-round.

For the tax years 1989 and 1990, VICO was granted

an exemption from ad valorem taxation for its personal

property in Harris County. In September 1991, VICO was

notified by the Harris County Appraisal District that its

estimated ad valorem tax liability for 1991 was $8,441.74,

which was based on a $380,260.00 appraisal of VICO’s

property at the export packer’s facility on January 1, 1991.

VICO timely protested the tax assessment, including the

appraised value, to the Harris County Appraisal Review

Board. The Review Board affirmed, and VICO filed suit in

district court against the Appraisal District and the Review

Board (collectively, Harris County).

In its motion for summary judgment, VICO argued

that its goods are merely in transit through Texas and that

they are therefore immune from state taxation under the

import-export and commerce clauses of the United States

Constitution. WVICO further argued that its goods are not

subject to the state’s taxing authority because they do not

meet the criteria of Texas Tax Code § 11.01(c). The trial

court granted VICO’s motion for summary judgment on both

grounds. The court of appeals reversed, holding that VICO

failed to conclusively prove the existence of either federal or

State grounds for an exemption from the ad valorem tax.

871 S.W.2d at 871.

4a

Our summary judgment standard is well established.

The movant must show that there are no genuine issues of

material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as

a matter of law. Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co.,

690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985). If the movant

establishes the right to judgment, the burden shifts to the

nonmovant to raise a fact issue that would preclude summary

judgment. City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth. , 589

S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979). In deciding whether there is

a disputed material fact issue, we regard evidence favorable

to the nonmovant as true. Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 548-49.

I

The import-export clause of the United States

Constitution provides:

No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress,

lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports,

except what may be absolutely necessary for

executing its Inspection Laws... .

U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 2.

Historically, the United States Supreme Court decided

import-export clause challenges by focusing on the nature of

the goods, that is, whether the tax-burdened goods were

imports or exports. Under the "original package" doctrine,

goods were deemed to be imports, and hence immune from

state and local taxation, as long as they retained their original

form or package of import. Low v. Austin, 80 U.S. 29, 34

(1871) (holding that French champagne, which had been

stored in its “original cases, unbroken and unsold” since its

importation, was immune from a nondiscriminatory state

property tax); see also Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corp. v.

Sa

Alabama, 288 U.S. 218 (1933); Hooven & Allison Co. v.

Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945).

Whereas the original package doctrine applied to

imports, the "stream of export" doctrine controlled exports.’

Under this doctrine, goods are not subject to state taxation

once exportation has commenced, which occurs when goods

"have been shipped, or entered with a common carrier for

transportation to another State, or have been started upon

such transportation in a continuous route or journey." Coe

v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517, 527 (1886). The mere intent to

export is not enough, Empresa Siderurgica v. County of

Merced, 337 U.S., 154, 157 (1949); the goods must begin

their "physical entry into the stream of exportation."

Kosydar v. National Cash Register Co., 417 U.S. 62, 71

(1974); see also Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Bd. of

Equalization, 329 U.S. 69, 81-83 (1946). Once exportation

has begun, goods retain their "export" status, and thus

remain exempt from state taxation as long as they are in

transit. Temporary interruptions "due to the necessities of

the journey or for the purpose of safety and convenience in

the course of the movement" do not break the continuity of

transit; however, stoppages that serve the owner’s business

purpose interrupt the goods’ continuity of transit, rendering

them subject to the taxing power of the state. Minnesota v.

Blasius, 290 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1933). The continued validity of

the stream of export doctrine is of prime importance in this

case.

In the seminal case of Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages,

423 U.S. 276, 301 (1976), the United States Supreme Court

altered its approach to import-export clause challenges and

' This doctrine, which analyzes whether the goods are in transit at

the time of taxation, has been developed under both the import-export and

commerce clauses of the U.S. Constitution.

6a

rejected the original package doctrine of Low v. Austin. See

generally Walter Hellerstein, Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages;

Enhanced State Power to Tax Imports, 1976 SUP. CT. REV.

99 (explaining Michelin). The issue in Michelin was whether

Georgia could assess a nondiscriminatory ad valorem tax on

imported goods held in the taxpayer’s warehouse. Rejecting

the argument that the tax was unconstitutional simply because

it burdened goods in their original packages, the Michelin

court concentrated on whether the tax offended any of the

three policies underlying the import-export clause:

[(1)] the Federal Government must speak with one

voice when regulating commercial relations with

foreign government, and tariffs, which might affect

foreign relations, could not be implemented by the

States consistently with that exclusive power; [(2)]

import revenues were to be the major source of

revenue of the Federal Government and should not be

diverted to the States; and [(3)] harmony among the

States might be disturbed unless seaboard States, with

their crucial ports of entry, were prohibited from

levying taxes on citizens of other States by taxing

goods merely flowing through their ports to the other

States not situated as favorably geographically.

423 U.S. at 285-86 (footnotes omitted). Addressing the first

of these concerns, the Court determined that the tax levied on

the taxpayer’s goods did not impede the federal government’s

power to speak with “one voice" explaining that:

[b]y definition, such [nondiscriminatory property

taxation] does not fall on imports as such because of

their place of origin. It cannot be used to create

special protective tariffs or particular preferences for

certain domestic goods, and it cannot be applied

selectively to encourage or discourage any

Ta

importation in a manner inconsistent with federal

regulation.

Id. at 286. Nor, the Court held, did the tax offend the

second policy concern which implicates only the federal

government’s right to the revenue raised from taxes assessed

on the commercial privilege of bringing goods into the

United States. Id. at 286-87 (stating that nondiscriminatory

ad valorem taxation "deprives the Federal Government of

nothing to which it is entitled").

Finally, the Court held that the tax did not interfere

with the harmony among the states policy. The

nondiscriminatory ad valorem tax at issue, explained the

Court, was simply "a quid pro quo for benefits actually

conferred by the taxing State." Jd. at 289. The Court

reasoned that the taxpayer’s imported goods, like all other

property within the taxing jurisdiction, benefit from the

provision of local services such as police and fire protection,

and that the import-export clause was not designed to shield

such goods from paying their fair share for these services.

Id. The Court, however, qualified its holding in the

following words:

[T]he Clause was fashioned to prevent the imposition

of exactions which were no more than transit fees on

the privilege of moving through a State. A

nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax obviously

stands on a different footing, and to the extent there

is any conflict whatsoever with this purpose of the

Clause, it may be secured merely by prohibiting the

assessment of even nondiscriminatory property taxes

on goods which are merely in transit through the

State when the tax is assessed.

8a

Id. at 290 (emphasis added)(footnotes omitted). This

qualification was not implicated in Michelin because the

Court determined that the taxpayer’s goods “were no longer

in transit.” Id. at 302. Having concluded that the Georgia

tax did not impinge on any of the three policies underlying

the import-export clause, the Court upheld its

constitutionality.

The next year, the United States Supreme Court

applied Michelin’s analytic framework in Department of

Revenue v. Association of Washington stevedoring Cos. , 435

U.S. 734 (1977).? In that case, the State of Washington

assessed a business and occupation tax on stevedoring, the

business of loading and unloading cargo from ships.

Addressing the taxpayer’s import-export clause challenge, the

Court concluded that the tax violated none of the policies

articulated in Michelin. The Court went on to consider the

significance of Michelin’s exception for in-transit goods:

The Court in Michelin qualified its holding with the

observation that Georgia had applied the property tax

to goods "no longer in transit." 423 U.S., at 302.

Because the goods were no longer in _ transit,

however, the Court did not have to face the question

whether a tax relating to goods in transit would be an

"Impost or Duty" even if it offended none of the

policies behind the Clause. Inasmuch as we now face

this inquiry, we note two distinctions between this

case and Michelin. First, the activity taxed here

occurs while imports and exports are in transit.

? The Michellin test applies with equal force to imports and exports.

Washington Stevedoring, 435 U.S. at 758. However, U.S. CONST. art.

1, § 9 forbids federal taxation of exports; therefore, the second “federal

revenue enhancement” policy in Michelin is not implicated in export tax

cases. Id.

9a

Second, however, the tax does not fall on the goods

themselves. This levy reaches only the business of

loading and unloading ships . . . . Despite the

existence of the first distinction, the presence of the

second leads to the conclusion that the Washington

tax is not a prohibited "Impost or Duty” when it

violates none of the policies.

435 U.S. at 755 (footnote omitted). Thus, drawing a

distinction between a direct tax on goods and a tax on the

business of handling goods, the Court upheld the stevedoring

tax. Jd. at 756-77 (stating that the “immunity of services

incidental to importing and exporting [is] not so broad as the

immunity of the goods themselves"). Because the tax did not

directly burden the goods, the Court expressly declined to

consider the applicability of the Michelin approach when a

State directly taxes imports or exports in transit. Jd. at 757

n.23.

Most recently, the United States Supreme Court

considered whether a Tennessee sales tax on the rental of

leased cargo containers violated the policies underlying the

import-export clause. tel Containers Int’l Corp. vy.

Huddleston, 113 S.Ct. 1095 (1993). Because the containers

were used in the international shipping industry, the taxpayer

argued that the tax violated the import-export clause. The

Court concluded that the tax did not violate any of the

policies identified in Michelin, noting specifically that the tax

was not “a tax on importation or imported goods, but a tax

on a business transaction occurring within the taxing State."

Id. at 1106.

Just last year, we considered the impact of the import-

export clause on the scope of state taxing authority in

Diamond Shamrock, we assessed whether oil imported from

a foreign country directly into Texas, the state of its final

10a

destination, may be subject to state ad valorem taxation. Id.

at 298. The parties stipulated that the oil was in transit

through Nueces County at the time of taxation. The taxpayer

argued that the tax fell within Michelin’s “merely in transit"

qualification and was, thus, unconstitutional under the

import-export clause. We disagreed, stating:

[T]he Michelin Court’s qualification clearly applies

only to goods in transit through the state to or from

another state and not to goods merely in transit within

the only state the goods ever enter.

Id. at 301 (citing Robert C.W. Frantz, Comment,

Constitutional Law--Nondiscriminatory Ad Valorem Tax May

Be Applied to Imports, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 193, 197

(1976)). We then held that the third policy in Michelin,

preserving harmony among the states, was not implicated

because the imported oil was not transported to or from

another state. Jd. at 300-01. Rather, the imported oil

reached its first and final domestic destination upon arrival

in Texas. Thus, there was no risk of multiple taxation by

different states. Neither did we perceive that the tax could

conflict with either the “one voice" or "federal revenue

enhancement" policies articulated in Michelin, Id. at 301 n.3.

We expressly declined to reach the issue of whether the

import-export clause prohibits state taxation of goods passing

through Texas on their way to a foreign country. /d. at 299.

II

VICO argues that neither Michelin nor its progeny

have altered the fundamental rule that goods in the export

stream of commerce are exempt from taxation. Rather than

supplanting this doctrine, VICO urges that Michelin’s

qualification for in-transit goods, 423 U.S. at 286, requires

a threshold determination of whether the goods are merely in

lla

transit through the state at the time of taxation. If so, VICO

argues, the tax is unconstitutional, and it is unnecessary to

analyze whether the tax impinges upon the Michelin policies.

While Harris County acknowledges that the stream of export

doctrine has not been expressly overruled, it questions its

continued viability after Michelin. See Itel, 113 S.Ct. at

1106. Harris County urges this Court to apply the approach

set forth in Michelin, which, it argues, demonstrates that the

tax at issue undermines none of the clause’s underlying

policies.

The United States Supreme Court has yet to announce

whether the new approach set forth in Michelin should be

applied to a direct tax on imports or exports in transit.

Although the Michelin court rejected the original package

doctrine, it did not overrule Coe v. Errol or any of the

stream of export cases, and the two doctrines are different

enough that the rejection of one does not, of itself, signify

the demise of the other.

The sole relevant factor in the original package

doctrine was whether the goods’ original packaging remained

intact. This led to criticism that the doctrine tended to

produce superficial and disparate results. See Michelin, 423

U.S. at 282-83. The doctrine’s broad reach shielded not

only goods that were in import transit, but also goods that

were permanently situated within the state of their final

destination. As the Court wrote in Michelin, “[njothing in

the history of the Import-Export Clause even remotely

suggests that a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax

which is also imposed on imported goods that are no longer

in import transit was the type of exaction that was regarded

as Objectionable by the Framers of the Constitution." 423

U.S. at 286 (emphasis added).

12a

In contrast, the definition of “exports” under the

stream of export doctrine has been much narrower,

encompassing only those goods that have commenced "an

actual movement into the stream of export." Kosydar v.

National Cash Register Co. , 417 U.S. 62, 71 (1974). Unlike

its corollary, commentators have regarded the stream of

export doctrine as “commendably intelligible and consistent, "

see Walter Hellerstein, Michelin Tire Corp v. Wages:

Enhanced State Power to Tax Imports, 1976 SUP. CT. REV.

99, 132, and just two years before Michelin, the United

States Supreme Court praised it. Kosydar, 417 U.S. at 71

("This is an instance, however, where we believe that

simplicity has its virtues."). As one commentator has noted,

“poth the language and the expressed purpose of the clause

as being designed to prohibit the seaboard States ‘from ...

taxing goods merely flowing through their ports to other

States,’ indicate that property taxes imposed on exports

awaiting shipment abroad ... were intended to be

proscribed." 1 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN, STATE

TAXATION 4 5.4 (1983) (quoting Michelin, 423 U.S. at

285-86).

