Reply Brief of Petitioner — Chicago, M. & St. PR Co. v. Coogan

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APR15 1

Noa 268 WM. R. Sian

Supreme Court of the United States

CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE & St. Patt RAtway Company,

Petitioner,

Vs.

Epirn F. CooGaAn, AS SPECIAL ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE Es-

TATE OF WILLIAM CooGAN, DECEASED, Respondent.

REPLY BRIEF AND ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF

PETITIONER.

IF. W. Roor,

C. O. NEWCOMB,

A. C. ERDALL,

29 Milwaukee Station,

Minneapolis, Minnesota,

Attorneys for Petitioner.

Of Counsel:

0. W. Dynes, Esq.,

Chicago, Illinois.

Hayward Brief Company, 601-607 Fourth Ave. So., Minneapolis

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= United States v. Ross, 92 U.S. T07, 23

TABLE OF CASES

Brauckman vy. @., St. P.M. & O Ry. Co. 110 Minn. 309 .. ve

Chesepeake & Ohio Railway vy. Ware, 95 8. EL IS3 22... 15

Chicago, Rock Island & PL. Ry. Co. vo Brown, 229 UL Ss.

ee NS ees OR MOOD gy p's a unis eck wn edie eked Bae 1)

Gilo Valley Ry. Co. vo Hall, 232 UL S294, 34 Sup. Ct.

Rep. 220

ith CP ie, CE Pe FAVE EER STREET Oe eee eee 19

OS Ct 0 Ae < © In

Myers vy. Pittsburgh Coal Co. 238 U.S. 184. 54 Sup. Ct.

ON zal eds 54a bi don eaaaeny es 13

nw Ae. Ie. BRU, 0 O,, BOR MEUM, CE cs cn eee rf

Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Myers, 203 Fed. 221

Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co. v. Eftinger (CL CL AL),

ER TEE SIR i Ren AE Se, Rip oe 16

Patton vo Texas & Pacific Railway Co.. 179 Ul oS. G58, 21

CB oO SU a ae ies Sos eae ee re 17

Pee We ee eee, OO. Bee BOUIN, Se nce eee sh vas y

Reading Co. vo Boyer (Circuit: Court of Appeals, Third

NT EE BM sg a Ae se a vin ao ws A 16

Texas and Pacific Railway Co. v. Harvey, 228 U.S. 319,

ey ND nS en ss a's cy HOD OR RO 8 ws 20

Texas & Pacific Railway Co. vo Swearingen, 196 U.S, 57,

A I oa cag and @onlaks bdg alae ee ap ess eae 20)

; Truax v. M., St. P.& S.S. M. Ry. Co., 89 Minn, 143 .... 22

Union Pacitie Company v. Huwoll, 245 U.S. 535. 38 Sup.

Se IS ores aan Gaia veh a hb ae LAW am ark dik mie 13

Ti

up. Ct. Rep. 28b. 15

PP LOLA CNGEGOI LE. PERE DEALS PEO BELLY OOF 2 a A AE SISO OL LAI AGS Ol SEE

«© ped

Supreme Court of the United States

CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE & St. Patt RAILWAY COMPANY,

Petitioner,

Epiru FL CooGaN, AS SPECIAL ADMINISTRATRIX OF THLE [s-

TATE OF WILLIAM CooGAaN, DECEASED, Respondeut,

REPLY BRIEF AND ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF

PETITIONER.

Statements are made in respondent's brief which are in-

accurate and misleading and for that reason it is thought

advisable to file this bricf and argument in reply to respon-

dent.

It is important to keep in mind that only one act of

negligence was pleaded or is claimed by the respondent,

towit: That the air pipe located on top of the ties and

south of the rails of track No. 1, was defective and that

such defective condition was the proximate cause of dece-

dents death. Respondent does not and could not) claim

that the train itself was improperly handled.

Her claim is that it was the duty of decedent to couple

up the air hoses on the train in question. That certain air

hoses had been coupled up and, therefrom infers that de-

cedent was attempting to couple up the air hoses between

the caboose and the car attached to it when he was killed.

aE a is Nain a ae ars

<p:

Relying on testimony of Odekirk she claims men, in COUp-

ling air hoses, face the engine and under the circumstances

would have their left foot outside the rails. She also claims

that decedent's left shoe was under the air pipe line and

became fastened under same at the alleged defective place

When the train was shoved to clear the lead track. In SUp-

port of this she relies on the slight indentation appearing

on the outside counter of the heel of decedent's left shoe.

noticed sometime after the funeral.

The important ultimate facts to be determined are: Was

decedent's left foot caught under the air pipe line at) the

time of the accident and did this proximately contribute to

his fatal injuries,

Respondent must, of course, show petitioner violated a

duty which it owed to decedent. Respondent's claim is that

decedent at the time of the accident: was coupling air be-

tween the caboose and car attached to it and that it: was

his duty to do so. That the petitioner owed the duty to

furnish decedent a safe place to work and the claimed de-

fective air pipe line made it unsafe.

