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UNPUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE D.C. CIRCUIT

USTC-ADM

1 November 30. 201(

Isidoro Rodriguez

\

United States Ta

BEFORE: Rogers, Tatel and Griffit]

JUDGEMENT

his appeal was considered on the record form

the United States Tax Court and on the breifs filed by

the parties. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); D.c. Cir. Rul

344). Itis

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the United

States Tax Court orders disbarring appellant and

denying his motions for reconsideration and to vacate

be affirmed. Whether this court reviews the orders for

an abuse of discretion or de novo, the Tax court did not

err in disbarring appellant Appellant has _ not

demonstrated that the Tax Court proceedings suffered

from a lack of due process or infirmity or proof or that

v. Radford; see also In re Rodriguez 2009 WL 1953670

(D.C. Cir. Apr. 21, 2009). To the extent appellant

challenges the disbarment order as being based on a

Virginia State Disciplinary Board order that violates

Virginia law, the Tax Court properly relied on the

Virginia Supreme Court’s decision affirming thé

iJ i

Sibley 964

009)(rejecting challenge t

id and stating that “this

he controlling decisions of t

as appellant shown that tl

r litigating to enfo)

it be published. The

suance of the mandate

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t1t1i0On |

NITED STATES TAX COI

WASHINGTON, DC 2021]

= =

» NOoarigue

ORDER OF DISBARMEN

‘he Court received information that effectiv

October 27, 2006, by Order of the Virginia State Bar

Disciplinary Board, Isidoro Rodriguez’s license to

practice law in the Commonwealth of Virginia was

revoked. The Court also received information that by

Order of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Fourth Circuit dated December 21, 2006, Isidoro

Rodriguez was disbarred from the practice of law in

that Court

By Order to Show Cause dated March 9, 2007

mailed to Isidoro Rodriguez by both certified and

regular mail, the Court afforded Mr. Rodriguez the

opportunity, on or before April 17, 2007, to respond and

to request a hearing to be held on May 1, 2007, why he

should not be suspended or disbarred. On April 2, 2007,

the Court received Isidoro Rodriguez’s notice of intent

to appear and response to Order to Show Cause. Upon

due consideration, by Order dated April 13, 2007, this

Court continued Isidoro Rodriguez’s hearing on the

Court’s Order to Show Cause dated March 9, 2007 t

July 17, 2007. On May 7, 2007, the Court received

Isidoro Rodriguez's second notice of intent to appeat

and second response to the Order to Show Cause. Upon

due consideration, by Order dated May 14, 2007, this

Court continued [sidoro Rodriguez’s hearing on the

Order to Show Cause dated March 9, 2007 pending

further direction by the Court and directed him to fil

a status report as to the status of his Virginia

disciplinary matter by August 31, 2007

After a series of Orders and status reports, this

Court again afforded Isidoro Rodriguez the opportunity

on or before August 18, 2009, to respond and to request

a hearing to be held on September 1, 2009, why he

should not be suspended or disbarred. Upon

consideration of Mr. Rodriguez’s submissions and his

testimony at the Order to Show Cause hearing on

September 1, 2009, and for reasons set forth in the

attached Memorandum Sur Order, it is

ORDERED: That the Court’s Order to Show

‘ause 1s made absolute in that, under the provisions of

Rule 202 of the Rules of Practice and Procedure of this

(

I

Court, Isidoro Rodriguez is disbarred forthwith from

further practice before the United States Tax Court

ind it is further

ORDERED: That Isidoro Rodriguez be and

hereby is prohibited from holding himself out as a

member of the Bar of the United States Tax Court, an

it is further

ORDERED: That Isidoro Rodriguez shall, within

20: days of service of this order upon him, file with the

Court motions to withdraw as counsel in all pending

cases in which heis counsel! of record, in accordance

with Rule 24 of the Court’s Rules, and, in addition

surrender to this Court his Certificate of Admission t

actice before this C

By the Court

signed) John 0. Colvin

Chief Judge

Or) EES

Marvel and Morrison

Whalen, Senior Judg

MEMORANDUM SUR ORDER

Disciplinary proceedings were initiated against

Mr. Isidoro Rodriguez, a member of. the Bar of this

Court, by Order to Show Cause dated March 9, 2007

directing Mr. Rodriguez to show cause why he should

not be suspended or disbarred from practice before this

Court or otherwise disciplined. See Rule 202(c) of th

Tax Court Rules of Practice and Procedure. All rule

references herein are to the Tax Court Rules of Practic:

and Procedure

The Order to Show Cause issued to M:

Rodrig3léz on March 9, 2007, recites the fact that his

license to practice law had been revoked effective

October 27, 2006, by Order of the Virginia State Bar

Disciplinary Board (hereinafter Disciplinary Board)

entered November 28, 2006. The Order of the

Disciplinary Board was affirmed by the Supreme Court

of Virginia on June 29, 2007, and on July 17, 2007. The

Order to Show Cause also notes that Mr. Rodriguez had

been disbarred from practice by an Order of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit dated

December 21, 2006

N\A > ” : ’ aQY . - bh ro , Yr) ' |

Mr. Rodriguez appeared before a panel of

Court on September 1, 2009, at a hearing that had bee:

scheduled and rescheduled at Mr. Rodriguez’ request

ind he was heard on his own behalf. After the heari:

the pane] took the matter under consideratio}

BACKGROUND

The Disciplinary Board revoked Mr. Rodriguez

license to practice law in the Commonwealth of

Virginia as a result of his actions in two sets of cases.

The first group of case,s involved his relationship and

work with Sea Search Armada, a Caymans entity that

invests in and conducts searches for sunken treasure

ships. The Disciplinary Board found that he had

violated Rules 1.2(a), 1.5(a), 1.16(a) (3), 3.4G@), 7.1(a),

and 8.4(b) and (c) in his relationship with and

representation of Sea Search Armada, including his

attempts to recover unpaid attorneis’ fees. The second

eroup of cases involved ongoing litigation for the

custody of his son. The Disciplinary Board found that

Mr. Rodriguez had violated RUles 1.7(b), 3.1, 3.4(d),

(h). G), and (1), 3.7(a), 4.4. and 8.4(b) and (c) during

that litigation.

The Order of the Disciplinary Board entered

November 28, 2006, provides detailed explanations of

the bases for the Board’s finding that Mr. Rodriguez

had violated the Rules of Professional Conduct. The

following is an extended excerpt from the Board's

Order describing Mr. Rodriguez’s misconduct:

VSB Docket No. 04-052-0794 [Search Armada

Litigation]

(a) The Respondent violated Rule 1.2(a) (Scope

Representation) in that his authorization to act on

behalf of his client SSA (Sea Search Armada] was

limited, but he nonetheless acted without written

authorization.