Abandoning the original package doctrine "brought

import tax immunity into alignment with export tax

immunity" and eliminated what had previously been a wide

loophole to state taxation. Robert C.W. Frantz, Comment,

Constitutional Law--Nondiscriminatory Ad Valorem Tax May

be Applied To Imports, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 193, 203

(1976); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-23 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that

the original package doctrine operated as a shield to state

taxation). Nonetheless, the rejection of the original package

doctrine does not compel the conclusion that the Michelin

court abandoned the rule of immunity for in-transit goods.

To the contrary, by explicitly articulating an exception for in-

transit goods, Michelin appears to preserve bright-line

13a

immunity for goods in the stream of export. Whether this is

indeed the case, however, remains uncertain because none of

the Court’s post-Michelin cases has involved a direct tax on

in-transit goods,’ and the Court has stated its preference to

“defer decision [on this issue] until a case with pertinent facts

is presented.” Washington Stevedoring, 435 U.S. at 757

n.23.

Faced with the decision of whether to apply the

stream of export rule or to abandon it, we choose the former.

In reaching this choice, we are mindful of the words of the

United States Supreme Court: “If a precedent of this Court

has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on

reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, [the lower

court] should follow the case which directly controls, leaving

to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own

decisions." Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American

Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989); see also Quill

Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 321 (1992) (Scalia,

J., concurring). In light of the fact that the United States

Supreme Court has not overruled Coe v. Errol or any of its

progeny, we apply the long-standing rule that a tax on goods

in the export stream of commerce violates the import-export

clause.* See generally 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA &

> The United States Supreme Court has carefully distinguished the

taxes at issue in Michelin, Washington Stevedoring, and Intel from one

that falls directly on in-transit goods. See Michelin, 423 U.S. at 302;

Washington Stevedoring, 435 U.S. at 755-757; Itel, 113 S.Ct. at 1106.

* This approach is consistent with that recently taken by the Fifth

Circuit in Louisiana Land and Exploration Co. v. Pilot Petroleum

Corp. ,900 F.2d 816, 820-21 (Sth Cir. 1990), cert. denied 498 U.S. 897

(1990). In that case, the Fifth Circuit relied on Richfield Oil Corp. v.

State Bd. of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69 (1946), in striking down an

Alabama excise tax on oil ihe export stream of commerce. See

discussion infra part III.

l4a

JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTION

LAW § 13.2 (2d ed 1992); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,

AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-23 (2d ed.

1988); 1 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION

q 5.4 (1983).

Ill

The question we now determine is whether VICO’s

goods were in the export stream of commerce when the tax

was addressed. VICO argues that exportation began when its

goods were shipped from the vendors to the export packer’s

facility and that the temporary stoppage of the goods in

Harris County did not break the continuity of transit.

In this case, it is clear that VICO’s goods entered the

export stream of commerce when they were shipped from the

vendors to the export packer’s facility in Harris County

because, at that point, the goods began their movement to a

precommitted foreign destination. See Kosydar, 417 U.S. at

70; Richfield Oil, 329 U.S. at 82-83 (holding that delivery of

oil into a storage tank of a foreign-bound steamer "marked

the commencement of the movement of the oil abroad"); A.

G. Spaulding & Bros. v. Edwards, 262 U.S. 66, 68 (1923)

(holding that delivery of goods to an export carrier for

shipment abroad constituted a significant "step in

exportation"). The more difficult question before us is

whether the temporary stoppage of the goods at the export

packer’s facility disrupted the goods’ continuity of transit,

thus subjecting them to taxation in Harris County on January

1. It is the purpose of the stoppage that is important. See

Champlain Realty Co. v. Town of Brattleboro, 260 U.S. 366,

376-77 (1922). If the stoppage is attributable to the business

purpose of the owner, then the exportation is deemed to have

terminated, and the goods are subject to tax in the

jurisdiction of their stoppage. Minnesota v. Blasius, 290

15a

U.S. 1, 11-12 (1933). For instance, if goods are delayed for

the purpose of further processing or for storage pending the

receipt of orders, the goods are no longer in the stream of

commerce. See Bacon v. Illinois. 227 U.S. 504 (1913)

(holding that stoppage of grain for processing served owner’s

business purpose); Blasius, 290 U.S. at 12 (holding that

storage of inventory awaiting orders served owner’s business

purpose).

If, however, a stoppage is "due to the necessities of

the journey or for the purpose of safety and convenience in

the course of the movement,” continuity of transit is not

interrupted, and the goods remain immune from taxation

throughout the stoppage. Blasius, 290 U.S. at 9-10. Delays

that are incidental to the journey and to a necessary change

in the mode of transportation do not affect the continuity of

transit. In Hughes Bros. Timber Co. v. Minnesota, 272 U.S.

469 (1926), the United States Supreme Court considered

whether logs retained their in-transit status during a delay

between the time they floated down the river and the time

they were loaded on to a ship for further transport. In

concluding that the logs retained their in-transit status

throughout the stoppage, the Court stated:

The character of the shipment in such a case depends

upon all the evidential circumstances looking to what

the owner has done in the preparation for the journey

and in carrying it out. The mere power of the owner

to divert the shipment already started does not take it

out of interstate commerce is the other facts show that

the journey has already begun in good faith and

temporary interruption of the passage is reasonable

and in furtherance of the intended transportation ....

Id. at 475-76.

16a

This passage was later cited in Carson Petroleum Co.

v. Vial, 279 U.S. 95, 102-03 (1929). In that case, the

taxpayer transported oil, which was destined for foreign

export, by rail to the Louisiana coast. The oil was held in

a storage tank while awaiting the arrival of a ship. By

storing sufficient quantities of oil in the tanks, the taxpayer

was able to promptly deliver the oil on arrival of the ship,

thereby avoiding costly demurrage charges. The Court first

noted that "it would be impracticable to carry on the export

oil business by any other method.” /d. at 100. The Court

went on to question the precedential value of one of its

earlier cases, General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211

(1908), in which it had held that the temporary storage of

oil, which was necessitated by the practical constraints of

shipping and distributing oil, constituted a break in the

continuity of transit for business purposes. /d. at 104.

Having rejected the applicability of Crain,’ the Court then

noted that "[t]here has been a liberal construction of what is

continuity of the journey, in cases where the court finds from

the circumstances that export trade has been actually intended

and carried through, "id. at 105-06, and concluded that the

stored oil remained in transit during its stoppage in

Louisiana. Id. at 109.

5 The Court stated:

The [General Oil] court was divided and there was very

vigorous dissent. The case has caused discussion, and

it must be admitted that it is a close one and might

easily have been decided the other way. The result was

probably affected by the impression created by the

original situation and the somewhat artificial

rearrangement of tanks in a large entrepot for

redistribution of oil to avoid previous taxability.

Carson Petroleum, 279 U.S. at 105.

17a

Turning to the case before us, we are persuaded that

the stoppage of VICO’s goods in Harris County was

attributable to an exportation, not a business, purpose.

VICO purchases goods from vendors throughout the country

for the exclusive use of the Indonesian joint venture. From

the moment of purchase, VICO retains no control to divert

the goods from their precommitted foreign destination or to

sell the goods in a domestic market. Indeed, VICO has no

domestic market because it is not in the business of procuring

or marketing goods. Rather, VICO’s duty is simply to see

that the joint venture receives the goods necessary for its

operations abroad.

At the export packer’s facility, VICO checks the

goods to ensure they meet necessary specifications for import

into Indonesia, which enables VICO to resolve discrepancies

with its vendors prior to export. Harris County contends that

this activity serves VICO’s business purpose and, therefore,

breaks the goods’ continuity of transit. We disagree.

Indonesian law requires a pre-shipment inspection of the

quality and quantity of the imported goods by an independent

inspection agency selected by the Republic of Indonesia. See

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Trade Policy

Review - Indonesia, Vol. 1, pp. 79-82 (1991) (citing

Presidential Instruction No. 4 (1985)). We view VICO’s

examination of its goods as merely incidental to the

inspection mandated by Indonesian law. VICO’s goods are

also delayed pending approval for import by the Indonesian

government, a requirement that is outside of VICO’s control

and that serves no business purpose of VICO. Thereafter,

VICO’s goods are packaged for shipment, a step that must

occur after approval and inspection.

While in Harris County, VICO’s goods undergo only

those procedures -- inspection, approval for import to

Indonesia, and packaging -- required for exportation. See

18a

Carson Petroleum, 279 U.S. at 109 ([T]he selection of the

point of shipment and the equipment at that point were solely

for the speedy and continuous export of the product abroad

and for no other purpose."). VICO makes no profit from the

export of the goods, its role is simply to facilitate their

shipment abroad While we realize that the delay necessary

to perform these procedures is somewhat longer than that

which is generally associated with a "transportation" delay,

it is no longer than is necessary to get the goods on their way

to Indonesia, and consequently we are persuaded that under

these circumstances the delay is "due to the necessities of the

journey. "See Blasius, 290 U.S. at 9. Because we view the

presence if VICO’s goods in Harris County as a necessary

stoppage incident to their transportation abroad, we conclude

that, while at the export packer’s facility in Harris County,

VICO’s goods remain in the stream of export and immune

from state taxation.

Finally, under the circumstances of this case, the tax

imposed on VICO’s goods transgresses the “one voice”

policy of the import-export clause. On this issue, the Fifth

Circuit’s recent opinion in Louisiana Land and Exploration

Co. v. Pilot Petroleum Corp., 900 F.2d 816, 820-21 (Sth

Cir. 1990), cert. denied 498 U.S. 897 (1990), provides

guidance. Louisiana Land involved an Alabama excise tax

levied on jet fuel that was in transit for export to Canada.

Although the court noted th: . Michelin had marked a change

in the approach to import-..<port clause challenges, it also

noted that the United States Supreme Court had not overruled

the stream of export case of Richjield Oil Corp. v. State

Board of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69 (1946). Id. at 819. The

court then determined that immunity for in-transit exports

had not only survived Michelin, but also was consistent with

it. Id. at 820 ("We believe, consistent with the

contemporary view of the Supreme Court, that the Import-

19a

Export Clause was specifically intended to prevent the type

of taxation involved in this case").

Relying on both Richfield Oil and Michelin, the

Louisiana Land court struck down the Alabama tax. The

Fifth Circuit first determined that the tax impaired the

government’s ability to speak with one voice in matters of

foreign commerce. /d. at 821 (stating "[t}his type of tax

discourages foreign parties, who purchase oil from U.S.

companies and refineries, from using U.S., ports to transport

fuel from the United States into foreign countries").

Returning, then, to the long-standing stream of export rule,

the court observed that the Alabama tax, like the California

tax in Richfield Oil, was imposed on goods that were "the

subject of foreign export of the time of taxation;" the tax was

therefore unconstitutional. Jd. at 821.

In this case, Harris County argues that because the

tax at issue is nondiscriminatory, like that in Michelin, it

cannot be selectively applied only to goods destined for

foreign transport, and consequently does not impinge upon

the one voice policy. We disagree. The tax on VICO’s

goods impairs the federal government’s ability to speak with

one voice in matters of foreign commerce. While the

Michelin court did state that "[i]t is obvious that such

nondiscriminatory property taxation can have no impact

whatsoever on the Federal Government’s exclusive regulation

of foreign commerce," 423 U.S. at 286 (emphasis added), it

seems Clear that the kind of nondiscriminatory tax to which

the Court was referring was one imposed on goods that are

20a

no longer in transit. We agree that there is no impairment

of the one voice policy when a state tax is imposed on

imported goods that have come to rest in the state of their

ultimate destination. See Diamond Shamrock, 876 S.W.2d

at 301 n.3. However, the facts before us pose different

concerns. It is one thing to tax property that has come to

rest within the state; it is quite another to tax property that is

merely passing through on its way to its final foreign

destination. See Louisiana Land, 900 F.2d at 821 ("To

permit any and every state to impose a direct tax on goods in

the export stream would circumvent [the one voice]

objective.").

In essence, Harris County is attempting to tax exports

that will become the property of an Indonesian state agency

upon arrival in Indonesia, and that are only temporarily

within Harris County for the necessities of exportation,

including compliance with Indonesian import requirements.

The tax at issue has the potential of interfering with the

United States’ commercial relations with Indonesia insofar as

Indonesia might turn to other countries for its imported goods

or might engage in retaliatory taxation of its own exports

destined for the United States. Policy affecting foreign

relations should be uniform among the states and therefore

determined by the federal government: this matter "’

concern{s] the exterior relations of the United States with

other nations. . . and should proceed exclusively from the

legislative authority of the nation.’" Louisiana Land, 900

F.2d at 821 (quoting Bowman v. Chicago & N.R. Co., 125

U.S. 465, 482 (1888)).

* "Such" refers to a nondiscriminatory tax “imposed on imported

goods that are no longer in import transit." See Michelin, 423 U.S. at

286.

21a

We conclude that the tax on VICO’s goods violates

the import-export clause. We do not address VICO’s

additional arguments that the tax is unconstitutional under the

commerce clause of the United States Constitution or that it

violates Texas Tax Code § 11.01. We accordingly reverse

the judgment of the court of appeals and render judgment

that VICO owes no tax for the tax year 1991.

John Cornyn

Justice

OPINION DELIVERED: October 27, 1995

22a

APPENDIX B

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

No. 94-0245

VIRGINIA INDONESIA COMPANY, PETITIONER

v.

HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT AND

HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL REVIEW BOARD,

RESPONDENTS

ARGUED ON DECEMBER 15, 1994

ON APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF ERROR TO THE

COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTEENTH

DISTRICT OF TEXAS

JUSTICE HECHT, joined by JUSTICE OWEN,

dissenting.