In the last paragraph of page 3 of respondent's brief. it

is stated that Dubke coupled up the air four cars from the

engine and then found that air was escaping from the end

of the train. This is misleading as Dubke testified he made

other couplings before the body was discovered (R. 241).

This undisputed testimony conclusively shows that Coogan

did not couple the air hoses on all of the ears as claimed

by respondent.

On page 4 respondent states:

“The kicked up condition of the ground and the blood

found just opposite the south rail of track 1. indieated

Coogan’s body had been dragged a distance of 15 feet.”

a — aaa

Respondent's witness, Coroner Engelbert, testified the

body appeared to have been dragged for ten feet, that is,

the ground was scuffed up to a point about ten feet west

of the body (R. 10 and 11). Her witness, Jeffers, testified

the ground looked as though Coogan had been dragged eight

or ten feet (R. 18), while her witness, Odekirk, said the body

LRAT, LOPE

had been dragged, he would judge, a distance of ten or twelve

feet, maybe fifteen. The testimony of respondent's own wit-

nesses indicates the body was dragged about ten feet.

On page 5 respondent states that fifteen feet west of the

body the air pipe line was in a defective condition. In

support of her statement respondent refers to pages 39,

10 and 41 of the record. The only testimony on this feature,

on the pages mentioned, is that of the witness, Odekirk, alias

Murphy, who testified :

“How far from the body was it that, or how far from

the body was it to where vou noticed the condition of

the pipe that I have called your attention to?

A. About a car length and a half. Perhaps I don't

understand your question.

Q. How far from the body was it to the particular

place where you noticed the condition of this air pipe?

A. It was a half a car length, | should judge.”

Odekirk also testified that the average box car is forty —

feet long (R. 45) or in other words, he testified the bend —

in the pipe was from 20 to 60 feet west of the body.

Several pictures were taken showing the location of the

body and the nearby cars. Several of them showed the en-

tire second car ahead of the caboose and about half of the

third car ahead of the caboose, or in other words, showed

the cars and air pipe line for a distance of about 20 feet

west of the body. Mr. Lieb, who took the pictures men-

EY POP URE HARES PE BALI ERS SN LN IS TREE A PACS he Son OS ORG

tioned, testified the bend or bulge in the pipe was west of

the area shown in the pietures (R. 64). He also testified

the bend or bulge in the pipe was 40 or 50 feet west of

the body.

Exhibit *G™ referred to on page 5 of respondent's: brief

Was taken from under the third car ahead of the caboose

for the purpose of and did show the ties and ballast in the

opening between the second and third car where the hat was

found (R. 72).

There was no evidence indicating that Coogan, on the

Inorning of the accident, was in the immediate Vicinity of

the bend in the air pipe line. Respondent's statement that

the bulge or bend in the pipe was 15 feet west of the body,

is incorrect,

On page o of her brief respondent states the counter of

the left shoe had a round depression running parallel with

the sole of the shoe. This is misleading as the depression

Was nearly round in shape. On page 5 respondent states:

“The shoes were in the same condition at the time

they were taken from the body as when offered in evi-

.

denee.

This statement is merely a presumption not based upon

the evidence. Messrs. Goodwin and Gephart, witnesses for

respondent, were the sole witnesses on the condition of the

left shoe. The evidence actually shows that Goodwin. one

of the attorneys for respondent, visited the undertaker about

ten days after the accident and saw the shoes (R. 32) that

Undertaker Gephart, after removing the shoes from. the

body, put them in his garage. That quite a while after the

body was shipped to Austin, Messrs. Sheehan and Goodwin.

the respondent's attorneys, called on Gephart and he gave

the shoes to them (R. 27). The shoes were kept) because

a a NC SE hte YOY OTRAS SL ELA IU DARTS TILT OEY 8 NIA AYN bk WON a |

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hums ask for them and not because of any peculiar condi-

Sie ee

tion of the shoes (R. 28). Gephart paid no particular at-

try

tention to the shoes when in the garage (R, 29). He kept

acar, a delivery truck, packing for furniture and sometimes

hoxes, in the garage (R. 29). This witness testified on

direct examination as follows:

“Q. At the time you gave those shoes to me was vour

attention called to anything in connection with the

near ee *

A. Yes, vou said there was a mark on the counter

of one shoe, and vou said, ‘Look at that.’

Q. Did T show it to vou?

A. Yes.

Q. 1 called your attention to the left shoe, the out-

side of the counter above the heel?

A. TP domt remember which shoe it was (R. 29),

He further testified :

“Q. That is the first time you had any recollection

of seeing this mark on the counter of the shoe was when

Mr. Sheehan called vour attention to it?

