Reply Brief — Hill v. Department of the Air Force

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f = Supreme Court, U.S

KF iLk Dp

JUL 2 1996

No. 95-1498 cores

——— ee

In The

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1995

THOMAS W. HILL,

Petitioner.

DEPARTMENT OF AIR FORCE, MERIT SYSTEMS

PROTECTION BOARD, PAUL S. BRITT, and

PAUL J. VALLERIE,

Respondents

On Petition for Extraordinary Writ, and in the Alternative,

Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United States Court of

Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

PETITIONER’S REPLY BRIEF

THOMAS W. HILL,

Petitioner, Pro Se

1419 Stonewood Court

San Pedro, California 90732

(310) 831-4322

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Table of Contents

Table of Citations .

I]

Il.

Respondents Have Misstated Facts Regarding

Hill’s Federal Circuit Appeal And Have Not

Assessed The Scope Of That Review Against

ADEA Requirements .............. |

The Argument That Federal Employee Privacy

Act Claims Are Foreclosed By Construction

With The CSRA Is ee By Texts Of

Controlling Statutes ..

Supreme Court Decisions Support Claims

Against Federal Employees For Fourth

Amendment Torts ....

Conclusion ....

APPENDIX E - Final Decision of the Court of

Appeals for the Federal Circuit, MSPB Docket

No. DE075285 10204, Hill v. Department of the

Air Force. Decided February 10, 1987 ...............

Page

E-]

TABLE OF CITATIONS

Cases Cited Page

Astoria FS. & L. Ass‘n. v. Solimino.

501 U.S. 104 (1991) 4

Brewer v. U.S. Postal Service, 647 F.2d 1093.

1096 (Fed.Cir. 1981). cert. denied,

454 US. 1141 (1982) 3

Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983) ‘,9

Chandler v. Roudebush, 425 U.S. 840 (1976) 4

Dept. of Navy v. Egan, 108 S.Ct. 818 (1988) 8

Hayes v. Department of the Navy, 727 F.2d

1535, 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1984) 3

Hill v. Dept. of Air Force, 796 F.2d 1469

(Fed.Cir. 1986) 3

Hill v. Dept. of Air Force, 884 F.2d 1318

(10th Cir. 1989), cert. denied,

GOS U.S. S67 CAR cose 10

Hubbard v. U.S. EPA, 809 F.2d 1 (D.C.Cir

1986), aff'd in part on other grounds

sub. nom. Spagnola v. Mathis, 859 F.2d

223 (D.C.Cir. 1988) (en banc) ................000...... 8

Kleiman v. Dept. of Energy, 956 F.2d 335 (1992) ..... 7

McGregor v. Greer, 748 F.Supp. 881

PR ns OPIN o cinincnienddlnansnicauanindaaoaeeadiacedae ) 10

iil

Nabors v. United States, 568 F.2d 657.

669 (9th Cir. 1978) .............

we

O'Connor v. Consolidated Coin Caterers, Inc.

116 S.Ct. 1307 (1 April 1996) ....000...... 4

O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S.Ct. 1492 (1987) ..... 9

Pilon v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 73 F.3d

1111 (D.C. Cir. 1996) 200. : 8

Rivera v. U.S., 924 F.2d 948, 954 (9th Cir. 1991) 6

Schowengerdt v. General Dynamics Corp.

823 F.2d 1328, 1339 (9th Cir. 1987) .......... 10

Siegert v. Gilley, 500 US 226, 231 (1991) ............ 9

Stevens v. Dept. of Treasury, 500 U.S. 1 (1991)....... 4

Strang v. U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament

Agency, 864 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1989)... 7

United States v. Fausto, 484 U.S. 439 (1988) ....... 7

Other

Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, As Amended ..... passim

Age _ Discrimination in Employment Acct ............. 3

Privacy Act of 1974, As Amended ....... Lecce. Passim

Public Law 101-12: 5 U.S.C. § 1222 000... 6

135 Cong.Rec. $2782-83 (daily ed. Mar. 16, 1989) 7

l

1. Respondents Have Misstated Facts Regarding Hill’s

Federal Circuit Appeal And Have Not Assessed The

Scope Of That Review Against ADEA Requirements.

