Appendix — Glover v. McCaughtry
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IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
RICARDO GLOVER,
Petitioner
GARY McCAUGHTRY, WARDEN
Respondent
Separate Appendix
To Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
RICCARDO GLOVER
Layman (Pro Se) Litigan
Prisoner's LD #207606
Oshkosh Correctional Institution
Post Office Box 3310
Oshkosh. Wisconsin 54903
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
RICARDO GLOVER,
Petitioner,
V.
GARY McCAUGHTRY, WARDEN,
Respondent.
Separate Appendix
To Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
INDEX TO SEPARATE APPENDICES
Appendix-A Order, United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit denying
Petition For The Court To Rescind Its’
Original Order And Recall the mandate
thereof Denying Habeas § 2254 Appeal
Based On Mxtraordinary
Circumstances And In The Interest Of
Justice (Issued: Aurust 23,
0) | ee ae ee la
Appendix-B
Appendix-C
Petition For The Court To Rescind Its’
Original Order And _ Recall the
Mandate thereof Denying Habeas §
2254 Appeal Based On Extraordinary
Circumstances And In The Interest Of
Justice (Dated: July 21, 2010)
Za -llla
eer eee eee eee OP BEE eHE SHH SHORES EHH EOE EE BOs
Judgment, United States District
Court Eastern District of Wisconsin
Entered: (May 16, 1995)....... 112a-113a
Appendix-D 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (b) of the United
States Code; 28 U.S.C. § 2245 (b) of
the United States Code; Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States
EN oo os 5s ocus nae paemeees ll4a
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
August 23, 2010
Before
KENNETH F. RIPPLE, Circurt Judge
No. 95-2304
Appeal from the United
States District Court for
RICCARDO GLOVER, the Eastern District of
Petitioner-Appellant, Wisconsin.
Vv. No. 95 C 425
GARY McCAUGHTRY, J.P. Stadtmueller,
Respondent Appellate. Judge
ORDER
Ricardo Glovers MOTION TO RECALL THE
MANDATE is DENIED. The motion constitutes a
second or successive collateral attack that may be
commenced only if the criteria of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)
have been satisfied, Calderon v. Thompson, 523 U.S.
538, 553-54 (1998), which is not here argued. Indeed,
by iterating the claim’ previously presented,
authorization would be barred by § 2244(b)(1).
la
IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 95-2304
RICARDO GLOVER,
Petitioner,
GARY R. McCAUGHTRY, WARDEN,
WAUPUN CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR THE COURT TO RESCIND
ITS’ ORIGINAL ORDER AND RECALL THE
MANDATE THEREOF DENYING HABEAS
§ 2254 APPEAL BASE ON EXTRAORDINARY
CIRCUMSTANCES AND IN THE INTEREST
OF JUSTICE
Petitioner Ricardo Glover, a layman, (pro se)
litigant, petitions the United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit, the original panel of the
denial of his habeas § 2254 appeal, the Honorable
xq
Kenneth F. Ripple, Ilana Diamond Rovner, and
Terence T. Evans, Circuit Judges to rescind their
original order and recall the mandate thereof
denying his habeas § 2254 appeal. See #icardo
Glover v. Gary R. McCaughiry, Warden, No. 95-2304
(7th Cir. 1997, unpublished opinion).
This petition is based on_ extraordinary
circumstances exists and in the interest of justice.
Mr. Glover acknowledges that this Court has warned
him if he returns to it with his personal jurisdiction
and subject-matter jurisdictional claims that he will
invite sanction, however, on-point cases are
respectfully submitted herein show that
extraordinary circumstances exists, in the interest of
justice and a miscarriage of justice has occurred for
the Court to take a look at them, and thereafter if
the Court believes Mr. Glover should be sanctioned,
then so be it, or if not the Court may grant him
extraordinary relief.
Mr. Glover respectfully asks this Court for its
attention, because he is actually innocent and his
liberty was unconstitutionally and unlawfully taken
from him. The hardest thing for a layman (pro se)
litigant as Mr. Glover to do is to get a court to listen
to him and respect his pleadings. Mr. Glover is a
layman (pro se) litigant and unaided by counsel, he
asks this Court that the present petition be liberal
construction according to #Arickson v. Pardus, 551
U.S. 89 (2007):
“[Bleen proceeding, from the
litigation’s outset, without counsel. A
34
document filed pro se is ‘to be liberally
construed,’ Fstel/le, 429 U.S., at 106,
97 S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251, and ‘a
pro se complaint, however inactfully
pleaded, must be held to less stringent
standard than formal pleadings
drafted by lawyers, ibid. (internal
quotation marks omitted). Cf. Federal
Rules Civil Procedure 8(f) (‘All
pleadings shall be so construed as to
do substantial justice’).”
See 551 U.S. at 94. Mr. Glover drafted this petition
after his family received hundreds of cases similar
and on-point to his situation from organizations and
law professors in different States. Mr. Glover
respectfully submits and presents his extraordinary
situation.
1. CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY
JURISDICTION
A. The Supreme Court's Jurisdiction
“Only the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court is
derived directly from the Constitution. Every other
court created by the general government derives its
jurisdiction wholly from the authority of Congress.”
See Kline v. Burke Constr. Co., 260 U.S. 226, 234
(1922). “Congress, having the power to establish the
courts, must define their respective jurisdiction....
Courts created by statute can have no jurisdiction but
such as the statute confers.” See Sheldon v. Sill, 49
U.S. (8 How.) 441, 448-449, 12 L.Ed. 1147 (1850).
ta
“(Als regards all courts of the United States inferior
to this tribunal, two things are necessary to create
jurisdiction, whether original or appellate. The
Constitution must have give to the court the capacity
to take it, and an act of Congress [legislative] must
have supplied it.... To the extent that such action is
not taken, the power les dormant.” See Mayor v.
Cooper, 6 Wall. 247, 252, 18 L.Ed. 851 (1868)
(emphasis added).
B. The Seventh Crreurt’s Jurisdiction
The Seventh Circuit’s “jurisdiction is limited and
is established by Article III of the Constitution and
by statutes enacted by Congress pursuant to the
Constitution.” See United States v. Janik, 10 F.3d
470, 471 (7t Cir. 1993). “Created by these written
laws, federal courts, including [the Seventh Circuit],
‘disclaim all jurisdiction not given by the constitution
or by the law of the United States.” Jd. (quoting Ex
Parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 93, 2 L.Ed. 554
(1807)).
C. The Wisconsin Criminal Courts’ Jurisdiction
In Wisconsin, the commencement of criminal
proceedings are found under Chapter 968, the timely
filing of a criminal complaint by the prosecutor, see
Wis. § 968.01(2) against a defendant at his or her
initial appearance hearing from a warrantless arrest
and detention of their person in according to the time
limitation period provided by Wis. § § 968.04(1)(a)
and 970.01(2), to invoke the criminal circuit court’s
subject-matter jurisdictional power to act and
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proceed thereinafter [to adjudicate] pursuant to
Article VII, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution
and Wis. § 753.03, and in conjunction with Wis. §
970.02(1)(a), to provide the defendant with
constitution notice of the charged filed against him or
her and to provided them with a copy of the
complaint. In addition, for the criminal circuit court
to set bail on the defendant for the “charged” offense.
See Wis. § § § 969.02(1) and 969.03(1) and 970.02(2).
See (Exhibits A-E). lf the criminal complaint is not
filed on the criminal circuit court at the defendant’s
initial appearance from a warrantless arrest and
detention against him or her, then no offense exists,
and therefore the criminal circuit court does not have
subject-matter jurisdiction over a _ nonexistent
offense. See State v. Christensen, 110 Wis.2d 538,
542, 329 N.W.2d 382, 383 (1983).
Wisconsin criminal circuit courts are created
by written law, and their subject-matter jurisdiction
is defined by written law, see Article VII, Section 8 of
the Wisconsin Constitution and Wis. § 753.03. The
criminal circuit courts,
“cannot transcend that jurisdiction. It is
unnecessary to state the reasoning on
which the opinion is found, because it
has been repeatedly given by this Court;
and with decisions hereto rendered on
this point, no member of the bench has,
even for an instant, been dissatisfied.”
See Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 98, 2
L.Ed. 554 (1807). Two-hundred years
later, in 2007, the Supreme Court in
Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 214
6q
(2007), enforced its Bollman decision
when it held that courts have “no
authority to create equitable exceptions
to jurisdictional requirements,” along
with its decision in Vorres v. Oakland
Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 317 n.3
(1988) (“a litigant’s failure to clear a
jurisdiction hurdle can never’ be
‘harmless’ or waived by a court.”), and
enforcing the same in Bowles, 551 U.S.
at 213 (when a litigant’s “error is one of
jurisdictional magnitude, [they] cannot
rely on forfeiture or waiver to excuse
[their] lack of compliance with the
statute’s time limitation.”).
The Wisconsin Court of Appeals’ jurisdiction is
invoked by,
Similar, to the commencement of a
criminal proceeding in the criminal
circuit court, it is timely filing of the
notice of appeal, which invokes the
Wisconsin Court of Appeals’ subject-
matter jurisdiction. See State v.
Williams, 230 Wis.2d 50, 601 N.W.2d
838 (Wis.App. 1999) (appeal dismissed
for untimely filing of the notice of
appeal). An appeal is commenced and
jurisdiction is invoked by the filing of the
notice of appeal with the clerk of the
criminal circuit court, appeal of criminal
circuit court’s order or judgment is
perfected by filing timely notice of
appeal. Jd.
7q
In addition, the Wisconsin Supreme Court's
jurisdiction is invoked by,
A decision of the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals is reviewable only by a petition
to appeal which is granted by the
Wisconsin Supreme Court and that the
petition sha// be filed within 30 days of
the date of the decision of the Wisconsin
Court of Appeals constitutes a limitation
upon the jurisdiction of the Wisconsin
Supreme Court to entertain a petition to
appeal. See Wis. § 808.10; see a/so First
Wisconsin Nat. Bank v. Nicholaou, 87
Wis.2d 360, 274 N.W.2d 704 (Wis. 1979)
(the petition to appeal the decision of the
court of appeals filed outside the
mandatory language of sec. 808.10
constitutes a limitation upon the
jurisdiction of the court to entertain a
petition to appeal, the court has no
subject-matter jurisdiction over’ the
untimely appeal, nor can it extend the
jurisdictional requirements).
