Appendix — College Standard Magazine v. Student Ass'n of the State University of New York at Albany

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APPENDIX

Opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit (July 1, 20130)................................... la

Decision of the U.S. District Court for the

Northern District of New York (August 8, 2005)

(Excerpt of Transcript Proceedings containing

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Amended Decision of the U.S. District Court for

the Northern District of New York (February 6,

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Decision of the U.S. District Court for the

Northern District of New York (October 18,

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Order denying Appellee’s Petition for Rehearing

en banc of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit (September 20, 2010) .................... 18a

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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

COLLEGE STANDARD

MAGAZINE, JEFFREY SCOTT

BAREA, AND JULIEN A.M.

STARR,

No. 07-0891

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

vU.

STUDENT ASSOCIATION OF THE

STATE OF NEW YORK AT

ALBANY’,

Defendants-Appellants.

Argued: December 22, 2008.

Decided: July 1, 2010

Before: NEWMAN, CALABRESI, and SACK, Circuit

Judges. Judge Calabresi concurs in a separate

opinion

PER CURIAM:

* The State University of New York at Albany, named as a

defendant in the Verified Complaint, was voluntarily dismissed

while this case was pending in the district court.

2a

Defendant Student Association (the “SA”) of the

State University of New York at Albany (“SUNY-

Albany”) appeals from a decision of the United

States District Court for the Northern District of

New York granting summary judgment in favor of

plaintiffs College Standard Magazine (“CSM”), a

campus organization that publishes a_ politically

conservative newspaper, and its founders, Jeffrey

Barea and Julien Starr, on their challenge under the

First Amendment to a policy pursuant to which the

SA distributed funds comprising the proceeds of a

mandatory student activity fee to student groups.

The district court concluded that the policy was

facially unconstitutional because it vested in the SA

“unbridled discretion” to decide how to distribute the

funds, thereby presenting an impermissible risk of

viewpoint discrimination, and because unwritten

guidelines allegedly employed by the SA in making

funding decisions improperly implicated’ the

viewpoint of putative recipients.

The plaintiffs were denied funding under the

challenged policy in February of 2003. They initially

challenged the policy both facially and as-applied.

After the district court ruled in their favor on the

facial challenge, the plaintiffs stipulated to the entry

of summary judgment against them on the as-

applied challenge from which they cannot and have

not appealed. Thus the plaintiffs have conceded, for

present purposes, that they suffered no harm from

the denial of funding to their organization under the

challenged policy.

This appeal therefore concerns only the plaintiffs'

facial challenge to the policy. But the funding policy

challenged by the plaintiffs is no longer in place at

3a

SUNY-Albany. The SA amended its constitution in

the Spring of 2003 to include regulations on funding

that explicitly require viewpoint neutrality. The

plaintiffs have made clear that this lawsuit does not

challenge the new funding policy, and there is no

indication that the former, challenged funding policy

will be reinstated.

We are thus’ asked to _ consider’ the

constitutionality of a funding policy that is no longer

in effect, and that is not alleged to have caused the

plaintiffs harm when it was in effect. This we cannot

do. We are restricted to deciding “actual

controversies by a judgment which can be carried

into effect, and not to give opinions upon moot

questions or abstract propositions, or to declare

principles of law which cannot affect the matter in

issue in the case before [us].” Local No. 8-6, Oil,

Chem. and Atomic Workers Int'l Union, AFL-CIO v.

Missouri, 361 U.S. 363, 367, 80 S.Ct. 391, 4 L.Ed.2d

373 (1960) (internal quotation marks omitted).

There is no judgment we could issue here that

could be effective. Even if we could enjoin the

challenged policy now that it has been repealed, that

is not the remedy the plaintiffs are currently

seeking. In their stipulation, they have agreed that

“with regard to the claim in the complaint that the

defendant Student Association's policies for

allocating mandatory student activity fee money to

recognized student groups in effect on February 14,

2003 were unconstitutional on [their] face, the

plaintiffs are entitled to an award of nominal

damages in the amount of one dollar ($1.00) upon

the [District] Court's determination set forth in the

transcript of the Court's bench Decision.” See

4a

Stipulation of Settlement and Order, College

Standard Magazine v. Student Ass'n of the State

Univ. of N.Y. at Albany, No. 03 Civ. 0505 (N.D.NLY.

