Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Harris County Appraisal District v. Virginia Indonesia Co.
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FILED (~-’
BS 1528 MAR 20 199%
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
LLL, SLA EN ET eR EEE IESE
NO.
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1995
HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT AND
HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL REVIEW BOARD,
Petitioners,
Vv.
VIRGINIA INDONESIA COMPANY,
Respondent.
Petition For A Writ of Certiorari To
The Supreme Court of Texas
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
KENNETH WALL
Three Allen Center, Suite 3485
333 Clay Street
Houston, Texas 77002
Telephone (713) 759-0696
Fax (713) 759-0342
March 20, 1996
Counsel of Record for Petitioners
i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
l. Whether the Import - Export Clause prohibits
state and local ad valorem property taxation of goods in
transit in the stream of export even if the tax offends none of
the policies underlying the Clause, a question which the
Court has deferred deciding. Department of Revenue v.
Association of Washington Stevedoring Companies, 435 U.S.
734, 757 n.23 (1978).
y Whether an ad valorem property tax usurps the
Federal Government’s ability to “speak with one voice when
regulating commercial relations with foreign governments”
for the sole reason that it is levied on goods in transit in the
stream of export.
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
QUESTIONS PRESENTED: sock 3G Hew OOS bar i‘
TABLE OF COMINGS .... ..n:cilacand. erwin cst Su ii
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .... .@iiiiecs, iti
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI ........ l
OPINIONS BELOW: 2.6 cséiick. Linea. wtsias i
JURISDICTION . nce cc cesses ce se tA NN 2
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED ..... 2
STATEMENT OF THE CABE .. 2. ccc ccs 3
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ......... 9
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APUG OD gins + bab sie 6 tee 22a
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES PAGE
Barclays Bank PLC vy. Franchise Tax Board,
U.S. : , 114 S.Ct.
SED bo. Heb Be: BE cok PHEW BN a e's 13
Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,
Co ee Oe a are 5, 11-13
Department of Revenue v. Association of
Washington Stevedoring Companies, 435 U.S.
TE ees 6 co we MOVIE. Ce ee i, 6, 11, 13
Empressa Siderurgica v. County of Merced,
Bee es ME Ss PRE Rw ce wes 7
Itel Containers International Corporation v.
Huddleston, 507 U.S. , 113 S.Ct. 1095,
RIE Fe eae 6, 11, 12
Japan Line, Lid. v. County of Los Angeles,
a 5, 12
Kosydar v. National Cash Register Co..,
ES 0:7, 43
Louisiana Land and Exploration Company. v.
Pilot Petroleum Corporation. 900 F.2d 816
(Sth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S.
eee 7, 8
Limbach v. Hooven & Allison Company,
a a a a 9
iV
Low v. Austin,
oF Wes ie ee BA, EE CROTED Conk és 0 ee hae 9
Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages,
423 US: Zre (ieee: tas Va 04 OT Sack ae 6-13
Richfield Oil Corporation v. State Board of
Education, 329 U.S. @B CIDSB) ow we tt ee 6, 7
CONSTITUTIONS AND STATUTES
Federal
U.S. CONST. artidy §BycloeOics. 2 ccs eervice 4
ie Ree oe BS Saree oe 13
U.S. CONST.t. OC Mi. 2... 824 Vas 2,3
ee Sins © APO 6 Oe RO ee 2
Texas
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 6.01 (Vernon 1992) ..... 3
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 6.41, 41.41 (Vernon 1992 and
Vernal Supp. 3996)-02604 sitiaciaR ees bea Lanvin 3
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.251 (Vernon 1992) ....5
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 42.01, 42.21 et seq. (Vernon
1992 and Vernon Supp. 1996) ..............6.. 4
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.23 (Vernon 1992) ....4
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1995
HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT AND
HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL REVIEW BOARD,
Petitioners,
Vv.
VIRGINIA INDONESIA COMPANY,
Respondent.
Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari To
the Supreme Court Of Texas
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Petitioners, Harris County Appraisal District and
Harris County Appraisal Review Board, respectfully pray that
a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment and opinion
of the Supreme Court of Texas, entered in the above-entitled
proceeding on October 27, 1995.
OPINIONS BELOW
The opinion of the Supreme Court of Texas is
reported at 910 S.W. 2d 905 and is reprinted in the Appendix
hereto, p.49a, infra.
The opinion of the Court of Appeals for the
Fourteenth District of Texas is reported at 871 S.W. 2d 864
and is reprinted in the Appendix hereto, p. 49a, infra.
2
The judgment of the 333rd Judicial District Court of
Harris County, Texas has not been reported. It is reprinted
in the Appendix hereto, p.96a, infra.
JURISDICTION
The Supreme Court of Texas entered its judgment on
October 27, 1995 reversing the judgment of the Court of
Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas and rendering
judgment in favor of respondent and against petitioners.
On December 22, 1995, the Supreme Court of Texas
overruled petitioners’ timely filed motion for rehearing. See
p. 78a, infra.
Petitioners invoke the jurisdiction of this Court to
review the judgment of the Supreme Court of Texas under 28
U.S.C. § 1257(a).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION INVOLVED
United States Constitution, Article I, § 10, cl. 2
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress,
lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except
what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection
LM -0 as
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This is an ad valorem property tax case in which the
Supreme Court of Texas held that the Import - Export
Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 2, prohibits ad valorem
property taxation of goods in transit in the stream of export.
3
Petitioner, Harris County Appraisal District, is a
political subdivision of the State of Texas responsible for
appraising property within its boundaries for ad valorem tax
purposes. TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 6.01 (Vernon 1992).
Appraisal districts in Texas do not levy taxes. Rather, they
furnish appraisal rolls listing taxable property to units of
government within their boundaries which impose ad valorem
property taxes. Petitioner, Harris County Appraisal Review
Board, is a separate legal entity whose responsibilities
include determination of property owner protests. TEX. TAX
CODE ANN. §§ 6.41, 41.41 (Vernon 1992 and Vernon Supp.
1996). Respondent, Virginia Indonesia Company, is a
Delaware corporation authorized to do business in Texas.
For convenience, this petition refers to petitioner, Harris
County Appraisal District, as “district”, to petitioner, Harris
County Appraisal Review Board, as “board”, and to
respondent as “VICO.”
The parties do not dispute the material facts. VICO
is the operator of an Indonesian joint venture that explores
for oil and gas in the Republic of Indonesia. It purchases
goods for use by the joint venture from vendors throughout
the United States. Upon notification that certain goods are
needed, VICO issues a request for quotation to an Indonesian
purchasing agent which forwards the request to another agent
who solicits bids. VICO evaluates the bids and selects the
vendor. VICO’s standard purchase order is marked
“FOREIGN PURCHASE ORDER” and states “Ultimate
destination for all items on this order is Indonesia.”
Generally the vendors ship the goods directly to an
independent export packer in Houston, Texas. The goods
are committed to export to Indonesia at the time of purchase
and are never used in Texas or any other state.
At the export packer’s yard in Houston, the goods are
inspected for quality and correctness. If the goods are
4
damaged or otherwise incorrect, VICO or its export packer
resolves the irregularities with the vendor. VICO then
requests approval from Indonesia to import the goods. When
import approval is granted, an international inspection agency
in Houston inspects the goods on behalf of Indonesia. Local
inspection enables the goods to avoid customs inspection
upon their arrival in Indonesia. VICO’s export packer then
packs the goods for shipment. A separate freight forwarder,
not related to the export packer, arranges for shipment of the
goods. The freight forwarder notifies the export packer
when and where to deliver the goods for shipment.
Most items are exported within 45 days of their
arrival at the export packer’s yard. In some cases, however,
goods may remain with the export packer for 90 days or
longer. VICO has goods at the export packer’s yard
throughout the year.
Prior to 1991, the district exempted VICO’s goods in
its export packer’s yard from taxation. In 1991, the district
determined that the goods were taxable and notified VICO
that the appraised value of its property as of January 1, 1991
was $380,260.00. VICO protested the taxability of its goods
before the board. The board, by written order following
hearing, determined the protest in favor of the district and
adverse to VICO.
VICO then brought suit against district and board in
the 333rd Judicial District Court of Harris County, Texas
under TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §§ 42.01, 42.21 ef seq.
(Vernon 1992 and Vernon Supp. 1996). See p. 80a, infra.
Judicial review of an appraisal review board order
determining a property owner’s protest is by trial de novo.
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.23 (Vernon 1992). VICO
alleged that taxation of its property violated the Commerce
Clause, U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 3, the Import - Export
5
Clause, U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2, and various
provisions of Texas law not applicable here. See pp. 87a-
92a, infra.
Ail parties moved for summary judgment. The trial
court granted VICO’s motion and entered its final judgment
in favor of VICO and against district and board. See p. 96a,
infra. In its final judgment, the trial court held that VICO’s
property is immune from taxation under the Import - Export
and Commerce Clauses and the Texas Tax Code. District
and board appealed the trial court’s judgment to the Court of
Appeals for the Fourteenth District of Texas.
The court of appeals reversed the trial court’s
judgment and remanded the case to that court for
determination of the amount of exemption to which VICO
was entitled under TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.251 (Vernon
1992). See p. 77a, infra. The court of appeals, however,
held that taxation of VICO’s goods violated neither the
Commerce Clause nor the Import - Export Clause.
VICO contended that its goods were in transit in the
stream of export and were, therefore, immune from state and
local property taxation under both the Commerce Clause and
Import - Export Clause. The court of appeals heid that the
Supreme Court of the United States has abandoned the
“mechanical in transit” analysis of state taxation under the
Commerce Clause. The court of appeals applied the six-part
test established by the Court in Complete Auto Transit, Inc.
v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977), and Jay .1 Line, Lid. v.
County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979).
Taxation of VICO’s goods did not run afoul of the
Commerce Clause because the tax was applied to an activity
with a substantial nexus to the State of Texas, was fairly
apportioned, did not discriminate against interstate
6
commerce, was fairly related to services provided by the
State of Texas, did not create a substantial risk of multiple
international taxation, and did not prevent the federal
government from speaking with one voice when regulating
international commercial relations. See pp.55a-59a, infra.
The court of appeals likewise rejected VICO’s
argument that its goods were immune from taxation under
the Import - Export Clause because they were in transit in
the stream of export. The court of appeals applied the
modern Import - Export Clause approach first announced by
the Court in Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276
(1976). Prior to Michelin, the Court’s analysis of state taxes
under the Import - Export Clause focused on the status of the
goods being taxed as “imports” or “exports.” Goods were
“exports,” and immune from state taxation, if they had
entered the “export stream” in a continuous journey out of
the country. Kosydar v. National Cash Register Co., 417
U.S. 62, 70-71 (1974); Richfield Oil Corporation v. State
Board of Education, 329 U.S. 69 (1946).
Michelin changed the Court’s focus from the status of
the goods as “imports” or “exports” to the nature of the tax
as an “impost” or “duty.” If the tax offended none of the
purposes underlying the Clause, the Import - Export Clause
did not preclude the tax. Michelin, 423 U.S. at 286, 293.
Although Michelin involved a tax on imported goods, the
Court extended its approach to exports in Department of
Revenue v. Association of Washington Stevedoring
Companies, 435 U.S. 734, 758 (1978).
Although neither Michelin nor Washington
Stevedoring involved taxation of goods in transit, the court
of appeals held that the question of the applicability of the
Michelin analysis to a state tax on goods in transit was
resolved by this Court’s recent decision in /tel Containers
7
International Corporation v. Huddleston, 507 U.S.
113 S.Ct. 1095, 1106 (1993). See p. 60a, infra. Since the
tax at issue offended none of the policies underlying the
Clause, it was not prohibited by the Import - Export Clause.
VICO sought discretionary review of the opinion and
judgment of the court of appeals in the Supreme Court of
Texas. The supreme court granted VICO’s application for
writ of error to the court of appeals, reversed the judgment
of the court of appeals, and rendered judgment that VICO’s
property was immune from taxation under the Import -
Export Clause. See p. 21a, infra. Two justices dissented.
See p. 22a, infra. The Supreme Court of Texas decided the
case solely on Import - Export Clause grounds. It did not
reach VICO’s additional arguments that the tax violated the
Commerce Clause or the Texas Tax Code. There is no
independent state law basis for its decision.
Although it recognized the change in focus of Import
- Export Clause analysis originated by the Michelin decision,
the supreme court applied the “stream of export rule” to
taxation of VICO’s goods. It did so because this Court has
not expressly overruled the pre-Michelin line of cases holding
that taxation of goods in transit in the stream of export
violates the Import - Export Clause. See p. 13a, infra;
Kosydar v. National Cash Register Co., 417 U.S. 62 (1974);
Empressa Siderurgica v. County of Merced, 337 U.S. 154
(1949); Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Board of Equalization,
329 U.S. 69 (1946); see also, Louisiana Land and
Exploration Company v. Pilot Petroleum Corporation., 900
F.2d 816 (Sth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 897 (1990).
The court held that VICO’s goods were in transit in
the stream of export at the time of their taxation. Because
the goods were in transit, their taxation violated the Import -
Export Clause. See p. 18a, infra. Although district and
8
board vigorously contested the “in transit” status of the
goods, they accept, for purposes of this petition, the lower
court’s determination of the issue.
The court further held that taxation of VICO’s goods
was contrary to one of the purposes of the Import - Export
Clause identified by the Court in Michelin. Relying on
Louisiana Land and Exploration Company v. Pilot Petroleum
Corporation, 900 F.2d 816 (Sth Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498
U.S. 897 (1990), the court found that the tax “impairs the
federal government’s ability to speak with one voice in
matters of foreign commerce.” See p. 18a, infra. Since the
tax is levied on exports that will become Indonesian
property, it may interfere with commercial relations with
Indonesia because Indonesia might buy its goods from other
countries or levy retaliatory taxes on its goods destined for
the United States.
The dissent would hold that the tax at issue is not
inconsistent with the policies advanced by the Import -
Export clause. See p. 24a, infra. According to the dissent,
the court’s “adherence to the ‘export stream’ rule as an
exclusive test conflicts with both the rule and the spirit of
Michelin.” See pp. 23a-24a, infra. According to the
dissent, foreign purchasers cannot reasonably expect to avoid
payment for governmental services benefiting their
purchases. See p. 43a, infra.
The dissent distinguished the tax at issue in this case
from that before the court in Louisiana Land . The tax in
Louisiana Land was an excise tax levied on aviation fuel.
The tax here is a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax
like the one before the Court in Michelin. Since the tax is
not contrary to the purposes of the Import - Export Clause
identified in Michelin, it does not violate the Clause.
9
The question presented was first raised by VICO in
the trial court. See p. 87a, infra. District and board raised
the @ sstion in the court of appeals. See p. 59a, infra.
VICO raised the question in the Supreme Court of Texas.
See p. 2a, infra. District and board again raised the question
in their motion for rehearing in the Supreme Court of Texas.
See p. 79a, infra.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
The court below incorrectly decided an important
constitutional question: does the Import - Export Clause give
“bright line” immunity from state taxation to exports in
transit? Because this Court has not expressly overruled its
pre-Michelin decisions so holding, the Supreme Court of
Texas followed those decisions and struck down the tax at
issue. Beginning in 1976 with its Michelin decision, this
Court dramatically altered its Import - Export Clause analysis
of state taxation, and there is no reason why the Michelin
approach should not be applied to goods in transit.
In Michelin, the Court upheld against an Import -
Export Clause challenge a nondiscriminatory ad valorem
property tax on an inventory of imported tires stored in a
wholesale distribution warehouse. Michelin, 423 U.S. at
279. It expressly overruled its decision in Low v. Austin, 13
Wall. 29, 20 L.Ed. 517 (1872), which held that the Import -
Export Clause prohibited ad valorem property taxation of
imported goods until they were no longer imports. In
Michelin, the Court changed the focus of its Import - Export
Clause analysis from whether the challenged tax was a tax on
“imports” to whether the tax was an “impost” or “duty”.
See Limbach v. Hooven & Allison Company, 466 U.S. 353,
360 (1984).
10
In Michelin, the Court identified three principal
concerns of the Framers which underlie the Import - Export
Clause.
...[1] the Federal Government must speak
with one voice when regulating commercial
relations with foreign governments . . .; [2]
import revenues were to be the major source
of revenue of the Federal Government and
should not be diverted to the States, and [3]
harmony among the States might be disturbed
unless seaboard states . . . were prohibited
from levying taxes on citizens of other States
by taxing goods merely flowing through their
ports to the other States... .
Michelin, 423 U.S. at 285-286.
A tax which does not create the evils at which the
Import - Export Clause is directed is not an “impost” or
“duty” prohibited by the Clause. Michelin, 423 U.S. at 293.
The nondiscrimin; ‘ory ad valorem property tax before the
Court in Michelin was not the type tax considered by the
Framers to be an “impost” or “duty,” and its prohibition
would not promote the purposes underlying the Import -
Export Clause. Michelin, 423 U.S. at 283, 293.