A. Yes” (R. 29).

“QQ. Have you any personal recollection of the con:

dition of those shoes at the time they were taken off

Mr. Coogan’s body?

AL Nov (R, 29 and 30),

In the first paragraph on page ft of respondent's brief

it is stated:

“Tt appears that it was the duty of Coogan to conple

the air on this freight train.”

Plaintiff bases this solely upon the following quoted testi

mony of her witness, (hlekirk, whe wae @ mnemew off the

switehing crew:

“(2 Was it any part of the detiee of your crew,

yourself and Dube or amy off wane crew, tee compile What

air?

A. Ne

(2) Whese duty was in?

A. The duty of that crew of Ge

(2 Whe, of the crew of ae

A. Mr. Congan amd Dethomty amd dediiens ©

Hewpmotelemt’s wittmesne Edible, tthe comlly cttw wiltmwee fee

fest ify com this feutare cf the cmee mmmles it dhedimiite ae tee

Which member af this crew mwa the dete te Ee aL ae

nel staten that it wus the chute of Me Pneliaiw, tlhe feud

brakeman ef crm 9 Me Dtealdhie teed ilfieadl

“t), Was it seme date tee eompihe age tie alle”

A. Ne

(2 Whee wae iv”

A. The Beewnel Repo Rrmmanm calf tlhe wenn coniew

42 Whee wane the bee hewiemnnm

A. Me. Dhethowty

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whew thiaet it wane thee ollawt y co Mle Bikelhcmant y , Merstedl Meriplhor ween

amd mot the daty of Me (‘wang fee compile ip tlhe ailee ie

agent inom — “TT herewame, part it iver ait Mee Milian fi cqpteeset lane

comwal mee chat y tee Hairmiieh Comgsnm ae eine ipllanrw fen weenie: agp

ait hemes

The Henlow fimg: ew timmernime eftaiiermeeriit ihe alle iepenedby fogs Hlbes

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that both sides were satistied that it was Delhanty'’s duty.

There is no evidence that Coogan coupled up the air on any

eur and respondent's own witnesses show that Delhanty and

hot Coogan owed the duty to couple up the air on the train

in question, Respondent's proof also shows that the air wits

also coupled up at more than one place in the train hy her

Witness, Dubke. On page 9 of her brief respondent: states

in substance, that petitioner did not, in the State Court,

dispnte that if was Coogan’s duty to couple the air This

mattter was not referred to specifically in petitioner's brief

in chief in the State Supreme Court and no reply brief

Wis introduced in the State Supreme Court. Counsel ap

parently has either overlooked or forgotten that petitioner

arened this matter orally before the State Supreme Court,

The proof shows it was not Coogan’s duty and no conces-

sion has been made in this respect.

On page 9 respondent in stimmary states :

“It being his duty to make this coupling and the

fact that he had made all the other couplings of the

air with the exception hereinbefore referred to. and: it

heing shown that he was at this point. it is ao fair in

ference that he was engaged in the performance of his

duty."

As previously stated it was Delhanty’s and not Coogan’s

duty to couple up the air. There is no proof that Coogan

coupled up any air on the train. Therefore, the inference

that he was engaged in the performance of a duty owed the

defendant at the time of the accident is not based upon any

fact proven in this case.

The inference that Coogan had coupled up the air hose

on other cars of the train and that he was coupling up the

air between the caboose and car attached to it is very im

probable. The air hoses just mentioned were net coupled

after the accident. When the first cut of cars was coupled

onto the caboose Coogan was standing next to the caboose

ip. 25). Tf it was his duty to couple the air hoses het ween

the caboose and ear attached to it he would, of course, be

apt to couple up the air at onee after the first cut of cars

coupled onte the enboose because he would Know that the

ears would net be moved until Dubke returned with another

ent of ears. The inference in which respondent indulges,

to the effect that Coogan at the time of the accident was

in the act of coupling the air between the caboose and the

carattiched to the enboose, seems inconsistent with the fiaets

proved in this case,

On pages Mand TO of her brief. respondent: states the

position Which she claims Coogan Was in at the time of the

accident. The claim is that the natural position for Coogan

to take would be to place his right foot inside the rail and

left foot outside the rails and inside of the air pipe line, fie-

ine the engine. There is no proof as to the position Coogan

ordinarily took in doing work of this character. Respondent

claims testimony of her witness. Odekirk, as to the natural

position in doing this work, ix sufficient basis for the jury

finding that Coogan coupled up air in the nammner they claim,

that is, with right foot inside and left: foot ontside of the

rails.