Mar. 30, 2005), Doc. No. 107 (Feb. 2, 2007). The

district court's judgment, from which the plaintiffs

have not cross-appealed, similarly reflects that the

parties stipulated to an amount of damages in the

total sum of $1.00, without any mention of an

injunction. And we could not order damages for any

harm the policy inflicted on the plaintiffs because

the as-applied challenge has been conceded. Any

declaration that the policy was unconstitutional

would be strictly advisory. Cf. Hewitt v. Helms, 482

U.S. 755, 761, 107 S.Ct. 2672, 96 L.Ed.2d 654 (1987)

(“The real value of the judicial pronouncement-what

makes it a proper judicial resolution of a ‘case or

controversy rather than an advisory opinion-is in

the settling of some dispute which affects the

behavior of the defendant towards the plaintiff.”)

(emphasis 1n original).

In light of the repeal of the challenged policy and

the concession as to the as-applied challenge, we

cannot issue a decision that would confer any relief

to the plaintiffs and therefore lack jurisdiction over

this appeal. See, e.g., Church of Scientology of Cal. v.

United States, 506 U.S. 9, 12, 113 S.Ct. 447, 121

L.Ed.2d 313 (1992) (‘appeal must be dismissed” as

moot where court cannot grant “ ‘any effectual relief

whatsoever’ ”) (quoting Mills v. Green, 159 U.S. 651,

653, 16 S.Ct. 132, 40 L.Ed. 293 (1895)); see also Ky.

Right to Life, Inc. v. Terry, 108 F.3d 637, 645 (6th

Cir.1997) (referring to “general rule that legislative

repeal of a statute renders a case moot”); cf. City of

Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 289,

102 S.Ct. 1070, 71 L.Ed.2d 152 (1982) (upholding

5a

justiciability of challenge to practice that City had

voluntarily ceased but planned to reinstate).

The parties' failure to raise in their briefs the

question of whether this appeal is moot for the

foregoing reasons does not allow us to proceed

despite the absence of a live case or controversy.

“{[W]e have an independent obligation to consider the

presence or absence of subject matter jurisdiction

sua sponte.” Joseph v. Leavitt, 465 F.3d 87, 89 (2d

Cir.2006); see also, e.g., Muhammad v. City of New

York Dep't of Corr., 126 F.3d 119, 122-23 (2d

Cir.1997) (mootness is an issue of subject matter

jurisdiction).

For these reasons, the appeal is dismissed as

moot and the judgment of the district court is

vacated.! “It is well established that, when a matter

becomes moot on appeal, federal appellate courts

will generally vacate the lower court's judgment

except where actions attributable to one of the

parties rendered the appeal moot....” Catanzano uv.

Wing, 277 F.3d 99, 108 (2d Cir.2001) (nternal

quotation marks omitted). See United States uv.

Munsingwear, Inc., 340 U.S. 36, 39-40, 71 S.Ct. 104,

95 L.Ed. 36 (1950); see also Van Wie v. Pataki, 267

F.3d 109, 115 (2d Cir.2001) (explaining that vacatur

“avoids giving preclusive effect to a judgment never

reviewed by an appellate court” (internal quotation

marks omitted)). Cf. Russman v. Bd. of Educ. of

1 Because we vacate the judgment of the district court on

the basis of the mootness of the appeal, we need not determine

whether this case was moot while it was pending before the

district court, which it may have been. See concurring opinion

of Calabresi, J. If it was, of course, we would also be required to

vacate the district court's decision for that independent reason.