Respondents have not challenged the accuracy of Hill’s

evidence showing that the agency waited until the Merit Systems

Protection Board (MSPB) had upheld the firing of Hill to fill his

position with a younger employee. Neither have they denied that

an open position at Space Division for which Hill judged was

well-qualified was used to hire a person “less senior” than Hill, in

accordance with desires of management.’ Respondents have in-

stead relied on the claim that Hill had a “full and fair opportunity

to litigate those issues in the Federal Circuit” and “therefore was

not free to relitigate those issues in the district court.” Opp. Brief,

p. 6 (emphasis added). They conclude with the allegation (/d.

n.3) that “petitioner failed to assert before the MSPB or the

Federal Circuit that he was replaced by a younger person.”

The latter allegation is simply false, as shown by a file-

stamped copy of Hill’s pleading to the Federal Circuit on 28 July

1986,” more that six months prior to that court’s final decision.

' An affidavit executed by Major John -G. Gowan (DNM Dkt. No. 386, 6

Nov 86) states, “ ... I served as the Deputy Director of the Directorate of

Aerospace Studies (“AFCMD/SA”) at Kirtland Air Force Base. ... It is

my assessment that the promotion of Robert Blankert to the GS-14 grade

level is the result of conversion of the slot formerly occupied by Thomas

W. Hill ...”. In his declaration (/d.), Hill adds, “I have worked with both

Mr Feuchter and Robert Blankert ..._ I am personally aware that both

individuals are several years younger than I, although I do not know

their exact ages.” In his deposition William Jacoby, the selecting official

for the Space Division position Hill had applied-for, admits that he was

looking for a less senior person for the job. (See Supp. Brief, p. 3.)

> Petitioner has concurrently submitted a file-stamped copy of the refer-

enced ducument with a request for leave to lodge it and the Federal Cir-

cuit docket sheet during Supreme Court review. The docket sheet shows

that the appeal was not docketed until April 1986, i.e., four months after

Hill had submitted it and had closed one of his bank accounts.

7

j

il acl

2

At page 6 of his pleading Hill plainly alleges, “that a younger

employee, Robert Blankert, was promoted into his former

position.” Hill had previously informed the Circuit Court about

ongoing District Court discovery. See “Request for Stay ...”

(Fed. Cir. Dkt. No. 86-1081, Entry #7, 21 Apr 86),

“{A]ppellant has been afforded discovery by [the

District] Court. He has thus far taken deposi-

tions of seven Air Force officials. In addition, on

4 April 1986 the Court Ordered the Department

of the Air Force to release to plaintiff several

hundred pages of documents ..._ Appellant has

filed a number of the involved documents with

the Court as evidence of discrimination and im-

proper agency action. ... [C]ertain findings of the

presiding official for the Merit Systems Protec-

tion Board (MSPB) are no longer viable ... ”

The notice notwithstanding, the Federal Circuit entered an order

denying transfer on 17 July 1986. Hill first learned that the Air

Force had replaced him with a younger employee on 20 July

1986, and immediately submitted a Request for Admission to the

agency (Supp. Brief, p. 2). Without waiting for a response, Hill

filed the above-cited pleading with the Federal Circuit alleging his

replacement by Blankert. The Circuit Court denied the pleading

without comment and proceeded with review on the merits.

Other than a nebulous claim of “jurisdiction and age dis-

crimination”, Respondents do not specify “those issues” afforded

“full and fair” review by the Federal Circuit. They assert (Opp.

Brief, p.7), “The court below, however, did not give preclusive

effect to the MSPB’s determination of no discrimination. It gave

preclusive effect to the Federal Circuit’s de novo determination

that petitioner had failed to allege a colorable claim of discrimina-

tion.” Borrowing a phrase from the D.C. Circuit, this is “a dis-

tinction without a difference”, as the following discussion shows.

3

Since the Federal Circuit gave no consideration to dis-

covery in the District Court proceeding or to Hill’s claim that he

had been replaced by the younger Blankert, it follows that review

was limited to the contents of the MSPB record. This conclusion

is Consistent with the opinion in Hill v. Dept. of Air Force, 796

F.2d 146 (Fed.Cir. 1986), and the unreported final decision in

Hill’s case. See Pet. Ap. E herewith, “We must affirm the

board’s decision because it was supported by substantial evi-

dence and was not arbitrary, capricious, an abuse of discre-

tion, or otherwise not in accordance with law.” The Court

provided a citiation in support of its decision, Hayes v. De-

partment of the Navy, 727 F.2d 1535, 1537 (Fed. Cir. 1984).

