Opinion — Jones v. Prairie Oil & Gas Co.

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SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES.

No. 109.—Ocroser Term, 1926.

Minerva Jones, Philip A. Lewis, and

Carter W. Wesley, Trustees, ete., and

Leonard D. Ingram, Appellarts,

vs.

The Prairie Oil and Gas Company.

Appeal from the District

Court of the United

States for the Northern

District of Oklahoma.

[January 24, 1927.]

Mr. Justice Hotmes delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is a bill in equity seeking the cancellation of oil and gas

leases to, or held by, the Prairie Oil and Gas Company, and for

an account. The fundamental facts are as follows. Leonard D.

Ingram was a member of the Muskogee (Creek) Nation and as

such on July 1, 1907, received patents of homestead and other land,

the homestead patent expressing the conditions provided by Act

of Congress, that the land should be inalienable, &c., for twenty-

one years. On January 3, 1911, the County Court of Wagoner

County, Oklahoma, made an order appointing Minerva Ingram,

now Minerva Jones, guardian of Leonard D. Ingram. On January

24.1911, Mareh 28, 1911, and December 18, 1911, Minerva Ingram,

acting as guardian, made the leases in question, covering the above

lands and running for as long after the minority of Leonard Ingram

as oil or gas should be found in paying quantities. The defendant

company begar to remove oil and gas in 1920 and is continuing

to do so still. The leases are said to be invalid for several reasons:

It is alleged that the appointment of Minerva Ingram as guardian

was void under the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution

beeause no notice of the application for appointment was given. It

is alleged further that the guardian had no power to execute leases

that would or might outlast the minority of the ward, as that again

is thought to be contrary to the Fourteenth Amendment. Thirdly

it is urged that the inclusion of the homestead was invalid because

of the condition against alienation in the patent under the Act of

2 Jones et al. vs. Prairie Oil & Gas Co.

Congress, notwithstanding the later Act of May 27, 1908, ¢. 199;

35 Stat. 312, which is admitted to apply but is said to be ineffective

under the Fifth Amendment, as depriving the minor of his property

without due process of law. Finally it is averred that the teases

were not executed in manner and form required by law. On motion

the District Court dismissed the bill and the plaintiffs appealed

to this Court. Lipke v. Lederer, 259 U. 8. 557, 560.

The averment that the guardian was appointed without notice

was qualified by an amendment showing an order for a hearing

on January 3, 1911, and for notice by posting in three public

places, one being the door of the Court House. The notice was

posted as directed but although dated December 15, 1910, states

January 3, 1910, instead of 1911, as the time for the hearing. It

was also sent by mail to the minor, to Minerva Ingram and three

others, stated to be next of kin and persons having the care of the

minor. It is admitted that Minerva Ingram was the mother of the

minor, and the record indicates that the latter was of tender years,

or at least under twelve, which is not denied. The mother seems

to have had him in her custody. The Oklahoma statutes only re-

quire such notice as the judge deems reasonable to be given to the

relatives residing in the county and to any person having the care

of such minor. Compiled Oklahoma Statutes, 1921, § 1431. In

the circumstances stated, unqualified, the requirement of notice is

merely formal, if it exists. Lester v. Smith, 83 Okla. 143. Gibson,

Appellant, 154 Mass. 378, 379-381. Certainly there is nothing in

the Constitution of the United States that requires it. See Hoyt

v. Sprague, 103 U. 8S. 613. The clerical error in the notice would

mislead no one and did not invalidate the proceedings. The mother

was the petitioner and no one but the mother and son were con-

cerned. We see nothing to overcome the presumption if any

presumption were needed, in favor of the validity of the appoint-

ment, declared to exist by the Supreme Court of the State. Baker

v. Cureton, 49 Okla. 15.

The Oklahoma statutes are held to give to guardians the power

to execute oil and gas leases that may last beyond the minority of

their wards. Cabin Valley Mining Co. v. Hall, 53 Okla. 760.

Mallen v. Ruth Oil Co., 230 Fed. Rep. 497; affirmed, 231 Fed. Rep.

845. The fugitive character of the subject-matter makes it neces-

sary in the ward’s interest that guardians should have that power,

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Jones et al. vs. Prairie Oil & Gas Co. 3

and it appears to us that it would be an extravagant interpretation

of the Constitution to hold that the ward’s interest must be saecri-

ficed on the ground of the absolute character of his title when

adult. He takes that title subject to such qualificaticns as the law

reasonably allows to be imposed for his good. The denial of the

power as to agricultural (Haddock vy. Bronaugh, 92 Okla. 197)

or coal lands (Tierney Coal Co. vy. Smith, 180 Ky. 815) whether

right or wrong on constitutional grounds, cannot be extended to

this ease.

It is rot open to dispute that the removal by the later Act of

Congress that we have cited of the restriction upon alienation pre-

viously imposed is valid. Williams v. Johnson, 239 U. 8. 414, 420.

Egan v. McDonald, 246 U. S. 227, 229. Fink v. County Commis-

sioners, 248 U. 8. 399, 404.

It is admitted that if we follow the decisions of the Supreme

Court of Oklahoma, both those that we have cited and others. the

guardian did not have to follow the procedure prescribed for the

sale of a ward’s real estate. Duff v. Keaton, 33 Okla. 92. Papoose

Oil Co. v. Swindler, 95 Okla, 264. See also Jackson v. Gates Oil

Co., 297 Fed. Rep. 549. Clayton v. Tibbens, 298 Fed. Rep. 18,

affirming 288 Fed. Rep. 393. But it is argued here that under

Kuhn v. Fairmont Coal Co., 215 U. 8. 349, this Court is not bound

by the State decisions and may judge for itself, inasmuch as what-

ever may be the rule of property now, Duff v. Keaton was de-

cided after these leases were made. It would seem from the eases

cited that the present rule had been followed and great interests

established on the faith of it before Duff v. Keaton. But apart

from that consideration no case yet has gone to the length of under-

taking to correct the construction of State laws by State courts.

The exclusive authority to enact those laws carries with it final

authority to say what they mean. The construction of those laws

by the Supreme Court of the State is as much the act of the State,

as the enactment of them by the legislature. If we thought the

decisions cited far more questionable than we do, we nevertheless

should bow to them as binding upon a matter of local administra-

tion and of only local concern. The counsel for the appellants pre-

sented a very thorough and well stated argument, but failed to

make us doubt that the decree must be affirmed.

Decree affirmed.

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