6a

Enlarged City Sch. Dist. of City of Watervliet, 260

F.3d 114, 122 (2d Cir.2001) (noting exception to

general rule of vacatur where “appellant has caused

the mootness’”).2

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the appeal is dismissed

for want of jurisdiction, and the district court

judgment is vacated. The case is remanded to the

district court and the court is directed to dismiss the

Verified Complaint as moot.

2 The actions of the appellant SA did not cause the

mootness. The challenged policy had already been repealed

before the district court ruled on the facial challenge. Following

that ruling, the parties stipulated to the entry of summary

judgment against the plaintiffs on the as-applied challenge,

thus effectively agreeing that the plaintiffs had suffered no

harm from the policy. Cf. Russman, 260 F.3d at 122 (“[W]Jhen

the appellee has caused the case to become moot, we vacate the

district court’s judgment to prevent the appellee from

insulating a favorable decision from appellate review.”).

la

CALABRESI, Circuit Judge, concurring:

I agree with everything substantive in the per

curtam opinion! and join it in full. I add a few lines

because I think it is worthwhile to point out that this

case was in fact moot at the district court level.

In Spring 2003, the defendant Student

Association abolished the challenged funding policy.

In September 2005, the district court granted the

Plaintiffs' summary judgment motion as to liability.

In October 2006, the parties entered into the

stipulation that-we have held-caused this case to

become moot. Then, in February 2007, final

judgment was entered, and the Student Association

timely appealed.

The event which led us to find that this case is

moot happened between the district court's grant of

summary judgment and the entry of final judgment

below. I write to underscore that even after

summary judgment has been granted, if, before the

entry of final judgment, something occurs that

causes a case to cease to be an Article III case or

controversy, that action becomes moot and should be

dismissed forthwith. This is so because the “case-or-

controversy requirement subsists through all stages

of federal judicial proceedings,” Spencer v. Kemna,

523 U.S. 1, 7, 118 S.Ct. 978, 140 L.Ed.2d 43 (1998)

(internal quotation marks omitted); see also Altman

v. Bedford Cent. Sch. Dist., 245 F.3d 49, 70 (2d

Cir.2001).

1 [ would, however, for the sake of Latin, substitute “[nostra

)’ for “sua ” in the quotation from Joseph v. Leavitt, 465 F.3d

87, 89 (2d Cir.2006), ante, at 35.

8a

Moreover, the fact that the case was moot before

the district court entered final judgment forecloses

any possible claim by the Plaintiffs for attorneys'

fees under 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b). “Whether [a plaintiff]

can be deemed a ‘prevailing party’ in the District

Court, even though its judgment was mooted after

being rendered but before the losing party could

challenge its validity on appeal, is a question of some

difficulty.” Lewis v. Continental Bank Corp., 494

U.S. 472, 483, 110 S.Ct. 1249, 108 L.Ed.2d 400

(1990); see also Diffenderfer v. Gomez-Colon, 587

F.3d 445, 454 (1st Cir.2009) (answering the question

in the affirmative and collecting other cases doing

the same). But that question cannot arise in this

case. “Since the judgment below is vacated on the

basis of an event that mooted the controversy before

the [district court's] judgment issued, [the Plaintiffs

were} not, at that stage, ... ‘prevailing part[ies]’ as

[they] must be to recover fees under § 1988.” Lewis,

494 U.S. at 483, 110S.Ct. 1249.

9a

(Excerpt of Transcript Containing Decision)

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

COLLEGE STANDARD

MAGAZINE, et al.

Plaintiffs,

03-CV-505

-versus-

(DECISION)

STATE UNIVERSITY OF

NEW YORK AT ALBANY,

et al.,

Defendant.

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS held in and

for the United States District Court, Northern

District of new York, at the James T. Foley United

States Courthouse, 445 Broadway, Albany, New

York 12207, on MONDAY, AUGUST 8, 2005, before

the HON. THOMAS J. McAVOY, United States

District Court Judge.