The Harris County Appraisal District has determined

that personal property purchased by the Virginia Indonesia

Co. and stored with an export packer at the Port of Houston

awaiting transportation to Indonesia is subject to ad valorem

taxation. VICO contends that the property is exempted from

taxation by the Import-Export Clause and the Commerce

Clause of the United States Constitution, and by the Texas

Tax Code. The Court agrees with VICO’s Import-Export

Clause argument and thus does not reach VICO’s other

contentions.

23a

The Court holds that the Import-Export Clause

absolutely prohibits state taxation of exports whenever they

are in transit to their foreign destination. The Clause, in the

Court’s words, gives “bright-line immunity [from state

taxation] for goods in the stream of export." Ante at___.

This rule has the virtue of simplicity. To know if a tax is

prohibited, all one must do is determine whether the property

on which it falls is moving along its international course, or

whether it has not yet begun, stopped upon, or ended that

course. The in-transit rule also has a vice, however, which

exceeds its virtue: it is simplistic. It is neither a deduction

from nor a restatement of the policies embodied in the

constitutional provision. In many instances, probably most,

a tax allowed by the in-transit rule does not offend

constitutional policies, and a tax prohibited by the rule does.

But there are circumstances —and this case is an example

—in which the in-transit rule dictates a result inconsistent

with constitutional policy. The in-transit rule is a good rule

of thumb, but it is not an Import-Export Clause litmus test.

That is why the United States Supreme Court has

abandoned the exclusive use of the in-transit rule and related

condensations of constitutional principles like “original

package” and “export stream" as accurate or adequate

substitutes for the principles themselves. The fundamental

difference in Import-Export Clause jurisprudence since

Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976), is that

the constitutional provision’s limit on state taxation is now

defined in every instance by the actual policies which support

the limitation and which it is meant to further, and not by

shorthand formulae which at best only approximate and

sometimes distort constitutional concerns. Whether property

is in transit, and more importantly, how it is in transit,

remains a relevant factor in assessing the validity of a tax,

but it is not the only factor, nor is it determinative. The

Court’s adherence to an in-transit rule is at odds with the

24a

Supreme Court’s modern jurisprudence, and with our recent

decision in Diamond Shamrock Refining & Marketing Co. v.

Nueces County Appraisal District, 876 S$.W.2d 298 (Tex.),

cert. denied,— U.S. —,115 S.Ct. 500 (1994).

The Court defends its approach as being required by

Michelin’s predecessor cases, to which the doctrine of stare

decisis requires obedience. I have two responses, on which

I intend to elaborate. One is that the cases on which the

Court relies do not support its conclusion, Michelin aside —

and Michelin cannot be put aside. The other is more

philosophical: not constitutional; provision can be applied to

do either more of less than the principles on which it is

grounded require. It makes no sense to say that a tax is

prohibited because it does not meet a court-made test for

applying a constitutional provision, even though the tax

conflicts with neither the meaning nor the purpose of the

provision itself. The constitution cannot be made to say

something it does not mean.

The reasoning of Michelin and its progeny

demonstrate that the tax here does not offend the policies of

the Import-Export Clause. This is not an isolated case, even

in Texas. Another case pending before us involves similar

facts and issues under the Commerce Clause. Vinmar, Inc.

v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 890 S.W.2d 493 (Tex.

App.—El Paso 1994, writ requested). I would hold that a

nondiscriminatory ad valorem tax on personal property is not

prohibited by the Import-Export Clause in the circumstances

of the case before us. I am thus obliged to consider whether,

as petitioner argues, the tax is prohibited by the Commerce

Clause and the Texas Tax Code, and I would hold that it is

not. Because I believe today’s decision imposes a restriction

on the State’s power to tax not found in the Constitution or

state law, I respectfully dissent.

25a

The Import-Export Clause states: "No State shall,

without the Consent of the Congress lay any Imposts or

Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely

necessary for executing its inspection Laws. . . ." U.S.

CONST. art. I, § 10, cl2. The provision is not "an absolute

prohibition on all taxation of imports and exports.”

Department of Revenue vy. Association of Washington

Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 759 (1978). The "central

holding" of Michelin is "that the absolute ban is only of

‘Imposts or Duties’ and not of all taxes." /d. Harkening

back to Brown v. Maryland, 26 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 262

(1827), Michelin reiterated;

"(T]he words of the prohibition ought not to be

pressed to their utmost extent;... in our complex

system, the object of the powers conferred on the

government of the Union, and the nature of the often

conflicting powers which remain in the States, must

always be taken into view . . . . [T]here must be a

point of time when the prohibition ceases, and the

power of the State to tax commences... ."

Michelin, 423 U.S. at 296 (quoting Brown, 26 U.S. at 266-

267).

The parameters of the prohibition are two related

concepts, one being "Imposts or Duties", which describes the

prohibited tax, and the other "Imports or Exports", which

describes the article on which the tax falls. Before Michelin,

application of the prohibition focused almost exclusively on

the latter — whether the article taxed was an import or

export. This in turn depended on where the article was in

26a

the course of its journey when the tax was imposed. An

article was held to be an import as long as it remained in its

original package after entry into the country. Low v. Austin,

80 U.S. 29, 34 (1871). An article was an export when it

physically entered and remained in the stream of exportation.

Washington Stevedoring, 435 U.S. at 752; Kosydar v.

National Cash Register Co., 417 U.S. 62, 66-68 (1974);

Empresa Siderurgica, S.A. v. County of Merced, 337 U.S.

154, 157 (1949); Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Bd. of

Equalization, 329 U.S. 69, 82-83 (1946); Minnesota v.

Blasius, 290 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1933); A.G. Spalding & Bros. v.

Edwards, 262 U.S. 66, 69 (1923); Cornell v. Coyne, 192

U.S. 418, 427 (1904); Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517, 527

(1886).

Michelin “adopted a fundamentally different approach

to cases claiming the protection of the Import-Export

Clause." Limbach v. Hooven & Allison Co., 466 U.S. 353,

359 (1984). Michelin shifted the analytical focus from the

nature of the article to the nature of the tax — whether it

was an impost or duty. Jd. at 359-360; Washington

Stevedoring, 435 U.S. at 752. “[T]he term “‘Impost or Duty’

is not self-defining and does not necessarily encompass all

taxes.” Id. at 759. It is defined by the policies that

motivated inclusion of the provision in the Constitution. R.

J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham County, 479 U.S. 130,

153 (1986). According to Michelin:

The Framers of the Constitution . . . sought to

alleviate three main concerns by committing sole

power to lay imposts and duties on imports in the

Federal Government, with no concurrent state power:

the Federal Government must speak with one voice

when regulating commercial relations with foreign

governments, and tariffs, which might affect foreign

relations, could not be implemented by the States

27a

consistently with that exclusive power; import

revenues were to be the major source of revenue of

the Federal Government and should not be diverted to

the States; and harmony among the States might be

disturbed unless seaboard States, with their crucial

ports of entry, were prohibited from levying taxes on

citizens of other States by taxing goods merely

flowing through their ports to the other States not

situated as favorably geographically.

423 U.S. at 285-286 (footnotes omitted). I refer to the first

of these policies as the "foreign relations" policy and to the

third as the “state harmony” policy.

The Supreme Court has made it quite clear that “what

constitutes an import or export” is no longer “the exclusive

consideration” in applying the Import-Export Clause.

Washington Stevedoring, 435 U.S. at 760. The argument

was made in Washington Stevedoring that Michelin did not

address a situation in which the articles taxed remained "a

part of commerce". The Supreme Court firmly rejected that

argument as an attempt to return to the pre-Michelin focus on

the import or export nature of the property taxed:

Rather than examining whether the taxes are "Imposts

or Duties" that offend constitutional policies, the

contention would have the Court explore when goods

lose their status as imports and exports. This is

precisely the inquiry the Court abandoned in

[Michelin].

Id. In Limbach, the Supreme Court reiterated:

To repeat: we think it clear that this Court in

Michelin specifically abandoned the concept that the

Import-Export Clause constituted a broad prohibition

28a

against all forms of state taxation that fell on imports.

Michelin changed the focus of Import-Export Clause

cases from the nature of the goods as imports to the

nature of the tax at issue. The new focus is not on

whether the goods have lost their status as imports

but is, instead, on whether the tax sought to be

imposed is an “Impost or Duty."

466 U.S. at 360.

In today’s opinion in the case before us, the Court

appears to conclude that the Supreme Court has treated

imports differently than exports, and that while Michelin

abandoned the “original package" test for imports, it did not

abandon the "stream of export" test for exports.

Specifically, the Court says:

The United States Supreme Court has yet to

announce whether the new approach set forth in

Michelin should be applied to a direct tax on imports

or exports in transit. Although the Michelin court

rejected the original package doctrine, it did not

overrule Coe v. Errol or any of the stream of export

cases, and the two doctrines are different enough that

the rejection of one does not, of itself, signify the

demise of the other.

Ante at ____. The Court overlooks Washington Stevedoring,

in which the Supreme court observed that before Michelin—

the analysis in the export cases . . . differed from that

in the import cases. In the former, the question was

when did the export enter the export stream; in the

latter, the question was when did the goods escape

their original package. The questions differed, for

example, because an export could enter its export

29a

package and not secure tax immunity until later when

it began its journey out of the country. Until

Michelin, an import retained its immunity so long as

it remained in its original package.

Despite these formal differences, the Michelin

approach should apply to taxation involving exports

as well as imports. The prohibition on the taxation of

exports is contained in the same Clause as that

regarding imports. The export-tax ban vindicates two

of the three policies identified in Michelin. It

precludes state disruption of the United States foreign

policy. It does not serve to protect federal revenues,

however, because the Constitution forbids federal

taxation of exports. U.S. CONST., Art. I. § 9, cl.

5; see United States v. Hvoslef, 237 U.S. 1. But it

does avoid friction and trade barriers among the

States. As a result, any tax relating to exports can be

tested for its conformance with the first and third

policies. If the constitutional interests are not

disturbed, the tax should not be considered an

“Impost or Duty" any more than should a tax related

to imports.

435 U.S. at 758 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted). The

Court in today’s opinion states: "Faced with the decision of

whether to apply the ‘stream of export’ rule or to abandon it,

we choose the former." Given the strong, unqualified

language of Washington Stevedoring, 1 do not believe that

adherence to the "stream of export" rule as the exclusive test

for applying the Import-Export Clause remains an open

choice.

Thus, as a general rule, a state tax on exports is not

an impost or duty prohibited by the Import-Export Clause

unless it conflicts with either of the two policies of the

30a

Clause which apply to exports, namely, the “foreign

relations" policy and the "state harmony" policy.

The Court reads Michelin to leave one exception to

this general rule. It "remains uncertain", the Court says,

ante at ___, whether a direct tax on imports and exports in

transit is prohibited by the Import-Export Clause even if the

tax does not conflict with the principles of the Clause.

Because of this uncertainty, the Court concludes that it is

bound by stare decisis to continue to apply the “stream of

export" rule to such taxes, the effect of which is to prohibit

them absolutely.

The Court relies heavily on the following passage in

Michelin:

[Tjhe [Import-Export] Clause was fashioned to

prevent the imposition of exactions which were no

more than transit fees on the privilege of moving

through a State. A non-discriminatory ad valorem

property tax obviously stands on a different footing,

and to the extent there is any conflict whatsoever with

this purpose of the Clause, it may be secured merely

by prohibiting the assessment of even

nondiscriminatory property taxes on goods which are

merely in transit through the State when the tax is

assessed.

423 U.S. at 290 (footnotes omitted), ante at__. The Court

seems to read the second sentence to say that taxes on goods

merely in transit through a state are absolutely prohibited.

The sentence actually says that non-discriminatory ad

valorem property taxes on goods merely in transit through a

state are prohibited only “to the extent there is any conflict

3la

whatsoever with this purpose of the Clause". The only

examples suggested are “exactions which were no more than

transit fees". The Supreme Court does not say that there is

any conflict between the constitutional policies and a

nondiscriminatory ad valorem tax, and the Court’s use of the

word "whatsoever" suggests, if anything, that such conflict

in any event is minimal.

More importantly, however, the context in which the

passage appears makes it doubtful that the Supreme Court

contemplated any prohibition against nondiscriminatory ad

valorem taxes on imports and exports in transit except in

very limited circumstances, let alone an absolute prohibition.

The entire paragraph in which the passage appears reads as

follows:

Finally, nondiscriminatory ad valorem

property taxes do not interfere with the free flow of

imported goods among the States, as did the exactions

by States under the Articles of Confederation directed

solely at imported goods. Indeed, importers of goods

destined for inland States can easily avoid even those

taxes in today’s world. Modern transportation

methods such as air freight and containerized

packaging, and the development of railroads and the

Nation’s internal waterways, enable importation

directly into the inland States. Petitioner, for

example, operates other distribution centers from

wholesale warehouses in inland States. Actually, a

quarter of the tires distributed from _petitioner’s

Georgia warehouse are imported interstate directly

from Canada. To be sure, allowance of

nondiscriminatory ad valorem property taxation may

increase the cost of goods purchased by "inland"

consumers. But as already noted, such taxation is the

quid pro quo for benefits actually conferred by the

32a

taxing State. There is no reason why local taxpayers

should subsidize the services used by the importer;

ultimate consumers should pay for such services as

police and fire protection accorded the goods just as

much as they should pay transportation costs

associated with those goods. An evil to be prevented

by the Import-Export Clause was the levying of taxes

which could only be imposed because of the peculiar

geographical situation of certain States that enabled

them to single out goods destined for other States. In

effect, the Clause was fashioned to prevent the

imposition of exactions which were no more than

transit fees on the privilege of moving through a

State. A non-discriminatory ad valorem property tax

obviously stands on a different footing, and to the

extent there is any conflict whatsoever with this

purpose of the Clause, it may be secured merely by

prohibiting the assessment of even nondiscriminatory

property taxes on goods which are merely in transit

through the State when the tax is assessed.