(b) The Respondent violated Rule 1.5(a) 1

Fees) with his claim of a fee of 4.5 million dollar:

Respondent acknowledged that the fee arrangement

was a contingent fee arrangement and no recovery had

been made. Therefore, there was no basis to claim a fee.

Furthermore, the amount of the fee, $4.5 million, does

not appear to have any reasonable relationship to work

actually performed which is necessary for a recovery on

a quantum merit basis. Respondent testified that he

determined the amount based upon what the salary

would be for a legal representative for a U.S. company

operating in a foreign country.

(c) The Respondent violated Rule 1.16(a) (3)

(Declining or Terminating Representation) by

representing that he was SSA’s managing attorney in

a FOIA request (VSB Ex. 23), which he made well after

SSA had terminated their relationship.

(d) The Respondent violated Rule 3.4(I)

(Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel) by filing the

litigation in the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Virginia and the Circuit Court of

Fairfax County, Virginia. It should appear to any

reasonably competent lawyer that the courts did not

have jurisdiction over the parties named as defendants.

Even giving the Respondent the benefit of the doubt as

to the first suit, he received a ruling that the court

lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants which

was upheld on appeal. He nonetheless filed a second

suit with the same infirmity seeking the same recovery.

Furthermore, his suit in the Circuit Court of Fairfax

County, Virginia, included as a defendant Harrison

Pledger and his law firm, merely because Mr. Pledger

had acted as defense counsel in the two suits in the

federal court.

(e) The Respondent violated Rule 7.1(a) 1°

(Communication Concerning a Lawyer’s Services) by

misrepresentation on his website and resume. VSB

Exhibits 24 and 25 show that Mr. Rodriguez, on the

website he created, misrepresented his relationship

with SSA. He misrepresented what he did for SSA and

how he became employed by SSA. He misrepresented

his education by listing an LLM civil law degree from

the University of Bordeaux. He improperly claimed a

certification (the American Trial Lawyer Ultimate Trial

Lawyer Certification) where no such certification

exists.

(f) The Respondent violated Rule 8.4(b) and

8.4(c) (Misconduct) by representing in his FOIA request

that he was the managing attorney for SSA, when the

evidence shows that he clearly was not.

VSB Docket No. 04-052-1044

(a) The Respondent violated Rule 1.7(b) 1-2

(Conflict of interest) in his attempt to represent his son

in the District Court for the District of Columbia and

his continued actions to do so even tn the face of a court

ruling that there was a conflict.

(b) The Respondent violated Rule 3.1

(Meritorious Claims and Contentions) by his litigation

in the District Court for the District of Columbia and

his actions in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County,

Virginia. The complaint filed by the Respondent with

all the parties he named as defendants standing alone

shows that the Respondent has violated this Rule. The

numerous’ pleadings filed thereafter further

demonstrate that the Respondent’s aim was to punish

anyone who had any connection with the litigation filed

by his former wife to regain custody of their son. Any

attorney who had in any way appeared in that

litigation ended up being named as a defendant

NCMEC and several of its staff were named as

defendants resulting in a legal cost to NCMEC alone of

$160,090.00 Attorney Patrick Stiehm who had taken

Respondent's ex-wife’s case pro bono was named as a

defendant thereby making good on Respondent’s claim

that Stiehm’s representation would cost him a “big

chunk of change.”

Furthermore, in litigation in Fairfax County

Respondent subpoenaed two members of NCMEC as

witnesses for a hearing involving his efforts to file a

Statement of the Case for an appeal, when these two

staff members had nothing to do with the Fairfax

litigation. While the subpoenas were quashed they

nevertheless had the effect of harassing the NCMEC

staff members. Remarkably this is the only instance i:

which the Respondent was sanctioned by a court.

Perhaps if he had been sanctioned earlier, eithe

by the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia or the District Court for the District

of Columbia, such action would have put a stop to

Respondent's unwarranted and vexatious conduct

Unfortunately neither of the courts saw fit to impos

sanctions.

(c) The Respondent violated Rule 3.4(d)(h(i)G

(Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel) by the

following conduct: (1) by continuing to attempt t

represent his son in the District of Columbia litigation

in the face of a court ruling, in violation of Rule 3.4(d)

(2) by threatening the NCMEC attorney with a ba

complaint and filing a criminal complaint with the FBI,

in violation of 3.4(h); (3) by filing a motion for sanction

against Patrick Stiehm and naming Stiehm as

defendant in the District of Columbia litigation and by

his entire course of conduct in the District of Columb

litigation, in violation of Rule 3.44)q);

if

, , :

W itn , , advocate whet

Ta) SO yy | 1? ' i) |

| eC a V

rinia litigation

I Cea Pui :.4 rn

(e) The Respondent

Rights of Third Person

itigation in the District Court

In addition, his subpos

Fairfax Circuit

ts to be submitted fe

i(*t

) Dy the whole cours

for the District

na of Ms. Brinkerhoff

Court for

tne

‘Olumbia

ind Mr. Dennis to the

earing on the Statement of F

violation of this Rul

ed Rule 8.4(b) and 8

peal further demonstrate

(f) The Respondent violat

yt eae f ) | . 7

Vlisconduct)

' + } 4 Lf

5

igeravation and mitigatlo

espondent ncluding

ciplinary 1

vhat sanction 1m] (

conduct by the Respond \fter ic deliberatie

( Board rr‘ mnven incl

VDOS*! Lhe

'

ed that ylation cert h Ry

is Rule 1.5 |, and ih) & (c) standin lo

neri ie ultimat inction of ocati

wever, the Respondent onduct by pursul

tigation in Virginia in Do Ke | O. U4"-U02Z 1794 and

District of Columbia in Docket O4- | 1044

ted. Wh , rt thi

deceitful and unprincipled att

look LO the VSB for protection

demonstrate Respondent’s complet

1) 5 ee ’

Rules of Professional Conduct

furthermore the Re pondent was delia!

criticism of his conduct in pursuing what can only be

described as meritless and vexatious litigation. Thi

same defiance was evident to the Board as th

Respondent sought to justify his conduct. Therefore th

soard concluded that the sanction of revocation was th

only remedy by which the public and ba ild

idequately protected

pome of the htigation involving Sea Sea

Armada and related parties is reported at Rodriguez

Harbeston, 2000 WL 34556077 (E.D.Va. 2000), affd., 2

F. Appx. 202 (4th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 536 U.S. 92

(2002); Rodriguez v. HEP Inc., et : '7 F. Appx. 66

(4th Cir. 2003), cert. demied 541 U.S. 903 (2004)