The citation confirms’ that the Federal Circuit was

constrained by law not to afford Hill de novo* review of any-

thing, especially the merit of a claim filed in the District Court

under provisions of the Age Discrimination in Employment

Act (ADEA). See Hayes, at 1537, “This court’s scope of

review of MSPB decisions is defined and limited by statute.

. In applying these criteria, the court recognizes that it

should not try to place itself in the shoes of the agency and

second-guess it. ... The record need only disclose such rele-

vant evidence as might be accepted by a reasonable mind as

adequate to support the conclusion reached. ... This has been

our consistent view and that of our predecessor, the United

States Court of Claims, for many years, both before and after

the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978.”

‘ See also Brewer v. U.S. Postal Service. 647 F.2d 1093, 1096 (Fed.Cir.

1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1141 (1982), "In determining whether the

Board's decision is supported by substantial evidence the standard is not

what the Court would believe on a de novo appraisal ..."

* See Nabors v. United States, 568 F.2d 657, 669 (9th Cir. 1978), hold-

ing that “[T]he language of 29 U.S.C.§ 633a(c), ‘A civil action ... for

such legal or equitable relief as will effectuate the purposes of this

chapter’ would be to us a most unusual way of specifying review on an

administrative record.”

4

The courts in the Tenth Circuit have held that the penalty

for Hill’s failure to allege future replacement by a younger em-

ployee at the time of MSPB appeal is loss of right to de novo re-

view in District Court, regardless of facts. This conclusion can-

not be reconciled with the holdings of Chandler v. Roudebush,

425 U.S. 840 (1976), and Astoria FS. & L. Ass'n. v. Solimino,

501 U.S. 104 (1991), denying preclusive effect to administrative

findings on discrimination claims of federal employees.”

Furthermore, the Solicitor General’s position in this peti-

tion is inconsistent with his stated position in Stevens v. Dept. of

Treasury, 500 U.S. 1 (1991). The key issue in Stevens was fail-

ure to comply with procedures required for obtaining administra-

tive review of age discrimination. After certiorari was granted,

the Solicitor General took the position (/d., at 9) that "[A] federal

employee who elects agency review of an age discrimination

claim need not exhaust his administrative remedies before bring-

ing a civil action." As a result, the Supreme Court reversed the

lower court, but declined to rule on the merits of the exhaustion

issue, indicating that it would fade with time if not resolved by

future litigation. Hill’s position, involving an adjudged inade-

quacy in exhaustion of administrative relief due to MSPB plead-

ing insufficiency, is not substantively different from Stevens. The

issue has not faded, as the Solicitor General no longer advocates

his Stevens position, even though it appears in a different manner.

In sum, the lower courts have denied Hill the additional

protection of District Court review of an adverse personnel ac-

tion which Congress has provided to his class. See O'Connor v.

Consolidated Coin Caterers, Inc., 116 S.Ct. 1307 (1 Apr

1996). The denial was based not on any District Court find-

ing, but rather, on a bar due to Federal Circuit review of a

matter for which that Court has no jurisdiction. Congression-

al Record, Senate Report No. 969, cited at Pet. Brief, p. 12.

* Federal service hirings and promotions normally require months to

accomplish, and it is unlikely that firm discrimination evidence would be

available within the 30 days allowed for perfecting an MSPB appeal.

TARTS.

5

Il. The Argument That Federal Employee Privacy Act

Claims Are Foreclosed By Construction With The

CSRA Is Opposed By Texts Of Controlling Statutes.

In opposing certiorari for the Privacy Act matter, Re-

spondents’ again decline to challenge the accuracy of facts’ (Pet.

Ap. A) regarding damages endured by Hill as a direct conse-

quence of agency refusal to timely adjudicate a Special Security

File (SSF) generated under Hill’s name and social security num-

ber. Nor do they dispute the District Court finding that the

controlling regulation (DOD 5200.2-R/ AFR 205-32: re Pet.