2. THE PROTECTIONS OF THE FOURTEENTH
AMENDMENT AND IT’S CODIFICATIONS
This case involves Section 1 of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the United States Constitution, which
provide in relevant part:
Section 1... No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the
8q
privileges or immunities of citizens of
the United States; nor shall any State
deprive any person of life, liberty, or
property, without due process of law; nor
deny to any person within its jurisdiction
the equal protection of the laws.
Sections 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment are the
prohibitions addressed to the States. A State acts by
its legislative, its executive, or its judicial authorities,
by whatever instruments or in whatever modes that
action may be taken. A State can act in no other way.
The Fourteenth Amendment is enforced by its
codifications, Wisconsin Statutes Sections, which
provides:
Article VII, Section 8 of the
Wisconsin Constitution — Circuit court-
Jurisdiction, which provides: “Except as
otherwise provided by law, the circuit
court shal/ have original jurisdiction in
all matters civil and criminal within this
state and such appellate jurisdiction in
the circuit as the legislature may
prescribe by law. The circuit court may
issue all writs necessary in aid of its
jurisdiction.” (Emphasis added). See
(Exhibit-A at 48a, attached to this
petition).
Wisconsin Chapter 753.03, Circuit
Court, Wis. § 753.03 — Jurisdiction of
circuit courts, which provides in relevant
4a
part: "the circuit courts have power to
hear and determine, within their
respective circuits, all civil and criminal
actions....". See (Exhibit-B at 48a,
attached to this petition).
Wisconsin Chapter 968,
Commencement Of Criminal
Proceedings, Wis. § 968.01(2) —
Complaint, which provides: “The
complaint is a written statement of the
essential facts constituting the offense
charged.” See (Exhibit-C at 49a,
attached to this petition).
Wisconsin Chapter 968,
Commencement Of Criminal]
Proceedings, Wis. § 968.04(1)(a) —
Warrant or summons on complaint,
which provides in relevant part: “When
an accused has been arrested without a
warrant and is in custody ... no warrant
shall be issued and the complaint sAa//
be filed forthwith with a _ judge.”
(Emphasis added). See (Exhibit-C at
49a, attached to this petition).
Wisconsin Chapter 969, Bail And
Other Conditions Of Release, Wis. §
969.02(1) -— Release of defendants
charged with misdemeanors, which
provides: “A judge may release a
defendant charged with a misdemeanor
without bail or may permit him to
10a
execute an unsecured appearance bond
in an amount specified by the judge.” See
(Exhibit-D at 50a, attached to this
petition).
Wisconsin Chapter 969, Bail And
Other Conditions Of Release, Wis. §
969.03(1) -— Release of defendants
charged with felonies, which provides: “A
judge may release a defendant charged
with a felony without bail or may permit
him to execute an unsecured appearance
bond or the judge may in addition to
requiring the execution of an appearance
bond or in heu thereof impose one or
more... condition.” See (Exhibit-D at
50a, attached to this petition).
Wisconsin Chapter 970 Criminal]
Procedure — Preliminary Proceedings,
Wis. § 970.01(2) — Initial appearance
before a Judge, which provides: “When a
person is arrested without a warrant
and brought before a judge, a complaint
shall be filed forthwith.” (Emphasis
added). See (Exhibit-E at 5la, attached
to this petition).
Wisconsin Chapter 970 Criminal
Procedure — Preliminary Proceedings,
Wis. § 970.02(1)(a) ~ Duty of a judge at
the initial appearance, which provides:
“At the initial appearance the judge
shallinform the defendant:
lla
Of the charge against him and
Shall furnish the defendant with a copy
of the complaint which sAa// contain the
possible penalties for the offenses set
forth therein. In the case of a felony, the
judge sha/l/ also inform the defendant of
the penalties for the felony with which
the defendant is charged.” (Emphasis
added). See (Exhibit-E at 5la, attached
to this petition).
Wisconsin Chapter 970 Criminal
Procedure — Preliminary Proceedings
Wis. § 970.02(2) — Duty of a judge at the
inttial appearance, which provides: “The
judge sha// admit the defendant to bail
in accordance which ch. 969.” (Emphasis
added). See (Exhibit-E at 5la, attached
to this petition).
The foregoing codifications of the Fourteenth
Amendment protect individuals against deprivation
of their liberty without due process of law and the
equal protect of the law at the hands of the State.
According to Wis. § § 968.04(1)(a) and 970.01(2), the
prosecutor shal/ file the complaint, see Wis. §
968.01(2) against the defendant prior to his or her
initia] appearance, or at the time of his or her initial
appearance from a warrantless arrest and detention
to invoke the criminal circuit court’s subject-matter
jurisdictional power pursuant to Wis. § 753.03 to
hear a criminal action. In addition, the criminal
circuit court’ sha//inform the defendant of the charge
against him or her and sAa// provide the defendant
with a copy of the complaint, which contains the
Lag
charge and penalties against him or her. See Wis. §
970.02(1)(a).
The Fourteenth Amendment, which ordains that
“all person born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of
the United States, and of the State wherein they
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which
shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens
of the United States; nor shail any State deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.”
3. THE REASONS WHY THE COURT SHOULD
RESCIND ITS’ ORIGINAL DENIAL AND RECALL
ITS MANDATE ON MR. GLOVER’S HABEAS §
2254 APPEAL, INSTEAD OF SANCTIONING HIM.
A. The Accusatory Instrument Is
A Jurisdictional Document.
There are three accusatory instruments used to
charge a defendant in a court of law, they are an
indictment of a grand jury, an J/nformation and
complaint of the public prosecutor. An accusatory
instrument is “la] document in which an accusation
of crime is set forth like an indictment, information
or complaint.” See Black’s Law Dictionary at 15
(1891-1991).
This Court has held that an indictment mects
the requirement of Rule 7(c)(1) if it (1) contains the
elements of the offense charged; (2) fairly informs the
13a
defendant of the nature of the charge against him;
and (3) enables the defendant to plead the judgment
as a bar to later prosecution for the same offense. See
United States v. Moore, 446 F.3d 671, 676-77 (7 Cir.
2006); see also Fed. R. Crim. P. 7(c) (1) (The
indictment or information must be a plain, concise
and definite written statement of the essential facts
constituting the offense charged....”).
The State of South Dakota uses an indictment of
a grand jury, or information of the public prosecutor
to charge a defendant with a crime. See Ronald Lee
Honomichi v. State of South Dakota, No. 13918, 333
N.W.2d 797, 798, 1983 S.D. LEXIS 334, **3-4 (S.D.
1983) (quoting Article VI, § 10 of the South Dakota
Constitution). The South Dakota Supreme Court
stated “{wlithout a formal and sufficient indictment
or information, a court does not acquire subject
matter jurisdiction and thus an accused may not be
punished for a crime.” See Honomrichl, 333 N.W.2d at
798, 1983 S.D. LEXIS at **4 (citing Albrecht v.
United States, 273 U.S. 1, 47 S.Ct. 250 (1927)).
Wisconsin uses as its accusatory instrument a
complaint and not the information to charge a
defendant with a crime, see State of Wisconsin v.
Christopher L. Russell, 251 Wis.2d 482, 640 N.W.2d
565, 2002 Wisc. App. LEXIS 54 (Wis.App. 2002,
unpublished opinion) (the criminal complaint at the
defendant's initial appearance hearing not the
information charged him with a crime, the absence of
the information was a mere defect and did not
deprived the criminal court of subject-matter
jurisdiction). See (Exhibit-K at 75a-83a, attached
14a
hereto); see also State v. Smaxwell, 235 Wis.2d 230,
612 N.W.2d 756 (Wis.App. 2000).
The accusatory instrument, the criminal
complaint is the mandatory and_ jurisdictional
instrument for charging a defendant with an offense
committed against the laws of Wisconsin, Wis. §
968.01(2) - Complaint provides: “The complaint is a
written statement of the essential facts constituting
the offense charged.” Wisconsin criminal circuit
courts’ subject-matter jurisdiction is derived from
written law; and defined by written law, Article VII,
Section of the Wisconsin Constitution and Wis. §
753.03, and is not waivable, and may be raised
despite guilty plea. See State v. Aniton, 183 Wis.2d
125, 129, 515 N.W.2d 302, 303 (1994). Wisconsin
criminal “circuit court’s subject-matter jurisdiction
attaches when the complaint is filed ... the circuit
court lacks criminal subject-matter jurisdiction only
where the complaint does not charge an offense
known to law.” See Aniton, 183 Wis.2d at 129, 515
N.W.2d at 303. “Thus, whether the circuit court has
jurisdiction over a particular criminal complaint
presents a question of statutory and constitutional
interpretation.” See State v. LeQ@ue, 150 Wis.2d 256,
262, 442 N.W.2d 494, 497 (Wis.App. 1989). This
Court in a brief discussion on criminal complaints in
Wisconsin stated in United States v. Shannon, 94
F.3d 1065, 1087-89 (7 Cir. 1996), acknowledging
that the “complaint is a written statement of the
essential facts constituting the offense charged
Because the complaint in Wisconsin and other
jurisdiction is the initial charging instrument in a
felony proceeding.”
1459
B. The Enactment, What Should Have Happened
And What Did not Happened In This Case.
Here, in this present case, at the outset l[initial
appearance], see (Exh-H at 57a-65a), where the State
(prosecutor) forcefully brought Ricardo Glover before
a criminal circuit court in chains and shackles from a
warrantless arrest and detention by police to answer
no criminal offense. Therein the said proceeding, the
prosecutor informs the criminal circuit court that she
did not file her written mandatory and jurisdictional
accusatory instrument (“complaint,” Wis. 968.01(2))
against Mr. Glover charging him with a crime against
the laws of Wisconsin, but requested that the
criminal circuit court set bail on Mr. Glover contrary
to the Fourteenth Amendment and its codifications to
hold him. /d.