Like the tax upheld by the Court in Michelin, the tax
at issue here is a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax.
The tax which the lower court struck down was, however,
levied not on imported goods no longer in transit but on
exports in transit in the stream of export. The Court noted
that to the extent a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property
conflicts with the Import - Export Clause purpose of
prohibiting taxes which may be imposed only because of a
State’s peculiar geographic location, the Clause may prohibit
11
a tax on goods merely in transit through the taxing state.
Michelin, 423 U.S. at 290.
Two years after its decision in Michelin, the Court
held that Michelin’s Import - Export Clause analysis applied
to taxation of exports as well as imports. Department of
Revenue v. Association of Washington Stevedoring
Companies, 435 U.S. 734, 758 (1978). The tax at issue in
Washington Stevedoring was imposed not on goods but on
the business of loading and unloading ships’ cargo, both
imports and exports. The Court specifically declined to
reach the question of Michelin’s application to goods in
transit, imports or exports, deferring decision until faced
with appropriate facts. Washington Stevedoring, 435 U.S. at
757 n.22. The Court also noted that a tax on goods in transit
would not be valid “under traditional Commerce Clause
analysis.” (emphasis added) Perhaps the Court foresaw the
dramatic change in its Commerce Clause jurisprudence that
began the following term. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v.
Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
Since Michelin, the Court has not decided an Import -
Export Clause case involving ad valorem property taxation
of goods in transit. It has not, therefore, been required to
decide whether the Michelin approach applies in such cases.
Although it has not decided the question, it has recently
implied that Michelin altered its prior approach to taxation of
exports in transit. /tel Containers International Corporation
v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. , 113 S.Ct. 1095, 1106
(1993).
The “bright line” rule of Import - Export Clause tax
immunity for goods in the stream of export may have the
virtue of simplicity. Kosydar v. National Cash Register Co.,
417 U.S. 62, 71 (1974). There is little, if anything, else to
commend it after Michelin. So long as the tax in issue does
12
not offend its purposes, the Import - Export Clause should
not be a barrier.
That is not to say, however, that the in transit
character of taxed goods is immaterial. As pointed out by
the dissent in the lower court, taxed goods’ presence in a
taxing unit may be so transitory that the tax constitutes
nothing more than a transit fee. See p. 40a, infra; see also,
Michelin, 423 U.S. at 290. Further, depending upon the
circumstances, taxation of goods in transit may fail to satisfy
the Commerce Clause requirements of nexus and fair
relationship to services provided. Complete Auto Transit,
Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977).
The tax at issue here, even though imposed on goods
in the stream of export, did not offend any of the purposes
underlying the Import - Export Clause. The first policy
consideration identified by Michelin, the ability of the
Federal Government to speak with “one voice” when
regulating international commercial relations, is the same as
the “one voice” component of the Foreign Commerce Clause
test established by Japan Line, Lid. v. County of Los
Angeles, 441 U.S. 434 (1979), Itel Containers Internatinal
Corporation v. Huddleston, 507 U.S. BAe et.
1095, 1150 (1993). The lower court believed the tax
transgressed the “one voice” policy of the Clause. See p.
18a, infra. It was concerned that, because of the increased
cost of goods resulting from the tax, Indonesia might buy its
goods from other countries. Further, Indonesia might levy
retaliatory taxes on goods it exports to the United States.
See p. 20a., infra.
Of course, the lower court would have allowed the
tax if the goods were not in the stream of export. Had they
been taxed prior to entry into the stream of export, their cost
to Indonesia would reflect that tax resulting in the same
ADoser astra
13
potential harm which the lower court found in this case.
Further, Congress, not the courts, is given the power to
regulate foreign commerce. Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise
Tax Board, __U.S. - , 114 S.Ct. 2268, 2285
(1994). Neither VICO nor the lower court has identified any
Congressional policy which might prohibit the tax. See /tel,
507 U.S. at , 113 S.Ct. at 1105.
The second policy underlying the Import - Export
Clause, protection of federal revenues, is not implicated by
a tax on exports because the Constitution prohibits federal
taxation of exports. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5;
Department of Revenue v. Association of Washington
Stevedoring Companies, 435 U.S. 734, 758 (1978).
The third policy identified by Michelin, preservation
of state harmony, parallels the four-prong Commerce Clause
test established by Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S.
274 (1977). Itel, 507 U.S. at , 113 S.Ct. at 1105-
06. VICO has goods on hand at its export packer throughout
the year. They receive governmental services, particularly
fire and police protection. See p. 45a, infra. There is no
indication in the record that VICO pays more than its fair
share for the services received.
Where, as here, a nondiscriminatory ad valorem
property tax on goods in the stream of export offends none
of the policies underlying the Clause, the courts should not
apply a “bright line” rule whose sole virtue is its simplicity
to invalidate a tax on Import - Export Clause grounds.
14
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, the Court should grant this
petition for certiorari.
Respectfully submitted,
KENNETH WALL
Three Allen Center, Suite 3485
333 Clay Street
Houston, Texas 77002
Telephone (713) 759-0696
Fax (713) 759-0342
March 20, 1996 Counsel of Record for Petitioners
la
APPENDIX A
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS
No. 94-0245
VIRGINIA INDONESIA COMPANY, PETITIONER
v.
HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT AND
HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL REVIEW BOARD,
RESPONDENTS
ON APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF ERROR TO THE
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE
FOURTEENTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
Argued on December 15, 1994
JUSTICE CORNYN delivered the opinion of the
Court in which CHIEF JUSTICE PHILLIPS, JUSTICE
GONZALEZ, JUSTICE HIGHTOWER, JUSTICE ENOCH,
JUSTICE SPECTOR, and JUSTICE BAKER join.
JUSTICE HECHT, joined by JUSTICE OWEN,
dissenting.
In this case we consider whether goods purchased by
the Virginia Indonesia Company (VICO) on behalf of an
Indonesian joint venture are exempt from a state ad valorem
tax. The trial court granted VICO’s motion for summary
judgment on the basis that the goods are exempt from
taxation under the import-export and commerce clauses of
2a
the United States Constitution and under section 11.01 of the
Texas Tax Code. U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10 (import-export)
& art. 1, § 8 (commerce). The court of appeals reversed.
871 S.W.2d 864. We reverse the judgment of the court of
appeals and render judgment that the tax at issue violates the
import-export clause of the United States Constitution.
VICO, a Delaware corporation, is the operator and
agent for an Indonesian oil and gas exploration joint venture.
As one of its duties as operator, VICO purchases goods from
vendors throughout the United States on behalf of the joint
venture. Pursuant to a production sharing agreement
between the joint venture and Pertamina, a state enterprise of
the Republic of Indonesia, the goods become the property of
Pertamina upon arrival in Indonesia. WICO is reimbursed
for its costs, but it receives no additional compensation.
VICO uses a standard purchase order marked
"FOREIGN PURCHASE ORDER" that includes the notation
"Ultimate destination for all items on this order is
Indonesia." At the time of purchase, the goods are
committed to foreign export and cannot thereafter be diverted
to domestic use. The goods are transported from the vendors
directly to an independent export packer in Houston, Harris
County, Texas. Upon arriving at the export packer’s
facility, the goods are checked to confirm that the proper
items were shipped, and that they meet specifications
required for import to Indonesia. Any dispute over the items
are resolved at that time. VICO then requests approval from
Indonesia to import the goods. When approval is granted, an
international inspection agency inspects the goods on behalf
of Indonesia and clears the goods for shipment. The goods
are then packed and shipped abroad on the next available
vessel.
3a
In most instances, the goods remain with the export
packer no longer than 45 days while these procedures are
being performed. In exceptional cases, however, this period
may be somewhat longer: if the goods received from the
vendor are damaged or defective, or if VICO encounters
problems obtaining approval for import to Indonesia, the
goods may remain with the export packer for up to 175 days.
VICO has some quantity of goods present at the export
packer’s facility year-round.
For the tax years 1989 and 1990, VICO was granted
an exemption from ad valorem taxation for its personal
property in Harris County. In September 1991, VICO was
notified by the Harris County Appraisal District that its
estimated ad valorem tax liability for 1991 was $8,441.74,
which was based on a $380,260.00 appraisal of VICO’s
property at the export packer’s facility on January 1, 1991.
VICO timely protested the tax assessment, including the
appraised value, to the Harris County Appraisal Review
Board. The Review Board affirmed, and VICO filed suit in
district court against the Appraisal District and the Review
Board (collectively, Harris County).
In its motion for summary judgment, VICO argued
that its goods are merely in transit through Texas and that
they are therefore immune from state taxation under the
import-export and commerce clauses of the United States
Constitution. WVICO further argued that its goods are not
subject to the state’s taxing authority because they do not
meet the criteria of Texas Tax Code § 11.01(c). The trial
court granted VICO’s motion for summary judgment on both
grounds. The court of appeals reversed, holding that VICO
failed to conclusively prove the existence of either federal or
State grounds for an exemption from the ad valorem tax.
871 S.W.2d at 871.
4a
Our summary judgment standard is well established.
The movant must show that there are no genuine issues of
material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. Nixon v. Mr. Property Management Co.,
690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49 (Tex. 1985). If the movant
establishes the right to judgment, the burden shifts to the
nonmovant to raise a fact issue that would preclude summary
judgment. City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth. , 589
S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979). In deciding whether there is
a disputed material fact issue, we regard evidence favorable
to the nonmovant as true. Nixon, 690 S.W.2d at 548-49.
I
The import-export clause of the United States
Constitution provides:
No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress,
lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports,
except what may be absolutely necessary for
executing its Inspection Laws... .
U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 10, cl. 2.
Historically, the United States Supreme Court decided
import-export clause challenges by focusing on the nature of
the goods, that is, whether the tax-burdened goods were
imports or exports. Under the "original package" doctrine,
goods were deemed to be imports, and hence immune from
state and local taxation, as long as they retained their original
form or package of import. Low v. Austin, 80 U.S. 29, 34
(1871) (holding that French champagne, which had been
stored in its “original cases, unbroken and unsold” since its
importation, was immune from a nondiscriminatory state
property tax); see also Anglo-Chilean Nitrate Sales Corp. v.
Sa
Alabama, 288 U.S. 218 (1933); Hooven & Allison Co. v.
Evatt, 324 U.S. 652 (1945).
Whereas the original package doctrine applied to
imports, the "stream of export" doctrine controlled exports.’
Under this doctrine, goods are not subject to state taxation
once exportation has commenced, which occurs when goods
"have been shipped, or entered with a common carrier for
transportation to another State, or have been started upon
such transportation in a continuous route or journey." Coe
v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517, 527 (1886). The mere intent to
export is not enough, Empresa Siderurgica v. County of
Merced, 337 U.S., 154, 157 (1949); the goods must begin
their "physical entry into the stream of exportation."
Kosydar v. National Cash Register Co., 417 U.S. 62, 71
(1974); see also Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 329 U.S. 69, 81-83 (1946). Once exportation
has begun, goods retain their "export" status, and thus
remain exempt from state taxation as long as they are in
transit. Temporary interruptions "due to the necessities of
the journey or for the purpose of safety and convenience in
the course of the movement" do not break the continuity of
transit; however, stoppages that serve the owner’s business
purpose interrupt the goods’ continuity of transit, rendering
them subject to the taxing power of the state. Minnesota v.
Blasius, 290 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1933). The continued validity of
the stream of export doctrine is of prime importance in this
case.
In the seminal case of Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages,
423 U.S. 276, 301 (1976), the United States Supreme Court
altered its approach to import-export clause challenges and
' This doctrine, which analyzes whether the goods are in transit at
the time of taxation, has been developed under both the import-export and
commerce clauses of the U.S. Constitution.
6a
rejected the original package doctrine of Low v. Austin. See
generally Walter Hellerstein, Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages;
Enhanced State Power to Tax Imports, 1976 SUP. CT. REV.
99 (explaining Michelin). The issue in Michelin was whether
Georgia could assess a nondiscriminatory ad valorem tax on
imported goods held in the taxpayer’s warehouse. Rejecting
the argument that the tax was unconstitutional simply because
it burdened goods in their original packages, the Michelin
court concentrated on whether the tax offended any of the
three policies underlying the import-export clause:
[(1)] the Federal Government must speak with one
voice when regulating commercial relations with
foreign government, and tariffs, which might affect
foreign relations, could not be implemented by the
States consistently with that exclusive power; [(2)]
import revenues were to be the major source of
revenue of the Federal Government and should not be
diverted to the States; and [(3)] harmony among the
States might be disturbed unless seaboard States, with
their crucial ports of entry, were prohibited from
levying taxes on citizens of other States by taxing
goods merely flowing through their ports to the other
States not situated as favorably geographically.
423 U.S. at 285-86 (footnotes omitted). Addressing the first
of these concerns, the Court determined that the tax levied on
the taxpayer’s goods did not impede the federal government’s
power to speak with “one voice" explaining that:
[b]y definition, such [nondiscriminatory property
taxation] does not fall on imports as such because of
their place of origin. It cannot be used to create
special protective tariffs or particular preferences for
certain domestic goods, and it cannot be applied
selectively to encourage or discourage any
Ta
importation in a manner inconsistent with federal
regulation.
Id. at 286. Nor, the Court held, did the tax offend the
second policy concern which implicates only the federal
government’s right to the revenue raised from taxes assessed
on the commercial privilege of bringing goods into the
United States. Id. at 286-87 (stating that nondiscriminatory
ad valorem taxation "deprives the Federal Government of
nothing to which it is entitled").
Finally, the Court held that the tax did not interfere
with the harmony among the states policy. The
nondiscriminatory ad valorem tax at issue, explained the
Court, was simply "a quid pro quo for benefits actually
conferred by the taxing State." Jd. at 289. The Court
reasoned that the taxpayer’s imported goods, like all other
property within the taxing jurisdiction, benefit from the
provision of local services such as police and fire protection,
and that the import-export clause was not designed to shield
such goods from paying their fair share for these services.
Id. The Court, however, qualified its holding in the
following words:
[T]he Clause was fashioned to prevent the imposition
of exactions which were no more than transit fees on
the privilege of moving through a State. A
nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax obviously
stands on a different footing, and to the extent there
is any conflict whatsoever with this purpose of the
Clause, it may be secured merely by prohibiting the
assessment of even nondiscriminatory property taxes
on goods which are merely in transit through the
State when the tax is assessed.
8a
Id. at 290 (emphasis added)(footnotes omitted). This
qualification was not implicated in Michelin because the
Court determined that the taxpayer’s goods “were no longer
in transit.” Id. at 302. Having concluded that the Georgia
tax did not impinge on any of the three policies underlying
the import-export clause, the Court upheld its
constitutionality.
The next year, the United States Supreme Court
applied Michelin’s analytic framework in Department of
Revenue v. Association of Washington stevedoring Cos. , 435
U.S. 734 (1977).? In that case, the State of Washington
assessed a business and occupation tax on stevedoring, the
business of loading and unloading cargo from ships.
Addressing the taxpayer’s import-export clause challenge, the
Court concluded that the tax violated none of the policies
articulated in Michelin. The Court went on to consider the
significance of Michelin’s exception for in-transit goods:
The Court in Michelin qualified its holding with the
observation that Georgia had applied the property tax
to goods "no longer in transit." 423 U.S., at 302.
Because the goods were no longer in _ transit,
however, the Court did not have to face the question
whether a tax relating to goods in transit would be an
"Impost or Duty" even if it offended none of the
policies behind the Clause. Inasmuch as we now face
this inquiry, we note two distinctions between this
case and Michelin. First, the activity taxed here
occurs while imports and exports are in transit.
? The Michellin test applies with equal force to imports and exports.
Washington Stevedoring, 435 U.S. at 758. However, U.S. CONST. art.
1, § 9 forbids federal taxation of exports; therefore, the second “federal
revenue enhancement” policy in Michelin is not implicated in export tax
cases. Id.
9a
Second, however, the tax does not fall on the goods
themselves. This levy reaches only the business of
loading and unloading ships . . . . Despite the
existence of the first distinction, the presence of the
second leads to the conclusion that the Washington
tax is not a prohibited "Impost or Duty” when it
violates none of the policies.
435 U.S. at 755 (footnote omitted). Thus, drawing a
distinction between a direct tax on goods and a tax on the
business of handling goods, the Court upheld the stevedoring
tax. Jd. at 756-77 (stating that the “immunity of services
incidental to importing and exporting [is] not so broad as the
immunity of the goods themselves"). Because the tax did not
directly burden the goods, the Court expressly declined to
consider the applicability of the Michelin approach when a
State directly taxes imports or exports in transit. Jd. at 757
n.23.
Most recently, the United States Supreme Court
considered whether a Tennessee sales tax on the rental of
leased cargo containers violated the policies underlying the
import-export clause. tel Containers Int’l Corp. vy.