THE COURT: This case is back before the Court

on a motion for reconsideration. Familiarity with the

background and the prior decision in this case is

assumed. Plaintiffs move for reconsideration on the

ground that the Court did not address. their

argument that defendants’ unwritten funding

10a

policies are unconstitutional on their face. The

defendants cross move for reconsideration on the

ground that the Court failed to consider plaintiffs

lack of evidentiary proof that the opinions of certain

student association members may have tainted a

majority of the voting student association members

and that such taint led to the denial of funding.

Plaintiffs argue that the student association’s

unwritten funding policy is unconstitutional on its

face because it gives the student association

unbridled discretion and because defendants

admitted having taken into consideration such

factors as the number of active members in the

organization and whether the organization was

active on the campus and accessible to a wide group

of students.

Although the student association did not have

any written internal policies at the time plaintiffs

applied for funding, it did have to work within the

boundaries of 8 New York Rules and Regulations

Section 302.14(c)(3). Thus, it did have some

limitations. Nevertheless, the Court agrees with

plaintiff that there is insufficient evident of adequate

standards to avoid the problem of unbridled

discretion. This Court adopts the reasoning in

Southworth v. Board of Regents of the University of

Wisconsin, 307 F. 3d 566, 578 and 579, wherein the

Seventh Circuit held that a prohibition on unbridled

discretion is an element of viewpoint neutrality. See

also Forsyth County Georgia v. The Nationalist

Movement, 12 S. Crt. 2395. The existence of

unabridged discretion presents the risk that the

decisionmaker — here, the student association — will

use its broad discretion to favor or disfavor speech

lla

based on its content. Southworth at 579. Although

New York State regulations discussed above provide

very broad categories of purposes for which funding

may be allocated, it does not set out a mechanism for

approving or disapproving funding requests or

otherwise allocating funding among _ recognized

student organization.

As mentioned in the Court’s prior ruling from the

bench, the defendants have admitted not having a

written policy. To the extent that defendants did

have standards, they admitted to using criteria such

as the number of active members in the recognized

student organization, whether the recognized

student organization was active on campus, how

accessible the recognized student organization was

to students, and whether the recognized student

organization was a small group who merely wanted

money for a party. There’s also evidence that

defendants believed they could be denied funding for

any reason at all.

Several of these written factors, however, can be

related to speech or viewpoint. As the Seventh

Circuit noted in Southworth, quote, the University

cannot use the popularity of the speech as a factor in

determining funding, close quote. Southworth, at

594. Thus, for example, looking to the number of

active members in the recognized = student

organization can be seen as getting involved in

issues concerning the popularity of a particular

recognized student organization. Granting funding

based on the number of students in the organization

can be seen as treating minority viewpoints

differently from majority viewpoints. While the

number of students in the organization may in

12a

certain circumstances be a legitimate factor in

determining the amount of financing, see

Southworth, 307 F. 3d at 595, it is not proper in

determining whether to grant funding at all. The

Seventh Circuit further noted in Southworth that,

quote, consideration of the length of time in

organization has been in existence and the amount

of funding an organization has received in the past

discriminates against less traditional viewpoints,

end quote. Southworth at 594. The reasoning in

Southworth equally applies here to consideration of

the number of members in an organization and

whether the recognized student organization is

accessible to a wide range of students and how active

the group was on campus. An organization with less

popular viewpoints I unlikely to have many member,

may not have the resources to be as active as more

popular groups, and may be less known or less

interesting to a wide range of students. Nonetheless,

as noted, a group holding less popular viewpoints is

not entitled to any less First Amendment protection

than any other groups. Accordingly, the Court find

that the largely unbridled discretion afforded the

student association, coupled with the improper

factors it used in its unwritten policy, were facially

invalid.

Because plaintiffs raised the facial invalidity of

the funding policies in their motion for summary

judgment and the Court did not consider the facial

validity of the funding policy in light of defendants’

contentions concerning its claimed unwritten policy,

plaintiffs motion for reconsideration is granted.