The criminal circuit court was duty bound by the
fundamental and threshold principles of subject-
matter jurisdictional law, personal jurisdictional law,
constitutional law, and statutory law to dismiss the
unconstitutional and unlawful proceeding and order
Mr. Glover’s immediate release. Forth coming is an
enactment of what should had occurred, the criminal
circuit court should had informed the prosecutor and
did the forth coming, because it lacked jurisdiction at
the outset:
The criminal circuit court at the outset should
had stated and concluded the followings: We are at
the initial appearance proceeding, which is a
jurisdictional, constitutional and statutory
proceeding, where the court has to perform now, not
/6q
later four (mandatory) duties, non-discretionary
functions, which are:
1) to determine does the court
have subject-matter jurisdictional power
to adjudicate a criminal case (charge or
charges) filed against Mr. Glover therein
the State’s (prosecutor’s) written
mandatory and jurisdictional accusatory
instrument (“complaint,” Wis. §
968.01(2)); 2) to determine does the court
have personal jurisdictional over the
person of Mr. Glover from the State’s
(prosecutor’s) written mandatory and
jurisdictional accusatory instrument
(“complaint,” Wis. § 968.01(2)); 3) for the
court to make a constitutional judicial
determination does probable cause exist
therein the State’s (prosecutor’s) written
mandatory and jurisdictional accusatory
instrument (“complaint,” Wis. §
968.01(2)) for Mr. Glover warrantless
arrest and detention; and, 4) for the
court to set bail on Mr. Glover from the
charge or charges filed against him
therein the State’s (prosecutor’s) written
mandatory and jurisdictional accusatory
instrument (“complaint,” Wis. §
968.01(2)).
However, none can ever be perform now by the
court, because the court’s jurisdictional power has not
been invoked by the State (prosecutor) to act and
proceed hereinafter [to adjudicate], no criminal action
exists before the court against Mr. Glover, none
17a
whatsoever. This proceeding (case) must be dismissed
with prejudice.
Here, at the outset of the criminal proceeding, it
was the State (prosecutor’s) duty to file charges
against an individual who she believed committed a
crime. However, no crime has been committed in this
case that the court 1s aware of, because the State
(prosecutor) did not filed her written mandatory and
jurisdictional accusatory instrument (“complaint,”
Wis. § 968.01(2)) on the court against Mr. Glover
charging him with a crime. In Wisconsin, Chapter
968 -—- “COMMENCEMENT OF CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS,” mandates that a-— criminal
complaint be filed to commencement criminal
proceedings against the accused in the circuit courts.
Wis. § 968.01(2) comp/aint provides: “The complaint
is a written statement of the essential facts
constituting the offense charged.” No written
mandatory and jurisdictional accusatory instrument
(“complaint,” Wis. § 968.01(2)) has been filed on the
court by the State (prosecutor) against Mr. Glover
charging him with a crime:
1) to invoke the court’s subject-matter
jurisdictional power to adjudicate a
criminal proceeding pursuant Article
VII, Section 8 of the Wisconsin and Wis.
§ 753.03 against Mr. Glover;! 2) to
invoke the court’s personal jurisdictional
| A circuit court does not have subject-matter jurisdiction over a
nonexistent offense. See State v. Christensen, 110 Wis.2d 538
542, 329 N.W.2d 382, 383 (1983).
189
power over the person of Mr. Glover; 2 3)
for the court to make a_ judicial
determination of probable cause exist
therein the complaint for Mr. Glover's
warrantless arrest and detention; ° and
4) for the court to set bail on Mr. Glover
for a charged offense. 4
A court’s subject matter jurisdiction is invoked by
the filing of a complaint. The filing of a valid
2 There is no relationship between Mr. Glover and a criminal
complaint for the court to acquire personal jurisdiction over his
person. See State v. Smith, 131 Wis.2d 220, 239, 388 N.W.2d
601, 609 (Wis. 1986).
3 No charge existed for the court to find probable cause for Mr
Glover's warrantless arrest and detention as it did not, because
the prosecutor did not file the written mandatory and
jurisdictional accusatory instrument ("complaint," Wis. §
968.01(2)) against Mr. Glover charging him with a crime. The
“complaint at this point need not contain all the allegations of
fact which if would be necessary to convict. The text to be
apphed at this stage is the same as that which is required for
issuance of a warrant:’ *** enough information [shall] be
presented to the commissioner to enable him to make the
judgment that the charges are not capricious and are
sufficiently supported to justify bringing into play the further
steps of the criminal process.’ Jaben v. United States, (1965),
381 U.S. 214, 224, 85 S.Ct. 1365, 1371...." See State ex rel.
Cullen v. Cecr, 45 Wis.2d 432, 442, 173 N.W.2d 175, 179 (Wis
1970). “The face of the complaint and any affidavits annexed
thereto must recite probable cause for the defendant's
detention.” /d.
4 The court cannot not set bail on Mr. Glover for a nonexistent
offense, only a charged offense therein the prosecutor’s
complaint. See Wis. § § § 969.02(1), 969.03(1) and 970.02(2).
IFa
complaint is therefore a mandatory prerequisite to a
court’s acquiring jurisdiction, subject-matter and
personal. The defense of subject-matter jurisdiction
can never be waived. Even, the absence of the
criminal complaint filed here cannot be waived, even
by a plea of no contest or even guilty. Where as here,
at the outset [initial appearance], the complaint is
not filed; the conviction would be void ab iz:itio for
want of subject matter jurisdiction later if the court
attempts to adjudicate now.
The first and fundamental question here, at the
outset [initial appearance] is that of jurisdiction,
“Itlhe requirement that jurisdiction be established as
a threshold matter ... is ‘inflexible and withcut
exception.” See Mansfield, C. & L.M.R. Co. v. Swan,
111 U.S. 379, 382, 4 S.Ct. 510, 511 (1884). A party
may not waive a defect in subject-matter jurisdiction.
See United States v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 226, 229
(1938). It is well-settled that a court may raise the
question of subject-matter jurisdiction at any time
either on the motion of a party htigant or sua sponte.
ld.
Where as here, at the outset of this proceeding
initial appearance], the State (prosecutor) has
forcefully brought Mr. Glover before this court in
chains and shackles from a warrantless arrest and
detention, the law mandates Mr. Glover be afforded
due process of law, equal protection of the law,
fundamental fairness and non-deprivation of his
liberty pursuant to the Fourteenth Amendment to
the United States Constitution, which is afforded to
all citizens of the United States. Where as here, at
the outset, Mr. Glover has been arrested without a
Aa
warrant and has remained in custody, the
codifications of the Fourteenth Amendment,
mandate:
1) Wis. § 968.04(1)(a) -— Warrant or
summons on complaint, which provides
in relevant part: “When an accused has
been arrested without a warrant and is
in custody ... no warrant sha// be issued
and the complaint sha// be filed
forthwith with a judge;” and 2) Wis. §
970.01(2) — Jnitial appearance before a
Judge, which provides: “When a person is
arrested without a warrant and brought
before a judge, a complaint sha//be filed
forthwith.” Wis. § 968.01(2) complaint
provides: “The complaint is a written
statement of the essential facts
constituting the offense charged.”
[It was the duty of the State (prosecutor) to file
her timely complaint against Mr. Glover if he had
committed a crime, since the State (prosecutor) has
not filed her timely jurisdictional accusatory
instrument (complaint) no crime exist before the
court and the court has no _ subject-matter
jurisdictional power. In addition, criminal subject-
matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred upon the
court by consent. Kelly v. State, 54 Wis.2d 475, 479,
195 N.W.2d 457, 459 (Wis. 1972). Nor can subject-
matter jurisdiction be waived. /d.
Here, at the outset of the proceeding, the court
cannot provide Mr. Glover with a copy of the written
ala
mandatory and jurisdictional accusatory instrument
(““complaint,” Wis. 968.01(2)) and inform him of the
charge against him and penalties for that charge as
mandated by law, see Wis. § 970.02(1)(a), because the
prosecutor did not filed her written mandatory and
jurisdictional accusatory instrument (“complaint,’
Wis. § 968.01(2)) on the court charging him with a
crime to invoke the court’s jurisdictional power.
“Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all
in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to declare the law,
and when it ceases to exist, the only function
remaining to the court is that of announcing the fact
and dismissing the cause.” See Ex parte McCardle, 7
U.S. 506, 514, 19 L.Ed. 264 (1868).
Without filing the written mandatory and
jurisdictional accusatory instrument (“complaint,”
Wis. § 968.01(2)) on the court by the prosecution now,
at the outset [initial appearance] of this case against
Mr. Glover from his warrantless arrest and detention
in according to the time limitation period provided by
Wis. § § 968.04(1)(a) and 970.01(2), in conjunction
with Wis. § 970.02(1)(a), charging that he committed
an offense against the laws of Wisconsin, no criminal
action exists. Wis. § 753.03 —Jurisdiction of circuit
courts, provides in relevant part: “the circuit courts
have power to hear and determine, within their
respective circuits, all civil and criminal actions,” no
action exist before this court. The circuit courts are
created by written law, and their subject-matter
jurisdiction is defined by written law, see Article VII,
Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution and Wis. §
753.03. This court “cannot transcend _ that
jurisdiction. It is unnecessary to state the reasoning
on which the opinion is found, because it has been
aaa
repeatedly given by this Court; and with decisions
hereto rendered on this point, no member of the
bench has, even for an instant, been dissatisfied.” See
Ex parte Bollman, 4 Cranch 75, 93, 2 L.Ed. 554
(1807).
Where as here, the prosecutor’s failure to file her
written mandatory and jurisdictional accusatory
instrument (“complaint,” Wis. § 968.01(2)) at the
outset [initial appearance] in accordance with the
prescribed time limitation period of Wis. § § §
968.04(1)(a), 970.01(2) and 970.02(1)(a) at the outset
of this proceeding [initial appearance], has deprived
the court of subject-matter jurisdiction pursuant to
Article VI!, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution
and Wis. § 753.03 as well as personal jurisdiction, in
addition because the State’s (prosecutor’s) error is
one of jurisdictional magnitude, the prosecutor has
failed “to clear a jurisdictional hurdle" which "can
never be 'harmless' or waived by [the] court.” See
Torres v. Oakland Scavenger Co., 487 U.S. 312, 317
n.3 (1988).
Having said the following, the court lacks
subject-matter jurisdictional power to adjudicate
upon a none existent criminal action, and therefore
the unconstitutional and unlawful proceeding is
dismissed with prejudice for lack of subject-matter
jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction, and Mr. Glover
is discharged tmmediately from the same, the
unconstitutional and unlawful confinement and
imprisonment of his person.
As submitted above, the criminal circuit court
was duty bound to dismiss the unconstitutional and
Aaa
unlawful proceeding and discharge Mr. Glover from
the same, but failed to do so. This is the end of the
enactment.
C. The On-Point Cases To Mr. Glover’s Case,
Creating Extraordinary Circumstances And In The
Interest Of Justice For The Court To Rescind Its’
Original Order And Recall The Mandate Thereof
Wisconsin and Ohio have the same identical
commencement of criminal proceedings, the filing of
the complaint. In Wisconsin’s Chapter 968 -
“COMMENCEMENT OF CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS,” mandates that a_ criminal
complaint,5 not the information to be filed to
commence criminal proceedings against an accused in
a criminal courts. See Wis. § 968.01(2) complaint
provides, “The complaint is a written statement of the
essential facts constituting the offense charged.”