Huddleston, 113 S.Ct. 1095 (1993). Because the containers
were used in the international shipping industry, the taxpayer
argued that the tax violated the import-export clause. The
Court concluded that the tax did not violate any of the
policies identified in Michelin, noting specifically that the tax
was not “a tax on importation or imported goods, but a tax
on a business transaction occurring within the taxing State."
Id. at 1106.
Just last year, we considered the impact of the import-
export clause on the scope of state taxing authority in
Diamond Shamrock, we assessed whether oil imported from
a foreign country directly into Texas, the state of its final
10a
destination, may be subject to state ad valorem taxation. Id.
at 298. The parties stipulated that the oil was in transit
through Nueces County at the time of taxation. The taxpayer
argued that the tax fell within Michelin’s “merely in transit"
qualification and was, thus, unconstitutional under the
import-export clause. We disagreed, stating:
[T]he Michelin Court’s qualification clearly applies
only to goods in transit through the state to or from
another state and not to goods merely in transit within
the only state the goods ever enter.
Id. at 301 (citing Robert C.W. Frantz, Comment,
Constitutional Law--Nondiscriminatory Ad Valorem Tax May
Be Applied to Imports, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 193, 197
(1976)). We then held that the third policy in Michelin,
preserving harmony among the states, was not implicated
because the imported oil was not transported to or from
another state. Jd. at 300-01. Rather, the imported oil
reached its first and final domestic destination upon arrival
in Texas. Thus, there was no risk of multiple taxation by
different states. Neither did we perceive that the tax could
conflict with either the “one voice" or "federal revenue
enhancement" policies articulated in Michelin, Id. at 301 n.3.
We expressly declined to reach the issue of whether the
import-export clause prohibits state taxation of goods passing
through Texas on their way to a foreign country. /d. at 299.
II
VICO argues that neither Michelin nor its progeny
have altered the fundamental rule that goods in the export
stream of commerce are exempt from taxation. Rather than
supplanting this doctrine, VICO urges that Michelin’s
qualification for in-transit goods, 423 U.S. at 286, requires
a threshold determination of whether the goods are merely in
lla
transit through the state at the time of taxation. If so, VICO
argues, the tax is unconstitutional, and it is unnecessary to
analyze whether the tax impinges upon the Michelin policies.
While Harris County acknowledges that the stream of export
doctrine has not been expressly overruled, it questions its
continued viability after Michelin. See Itel, 113 S.Ct. at
1106. Harris County urges this Court to apply the approach
set forth in Michelin, which, it argues, demonstrates that the
tax at issue undermines none of the clause’s underlying
policies.
The United States Supreme Court has yet to announce
whether the new approach set forth in Michelin should be
applied to a direct tax on imports or exports in transit.
Although the Michelin court rejected the original package
doctrine, it did not overrule Coe v. Errol or any of the
stream of export cases, and the two doctrines are different
enough that the rejection of one does not, of itself, signify
the demise of the other.
The sole relevant factor in the original package
doctrine was whether the goods’ original packaging remained
intact. This led to criticism that the doctrine tended to
produce superficial and disparate results. See Michelin, 423
U.S. at 282-83. The doctrine’s broad reach shielded not
only goods that were in import transit, but also goods that
were permanently situated within the state of their final
destination. As the Court wrote in Michelin, “[njothing in
the history of the Import-Export Clause even remotely
suggests that a nondiscriminatory ad valorem property tax
which is also imposed on imported goods that are no longer
in import transit was the type of exaction that was regarded
as Objectionable by the Framers of the Constitution." 423
U.S. at 286 (emphasis added).
12a
In contrast, the definition of “exports” under the
stream of export doctrine has been much narrower,
encompassing only those goods that have commenced "an
actual movement into the stream of export." Kosydar v.
National Cash Register Co. , 417 U.S. 62, 71 (1974). Unlike
its corollary, commentators have regarded the stream of
export doctrine as “commendably intelligible and consistent, "
see Walter Hellerstein, Michelin Tire Corp v. Wages:
Enhanced State Power to Tax Imports, 1976 SUP. CT. REV.
99, 132, and just two years before Michelin, the United
States Supreme Court praised it. Kosydar, 417 U.S. at 71
("This is an instance, however, where we believe that
simplicity has its virtues."). As one commentator has noted,
“poth the language and the expressed purpose of the clause
as being designed to prohibit the seaboard States ‘from ...
taxing goods merely flowing through their ports to other
States,’ indicate that property taxes imposed on exports
awaiting shipment abroad ... were intended to be
proscribed." 1 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN, STATE
TAXATION 4 5.4 (1983) (quoting Michelin, 423 U.S. at
285-86).
Abandoning the original package doctrine "brought
import tax immunity into alignment with export tax
immunity" and eliminated what had previously been a wide
loophole to state taxation. Robert C.W. Frantz, Comment,
Constitutional Law--Nondiscriminatory Ad Valorem Tax May
be Applied To Imports, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 193, 203
(1976); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-23 (2d ed. 1988) (noting that
the original package doctrine operated as a shield to state
taxation). Nonetheless, the rejection of the original package
doctrine does not compel the conclusion that the Michelin
court abandoned the rule of immunity for in-transit goods.
To the contrary, by explicitly articulating an exception for in-
transit goods, Michelin appears to preserve bright-line
13a
immunity for goods in the stream of export. Whether this is
indeed the case, however, remains uncertain because none of
the Court’s post-Michelin cases has involved a direct tax on
in-transit goods,’ and the Court has stated its preference to
“defer decision [on this issue] until a case with pertinent facts
is presented.” Washington Stevedoring, 435 U.S. at 757
n.23.
Faced with the decision of whether to apply the
stream of export rule or to abandon it, we choose the former.
In reaching this choice, we are mindful of the words of the
United States Supreme Court: “If a precedent of this Court
has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on
reasons rejected in some other line of decisions, [the lower
court] should follow the case which directly controls, leaving
to this Court the prerogative of overruling its own
decisions." Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/American
Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989); see also Quill
Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 321 (1992) (Scalia,
J., concurring). In light of the fact that the United States
Supreme Court has not overruled Coe v. Errol or any of its
progeny, we apply the long-standing rule that a tax on goods
in the export stream of commerce violates the import-export
clause.* See generally 2 RONALD D. ROTUNDA &
> The United States Supreme Court has carefully distinguished the
taxes at issue in Michelin, Washington Stevedoring, and Intel from one
that falls directly on in-transit goods. See Michelin, 423 U.S. at 302;
Washington Stevedoring, 435 U.S. at 755-757; Itel, 113 S.Ct. at 1106.
* This approach is consistent with that recently taken by the Fifth
Circuit in Louisiana Land and Exploration Co. v. Pilot Petroleum
Corp. ,900 F.2d 816, 820-21 (Sth Cir. 1990), cert. denied 498 U.S. 897
(1990). In that case, the Fifth Circuit relied on Richfield Oil Corp. v.
State Bd. of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69 (1946), in striking down an
Alabama excise tax on oil ihe export stream of commerce. See
discussion infra part III.
l4a
JOHN E. NOWAK, TREATISE ON CONSTITUTION
LAW § 13.2 (2d ed 1992); LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 6-23 (2d ed.
1988); 1 JEROME R. HELLERSTEIN, STATE TAXATION
q 5.4 (1983).
Ill
The question we now determine is whether VICO’s
goods were in the export stream of commerce when the tax
was addressed. VICO argues that exportation began when its
goods were shipped from the vendors to the export packer’s
facility and that the temporary stoppage of the goods in
Harris County did not break the continuity of transit.
In this case, it is clear that VICO’s goods entered the
export stream of commerce when they were shipped from the
vendors to the export packer’s facility in Harris County
because, at that point, the goods began their movement to a
precommitted foreign destination. See Kosydar, 417 U.S. at
70; Richfield Oil, 329 U.S. at 82-83 (holding that delivery of
oil into a storage tank of a foreign-bound steamer "marked
the commencement of the movement of the oil abroad"); A.
G. Spaulding & Bros. v. Edwards, 262 U.S. 66, 68 (1923)
(holding that delivery of goods to an export carrier for
shipment abroad constituted a significant "step in
exportation"). The more difficult question before us is
whether the temporary stoppage of the goods at the export
packer’s facility disrupted the goods’ continuity of transit,
thus subjecting them to taxation in Harris County on January
1. It is the purpose of the stoppage that is important. See
Champlain Realty Co. v. Town of Brattleboro, 260 U.S. 366,
376-77 (1922). If the stoppage is attributable to the business
purpose of the owner, then the exportation is deemed to have
terminated, and the goods are subject to tax in the
jurisdiction of their stoppage. Minnesota v. Blasius, 290
15a
U.S. 1, 11-12 (1933). For instance, if goods are delayed for
the purpose of further processing or for storage pending the
receipt of orders, the goods are no longer in the stream of
commerce. See Bacon v. Illinois. 227 U.S. 504 (1913)
(holding that stoppage of grain for processing served owner’s
business purpose); Blasius, 290 U.S. at 12 (holding that
storage of inventory awaiting orders served owner’s business
purpose).
If, however, a stoppage is "due to the necessities of
the journey or for the purpose of safety and convenience in
the course of the movement,” continuity of transit is not
interrupted, and the goods remain immune from taxation
throughout the stoppage. Blasius, 290 U.S. at 9-10. Delays
that are incidental to the journey and to a necessary change
in the mode of transportation do not affect the continuity of
transit. In Hughes Bros. Timber Co. v. Minnesota, 272 U.S.
469 (1926), the United States Supreme Court considered
whether logs retained their in-transit status during a delay
between the time they floated down the river and the time
they were loaded on to a ship for further transport. In
concluding that the logs retained their in-transit status
throughout the stoppage, the Court stated:
The character of the shipment in such a case depends
upon all the evidential circumstances looking to what
the owner has done in the preparation for the journey
and in carrying it out. The mere power of the owner
to divert the shipment already started does not take it
out of interstate commerce is the other facts show that
the journey has already begun in good faith and
temporary interruption of the passage is reasonable
and in furtherance of the intended transportation ....
Id. at 475-76.
16a
This passage was later cited in Carson Petroleum Co.
v. Vial, 279 U.S. 95, 102-03 (1929). In that case, the
taxpayer transported oil, which was destined for foreign
export, by rail to the Louisiana coast. The oil was held in
a storage tank while awaiting the arrival of a ship. By
storing sufficient quantities of oil in the tanks, the taxpayer
was able to promptly deliver the oil on arrival of the ship,
thereby avoiding costly demurrage charges. The Court first
noted that "it would be impracticable to carry on the export
oil business by any other method.” /d. at 100. The Court
went on to question the precedential value of one of its
earlier cases, General Oil Co. v. Crain, 209 U.S. 211
(1908), in which it had held that the temporary storage of
oil, which was necessitated by the practical constraints of
shipping and distributing oil, constituted a break in the
continuity of transit for business purposes. /d. at 104.
Having rejected the applicability of Crain,’ the Court then
noted that "[t]here has been a liberal construction of what is
continuity of the journey, in cases where the court finds from
the circumstances that export trade has been actually intended
and carried through, "id. at 105-06, and concluded that the
stored oil remained in transit during its stoppage in
Louisiana. Id. at 109.
5 The Court stated:
The [General Oil] court was divided and there was very
vigorous dissent. The case has caused discussion, and
it must be admitted that it is a close one and might
easily have been decided the other way. The result was
probably affected by the impression created by the
original situation and the somewhat artificial
rearrangement of tanks in a large entrepot for
redistribution of oil to avoid previous taxability.
Carson Petroleum, 279 U.S. at 105.
17a
Turning to the case before us, we are persuaded that
the stoppage of VICO’s goods in Harris County was
attributable to an exportation, not a business, purpose.
VICO purchases goods from vendors throughout the country
for the exclusive use of the Indonesian joint venture. From
the moment of purchase, VICO retains no control to divert
the goods from their precommitted foreign destination or to
sell the goods in a domestic market. Indeed, VICO has no
domestic market because it is not in the business of procuring
or marketing goods. Rather, VICO’s duty is simply to see
that the joint venture receives the goods necessary for its
operations abroad.
At the export packer’s facility, VICO checks the
goods to ensure they meet necessary specifications for import
into Indonesia, which enables VICO to resolve discrepancies
with its vendors prior to export. Harris County contends that
this activity serves VICO’s business purpose and, therefore,
breaks the goods’ continuity of transit. We disagree.
Indonesian law requires a pre-shipment inspection of the
quality and quantity of the imported goods by an independent
inspection agency selected by the Republic of Indonesia. See
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Trade Policy
Review - Indonesia, Vol. 1, pp. 79-82 (1991) (citing
Presidential Instruction No. 4 (1985)). We view VICO’s
examination of its goods as merely incidental to the
inspection mandated by Indonesian law. VICO’s goods are
also delayed pending approval for import by the Indonesian
government, a requirement that is outside of VICO’s control
and that serves no business purpose of VICO. Thereafter,
VICO’s goods are packaged for shipment, a step that must
occur after approval and inspection.
While in Harris County, VICO’s goods undergo only
those procedures -- inspection, approval for import to
Indonesia, and packaging -- required for exportation. See
18a
Carson Petroleum, 279 U.S. at 109 ([T]he selection of the
point of shipment and the equipment at that point were solely
for the speedy and continuous export of the product abroad
and for no other purpose."). VICO makes no profit from the
export of the goods, its role is simply to facilitate their
shipment abroad While we realize that the delay necessary
to perform these procedures is somewhat longer than that
which is generally associated with a "transportation" delay,
it is no longer than is necessary to get the goods on their way
to Indonesia, and consequently we are persuaded that under
these circumstances the delay is "due to the necessities of the
journey. "See Blasius, 290 U.S. at 9. Because we view the
presence if VICO’s goods in Harris County as a necessary
stoppage incident to their transportation abroad, we conclude
that, while at the export packer’s facility in Harris County,
VICO’s goods remain in the stream of export and immune
from state taxation.
Finally, under the circumstances of this case, the tax
imposed on VICO’s goods transgresses the “one voice”
policy of the import-export clause. On this issue, the Fifth
Circuit’s recent opinion in Louisiana Land and Exploration
Co. v. Pilot Petroleum Corp., 900 F.2d 816, 820-21 (Sth
Cir. 1990), cert. denied 498 U.S. 897 (1990), provides
guidance. Louisiana Land involved an Alabama excise tax
levied on jet fuel that was in transit for export to Canada.
Although the court noted th: . Michelin had marked a change
in the approach to import-..<port clause challenges, it also
noted that the United States Supreme Court had not overruled
the stream of export case of Richjield Oil Corp. v. State
Board of Equalization, 329 U.S. 69 (1946). Id. at 819. The
court then determined that immunity for in-transit exports
had not only survived Michelin, but also was consistent with
it. Id. at 820 ("We believe, consistent with the
contemporary view of the Supreme Court, that the Import-
19a
Export Clause was specifically intended to prevent the type
of taxation involved in this case").
Relying on both Richfield Oil and Michelin, the
Louisiana Land court struck down the Alabama tax. The
Fifth Circuit first determined that the tax impaired the
government’s ability to speak with one voice in matters of
foreign commerce. /d. at 821 (stating "[t}his type of tax
discourages foreign parties, who purchase oil from U.S.
companies and refineries, from using U.S., ports to transport
fuel from the United States into foreign countries").
Returning, then, to the long-standing stream of export rule,
the court observed that the Alabama tax, like the California
tax in Richfield Oil, was imposed on goods that were "the
subject of foreign export of the time of taxation;" the tax was
therefore unconstitutional. Jd. at 821.
In this case, Harris County argues that because the
tax at issue is nondiscriminatory, like that in Michelin, it
cannot be selectively applied only to goods destined for
foreign transport, and consequently does not impinge upon
the one voice policy. We disagree. The tax on VICO’s
goods impairs the federal government’s ability to speak with
one voice in matters of foreign commerce. While the
Michelin court did state that "[i]t is obvious that such
nondiscriminatory property taxation can have no impact
whatsoever on the Federal Government’s exclusive regulation
of foreign commerce," 423 U.S. at 286 (emphasis added), it
seems Clear that the kind of nondiscriminatory tax to which
the Court was referring was one imposed on goods that are
20a
no longer in transit. We agree that there is no impairment
of the one voice policy when a state tax is imposed on
imported goods that have come to rest in the state of their
ultimate destination. See Diamond Shamrock, 876 S.W.2d
at 301 n.3. However, the facts before us pose different
concerns. It is one thing to tax property that has come to
rest within the state; it is quite another to tax property that is
merely passing through on its way to its final foreign
destination. See Louisiana Land, 900 F.2d at 821 ("To
permit any and every state to impose a direct tax on goods in
the export stream would circumvent [the one voice]
objective.").
In essence, Harris County is attempting to tax exports
that will become the property of an Indonesian state agency
upon arrival in Indonesia, and that are only temporarily
within Harris County for the necessities of exportation,
including compliance with Indonesian import requirements.