Rodriguez v. Pereira, 163 F. Appx. 227 (4th Cir. 200¢

ert. denied, 549 U.S. 954 (2006

Pome ot tne custody ltig ’

QT) PCpOTLCa

WL 1487119 (\

App. 2004); Escaf v.Rodriguez, 200 F. Supp.2d 6(

(K.D. Va. 2002), 191 F. Supp.2d 685 (E.D. Va. 2002

affd., 52 F. Appx. 207 (4th Cir. 2002), cert. demied, 53

U/_S. 1000 (2003); Rodriguez v. Nati Center for Missin;

and Exploited Children, et al., 2005 WL 736526 (D._D.(

2005), affd., 2005 WL 3843612 (D.C. Cir. 2005)

denied 547

U.S. £106 (2006) . Also see Rodrigu

Rodriguez Hazbun v. Escaf, 2004

Appx 6 (D.C. Cir. 2008)

J

' ils for the |

the Kourtl cult isha

aris ( liled Dec mp i trite thy

urt had received no re i I 1 < if Jotiees t al

ause from Mr. Rodrivuez. At me point, he filed wit

yurt motion consideration f h

Darment. In spon the irt issued a Not

now Cau on March 23, 2007, vacating 1t rder

lecember 21. 2006. and avain ordering him to sb

t be disbarred from practi

iuse why he shouid ni

hat matter was heard by the court «

1008, and in an unpublished opini the court agat

rdered Mr. Rodrigue; hisbarmen in [sidor

Rodrigu 1G-95) ;

Sian

[pt ; iJ pout

peal for the Third Cn

ppeals { hit

driguez ens

Ommonwealth of Virgin Lust

barment from practice before that Court of Appeal

ee [n_re Isidoro Rodriguez 4k. Ap 17, 949

sd Cir. 2008), cert. demied, Rodriguez stands

ommiuttee on Attorney Discipline, 1295. Ct. 2384, |}

Kd. 2d 1326 (2009) Mr. Rodrigue

plication f reinstateme mem

; en tha :'

rhoai ISCIDII I > Le

‘geet

ymmittee’s report recommending that Mr

petition be denied was adopted by the c

)

ssued Decembs Yr 14) r OT abe: } 4 A

teciprocal Disc

Appeals for the Distr

pears that o1

Court yf Appe als tor the

issued an Order 1 Shor

Rodriguez based upon the revocation of his licens

practice in the Commonwealth of Virginia. Brie

Respondent at 7, In re Isidoro Rodriguez, Case No. |

7134, 2009 WL1953670 (DC Cir. 2009). After briefs a1

1 hearing on the matter, the court filed its Ord

Disbarment on pril 2] 00! disbarring

Rodriguez Inr doro R l att V

ate ' |

Appellate Review

Board by the Virginia Suprem«

f

Rodriguez and that the order is affirmed

that the Virginia Supreme Court issued

n July 17, 2007, affirming the Disciplinary Board

s not in the record of this pr z

lescribed

Appeals

}

lenied Ki

inding Committe

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ive their etiect W Uidd ¢ nil

which rests upon us not to disbar ex

he conviction that, under the princip!

shit anda ustice, we were constrained

’ Fe }

ling Radford, Supra al

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i 4 | ¥

ru [ : nown co0d caust quring

inal proceeding, why he should n

plined by this Court, taking into account

rs enunciated by the Supreme Court in Selling \

idford, supra, quoted above. See generally, In _ the

Matter of Edelstein, 214 F.3d 127, 131-132 (2nd Cir

MOO);

rris Industries, 843 F.2d 443 (11th Cir. 1988) ; In 2

2A 2 Id +{ ) 1)-Q] (4th (‘ir 1TQOR

|

Greer’s Refuse Service, Inc., et al.. v. Browning

sponse tf tne Urder to snow

ikes ree arguments. First. he

sciplinarv Board (VSBDB,)”. Astothisarg

yurt is prohibited from imposing at

Rodriguez based on the vord orders of tl

me Court of Virginia and its agent, Virginia St

biiiid Lis ica

as the linchpin to a crimin

spirac'’ { Government attornevs and judge

> T ‘ ’ i <> ] s>Ae or

f18 U.S.C. §§ 241, 242, 1204, ar

—— ee : ae a , oi

deny Rodriguez access to an impart

court and deprive him of his rig}

nt as an attorney as punishment f

k a e. mame i A —s

ng Congress and the General Assen

no fT ANTO?

rovernment

him of su

issuming

ilid-dispute

| and f the Constitution of Virg

ApiMin

oO

-

’

rcriminal conspiracy by F

lla Government attorney and judges

in violation of 18 U.S.¢

authority

1. 1848, 1513, 19

§ i fi

' th QC, oO PT r . t tn ne mulgat -rwarieoe an

riZes om upremie \ ut vi MmuUuUIZaAalLt ruies an

gulations “prescribing procedures for disciplining

uspending, and disbarring attorneys’. Presumably, h

uld have the courts ofthe Commonwealth of Virgini

the rules and regulations promulgated by th

Supreme Court under that 1uthoritys V1S Rules

Supreme Ct

Procedure forD1

\ttornevs. The

isciplinary Board and establ

lministrative consideration

f that mex

6. 8IV. Par

manna ti

Aiical i

terminate

demand within 21 days after disci

to the Disciplinary

Pt 6 S|T\ Par

.

narges ar

Va. State Bar,

Cilman v. Va.