The Ohio criminal courts have the same
identical commencement of criminal proceedings
5 In addition, other States as Wisconsin and Ohio use a criminal
complaint as its initial charging instruments as well in a
criminal case. See Commonwealth v. Hatchin, 709 A.2d 405
1998 Pa. Super LEXIS 117 (Pennsylvania 1998) (the criminal
complaint, not the information charged the defendant with a
crime, thus, the trial court had subject-matter jurisdiction over
the matter); Commonwealth vy. Khorey, 521 Pa. 1, n.10, 555
A.2d 100, 106 n.10 (Pennsylvania 1989) (Although a guilty plea
results in the waiver of most defenses, an objection to subject:
matter jurisdiction can never be waived); State v. Jelliff 251
N.W.2d 1, 1977 N.D. LEXIS 235 (North Dakota 19977) (a
criminal complaint, supported by an affidavit of probable cause
charged the defendant with an offense)
QYe
against the accused as Wisconsin, mandating that a
criminal complaint be filed. See Ohio Criminal Rule
3 (“The complaint is a written statement of the
essential facts constituting the offense charged.”).
“[A] defect that deprives a court of subject matter
jurisdiction cannot be waived by an accused. The
absence of the criminal complaint cannot be waived
by a plea of no contest or even guilty, since any
conviction resulting from an invalid complaint is a
nullity.” See e.g., Ohto v. Bishop, 1993 Ohio App.
LEXIS 5799, *2 (Ohio App. 1993, unpublished;
Exhibit-L at 84a-88a, attached to this petition)
(citing, State v. Green, 48 Ohio App.3d 121, 548
N.E.2d 334 (Ohio 1988); State v. Miller, 47 Ohio
App.3d 113, 114, 547 N.E.2d 399, 401 (Ohio 1988) (In
the absence of a sufficient formal accusation, a court
acquires no jurisdiction whatsoever, and if if
assumes jurisdiction, a trial and conviction are a
nullity .... the complaint is the jurisdictional
instrument of the municipal court.”)
The State of Ohio, uses a criminal complaint a
its initial charging instrument as Wisconsin. See e.£
State v. Sharp, 2009 Ohio 1854, 2009 Ohio App
LEXIS 1561 (Ohio App. 2009), where the Ohio Court
of Appeals stated:
In the absence of a sufficient formal
accusation, a Court acquires ni
jurisdiction whatsoever, and if it
assumes jurisdiction, a trial and
conviction are a nullity ... The complaint
is the jurisdictional instrument of the
municipal court.”
See Sharp, 2009 Ohio 1854, 414, 2009 Ohio App.
LEXIS 1561, **5. “A court’s subject matter
jurisdiction is invoked by the filing of a complaint.”
See Id. “The filing of a valid complaint is therefore a
necessary prerequisite to a courts acquiring
jurisdiction.” 2009 Ohio 1854, 914, 2009 Ohio App.
LEXIS 1561, **5-6. “We review the determination of
subject matter jurisdiction de novo, without any
deference to the trial court.” See Sharp, 2009 Ohio
1854, 414, 2009 Ohio App. LEXIS 1561, **6. The
Sharp court further stated that,
‘IT The defense of subject-matter
jurisdiction can never be waived The
absence of the criminal complaint cannot
be waived by a plea of no contest or even
guilty, since any conviction resulting
from an invalid complaint is a nullity
State v. Bishop, (1993), Clark App. No
3070, 1993 Ohio App. LEXIS
unreported. The question of subject
matter jurisdiction is so basic that it can
be raised at any stage before the trial
court or any appellate court, or even
collaterally in subsequent and
proceeding ;
Lf the complaint
filed he "a0 _— }
hiled, the convictions are void
for want of subject matter jurisdiction
is the jurisdiction of the Mount Vernor
Municipal
Further, appellant is not barred from
raising the issue at this stage in the
proceedings, as subject matter
jurisdiction cannot be waived.”
See Sharp, 2009 Ohio 1854, 915 & 417, 2009 Ohio
App. LEXIS 1561, **6, **7; Crty of Zanesvill v. Rouse,
2009 Ohio 2689, 2009 App. LEXIS 2278 (Ohio 2009)
In Ohio, as in Wisconsin, under Ohio Criminal Rul
3, provides, “The complaint is a written statement of
the essential facts constituting the offense charged.’
A defect that deprives a court of subject-matter
jurisdiction cannot be waived by an accused. The
absence of the criminal complaint cannot be waived
by a plea of no contest or even guilty, since any
conviction resulting from an invalid complaint is a
nullity. See e.g., State v. Green, 48 Ohio App.3d 12]
548 N.E.2d 334 (Ohio 1988)
A court can acquire no jurisdiction to try a
person for a criminal offense unless he has been
charged with the commission of the particular
offense and charged in the particular form and mod
required by law. If that 1s wanting, his trial and
conviction 1s a nullity, for no person can be deprived
of either life, liberty, or property without due process
of law.” See e.g., People v. Walley, 21 Misc.2d 623,
626, 202 N.Y.S.2d 859, 862-863 (New York 1959); see
also Stewart v. State, 41 Ohio App. 351, 353-354, 181
N.if. 11, 112 (Ohio Ct. App. 1932, unpublished)
(same); Morse v. People, 43 Col. 118, 122, 95 P. 285,
286-287 (Colorado 1908) (same) (quoting Dykeman v
Budd, 3 Wis. 640, 643 (Wis. 1854))
ATa
“The general rule applicable in_ criminal
proceedings ... is that by pleading guilty, the
defendant ... waives all nonjurisdictional defects.” See
State v. Norris, 2004 UT App. 267, 94, 97 P.3d 732,
735-736 (Utah App. 2004). “Subject matter
jurisdiction is the power and authority of the court to
determine a controversy and without which it cannot
proceed.” /d. at 45, 97 P.3d at 736. “When subject
matter jurisdiction is an issue, ‘it is the duty of this
court to satisfy not only of its own jurisdiction, but
also that of the law courts in a cause under review.”
Id. (quoting EEOC v. Chicago Club, 86 F.3d 1423,
1428 (7th Cir. 1996) (crting Mitchell v. Maurer, 293
U.S. 237, 244, 55 .Ct. 162 (1934)).
If a court has no jurisdiction over the subject-
matter of the criminal conviction, the defendant’s
conviction in that court is void. See Wright v. State, 2
Tenn. Crim. App. 95, 451 S.W.2d 707, 709 (Tenn.
Crim. App. 1969). “If the Court rendering a judgment
sought to be attacked collaterally is one of general
jurisdiction, there is a presumption that nothing shall
be intended to be out of its jurisdiction except that
which appears upon the face of the judgment or in the
record of the case in which that judgment is
rendered.” See Bomar v. State ex rel. Stewart, 201
Tenn. 480, 483, 300 S.W.2d 885, 887 (Tenn. 1957); see
also State v. Ritchie, 20 S.W.3d 624, 631, 2000 Tenn.
LEXIS 156, **19 (Tenn. 2000) (“the lack of
jurisdiction must appear upon the face of the
judgment or in the record of the case in which the
judgment was rendered.”).
Furthermore, if it becomes apjarent to a court
reviewing the judgment or record of the criminal
A8q
circuit court [trial court] that the criminal circuit
court [trial court] lacked subject-matter jurisdiction,
then the reviewing court shall vacate the judgment
and dismiss the case. See State v. Seagraves, 837
S.W.2d 615, 616 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1992); see also Ex
parte Nielsen, 131 U.S. 176, 183 (1889) (“if [the trial
court's} want of power appears on the face of the
record of his condemnation, whether in_ the
indictment or elsewhere, the court which has
authority to issue the writ lof habeas corpus} is bound
to release him.”).
The court in Honomichl, supra, stated: “Subject
matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred by
agreement, consent, or waiver. State v. Higgins. 145
N.W.2d 478 (N.D. 1966); see also, State v. Cochrun,
328 N.W.2d 271 (S.D. 1983). A reviewing court is
required to consider the issue of subject matter
jurisdiction even where it was not raised below in
order where to avoid an unwarranted exercise of
judicial authority. State v. Wiese, 201 N.W.2d 734
(la. 1972). As we held in Mee, 67 S.D. 335, 292
N.W.2d 875, subject matter jurisdiction cannot be
acquired by estoppel.” See Honomichl, supra, 333
N.W.2d at 799, 1983 S.D. LEXIS at **7.
D. No Provision Of The Constitution Or Statute, Or
Both, Gave The Criminal Circuit Court
Jurisdictional Power To Adjudicate At The Outset,
[Initial Appearance], To Condemn And Enter A
Judgment Against Mr. Glover.
The facts of this case are not in dispute; they
have been taken directly from the record. On May 29,
Qa
1989, S.B. stated to Racine, Wisconsin police that
while she and her brother-in-law (Ricardo Glover)
were returning from Kenosha, Wisconsin to Racine,
Wisconsin looking for her mother, Glover parked his
vehicle and touched her crotch and buttock area
while they were in his car, see (Exh-F at 52a-53a).
However, S.B. informed Sgt. Grayhart of the Racine
Police Department that no sexual conduct or contact
took place on the part of Mr. Glover.
Subsequently, police took S.B. to Racine St.
Luke’s Hospital Emergency Room, Doctor G_.L.
Brown attending physician observed and talked with
S.B., he reported as follows:
A female involved in an assault, which
she was supposed to be taken over to her
grandmother’s home lin Kenosha County]
by her brother-in-law.
When they could not (find her
grandmother there, they were returning to
patient’s sister's home [in Racine County]
so she could spend the night. Then the
brother-in-law took her to a bridge and, she
states, attempted to sexually molest her,
getting very close to her, placing his hands
on her crotch and on her chest. When he
could not get her jumpsuit off easily,
apparently aborted his attempt to molest
her and decided that he did not want her
talking about it, so he took a torn towel and
“tied” her hands together behind her back,
told her that she wasn’t going to be able to
309
tell anybody about this and proceeded to
stop on a bridge overlying a river with
several feet of water in it, threw her off the
bridge approximately 15-20 feet to the
water below. Patient was able to “untie” her
hand and escape.
See (Exh-F at 52a-53a). But, the State prosecutor’s
very own witnesses, Michael Blalke and Cruz
Jamaillo testified under oath contrary to S.B.