The tax at issue has the potential of interfering with the
United States’ commercial relations with Indonesia insofar as
Indonesia might turn to other countries for its imported goods
or might engage in retaliatory taxation of its own exports
destined for the United States. Policy affecting foreign
relations should be uniform among the states and therefore
determined by the federal government: this matter "’
concern{s] the exterior relations of the United States with
other nations. . . and should proceed exclusively from the
legislative authority of the nation.’" Louisiana Land, 900
F.2d at 821 (quoting Bowman v. Chicago & N.R. Co., 125
U.S. 465, 482 (1888)).
* "Such" refers to a nondiscriminatory tax “imposed on imported
goods that are no longer in import transit." See Michelin, 423 U.S. at
286.
21a
We conclude that the tax on VICO’s goods violates
the import-export clause. We do not address VICO’s
additional arguments that the tax is unconstitutional under the
commerce clause of the United States Constitution or that it
violates Texas Tax Code § 11.01. We accordingly reverse
the judgment of the court of appeals and render judgment
that VICO owes no tax for the tax year 1991.
John Cornyn
Justice
OPINION DELIVERED: October 27, 1995
22a
APPENDIX B
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS
No. 94-0245
VIRGINIA INDONESIA COMPANY, PETITIONER
v.
HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT AND
HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL REVIEW BOARD,
RESPONDENTS
ARGUED ON DECEMBER 15, 1994
ON APPLICATION FOR WRIT OF ERROR TO THE
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FOURTEENTH
DISTRICT OF TEXAS
JUSTICE HECHT, joined by JUSTICE OWEN,
dissenting.
The Harris County Appraisal District has determined
that personal property purchased by the Virginia Indonesia
Co. and stored with an export packer at the Port of Houston
awaiting transportation to Indonesia is subject to ad valorem
taxation. VICO contends that the property is exempted from
taxation by the Import-Export Clause and the Commerce
Clause of the United States Constitution, and by the Texas
Tax Code. The Court agrees with VICO’s Import-Export
Clause argument and thus does not reach VICO’s other
contentions.
23a
The Court holds that the Import-Export Clause
absolutely prohibits state taxation of exports whenever they
are in transit to their foreign destination. The Clause, in the
Court’s words, gives “bright-line immunity [from state
taxation] for goods in the stream of export." Ante at___.
This rule has the virtue of simplicity. To know if a tax is
prohibited, all one must do is determine whether the property
on which it falls is moving along its international course, or
whether it has not yet begun, stopped upon, or ended that
course. The in-transit rule also has a vice, however, which
exceeds its virtue: it is simplistic. It is neither a deduction
from nor a restatement of the policies embodied in the
constitutional provision. In many instances, probably most,
a tax allowed by the in-transit rule does not offend
constitutional policies, and a tax prohibited by the rule does.
But there are circumstances —and this case is an example
—in which the in-transit rule dictates a result inconsistent
with constitutional policy. The in-transit rule is a good rule
of thumb, but it is not an Import-Export Clause litmus test.
That is why the United States Supreme Court has
abandoned the exclusive use of the in-transit rule and related
condensations of constitutional principles like “original
package” and “export stream" as accurate or adequate
substitutes for the principles themselves. The fundamental
difference in Import-Export Clause jurisprudence since
Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276 (1976), is that
the constitutional provision’s limit on state taxation is now
defined in every instance by the actual policies which support
the limitation and which it is meant to further, and not by
shorthand formulae which at best only approximate and
sometimes distort constitutional concerns. Whether property
is in transit, and more importantly, how it is in transit,
remains a relevant factor in assessing the validity of a tax,
but it is not the only factor, nor is it determinative. The
Court’s adherence to an in-transit rule is at odds with the
24a
Supreme Court’s modern jurisprudence, and with our recent
decision in Diamond Shamrock Refining & Marketing Co. v.
Nueces County Appraisal District, 876 S$.W.2d 298 (Tex.),
cert. denied,— U.S. —,115 S.Ct. 500 (1994).
The Court defends its approach as being required by
Michelin’s predecessor cases, to which the doctrine of stare
decisis requires obedience. I have two responses, on which
I intend to elaborate. One is that the cases on which the
Court relies do not support its conclusion, Michelin aside —
and Michelin cannot be put aside. The other is more
philosophical: not constitutional; provision can be applied to
do either more of less than the principles on which it is
grounded require. It makes no sense to say that a tax is
prohibited because it does not meet a court-made test for
applying a constitutional provision, even though the tax
conflicts with neither the meaning nor the purpose of the
provision itself. The constitution cannot be made to say
something it does not mean.
The reasoning of Michelin and its progeny
demonstrate that the tax here does not offend the policies of
the Import-Export Clause. This is not an isolated case, even
in Texas. Another case pending before us involves similar
facts and issues under the Commerce Clause. Vinmar, Inc.
v. Harris County Appraisal Dist., 890 S.W.2d 493 (Tex.
App.—El Paso 1994, writ requested). I would hold that a
nondiscriminatory ad valorem tax on personal property is not
prohibited by the Import-Export Clause in the circumstances
of the case before us. I am thus obliged to consider whether,
as petitioner argues, the tax is prohibited by the Commerce
Clause and the Texas Tax Code, and I would hold that it is
not. Because I believe today’s decision imposes a restriction
on the State’s power to tax not found in the Constitution or
state law, I respectfully dissent.
25a
The Import-Export Clause states: "No State shall,
without the Consent of the Congress lay any Imposts or
Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely
necessary for executing its inspection Laws. . . ." U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 10, cl2. The provision is not "an absolute
prohibition on all taxation of imports and exports.”
Department of Revenue vy. Association of Washington
Stevedoring Cos., 435 U.S. 734, 759 (1978). The "central
holding" of Michelin is "that the absolute ban is only of
‘Imposts or Duties’ and not of all taxes." /d. Harkening
back to Brown v. Maryland, 26 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 262
(1827), Michelin reiterated;
"(T]he words of the prohibition ought not to be
pressed to their utmost extent;... in our complex
system, the object of the powers conferred on the
government of the Union, and the nature of the often
conflicting powers which remain in the States, must
always be taken into view . . . . [T]here must be a
point of time when the prohibition ceases, and the
power of the State to tax commences... ."
Michelin, 423 U.S. at 296 (quoting Brown, 26 U.S. at 266-
267).
The parameters of the prohibition are two related
concepts, one being "Imposts or Duties", which describes the
prohibited tax, and the other "Imports or Exports", which
describes the article on which the tax falls. Before Michelin,
application of the prohibition focused almost exclusively on
the latter — whether the article taxed was an import or
export. This in turn depended on where the article was in
26a
the course of its journey when the tax was imposed. An
article was held to be an import as long as it remained in its
original package after entry into the country. Low v. Austin,
80 U.S. 29, 34 (1871). An article was an export when it
physically entered and remained in the stream of exportation.
Washington Stevedoring, 435 U.S. at 752; Kosydar v.
National Cash Register Co., 417 U.S. 62, 66-68 (1974);
Empresa Siderurgica, S.A. v. County of Merced, 337 U.S.
154, 157 (1949); Richfield Oil Corp. v. State Bd. of
Equalization, 329 U.S. 69, 82-83 (1946); Minnesota v.
Blasius, 290 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1933); A.G. Spalding & Bros. v.
Edwards, 262 U.S. 66, 69 (1923); Cornell v. Coyne, 192
U.S. 418, 427 (1904); Coe v. Errol, 116 U.S. 517, 527
(1886).
Michelin “adopted a fundamentally different approach
to cases claiming the protection of the Import-Export
Clause." Limbach v. Hooven & Allison Co., 466 U.S. 353,
359 (1984). Michelin shifted the analytical focus from the
nature of the article to the nature of the tax — whether it
was an impost or duty. Jd. at 359-360; Washington
Stevedoring, 435 U.S. at 752. “[T]he term “‘Impost or Duty’
is not self-defining and does not necessarily encompass all
taxes.” Id. at 759. It is defined by the policies that
motivated inclusion of the provision in the Constitution. R.
J. Reynolds Tobacco Co. v. Durham County, 479 U.S. 130,
153 (1986). According to Michelin:
The Framers of the Constitution . . . sought to
alleviate three main concerns by committing sole
power to lay imposts and duties on imports in the
Federal Government, with no concurrent state power:
the Federal Government must speak with one voice
when regulating commercial relations with foreign
governments, and tariffs, which might affect foreign
relations, could not be implemented by the States
27a
consistently with that exclusive power; import
revenues were to be the major source of revenue of
the Federal Government and should not be diverted to
the States; and harmony among the States might be
disturbed unless seaboard States, with their crucial
ports of entry, were prohibited from levying taxes on
citizens of other States by taxing goods merely
flowing through their ports to the other States not
situated as favorably geographically.
423 U.S. at 285-286 (footnotes omitted). I refer to the first
of these policies as the "foreign relations" policy and to the
third as the “state harmony” policy.
The Supreme Court has made it quite clear that “what
constitutes an import or export” is no longer “the exclusive
consideration” in applying the Import-Export Clause.
Washington Stevedoring, 435 U.S. at 760. The argument
was made in Washington Stevedoring that Michelin did not
address a situation in which the articles taxed remained "a
part of commerce". The Supreme Court firmly rejected that
argument as an attempt to return to the pre-Michelin focus on
the import or export nature of the property taxed:
Rather than examining whether the taxes are "Imposts
or Duties" that offend constitutional policies, the
contention would have the Court explore when goods
lose their status as imports and exports. This is
precisely the inquiry the Court abandoned in
[Michelin].
Id. In Limbach, the Supreme Court reiterated:
To repeat: we think it clear that this Court in
Michelin specifically abandoned the concept that the
Import-Export Clause constituted a broad prohibition
28a
against all forms of state taxation that fell on imports.
Michelin changed the focus of Import-Export Clause
cases from the nature of the goods as imports to the
nature of the tax at issue. The new focus is not on
whether the goods have lost their status as imports
but is, instead, on whether the tax sought to be
imposed is an “Impost or Duty."
466 U.S. at 360.
In today’s opinion in the case before us, the Court
appears to conclude that the Supreme Court has treated
imports differently than exports, and that while Michelin
abandoned the “original package" test for imports, it did not
abandon the "stream of export" test for exports.
Specifically, the Court says:
The United States Supreme Court has yet to
announce whether the new approach set forth in
Michelin should be applied to a direct tax on imports
or exports in transit. Although the Michelin court
rejected the original package doctrine, it did not
overrule Coe v. Errol or any of the stream of export
cases, and the two doctrines are different enough that
the rejection of one does not, of itself, signify the
demise of the other.
Ante at ____. The Court overlooks Washington Stevedoring,
in which the Supreme court observed that before Michelin—
the analysis in the export cases . . . differed from that
in the import cases. In the former, the question was
when did the export enter the export stream; in the
latter, the question was when did the goods escape
their original package. The questions differed, for
example, because an export could enter its export
29a
package and not secure tax immunity until later when
it began its journey out of the country. Until
Michelin, an import retained its immunity so long as
it remained in its original package.
Despite these formal differences, the Michelin
approach should apply to taxation involving exports
as well as imports. The prohibition on the taxation of
exports is contained in the same Clause as that
regarding imports. The export-tax ban vindicates two
of the three policies identified in Michelin. It
precludes state disruption of the United States foreign
policy. It does not serve to protect federal revenues,
however, because the Constitution forbids federal
taxation of exports. U.S. CONST., Art. I. § 9, cl.
5; see United States v. Hvoslef, 237 U.S. 1. But it
does avoid friction and trade barriers among the
States. As a result, any tax relating to exports can be
tested for its conformance with the first and third
policies. If the constitutional interests are not
disturbed, the tax should not be considered an
“Impost or Duty" any more than should a tax related
to imports.
435 U.S. at 758 (emphasis added, footnotes omitted). The
Court in today’s opinion states: "Faced with the decision of
whether to apply the ‘stream of export’ rule or to abandon it,
we choose the former." Given the strong, unqualified
language of Washington Stevedoring, 1 do not believe that
adherence to the "stream of export" rule as the exclusive test
for applying the Import-Export Clause remains an open
choice.
Thus, as a general rule, a state tax on exports is not
an impost or duty prohibited by the Import-Export Clause
unless it conflicts with either of the two policies of the
30a
Clause which apply to exports, namely, the “foreign
relations" policy and the "state harmony" policy.
The Court reads Michelin to leave one exception to
this general rule. It "remains uncertain", the Court says,
ante at ___, whether a direct tax on imports and exports in
transit is prohibited by the Import-Export Clause even if the
tax does not conflict with the principles of the Clause.
Because of this uncertainty, the Court concludes that it is
bound by stare decisis to continue to apply the “stream of
export" rule to such taxes, the effect of which is to prohibit
them absolutely.
The Court relies heavily on the following passage in
Michelin:
[Tjhe [Import-Export] Clause was fashioned to
prevent the imposition of exactions which were no
more than transit fees on the privilege of moving
through a State. A non-discriminatory ad valorem
property tax obviously stands on a different footing,
and to the extent there is any conflict whatsoever with
this purpose of the Clause, it may be secured merely
by prohibiting the assessment of even
nondiscriminatory property taxes on goods which are
merely in transit through the State when the tax is
assessed.
423 U.S. at 290 (footnotes omitted), ante at__. The Court
seems to read the second sentence to say that taxes on goods
merely in transit through a state are absolutely prohibited.
The sentence actually says that non-discriminatory ad
valorem property taxes on goods merely in transit through a
state are prohibited only “to the extent there is any conflict
3la
whatsoever with this purpose of the Clause". The only
examples suggested are “exactions which were no more than
transit fees". The Supreme Court does not say that there is
any conflict between the constitutional policies and a
nondiscriminatory ad valorem tax, and the Court’s use of the
word "whatsoever" suggests, if anything, that such conflict
in any event is minimal.
More importantly, however, the context in which the
passage appears makes it doubtful that the Supreme Court
contemplated any prohibition against nondiscriminatory ad
valorem taxes on imports and exports in transit except in
very limited circumstances, let alone an absolute prohibition.
The entire paragraph in which the passage appears reads as
follows:
Finally, nondiscriminatory ad valorem
property taxes do not interfere with the free flow of
imported goods among the States, as did the exactions
by States under the Articles of Confederation directed
solely at imported goods. Indeed, importers of goods
destined for inland States can easily avoid even those
taxes in today’s world. Modern transportation
methods such as air freight and containerized
packaging, and the development of railroads and the
Nation’s internal waterways, enable importation
directly into the inland States. Petitioner, for
example, operates other distribution centers from
wholesale warehouses in inland States. Actually, a
quarter of the tires distributed from _petitioner’s
Georgia warehouse are imported interstate directly
from Canada. To be sure, allowance of
nondiscriminatory ad valorem property taxation may
increase the cost of goods purchased by "inland"
consumers. But as already noted, such taxation is the
quid pro quo for benefits actually conferred by the
32a
taxing State. There is no reason why local taxpayers
should subsidize the services used by the importer;
ultimate consumers should pay for such services as
police and fire protection accorded the goods just as
much as they should pay transportation costs
associated with those goods. An evil to be prevented
by the Import-Export Clause was the levying of taxes
which could only be imposed because of the peculiar
geographical situation of certain States that enabled
them to single out goods destined for other States. In
effect, the Clause was fashioned to prevent the
imposition of exactions which were no more than
transit fees on the privilege of moving through a
State. A non-discriminatory ad valorem property tax
obviously stands on a different footing, and to the
extent there is any conflict whatsoever with this
purpose of the Clause, it may be secured merely by
prohibiting the assessment of even nondiscriminatory
property taxes on goods which are merely in transit
through the State when the tax is assessed.
Michelin, 423 U.S. at 288-290 (footnotes omitted). The
Supreme Court does not suggest that taxes directly on goods
in transit may be absolutely prohibited; to the contrary, the
Supreme Court states that "nondiscriminatory ad valorem
property taxation . . . is the quid pro quo for benefits
actually conferred by the taxing State." Jd. at 288-289. The
Import-Export Clause was intended to prohibit exaction of
fees for nothing more than the privilege of moving through
a state’s ports. The Clause was not intended to exempt
imports and exports from their fair share of the cost of police
and fire protection and other such services rendered by the
state through which the goods pass. Rather, the Supreme
Court said, imports and exports are no more exempt from
paying taxes for such services than they are from paying the
cost of their own transportation.
33a
That a non-discriminatory ad valorem tax on imports
and exports might be prohibited is, in Michelin, only a very
limited possibility. The Supreme Court stated that a tax
would be prohibited only “to the extent there is any conflict
whatsoever with [the] purpose of the Clause". /d. at 290.
Thus, even a prohibition against taxes on imports and exports
in transit must be based on the policies of the constitutional
provision. The Supreme Court did not suggest circumstances
which would call for prohibition of such a tax:
In any event, since prohibition of
nondiscriminatory ad valorem property taxation would
not further the objectives of the Import-Export
Clause, only the clearest constitutional mandate
should lead us to condemn such taxation. The
terminology employed in the Clause — "Imposts or
Duties” — is sufficiently ambiguous that we decline
to presume it was intended to embrace taxation that
does not create the evils the Clause was specifically
intended to eliminate.