Michelin, 423 U.S. at 288-290 (footnotes omitted). The

Supreme Court does not suggest that taxes directly on goods

in transit may be absolutely prohibited; to the contrary, the

Supreme Court states that "nondiscriminatory ad valorem

property taxation . . . is the quid pro quo for benefits

actually conferred by the taxing State." Jd. at 288-289. The

Import-Export Clause was intended to prohibit exaction of

fees for nothing more than the privilege of moving through

a state’s ports. The Clause was not intended to exempt

imports and exports from their fair share of the cost of police

and fire protection and other such services rendered by the

state through which the goods pass. Rather, the Supreme

Court said, imports and exports are no more exempt from

paying taxes for such services than they are from paying the

cost of their own transportation.

33a

That a non-discriminatory ad valorem tax on imports

and exports might be prohibited is, in Michelin, only a very

limited possibility. The Supreme Court stated that a tax

would be prohibited only “to the extent there is any conflict

whatsoever with [the] purpose of the Clause". /d. at 290.

Thus, even a prohibition against taxes on imports and exports

in transit must be based on the policies of the constitutional

provision. The Supreme Court did not suggest circumstances

which would call for prohibition of such a tax:

In any event, since prohibition of

nondiscriminatory ad valorem property taxation would

not further the objectives of the Import-Export

Clause, only the clearest constitutional mandate

should lead us to condemn such taxation. The

terminology employed in the Clause — "Imposts or

Duties” — is sufficiently ambiguous that we decline

to presume it was intended to embrace taxation that

does not create the evils the Clause was specifically

intended to eliminate.

Id. at 293-294. Low v. Austin made “crystal clear", the

Supreme Court said, “that the prohibition applied only to

state exactions upon imports as imports and did not apply to

nondiscriminatory ad valorem property taxes." Jd. at 300.

Nevertheless, in Washington Stevedoring the Supreme

Court held open the possibility not entirely foreclosed by

Michelin that some nondiscriminatory ad valorem tax on

imports and exports in transit might be absolutely prohibited,

stating in a footnote:

We do not raise the question of the

applicability of the Michelin approach when a State

directly taxes imports or.exports in transit.

34a

. . . As in Michelin, decided less than three

years ago, we prefer to defer decision until a case

with pertinent facts is presented. At that time, with

full argument, the issue with all its ramifications may

be decided.

435 U.S. at 757 n.23. In a concurring opinion, however,

Justice Powell explained the Supreme Court’s concern:

In [Michelin] this Court abandoned the

traditional, formalistic methods of determining the

validity of state levies under the Import-Export

Clause and applied a functional analysis based on the

exaction’s relationship to the three policies that

underlie the Clause: (i) preservation of uniform

federal regulation of foreign relations; (ii) protection

of federal revenue derived from imports; and (iii)

maintenance of harmony among the inland States and

the seaboard States. The nondiscriminatory ad

valorem property tax in Michelin was held not to

violate any of those policies, but the Court suggested

that even a nondiscriminatory tax on goods merely in

transit through the State might run afoul of the

Import-Export Clause.

* =

In questioning the validity of “transit fees," the

Michelin Court was concerned with exactions that

bore no relation to services and benefits conferred by

the State. Thus, the transit-fee inquiry cannot be

answered by determining whether or not the tax

relates to the value of the goods; instead, it must be

answered by inquiring whether the State is simply

making the imported goods pay their own way, as

opposed to exacting a fee merely for “the privilege of

moving through a State."

35a

435 U.S. at 762-764 (citation omitted). See also Xerox

Corp. v. County of Harris, Texas, 459 U.S. 145, 157-158

(1982) (Powell, J., dissenting). The Court did not agree

with Justice Powell that it had in effect already decided the

question whether states could tax import and exports in

transit, but it did not disagree that the determinative issue

was “whether the State is simply making the imported goods

pay their won way, as opposed to exacting a fee merely for

‘the privilege of moving through a State.’"

In two cases since Washington Stevedoring, the

Supreme Court has all but said that nondiscriminatory ad

valorem taxes on imports and exports in transit are not

prohibited by the Import-Export Clause except in rare

circumstances. In Limbach, the Supreme Court reconsidered

whether such a tax on imports still in their original

containers — and thus still in transit — was permitted.

Thirty-nine years earlier the Supreme had held that the tax

was prohibited. Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S.

652 (1945) [Hooven I}. In Limbach, following Michelin, the

Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion. In so

doing, it explained:

Hooven I held that, under the Clause, a

nondiscriminatory state ad valorem tax could not be

imposed until the imported goods had lost their status

as imports by being removed from their original

packages. This decision was among the progeny of

Low v. Austin for it, too, was decided on the original-

package doctrine. Thus Hooven / is inconsistent with

the later ruling in Michelin that such a tax is not an

"Impost or Duty" and therefore is not prohibited by

the Clause. Although Hooven I was not expressly

overruled in Michelin, it must be regarded as

retaining no vitality since the Michelin decision.

36a

466 U.S. at 360-361 (emphasis added). Thus, Limbach holds

that a nondiscriminatory state ad valorem tax on an import

still in its original package and thus in transit is not, under

Michelin, an impost or duty prohibited by the Import-Export

Clause.

In Itel Containers International Corp. v. Huddleston,

507 U.S.___, 113 S.Ct. 1095 (1993), the Supreme Court

held that a state sales tax on leases of containers owned by

a domestic company and used in international shipping was

not prohibited by the Import-Export Clause. To arrive at this

conclusion, the Supreme Court examined whether the tax

violated any of the three constitutional policies identified in

Michelin and decided that it did not. If also rejected the

taxpayer’s argument that the tax was not permitted because

it fell directly on goods in transit:

For similar reasons, we reject the argument that the

tax violates the prohibition on the direct taxation of

imports and exports “in transit," the rule we followed

in [Richfield Oil}. Even assuming that rule has not

been altered by the approach we adopted in Michelin,

it is inapplicable here.

Id. at 1106 (emphasis added). Although the Supreme Court

concluded that the in-transit rule was inapplicable because the

tax did not fall on goods themselves, it strongly suggested

that the rule was altered by Michelin.

In sum, nothing in Michelin or any subsequent

Supreme Court decision involving the Import-Export Clause

— Washington Stevedoring, Limbach and Itel — suggests that

any direct tax on imports or exports in transit, and

particularly any nondiscriminatory ad valorem tax, is

prohibited unless it conflicts with either the “foreign

relations” policy or the "state harmony” policy. This is not,

37a

of course, surprising in the least. For there to be an

exception to the Michelin rule, there must be some tax that

was fully consistent with constitutional policies but

nevertheless prohibited, or a tax that was inconsistent with

such policies and yet permitted. Neither is possible. The

very purpose of identifying the policies behind the Clause is

to define its scope as precisely as possible. The

constitutional policies and the scope of their prohibition must

be exactly coextensive. Because those policies define the

Clause’s prohibition more exactly than shorthand tests like

“original package” and “export stream", Michelin abandoned

the latter altogether. This Court’s adherence to the “export

stream” rule as an exclusive test conflicts with both the rule

and the spirit of Michelin.

The Court attempts to support its view with the Fifth

Circuit’s decision in Louisiana Land & Exploration Co. vy.

Pilot Production Co., 900 F.2d 816 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied,

498 U.S. 897 (1990), which held invalid a state excise tax on

jet fuel bound for a foreign country. A divided panel in that

case did indicate that the Import-Export Clause prohibits a

direct tax on exports actually in transit, but it relied heavily

on the rule in Richfield Oil which the Supreme Court

undercut in Itel three years after Louisiana Land was

decided. Itel, 113 S. Ct. at 1106. Louisiana Land thus

provides very little continued support for an absolute in-

transit rule, which this Court applies today. The Fifth

Circuit may nevertheless have reached the correct result,

applying Michelin’s “foreign relations" and "state harmony"

policies, for reasons I discuss below.

Cc

Whether goods are actually in transit is not

determinative in applying the Import-Export Clause, but

neither is it irrelevant. Focusing on the concept of "Imposts

38a

or Duties" need not and should not exclude all consideration

of the concept of “Imports and Exports". Not only are the

concepts related — imposts and duties are by definition taxes

levied on imports and exports — but they are intertwined in

the policies embodied in the Clause. Those policies are the

sole arbiters of the validity of a tax, but among the factors to

be considered is whether the goods taxed are in transit.

More precisely, what is really important is not whether the

goods are in transit, but how. This, I think, is what the

Supreme Court meant in the Michelin passage which is so

important to this Court’s opinion:

In effect, the Clause was fashioned to prevent the

imposition of exactions which were no more than

transit fees on the privilege of moving through a

State. A non-discriminatory ad valorem property tax

obviously stands on a different footing, and to the

extent there is any conflict whatsoever with this

purpose of the Clause, it may be secured merely by

prohibiting the assessment of even nondiscriminatory

property taxes on goods which are merely in transit

through the State when the tax is assessed.

423 U.S. at 290 (emphasis added, footnote omitted). In

other words, the Import-Export Clause prohibits taxes which

are “no more than transit fees" on goods which are “merely

in transit". That is far different from saying that the Clause

prohibits all taxes on goods in transit.

This Court reached the same conclusion in Diamond

Shamrock Refining & Marketing Co. v. Nueces County

Appraisal District, 876 S.W.2d 298 (Tex.), cert. denied, _

U.S. __, 115 S.Ct. 500 (1994). In that case we upheld an

ad valorem tax on imported oil stored in Nueces County

prior to the completion of its journey to other Texas

destinations. We said:

39a

Pointing to the parties’ stipulation that its

crude oil is “in transit" while in Nueces County,

Diamond Shamrock argues that the tax here falls

within the “merely in transit" qualification. We

disagree. The tax in question here does not in any

way impinge on the third “harmony among the

States” policy of the Import-Export Clause. Although

still on its foreign import journey and in that sense

“in transit,” the oil in question here entered only the

State of Texas and, according to the stipulated facts,

never left Texas in its crude oil form. Thus, there

simply was no opportunity for harmony between the

states to be disturbed. Read in context, the Michelin

Court’s qualification clearly applies only to goods in

transit through the state to or from another state and

not to goods merely in transit within the only state

the goods ever enter.

876 S.W.2d at 300-301 (some emphasis added, footnotes

omitted). The dispositive issue was not whether the oil could

be said to be in transit in some sense, but whether it was in

transit in such a way as to invoke constitutional protection

from state taxation.

The idea is even clearer in our analysis of the validity

of the tax under the Commerce Clause. The policies of that

clause are identified in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,

430 U.S. 274 (1977), in what we referred to as "four

prongs”. Our opinion in Diamond Shamrock said:

Obviously, where the four prongs of Complete

Auto are not met, goods are not taxable under the

Commerce Clause whether or not they are “in

transit." And, the circumstances which make the

goods “in transit” may inform a court’s decision that

the first and fourth nexus requirements of Complete

40a

Auto are not met. For instance, if oil in tanks on

trucks merely passed through Nueces County without

stopping, it would be “in transit” in a way that would

cause it to have little or no nexus with the county.

But under other circumstances, as in this case, there

can be sufficient nexus to support a tax even Annes

are technically “in transit."

876 S.W.2d at 302 (footnote omitted). This passage is

important for two reasons. First, it acknowledges that the

validity of a tax depends upon its consistency with

constitutional policies and not merely on whether it is in

transit. Second, how goods are in transit is important in

applying constitutional policies.

So, for example, suppose in the case before us that

VICO’s property, instead of being stored within the

boundaries of the taxing units on January 1, had been present

there only for the few hours it would have taken a truck to

drive from outside the units, across them and onto a ship tied

up at the dock. In such circumstances, the property would

have been merely in transit through the taxing unit, and the

tax little more than a transit fee. The taxing units would not

even have had the opportunity to render any significant

services to benefit the property. The property would be in

transit in a far different way than property stored near the

dock for one to six months or more on its way to the same

ultimate destination.

This distinction, which was crucial in Diamond

Shamrock, goes unmentioned in today’s opinion. I do not

challenge the Court’s conclusion that VICO’s property was

in transit through Texas to Indonesia, nor do I think that its

stayover at the Port of Houston was for reasons unrelated to

its transportation. These are close calls but not at all

implausible. VICO’s property was delayed in storage only

4la

when it was damaged, lacking parts, otherwise faulty or

unsuitable, or did not meet Indonesia’s stringent standard for

imports. The fact is, however, that of the $380,260 worth

of property VICO warehoused at the Port of Houston on

January 1, 1991, more than $9,000 had been there for more

than 175 days, 20% had been there for more than 45 days

and over a third of it had been there for more than a month.

The record reflects that VICO stored property awaiting

authorization from Indonesia for shipment. VICO does not

dispute that its property benefits from police and fire

protection and other governmental services provided by the

taxing units, or that it pays no more than its fair share of

those services. As the Supreme Court stated in Michelin:

There is no reason why local taxpayers should

subsidize the services used by the importer [or in this

case, the exporter]; ultimate consumers should pay

for such services as police and fire protection

accorded the goods just as much as they should pay

transportation costs associated with those goods.

423 U.S. at 289 (footnote omitted). The same police officers

who protect property permanently located in the taxing units

also protect VICO’s. The same fire fighters put out the

fires. VICO’s property is carried to and from the warehouse

on streets paved and maintained with ad valorem taxes.