(2003); Gunter \

BK Yd 890 (1991

irgume

roceeding, v

revoking his

1

;

*

matter

urts

684, 6!

xpositors

MNStTructl

biict i:

lisbarring Mr

the argument he

[sidoro Rodriguez, No

Oct. 20, 2008). Mr. Rodriguez's

ar, 11 not identi

06-9518, sli

ceeding is sim1]

IS Making in tnis urt. i me

the Disciplinary Board lacked jurisdiction under

the Constitution of Virginia to revoke his licenss

to practice in the Commonwealth. More

specifically, he asserts that Virginia’s

disciplinary procedures contravene the

separation of powers clause of the Constitution

of Virginia, and that only a Virginia court of

record --rather than the Board — possesses the

authority to sanction a Virginia attorney fo1

professional misconduct. As a result, Rodriguez

asserts that the revocation of his law license by

the Board is void and that our reliance thereon

would contravene the first Selling condition

[The opinion of the Court of Appeals also points

ut that the Supreme Court of Virginia had rejected the

same argument when that court affirmed the order of

the Disciplinary Board revoking Mr. Rodriguez’ licens:

to practice. The Court of Appeals opinion continues a:

follows:

Importantly, Rodriguez presented the foregoing

contention in his appeal of the Disciplinary

Board’s action to the Supreme Court of Virginia

As the Supreme Court has’ recognized, “the

States have a compelling interest in the practice

of professions within their boundaries, and .

have broad power to establish standards f o1

licensing practitioners and regulating the

practice of professions.” Goldfarb v. Va. State

Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 792 (1975) In its Order of

July 17, 2007, the Supreme Court of Virginia

affirmed the revocation of Rodriguez’s license by

the Board. thus rejecting the contention that h

disbarment was void under the Constitution of

Virginia. That determination was a matter

within its power and there is no basis for that

ruling to be disturbed by our Court. Id. at 6-7

The opinion of the Court of Appeals concludes that “the

Disciplinary Board’s revocation of Rodriguez’s license

to practice in the Commonwealth of Virginia must bs

deemed valid in this proceeding”. Id. at 7

Similarly, the order of the United States Court

of Appeals for the Third Circuit and the report of its

Standing Committee on Attorney Discipline rejecting

Mr. Rodriguez’ application for reinstatement as a

member of its bar describes the argument that Mr

Rodriguez had made in that proceeding, viz the action

of the Disciplinary Board is void, etc., and the report of

the Standing Committee points out that the Suprem«

Court of Virginia had rejected the same argument in

affirming the order of the Disciplinary Board. See In re

Isidoro Rodriguez, 304 F. Appx. 947, 952-955 (2008),

cert. denied, 1298S. Ct. 2384, 173 L. Ed. 2d 1326 (2009).

The report of the Standing Committee states, “it is

clear that this Court should regard the Virginia

The

proceedings as valid under Virginia law.” at 954

report also points out,

In this case, * * * it is perfectly clear that thi

Virginia proceedings were valid as a matter of

federal law and Rodriguez’s contentions to the

contrary are completely unmeritorious and

,

require no discussion. [Citation ommitted.|[Id

Mr. Rodriguez relies in this proceeding, that the order

of the Disciplinary Board is void, was considered and

rejected by the Supreme Court of Virginia when it

rejectedc Mr. Rodriguez’ appeal of the Disciplinary

Board’s order. Like the court of Appeals for the Third

and Fourth Circuits, we are bound by the action of the

Supreme Court of Virginia. Accordingly, we reject Mr.

Rodriguez’s argument that the order of the

Disciplinary Board 1s void.

In this proceeding, Mr. Rodriguez has not shown

any of the three factors identified by the Supreme

Court in Selling v. Radford, supra, which would justify

not giving effect to the revocation of Mr. Rodriguez’s

license to practice law in the Commonwealth of

Virginia. He has not shown that there was a “want of

notice or opportunity to be heard” in the Virginia

proceeding, that there was “an infirmity of proof as to

facts found to have established the want of fair private

and professional character”, or that there was any

“other grave reason” not to give effect to the actions of

the Disciplinary Board and Supreme Court of Virginia.

See Selling v. Radford, supra, at 51. Accordingly, we

will give full effect to the revocation of Mr. Rodriguez’s

license to practice in the Commonwealth of Virginia

We make one final observation. about Mr.

Rodriguez’s argument. In this proceeding, he has

continued his practice of making outlandish filings that

demonstrate his unsuitability to practice law. For

example, on September 1, 2009, the date of his hearing,

Mr. Rodriguez filed a Supplemental Response reporting

that he had issued two documents involving his case

The first document is a letter to the President of th

United States informing the President that Mr

Rodriguez has “been the target of an interstate

business conspiracy’ in retaliation for the actions h

has taken to defend his rights as a father. According to

the letter:

The linchpin of this interstate crimina

business conspiracy was: (1) the filing of two

fraudulent bar complaints by then Beltway

Lobbyist/Attorney Eric Holder and my former

client with the Virginia State Bar Disciplinary

Board (VSBDB); (2) the VSBDB issuing a void

order revoking my in license for litigating to

enforce my federal and Virginia statutory rights

as a father and attorney (See

http://hom.earthlink.net/—treason/); and (3

Federal judges in VA, DC, CO, NY, and PA

conspired to refuse to protect me as a victim of a

conspiracy pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §3771, and to

deny me access to impartial judicial review of

VSBDB vord order by refusing to comply with

Void Order Doctrine, Marbury v. Madison, 1]

Cranch 137 (1803), and Pennoyer v. Neff, 95

U.S. 714 (1877), the standard of Selling \

Redford, 243 U.S. 46 (1917), Theard v. United

States, 354 U.S. 278 (1957), and Rules Enablin;

Act

Mr. Rodriguez asks the President to reverse t

decision of his staff not to become involved in lega

matters, and to direct the Solicitor General to support

Mr. Rodriguez’s petition for certiorari challenging hi

disbarment by the United States Court of Appeals 1

the District of Columbia

ine econaq aocument

lement Response as follow

second, Exhibit 2, Criminal Complaint filed o

August 7, 2009, with the FBI and the AUSA n

VA, D.C., CO, NY, and PA, for the interstat«

‘riminal conspiracy to punish me as an

independent federal civil litigator in violation ot!

18 U.S.C. § 4, 201, 241, 242, 1341, 1343, 1513

1951, and the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt

Organizations Act (RICO) 18 U.S.C. §1962 ¢.

land (d), as well as Va. Code §18.2-481(5), 2-482

n d 4 9 9 me £ £

home.earthlink.net/~malfeasance

Mr. Rodriguez’s criminal complaint seeks to charge the

Chief Justice of the United States, various federal and

tate judges, and others, including “Alberto Gonzalez

Beltway Lobbyist/Attorney Eric Holder’, and member

f “the Committee on Admissions District of Columb

urt of Appeals” with various crin

mnsiaering tne entire record 1n UNIS prot gain

onclude that Mr. Rodriguez has not shown goo

1use why he should not be suspended, disbarred 0:

therwise disciplined, and we further conclude that

inder Rule 202. the appropr1 lisciplin n th

lisharme

State Bar Dise

Upon consideration

nents by appellant

runsel for the appellee the Court is of the oj mion

he order of the Virginia State

ira revokin

Rodriguez

Immonwe

?