Id. at 293-294. Low v. Austin made “crystal clear", the
Supreme Court said, “that the prohibition applied only to
state exactions upon imports as imports and did not apply to
nondiscriminatory ad valorem property taxes." Jd. at 300.
Nevertheless, in Washington Stevedoring the Supreme
Court held open the possibility not entirely foreclosed by
Michelin that some nondiscriminatory ad valorem tax on
imports and exports in transit might be absolutely prohibited,
stating in a footnote:
We do not raise the question of the
applicability of the Michelin approach when a State
directly taxes imports or.exports in transit.
34a
. . . As in Michelin, decided less than three
years ago, we prefer to defer decision until a case
with pertinent facts is presented. At that time, with
full argument, the issue with all its ramifications may
be decided.
435 U.S. at 757 n.23. In a concurring opinion, however,
Justice Powell explained the Supreme Court’s concern:
In [Michelin] this Court abandoned the
traditional, formalistic methods of determining the
validity of state levies under the Import-Export
Clause and applied a functional analysis based on the
exaction’s relationship to the three policies that
underlie the Clause: (i) preservation of uniform
federal regulation of foreign relations; (ii) protection
of federal revenue derived from imports; and (iii)
maintenance of harmony among the inland States and
the seaboard States. The nondiscriminatory ad
valorem property tax in Michelin was held not to
violate any of those policies, but the Court suggested
that even a nondiscriminatory tax on goods merely in
transit through the State might run afoul of the
Import-Export Clause.
* =
In questioning the validity of “transit fees," the
Michelin Court was concerned with exactions that
bore no relation to services and benefits conferred by
the State. Thus, the transit-fee inquiry cannot be
answered by determining whether or not the tax
relates to the value of the goods; instead, it must be
answered by inquiring whether the State is simply
making the imported goods pay their own way, as
opposed to exacting a fee merely for “the privilege of
moving through a State."
35a
435 U.S. at 762-764 (citation omitted). See also Xerox
Corp. v. County of Harris, Texas, 459 U.S. 145, 157-158
(1982) (Powell, J., dissenting). The Court did not agree
with Justice Powell that it had in effect already decided the
question whether states could tax import and exports in
transit, but it did not disagree that the determinative issue
was “whether the State is simply making the imported goods
pay their won way, as opposed to exacting a fee merely for
‘the privilege of moving through a State.’"
In two cases since Washington Stevedoring, the
Supreme Court has all but said that nondiscriminatory ad
valorem taxes on imports and exports in transit are not
prohibited by the Import-Export Clause except in rare
circumstances. In Limbach, the Supreme Court reconsidered
whether such a tax on imports still in their original
containers — and thus still in transit — was permitted.
Thirty-nine years earlier the Supreme had held that the tax
was prohibited. Hooven & Allison Co. v. Evatt, 324 U.S.
652 (1945) [Hooven I}. In Limbach, following Michelin, the
Supreme Court reached the opposite conclusion. In so
doing, it explained:
Hooven I held that, under the Clause, a
nondiscriminatory state ad valorem tax could not be
imposed until the imported goods had lost their status
as imports by being removed from their original
packages. This decision was among the progeny of
Low v. Austin for it, too, was decided on the original-
package doctrine. Thus Hooven / is inconsistent with
the later ruling in Michelin that such a tax is not an
"Impost or Duty" and therefore is not prohibited by
the Clause. Although Hooven I was not expressly
overruled in Michelin, it must be regarded as
retaining no vitality since the Michelin decision.
36a
466 U.S. at 360-361 (emphasis added). Thus, Limbach holds
that a nondiscriminatory state ad valorem tax on an import
still in its original package and thus in transit is not, under
Michelin, an impost or duty prohibited by the Import-Export
Clause.
In Itel Containers International Corp. v. Huddleston,
507 U.S.___, 113 S.Ct. 1095 (1993), the Supreme Court
held that a state sales tax on leases of containers owned by
a domestic company and used in international shipping was
not prohibited by the Import-Export Clause. To arrive at this
conclusion, the Supreme Court examined whether the tax
violated any of the three constitutional policies identified in
Michelin and decided that it did not. If also rejected the
taxpayer’s argument that the tax was not permitted because
it fell directly on goods in transit:
For similar reasons, we reject the argument that the
tax violates the prohibition on the direct taxation of
imports and exports “in transit," the rule we followed
in [Richfield Oil}. Even assuming that rule has not
been altered by the approach we adopted in Michelin,
it is inapplicable here.
Id. at 1106 (emphasis added). Although the Supreme Court
concluded that the in-transit rule was inapplicable because the
tax did not fall on goods themselves, it strongly suggested
that the rule was altered by Michelin.
In sum, nothing in Michelin or any subsequent
Supreme Court decision involving the Import-Export Clause
— Washington Stevedoring, Limbach and Itel — suggests that
any direct tax on imports or exports in transit, and
particularly any nondiscriminatory ad valorem tax, is
prohibited unless it conflicts with either the “foreign
relations” policy or the "state harmony” policy. This is not,
37a
of course, surprising in the least. For there to be an
exception to the Michelin rule, there must be some tax that
was fully consistent with constitutional policies but
nevertheless prohibited, or a tax that was inconsistent with
such policies and yet permitted. Neither is possible. The
very purpose of identifying the policies behind the Clause is
to define its scope as precisely as possible. The
constitutional policies and the scope of their prohibition must
be exactly coextensive. Because those policies define the
Clause’s prohibition more exactly than shorthand tests like
“original package” and “export stream", Michelin abandoned
the latter altogether. This Court’s adherence to the “export
stream” rule as an exclusive test conflicts with both the rule
and the spirit of Michelin.
The Court attempts to support its view with the Fifth
Circuit’s decision in Louisiana Land & Exploration Co. vy.
Pilot Production Co., 900 F.2d 816 (Sth Cir.), cert. denied,
498 U.S. 897 (1990), which held invalid a state excise tax on
jet fuel bound for a foreign country. A divided panel in that
case did indicate that the Import-Export Clause prohibits a
direct tax on exports actually in transit, but it relied heavily
on the rule in Richfield Oil which the Supreme Court
undercut in Itel three years after Louisiana Land was
decided. Itel, 113 S. Ct. at 1106. Louisiana Land thus
provides very little continued support for an absolute in-
transit rule, which this Court applies today. The Fifth
Circuit may nevertheless have reached the correct result,
applying Michelin’s “foreign relations" and "state harmony"
policies, for reasons I discuss below.
Cc
Whether goods are actually in transit is not
determinative in applying the Import-Export Clause, but
neither is it irrelevant. Focusing on the concept of "Imposts
38a
or Duties" need not and should not exclude all consideration
of the concept of “Imports and Exports". Not only are the
concepts related — imposts and duties are by definition taxes
levied on imports and exports — but they are intertwined in
the policies embodied in the Clause. Those policies are the
sole arbiters of the validity of a tax, but among the factors to
be considered is whether the goods taxed are in transit.
More precisely, what is really important is not whether the
goods are in transit, but how. This, I think, is what the
Supreme Court meant in the Michelin passage which is so
important to this Court’s opinion:
In effect, the Clause was fashioned to prevent the
imposition of exactions which were no more than
transit fees on the privilege of moving through a
State. A non-discriminatory ad valorem property tax
obviously stands on a different footing, and to the
extent there is any conflict whatsoever with this
purpose of the Clause, it may be secured merely by
prohibiting the assessment of even nondiscriminatory
property taxes on goods which are merely in transit
through the State when the tax is assessed.
423 U.S. at 290 (emphasis added, footnote omitted). In
other words, the Import-Export Clause prohibits taxes which
are “no more than transit fees" on goods which are “merely
in transit". That is far different from saying that the Clause
prohibits all taxes on goods in transit.
This Court reached the same conclusion in Diamond
Shamrock Refining & Marketing Co. v. Nueces County
Appraisal District, 876 S.W.2d 298 (Tex.), cert. denied, _
U.S. __, 115 S.Ct. 500 (1994). In that case we upheld an
ad valorem tax on imported oil stored in Nueces County
prior to the completion of its journey to other Texas
destinations. We said:
39a
Pointing to the parties’ stipulation that its
crude oil is “in transit" while in Nueces County,
Diamond Shamrock argues that the tax here falls
within the “merely in transit" qualification. We
disagree. The tax in question here does not in any
way impinge on the third “harmony among the
States” policy of the Import-Export Clause. Although
still on its foreign import journey and in that sense
“in transit,” the oil in question here entered only the
State of Texas and, according to the stipulated facts,
never left Texas in its crude oil form. Thus, there
simply was no opportunity for harmony between the
states to be disturbed. Read in context, the Michelin
Court’s qualification clearly applies only to goods in
transit through the state to or from another state and
not to goods merely in transit within the only state
the goods ever enter.
876 S.W.2d at 300-301 (some emphasis added, footnotes
omitted). The dispositive issue was not whether the oil could
be said to be in transit in some sense, but whether it was in
transit in such a way as to invoke constitutional protection
from state taxation.
The idea is even clearer in our analysis of the validity
of the tax under the Commerce Clause. The policies of that
clause are identified in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady,
430 U.S. 274 (1977), in what we referred to as "four
prongs”. Our opinion in Diamond Shamrock said:
Obviously, where the four prongs of Complete
Auto are not met, goods are not taxable under the
Commerce Clause whether or not they are “in
transit." And, the circumstances which make the
goods “in transit” may inform a court’s decision that
the first and fourth nexus requirements of Complete
40a
Auto are not met. For instance, if oil in tanks on
trucks merely passed through Nueces County without
stopping, it would be “in transit” in a way that would
cause it to have little or no nexus with the county.
But under other circumstances, as in this case, there
can be sufficient nexus to support a tax even Annes
are technically “in transit."
876 S.W.2d at 302 (footnote omitted). This passage is
important for two reasons. First, it acknowledges that the
validity of a tax depends upon its consistency with
constitutional policies and not merely on whether it is in
transit. Second, how goods are in transit is important in
applying constitutional policies.
So, for example, suppose in the case before us that
VICO’s property, instead of being stored within the
boundaries of the taxing units on January 1, had been present
there only for the few hours it would have taken a truck to
drive from outside the units, across them and onto a ship tied
up at the dock. In such circumstances, the property would
have been merely in transit through the taxing unit, and the
tax little more than a transit fee. The taxing units would not
even have had the opportunity to render any significant
services to benefit the property. The property would be in
transit in a far different way than property stored near the
dock for one to six months or more on its way to the same
ultimate destination.
This distinction, which was crucial in Diamond
Shamrock, goes unmentioned in today’s opinion. I do not
challenge the Court’s conclusion that VICO’s property was
in transit through Texas to Indonesia, nor do I think that its
stayover at the Port of Houston was for reasons unrelated to
its transportation. These are close calls but not at all
implausible. VICO’s property was delayed in storage only
4la
when it was damaged, lacking parts, otherwise faulty or
unsuitable, or did not meet Indonesia’s stringent standard for
imports. The fact is, however, that of the $380,260 worth
of property VICO warehoused at the Port of Houston on
January 1, 1991, more than $9,000 had been there for more
than 175 days, 20% had been there for more than 45 days
and over a third of it had been there for more than a month.
The record reflects that VICO stored property awaiting
authorization from Indonesia for shipment. VICO does not
dispute that its property benefits from police and fire
protection and other governmental services provided by the
taxing units, or that it pays no more than its fair share of
those services. As the Supreme Court stated in Michelin:
There is no reason why local taxpayers should
subsidize the services used by the importer [or in this
case, the exporter]; ultimate consumers should pay
for such services as police and fire protection
accorded the goods just as much as they should pay
transportation costs associated with those goods.
423 U.S. at 289 (footnote omitted). The same police officers
who protect property permanently located in the taxing units
also protect VICO’s. The same fire fighters put out the
fires. VICO’s property is carried to and from the warehouse
on streets paved and maintained with ad valorem taxes.
The Court attempts to avoid this language in Michelin
by arguing that because the tax is assessed on property
present on January 1 each year, VICO is taxed as if its
property were present year round. The flaws in this
argument are obvious. VICO is taxed, not as if the property
assessed on January | were present all year long, but only as
if it stored some property at the port throughout the year,
which, in fact, it does. It might have a great deal more or
less property stored at the Houston port on an average day;
42a
there is no evidence one way or the other. The use of a
single date is simply an expedient to calculating the tax due.
Moreover, there is no discrimination against VICO in this
respect. VICO makes no assertion that the use of January |
discriminates against exports. Every property owner is taxed
the same way, and every taxpayer, VICO included, is free to
arrange its affairs to minimize the property it has on hand on
January 1 in order to minimize its tax obligation.
VICO argues that governmental services can be paid
for by ad valorem taxes on real property, including the
warehouse in which its property is stored. The taxing units
are not required to rely entirely, or even at all, on taxes on
realty. They may choose to require personalty to pay its
share of government services. The Court acknowledges that
VICO receives governmental services for which it ought to
pay something. The conclusion that the tax is unduly
burdensome to international commerce presumes that VICO
is paying more than its share. VICO does not make this
claim, and there is no evidence to support it.
D
The validity of the tax in this case under the Import-
Export Clause should depend solely upon its consistency with
the “foreign relations" and “state harmony" policies in
Michelin. The Court goes through the motions of this
analysis, but its conclusions are all dictated by its belief that
taxes on goods in transit always contravene these polices.
The Court does not assess the effect of the tax in this case on
constitutional policies independent of its in-transit rule.
What I have called the "foreign relations" policy was
stated by the Court in Michelin as follows:
43a
the Federal Government must speak with one voice
when regulating commercial relations with foreign
governments, and tariffs, which might affect foreign
relations, could not be implemented by the States
consistently with that exclusive power... .
423 U.S. at 285 (footnote omitted). The ad valorem tax in
this case does not interfere with the federal government’s
foreign relations. It is imposed on all property present in the
taxing units on a certain date for the purpose of paying for
government services which benefit the property. While this
indisputably affects the price property is sold for, it is only
an incidental effect common to all property. In R. J.
Reynolds, the Supreme Court wrote of a nondiscriminatory
ad valorem tax on imports:
If imposition of the tax happens to have the
"incidental effect" . . .of discouraging some
importation of foreign goods, prohibiting this result
is not a function of the Import-Export Clause.
479 U.S. at 154.
A foreign government simply has no more reason to
think that the goods it imports will be exempt from paying
for government service than that they will be from paying
transportation cost. The Court surmises that “Indonesia
might turn to other countries for its imported goods or might
engage in retaliatory taxation of its own exports destined for
the United States." Ante at___. Again, Indonesia, like any
other purchaser, cannot reasonably expect to escape paying
for government services benefiting its purchases, either as a
direct expense or a component of the price, no matter what
country it turns to.
44a
The “state harmony" policy was stated in Michelin as
follows:
harmony among the States might be disturbed unless
seaboard States, with their crucial ports of entry,
were prohibited from levying taxes on citizens of
other States by taxing goods merely flowing through
their ports to the other States not situated as favorable
geographically.
423 U.S. at 285-286 (footnote omitted). Requiring property
to pay for the benefits of government services is not a
prerogative limited to seaboard states. The taxing units in
this case enjoy no more favorable a position than the taxing
units in any other state. To the contrary, invalidating the tax
in this case discriminates against the port because it is a port.
The tax in this case is different from the tax
invalidated by the Fifth Circuit in Louisiana Land. That was
an excise tax, a sales tax imposed specifically on jet fuel.
900 F.2d at 817 n.1. The tax in this case is a completely
nondiscriminatory ad valorem tax imposed on all personalty
as in Michelin. An argument can be made that one state’s
sales tax on certain products may impact foreign relations or
harmony among the states more than an ad valorem tax on
all kinds of property. Also, an excise tax may fall on
property that is merely moving through a state without a
sufficient nexus there to warrant taxation. In any event, the
tax expressly identified in Michelin as being outside
constitutional prohibition is a nondiscriminatory ad valorem
tax.
Since the tax on VICO’s property does not conflict
with the policies of the Import-Export Clause identified in
Michelin, 1 would conclude that the tax is not prohibited by
that provision.
.
1 EIS:
45a
Il
The Foreign Commerce Clause empowers Congress
"To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.” The United
States Supreme Court has construed this Clause not only as
a grant of power to the Congress but also as a negation of
power in the states. See Intel, 113 S.Ct. at 1107-1108
(Scalia, J., concurring). As with the Import-Export Clause,
the Supreme Court has defined the scope of the prohibition
of this Clause based upon the policies its serves. The test
includes four factors which apply to interstate and foreign
commerce both, Complete Auto Transit 430 U.S. at 277-279,
plus two additional factors unique to foreign commerce,
Japan Line, Lid. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434,
451 (1979). Mel, 113 S.Ct. at 1103. A tax passes muster
under the Complete Auto test if it is: (1) applied to an
activity with a substantial nexus with the taxing state; (2)
fairly apportioned; (3) nondiscriminatory; and (4) fairly
related to services provided by the State. Complete Auto, 430
U.S. at 279; Diamond Shamrock, 876 S.W.2d at 301.