“untying” her hands from behind her back and
escaping, both, Mr. Blake and Mr. Jamaillo stated
under oath that when S.B. “appeared” in their home
her hands were “tied” behind her back and Mr.
Jamaillo was the one who “untied” her hands from
behind her back. S.B. stated that she “untied” her
hands from behind her back and went to seek help
was untrue as both witnesses testified under oath.
The only way the incident could have occurred is that
S.B. walked into the water with her hands freely
(“untied”), and walked out of the water with someone
assisting her in “tying” her hands behind her back
when she was wet. As the evidence clearly revealed,
S.B. was not thrown over a bridge.
Dr. Brown’s observation of and discussion with
S.B., surrounding the facts of the alleged incident
continues, he reported further that S.B. stated:
She scraped up her leg during the fall,
landed primarily on her bottom. Absolutely
denies any pain at this point. Seems to be
in relatively good spirits. Is able to describe
the incident consistently between those
3/q
interviewers and relative good detaul....
Patient absolutely denies that any actual
sexual contact took place.
See id.. From S.B.’s statements alone to Dr. Brown
and Racine police along, without any investigation
id., police made a deliberate plan to arrest Mr. Glover
without a warrant. Subsequently, at 6:00 a.m., on
May 29, 1989, Racine police made a warrantless
arrest of Mr. Glover, placing him in custody and did
not release him from their custody, and stated that
on the same date they obtained a statement from Mr.
Glover and other evidence during the warrantless
arrest and detention of Mr. Glover. The statement
police allegedly obtained, Mr. Glover never read it,
nor signed it, nor knowledge the correctness of it,
that statement entered into evidence against Mr.
Glover was not his own statement.
5.B. made another statement to police and signed
it as well while Mr. Glover was in Racine police
custody, informing police that her initial statement
was untrue. This signed statement, see (Exh-G at
54a-56a), of S.B. contradicts her initial statement to
Dr. Brown and Racine police, see (Exh-F at 52a-53a)
to get Mr. Glover arrested, and shows that Mr.
Glover was warrantlessly arrested and jailed falsely,
in fact, it shows the untruthfulness of S.B. See (Exh-
F; Exh-G at 54a-56a). On the same date, May 29,
1989, Officer Cindy Cros of the Kenosha Police
Department reported that S.B. informed her that
while she was spending the night in Racine at her
sister's home, her sister is married to Ricardo Glover,
that she was awaken at approximately 1:00 a.m. by
Glover on this date and was driven back to Kenosha
324
to her residence by Glover: nobody was home at S.B.’s
residence except her grandmother. S.B. was held with
a knife against her throat by Glover and ordered to
take her clothes off or she would be killed. She
complied and she lay on top of her mother’s bed with
Glover on top of her naked. S.B. “states that
intercourse did not occur but Glover ejaculated on the
sheet.” See (Exh-G at 55a). As the examination of the
bedsheets revealed: “[n]o semen was detected on the
panties, leggings or bedsheet.” See (Exh-I at 66a-
71a). S.B. was untruthful once again.
On May 30, 1989, the Racine District Attornev’s
Office (prosecutor) forcefully brought Mr. Glover
before a criminal circuit court for an_ initial
appearance in chains and shackles from his
warrantless arrest and detention by police pursuant
to the Fourteenth Amendment’s due process clause
and equal protection clause, and the Fourteenth
Amendment’s codifications, Wis. § § 968.04(1)(a) and
970.01(2) in conjunction with Wis. § 970.02(1)(a), to:
1) invoke the criminal circuit
court's subject-matter jurisdictional
power to adjudicate a criminal case
(charge or charges) filed against Mr.
Glover therein the prosecutor’s written
mandatory and jurisdictional accusatory
instrument (“complaint,” Wis. §
968.01(2));
2) to invoke the criminal circuit
court’s personal jurisdictional power
over the person of Mr. Glover from her
43a
written mandatory and jurisdictional
accusatory instrument (“complaint,” Wis.
§ 968.01(2));
3) for the criminal circuit court to
make a constitutional judicial
determination does probable cause exist
from the her written mandatory and
jurisdictional accusatory instrument
(“complaint,” Wis. § 968.01(2)) for Mr.
Glover warrantless arrest and detention;
and,
4) for the criminal] circuit court to
set bail on Mr. Glover from the charge or
charges filed against him therein her
written mandatory and jurisdictional
accusatory instrument (“complaint,” Wis.
§ 968.01(2)).
Here, at the outset [initial appearance] of this
case, contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment’s due
process of law and equal protection of the law, and
it’s codification, Wis. § § 968.04(1)(a), and Wis. §
970.01(2) in conjunction with 970.02(1)(a), the
prosecutor did not filed her timely written mandatory
and jurisdiction accusatory instrument (“complaint,”
Wis. § 968.01(2))§ against Mr. Glover charging him
§ In addition, the prosecutor, an officer of the court stated to the
criminal circuit court without filing her written mandatory and
jurisdictional accusatory instrument (“‘complaint,” Wis. §
968.01(2)) against Mr. Glover that he “raped” S.B, see (Exh-H at
57a-65a). This was intentional misconduct on the part of the
prosecuting attorney because she knew that Dr. Brown's report
34q
with a crime in accordance with the prescribed time
limitation period of Wis. § § 968.04(1)(a) (Mr. Glover
was arrested without a warrant on May 29, 1989 and
is in police custody, no warrant sha/l/ be issued for
him and the complaint charging him with an offense
Shall be filed now or at his initial appearance on the
criminal circuit court by the prosecutor) and
970.01(2) (Mr. Glover was arrested without a warrant
and on May 30, 1989 brought before an initial
appearance hearing court, the complaint shal/ be
filed on the initial appearance hearing court against
him now) in conjunction with Wis. § 970.02(1)(a) (at
this initial appearance hearing the court sha//inform
Mr. Glover of the charge against him and sfa//
furnish him with a copy of the complaint which sha//
contain the possible penalties for the offenses set
forth therein. In the case he is charged with a felony,
the judge shal] also inform him of the penalties for
that felony which he is charged) to invoke the
criminal circuit court’s subject-matter jurisdictional
power and personal jurisdiction power to act and
proceed at the outset pursuant to Article VII, Section
8 of the Wisconsin Constitution and Wis. § 753.03 in
this case. See (Exh-H at 57a-65a). In addition, the
Wisconsin Legislature made no provision therein
Wis. § § § 968.04(1)(a), 970.01(2) or 970.02(1)(a), for
the criminal circuit court to allow the prosecutor time
to extend the filing of her written mandatory and
jurisdictional accusatory instrument (“complaint,”
Wis. 968.01(2)) after Mr. Glover's initial appearance
to invoke its subject-matter jurisdiction.
stated that S.B. was not raped and “injury free,” see (Exh-F at
52a-53a) and Officer Cros’ reported stated “that rntercourse did
not occur,” see (Exh-G at 55a; Exh © at 66a-71a).
35q
Mr. Glover’s constitutional rights to due process
of law, equal protection of the law, fundamental
fairness and non-deprivation of his liberty pursuant
to the Fourteenth Amendment and his statutory
rights, which are codifications of the Fourteenth
Amendment, Wis. § § § 968.04(1)(a), 970.01(2) and
970.02(1)(a), were violated,?7 when the criminal circuit
court failed to dismiss the case against him for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction,
adjudicating on unlawful “hypothetical jurisdiction,”
and setting an unconstitutional and unlawful bail on
him of Ten Thousand Dollars, ($10,000.00), holding
him for the nonexistent offense of “further
investigation.” Jd Here, at the outset [initial
appearance], the accusatory instrument (complaint)
was not filed on the criminal circuit court in
accordance with the prescribed time limitation
period, the conviction and judgment thereof is void ab
initio for want of subject matter jurisdiction, as the
jurisdiction of the criminal circuit court was never
invoked, as subject matter jurisdiction cannot be
waived. In addition, when the prosecutor failed to file
her written mandatory and jurisdictional accusatory
instrument (complaint) against Mr. Glover at the
outset of the criminal case [initial appearance], see
(Exh-H at 57a-65a), the prosecutor failed “to clear a
jurisdictional hurdle” which “can never be ‘harmless’
7 This was a continuous violation of Mr. Glover’s Fourteenth
Amendment rights to due process of law, equal protection of the
law, fundamental! fairness and deprivation of his liberty that
could not be waived, because it “went to the power of the State
to bring him into court to answer [no] charge brought against
him.” See Blackledge v. Perry, 417 U.S. 21, 30 (1974) (emphasis
added in brackets).
Soa
or waived by a court.” See Torres., 487 U.S. at 317
n.3.
The criminal circuit court lacked subject-matter
jurisdictional power to adjudicate at the outset
[initial appearance] pursuant to Article VII, Section 8
of the Wisconsin Constitution and Wis. § 753.03,
because the written mandatory and jurisdictional
accusatory instrument (“complaint,” Wis. § 968.01(2))
was not filed on it by the prosecutor in accordance
with the prescribed time limitation period of Wis. § §
968.04(1)(a) (Mr. Glover was arrested without a
warrant on May 29, 1989 and its in police custody, no
warrant shal/ be issued for him and the complaint
charging him with an offense shal/ be filed now or at
his initial appearance on the criminal circuit court by
the prosecutor) and 970.01(2) (Mr. Glover was
arrested without a warrant and on May 30, 1989
brought before an initial appearance hearing court,
the complaint shal/ be filed on the initial appearance
hearing court against him now) in conjunction with
Wis. § 970.02(1)(a) (at this initial appearance hearing
the court sAal/ inform Mr. Glover of' the charge
against him and sHa// furnish him with a copy of the
complaint which sfa// contain the possible penalties
for the offenses set forth therein. In the case he is
charged with a felony, the judge shaJ/also inform him
of the penalties for that felony which he is charged),
because “[wlithout jurisdiction the court cannot
proceed at all in any cause. Jurisdiction is power to
declare the law, and when it ceases to exist, the only
function remaining to the court is that of announcing
the fact and dismissing the cause.” See Steel Co. v.
Citizens for a Better Environment, 523 U.S. 83, 94
(1998) (quoting Ex parte McCardle, 7 Wall. 506, 54,
379
19 L.Ed. 264 (1868)). “The requirement that
jurisdiction be established as a threshold matter ... is
‘inflexible and without exception.” See Steel Co., 523
U.S. at 94-95 (quoting Mansfield, C. & L.M.R. Co. v.
Swan, 111 U.S. 379, 382, 4 S.Ct. 510, 511, 28 L.Ed.
462 (1884)).