Ol]

oy) (quoting Williams v. Virginia

\

Va. 258, 264. 542 SS... 2d 885. 3889 (2001

tations omitted); se \min v. Virgini

Late Bar, Zeb Va. 608 12. O14 S.e 2d as

1999); Myers v. Virginia State Bar, 226 |

oe Oe.

y «(Cdl

| »< y 1 ¢

| ht) Me

KIT

| allegation

Protessi r)

VOlVInYZ two set

volving Rodriguez

arch Armada

Ligation regarding

1654 0053)

lation

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\rmada, including

le The Virg

vidence f

(ACh

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YIINUIIINI

PLINARY

ind Devis Nong oil the defendant

OMmmonwealth of Virginia

smiss

> defendants. This motion

.

. ] } *1. > . —

Was aismissea ine nesponi

yo

a

defendants in the second law suit and Harrison Pledge.

and his law firm as defendants. VSB Ex. 21. This law

suit was also dismissed but the court denied the

defendants motions for sanctions.

11. The Respondent created a website which

displayed false and misleading information regarding

his relationship with SSA and his participation in the

litigation in Colombia. VSB Ex 24 & 25. On the site

the Respondent claimed that in 1988, at the request of

the United States Department of State, he becam«

SSA's legal representative and managing attorney

responsible for managing alternative dispute resolution

negotiations and outside counsel in litigation against

the government of Colombia, posts he claims he held

until! 2000. These assertions are not true. On his

resume, the Respondent listed a LLM Civil law degree

from the University of Bordeaux. While the Respondent

attended a class at the University of Bordeaux, ht

never received a degree from that university. The

Respondent also listed an American Trial Lawyer

Ultimate Trial Lawyer Certification. There is no such

certification. The basis for Respondent’s claim is tn¢

fact that he attended a one week continuing legal

education program sponsored byte Association of Trial

awyers of American titled “Ultimate Trial Advocacy

12. Respondent, in 2004,while communicating

with the U.S. State Department regarding Freedom of

Information Act (“FOIA”) requests he had made for

information relating to SSA litigation, represented that

he was the attorney for SSA notwithstanding the fact

that Harbeston had revoked his authority in 2000. VSB

ms

Ex. 23. Respondent claimed that since the power of

ittorney filed with the Colombian government

‘ver been terminated he was: making

misrepresent ation 1)

VSB Docket No. 04-502-1044

l. The Respondent lved for many years

Colombia and had married Amalin Hazbun Escaf :

citizen of Colombia. One son was born of the marriag:

The marriage ultimately ended in a divorce in

Colombia with the wife/mother obtaining custody of the

son by order of a Colombian court with visitation rights

to the Respondent.

2. The Respondent subsequently returned to th

United States where he has been living and his son

visited him pursuant to the visitation rights granted by

the Colombian Court. In 2001 while the son was

visiting the Respondent the Respondent refused to

return his son to Colombia and filed an action in thi

Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court in Fairfa>

County to gain custody of his son.

3. In 2001, subsequent to the filing

Respondents suit in the Juvenile and Domesti

Relations Court in Fairfax County, Respondent’s

ex-wife filed an action in the United States District

Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, under the

Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of Child

Abduction (the “Hague Convention”) and _ the

International Child Abduction Remedies Act (“TCARA’

in order to secure the return to Colombia of her son

VSB Ex. 34. In this litigation she was represented by

Patrick Stiehm, a Virginia attorney who had

undertaken this representation pro bonoat the request

of the National Center for Missing and Exploited

Children (“NCMEC”). NCMEC is a non profit cor

oration that acts as a neutral in facilitating the

processing of claims under the Hague Convention and

ICARA. When Stiehm initially contacted Respondent to

inform him of the pending litigation, Respondent told

Stiehm that his pro bono representation would cost

Stiehn “a big chunk of change.” In keeping with this

threat, Respondent immediately filed a motion for

sanctions against Stiehn (VSB Ex. 35) but that motion

was denied. VSB Ex. 38. However, Respondent’s

subsequent litigation described herein, which included

Stiehm as a defendant, resulted in Stiehm incurring

significant legal expenses to respond to meritless and

vexatious litigation.. After a bench trial the Court ruled

that the Respondent had kept the child in Virginia in

violation of his ex-wife’s custody rights. VSB Ex. 39.

The Court ordered that the child be removed from the

Respondent’s custody and returned to the child’s

mother in Colombia The Respondent’s appeals to the

Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals and the United States

Supreme Court were denied. After all appeals and

stays were denied the son was reunited with his mothe:

and left for Colombia in June of 2002.

4. In January of 2003, the Respondent filed suit

the District Court for the District of Columbia

against numerous defendants, including NCMEC

several employees of NCMEC, the United States

District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, the

Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, the Circuit Court of

Fairfax County, the Court of Appeals of Virginia, the

District Court for the District of Columbia, the United

States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia

various judges, a court clerk, the United States

Department of State, Patrick Stiehm and Stephen

Cullen (an attorney who had assisted Stie¢hm in the

]

Virginia litigation) claiming aconstitutional conspiracy

by the defendants against him in his litigation in

Virginia. VSB Ex. 43. Staff members of NCMEC had

been witnesses in the Virginia ltigation and NCMEC

had provided legal representation to witnesses in the

litigation in Virginia. In filing this litigation in which

Respondent and his son were named as plaintiffs,

Respondent who is not licensed to practice in the

District of Columbia and had not obtained an order to

appear pro hoc vice, attempted to act as attorney for his

son.

5. In March of 2008, the Respondent filed a Writ

of Mandamus in an attempt to compel NCMEC to take

actions to force the country of Colombia to grant the

Respondent access to his son. VSB Ex. 64. By letter

dated September 24,2003, Warren L. Dennis, Esquire,

counsel for NCMEC, informed the Clerk of the United

States Supreme Court that NCMEC would not be filing

a responsive brief to the Respondent's Writ because,

inter alia, it had no power to compe! the government of

the country of Colombia to do anything. VSB Ex. 65

Upon receipt of a copy of the letter, the Respondent

called Mr. Dennis’s office and left a voice mail message

in which he threatened to file an ethics complaint

because the letter falsely characterized the

Respondent’s Virginia litigation. Also, by letter dated

September 29,2003, the Respondent gave notice of his

intent to file a judicial complaint and District of

Columbia Bar complaint against those involved in the

litigation unless facts already proved were proved

within twenty-four (24) hours. VSB Ex 67

6. In the District of Columbia litigation th

Respondent repeatedly filed pleadings with no basis in

law or fact. VSB Ex. 43 - 81. In an amended complaint

(VSB Ex. 72) Respondent asserted a claim under thx

A--40

RICO) 18 U.S.C. 1961. Included as defendant

omplaint were the United States Supreme Court

nited States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circu

the United States Court of Appeals for the District

Columbia, the United States District Court for t

Mastern District of Virginia, the United States Distr

the

upreme Cr \ppeal

Circuit ourt of ix County

in the D.C. | clearly demonst

and intimidate

considered 1 een INnvol\

rinia litigation that

litigate the \

Respondent

its employee

NCMEC ove

bankrupted 1

(this litigat

ntial

licensed in the District of Columbia

8. During this litigation, the Respon

leadings and attempted to represent his minor son

several occasions 1n the District of Columbia litigati

lespite the fact there was a conflict of interest

betwee

he father and son, despite the fact that the Responde:

vould be a witness in the casi and despit the tact th

he hudgr instructed the Ke pond n

representin ni wy ® ‘D>. |

ie the follown

(1) the time and labor 4 quuired Lhe novell iyi

fficulty of the questions involved, and the kil

Crvice properly

(2) the likelhood, if apparent to the clicn

wcceptance of the particular

lude other employment by the |

) the fee

on

juisite to perform the legal

employ mer

IWver

customartl harvged int

i] legal Services

1) the amount dt)

) the time limit

Ircumstance

>) T

|

che ¢ XPerien repu

iwyers performing t!

whet t |

LaJA lawyer shall not, on behalf of the lawyer

yny other lawyer affiliated with the lawyer or the firn

use or participate in the use of any form of publi

communication if such communication contains a fals«

fraudulent, misleading, or deceptive statement

claim. For example, a communication or adv

violates this Rule 1f 11

(1) contains misleading fee informat!

(2) states or implies that the outcon

particular legal matter was not or will not be r

its facts or merits;

(3) compares th

lawyers services, unle mpai

factually substantiated

(4) contains an endorsement by a celebrit

public figure who is not a client of the firm withot

disclosure (I) of the fact that the speaker is not a clie1

of the lawyer or the firm, and (1) whether the speak

s being paid for the appearance or endorsement

(5) contains a portrayal of a chent

non-client without a disclosure that the depict

dramatization

In the determination whethe

communication or advertisement violates this Rule, t

communication or advertisement shall be considered

its entirety including any qualifying stat

disclaimers contained therein

RULE 8.4 Misconduct

professional misconduct for a lawye!

(b) commit a criminal or deliberately

t that reflects adversely on the lawyse

rustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer

(c) engage in professional conduct

TY frau v4 . 1] yy TY) ?

The Certification for VSB Docket No

004-052-1044 charges violations of the following

provisions of the Virginia Rules of Professional

Conduct:

RULE 1.7 Conflict of Interest: General Rule

(b) A lawyer shall not represent a client if the

representation of that chent may be materially limited

by

the lawyer’s responsibilities to another client or to a

third person, or by the lawyer’s own interests, unless

(1) the lawyer reasonably believes the representation

will not be adversely affected; and

(2) the chent consents after consultation. When

representation of multiple clients in a single matter is

undertaken, the consultation shall include explanation

of the implications of the common representation and

the advantages and risks involved.

RULE 3.1 Meritorious Claims And Contentions

\ lawyer shall not bring or defend a proceeding, or

assert or controvert an issue therein, unless there is a

basis for doing so that is not frivolous, which includes

a good faith argument for an extension, modification or

reversal of existing law. A lawyer for the defendant in

a criminal proceeding, or the respondent in a

proceeding that could

result in incarceration may nevertheless so defend the

proceeding as to require that every element of the case

be established.

RULE 3.3 Candor Toward The Tribunal

(a) A lawyer shall not knowingly

(1) make a false statement of fact or law to a tribunal;

(2) fail to disclose a fact to a tribunal when disclosure

is necessary to avoid assisting a criminal or fraudulent

act by the client, subject to Rule 1.6;

(3) fail to disclose to the tribunal controlling lega

authority in the subject jurisdiction known to the

lawyer to be adverse to the position of the chent and

not disclosed by opposing counsel; or

(4) offer evidence that the lawyer knows to be false. I!

a lawyer has offered material evidence and comes to

know of its falsity; the lawyer shall take reasonabk

remedial measures.

RULE 3.4 Fairness To Opposing Party And

Counsel. A lawyer shall not:

(d) Knowingly disobey or advise a client to disregard a

standing rule or a ruling of a tribunal made in the

course of a proceeding, but the lawyer may take steps

in good faith, to test the validity of such rule or ruling

(h) Present or threaten to present criminal or

disciplinary charges solely to obtain an advantage in a

civil matter.

(I) File a suit, initiate criminal charges, assert a

position, conduct a defense, delay a trail, or take other

action on behalf of the chent when the lawyer knows or

when it. 1s obvious that such action would serve merely

to harass or maliciously injure’ another. Effectiv:

January 1,2004

(Gj) Present or threaten to present criminal

disciplinary charges solely to obtain an advantage in

civil matter,

(k) File a suit, initiate criminal charges, assert

position, conduct a defense, delay a trail, or take other

action on behalf of the chent when the lawyer knows or

when it 1s obvious that such action would serve merely

to harass or maliciously injure another

RULE 3.7 Lawyer As Witness

(a) A lawyer shall not act as an adi

Se TV1ICeS rendered in thn

{>

|

i}

disqualification of th

intial hardship on the client

RULE 44 Respect For Rights Of Third

not u

t Lit

In representing a client, a lawyer shall

ans that have no purpose « in to embarra:

‘lay; or burden a third person, or use methods «

btaining evidence that violat | 7

" rintc 7 |

lates the re

urisdiction; or

i) assist a per

performance

i.uthorized practi

RULE

rs Service

(a) A lawyer shall n n behalf

ther lawyer affiliated with the

yr participate the use of any form of pul

i. .

iawVe {

mmunication if such communication contains a fal

1udulent, misleading, or deceptive statement or

11m. Fo} ramp!

'

Nt te we rYyv FPN V6 Bar i

particular legal matter was not OR will not be related

to its facts or merits; or

(3) compares the lawyer’s services with other

lawyers’ services, unless the comparison can be

factually substantiated: or

(4) is likely to create an unjustified expectation

about results the lawyer can achieve, or states or

implies that the lawyer can achieve results by means

that violate the Rules of Professional Conduct or other

law.