Ap. A-6, Defn. Ex. F) requires that the SSF be adjudicated,

Essential facts regarding the security records may be summarized as

follows. On 24 May 1985 Paul S. Britt generated a Special Security File

(SSF) under Hill’s name and social security number, accusing Hill of

being a thief, amoral, unscrupulous, and other derogatory terms. In

mid-August 1985 Major General Bernard L. Weiss, Britt’s superior,

reviewed the SSF and stated in writing that “the acts attributed to [Hill]

did not have adverse security significance” and “the withdrawal of

[Hill's] security clearance was unwarranted”. (Pet. Ap. A-6, Fact #22).

However, the agency refused to adjudicate the SSF, even though its con-

trolling regulation required that the SSF be adjudicated, regardless of

other actions taken, including separation (/d., Fact #26). Hill appealed

to the MSPB to review the security suspension. However, the MSPB

held that the firing action was independent of the security action and

refused to consider the security matter in any- manner. (See note 10

below.) In the later part of 1985 Hill negotiated separate offers of

employment from bd Systems in Torrance, California, and Aerojet

Corporation in Azusa, California, at salary levels significantly higher

than his former Air Force salary. However, when the two companies

submitted forms to the Defense Industrial Security Clearance Office

(DISCO) to obtain an interim clearance for Hill, DISCO received

information from the Air Force central security computer that Hill was

considered unsuitable for holding a security clearance. As a result. both

companies withdrew their offers of employment, and Hill was unable to

secure employment in his chosen career field for more than a year. The

District Court found malicious intent on Britt’s part (/d., A-4, Fact # 14)

and further found that the sole purpose of the security action was to

prevent Hill from obtaining employment in the civilian defense com-

munity (/d., A-7, Fact #27).

6

regardless of any other adverse action taken, including separa-

tion. Rather, they claim that Bnitt’s separate, vindictive security

action against Hill constituted a “personnel practice prohibited by

the CSRA [Civil Service Reform Act]” (Opp. Brief, p. 8) and

that “an employee may not assert a Privacy Act claim to chal-

lenge a personnel practice prohibited by the CSRA” (/d., p. 9).

On 4 September 1987 the District Court refused to

dismiss Hill’s Privacy Act cause for damages. Opp. Ap. D.

Years later (11 January 1993), in response to another agency

motion, the Court decided to dismiss the damages claim for

reasons not specified in its order. Pet. Ap. B. Upon appeal,

the Tenth Circuit held that the basis for dismissal was con-

struction of the Privacy Act vis-a-vis prohibited personnel

practices defined by the CSRA (chapter 23). However, Con-

gress has directed the courts not to construe the CSRA to

limit remedies afforded by other statutes, which include the

Privacy Act.. More specifically, on 9 July 1989 Public Law

101-12 (codified in part at 5 U.S.C. § 1222) became effective.

“§ 1222. Availability of other remedies

Except as provided in section 1221(i), nothing

in this chapter or chapter 23 shall be construed

to limit any nght or remedy available under a

provision of statute which is outside of both

this chapter and chapter 23.”

There is no question that the Privacy Act (5 U.S.C. § 552a)

lies outside ’ chapter 12 “Merit Systems Protection Board”

and is also outside chapter 23 “Merit System Principles”, and

that section 1221(i) is not applicable to the instant action.

There is also no question that section 1222 was directed to

the federal courts and that they are bound by its provisions for

decisions entered after 9 July 1989.

Clearly, the actions of the District and Circuit Courts

” Hill’s Privacy Act cause does not suffer from the plaintiffs’ deficiency

in Rivera v. U.S., 924 F.2d 948, 954 (9th Cir. 1991), where the Court

found no statutory-based cause of action independent of the CSRA.

mma taal

7

in 1991 and 1995 violate provisions of the statute. The error

is especially egregious when viewed against the background

of the purpose of the act (section 2) and Congressional dissat-

isfaction’ with (1) the lack of protection afforded to whistle-

blowers by the MSPB, the Special Counsel, and the federal

courts, and (2) a series of federal court decisions, including

Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983), and U.S. v. Fausto, 484

U.S. 439 (1988), which have over a period of time expanded

\ the sphere of exclusivity of remedies afforded by the CSRA.

R Even if 5 U.S.C. § 1222 had not been enacted, the

lower court construction is still improper for the reason that

the MSPB determined that the security matter was independ-

ent of the firing action,’ so that Hill’s removal would be un-

affected by any action the agency might take on the SSF.