The Court attempts to avoid this language in Michelin

by arguing that because the tax is assessed on property

present on January 1 each year, VICO is taxed as if its

property were present year round. The flaws in this

argument are obvious. VICO is taxed, not as if the property

assessed on January | were present all year long, but only as

if it stored some property at the port throughout the year,

which, in fact, it does. It might have a great deal more or

less property stored at the Houston port on an average day;

42a

there is no evidence one way or the other. The use of a

single date is simply an expedient to calculating the tax due.

Moreover, there is no discrimination against VICO in this

respect. VICO makes no assertion that the use of January |

discriminates against exports. Every property owner is taxed

the same way, and every taxpayer, VICO included, is free to

arrange its affairs to minimize the property it has on hand on

January 1 in order to minimize its tax obligation.

VICO argues that governmental services can be paid

for by ad valorem taxes on real property, including the

warehouse in which its property is stored. The taxing units

are not required to rely entirely, or even at all, on taxes on

realty. They may choose to require personalty to pay its

share of government services. The Court acknowledges that

VICO receives governmental services for which it ought to

pay something. The conclusion that the tax is unduly

burdensome to international commerce presumes that VICO

is paying more than its share. VICO does not make this

claim, and there is no evidence to support it.

D

The validity of the tax in this case under the Import-

Export Clause should depend solely upon its consistency with

the “foreign relations" and “state harmony" policies in

Michelin. The Court goes through the motions of this

analysis, but its conclusions are all dictated by its belief that

taxes on goods in transit always contravene these polices.

The Court does not assess the effect of the tax in this case on

constitutional policies independent of its in-transit rule.

What I have called the "foreign relations" policy was

stated by the Court in Michelin as follows:

43a

the Federal Government must speak with one voice

when regulating commercial relations with foreign

governments, and tariffs, which might affect foreign

relations, could not be implemented by the States

consistently with that exclusive power... .

423 U.S. at 285 (footnote omitted). The ad valorem tax in

this case does not interfere with the federal government’s

foreign relations. It is imposed on all property present in the

taxing units on a certain date for the purpose of paying for

government services which benefit the property. While this

indisputably affects the price property is sold for, it is only

an incidental effect common to all property. In R. J.

Reynolds, the Supreme Court wrote of a nondiscriminatory

ad valorem tax on imports:

If imposition of the tax happens to have the

"incidental effect" . . .of discouraging some

importation of foreign goods, prohibiting this result

is not a function of the Import-Export Clause.

479 U.S. at 154.

A foreign government simply has no more reason to

think that the goods it imports will be exempt from paying

for government service than that they will be from paying

transportation cost. The Court surmises that “Indonesia

might turn to other countries for its imported goods or might

engage in retaliatory taxation of its own exports destined for

the United States." Ante at___. Again, Indonesia, like any

other purchaser, cannot reasonably expect to escape paying

for government services benefiting its purchases, either as a

direct expense or a component of the price, no matter what

country it turns to.

44a

The “state harmony" policy was stated in Michelin as

follows:

harmony among the States might be disturbed unless

seaboard States, with their crucial ports of entry,

were prohibited from levying taxes on citizens of

other States by taxing goods merely flowing through

their ports to the other States not situated as favorable

geographically.

423 U.S. at 285-286 (footnote omitted). Requiring property

to pay for the benefits of government services is not a

prerogative limited to seaboard states. The taxing units in

this case enjoy no more favorable a position than the taxing

units in any other state. To the contrary, invalidating the tax

in this case discriminates against the port because it is a port.

The tax in this case is different from the tax

invalidated by the Fifth Circuit in Louisiana Land. That was

an excise tax, a sales tax imposed specifically on jet fuel.

900 F.2d at 817 n.1. The tax in this case is a completely

nondiscriminatory ad valorem tax imposed on all personalty

as in Michelin. An argument can be made that one state’s

sales tax on certain products may impact foreign relations or

harmony among the states more than an ad valorem tax on

all kinds of property. Also, an excise tax may fall on

property that is merely moving through a state without a

sufficient nexus there to warrant taxation. In any event, the

tax expressly identified in Michelin as being outside

constitutional prohibition is a nondiscriminatory ad valorem

tax.

Since the tax on VICO’s property does not conflict

with the policies of the Import-Export Clause identified in

Michelin, 1 would conclude that the tax is not prohibited by

that provision.

.

1 EIS:

45a

Il

The Foreign Commerce Clause empowers Congress

"To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.” The United

States Supreme Court has construed this Clause not only as

a grant of power to the Congress but also as a negation of

power in the states. See Intel, 113 S.Ct. at 1107-1108

(Scalia, J., concurring). As with the Import-Export Clause,

the Supreme Court has defined the scope of the prohibition

of this Clause based upon the policies its serves. The test

includes four factors which apply to interstate and foreign

commerce both, Complete Auto Transit 430 U.S. at 277-279,

plus two additional factors unique to foreign commerce,

Japan Line, Lid. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434,

451 (1979). Mel, 113 S.Ct. at 1103. A tax passes muster

under the Complete Auto test if it is: (1) applied to an

activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing state; (2)

fairly apportioned; (3) nondiscriminatory; and (4) fairly

related to services provided by the State. Complete Auto, 430

U.S. at 279; Diamond Shamrock, 876 S.W.2d at 301.

Taxation on international commerce, because it implicates

additional constitutional concerns, is subjected to two

additional inquiries: whether the tax, notwithstanding

apportionment, creates a substantial risk of international

multiple taxation, and whether the tax prevents the federal

government from speaking with one voice when regulating

commercial relations with foreign governments. Japan Line,

Lid., 441 U.S. at 451; Diamond Shamrock, 876 S.W.2d at

301.

The tax in this case meets all six factors. The goods

clearly have a nexus to this state. They are present for

relatively prolonged periods during which they receive local

services such as police and fire protection. The tax 1s

nondiscriminatory. The same tax applies to all personal

property. There is no evidence that the tax is not fairly

46a

apportioned insofar as it falls only on those goods here on

January 1. See Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 445, n.8. Rather,

it is undisputed that VICO has goods present in Harris

County throughout the year. There is no evidence that the

tax is not fairly related to the services provided. There is no

evidence that the goods would be subject to multiple taxation

here and abroad, or for that matter, that they would be

subject to multiple taxation here and in other states. And

finally, as already noted, there is no evidence that imposition

of this nondiscriminatory ad valorem tax would be a tariff or

tax interfering with the federal government’s ability to speak

with one voice in foreign relations. The tax does not fall on

goods because of their place of destination, but is simply

based on their presence here on the day of assessment. Their

presence or absence on that date could be manipulated by a

taxpayer to its advantage.

The tax in this case impinges no more upon the

Foreign Commerce Clause than the tax we upheld in

Diamond Shamrock. 1 would conclude that it is not

prohibited by that Clause.

Il

Section 11.01(c)(1) of the Texas Tax Code states:

"This state has jurisdiction to tax tangible personal property

if the property is . . . located in this state for longer than a

temporary period... ." The taxing units concede that this

is the only provision of state law that allows them to tax

VICO’s property. VICO argues that its property is only

temporarily present within the taxing units’ boundaries and

thus not subject to their taxation.

In Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Board of Equalization,

419 S.W.2d 345, 349 (Tex. 1967), we stated:

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47a

To acquire a tax situs of its own in a

particular state, it is not necessary that tangible

personal property be situated in the state with

absolute permanency, or that it be there situated with

no intention on the part of the owner to remove it; it

is enough to fix tax situs that its situation have a

degree of permanency which will distinguish it from

property which is in the state on a purely temporary

or transitory basis.

In that case we held that Greyhound buses were taxable at

that company’s principal place of business in Texas, which

was Fort Worth, even though the buses were constantly

moving into, across and out of the State.

While we have been cited to no case involving

circumstances more like those of the present case, I would

hold that VICO’s property is in the State for more than a

temporary period. Even though it is destined for Indonesia

from before the moment it enters the State and is warehoused

at the Port of Houston for only as long as is necessary to

prepare it for transportation, that period is almost always a

number of days and often a number ef months. One could

argue that article VIII, section 1-j of the Texas Constitution,

exempting property within the State for less than 175 days in

certain circumstances, sets a standard for what is temporary

under section 11.01(c)(1), but that argument is not made by

the parties here and I do not address it. I would conclude

that taxation of VICO’s property does not violate section

11.01(c)(1) of the Tax Code.

* a * cd *

The court of appeals held that neither the Import-

Export Clause, the Foreign Commerce Clause, nor section

11.01(c)(1) of the Tax Code prohibited the taxing authorities

48a

from taxing VICO’s property. It remanded the case to

consider other arguments made by VICO pertaining to its

claim of freeport exemption under the Tax Code and the

Texas Constitution. I agree, for the reasons explained by the

court of appeals, that the case should be remanded. I would

therefore affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.

Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.

Nathan L. Hecht, Justice

Opinion delivered: October 27, 1995

49a

APPENDIX C

Reversed and Remanded and Opinion Filed February 10,

1994.

In The

FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS

NO. C14-92-01158-CV

HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT and

HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL REVIEW BOARD,

Appellants

Ve

VIRGINIA INDONESIA COMPANY, Appellee

On Appeal from the 333rd District Court

Harris County, Texas

Trial Court Cause No. 91-59779

OPINION

I. Nature of the Case

This is an ad valorem property tax case. The Harris

County Appraisal District (the “District") assessed a 1991

property tax against Virginia Indonesia Company (“VICO")

on goods and equipment located in Harris County but

destined for Indonesia. VICO protested to the Harris County

Appraisal Review Board (the "Board"), and the Board upheld

the tax. VICO sued the District and Board in district court,

claiming that the tax violated the United States Constitution's

commerce and import-export clauses and Texas property law.

Both VICO and the District and Board moved for summary

50a

judgment. The district court granted VICO’s motion and

denied the District and Board’s. The District and Board

appeal. We reverse and remand.

Il. Facts

The following facts are undisputed. VICO is a

Delaware corporation authorized to do business in Harris

County, Texas. The District is a political subdivision of the

state responsible for providing annual appraisal rolls listing

taxable property and appraised values to taxing units within

its jurisdiction that impose ad valorem property taxes. The

Board is a separate entity responsible for, among other

matters, hearing and determining taxpayer protests.

VICO is the operator of an Indonesian joint venture

which explores for oil and gas in the Republic of Indonesia.

VICO purchases goods and equipment for use by the joint

venture in its Indonesian operations from vendors both within

and outside Texas. Upon being notified that certain goods

are needed in Indonesia, VICO issues a request for quotation

to an Indonesian company that forwards the request to an

agent who solicits bids. VICO selects a vendor and issues a

purchase order for the goods. Generally, the vendor ships

the goods directly to VICO’s export packer in Houston and

bills VICO.

At the export packer’s yard in Houston, the goods are

inspected for quality and correctness. If the goods are

damaged or otherwise incorrect, VICO or its export packer

resolves the irregularities with the vendor. VICO then

requests from Indonesia approval for import. When import

approval is granted, an international inspection agency

inspects the goods on behalf of Indonesia. Local inspection

enables the goods to avoid customs inspection upon their

arrival in Indonesia. When a good or item of equipment has

S5la

been finally cleared for import to Indonesia, VICO pays the

vendor’s invoice.

VICO’s export packer then packs the goods for

export. A separate freight forwarder, not associated with the

export packer, arranges for shipment of the goods. The

freight forwarder notifies the export packer when and where

to deliver the goods for shipment. Most items are exported

within 45 days from receipt by the packer, but in some cases

they may remain with the packer for more than 90 days.

VICO’s property that was included on the District’s 1991

appraisal roll consisted of the goods and equipment

physically present at the export packer’s premises on January

1, 1991, although VICO has goods and equipment at that

location throughout the year.

At no point in VICO’s exporting process can the

property be diverted to domestic use. All VICO purchase

orders have FOREIGN PURCHASE ORDER printed at the

top and “Ultimate destination for all items on this order is

Indonesia.” The property is committed for export to a

foreign destination from the moment of purchase. The only

reasons for holding the property at the export packer are for

inspection, packing, and awaiting approval for import to

Indonesia. None of the property is ever used in Texas.

Ill. Discussion

In two points of error, the District and Board

complain that the trial court erred in granting VICO’s motion

for summary judgment and denying their own.

A. Standard of Review

The movant for summary judgment has the burden to

show that there are no genuine issues of material fact and

S2a

that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Nixon v.

Mr. Property Management, Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49

(Tex. 1985). In deciding whether there is a disputed material

fact issue precluding summary judgment, we take evidence

favorable to the non-movant as true. /d. We indulge every

reasonable inference in favor of the non-movant and resolve

any doubts in his favor. Jd. If the movant’s motion and

summary judgment proof facially establishes his right to

judgment as a matter of law, then the burden shifts to the

non-movant to raise fact issues precluding summary

judgment. See City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth..,

589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979). A defendant, to be

entitled to summary judgment, is required to disprove at least

one essential element of each pleaded cause of action or

otherwise show that plaintiffs could not succeed on any

theory pleaded. Rosas v. Buddies Food Store, 518 S.W.2d

534, 537 (Tex. 1975).

In its motion for summary judgment, VICO contended

that the goods and equipment destined for export were

exempt from state taxation under the commerce and import-

export clauses of the United States Constitution and under the

Texas Constitution and Tax Code. US. CONST. art. I, § 8,

cl. 3 & § 10, cl. 2; TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1-j; TEX.

TAX CODE ANN. §§ 11.01(c) and 11.251 (Vernon 1992 &

Supp. 1994). VICO further contended that the District

waived its right to list the property on the 1991 appraisal roll

by exempting similar VICO property in prior years. Finally

VICO complained that the appraised value of its property

was greater than its market value.