The criminal circuit court at the outset of this
criminal case [initial appearance] acted and
proceeded thereinafter on unconstitutional and
unlawful “hypothetical jurisdiction,” see Steel Co.,
523 U.S. at 84, 94, no written mandatory and
jurisdictional accusatory instrument (“complaint”,
Wis. § 968.01(2)) was filed on it by the prosecutor to
invoke it subject-matter jurisdictional power, see
(Exh-H at 57a-65a). The defect was jurisdictional, not
only because no written mandatory and jurisdictional
accusatory instrument (“complaint”, Wis. § 968.01(2))
was filed against Mr. Glover charging him with an
offense for the criminal circuit court to adjudicate,
but also the defect was a violation against the scope
of power granted to the criminal circuit court to
adjudicate, at the outset [initial appearance] of the
criminal case, see (Exh-H at 57a-65a). See Steel Co.,
523 U.S. at 101-102 (“For a court to pronounce upon
the meaning or constitutionality of a state or federal
law when it has no jurisdiction to do so is, by very
definition, for a court to act ultra vires.”).
As the Supreme Court held,
“courts which are created by written law,
and whose jurisdiction is defined by
written law, cannot transcend that
384
jurisdiction. [t is unnecessary to state
the reasoning on which the opinion is
found, because it has been repeatedly
given by this Court; and with decisions
hereto rendered on this’ point, no
member of the bench has, even for an
instant, been dissatisfied.”
See Bollman, 4 Cranch at 93, 2 L.Ed. 554. The lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction of the criminal circuit
court at the outset of the criminal proceeding [initial
appearance], see (Exh-H at 57a-65a), involved its
power “to hear a case, can never be forfeited or
waived.” See United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625,
630 (2002). The criminal circuit court at the outset of
the criminal case was without the written mandatory
and jurisdictional accusatory instrument
(“complaint,” Wis. § 968.01(2)) filed on it by the
prosecutor, did not make the constitutional judicial
determination that probable cause existed for Mr.
Glover’s warrantless arrest and detention. The law
mandated that the written mandatory = and
jurisdictional accusatory instrument:
“[Clomplaint at this point need not
contain all the allegations of fact which
if would be necessary to convict. The text
to be applied at this stage is the same as
that which is required for issuance of a
warrant: *** enough information [shall]
be presented to the commissioner to
enable him to make the judgment that
the charges are not capricious and are
sufficiently supported to justify bringing
into play the further steps of the
3F 6
criminal process.’ Jaben v. United states,
(1965), 381 U.S. 214, 224, 85 S.Ct. 1365,
1371 ... The face of the complarnt and
any affidavits annexed thereto must
recite probable cause for the defendant's
detention.”
See Cullen, supra 45 Wis.2d at 442, 173 N.W.2d at
179. No charge existed for the criminal circuit court
to find probable cause for Mr. Glover’s warrantless
arrest and detention as it did not, nor to set a Ten
Thousand Dollar, $10,000.00 bail on Mr. Glover as it
did to hold him, because the prosecutor did not file
her written mandatory and jurisdictional accusatory
instrument (“complaint,” Wis. § 968.01(2)) against
Mr. Glover charging him with a crime, see (Exh-H at
57a-65a). The criminal circuit court could not set bail
on Mr. Glover for a nonexistent offense, the law
mandates that the criminal circuit court can only set
bail for a charged offense therein a_ written
mandatory and jurisdictional accusatory instrument
(““complaint,” Wis. § 968.01(2)). See Wis. § § §
969.02(1), 969.03(1) and 970.02(2).
On January 8, 1990, jury trial commenced, but
ended in a plea. Mr. Glover pled not because he was
guilty, but because he feared the criminal circuit
court judge. See (Affidavit In Support, attached to
this document as Exh-M at 89a-97a).
The criminal circuit court lacking subject-matter
jurisdiction and personal jurisdiction from the outset
linitial appearance} of the criminal case, without
jurisdiction being conferred on it by law, which
4Og
40
amounted to no more than consent and hypothetical
jurisdiction, see (Exh-H at 57a°65a), on February 22,
1990, the criminal circuit court that lacked subject
matter jurisdiction to sentenced Mr. Glover to serve
the maximum period of 45 years imprisonment and
confinement in the Wisconsin Department of
Corrections. See (Exh-d at 72a-74a).
The criminal circuit court, which sentenced Mr.
Glover, was therefore without jurisdiction, and its
judgment is void, see (Exh-Jd at 72a-74a). The
judgment of conviction Mr. Glover is imprisoned and
confined thereunder is “absolutely void for want of
jurisdiction in the court that pronounced it,” see (Exh-
J at 72a-74a, Judgment of Conviction, Case No.
89CF402), “because such jurisdiction was absent at
the beginning ... of the proceedingl),” see (Exh-H at
57a°65a, Initial Appearance Transcript, Case No.
89C F402). See Frank v. Mangum, 237 U.S. 309, 327
(1915).
The on-point cases to Mr. Glover's case presented
above in section 3C of this petition at pages 24°29 and
respectfully incorporated herein’ by © reference,
creating extraordinary circumstances exists and in
the interest of justice for the Court to rescind its’
original order and recall the mandate thereof. In
addition, the Sharp, supra, Green, supra, and Miller,
supra, cases cited are directly on-point to Mr. Glover's
case. The fundamental and threshold principles of
subject-matter jurisdictional law are clear for all
courts. The corollary to the rule is consent, collusion,
laches, waiver, or estoppel cannot confer that subject>
matter jurisdiction otherwise lacking. Subject matter
jurisdiction cannot be thus conferred irrespective of
Lila
whether the consent was the result of an honest
mistake or otherwise:
A plea of guilty or no contest “waives all
nonjurisdictional defects and defenses,”
and that “[jlurisdictional defects’ can
involve the court’s personal jurisdiction
over the person of the defendant or the
court’s jurisdiction over the _ subject
matter of the proceeding.” See State v.
Dietzen, 164 Wis.2d 205, 210, 474
N.W.2d 753, 755 (Wis.App. 1991); see
also State v. Cvorovic, 158 Wis.2d 630,
634, 462 N.W.2d 897, 898 (Wis.App.
1990). “Subject matter jurisdiction is
conferred on the court by law; it cannot
be conferred by consent, nor can it be
waived.” See Dietzen, 164 Wis.2d at 210-
211, 474 N.W.2d at 755.
When the prosecutor did not file her written
mandatory and jurisdictional accusatory instrument
(“complaint,” Wis. § 968.01(2)) against Mr. Glover at
the outset [initial appearance] on the criminal circuit
court from his warrantless arrest and detention in
accordance with the prescribed time limitation period,
Wis. § § 968.04(1)(a) and 970.01(2) in conjunction
with Wis. § 970.02(1)(a), what occurred is,
a) the prosecutor deprived the
criminal circuit court of subject-matter
jurisdiction pursuant to Article VII,
Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution
and Wis. § 753.03, the prosecutor
4Y2q
“failure to clear a jurisdiction hurdle can
never be ‘harmless’ or waived by a
court.” See Torres, supra, 487 U.S. at
317 n.3;3
and,
b) the prosecutor deprived the
criminal circuit court of subject-matter
jurisdiction pursuant to Article VII,
Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution
ana Wis. § 753.03, the State's
(prosecutor’s) error is one_ of
jurisdictional magnitude, it cannot rely
on any excuse for its lack of compliance
with the statute’s limitations. See
Bowles, 551 U.S. at 213 (citing Arbaugh,
546 U.S. at 513-514, 126 S.Ct. 1235, 163
L.Ed.2d 1097).
Furthermore,
the criminal circuit court had no power
to “delayed” or “stayed” the filing of the
written mandatory and_ jurisdictional
accusatory instrument (“complaint,” Wis.
§ 968.01(2)) at the outset [initial
appearancel, where the defendant has
been brought before from a
warrantlessly arrested and detention in
chains and shackles, to allow the State
(prosecutor) time to file an out-of-time
accusatory instrument [complaint] to
invoke its subject-matter jurisdiction.
Such a “delay” or “stay” by the criminal
439
circuit court carries no weight, because a
criminal circuit court has “no authority
to create equitable exceptions’ to
jurisdictional requirements.”
See Bowles, 551 U.S. at 214.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Extraordinary circumstances exist and in the
interest of justice for this Court to rescind its original
order denying Mr. Glover habeas corpus relief and
recall the mandate thereof. Mr. Glover was deprived
of his hberty without due process and equal
protection of the law, contrary to the Fourteenth
Amendment and its codifications. The criminal
circuit court lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to
condemn him and entered a judgment of conviction
against him. Mr. Glover asks that this Court
discharge him from the same immediately, instead of
sanctioning him.
VERIFICATION
I, Ricardo Glover declare under penalty of perjury
that the foregoing is true and correct. Executed on
this 21st day of July, 2010.
Respectfully submitted,
Kop?
Ricardo Glover, Affiant-Layman
Prisoner ID No. 207606
Oshkosh Correctional Institution
Post Office Box 3310
Oshkosh, Wisconsin 54903-3310
44a
INDEX TO EXHIBITS
Exhibit-A
Exhibit-B
Exhibit-C
Exhibit-D
Article VII, Section 8 of the Wisconsin
Constitution — Circuit court:
jurisdiction.
Reformatted from page Al to 48a
Wisconsin Chapter 753.03, Circuit
Court, Wis. § 753.03 — Jurisdiction of
circuit courts.
Reformatted from page B1 to 48a
Wisconsin Chapter 968, Commencement
Of Criminal Proceedings, Wis. §
968.01(2) — Complaint and Wis. §
968.04(1)(a) — Warrant or summons on
complaint
Reformatted from pages C1-C2 to 49a
Wisconsin Chapter 969, Bail And Other
Conditions Of Release, Wis. § 969.02(1)—
Release of defendants charged with
Misdemeanors and Wis. § 969.03(1) —
Release of defendants charged with
felonies.
Reformatted from page D1-D2 to 50a
Y 5a
Exhibit-E
Exhibit-F
Exhibit-G
Exhibit-H
Exhibit-I
Wisconsin Chapter 970 Criminal
Procedure Preliminary Proceedings,
Wis. § 970.01(2) — Initial appearance
before a judge; Wis. § 970.02(1)(a) —
Duty of a judge at the initial
appearance; and Wis. § 970.02(2) — Duty
of a judge at the initial appearance.
Reformatted from page E1 to 5la
Emergency Room Report, St. Luke’s
Hospital, Racine, Wisconsin, Doctor
G.L. Brown (Dated: May 29, 1989).