For support of their position, Respondents indicate that

Strang v. U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency, 864 F.2d

859 (D.C. Cir. 1989), is no longer good case law and casually

cite Kleiman v. Dept. of Energy, 956 F.2d 335 (1992), which

involves a minor, non reviewable position classification dis-

pute labeled by the D.C. Circuit Court (/d., 338) as “not the

stuff of which Privacy Act suits are made.” A more studied

we savings provision summarized in Historical and Statutory Notes of

the USCA at the beginning of chapter 12 exempts the MSPB, the Special

Counsel, and their officers and employees from provisions of the statute

for suits commenced prior to its enactment. However, the key issue in-

volved in this Privacy Act matter is not entitlement against the MSPB,

but federal court construction of the two statutes in 1991. There is no

exemption in P.L. 101-12 for federal court decisions in Privacy Act suits

against the Air Force which were pending in July 1989.

” See Joint Explanatory Statement, 135 Cong.Rec. $2782-83 (daily ed.

March 16, 1989).

'° See 16 September 85 MSPB order (DNM Dkt. No. 62, MSPB record.

vol. Il, Item 24), “[{T]he presiding official ruled that she will not con-

sider evidence about the suspension of [Hill's] security clearance because

it was not the basis for the agency’s removal action.”

8

reading of Kleiman reveals the following. At 956 F.2d 339,

“In short, we think that nothing in Hubbard [v. U.S. EPA,

809 F.2d 1 (D.C. Cir. 1986)] can be construed as conflicting

with our decision today. ° ...

> This harmony also means that nothing we say today should be taken to

cast doubt on Hubbard's statement that ‘the Privacy Act permits a feder-

al job applicant to recover damages for an adverse personnel action

actually caused by an inaccurate or incomplete record.” 809 F.2d at 5.”

See also Pilon v. U.S. Dept. of Justice, 73 F.3d 1111 (D.C.

Cir. 1996), allowing a Privacy Act suit for damages exceeding

one-half million dollars for the unauthorized disclosure of a

record by the supervisor of a former federal employee, even

though the recipient was already familiar with the record.

Finally, the novel attempt to label untimely-maintained

security records'' designed solely (District Court determina-

tion) to prevent Hill’s employment outside the Air Force as a

prohibited personnel practice under the CSRA is opposed by

the text of the CSRA. Positions offered to Hill by Aerojet or

bd Systems or any contractor are not “covered positions”

within the meaning of 5 U.S.C. § 2802(a)(2)(B) for which the

eleven proscriptions set out at section 2802(b) apply. In addi-

tion, it would not be possible for the MSPB or the Special

Counsel, which the CSRA has charged with responsibility to

correct such practices, to discharge their duties if an adverse

security action could be defined as a prohibited personnel

practice. See Dept. of Navy v. Egan, 108 S.Ct. 818 (1988).

'' The key Privacy Act issue is failure to timely maintain a system of re-

cords, as expressedly required by the Act. If the SSF had been adjudi-

cated within the time specified by the controlling regulation, the matter

would have been resolved before DISCO querry. However, Britt’s stated

intent was that the matter never be cleared. Both bd Systems and Aero-

jet officials were fully aware of the firing action, but were unconcerned

so long as the security issue was resolved, as evidenced by an affidavit

filed on Hill’s behalf by bd’s President. Hill was later employed by bd

Systems and worked there for 4 years before establishing own business.

9

fl. Supreme Court Decisions Support Claims Against

Federal Employees For Fourth Amendment Torts.

In Bush v. Lucas, 462 U.S. 367 (1983), the Court held

(/d., 385 n. 28) that, “certain actions by supervisors against

federal employees, such as wire-tapping, warrantless searches.

or uncompensated takings, would not be defined as ‘person-

nel actions’ within the statutory scheme.” In a matter involv-

ing suit brought by a federal employee against a former super-

visor, Siegert v. Gilley, 500 US 226, 231 (1991), the Court

restated the requirements that the suit must “allege the vio-

lation of a clearly established constitutional right” and that

“malice is a requisite showing to avoid the bar of qualified

immunity” (/d., concurring opinion at 289).

The District Court found that Britt “was involved in

monitoring of Plaintiff's telephone conversations at his place

of employment and in recruiting others to do the same.” Opp.