In its summary judgment order, the trial court held

that VICO’s property was not taxable because the property

(1) was “protected from state taxation by exemptions

provided by the Import-Export or Commerce Clauses of the

United States Constitution,” and (2) “fails to meet the

tlk gt ho Reed Wei eee

RR ance} wiht goed)

53a

{taxability] criteria as outlined under the Texas Tax Code."

The trial court did not reach the waiver or appraised value

issues. When the trial court specifies the grounds upon

which it bases its summary judgment, we can only affirm the

summary judgment on those grounds. Carlisle v. Philip

Morris Inc. , 805 S.W.2d 498, 518 (Tex. App.--Austin 1991,

writ denied). Therefore, we do not consider VICO’s waiver

argument as a basis for the summary judgment. However,

we note that, generally, the doctrine of waiver does not

preclude the taxation of property previously determined to be

exempt. 16 STEPHEN M. FLANAGAN, THE LAW OF

MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 44.84 (3rd ed. rev.

1984). Also, only in exceptional circumstances, is a

governmental unit subject to estoppel, a doctrine related to

waiver, in the exercise of its governmental powers. City of

Hutchins v. Prasifka, 450 S.W.2d 829, 836 (Tex. 1970).

The Tax Code itself provides that the chief appraiser may

cancel an exemption erroneously allowed. TEX. TAX

CODE ANN.§ 11.43(H) (Vernon 1992).

To prevail in its summary judgment, VICO must have

proved that the tax at issue was (1) unconstitutional under the

U.S. commerce clause, (2) unconstitutional under the U.S.

import-export clause, or (3) invalid under Texas tax law.

B. Commerce Clause

The foreign and domestic commerce clauses of the

United States Constitution provide that "[t]he Congress shall

have power ... to regulate commerce with foreign nations,

and among the several states ...." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8

cl. 3. While on its face an affirmative grant of power to the

Congress, the commerce clause has been interpreted to

negative a state’s power to unduly burden foreign or

interstate commerce. It is this “negative” or “dormant”

aspect of the commerce clause that is at issue in the present

case.

54a

Here, the ad valorem property tax is being imposed

on goods and equipment destined for export to Indonesia.

The foreign commerce clause is implicated, and a six-part

test is used to determine whether the tax passes constitutional

muster. See ltel Containers Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, __

U.S.___,___; 113 S.Ct. 1095, 1103 (1993); Nueces County

v. Diamond Shamrock, 853 S.W.2d 212, 217 (Tex. App.--

Corpus Christi 1993, writ granted). The first four prongs of

the foreign commerce clause test are the same as those used

to determine compliance with the domestic commerce clause.

A state tax is constitutional under the domestic commerce

clause when the tax (1) is applied to an activity with a

substantial nexus with the taxing state, (2) is fairly

apportioned,(3) does not discriminate against interstate

commerce, and (4) is fairly related to the services provided

by the state. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S.

274, 279 (1977). The last two prongs of the six-part test

would validate a tax that (5) did not create a substantial risk

of multiple international taxation, and (6) did not prevent the

federal government from speaking with one voice when

regulating commercial relations with foreign governments.

Japan Line, Lid. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434,

451 (1979).

The burden was on VICO to establish commerce

clause immunity. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax

Board, 463 U.S. 159, 175-76 (1983). To prevail in its

summary judgment, VICO need only prove as a matter of

law that the tax failed any one prong of the test.

Conversely, for the District and Board to prevail on their

summary judgment, they must prove as a matter of law that

the tax met all six prongs.

Traditional commerce clause analysis focused on

whether the goods taxed were “in transit” in interstate or

foreign commerce. See, e.g., Calvert v. Zanes-Ewalt

PED Wie Pips

Mee eR ON aah ast

55a

Warehouse, Inc., 502 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. 1973). However,

the reformulation of the foreign commerce clause test, first

announced in Japan Line and reaffirmed in Huddleston,

abandons this mechanical "in transit" approach. Instead, the

current test measures the constitutionality of a tax against the

underlying purposes of the commerce clause. Once the

purposes of the commerce clause are satisfied, “the concept

of ‘in transit’ loses any rational meaning.” See Diamond

Shamrock, 853 S.W.2d at 216. It was “largely irrelevant"

whether the goods and equipment in the export packer’s

warehouse were still considered "in the stream of interstate

commerce” or whether they “came to rest" in Texas. See D.

H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 31 (1988). The

issue of whether goods were merely “in-transit" through a

state and therefore not taxable is now incorporated in the

various prongs of the six-part analysis. The focus is no

longer on a good’s status as “import" or “export,” but rather,

on whether the purposes of the commerce clause are

frustrated.

Prong 1: Is the tax applied to an activity with a

substantial nexus with the taxing state?

It was undisputed that VICO is a corporation doing

business in Texas. VICO’s business in Texas is the

procurement of goods and equipment for use by the

Indonesian joint venture. VICO presumably derives profits

through its procurement services. In essence, VICO uses

Texas as a staging area for the goods it procures. Goods are

shipped from in-state and out-of-state suppliers to Houston

where the goods remain in an export packer’s warehouse for

an average of 45 days. During this time, (1) the goods and

equipment are stored, (2) the goods are inspected for quality

and conformity, (3) irregularities are resolved, (4) the goods

are inspected for import clearance into Indonesia, (5)

purchases are finalized, (6) the goods are packaged for

56a

export, and (7) shipping arrangement are made. The

resolution of inspection discrepancies can involve the

replacement of an item, a wait for missing parts, or the

outright return of the item to the vendor. Goods and

equipment are present in the packer’s warehouse throughout

the year.

We find that there was a sufficient nexus between

VICO, the taxed goods and equipment, and Texas. VICO

cannot rely on prong one to invalidate the ad valorem

property tax.

Prong 2: Is the tax fairly apportioned?

The goal is to avoid duplicative taxation. The tax

here is assessed on the inventory of goods and equipment

present in the export packer’s warehouse on January 1, 1991.

The tax is levied only on those goods, not the other goods

and equipment that had occupied the warehouse at other

times throughout the year. The average stay of a good or

piece of equipment in Texas is 45 days. However, VICO is

constantly shipping goods through the packer’s warehouse,

and goods similar to those present on January 1, 1991, are

in the warehouse throughout the year. Therefore, basing the

tax on the total value of goods present on any particular day

is the equivalent of taxing the total value of all goods and

equipment present at any time throughout the year at a rate

proportionate to each item’s time-of-stay in Texas, i.e., a

ratio of 45 days/365 days. Therefore, Texas’ ad valorem

property tax, being roughly pro-rated as to the property’s

duration of stay in Texas, is properly apportioned. See

Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 445 n.8.

VICO argues that the tax cannot be properly

apportioned because the export packer also pays property

taxes. But the export packer pays a tax commensurate with

ween Se “er

57a

its wealth, i.e., the warehouse facilities and equipment, but

not commensurate with VICO’s and the Indonesian joint

venture’s wealth, i.e., the contents of the warehouse. We

find that VICO cannot rely on prong two to invalidate the

tax.

Prong 3: Does the tax not discriminate against

interstate commerce?

A general ad valorem property tax does not tax goods

based on origin or destination. Any incidental increase in

cost to the supplier or ultimate consumer does not unduly

burden interstate commerce. Interstate commerce should be

made to pay its own way. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279.

We find that VICO cannot rely on prong three to invalidate

the tax.

Prong 4: Is the tax fairly related to the services

provided by the State?

The ad valorem property tax is applied to property

owners to compensate the state for a variety of services

rendered, e.g., fire and police protection, port facilities,

street lighting, roads and streets, and other incidents of a

modern industrial infrastructure. While true that the goods

and equipment are, from the time of purchase, destined for

Indonesia, it is not unconstitutional for an exporter to pay his

fair share of the cost of public services and infrastructure

provided by the state. We find that the ad valorem property

tax is fairly related to the services provided by the state.

VICO cannot rely on prong four to invalidate the tax.

Prong 5: Does the tax create a substantial risk of

multiple international taxation?

58a

VICO offered no evidence of a risk of multiple

international taxation, and VICO’s reliance on Japan Line is

misplaced. In Japan Line, the Court invalidated a California

ad valorem property tax on cargo shipping containers owned

by a Japanese-based company. But in Japan Line, there was

evidence of multiple international taxation in fact. Japan

Line, 441 U.S. at 452. Neither the foreign commerce clause

nor Japan Line demands that a state’s taxing power be

restrained due to the mere potential taxation by a foreign

sovereign. Huddleston, ____ U.S. at ___; 113 S.Ct. at 1104.

VICO cannot rely on prong five to invalidate the tax.

Prong 6: Does the tax prevent the federal

government from speaking with one voice when

regulating commercial relations with foreign

governments?

VICO offered no evidence that the tax impacted on

the federal government’s ability to regulate foreign

commerce. The ad valorem property tax does not

discriminate against foreign commerce in general, nor against

any particular foreign destination or state-of-origin. The tax

does not single out a particular country for discriminatory

tariffs thereby triggering retaliation against the United States

as a whole. To the extent that the tax increases the cost of

doing business through Harris County’s port facilities, the

market place and ultimate consumers can decide whether the

benefits of using those facilities outweigh the costs. VICO

cannot rely on prong six to invalidate the tax.

Summary

We conclude that VICO did not establish as a matter

of law that the tax assessed by the District runs afoul of the

commerce clause. To the contrary, we find that the

summary judgment proof and the undisputed facts

59a

conclusively establish that VICO cannot prevail on this

ground, The trial court erred to the extent that it granted

VICO’s summary judgment on the basis that the ad valorem

property tax violated the commerce clause.

C. Import-Export Clause

The Import-Export Clause of the United States

Constitution provides that “[nJo state shall without the

consent of congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or

exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for

executing its inspection laws... ." U.S. CONST. art. I, §

10, cl.2.

In the past, import-export clause analysis focused on

the status of a good as an “import” or “export.” Various

doctrines evolved to aid in this determination. For example,

if an import stayed in its original package after arriving in

the United States, it remained an “import” immune from

State taxation. Department of Revenue v. James B. Beam

Distilling Co. , 377 U.S. 341, 343 (1964). Also, if an export

had entered the “export stream" in its final continuous

journey out of the country, then it was immune from state

taxation. Kosydar v. National Cash Register Co., 417 U.S.

62, 70-71 (1974). But beginning with Michelin Tire Corp.

v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 283 (1976), the central inquiry

shifted to a determination whether a particular tax constituted

an impermissible “impost" or "duty." See Department of

Revenue v. Association of Washington Stevedoring

Companies, 435 U.S. 732, 752 (1978).

We are aware that the Michelin Court’s analysis was

addressed to a tax on imports, not exports. However, in

Washington Stevedoring, the Court held that the Michelin

approach apples to exports as well as imports. Jd. at 758.

We are also aware that Michelin did not deal with the issue

60a

of a tax on goods "in transit’ in foreign commerce and that

the Court in Washington Stevedoring held: “We do not reach

the question of the applicability of the Michelin approach

when a State directly taxes imports or exports in transit."

Id. at 757 n. 23; see also City of Farmers Branch v.

Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 537 S.W.2d 452, 453 (Tex.

1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1986). However, we

read Huddleston as putting to rest the issue of the relevancy

of “in transit" status as affecting the applicability of the

Michelin approach:

[W]e reject the argument that the tax violates the

prohibition on the direct taxation of imports and

exports “in transit,” the rule we followed in Richfield

Oil, 329 U.S., at 78-79, 84, 67 S.Ct., at 161, 164.

Even assuming that rule has not been altered by the

approach we adopted in Michelin,it is inapplicable

here.

Huddleston, ____ U.S. at ___; 113 S.Ct. at 1106 (emphasis

added). See also Diamond Shamrock, 853 S.W.2d at 216

("We conclude that once the purposes of the Import-Export

Clauses ... have been satisfied ...the concept of ‘in transit’

loses any rational meaning.")

The current import-export clause test is based on the

main concerns prompting the framers of the Constitution to

adopt the import-export clause. The test has three elements:

(1) Does the challenged tax impair the federal government

from speaking with one voice when regulating commercial

relations with foreign governments?, (2) Does the tax

threaten to disturb harmony among the states by allowing

seaboard states, with their crucial ports of entry, to levy

taxes on citizens of other states by taxing goods merely

flowing through their ports?, or (3) Does the tax divert

6la

import-derived revenue from the federal government to the

states?. Huddleston, U.S. at ; 113 S.Ct. at 1105

(emphasis added).

To prevail in its summary judgment, VICO need only

prove as a matter of law that the tax failed any one prong of

the test. Conversely, for the District and Board to prevail on

their summary judgment, they must prove as a matter of law

that the tax met all three prongs.

Prong 1: Does the ad valorem property tax impair the

federal government from speaking with one voice

when regulating commercial relations with foreign

governments?

Prong 2: Does the tax threaten to disturb harmony

among the states by allowing Texas, with its

excellent port facility in Houston, to levy taxes on

citizens of other states by taxing goods merely

flowing through its port?

The one-voice component of the import-export clause

test is the same as the one-voice component of the foreign

commerce clause test. Jd. Likewise, the state-harmony

component parallels the four Complete Auto requirements of

the foreign and domestic commerce clause tests. Jd. at 1105-

06. Having concluded that Texas’ ad valorem tax survives

commerce clause scrutiny, we must conclude that the tax

passes the first two prongs of the import-export clause test.

See id. at 1106. We find that VICO cannot rely on prongs

one or two to invalidate the tax.

Prong 3: Does the tax divert import-derived revenue

from the federal government to Texas?

62a

An ad valorem property tax on goods and equipment

expressly prohibits Congress from taxing exports. U.S.

CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5. VICO cannot rely on prong three

of the current import-export clause test to invalidate the tax.