Taxation on international commerce, because it implicates
additional constitutional concerns, is subjected to two
additional inquiries: whether the tax, notwithstanding
apportionment, creates a substantial risk of international
multiple taxation, and whether the tax prevents the federal
government from speaking with one voice when regulating
commercial relations with foreign governments. Japan Line,
Lid., 441 U.S. at 451; Diamond Shamrock, 876 S.W.2d at
301.
The tax in this case meets all six factors. The goods
clearly have a nexus to this state. They are present for
relatively prolonged periods during which they receive local
services such as police and fire protection. The tax 1s
nondiscriminatory. The same tax applies to all personal
property. There is no evidence that the tax is not fairly
46a
apportioned insofar as it falls only on those goods here on
January 1. See Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 445, n.8. Rather,
it is undisputed that VICO has goods present in Harris
County throughout the year. There is no evidence that the
tax is not fairly related to the services provided. There is no
evidence that the goods would be subject to multiple taxation
here and abroad, or for that matter, that they would be
subject to multiple taxation here and in other states. And
finally, as already noted, there is no evidence that imposition
of this nondiscriminatory ad valorem tax would be a tariff or
tax interfering with the federal government’s ability to speak
with one voice in foreign relations. The tax does not fall on
goods because of their place of destination, but is simply
based on their presence here on the day of assessment. Their
presence or absence on that date could be manipulated by a
taxpayer to its advantage.
The tax in this case impinges no more upon the
Foreign Commerce Clause than the tax we upheld in
Diamond Shamrock. 1 would conclude that it is not
prohibited by that Clause.
Il
Section 11.01(c)(1) of the Texas Tax Code states:
"This state has jurisdiction to tax tangible personal property
if the property is . . . located in this state for longer than a
temporary period... ." The taxing units concede that this
is the only provision of state law that allows them to tax
VICO’s property. VICO argues that its property is only
temporarily present within the taxing units’ boundaries and
thus not subject to their taxation.
In Greyhound Lines, Inc. v. Board of Equalization,
419 S.W.2d 345, 349 (Tex. 1967), we stated:
ian
i Sak a ARTI SP LO I OPI Rn Re ME
sR Rtg
Be iach
Aue
ae a —
LL oka Ngee aT
i ANH EA OT FRR?
if
47a
To acquire a tax situs of its own in a
particular state, it is not necessary that tangible
personal property be situated in the state with
absolute permanency, or that it be there situated with
no intention on the part of the owner to remove it; it
is enough to fix tax situs that its situation have a
degree of permanency which will distinguish it from
property which is in the state on a purely temporary
or transitory basis.
In that case we held that Greyhound buses were taxable at
that company’s principal place of business in Texas, which
was Fort Worth, even though the buses were constantly
moving into, across and out of the State.
While we have been cited to no case involving
circumstances more like those of the present case, I would
hold that VICO’s property is in the State for more than a
temporary period. Even though it is destined for Indonesia
from before the moment it enters the State and is warehoused
at the Port of Houston for only as long as is necessary to
prepare it for transportation, that period is almost always a
number of days and often a number ef months. One could
argue that article VIII, section 1-j of the Texas Constitution,
exempting property within the State for less than 175 days in
certain circumstances, sets a standard for what is temporary
under section 11.01(c)(1), but that argument is not made by
the parties here and I do not address it. I would conclude
that taxation of VICO’s property does not violate section
11.01(c)(1) of the Tax Code.
* a * cd *
The court of appeals held that neither the Import-
Export Clause, the Foreign Commerce Clause, nor section
11.01(c)(1) of the Tax Code prohibited the taxing authorities
48a
from taxing VICO’s property. It remanded the case to
consider other arguments made by VICO pertaining to its
claim of freeport exemption under the Tax Code and the
Texas Constitution. I agree, for the reasons explained by the
court of appeals, that the case should be remanded. I would
therefore affirm the judgment of the court of appeals.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
Nathan L. Hecht, Justice
Opinion delivered: October 27, 1995
49a
APPENDIX C
Reversed and Remanded and Opinion Filed February 10,
1994.
In The
FOURTEENTH COURT OF APPEALS
NO. C14-92-01158-CV
HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT and
HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL REVIEW BOARD,
Appellants
Ve
VIRGINIA INDONESIA COMPANY, Appellee
On Appeal from the 333rd District Court
Harris County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 91-59779
OPINION
I. Nature of the Case
This is an ad valorem property tax case. The Harris
County Appraisal District (the “District") assessed a 1991
property tax against Virginia Indonesia Company (“VICO")
on goods and equipment located in Harris County but
destined for Indonesia. VICO protested to the Harris County
Appraisal Review Board (the "Board"), and the Board upheld
the tax. VICO sued the District and Board in district court,
claiming that the tax violated the United States Constitution's
commerce and import-export clauses and Texas property law.
Both VICO and the District and Board moved for summary
50a
judgment. The district court granted VICO’s motion and
denied the District and Board’s. The District and Board
appeal. We reverse and remand.
Il. Facts
The following facts are undisputed. VICO is a
Delaware corporation authorized to do business in Harris
County, Texas. The District is a political subdivision of the
state responsible for providing annual appraisal rolls listing
taxable property and appraised values to taxing units within
its jurisdiction that impose ad valorem property taxes. The
Board is a separate entity responsible for, among other
matters, hearing and determining taxpayer protests.
VICO is the operator of an Indonesian joint venture
which explores for oil and gas in the Republic of Indonesia.
VICO purchases goods and equipment for use by the joint
venture in its Indonesian operations from vendors both within
and outside Texas. Upon being notified that certain goods
are needed in Indonesia, VICO issues a request for quotation
to an Indonesian company that forwards the request to an
agent who solicits bids. VICO selects a vendor and issues a
purchase order for the goods. Generally, the vendor ships
the goods directly to VICO’s export packer in Houston and
bills VICO.
At the export packer’s yard in Houston, the goods are
inspected for quality and correctness. If the goods are
damaged or otherwise incorrect, VICO or its export packer
resolves the irregularities with the vendor. VICO then
requests from Indonesia approval for import. When import
approval is granted, an international inspection agency
inspects the goods on behalf of Indonesia. Local inspection
enables the goods to avoid customs inspection upon their
arrival in Indonesia. When a good or item of equipment has
S5la
been finally cleared for import to Indonesia, VICO pays the
vendor’s invoice.
VICO’s export packer then packs the goods for
export. A separate freight forwarder, not associated with the
export packer, arranges for shipment of the goods. The
freight forwarder notifies the export packer when and where
to deliver the goods for shipment. Most items are exported
within 45 days from receipt by the packer, but in some cases
they may remain with the packer for more than 90 days.
VICO’s property that was included on the District’s 1991
appraisal roll consisted of the goods and equipment
physically present at the export packer’s premises on January
1, 1991, although VICO has goods and equipment at that
location throughout the year.
At no point in VICO’s exporting process can the
property be diverted to domestic use. All VICO purchase
orders have FOREIGN PURCHASE ORDER printed at the
top and “Ultimate destination for all items on this order is
Indonesia.” The property is committed for export to a
foreign destination from the moment of purchase. The only
reasons for holding the property at the export packer are for
inspection, packing, and awaiting approval for import to
Indonesia. None of the property is ever used in Texas.
Ill. Discussion
In two points of error, the District and Board
complain that the trial court erred in granting VICO’s motion
for summary judgment and denying their own.
A. Standard of Review
The movant for summary judgment has the burden to
show that there are no genuine issues of material fact and
S2a
that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Nixon v.
Mr. Property Management, Co., 690 S.W.2d 546, 548-49
(Tex. 1985). In deciding whether there is a disputed material
fact issue precluding summary judgment, we take evidence
favorable to the non-movant as true. /d. We indulge every
reasonable inference in favor of the non-movant and resolve
any doubts in his favor. Jd. If the movant’s motion and
summary judgment proof facially establishes his right to
judgment as a matter of law, then the burden shifts to the
non-movant to raise fact issues precluding summary
judgment. See City of Houston v. Clear Creek Basin Auth..,
589 S.W.2d 671, 678 (Tex. 1979). A defendant, to be
entitled to summary judgment, is required to disprove at least
one essential element of each pleaded cause of action or
otherwise show that plaintiffs could not succeed on any
theory pleaded. Rosas v. Buddies Food Store, 518 S.W.2d
534, 537 (Tex. 1975).
In its motion for summary judgment, VICO contended
that the goods and equipment destined for export were
exempt from state taxation under the commerce and import-
export clauses of the United States Constitution and under the
Texas Constitution and Tax Code. US. CONST. art. I, § 8,
cl. 3 & § 10, cl. 2; TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1-j; TEX.
TAX CODE ANN. §§ 11.01(c) and 11.251 (Vernon 1992 &
Supp. 1994). VICO further contended that the District
waived its right to list the property on the 1991 appraisal roll
by exempting similar VICO property in prior years. Finally
VICO complained that the appraised value of its property
was greater than its market value.
In its summary judgment order, the trial court held
that VICO’s property was not taxable because the property
(1) was “protected from state taxation by exemptions
provided by the Import-Export or Commerce Clauses of the
United States Constitution,” and (2) “fails to meet the
tlk gt ho Reed Wei eee
RR ance} wiht goed)
53a
{taxability] criteria as outlined under the Texas Tax Code."
The trial court did not reach the waiver or appraised value
issues. When the trial court specifies the grounds upon
which it bases its summary judgment, we can only affirm the
summary judgment on those grounds. Carlisle v. Philip
Morris Inc. , 805 S.W.2d 498, 518 (Tex. App.--Austin 1991,
writ denied). Therefore, we do not consider VICO’s waiver
argument as a basis for the summary judgment. However,
we note that, generally, the doctrine of waiver does not
preclude the taxation of property previously determined to be
exempt. 16 STEPHEN M. FLANAGAN, THE LAW OF
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 44.84 (3rd ed. rev.
1984). Also, only in exceptional circumstances, is a
governmental unit subject to estoppel, a doctrine related to
waiver, in the exercise of its governmental powers. City of
Hutchins v. Prasifka, 450 S.W.2d 829, 836 (Tex. 1970).
The Tax Code itself provides that the chief appraiser may
cancel an exemption erroneously allowed. TEX. TAX
CODE ANN.§ 11.43(H) (Vernon 1992).
To prevail in its summary judgment, VICO must have
proved that the tax at issue was (1) unconstitutional under the
U.S. commerce clause, (2) unconstitutional under the U.S.
import-export clause, or (3) invalid under Texas tax law.
B. Commerce Clause
The foreign and domestic commerce clauses of the
United States Constitution provide that "[t]he Congress shall
have power ... to regulate commerce with foreign nations,
and among the several states ...." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8
cl. 3. While on its face an affirmative grant of power to the
Congress, the commerce clause has been interpreted to
negative a state’s power to unduly burden foreign or
interstate commerce. It is this “negative” or “dormant”
aspect of the commerce clause that is at issue in the present
case.
54a
Here, the ad valorem property tax is being imposed
on goods and equipment destined for export to Indonesia.
The foreign commerce clause is implicated, and a six-part
test is used to determine whether the tax passes constitutional
muster. See ltel Containers Int’l Corp. v. Huddleston, __
U.S.___,___; 113 S.Ct. 1095, 1103 (1993); Nueces County
v. Diamond Shamrock, 853 S.W.2d 212, 217 (Tex. App.--
Corpus Christi 1993, writ granted). The first four prongs of
the foreign commerce clause test are the same as those used
to determine compliance with the domestic commerce clause.
A state tax is constitutional under the domestic commerce
clause when the tax (1) is applied to an activity with a
substantial nexus with the taxing state, (2) is fairly
apportioned,(3) does not discriminate against interstate
commerce, and (4) is fairly related to the services provided
by the state. Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S.
274, 279 (1977). The last two prongs of the six-part test
would validate a tax that (5) did not create a substantial risk
of multiple international taxation, and (6) did not prevent the
federal government from speaking with one voice when
regulating commercial relations with foreign governments.
Japan Line, Lid. v. County of Los Angeles, 441 U.S. 434,
451 (1979).
The burden was on VICO to establish commerce
clause immunity. Container Corp. of Am. v. Franchise Tax
Board, 463 U.S. 159, 175-76 (1983). To prevail in its
summary judgment, VICO need only prove as a matter of
law that the tax failed any one prong of the test.
Conversely, for the District and Board to prevail on their
summary judgment, they must prove as a matter of law that
the tax met all six prongs.
Traditional commerce clause analysis focused on
whether the goods taxed were “in transit” in interstate or
foreign commerce. See, e.g., Calvert v. Zanes-Ewalt
PED Wie Pips
Mee eR ON aah ast
55a
Warehouse, Inc., 502 S.W.2d 689 (Tex. 1973). However,
the reformulation of the foreign commerce clause test, first
announced in Japan Line and reaffirmed in Huddleston,
abandons this mechanical "in transit" approach. Instead, the
current test measures the constitutionality of a tax against the
underlying purposes of the commerce clause. Once the
purposes of the commerce clause are satisfied, “the concept
of ‘in transit’ loses any rational meaning.” See Diamond
Shamrock, 853 S.W.2d at 216. It was “largely irrelevant"
whether the goods and equipment in the export packer’s
warehouse were still considered "in the stream of interstate
commerce” or whether they “came to rest" in Texas. See D.
H. Holmes Co. v. McNamara, 486 U.S. 24, 31 (1988). The
issue of whether goods were merely “in-transit" through a
state and therefore not taxable is now incorporated in the
various prongs of the six-part analysis. The focus is no
longer on a good’s status as “import" or “export,” but rather,
on whether the purposes of the commerce clause are
frustrated.
Prong 1: Is the tax applied to an activity with a
substantial nexus with the taxing state?
It was undisputed that VICO is a corporation doing
business in Texas. VICO’s business in Texas is the
procurement of goods and equipment for use by the
Indonesian joint venture. VICO presumably derives profits
through its procurement services. In essence, VICO uses
Texas as a staging area for the goods it procures. Goods are
shipped from in-state and out-of-state suppliers to Houston
where the goods remain in an export packer’s warehouse for
an average of 45 days. During this time, (1) the goods and
equipment are stored, (2) the goods are inspected for quality
and conformity, (3) irregularities are resolved, (4) the goods
are inspected for import clearance into Indonesia, (5)
purchases are finalized, (6) the goods are packaged for
56a
export, and (7) shipping arrangement are made. The
resolution of inspection discrepancies can involve the
replacement of an item, a wait for missing parts, or the
outright return of the item to the vendor. Goods and
equipment are present in the packer’s warehouse throughout
the year.
We find that there was a sufficient nexus between
VICO, the taxed goods and equipment, and Texas. VICO
cannot rely on prong one to invalidate the ad valorem
property tax.
Prong 2: Is the tax fairly apportioned?
The goal is to avoid duplicative taxation. The tax
here is assessed on the inventory of goods and equipment
present in the export packer’s warehouse on January 1, 1991.
The tax is levied only on those goods, not the other goods
and equipment that had occupied the warehouse at other
times throughout the year. The average stay of a good or
piece of equipment in Texas is 45 days. However, VICO is
constantly shipping goods through the packer’s warehouse,
and goods similar to those present on January 1, 1991, are
in the warehouse throughout the year. Therefore, basing the
tax on the total value of goods present on any particular day
is the equivalent of taxing the total value of all goods and
equipment present at any time throughout the year at a rate
proportionate to each item’s time-of-stay in Texas, i.e., a
ratio of 45 days/365 days. Therefore, Texas’ ad valorem
property tax, being roughly pro-rated as to the property’s
duration of stay in Texas, is properly apportioned. See
Japan Line, 441 U.S. at 445 n.8.
VICO argues that the tax cannot be properly
apportioned because the export packer also pays property
taxes. But the export packer pays a tax commensurate with
ween Se “er
57a
its wealth, i.e., the warehouse facilities and equipment, but
not commensurate with VICO’s and the Indonesian joint
venture’s wealth, i.e., the contents of the warehouse. We
find that VICO cannot rely on prong two to invalidate the
tax.
Prong 3: Does the tax not discriminate against
interstate commerce?
A general ad valorem property tax does not tax goods
based on origin or destination. Any incidental increase in
cost to the supplier or ultimate consumer does not unduly
burden interstate commerce. Interstate commerce should be
made to pay its own way. Complete Auto, 430 U.S. at 279.
We find that VICO cannot rely on prong three to invalidate
the tax.
Prong 4: Is the tax fairly related to the services
provided by the State?