RULE 7.4 Communication Of Fields Of Practice

And Certification

Lawyers may state, announce or hold themselves

out as limiting their practice in a particular area or

field of law so long as the communication of such

limitation of practice is in accordance with the

standards of this Rule, Rule 7.1, and Rule 7.3, as

appropriate. A lawyer shall not state or imply that the

lawyer has been recognized or certified as a specialist

in a particular field of law except as follows:

(a) A lawyer admitted to engage in patent

practice before the United States Patent and

Trademark Office may use the designation “Patent

Attorney” or a substantially similar designation;

(b) A lawyer engaged in Admiralty practice may

use as a designation “Admiralty,” “Proctor in

Admiralty” or a substantially similar designation;

(c) A lawyer who has been certified by the

Supreme Court of Virginia as a specialist in some

capacity may use the designation of being so certified,

e.g., “certified mediator” or a substantially similar

designation;

(d) A lawyer may communicate the fact that the

lawyer has been certified as a specialist in a field of law

by a named organization, provided that’ the

communication clearly states that there 1s no procedure

in the Commonwealth of Virginia for approving

certifying organizations. Effective Nov. 1,2002

(a) A lawyer admitted to engage in patent

practice before the United States Patent and

Trademark Office may use the designation “Patent

Attorney” or a substanttally similar designation;

(b) A lawyer engaged in Admiralty practice may

use as a designation “Admiralty,” “Proctor in

Admiralty” or a substantially similar designation:

(c) A lawyer who has been certified by the

Supreme Court of Virginia as a specialist in some

capacity maw use the designation of being so certified,

e.g., “certified mediator” or a substantially similar

designation;

(d) Alawyer may communicate the fact that the

tawyer has been certified as a specialist in a field of law

by a named organization, provided that the

communication clearly states that there is no procedure

in the Commonwealth of Virginia for approving

certifying organizations.

RULE 8.4 Misconduct

It is professional misconduct for a lawyer to:

(b) commit a criminal or deliberately wrongful act that

reflects adversely on the lawyer's’ honesty,

trustworthiness or fitness as a lawyer;

( c ) engage in professional conduct involving

dishonesty, fraud, deceit or misrepresentation:;

Effective Mar. 25, 2003

(b) commit a criminal or deliberately wrongful act that

reflects adversely on the lawyer's honesty,

trustworthiness or fitness to practice law.

(c) engage in conduct involving dishonesty, fraud

deceit or misrepresentation which reflects adversely on

the lawyer’s fitness to practice law;

lil. DISPOSITION

Upon review of the forgoing finding of facts, the

exhibits presented by Bar Counsel on behalf of the VSB

as Exhibits 1- 92, the exhibits presented by the

Respondent as The Respondent’s Exhibits 1-42, the

evidence from witnesses presented on behalf ofthe VSB

and evidence presented by the Respondent in the form

of his own

testimony, and at the conclusion of the evidence

regarding misconduct, the Board recessed to deliberate.

After deliberation the Board reconvened and stated

that it had found by clear and convincing evidence that

the Respondent had violated The following Rules of

Professional Conduct: in Docket No. 04-:052-0794, Rule

1.2(a); 1.5(a); 1.16(a)(3); 3.4{1); 7.1(a); 8.4(b) & ©); in

Docket No. 04-052-1044. Rule 1.7(b) 1-2; 3.1; 3.4

(d)(h) WG); 3.7(a)(1-3); 4.4 and 8(b) and (c).

The Board stated that the Bar had failed to

prove by clear and convincing evidence any violation of

the following the Rules of Professional Conduct:

3.3(a)1-4; 5.5(a)l-2; 7.1(a)1-4; —-7.4(a)(b)(c)(d); and

effective Nov. 1, 2002 7.4(a)(b)(c)(d).

The bases for the Boards finding of violation of

the Rules of Professional Conduct are as follows:

VSB Docket No. 04-052-0794

(a) The Respondent violated Rule 1.2(a) (Scope

of Representation) in that his authorization to act on

behalf of his client SSA was limited, but he nonetheless

acted without written authorization from his client.

A--50

Furthermore, after he had been discharged by SSA, he

wrote the Department of State claiming to be the

managing attorney of SSA, which was not the case. He

also made a FOIA request without any authorization.

(b) The Respondent violated Rule 1.5(a) 1-8

(Fees) with his claim of a fee of 4.5 million dollars.

Respondent acknowledged that the fee arrangement

was a contingent fee arrangement and no recovery had

been made. Therefore, there was no basis to claim a fee.

Furthermore, the amount of the fee, $4.5 million, does

not appear to have any reasonable relationship to work

actually performed which is necessary for a recovery on

a quantum merit basis. Respondent testified that he

determined the amount based upon what the salary

wcald be for a legal representative for a U.S. company

overating in a foreign country.

(c) The Respondent violated Rule 1.16 (a)(3)

‘Declining or Terminating Representation) by

representing that he was SSA’s managing attorney in

a FOIA request (VSB Ex. 23), which he made well after

SSA had terminated their relationship.

(d) The Respondent violated Rule 3.4(D)

(Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel) by tiling the

litigation in the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Virginia and the Circuit Court of

Fairfax County, Virginia. [t should appear to any

reasonably competent lawyer that the courts did not

have jurisdiction over the parties named as defendants.

Even giving the Respondent the benefit of the doubt as

to the first suit, he received a ruling that the court

lacked personal jurisdiction over the defendants which

was upheld on appeal. He nonetheless filed a second

suit with the same infirmity seeking the same recovery.

Furthermore, his suit in the Circuit Court of Fairfax

\--5 9

d

County, Virginia, included as a defendant Harrison

Pledger and his law firm, merely because Mr. Pledger

had acted as defense counsel in the two suits in the

federal court

(e) The Respondent violated Rule 7.1(a) 1-5

(Communication Concerning a Lawyer’s Services) by

misrepresentation on his website and resume. VSB

Exhibits 24 and 25 show that Mr. Rodriguez, on the

website he created, misrepresented his relationship

with SSA. He misrepresented what he did for SSA and

how he became employed by SSA. He misrepresented

his education by listing an LLM civil law degree from

the University of Bordeaux. He improperly claimed:a

certification (the American Trial Lawyer Ultimate Trial

Lawyer Certification) where no such certification

exists.

(f) The Respondent violated Rule 8.4(b) and

8.4(c) (Misconduct) by representing in his FOIA request

that he was the managing attorney for SSA, when the

evidence shows that he clearly was not.