Summary

We conclude the VICO did not prove as a matter of

law that Texas’ ad valorem property tax is unconstitutional

VICO’s summary judgment on the basis that the ad valorem

with Texas law.

D. Texas Property Tax Law

Section § 11.01(c}) of the Texas Tax Code provides

that “This state has jurisdiction to tax tangible personal

property is the property is ... located in this state for longer

than a temporary period ...." TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §

11.01(c)(1) (Vernon 1992). In its motion for summary

judgment, VICO contended that Texas had no jurisdiction to

tax its property because VICO’s goods were not located in

Texas “for longer than a temporary period.” VICO further

argued that, even if its goods and equipment were in Texas

“for longer than a temporary period,” they were entitled to

the freeport goods exemption. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN.

63a

§ 11.251 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1994) and TEX. CONST.

art. VIII, § 1-j.

Background

"For longer than a temporary period” is not defined

in the Tax Code. Under prior law, the Texas legislature had

Goods, wares, ores, ... and merchandise are

presumed to be in interstate commerce and/or not to

be located in this state for longer than a temporary

period if the property is: (1) transported from outside

this state into the state to be forwarded outside this

state; (2) detained in this state for assembling,

oe, etalon. gpg veer

purposes; and (3) not located in this state for longer

than 175 days.

Dallas County Appraisal Dist. v. Brinkman, 701 S.W.2d 20,

12,22 (Tex. App.--Dalias 1985), writ ref’d n.r.e.), quoting

TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.01(d) (Vernon 1982) (the

freeport law) ( is added) (repealed by Acts 1989, 7! st

.» ch. 534, § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 1990) (see now § 11.251).

64a

issue were indeed “located in the State for longer than a

temporary period:"

We conclude that goods are located in the state for

longer than a temporary period if, under federal law,

they are in the state on more than a transitory basis

.... Goods are in the state on a transitory basis if they

are in “interstate transit” .... Goods are nor in

interstate transit if there is an interruption in the

continuity of transit .. . If the owner halts the transit,

“not in necessary delay or accommodation to the

means of transportation ... but for the business

purposes and profits of the company,” . then there

is an interruption in the continuity of transit and the

goods are taxable in the state.

Brindonan, 701 S.W.2d at 23 (citations omitted) (emphasis in

original); see also Friedrich Air Conditioning and

Refrigeration Co. v. Bexar Appraisal Dist., 762 S.W.2d 763,

767-68 (Tex. App.--San Antoniio 1988, no writ).

In both Brinkonan and Friedrich Air. the courts held

that the freeport presumption was rebutted and that the goods

at issue were taxable. However, in 1989, the legislature

repealed the freeport law and enacted in its stead § 11.251,

which established the freeport goods exemption. Section

11.251 provides in pertinent part:

(a) In this section, “freeport goods” means property

that under Article VIII, Section 1-j, of the Texas

Constitution is not taxable.

(>) A person is entitled to an exemption from

taxation of the appraised value of that portion of the

person's inventory or property consisting of freeport

65a

(i) The exemption provided by Subsection (b) does

not apply to a taxing unit that takes action to tax the

property under Article VIII, Section 1-j, Subsection

(b), of the Texas Constitution.

TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.251 (Vernon 1992).

Significantly, the Texas Constitution was also

amended to provide a constitutional underpinning for the

statutory freeport goods exemption. Section 1-j of the Texas

Constitution provides:

(a) To promote economic development in the State,

goods, wares, merchandise, other tangible personal

property, and ores ... are exempt from ad valorem

taxation if:

(1) the property is acquired in or imported

into this State to be forwarded outside this State,

whether or not the intention to forward the property

outside this State is formed or the destination to

which the property is forwarded is specified when the

property is acquired in or imported into this State;

(2) the property is detained in this State for

assembling, storing, manufacturing, processing, or

fabricating purposes by the person who acquired or

imported the property; and

(3) the property is transported outside this

State not later than 175 days after the date the person

acquired or imported the property in this State.

66a

(6) Tangible personal property exempted from

taxation in Subsection (a) of this section is subject to

the following:

(1) A county, common, or independent school

district, junior college district, or municipality,

including a home-rule city, may tax such property

otherwise exempt, if the governing body of the

county, common, or independent school district,

junior college district, or municipality, including a

home-rule city, takes official action as provided by

this section and in the manner provided by law to

provide for the taxation of such property.

(2) Any official action to tax such exempt

property must be taken before April 1, 1990. If

official action is taken to tax such exempt property

before January 1, 1990, such property is taxable

effective for the tax year 1990. However, if such

official action to tax such exempt property is taken

prior to April 1, 1990, but after January 1, 1990, the

official action shall not become effective to tax such

property until the 1991 tax year.

(4) The governing body of a county,

common, or independent school district, junior

college district, or municipality, including a home-

rule city, that acts under Subdivision (2) of

Subsection (b) of this section to tax the property

otherwise exempt by Subsection (a) of this section

may subsequently exempt the property from taxation

by rescinding its action to tax the property. The

exemption applies to each tax year that begins after

the date the action is taken and applies to the tax year

67a

in which the action is taken if the governing body so

provides. A governing body that rescinds its action

to tax the property may not take action to tax such

TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1-.

Under the prior law, then, the Texas legislature had

sought to clarify the meaning of “located in this state longer

than a temporary period” by establishing the freeport law

presumption, which Texas courts held to be subject to

rebuttal by application of federal constitutional principles.

However, as discussed earlier, in determining the

constitutionality of a state tax, current federal commerce and

import-export clause jurisprudence no longer focuses on

whether goods are “in interstate transit,” committed to the

“export stream,” or have retained their “status” as “imports”

or “exports.” We have found that current federal

constitutional law does not preclude Texas’ non-

discriminatory ad valorem property tax.

Under current Texas law, the legislature has replaced

the freeport law's rebuttable presumption with the freeport

goods exemption, which has been expressly validated by

amendment of the Texas Constitution. Therefore, under

present Texas tax law, the critical inquiries in judging the

validity of the 1991 property tax on VICO’s goods, are (1)

whether any eligible taxing entities “took official action to

tax" freeport goods prior to April 1, 1990, thereby

preempting the exemption, see TEX CONST. art. VIII, § 1-

j®)(1)&Q2), (2) whether VICO’s goods met the freeport

goods criteria, see id. § 1-j(a), and (3) whether VICO

applied for the exemption, see TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §

11.43 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1994).

68a

Did the taxing entities "Take Action to Tax" Freeport

Goods?

The notice of appraised value issued to VICO listed

nine taxing entities: the Aldine Independent Schod District,

Harris County Education District, Harris County, Harris

County Flood Control District, Port of Houston Authority,

Harris County Hospital District, Harris County Department

of Education, North Harris/Montgomery Communty College

District, and the City of Houston. The record doe: not show

(1) which of these taxing entities are political swdivisions

authorized to preempt the freeport goods exemption, see

TEX. CONST. art. VIE, § 1-j(>)(1), (2) which of the

eligible political subdivisions did, in fact, prempt the

freeport goods exemption by taking official action 0 tax such

property prior to April 1, 1990, see id. § 1-j(b)@) and (3)

which of the latter political subdivisions resciided their

action to tax, see id. § 1-j(b)(4). If an eligible ta:ing entity

did not exercise its option and take official action 0 tax such

Section 1-j(a) states that goods “are exempt from ad

valorem taxation” if the freeport goods criteria ar met. Jd.

§ 1j@ (emphasis added). _ Section 1-j() ‘tates that

69a

action to tax the property prior to April 1, 1990, and did not

subsequently rescind its action.

With respect to VICO’s motion for summary

judgment, as discussed below, VICO did not establish as a

matter of law that any of its 1990 or 1991 goods met the

freeport goods criteria. Therefore, the presumption of a non-

preempted exemption did not arise. Had VICO established

that its goods were freeport goods, then the presumption of

a valid exemption would have arisen, and the burden would

have shifted to the District and Board to rebut the

presumption.

On the other hand, regarding the District and Board’s

motion for summary judgment, the District and Board

provided no evidence that any taxing entity had preempted

the freeport goods exemption. Therefore, the District and

Board’s motion fails to the extent that the District and Board

relied on the taxing entities having preempted VICO’s

freeport goods exemption. We note that the District’s 1991

Rendition Form, with its express provision for taxpayers to

invoke the freeport goods exemption, suggests that at least

one of the taxing entities allows the exemption, i.e., that at

least one taxing entity did not take official action to preempt .

the exemption.

Were VICO’s Goods "Freeport Goods?"

We find that the summary judgment proof shows that

VICO’s property met the first two elements of the freeport

goods criteria. That is, the property was (1) acquired in or

imported into Texas to be forwarded outside Texas, and (2)

detained in Texas for storing and processing. See TEX.

CONST. §1-j(a)(1)&(2). However, we find that a fact issue

exists regarding which items of property were transported

outside Texas no later than 175 days after the date VICO

70a

acquired or imported the property into Texas. i/d. § 1-

j(a)3). VICO’s summary judgment proof merely identifies

several items that had been in Texas more than 175 days as

of January 1, 1991. The proof does not establish whether

the remaining items of property were, in fact, shipped out of

Texas within 175 days of their acquisition or importation into

Texas.

Moreover, we find that a fact issue exists as to which

items of VICO’s property owned in the preceding year met

the freeport goods criteria. This is important because of the

appraisal procedures specified by § 11.251:

(d) ...The chief appraiser shall determine the

percentage of the markei value of inventory or

property owned by the property owner in the

preceding calendar year that was contributed by

freeport goods. The chief appraiser shall apply that

percentage to the market value of the property

owner’s inventory or property for the current year to

determine the appraised vai ue of freeport goods for

the current year.

(g) If the property owner or the chief appraiser

demonstrates that the method provided by Subsection

(d) significantly understates or overstates the market

value of the property qualified for an exemption

under Subsection (b) in the current year, the chief

appraiser shall determine the market value of the

freeport goods to be exempt by determining according

to the property owner’s records and any other

available information, the market value of those

freeport goods owned by the property owner on

January | of the current year ....

Tila

** *& *

TEX. TAX CODE ANN.§ 11.251(d) & (g) (Vernon 1992).

We are unable to extract from the summary judgment

proof the information needed to apply § 11.251. In any

event, this is a matter best left to the trial court and the

parties with the necessary records and expertise to properly

implement the technical aspects of the appraisal process. We

therefore find that fact issues exist precluding summary

judgment in favor of either VICO or the District and Board.

Did VICO Apply for the Freeport Exemption?

We next ask whether VICO applied for its freeport

goods exemption. Section 11.43 of the Tax Code provides:

(a) To receive an exemption, a person claiming the

exemption ... must apply for the exemption. To

apply for an exemption, a person must file an

exemption application form with the chief appraiser

(b) ...[A] person required to apply for an éxemption

must apply each year the person claims entitlement to

the exemption.

*’- * *

(d) A person required to claim an exemption must

file a completed exemption application form before

May ! and must furnish the information required by

(e) ...[{I]}f a person required to apply for an exemption

in a given year fails to file timely a completed

application form, the person may not receive the

exemption for that year.

72a

*_* * &

TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.43 (Vernon 1992) (emphasis

added).

The summary judgment proof included VICO’s 1991

Rendition of Business Personal Property. In the section of

the form captioned “Inventory of Merchandise, Finished

Goods, or Consigned Goods" VICO typed the following

note:

Note: This inventory is exempt from sales and use tax

and we hereby apply for property tax exemption. All

is being exported. You have exempt in past.

(Emphasis added.)

However, in the section of the rendition above this note were

the following pre-printed instructions:

If you claim entitlement to the "freeport exemption"

provided by Sec. 11.251 Texas Tax Code, check this

box. Report full original cost of all inventory on this

rendition and attach a completed exemption

application using form 11.251 prescribed by the State

Property Tax Board.

The box preceding these instructions was not checked. Nor

is there anything in the record to show that VICO completed

an “exemption application form” per se.

The legislative intent of the free-port goods

exemption, as stated expressly within § 1-j itself, is “[t]o

promote the economic development in the State.” TEX.

CONST. art. VIII, § 1-j. With this intent foremost in mind,

we find that VICO’s failure to complete a § 11.251

73a

exemption form for 1991 is not fatal to its claim for property

tax immunity.

VICO applied for the exemption in the same manner

that it had in the prior tax years of 1989 and 1990 by

annotating its annual rendition form and _ supplying

supplemental justification. VICO’s application in those years

was apparently adequate for the District to exempt VICO’s

property in those years. In 1991, VICO provided a complete

listing of inventory as of January 1 and supplemented its

rendition with a letter detailing the nature of its exporting

operation. All this was done prior to the May | deadline for

claiming an exemption. There is no indication in the record

that VICO intentionally withheld information or failed to

respond to any District request for records.

We take judicial notice of the Texas Register and its

description of the required contents of the § 11.251

exemption form: (1) the owner’s name, street address,

mailing address, and telephone number; (2) a description of

the inventory affected by the exemption; (3) the total cost of

goods sold from inventory held by the property owner in the

preceding year; (4) the total cost of goods sold from

inventory that in the preceding year met the criteria set forth

in the Tax Code, Texas Constitution, Article VIII, § 1-

j(a)(1)@), excluding the cost of equipment, machinery, or

materials that entered into and became part of the inventory

described in paragraph three of this subsection but did not

themselves meet the criteria set forth in the Texas

Constitution; (4) a statement that the property owner holds

items in inventory that in the current year meet or will meet

the requirements of the Texas Constitution; and (6) a

statement indicating how long the property owner has

engaged in the business of transporting goods out of this

state. 17 Tex. Reg. 1159 (1992) (codified at 34 TEX.