Reformatted from pages Al to 52a-°53a
Kenosha, Wisconsin, Police Report,
Officer Cindy Cros, (Dated: May 29,
1989).
Reformatted from pages G1-G3 to 54a-
06a
Initial Appearance Transcript, Racine,
Wisconsin, State v. Glover, Case No.
89CF402 (Dated: May 30, 1989).
Reformatted from pages H1-H7 to 57a-
65a
Laboratory Findings, Wisconsin State
Crime Laboratory, (Dated: July 31, 1989
and July 6, 1989).
Reformatted from pages I1-I3 to 66a-
Yla
Heq
Exhibit-J
Exhibit-K
Exhibit-L
Exhibit-N
Judgment of Conviction, Racine,
Wisconsin, State v. Glover, Case No.
89CF402 (Entered: February 22,
1990).
Reformatted from page J1 to 72a-74a
State of Wisconsin vy. Christopher L.
Russell, 251 Wis.2d 482, 640 N.W.2d
565, 2002 Wisc. App. LEXIS 54
(Wis.App. 2002, unpublished
opinion).
Reformatted from pages K1-K4 to 75a-
83a
State of Ohio v. Billy Ray Bishop, 1993
Ohio App. LEXIS 5799 (Ohio App.
1993, unpublished opinion).
Reformatted from pages L1-L3 to 84a-
88a
Affidavit In Support of Petition from
Ricardo Glover (Dated: July 19,
2010).
Reformatted from pages M1-M7 to 89a-
a-97a
Order, United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit denying Habeas
Corpus Appeal (Entered: November 25,
1997).
Reformatted from page N1-N9 to 98a-
llla
479
Article 7, Section 8 of the Wisconsin Constitution
(1989-1990)
Circuit court: jurisdiction. [4s amended April 1977
“Except as otherwise provided by law, the circuit
court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters
civil and criminal within this state and _ such
appellate jurisdiction in the circuit as the legislature
may prescribe by law. The circuit court may issue all
writs necessary in aid of its jurisdiction.”
WISCONSIN CHAPTER 753
CIRCUIT COURTS
(1989-1990)
753.03 Jurisdiction of circuit courts. The circuit court
have general jurisdiction prescribed for them by
article VII of the constitution and have power to
issue all writs, process and commissions provided in
article VII of the constitution or by the statutes, or
which may be necessary to the due execution of the
powers vested in them. The circuit courts have power
to hear and determine, within their respective
circuits, all civil and criminal actions and
proceedings unless exclusive jurisdiction is given to
some other court; and they have all the power,
according to the usages of courts of law and equity,
necessary to the full and complete administration of
justice, and to carry into effect their judgments,
orders and other determinations, subject to review by
the court of appeals or the supreme court as provided
by law. The courts and the judges thereof have power
to award all such writs, process and commissions,
throughout the state, returnable in the proper
county.
489
WISCONSIN CHAPTER 968
COMMENCEMENT OF CRIMINAL
PROCEEDINGS
(1989-1990)
968.01(2) Complaint. The complaint is a written
statement of the essential facts constituting the
offense charged. A person make a complaint on
information and belief. Except as provided in sub.
(3), the complaint shall be made upon oath before a
district attorney or judge as provided in this chapter.
968.04(1)(a) Warrant or summons on complaint,
When an accused has been arrested without a
warrant and is in custody or appears voluntarily
before a judge, no warrant shall be issued and the
complaint shall be filed forthwith with a judge.
WISCONSIN CHAPTER 969
BAIL AND OTHER CONDITIONS OF RELEASE
(1989-1990)
969.02(1) Release of defendants charged with
misdemeanors. A judge may release a defendant
charged with a misdemeanor without bail or may
permit him to execute an unsecured appearance bond
in an amount specified by the judge.
969.03(1) Release of defendants charged with
felonies. A defendant charged with a felony may be
release by the judge without bail or upon the
execution of an unsecured appearance bond or the
judge may in addition to require the execution of an
appearance bond or in lieu thereof impose one or
more of the following conditions which will assure
appearance for trial.
50g
WISCONSIN CHAPTER 970
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ~— PRELIMINARY
PROCEEDINGS
(1989-1990)
970.01(2) Initial appearance before a judge. When a
person is arrested without a warrant and brought
before a judge, a complaint shall be filed forthwith.
970.02(1)(a) Duty of a judge at the initial appearance.
At the initial appearance the judge shall inform the
defendant:
Of the charge against him and shall furnish the
defendant with a copy of the complaint which shall
contain the possible penalties for the offenses set
forth therein. In the case of a felony, the judge shall
also inform the defendant of the penalties for the
felony with which the defendant is charged.
970.02(2) Duty of a judge at the initial appearance.
The judge shall admit the defendant to bail in
accordance which ch. 969.”
EMERGENCY ROOM REPORT BELONGIA,
SHELLY R.
007824
5/29/89
11 year old female, involved in an assault in which
she was supposed to be taken over to her
srandmother’s house by her brother-in-law. When
they could not find her grandmother there, they were
returning to patient’s sisters house so she could
spend the night. When the brother-in-law took her to
a bridge and, she states, attempted to sexually
molest her, getting very close to her, placing his
hands on her crotch and on her chest. When he could
not get her jumpsuit off easily, apparently aborted
his attempt to molest her and decided that he did not
want her talking about it, so he took a torn towel and
tied her hands together behind her back, told her
that she wasn’t going to be able to tell anybody about
this and proceeded to stop on a bridge overlying a
river with several feet of water in it, threw her off
the bridge approximately 15-20 feet to the water
below. Patient was able to untie her hands and
escape. States that she scraped up her leg during the
fall, landed primarily on her bottom. Absolutely
denies any pain at this time. Seems to be in
relatively good spirits. Is able to describe the incident
consistently between those interviewers and in
relatively good detail. Otherwise, no evidence by
history of other problem.
5d&a
Physical examination show several scratches to the
left anterior tibial region. Patient shows good ROM
Of all extremities. HEENT exam is unremarkable.
Neck is supple. Lungs, cardiac exam, abdomen are
all benign. Patient absolutely denies that any actual
sexual contact took place.
Assessment: Attempted sexual assault, as well as
physical assault with intent to do bodily harm.
Patient is relatively injury-free at this time and
exceedingly fortunate.
Will have patient discharged only to custody of her
mother or suitable guardian, with full instructions
that if any problems develop she is to return here
right away.
cep
G.L. Brown, M.D. /prr
d52989t53189
Kenosha Wisconsin Police Department
CLASS 1710 DATE&TIME —PAGE
CODE_1700 5-29-89 | ae
JURISDICTION GRID CASE OR E VENTS NO.
a: __89-47252
C SOMPLAINAN’ T/REPC PORT ING PERSON - /NAME
LAST FIRST MI SEX RACE DOB
Belongia __—_— Shelly | kK. FF W 9§-10°77
RESIDENCE ADDRESS CITY STATE (ANS
5703 13TH Avenue _ Kenosha _—Wisc. sy
CRIME OF INCIDENT DATE ~ TIME OCCURRED
Sexual Assault 6°29°89 0330
DESCRIBED L OCATION OF OFFENSE/OR
PREMISE
Residence 5703 13 Avenue —__-
SUMMARY OF CRIME OR INC IDENT
Compl reports that she was sexually assaulted by
her brother-in-law. __ ee PR ee
NO CONSENT FORM
I, Shelly Belongia, HAVE GIVEN NO ONE
CONSENT SEXUALLY ASSAULT ME IN ANY
MANNER
S: wire Be ones y Mothe
WITNESS “sf CO STIGNED “sf”
Cindy Cros She iy Be Jongis i
REPORTING OFFICER NO. SUPERVISOR
si —teen Sb...
Cindy Cros Reporting Lt. M. Bostettia
5 4a
SUPPLEMENTARY INVESTIGATION REPORT
CASE OR EVENTS NO. NO. OF oe
ee Ee. _ 20OF
D. ATE OF SUPPLEME NT ARY RiP a
5-20-89
DATE — TIME RE POR’ T
oh 5-29-891507
$= “lawns. Rix ae DOB 1-24- 62 WM
4035 Erie St., Racine, Wisc. _ anita Sees
Officer spoke with compl Shelly Riot: are of comp!
of sexual assault. Suspect in compl _1s_ victim's
brother’) in-law Ricardo Glover
Racine at ‘her. sister’s | cae: ” Her | ek i rye
suspect Glover _ | - m oe
Belongia was ewnken. at approx 1] am he Clover on
this date, and was driven back to Kenosha to her
residence by Glover. Nobody was home at Belongia’s
residence except her grandmother. Belongia was held
with a knife against her throat by Glover and was
ordered to take her clothes off or she would be killed.
She complied and she layed on top of her mother’s
bed with Glover on top of her naked. Belongia states
that intercourse did not occur but Glover ejaculated
on the bed sheets. Afterwards he order her dressed
and back in the car where they drove back to Racine.
They parked on Parkview. Dr. and Glover tied
Belongia’s hands behind her b: ack wit th a towel. They
REPORTING OFFICER SUPERVISOR
“sf” | #242 : seo
Cindy Cros Lt. M. Bostettia
SUPPLEMENTARY INVESTIGATION REPORT
CASE OR EVENTS NO. NO. OF PAGES
89-47252 3 OF 3
DATE OF SUPPLEMENTARY REPORT
5-29-89
DATE — TIME REPORT
5-29-89 1507
got out and walked to a bridge that is over the Root
River. Glover then threw Belongia over the bridge
and into the river. Belongia was able to get up
because the water was shallow and she got help from
a_nearby residence. Racine PD responded and _ took
Belongia to St. Luke’s Hospital for examination.
During the sexual assault, Glover did not kiss or
touch Belongia except for his penis touching her leg.
Officer obtained a statement from Belongia. Case
was turned over to Det. Kopesky. Det. Kopesky took
sheets as evidence.
REPORTING OFFICER SUPERVISOR
“sf _ _ #242 “sf ee
Cindy Cros Lt. M. Bostettia
569
STATE OF WISC. : CIRCIUT COURT: COUNTY RACINE
BRANCH 6
KKK HK KK KKKK KKK KK KKK KKK KKK KE KEK KEK KEKE KKK KEKE KEES
STATE OF WISCONSIN, *
Plaintiff, "
*INITIAL APPEARANCE
a Case No. 89CF402
RICARDO GLOVER, "
*
-VS-
Defendant. *
HREKKEKKEKKKKKEK KKK KK KKK KKEKKEKKKKEKE KEKE KKK KKKAKEKEKEKK
HONORABLE WAYNE J. MARIK
Judge Presiding
APPEARANCE:
Zoe Stowers, Assistant District
Attorney, appearing on behalf of the
plaintiff.