Accepting defendants’ facts as true, and assuming

they did have such as unwritten policy, the student

association’s unwritten policy allows for too much

l3a

discretion. The student association’s policy also

takes into consideration factors that are improperly

related to the content of the speech. Accordingly,

plaintiffs motion for summary judgment must be

granted. Because the Court finds the student

association’s funding policy to have been facially

unconstitutional, the Court need not address

defendants’ motion for reconsideration. Accordingly,

that motion is denied.

Plaintiffs shall submit an order on notice to

defendants within 11 days of today’s date.

(Court adjourned at 10:40 AM.)

l4a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

COLLEGE STANDARD

MAGAZINE, et al.

Plaintiffs,

AMENDED

v.

Judgment in a Civil

STATE UNIVERSITY OF Case

NEW YORK AT ALBANY,

et all., Case No. 1:03-CV-

505

Defendant.

JURY VERDICT. This action came before this

Court for a trial by jury. The issues have been

tried and the jury has rendered its verdict.

DECISION BY COURT. This action came to

trial or hearing before the Court. The issues have

been tried or heard and a decision has been

rendered.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED pursuant

to plaintiffs’ [11] Notice of Dismissal dated May

13, 2003, the complaint was _ voluntarily

dismissed against defendant, State University of

New York at Albany.

15a

As to the plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 First

Amendment right violations, the Court granted

plaintiffs summary judgment against defendant,

The Student Association of the State University

of New York at Albany, finding that such student

association funding policy owas deemed

unconstitutional in accordance with Senior Judge

Thomas J. McAvoy’s [90] Order dated September

3, 2005. The parties have stipulated to the

amount of damages in the total sum of $1.00 as

placed upon the record on October 11, 2006.

Dated: February 6, 2007

Lawrence K. Baerman

Clerk of Court

s/ C.M. Ligas

By: Deputy Clerk

16a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

COLLEGE STANDARD

MAGAZINE, et al.

Plaintiffs,

AMENDED

U.

Judgment in a Civil

STATE UNIVERSITY OF Case

NEW YORK AT ALBANY,

et al., Case No. 1:03-CV-

505

Defendant.

_. JURY VERDICT. This action came before this

Court for a trial by jury. The issues have been

tried and the jury has rendered its verdict.

xx DECISION BY COURT. This action came to

trial or hearing before the Court. The issues have

been tried or heard and a decision has been

rendered.

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED pursuant

to the plaintiffs’ [11] Notice of Dismissal dated

May 13, 2003, the complaint was voluntarily

dismissed against defendant, State University of

New York at Albany.

As to the plaintiffs’ 42 U.S.C. § 1983 First

Amendment right violations, the Court granted

17a

plaintiffs summary judgment against defendant,

The Student Association of the State University

of New York at Albany, finding that such student

association funding’ policy owas deemed

unconstitutionai in accordance with Senior Judge

Thomas J. McAvoy’s [82] Order dated July 9,

2005; however, the Court did not reach a decision

as to the remaining cause of action relating to the

discriminatory voting practices. The parties have

stipulated to the amount of damages in the total

sum of $1.00 as placed upon the record on

October 11, 2006.

Dated: October 18, 2006

Lawrence K. Baerman

Clerk of Court

s/ C.M. Ligas

By: Deputy Clerk

18a

UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEAL FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Filed September 20, 2010

At a stated Term of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Daniel

Patrick Moynihan United States Courthouse, 500

Pearl Street, in the City of New York, on the 20th

day of September, two thousand-ten,

x

Docket No. [s]: 07-0981-cv

College Standard Magazine, Jeffrey Scott

Barea, and Julien A.M. Starr,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

v.

Student Association of the State University

of New York at Albany,

Defendant-Appellant.

xX

Appellees College Standard Magazine, Jeffrey

Scott Barea and Julien A.M. Starr filed a petition for

panel rehearing, or in the alternative, for rehearing

en banc, and the panel that determined the appeal

having considered the request for panel rehearing,

and the active members of the Court having

considered the request for rehearing en banc.

19a

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the petition be

denied.

FOR THE COURT:

s/Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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