ADMIN. CODE § 9.404) (Comptroller of Public Accounts).

T4a

The tax law had recently been changed and new

information requirements and forms introduced. Our opinion

should not be read as condoning a taxpayer’s failure to

provide information to the taxing authority in a format

necessary for maximum administrative efficiency. However,

on the unique facts of this case, we find that VICO did make

a bona fide effort to apply for its property tax exemption and

provided most of the required information to the District.

We believe that the purpose of the freeport goods exemption, _

to promote economic development, would not be served by

our holding that VICO’s tax exemption turned on whether

VICO checked a particular box or completed a particular

form. Therefore, we find that VICO established that it

applied for the freeport exemption. What supplemental

information the trial court and District may require to

calculate VICO’s 1991 tax liability can be gathered on

remand.

Appraisal Value

The trial court granted VICO’s summary judgment on

tax liability and did not reach VICO’s contention that the

appraised value of the goods and equipment was overstated.

VICO argued that the District’s appraisal was based on a

computational error resulting in an appraised value of

$380,260.00 rather than the correct value of $296,846.95.

We have found that VICO, in principle, is entitled to

a freeport goods exemption. On remand, VICO’s tax

liability, if any, will be determined under § 11.251. In the

event that an over-appraisal question arises on remand, we

note that the tax code provides for the correction of

computational errors.

VICO was entitled to protest to the Board the

“determination of the appraised value" of its property, TEX.

timeline specified i in § 41.44. Additionally, VICO was

entitled to move the Board to “direct by written order

changes in the appraisal roll to correct ... clerical errors that

affect [VICO’s] liability ..... TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §

25.25 (Vernon 1992). Still further, “At any time, the

governing body of a taxing unit, on motion of the assessor

for the unity or of a property owner, shall direct by written

order changes in the tax roll to correct errors in the

mathematical computation of a tax." TEX. TAX CODE

ANN.§ 26.15 (Vernon 1992)’ see Liland v. Dallas County

Appraisal Dist., 731 S.W.2d 109, 112 (Tex. App.-- Dallas

1987, no writ). Section 26.15(c) does not appear to set a

time limit on the correction of mathematical computation of

a tax. See § 26.15(c). And under § 25.25, the Board may

correct clerical errors in the appraisal roll at any time before

the end of five years after January | of a tax year. See §

25.25(c).

"In order for a taxpayer to protest an action taken by

a taxing authority, the taxpayer must follow the procedures

outlined by the Tax Code. These requirements are

jurisdictional." Harris County Appraisal Dist. v. Texas Nat’!

Bank, 775 S.W.2d 66, 69 (Tex. App.--Houston [Ist Dist.]

1989, no writ). The remedies defined in the Tax Code are

exclusive, and failure to exhaust the available administrative

remedies precludes a taxpayer from seeking judicial review.

See id. at 70; TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.09 (Vernon

1992).

Therefore, if in the trial court VICO seeks to correct

the computational error, it would need to demonstrate that it

had exhausted its administrative remedies.

76a

Summary

Although an ad valorem property tax on VICQO’s

goods does not run afoul of the U.S. commerce or import-

export clauses, Texas has exempted freeport goods to

promote the economic development of the state. While

VICO made a bona fide effort to apply for the exemption,

fact issues remain precluding summary judgment. On

remand, to determine VICO’s tax liability, the trial court will

first need to ascertain which taxing entities allow the

exemption, then, if necessary, VICO’s 1990 or 1991 freeport

goods activity history.

IV. Conclusion

We conclude that an ad valorem property tax on

VICO’s goods and equipment does not violate the U.S.

Constitution’s commerce or _ import-export clauses.

However, we also conclude that VICO, in principle, was

entitled to the freeport goods exemption under Texas law and

that VICO substantially complied with application

requirements. However, fact issues remain as to the actual

amount of VICO’s exemption and tax liability. This will

depend on what information the District and Board provide

regarding taxing entities’ official actions to preempt the

freeport goods exemption. Assuming an exemption exists,

the amount of VICO’s tax liability will turn on what

information VICO provides, in compliance with § 11.251d),

as to previous-year freeport goods activity history.

Alternatively, should § 11.251(g) be invoked by either party,

VICO’s tax liability will depend on VICO’s 1991 freeport

goods activity.

We therefore find that the trial court erred in granting

VICO’s summary judgment. Fact issues exist precluding

summary judgment for either party. We sustain the District

77a

and Board’s point of error one and remand the cause to the

trial court to calculate the amount of VICO’s tax liability, if

any. Since the trial court did not err in denying the District

and Board’s motion for summary judgment, we overrule

point two.

/s/ Robert E. Morse, Jr.

Former Justice

Judgment Rendered and Opinion Filed February 10, 1994.

Panel Consists of Justices Robertson, Cannon and Morse,

(sitting by designation).

Publish - Tex. R. App. P. 90.

78a

APPENDIX D

THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

Post Office Box 12248

Austin, Texas 78711 (512) 463-1312

December 22,1995

Mr. J. Randolph Burton

Moerer & Burton

440 Louisiana, Suite 350

Houston, TX 77002

Mr. Kenneth Wall

Olsen & Olsen

Three Allen Center, Suite 3485

333 Clay Street

Houston, TX 77002

RE: Case Number 94-0245

Style: VIRGINIA INDONESIA COMPANY v. HARRIS

COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT and HARRIS COUNTY

APPRAISAL REVIEW BOARD

Dear Counsel:

Today, the supreme Court of Texas overruled the

motion for rehearing in the above referenced cause.

Sincerely,

John T. Adams, Clerk

by_S/

Courtland Crocker

Deputy

oi watt ; FA

79a

APPENDIX E

NO. 94-0245

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS

VIRGINIA INDONESIA COMPANY

Petitioner,

v.

HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT AND

HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL REVIEW BOARD,

Respondent

RESPONDENTS’ MOTION FOR REHEARING

TO THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAs:

Respondents, Harris County Appraisal District and

Harris County Appraisal Review Board, file this Motion for

Rehearing from the judgment and opinion of this Court

rendered on October 27, 1995.

POINT OF ERROR

The Supreme Court of Texas erred by holding that ad

valorem property taxation of Petitioner’s goods violates the

Import-Export Clause of the United States Constitution.

80a

APPENDIX F

NO. 91-59779

VIRGINIA INDONESIA

COMPANY,

Plaintiff,

IN THE DISTRICT

COURT OF

§

§

:

§

VS. § HARRIS COUNTY,

§ TEXAS

HARRIS COUNTY §

APPRAISAL DISTRICT = §

§

§

§

§

and HARRIS COUNTY 333RD JUDICIAL

APPRAISAL REVIEW DISTRICT

BOARD,

Defendants.

PLAI ’S FIRST AMENDED PETITION

FOR REVIEW APPRAISAL REVIEW BOARD ORDER

TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:

COMES NOW, VIRGINIA INDONESIA COMPANY

(hereinafter sometimes referred to as "VICO"), Plaintiff, and

files this its First Amended Petition for Review of Appraisal

Review Board Order, complaining of HARRIS COUNTY

APPRAISAL DISTRICT and HARRIS COUNTY

APPRAISAL REVIEW BOARD (hereinafter sometimes

jointly referred to as the "Defendants"), and for cause of

action would respectfully show unto the Court as follows:

ee RARER Alaa

8la

Plaintiff is a Delaware corporation duly incorporated

and existing under the laws of Delaware and authorized to do

business in Harris County, Texas.

Defendant, HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL

DISTRICT (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the

"APPRAISAL DISTRICT"), is located in Houston, Harris

County, Texas, duly organized and acting pursuant to the

laws of Texas. Defendant APPRAISAL DISTRICT has

appeared and answered herein by and through its attorney of

record, Mr. Kenneth Wall, at Olson & Olson, Three Allen

Center, 333 Clay Street, Suite 3845, Houston, Harris

County, Texas 77002.

Defendant, HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL

REVIEW BOARD (hereinafter sometimes referred to as

"REVIEW BOARD"), is located in Houston, Harris County,

Texas, duly organized and acting pursuant to the laws of

Texas. Defendant REVIEW BOARD has appeared and

answered herein by and through its attorney of record, Mr.

Kenneth Wall, at Olson & Olson, Three Allen Center, 333

Clay Street, Suite 3845, Houston, Harris County, Texas

77002.

DEFINITIONS

III.

Each of these words or terms shall have the following

meaning unless a different meaning is stated clearly or is

reflected by the context in which the word or term is used:

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(a) “Appraised value" means a property’s value

according to the APPRAISAL DISTRICT’s

appraisal roll for the tax year.

(b) "Code" refers to Title 1 of the Texas Tax

Code, more commonly known as the Texas

Property Tax Code.

(c) "Property" means that personal property

owned or possessed by Plaintiff that is the

subject of this suit, said Property being more

accurately described as follows:

Various materials and supplies related

to conducting onshore oil and gas

exploration and development activities

in a foreign country, more particularly

described by the summary record

shown in Exhibit "A," which is

attached hereto by reference and

incorporated herein for all purposes.

(d) “Tax year" means the 1991 calendar year.

JURISDICTION AND VENUE

IV.

This First Amended Petition is a petition for review

filed within the time required by Section 42.21 of the Code.

Plaintiff brings this cause as an appeal from the REVIEW

BOARD’s order determining a taxpayer protest duly and

properly prosecuted by Plaintiff under Chapter 41 of the

Code. The REVIEW BOARD and the APPRAISAL

DISTRICT are established for and located in the county in

which this First Amended Petition is filed. The Court has

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jurisdiction to hear and decide Plaintiff's appeal pursuant to

Chapter 42 of the Code.

FACTS AND BASIS FOR REVIEW

V.

On or about September 10, 1991, Plaintiff was

notified by the APPRAISAL DISTRICT that, for the tax year

ended 1991, the appraised value of personal property

(rendered under Harris County Appraisal District account

number 0385507) possessed by Plaintiff would be

$380,260.00. The subject "property" consists of various

materials and supplies related to conducting onshore oil and

gas exploration and development activities in a foreign

country, said materials and supplies being more particularly

described in the attached Exhibit "A" which Plaintiff

incorporates herein by reference for all purposes (hereinafter

referred to as the "Property"). A true and correct copy of

the "Notification of Appraised Value for Property Tax

Purposes" is attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and incorporated

herein by reference for all purposes.

On or about September 16, 1991, Plaintiff timely filed

a Notice of Protest of the appraised value given the Property

by the APPRAISAL DISTRICT in the manner required by

law. A true and correct copy of the Notice of Protest is

attached hereto as Exhibit "C" and incorporated herein by

reference for all purposes. Plaintiff presented evidence and

argument before the REVIEW BOARD as provided by law.

A true and correct copy of the Confidential General

Personal Property Rendition of Taxable Property for January

1, 1991, submitted on behalf of VICO by Clarke and

Company is attached hereto as Exhibit "D" and incorporated

herein by reference for all purposes. This Exhibit "D"

includes a letter to the Harris County Appraisal District dated

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March 14, 1991 (Exhibit "D-1") and a description of the

Property on hand at the Houston packer, McClean Cargo, as

of January 1, 1991 (Exhibit "D-2"). The total value of the

Property shown on Exhibit "D-2" is $380,260.00. Exhibit

"D-2" contains the exact same individual items with the exact

same price extensions as those shown on the attached Exhibit

"A". However, due to a computational error, these items

were incorrectly added and given an appraised value of

$380,260.00 by the APPRAISAL DISTRICT when, in fact,

their correct total equals $296,846.95 as shown on Exhibit

"A". Thereafter on October 11, 1991, the REVIEW

BOARD made its Final Order determining Plaintiff's protest

in which the value of Plaintiff's Property was determined to

be $380,260.00. A true and correct copy of the Notice of

Final Order and Order Determining Protest are attached

hereto as Exhibit "E" and incorporated herein by reference

for all purposes. All conditions precedent to Plaintiff's right

of judicial review of the REVIEW BOARD ’s decision having

been performed or having occurred, Plaintiff is entitled to a

trial de novo review of the REVIEW BOARD’s Final Order.

Plaintiff VICO functions as the operator of an

Indonesian joint venture which explores for oil and gas

overseas. The joint venture’s operations are limited to an

area of mutual interest ("AMI") in a single foreign country,

namely, the Republic of Indonesia. The Indonesian joint

venture, by and through its operator, VICO, purchases

certain goods, wares and equipment for use in petroleum

operations in the AMI, all pursuant to that certain Amended

and Restated Production Sharing Contract (hereinafter

referred to as the "Production Sharing Contract") by and

between the joint venture participants and Perusahaan

Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara ("Pertamina"),

a state enterprise of the Republic of Indonesia. Based upon

requests from the Division Office in Indonesia, VICO, as

operator of the Indonesian joint venture, purchases certain

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goods for and on behalf of PERTAMINA, all for exclusive

use in the above mentioned AMI. Pursuant to the

aforementioned Production Sharing Contract, the property

purchased for the Indonesian joint venture, by and through

its operator, VICO, becomes the property of PERTAMINA

upon arrival at the Indonesian port of import.

Upon being notified that certain goods are needed in

Indonesia, VICO, in accordance with Indonesian law

(Indonesian Presidential Decree 14A, implemented in 1981,

requiring production sharing contractors to prepare their

imported material purchase orders in Indonesia for issue to

Indonesian agents), issues a request for quotation to an

Indonesian company which acts as an agent. The Indonesian

purchasing agent then obtains bids from several companies

for the product needed. The best bids are taken and a

quotation is furnished to VICO. VICO evaluates the bids

under PERTAMINA procedures and selects a winning bid.

VICO then issues a purchase order through the proper

channels for the product. The product is then purchased

from the company holding

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