Daryl Kastenson, Assistant State Public
Defender, appearing on behalf of the
defendant who was present in court.
Date of Proceeding:
May 30, 1989
Gayle Leikam
Court Reporter
579
THE COURT: State versus Ricardo
Glover
MS.STOWERS: Zoe Stowers appears for
the state.
MR. KASTENSON: Daryl Kastenson on
behalf of the defendant who appears in person.
MS.STOWERS: Your Honor, these charges
came in today. We've sent it back for further
investigation and intend to issue charges tomorrow.
There are also potential charges coming out of
Kenosha with reference to this incident, and we’re
going to have to coordinate it with Kenosha.
The allegations are that the defendant
allegedly raped his eleven-year-old sister-in-law at
knife point—that incident occurred in Kenosha—took
her to the riverfront in Racine, tied her hands behind
her back, and threw her off the bridge which is
589
approximately eighteen feet from the water into
three feet of water, and then fled the scene.
So there are potential attempted murder
charges coming out of Racine. I guess we should have
a bond review at this time.
THE COURT: All right. As far as the nature or
strength of character of the evidence, do you have
statements from any persons other than the young
lady who's the alleged victim?
MS. STOWERS: We have the statement of the
young lady. This is Beth Blackwood’s case, and she
informed me of what the reports indicated. She
arrived at a house, and witnesses observed her hands
to be tied behind her back: at that point she was wet.
Other then that, the young girl’s statement as
to what occurred the defendant does have a criminal
record from Muskegon, Michigan, for what’s termed
as illegal entry. He also gave police a_ false
549
identification and insisted in this false identification
at the time of his arrest.
The state would ask for a minimum of $50,000
cash.
THE COURT: False identification; a false
name that was given?
MS. STOWERS: The note I have was false
identification.
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Kastenson?
MR. KASTENSON: Judge, my client has lived
in Racine for six years. His aunt is present in court
today who, I believe, is also employed. My client is
employed at Ganto Technology (spelled phonetically)
in Sturtevent and if released, would not be eligible
for our representation. He has other assets that are
fairly minimal.
60g
Again, he has lived in Racine six years. He has
no record here. He does admit to having a record; he
told me he had an illegal entry charge in Michigan in
about 1983 about six years ago and lives at 1206
Grand Avenue in Racine.
I'd ask that the Court permit him to sign a
signature bond until tomorrow at 2 o’clock with home
detention if the Court wants that. He would like to
be able to keep his employment obviously. And I
think the aunt might be willing to sign the bond,
although she has no real property; I think the
automobile is the most available.
THE COURT: Other than his aunt, does he
have any other relatives of family members in the
Racine community?
MRS. GLOVER: Excuse me, your Honor, I’m
his wife.
bla
MR. KASTENSON: That’s’ correct. He
apparently is separated at this point.
THE DEFENDANT: No. I came _ from
Michigan, yes. And | don’t have any type of record.
When I had that illegal entry, it was served on me
here and [| did appear before the Court here. If you
want to—I want to get to my job tomorrow before I
lose it.
MR. KASTENSON: You referred to somebody
coming up to a house?
MS. STOWERS: This was after the incident;
an independent witness observed her hands to be
tied behind her back.
THE DFENDANT: May I—
THE COURT: Don’t say anything about the
incident; I suggest you follow your lawyer's advice in
that regard, Mr. Glover.
All right. The nature of the potential charge
here certainly is extremely aggravated and
extremely serious. It does appear that at least the
minimum amount of evidence that we have to go on
at this point is corroborated by this interested third
party, that we’re not going solely on the basis of the
information provided by the young lady.
I note that Mr. Glover does have some ties to
the community which might be termed relatively
strong, that he has employment, and has been here
for a period of time. But I believe his incentive to flee
from the jurisdiction considering the fact that he has
some sort of a prior record and is facing rather
serious charges here with extremely aggravated
potentials would be incentive for him to flee.
I think that something more that a signature
bond or a simple co-signed bond is necessary to
guarantee that he will, in fact, appear when
6 3c7
complaints are filed tomorrow and in _ further
proceedings. If there was someone available, some
property to post, the Court would consider it; but
that doesn’t appear to be a possibility.
Therefore, I am going to set bond in the form
of cash bail in the amount of $10,000. I think that
that amount, based upon the information that’s been
provided, is reasonably necessary to guarantee the
defendant’s appearance. I[ think that the amount
requested by the state is substantial weighted by the
evidence before the Court at this time; I think that
the other amount is reasonably necessary and
adequate to guarantee the defendant’s appearance.
The matter will be set for hearing tomorrow
afternoon at 2:00 p.m.
(Proceedings concluded.)
STATE OF WISCONSIN)
) SS.
COUNTY OF RACINE )
I, Gayle Leikam, Freelance Court Reporter, do
hereby certify that I reported the foregoing matter
and that the foregoing transcript, consisting of 5
pages, has been carefully compared by me with my
stenographic notes as taken by me in machine
shorthand and by me thereafter transcribed, and
that it is a true and correct transcript of the
proceedings had in said matter to the best of my
knowledge.
Dated this 18» day of May, 1990.
Gayle Leikam, CSR
65q
CONFIDENTIAL REPORT OF LABORATORY
FINDINGS
WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Division of law Enforcement Services
STATE CRIME LABORATORY
1578 South 11 Street
Milwaukee, WI 553204-2860
(414) 649-2440
Submitting Agency: Date: July 31,
1989
[ | Case No. R89-
1453
Chief Karl A. Hansen Agency
89-35979
Racine Police Department
730 Center Street
Racine, WI 53403
Attn: Jackie Cooper
Laboratory
Analyst:
Case Name: a
Belongia, Shelly R.(V) Elaine Canales-Willson
Racine, Racine (Serology)
County, Wisconsin
I do hereby certify this document, consisting of Z
page(s), to be a true and correct report of the findings
of the State Crime Laboratory on the items examined
as shown by this report.
booq
Donald J. Hanaway _. Designee“s/"
ATTORNEY GENERAL SIGNATURE
The following items were submitted for examination
by the Serology section:
Item Al: Vaginal swabs
Item A2: Cervical swabs
Item A3: Rectal swabs
Item A4: Vaginal smears
[tem A5: Cervical smear
Item A6: Unlabeiled smears
Item A7: Standard saliva sample
Item A8: Standard head hair
Item AQ: Standard pubic hair
Item AlO: Pubic hair combings
Item B: Standard blood sample
Item C: Piece of towel
Item D: Panties
Item E: Skirted leggings
[Item F: Hospital pad
Item H: Black sweatpants
Item J: Piece of towel
Item K: Black/white underwear
[tem L: Pink bedsheet
Items Al through F were reportedly collected from
Shelly Belongia.
Items J and L were reportedly recovered from Shelly
Belongia’s residence.
o'7a
Items H and K reportedly belong to Ricardo Glover.
1. No semen was detected on the vaginal swabs
(Item Al), No sperm were observed during
microscopic examination of the vaginal, cervical
or unlabeled smears (Items A4, A5 and A6). One
sperm was detected in a smear prepared from
the cervical swabs (Items A2).
2. Seminal components was detected on the rectal
swab. No information regarding the semen
source was obtained from typing examination of
this swab.
3. No semen was detected on the panties, leggings
or bedsheets (Item D, E and L). Two head hairs
recovered from Item E were similar in
microscopic characteristics to the standard head
hairs of Belongia (Item A8). A small bloodstain
was detected on the sheet (Item 1) but the
attempted typing examination was unsuccessful.
4. Item C, a strip of a towel reportedly used as a
ligature, and Item J, a part of a towel torn
lengthwise, have matching blue and green floral
patterns on a white background. The one blonde
head hair recovered from Item C- was
inconsistent with the standard head hairs of
Item A8.
5. The one head hair recovered from the hospital
examination pad was not’ consistent in
microscopic characteristics with the standard
head hairs of Item A8.
68a
6. Seminal stains were detected on the inside from
of Glover’s sweatpants (tem H) but not the
underwear (Item K).
No typing examinations were performed on these
stains.
Page 2 “s/’
State Crime Laboratory- Milwaukee case No,
R891458
TWO COPIES OF THIS REPORT ARE BEING
FURNISHED FOR YOUR TRANSMITTAL TO THEE
DISTRICT ATTORNEY.
69q
CONFIDENTIAL REPORT OF LABORATORY
FINDINGS
WISCONSIN DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
Division of law Enforcement Services
STATE CRIME LABORATORY
1578 South 11* Street
Milwaukee, WI 553204-2860
(414) 649-2440
Submitting Agency: Date: July 6,
1989
Case No. R89-
1453
Chief Karl A. Hansen Agency No.
89-35979
Racine Police Department
730 Center Street
Racine, WI 53403
L 2
Attn: Jackie Cooper
Laboratory
Analyst:
Case Name: “sl”
Belongia, Shelly R. (V) John P. Nielson
Racine, Racine County (identification)
Wisconsin
I do hereby certify this document, consisting of 1
page(s), to be a true and correct report of the findings
of the State Crime Laboratory on the items examined
as shown by this report.
Donald J. Hanaway_ .Designee“s/’”_
ATTORNEY GENERAL SIGNATURE
10q
The following items were received
Item G: One knife
Item I: Two 1 3/4 oz “Vaseline” jars
Examination of Items G and I revealed no finger or
palm prints which were suitable for comparison
Fi / a
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & STATE OF WISCONSIN
SOCIAL SERVICES Wisconsin
Statutes
Division of Corrections Section
972.13
DOC-14 (Rev. 10/84)
JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION
SENTENCE TO WISCONSIN STATE PRISONS
STATE OF WISCONSIN, STATE OF WISCONSIN,
Plaintiff, Circuit Court Branch 6
Vv.
Ricardo Glover, Defendant, County _ Racine
Jan. 24, 1962 Defendant DOB Court
The defendant entered his plea no contest:
LJ guilty [J] not guilty {no contest:
The x) Court L) Jury found the defendant guilty of:
Felony or Dates(s)
Wis. Statute(s) Misdemeanor Class Crime
Crime(s) _Violation. (For M). (A-E) Committed
Lt 4: 940.225(10(d) F 5-29-89
1st Sexual
Assault
Ct 2: 940.30 &
False Imp, 939.63(1)(a)(4)
w/dang. weapon
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.