Ap. 7a. The MSPB record (e.g., MSPB Tr., vol 1, 198, 246-

8, DNM Dkt. No.62) shows that Bruno Manz and other em-

ployees under Britt’s supervision eavesdropped and reported

to him on Hill’s telephone and other conversations, regarding

such matters as discussions between Hill and his attorney dur-

ing divorce proceedings, calls from Hill’s marriage counselor,

and calls from D.C. Court officials. No other member of

Hill’s employing organization was subjected to such” intru-

'2 See O'Connor v. Ortega, 107 S.Ct. 1492 (1987), refusing to release

O'Connor under a claim of immunity accruing from an employment

relationship and holding at 1504, “[Pjublic employer intrusions on the

constitutionally protected privacy interests of government employees for

noninvestigatory, work-related purposes, as well as investigations of

work-related misconduct, should be judged by a standard of reasonable-

ness. Under this reasonableness standard, both the inception and the

scope of the intrusion must be reasonable.” See also, Buiz v. Economou.

98 S.Ct. 2894, 2909 (1978) holding that there is no distinction for

purposes of immunity law between Section 1983 claims against state

officials (e.g., Ortega) and constitutional claims against federal officials.

10

Wions of privacy in the workplace. /d. In addition, during his

deposition David W. Hickman, a member of the Staff Judge

Advocate at Kirtland, testified that he counseled Britt and

cautioned him against violating Hill’s constitutional nghts

The District Court repeatedly found malice on Britt’s

part (Pet. Ap. A-3, 4, 5) and cited the above-referenced sec-

tion of Bush, holding that “Plaintiff properly suggests that

Britt’s actions were something other than ‘personnel actions’

within the purview of any statutory scheme.” Nevertheless,

the Tenth Circuit, Hill v. Dept. of Air Force, 884 F.2d 1318,

cert. denied, 495 U.S. 947 (1990), held that “there is no

Bivens remedy” and ordered Britt released without certifica-

tion that his acts were within the scope of his employment."

Conclusion

For the reasons stated, the Supreme Court should

issue a Summary writ, directing the District Court to find its

own facts regarding Hill’s claim of age discrimination, follow-

ing amendment of the complaint to include facts not available

at the time suit was filed. In the alternative, the Court should

issue a writ, under provisions of 5 U.S.C. § 1222,"* directing

the District Court to set tnal of Hill’s Privacy Act cause for

damages. In the second alternative, certiorari should be

granted to resolve the age discrimination, Privacy Act, and

constitutional tort issues involved in this petition.

Respectfully submitted.

Thomas W. Hill, Pro Se

13

The D.C. District Court held oppositely in a similar action. See Mc-

Gregor v. Greer, 748 F.Supp. 881 (D.D.C. 1990), citing Bush and also

citing Schowengerdt v. General Dynamics Corp. 823 F.2d 1328, 1339

(9th Cir. 1987), as bases for not construing the CSRA to preclude Bivens

claims against federal employees for fourth amendment violations.

14

Hill petitioned the Tenth Circuit for a writ regarding the age discrim-

ination cause at the outset of his appeal, and later pled the requirements

of Public Law 101-12. See, 10th Cir. No. 95-2017, Dkt. Nos. 8, 56.

E-]

Note: This opinion will not be published in a printed volume becausc

it does not add significantly to the body of law and is not of widespread

legal interest. It is a public record. It is not citable as precedent. The

decision will appear in tables published periodically

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

Thomas W. Hill. )

Petitioner, )

)

V ) Appeal No. 86-1081

)

Department of the Air Force. )

Respondent.)

DECIDED: February 10, 1987

Before SMITH, NEWMAN, and BISSELL. Circuit Judges

PER CURIAM

DECISION

The decision of the Merit Systems Protection Board

(board), docket No. DE07528510204. which became final on

December 11, 1985, affirming the removal of Thomas W. Hill

by the Department of the Air Force, is affirmed

OPINION

We must affirm the board’s decision because it was sup-

ported by substantial evidence and was not arbitrary, capri-

cious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance

with law. 5 U.S.C. § 7703(c) (1982); see Hayes v. Depart-

ment of the Navy, 727 F.2d 1535, 1537 (Fed. Cir 1984)

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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