The ad valorem property tax is applied to property
owners to compensate the state for a variety of services
rendered, e.g., fire and police protection, port facilities,
street lighting, roads and streets, and other incidents of a
modern industrial infrastructure. While true that the goods
and equipment are, from the time of purchase, destined for
Indonesia, it is not unconstitutional for an exporter to pay his
fair share of the cost of public services and infrastructure
provided by the state. We find that the ad valorem property
tax is fairly related to the services provided by the state.
VICO cannot rely on prong four to invalidate the tax.
Prong 5: Does the tax create a substantial risk of
multiple international taxation?
58a
VICO offered no evidence of a risk of multiple
international taxation, and VICO’s reliance on Japan Line is
misplaced. In Japan Line, the Court invalidated a California
ad valorem property tax on cargo shipping containers owned
by a Japanese-based company. But in Japan Line, there was
evidence of multiple international taxation in fact. Japan
Line, 441 U.S. at 452. Neither the foreign commerce clause
nor Japan Line demands that a state’s taxing power be
restrained due to the mere potential taxation by a foreign
sovereign. Huddleston, ____ U.S. at ___; 113 S.Ct. at 1104.
VICO cannot rely on prong five to invalidate the tax.
Prong 6: Does the tax prevent the federal
government from speaking with one voice when
regulating commercial relations with foreign
governments?
VICO offered no evidence that the tax impacted on
the federal government’s ability to regulate foreign
commerce. The ad valorem property tax does not
discriminate against foreign commerce in general, nor against
any particular foreign destination or state-of-origin. The tax
does not single out a particular country for discriminatory
tariffs thereby triggering retaliation against the United States
as a whole. To the extent that the tax increases the cost of
doing business through Harris County’s port facilities, the
market place and ultimate consumers can decide whether the
benefits of using those facilities outweigh the costs. VICO
cannot rely on prong six to invalidate the tax.
Summary
We conclude that VICO did not establish as a matter
of law that the tax assessed by the District runs afoul of the
commerce clause. To the contrary, we find that the
summary judgment proof and the undisputed facts
59a
conclusively establish that VICO cannot prevail on this
ground, The trial court erred to the extent that it granted
VICO’s summary judgment on the basis that the ad valorem
property tax violated the commerce clause.
C. Import-Export Clause
The Import-Export Clause of the United States
Constitution provides that “[nJo state shall without the
consent of congress, lay any imposts or duties on imports or
exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for
executing its inspection laws... ." U.S. CONST. art. I, §
10, cl.2.
In the past, import-export clause analysis focused on
the status of a good as an “import” or “export.” Various
doctrines evolved to aid in this determination. For example,
if an import stayed in its original package after arriving in
the United States, it remained an “import” immune from
State taxation. Department of Revenue v. James B. Beam
Distilling Co. , 377 U.S. 341, 343 (1964). Also, if an export
had entered the “export stream" in its final continuous
journey out of the country, then it was immune from state
taxation. Kosydar v. National Cash Register Co., 417 U.S.
62, 70-71 (1974). But beginning with Michelin Tire Corp.
v. Wages, 423 U.S. 276, 283 (1976), the central inquiry
shifted to a determination whether a particular tax constituted
an impermissible “impost" or "duty." See Department of
Revenue v. Association of Washington Stevedoring
Companies, 435 U.S. 732, 752 (1978).
We are aware that the Michelin Court’s analysis was
addressed to a tax on imports, not exports. However, in
Washington Stevedoring, the Court held that the Michelin
approach apples to exports as well as imports. Jd. at 758.
We are also aware that Michelin did not deal with the issue
60a
of a tax on goods "in transit’ in foreign commerce and that
the Court in Washington Stevedoring held: “We do not reach
the question of the applicability of the Michelin approach
when a State directly taxes imports or exports in transit."
Id. at 757 n. 23; see also City of Farmers Branch v.
Matsushita Elec. Corp. of Am., 537 S.W.2d 452, 453 (Tex.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 861 (1986). However, we
read Huddleston as putting to rest the issue of the relevancy
of “in transit" status as affecting the applicability of the
Michelin approach:
[W]e reject the argument that the tax violates the
prohibition on the direct taxation of imports and
exports “in transit,” the rule we followed in Richfield
Oil, 329 U.S., at 78-79, 84, 67 S.Ct., at 161, 164.
Even assuming that rule has not been altered by the
approach we adopted in Michelin,it is inapplicable
here.
Huddleston, ____ U.S. at ___; 113 S.Ct. at 1106 (emphasis
added). See also Diamond Shamrock, 853 S.W.2d at 216
("We conclude that once the purposes of the Import-Export
Clauses ... have been satisfied ...the concept of ‘in transit’
loses any rational meaning.")
The current import-export clause test is based on the
main concerns prompting the framers of the Constitution to
adopt the import-export clause. The test has three elements:
(1) Does the challenged tax impair the federal government
from speaking with one voice when regulating commercial
relations with foreign governments?, (2) Does the tax
threaten to disturb harmony among the states by allowing
seaboard states, with their crucial ports of entry, to levy
taxes on citizens of other states by taxing goods merely
flowing through their ports?, or (3) Does the tax divert
6la
import-derived revenue from the federal government to the
states?. Huddleston, U.S. at ; 113 S.Ct. at 1105
(emphasis added).
To prevail in its summary judgment, VICO need only
prove as a matter of law that the tax failed any one prong of
the test. Conversely, for the District and Board to prevail on
their summary judgment, they must prove as a matter of law
that the tax met all three prongs.
Prong 1: Does the ad valorem property tax impair the
federal government from speaking with one voice
when regulating commercial relations with foreign
governments?
Prong 2: Does the tax threaten to disturb harmony
among the states by allowing Texas, with its
excellent port facility in Houston, to levy taxes on
citizens of other states by taxing goods merely
flowing through its port?
The one-voice component of the import-export clause
test is the same as the one-voice component of the foreign
commerce clause test. Jd. Likewise, the state-harmony
component parallels the four Complete Auto requirements of
the foreign and domestic commerce clause tests. Jd. at 1105-
06. Having concluded that Texas’ ad valorem tax survives
commerce clause scrutiny, we must conclude that the tax
passes the first two prongs of the import-export clause test.
See id. at 1106. We find that VICO cannot rely on prongs
one or two to invalidate the tax.
Prong 3: Does the tax divert import-derived revenue
from the federal government to Texas?
62a
An ad valorem property tax on goods and equipment
expressly prohibits Congress from taxing exports. U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 5. VICO cannot rely on prong three
of the current import-export clause test to invalidate the tax.
Summary
We conclude the VICO did not prove as a matter of
law that Texas’ ad valorem property tax is unconstitutional
VICO’s summary judgment on the basis that the ad valorem
with Texas law.
D. Texas Property Tax Law
Section § 11.01(c}) of the Texas Tax Code provides
that “This state has jurisdiction to tax tangible personal
property is the property is ... located in this state for longer
than a temporary period ...." TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §
11.01(c)(1) (Vernon 1992). In its motion for summary
judgment, VICO contended that Texas had no jurisdiction to
tax its property because VICO’s goods were not located in
Texas “for longer than a temporary period.” VICO further
argued that, even if its goods and equipment were in Texas
“for longer than a temporary period,” they were entitled to
the freeport goods exemption. See TEX. TAX CODE ANN.
63a
§ 11.251 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1994) and TEX. CONST.
art. VIII, § 1-j.
Background
"For longer than a temporary period” is not defined
in the Tax Code. Under prior law, the Texas legislature had
Goods, wares, ores, ... and merchandise are
presumed to be in interstate commerce and/or not to
be located in this state for longer than a temporary
period if the property is: (1) transported from outside
this state into the state to be forwarded outside this
state; (2) detained in this state for assembling,
oe, etalon. gpg veer
purposes; and (3) not located in this state for longer
than 175 days.
Dallas County Appraisal Dist. v. Brinkman, 701 S.W.2d 20,
12,22 (Tex. App.--Dalias 1985), writ ref’d n.r.e.), quoting
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.01(d) (Vernon 1982) (the
freeport law) ( is added) (repealed by Acts 1989, 7! st
.» ch. 534, § 2, eff. Jan. 1, 1990) (see now § 11.251).
64a
issue were indeed “located in the State for longer than a
temporary period:"
We conclude that goods are located in the state for
longer than a temporary period if, under federal law,
they are in the state on more than a transitory basis
.... Goods are in the state on a transitory basis if they
are in “interstate transit” .... Goods are nor in
interstate transit if there is an interruption in the
continuity of transit .. . If the owner halts the transit,
“not in necessary delay or accommodation to the
means of transportation ... but for the business
purposes and profits of the company,” . then there
is an interruption in the continuity of transit and the
goods are taxable in the state.
Brindonan, 701 S.W.2d at 23 (citations omitted) (emphasis in
original); see also Friedrich Air Conditioning and
Refrigeration Co. v. Bexar Appraisal Dist., 762 S.W.2d 763,
767-68 (Tex. App.--San Antoniio 1988, no writ).
In both Brinkonan and Friedrich Air. the courts held
that the freeport presumption was rebutted and that the goods
at issue were taxable. However, in 1989, the legislature
repealed the freeport law and enacted in its stead § 11.251,
which established the freeport goods exemption. Section
11.251 provides in pertinent part:
(a) In this section, “freeport goods” means property
that under Article VIII, Section 1-j, of the Texas
Constitution is not taxable.
(>) A person is entitled to an exemption from
taxation of the appraised value of that portion of the
person's inventory or property consisting of freeport
65a
(i) The exemption provided by Subsection (b) does
not apply to a taxing unit that takes action to tax the
property under Article VIII, Section 1-j, Subsection
(b), of the Texas Constitution.
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.251 (Vernon 1992).
Significantly, the Texas Constitution was also
amended to provide a constitutional underpinning for the
statutory freeport goods exemption. Section 1-j of the Texas
Constitution provides:
(a) To promote economic development in the State,
goods, wares, merchandise, other tangible personal
property, and ores ... are exempt from ad valorem
taxation if:
(1) the property is acquired in or imported
into this State to be forwarded outside this State,
whether or not the intention to forward the property
outside this State is formed or the destination to
which the property is forwarded is specified when the
property is acquired in or imported into this State;
(2) the property is detained in this State for
assembling, storing, manufacturing, processing, or
fabricating purposes by the person who acquired or
imported the property; and
(3) the property is transported outside this
State not later than 175 days after the date the person
acquired or imported the property in this State.
66a
(6) Tangible personal property exempted from
taxation in Subsection (a) of this section is subject to
the following:
(1) A county, common, or independent school
district, junior college district, or municipality,
including a home-rule city, may tax such property
otherwise exempt, if the governing body of the
county, common, or independent school district,
junior college district, or municipality, including a
home-rule city, takes official action as provided by
this section and in the manner provided by law to
provide for the taxation of such property.
(2) Any official action to tax such exempt
property must be taken before April 1, 1990. If
official action is taken to tax such exempt property
before January 1, 1990, such property is taxable
effective for the tax year 1990. However, if such
official action to tax such exempt property is taken
prior to April 1, 1990, but after January 1, 1990, the
official action shall not become effective to tax such
property until the 1991 tax year.
(4) The governing body of a county,
common, or independent school district, junior
college district, or municipality, including a home-
rule city, that acts under Subdivision (2) of
Subsection (b) of this section to tax the property
otherwise exempt by Subsection (a) of this section
may subsequently exempt the property from taxation
by rescinding its action to tax the property. The
exemption applies to each tax year that begins after
the date the action is taken and applies to the tax year
67a
in which the action is taken if the governing body so
provides. A governing body that rescinds its action
to tax the property may not take action to tax such
TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1-.
Under the prior law, then, the Texas legislature had
sought to clarify the meaning of “located in this state longer
than a temporary period” by establishing the freeport law
presumption, which Texas courts held to be subject to
rebuttal by application of federal constitutional principles.
However, as discussed earlier, in determining the
constitutionality of a state tax, current federal commerce and
import-export clause jurisprudence no longer focuses on
whether goods are “in interstate transit,” committed to the
“export stream,” or have retained their “status” as “imports”
or “exports.” We have found that current federal
constitutional law does not preclude Texas’ non-
discriminatory ad valorem property tax.
Under current Texas law, the legislature has replaced
the freeport law's rebuttable presumption with the freeport
goods exemption, which has been expressly validated by
amendment of the Texas Constitution. Therefore, under
present Texas tax law, the critical inquiries in judging the
validity of the 1991 property tax on VICO’s goods, are (1)
whether any eligible taxing entities “took official action to
tax" freeport goods prior to April 1, 1990, thereby
preempting the exemption, see TEX CONST. art. VIII, § 1-
j®)(1)&Q2), (2) whether VICO’s goods met the freeport
goods criteria, see id. § 1-j(a), and (3) whether VICO
applied for the exemption, see TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §
11.43 (Vernon 1992 & Supp. 1994).
68a
Did the taxing entities "Take Action to Tax" Freeport
Goods?
The notice of appraised value issued to VICO listed
nine taxing entities: the Aldine Independent Schod District,
Harris County Education District, Harris County, Harris
County Flood Control District, Port of Houston Authority,
Harris County Hospital District, Harris County Department
of Education, North Harris/Montgomery Communty College
District, and the City of Houston. The record doe: not show
(1) which of these taxing entities are political swdivisions
authorized to preempt the freeport goods exemption, see
TEX. CONST. art. VIE, § 1-j(>)(1), (2) which of the
eligible political subdivisions did, in fact, prempt the
freeport goods exemption by taking official action 0 tax such
property prior to April 1, 1990, see id. § 1-j(b)@) and (3)
which of the latter political subdivisions resciided their
action to tax, see id. § 1-j(b)(4). If an eligible ta:ing entity
did not exercise its option and take official action 0 tax such
Section 1-j(a) states that goods “are exempt from ad
valorem taxation” if the freeport goods criteria ar met. Jd.
§ 1j@ (emphasis added). _ Section 1-j() ‘tates that
69a
action to tax the property prior to April 1, 1990, and did not
subsequently rescind its action.
With respect to VICO’s motion for summary
judgment, as discussed below, VICO did not establish as a
matter of law that any of its 1990 or 1991 goods met the
freeport goods criteria. Therefore, the presumption of a non-
preempted exemption did not arise. Had VICO established
that its goods were freeport goods, then the presumption of
a valid exemption would have arisen, and the burden would
have shifted to the District and Board to rebut the
presumption.
On the other hand, regarding the District and Board’s
motion for summary judgment, the District and Board
provided no evidence that any taxing entity had preempted
the freeport goods exemption. Therefore, the District and
Board’s motion fails to the extent that the District and Board
relied on the taxing entities having preempted VICO’s
freeport goods exemption. We note that the District’s 1991
Rendition Form, with its express provision for taxpayers to
invoke the freeport goods exemption, suggests that at least
one of the taxing entities allows the exemption, i.e., that at
least one taxing entity did not take official action to preempt .
the exemption.
Were VICO’s Goods "Freeport Goods?"
We find that the summary judgment proof shows that
VICO’s property met the first two elements of the freeport
goods criteria. That is, the property was (1) acquired in or
imported into Texas to be forwarded outside Texas, and (2)
detained in Texas for storing and processing. See TEX.
CONST. §1-j(a)(1)&(2). However, we find that a fact issue
exists regarding which items of property were transported
outside Texas no later than 175 days after the date VICO
70a
acquired or imported the property into Texas. i/d. § 1-
j(a)3). VICO’s summary judgment proof merely identifies
several items that had been in Texas more than 175 days as
of January 1, 1991. The proof does not establish whether
the remaining items of property were, in fact, shipped out of
Texas within 175 days of their acquisition or importation into
Texas.
Moreover, we find that a fact issue exists as to which
items of VICO’s property owned in the preceding year met
the freeport goods criteria. This is important because of the
appraisal procedures specified by § 11.251:
(d) ...The chief appraiser shall determine the
percentage of the markei value of inventory or
property owned by the property owner in the
preceding calendar year that was contributed by
freeport goods. The chief appraiser shall apply that
percentage to the market value of the property
owner’s inventory or property for the current year to
determine the appraised vai ue of freeport goods for
the current year.
(g) If the property owner or the chief appraiser
demonstrates that the method provided by Subsection
(d) significantly understates or overstates the market
value of the property qualified for an exemption
under Subsection (b) in the current year, the chief
appraiser shall determine the market value of the
freeport goods to be exempt by determining according
to the property owner’s records and any other
available information, the market value of those
freeport goods owned by the property owner on
January | of the current year ....
Tila
** *& *
TEX. TAX CODE ANN.§ 11.251(d) & (g) (Vernon 1992).
We are unable to extract from the summary judgment
proof the information needed to apply § 11.251. In any
event, this is a matter best left to the trial court and the
parties with the necessary records and expertise to properly
implement the technical aspects of the appraisal process. We
therefore find that fact issues exist precluding summary
judgment in favor of either VICO or the District and Board.
Did VICO Apply for the Freeport Exemption?