VSB Docket No. 04-052-1044

(a) The Respondent violated Rule 1.7(b) 1

(Conflict of interest) in his attempt to represent his son

in the District Court for the District of Columbia and

his continued actions to do so even in the face of a court

ruling that there was a conflict.

(b) The Respondent violated Rule 3.1

(Meritorious Claims and Contentions) by his litigation

in the District Court for the District of Columbia and

his actions in the Circuit Court of Fairfax County,

Virginia. The complaint filed by the Respondent with

all the parties he named as defendants standing alone

shows that the Respondent has violated this Rule. The

numerous pleadings filed thereafter further

demonstrate that the Respondent’s aim was to punish

anyone who had any connection with the htigation filed

by his former wife to regain custody of their son. Any

attorney who had in any way appeared in that

litigation ended up being named as a defendant.

NCMEC and several of its staff were named as

defendants resulting in a legal cost to NCMEC alone of

$160,090.00 Attorney Patrick Stiehm who had taken

Respondent's ex-wife’s case pro bono was named as a

defendant thereby making good on Respondent’s claim

that Stiehm’s representation would cost him a “big

chunk of change.”

Furthermore, in litigation in Fairfax County,

Respondent subpoenaed two members of NCMEC as

witnesses for a hearing involving his efforts to file a

Statement of the Case for an appeal, when these two

staff members had nothing to do with the Fairfax

litigation. While the subpoenas were quashed they

nevertheless had the effect of harassing the NCMEC

staff members. Remarkably this is the only instance in

which the Respondent was sanctioned by a court.

Perhaps if he had been sanctioned earlier, either

by the United States District Court for the Eastern

District of Virginia or the District Court for the District

of Columbia, such action would have put a stop to

Respondent’s unwarranted and vexatious conduct.

Unfortunately neither of the courts saw fit to impose

sanctions.

(c) The Respondent violated Rule 3.4(d)(h(G)()

(Fairness to Opposing Party and Counsel) by the

following conduct: (1) by continuing to attempt to

represent his son tn the District of Columbia litigation

in the face of a court ruling, in violation of Rule 3.4(d);

(2) by threatening the NCMEC attorney with a bar

complaint and filing a criminal complaint with the FBI,

in violation of 3.4(h); (3) by filing a motion for sanction:

against Patrick Stiehm and naming Stiehm as a

defendant in the District of Columbia litigation and by

his entire course of conduct in the District of Columbia

litigation, in violaticn of Rule 3.4()():

(d) The Respondent violated Rule 3.7(a) 1-3

(Lawyer as Witness) by acting as an advocate when he

was a necessary witness in the Eastern District of

Virginia litigation.

(e) The Respondent violated Rule 4.4 (Respect

for the Rights of Third Persons) by the whole course of

litigation in the District Court for the District of

Columbia. In addition, his subpoena of Ms. Brinkerhoff

and Mr. Dennis to the Fairfax Circuit Court for a

bearing on the Statement of Facts to be submitted fo.

appeal further demonstrates a violation of this Rule

(f) The Respondent violated Rule 8.4(b) and 8.4(

c ) (Misconduct) in asserting a RICO claim and by hi:

letter to the FBI.

Thereafter, the Board received further evidence

of aggravation and mitigation from the Bar and th

Respondent, including the Respondent’s prior

disciplinary record. The Board recessed to deliberate

what sanction to impose upon its findings of

misconduct by the Respondent. After due deliberation

the Board reconvened to announce the sanction

imposed. The Chair announced the sanction as

REVOCATION. The Board in reaching its decision

of revocation recognized that the violation of certain of

the Rules such as Rule 1.5(a), 7.1, and 8.4(b) & (c )

standing alone may not merit the ultimate sanction of

revocation. However, the Respondent's conduct by

pursuing litigation in Virginia in Docket No

04-¥52-0794 and in the District of Columbia in Docket

No. 04-052-1044 is conduct that cannot be tolerated

While a court through sanctions can protect itself from

such conduct by a deceitful and unprincipled attorney,

the public must look to the VSB for protection. The

other violations demonstrate Respondent's complet

lisregard for the Rules of Professional Conduct.

Furthermore the Respondent was defiant to any

riticism of his conduct in pursuing what can only be

described as meritiess and vexatious litigation. This

same defiance was evident to the Board as the

Respondent sought to justify his conduct. Therefore the

Board concluded that the sanction of revocation was thi

only remedy by which the public and bar could bi

idequately protected

Accordingly, 11 ORDERED ~ that the

Respondents license to practice law in_ th

Commonwealth of Virginia is revoked, effective Octobe:

rf, 2006

It is further ORDERED that the Respondent

must comply with the requirements of Part Six, § IV, §

13(M) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia

The Respondent shall forthwith give notice by certified

mail, return receipt requested, of the revocation of hi:

license to practice law in the Commonwealth of!

Virginia, to all chents for whom he is currently

handling matters and to all opposing attorneys and

presiding judges in pending litigation. The Respondent

shall also make appropriate arrangements for the

disposition of matters then in his care in conformity

with the wishes of his client The Respondent shall give

uch notice within 14 days of the effective date of tl

vocation. and make such arrangements @as ar

required herein within 45 days of the effective date o

the revocation. The Respondent shall also furnish proof!

to the Bar within 60 days of the effective day of the

revocation that such notices have been timely give:

and such arrangements made for the dispositior

matters

Itis further ORDERED that ifthe Respondent

not handling any client matters on the effective dats

October 27,2006, he shall submit an affidavit to that

effect to the Clerk of the Disciplinary System at th

Virginia State Bar. Allissuecs concerning the adequac:

of the notice and arrangements required by Paragraph

13 (M) shall be determined by the Virginia State Baz

Disciplinary Board, unless the Respondent make

timely request for hearing before a three-judge court

It is further ORDERED that pursuant to Pa)

Six, §1V, {| 13,B.8.c. of the Rules of the Supreme Court

of Virginia, the Clerk of the Disciplinary System sha

assess all costs against the Respondent

[It is further ORDERED that the Clerk of t

Disciplinary System shall mail an attested copy of thi

order to the Respondent at his address of record with

the Virginia State Bar, being 7924 Peyton Forest Trail

Annandale, VA 22003-1560, by certified mail, retur:

receipt requested, and by regular mail to Noel

Sengel, Bar Counsel, Virginia State Bar, Suite 310, 10!

North Pitt Street, Alexandria, Virginia, 22314°31

ENTERED this 28th day of November, 2006

VIRGINIA STATE BAR DISCIPLINARY BOA