We next ask whether VICO applied for its freeport
goods exemption. Section 11.43 of the Tax Code provides:
(a) To receive an exemption, a person claiming the
exemption ... must apply for the exemption. To
apply for an exemption, a person must file an
exemption application form with the chief appraiser
(b) ...[A] person required to apply for an éxemption
must apply each year the person claims entitlement to
the exemption.
*’- * *
(d) A person required to claim an exemption must
file a completed exemption application form before
May ! and must furnish the information required by
(e) ...[{I]}f a person required to apply for an exemption
in a given year fails to file timely a completed
application form, the person may not receive the
exemption for that year.
72a
*_* * &
TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 11.43 (Vernon 1992) (emphasis
added).
The summary judgment proof included VICO’s 1991
Rendition of Business Personal Property. In the section of
the form captioned “Inventory of Merchandise, Finished
Goods, or Consigned Goods" VICO typed the following
note:
Note: This inventory is exempt from sales and use tax
and we hereby apply for property tax exemption. All
is being exported. You have exempt in past.
(Emphasis added.)
However, in the section of the rendition above this note were
the following pre-printed instructions:
If you claim entitlement to the "freeport exemption"
provided by Sec. 11.251 Texas Tax Code, check this
box. Report full original cost of all inventory on this
rendition and attach a completed exemption
application using form 11.251 prescribed by the State
Property Tax Board.
The box preceding these instructions was not checked. Nor
is there anything in the record to show that VICO completed
an “exemption application form” per se.
The legislative intent of the free-port goods
exemption, as stated expressly within § 1-j itself, is “[t]o
promote the economic development in the State.” TEX.
CONST. art. VIII, § 1-j. With this intent foremost in mind,
we find that VICO’s failure to complete a § 11.251
73a
exemption form for 1991 is not fatal to its claim for property
tax immunity.
VICO applied for the exemption in the same manner
that it had in the prior tax years of 1989 and 1990 by
annotating its annual rendition form and _ supplying
supplemental justification. VICO’s application in those years
was apparently adequate for the District to exempt VICO’s
property in those years. In 1991, VICO provided a complete
listing of inventory as of January 1 and supplemented its
rendition with a letter detailing the nature of its exporting
operation. All this was done prior to the May | deadline for
claiming an exemption. There is no indication in the record
that VICO intentionally withheld information or failed to
respond to any District request for records.
We take judicial notice of the Texas Register and its
description of the required contents of the § 11.251
exemption form: (1) the owner’s name, street address,
mailing address, and telephone number; (2) a description of
the inventory affected by the exemption; (3) the total cost of
goods sold from inventory held by the property owner in the
preceding year; (4) the total cost of goods sold from
inventory that in the preceding year met the criteria set forth
in the Tax Code, Texas Constitution, Article VIII, § 1-
j(a)(1)@), excluding the cost of equipment, machinery, or
materials that entered into and became part of the inventory
described in paragraph three of this subsection but did not
themselves meet the criteria set forth in the Texas
Constitution; (4) a statement that the property owner holds
items in inventory that in the current year meet or will meet
the requirements of the Texas Constitution; and (6) a
statement indicating how long the property owner has
engaged in the business of transporting goods out of this
state. 17 Tex. Reg. 1159 (1992) (codified at 34 TEX.
ADMIN. CODE § 9.404) (Comptroller of Public Accounts).
T4a
The tax law had recently been changed and new
information requirements and forms introduced. Our opinion
should not be read as condoning a taxpayer’s failure to
provide information to the taxing authority in a format
necessary for maximum administrative efficiency. However,
on the unique facts of this case, we find that VICO did make
a bona fide effort to apply for its property tax exemption and
provided most of the required information to the District.
We believe that the purpose of the freeport goods exemption, _
to promote economic development, would not be served by
our holding that VICO’s tax exemption turned on whether
VICO checked a particular box or completed a particular
form. Therefore, we find that VICO established that it
applied for the freeport exemption. What supplemental
information the trial court and District may require to
calculate VICO’s 1991 tax liability can be gathered on
remand.
Appraisal Value
The trial court granted VICO’s summary judgment on
tax liability and did not reach VICO’s contention that the
appraised value of the goods and equipment was overstated.
VICO argued that the District’s appraisal was based on a
computational error resulting in an appraised value of
$380,260.00 rather than the correct value of $296,846.95.
We have found that VICO, in principle, is entitled to
a freeport goods exemption. On remand, VICO’s tax
liability, if any, will be determined under § 11.251. In the
event that an over-appraisal question arises on remand, we
note that the tax code provides for the correction of
computational errors.
VICO was entitled to protest to the Board the
“determination of the appraised value" of its property, TEX.
timeline specified i in § 41.44. Additionally, VICO was
entitled to move the Board to “direct by written order
changes in the appraisal roll to correct ... clerical errors that
affect [VICO’s] liability ..... TEX. TAX CODE ANN. §
25.25 (Vernon 1992). Still further, “At any time, the
governing body of a taxing unit, on motion of the assessor
for the unity or of a property owner, shall direct by written
order changes in the tax roll to correct errors in the
mathematical computation of a tax." TEX. TAX CODE
ANN.§ 26.15 (Vernon 1992)’ see Liland v. Dallas County
Appraisal Dist., 731 S.W.2d 109, 112 (Tex. App.-- Dallas
1987, no writ). Section 26.15(c) does not appear to set a
time limit on the correction of mathematical computation of
a tax. See § 26.15(c). And under § 25.25, the Board may
correct clerical errors in the appraisal roll at any time before
the end of five years after January | of a tax year. See §
25.25(c).
"In order for a taxpayer to protest an action taken by
a taxing authority, the taxpayer must follow the procedures
outlined by the Tax Code. These requirements are
jurisdictional." Harris County Appraisal Dist. v. Texas Nat’!
Bank, 775 S.W.2d 66, 69 (Tex. App.--Houston [Ist Dist.]
1989, no writ). The remedies defined in the Tax Code are
exclusive, and failure to exhaust the available administrative
remedies precludes a taxpayer from seeking judicial review.
See id. at 70; TEX. TAX CODE ANN. § 42.09 (Vernon
1992).
Therefore, if in the trial court VICO seeks to correct
the computational error, it would need to demonstrate that it
had exhausted its administrative remedies.
76a
Summary
Although an ad valorem property tax on VICQO’s
goods does not run afoul of the U.S. commerce or import-
export clauses, Texas has exempted freeport goods to
promote the economic development of the state. While
VICO made a bona fide effort to apply for the exemption,
fact issues remain precluding summary judgment. On
remand, to determine VICO’s tax liability, the trial court will
first need to ascertain which taxing entities allow the
exemption, then, if necessary, VICO’s 1990 or 1991 freeport
goods activity history.
IV. Conclusion
We conclude that an ad valorem property tax on
VICO’s goods and equipment does not violate the U.S.
Constitution’s commerce or _ import-export clauses.
However, we also conclude that VICO, in principle, was
entitled to the freeport goods exemption under Texas law and
that VICO substantially complied with application
requirements. However, fact issues remain as to the actual
amount of VICO’s exemption and tax liability. This will
depend on what information the District and Board provide
regarding taxing entities’ official actions to preempt the
freeport goods exemption. Assuming an exemption exists,
the amount of VICO’s tax liability will turn on what
information VICO provides, in compliance with § 11.251d),
as to previous-year freeport goods activity history.
Alternatively, should § 11.251(g) be invoked by either party,
VICO’s tax liability will depend on VICO’s 1991 freeport
goods activity.
We therefore find that the trial court erred in granting
VICO’s summary judgment. Fact issues exist precluding
summary judgment for either party. We sustain the District
77a
and Board’s point of error one and remand the cause to the
trial court to calculate the amount of VICO’s tax liability, if
any. Since the trial court did not err in denying the District
and Board’s motion for summary judgment, we overrule
point two.
/s/ Robert E. Morse, Jr.
Former Justice
Judgment Rendered and Opinion Filed February 10, 1994.
Panel Consists of Justices Robertson, Cannon and Morse,
(sitting by designation).
Publish - Tex. R. App. P. 90.
78a
APPENDIX D
THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS
Post Office Box 12248
Austin, Texas 78711 (512) 463-1312
December 22,1995
Mr. J. Randolph Burton
Moerer & Burton
440 Louisiana, Suite 350
Houston, TX 77002
Mr. Kenneth Wall
Olsen & Olsen
Three Allen Center, Suite 3485
333 Clay Street
Houston, TX 77002
RE: Case Number 94-0245
Style: VIRGINIA INDONESIA COMPANY v. HARRIS
COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT and HARRIS COUNTY
APPRAISAL REVIEW BOARD
Dear Counsel:
Today, the supreme Court of Texas overruled the
motion for rehearing in the above referenced cause.
Sincerely,
John T. Adams, Clerk
by_S/
Courtland Crocker
Deputy
oi watt ; FA
79a
APPENDIX E
NO. 94-0245
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF TEXAS
VIRGINIA INDONESIA COMPANY
Petitioner,
v.
HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL DISTRICT AND
HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL REVIEW BOARD,
Respondent
RESPONDENTS’ MOTION FOR REHEARING
TO THE SUPREME COURT OF TEXAs:
Respondents, Harris County Appraisal District and
Harris County Appraisal Review Board, file this Motion for
Rehearing from the judgment and opinion of this Court
rendered on October 27, 1995.
POINT OF ERROR
The Supreme Court of Texas erred by holding that ad
valorem property taxation of Petitioner’s goods violates the
Import-Export Clause of the United States Constitution.
80a
APPENDIX F
NO. 91-59779
VIRGINIA INDONESIA
COMPANY,
Plaintiff,
IN THE DISTRICT
COURT OF
§
§
:
§
VS. § HARRIS COUNTY,
§ TEXAS
HARRIS COUNTY §
APPRAISAL DISTRICT = §
§
§
§
§
and HARRIS COUNTY 333RD JUDICIAL
APPRAISAL REVIEW DISTRICT
BOARD,
Defendants.
PLAI ’S FIRST AMENDED PETITION
FOR REVIEW APPRAISAL REVIEW BOARD ORDER
TO THE HONORABLE JUDGE OF SAID COURT:
COMES NOW, VIRGINIA INDONESIA COMPANY
(hereinafter sometimes referred to as "VICO"), Plaintiff, and
files this its First Amended Petition for Review of Appraisal
Review Board Order, complaining of HARRIS COUNTY
APPRAISAL DISTRICT and HARRIS COUNTY
APPRAISAL REVIEW BOARD (hereinafter sometimes
jointly referred to as the "Defendants"), and for cause of
action would respectfully show unto the Court as follows:
ee RARER Alaa
8la
Plaintiff is a Delaware corporation duly incorporated
and existing under the laws of Delaware and authorized to do
business in Harris County, Texas.
Defendant, HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL
DISTRICT (hereinafter sometimes referred to as the
"APPRAISAL DISTRICT"), is located in Houston, Harris
County, Texas, duly organized and acting pursuant to the
laws of Texas. Defendant APPRAISAL DISTRICT has
appeared and answered herein by and through its attorney of
record, Mr. Kenneth Wall, at Olson & Olson, Three Allen
Center, 333 Clay Street, Suite 3845, Houston, Harris
County, Texas 77002.
Defendant, HARRIS COUNTY APPRAISAL
REVIEW BOARD (hereinafter sometimes referred to as
"REVIEW BOARD"), is located in Houston, Harris County,
Texas, duly organized and acting pursuant to the laws of
Texas. Defendant REVIEW BOARD has appeared and
answered herein by and through its attorney of record, Mr.
Kenneth Wall, at Olson & Olson, Three Allen Center, 333
Clay Street, Suite 3845, Houston, Harris County, Texas
77002.
DEFINITIONS
III.
Each of these words or terms shall have the following
meaning unless a different meaning is stated clearly or is
reflected by the context in which the word or term is used:
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(a) “Appraised value" means a property’s value
according to the APPRAISAL DISTRICT’s
appraisal roll for the tax year.
(b) "Code" refers to Title 1 of the Texas Tax
Code, more commonly known as the Texas
Property Tax Code.
(c) "Property" means that personal property
owned or possessed by Plaintiff that is the
subject of this suit, said Property being more
accurately described as follows:
Various materials and supplies related
to conducting onshore oil and gas
exploration and development activities
in a foreign country, more particularly
described by the summary record
shown in Exhibit "A," which is
attached hereto by reference and
incorporated herein for all purposes.
(d) “Tax year" means the 1991 calendar year.
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
IV.
This First Amended Petition is a petition for review
filed within the time required by Section 42.21 of the Code.
Plaintiff brings this cause as an appeal from the REVIEW
BOARD’s order determining a taxpayer protest duly and
properly prosecuted by Plaintiff under Chapter 41 of the
Code. The REVIEW BOARD and the APPRAISAL
DISTRICT are established for and located in the county in
which this First Amended Petition is filed. The Court has
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jurisdiction to hear and decide Plaintiff's appeal pursuant to
Chapter 42 of the Code.
FACTS AND BASIS FOR REVIEW
V.
On or about September 10, 1991, Plaintiff was
notified by the APPRAISAL DISTRICT that, for the tax year
ended 1991, the appraised value of personal property
(rendered under Harris County Appraisal District account
number 0385507) possessed by Plaintiff would be
$380,260.00. The subject "property" consists of various
materials and supplies related to conducting onshore oil and
gas exploration and development activities in a foreign
country, said materials and supplies being more particularly
described in the attached Exhibit "A" which Plaintiff
incorporates herein by reference for all purposes (hereinafter
referred to as the "Property"). A true and correct copy of
the "Notification of Appraised Value for Property Tax
Purposes" is attached hereto as Exhibit "B" and incorporated
herein by reference for all purposes.
On or about September 16, 1991, Plaintiff timely filed
a Notice of Protest of the appraised value given the Property
by the APPRAISAL DISTRICT in the manner required by
law. A true and correct copy of the Notice of Protest is
attached hereto as Exhibit "C" and incorporated herein by
reference for all purposes. Plaintiff presented evidence and
argument before the REVIEW BOARD as provided by law.
A true and correct copy of the Confidential General
Personal Property Rendition of Taxable Property for January
1, 1991, submitted on behalf of VICO by Clarke and
Company is attached hereto as Exhibit "D" and incorporated
herein by reference for all purposes. This Exhibit "D"
includes a letter to the Harris County Appraisal District dated
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March 14, 1991 (Exhibit "D-1") and a description of the
Property on hand at the Houston packer, McClean Cargo, as
of January 1, 1991 (Exhibit "D-2"). The total value of the
Property shown on Exhibit "D-2" is $380,260.00. Exhibit
"D-2" contains the exact same individual items with the exact
same price extensions as those shown on the attached Exhibit
"A". However, due to a computational error, these items
were incorrectly added and given an appraised value of
$380,260.00 by the APPRAISAL DISTRICT when, in fact,
their correct total equals $296,846.95 as shown on Exhibit
"A". Thereafter on October 11, 1991, the REVIEW
BOARD made its Final Order determining Plaintiff's protest
in which the value of Plaintiff's Property was determined to
be $380,260.00. A true and correct copy of the Notice of
Final Order and Order Determining Protest are attached
hereto as Exhibit "E" and incorporated herein by reference
for all purposes. All conditions precedent to Plaintiff's right
of judicial review of the REVIEW BOARD ’s decision having
been performed or having occurred, Plaintiff is entitled to a
trial de novo review of the REVIEW BOARD’s Final Order.
Plaintiff VICO functions as the operator of an
Indonesian joint venture which explores for oil and gas
overseas. The joint venture’s operations are limited to an
area of mutual interest ("AMI") in a single foreign country,
namely, the Republic of Indonesia. The Indonesian joint
venture, by and through its operator, VICO, purchases
certain goods, wares and equipment for use in petroleum
operations in the AMI, all pursuant to that certain Amended
and Restated Production Sharing Contract (hereinafter
referred to as the "Production Sharing Contract") by and
between the joint venture participants and Perusahaan
Pertambangan Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara ("Pertamina"),
a state enterprise of the Republic of Indonesia. Based upon
requests from the Division Office in Indonesia, VICO, as
operator of the Indonesian joint venture, purchases certain
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goods for and on behalf of PERTAMINA, all for exclusive
use in the above mentioned AMI. Pursuant to the
aforementioned Production Sharing Contract, the property
purchased for the Indonesian joint venture, by and through
its operator, VICO, becomes the property of PERTAMINA
upon arrival at the Indonesian port of import.
Upon being notified that certain goods are needed in
Indonesia, VICO, in accordance with Indonesian law
(Indonesian Presidential Decree 14A, implemented in 1981,
requiring production sharing contractors to prepare their
imported material purchase orders in Indonesia for issue to
Indonesian agents), issues a request for quotation to an
Indonesian company which acts as an agent. The Indonesian
purchasing agent then obtains bids from several companies
for the product needed. The best bids are taken and a
quotation is furnished to VICO. VICO evaluates the bids
under PERTAMINA procedures and selects a winning bid.
VICO then issues a purchase order through the proper
channels for the product. The product is then purchased
from the company holding
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