Petitioners witness Binko, a yard master and trainman

of twenty vears, testified he had never seen a man couple

up cars with his right foot inside the rails and his left foot

outside the rails and pointed out it would be dangerous to

do the work in that way (RL 90, 9D and 92). The testimony

of Trainmaster Lieb (R. 61). General Car Poreman Palmer

(R. TO and 90). and General Freight Car Foreman Tem,

10

sev (RO S9) coincides with that of Binko. It is sated,

however, that some sinall men teive both feet inside the rails

(Ro SS and S89). Coogan’s shoes were small and) possibly

he was smuill enough so that he could couple air hoses with

both feet inside the rails. Tt is clear from the proof, there

fore. that the best that can be said for plaintill!s conten

tion is that there are several different methods of going

in between cars to couple up the air and there is ne proof

ts fo what method Coogan ordinarily used in doing this

work. The burden, of course, is upon the respondent. to

show Coogan was doing the work claimed and that he was

doing it in the manner contended for. There is ne proof to

support either contention,

On page TO the statement is made that petitioner's wit-

nesses Lieb. Palmer and THemsey had no experience in

coupling air hoses. Of course. the statement is erroneous.

The train master has supervision over the trainmen and,

of course, in order to supervise and instruet the trainmen

Inust Know how todo the work. Train Master Lieb testified

the Jasi owitching he did was for a period of two months,

two vears before the trial (Ro TO and 71). General Car

Poreman Palmer testified he had experience in coupling and

nncoupling cars, and of course, this includes air hoses, prac:

tically all of his life (Ro St). General Freight Car Fore-

man THemsey testified he had had considerable experience in

coupling and uncoupling cars and had observed switchmen,

traimmen and carmen doing such work (RL SS).

Respondent had the burden of proving Coogan was cou

pling air hoses on the cars. She called Conductor Jetfers

and Switchman Dubke as her witnesses but didn't ask them

any question as to how to couple or uncouple air hoses. A

statement that a train master and general car foreman are

not familiar with the manner of coupling air hoses on trains

seems ridienlous. Petitioner's witness Binko also testified

as fo the manner of coupling air hoses and disagreed with

Odekirk. Binkeo testified he had considerable experience in

coupling and uncoupling air hoses as a yard foreman and

trainman. Tle had worked for petitioner for ten vears stead.

ily and off and on for 20 vears as brakeman, switehman and

yard foreman (RL S99 and 90),

It seems inconceivable that a foot could become caught be-

tween a round iron pipe one and three-fourths ineh outside

diameter OR. TS amd Soy. and flat ties and ballast. The bulge

in the pipe was 12 or 15 feet long (RR. 69) and could be

bent by putting vour foot against it CR. Gs). At the maxi

mum bulge the pipe was six inches or more south of the

south rail of track Noo TOR. dl and 68) and was bent up

three and one-half or four inches above the ties @R. 4b).

This is not like a crossing frog with sharp edges and flat sur

faces where a foot may become wedged in and caught. The

altimate presumption indulged in’ by the respondent not

only is not based on any fact in the ease but is also an im-

probable one.

On page 19 of her brief, respondent refers to “defendant's

admitted negligence.” Defendant has made no such admis-

sion.

Respondent indulges in a large series of presumptions not

supported by the facts in the case. Respondent presumes :

1. That it was Coogan’s duty to couple the air hoses in

the train.

’ That all the air hoses on the train were coupled im-

mediately after the accident,

3. That Coogan coupled the air hoses on the entire train

except the air hose coupling four cars from the engine,

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The first three prestimptions are disputed by respondent's

Withess Dubke

f. That at the time of the accident Coogan was about

to couple the ain between the eahoose gad the car atiaehed

to it. .

ae eg P oe ee

> That he was standing in oa steeping position and bis

foot slipped baek.

6. That at the time he was at the point where the iron

air pipe was bent or bulged.

7 That at the time of the accident he was standing with

his right foot inside and lett foot outside the rails.

S. That his left shoe did not have a dent on the counter

before the accident.

9 That the dent in the counter of the left shoe. first

noticed some time after the funeral was enused in the aeei

dent.

10. That the shoe did not become seratcehed or dented

While on the floor of the undertakers garage.

11. That the shoe was indented in the accident but not

on account of hitting some part of the ear. rail pebble. tie

or air pipe line,

1.) That the dent in the shoe was caused by the shoe

and foot being eaught under the round air pipe line.

3. That while his foot was fastened under the round

air pipe his clothing was caught in the rigging of the ear

and he was thrown under the train and run over.

AUTIIORITIES.

In her brief, respondent quotes from the case of ( aiou

Pacific Company ¢. HWierall, 2A VOR. SIS AS Sup. Ct. Rep.

IST. In the Huxell case it was claimed that the power brake

on the locomotive was defective. The engineer was notified

instantly that the engine had strnuek a oman and he imme

diately applied the brake. The proof showed that if the

power brake was in good order the engine conld have been

stopped in eight or ten feet and the proof showed it actually

moved [35 feet. Tuxolls arm was run ever by the middle

driving wheel. This is, of course, considerably more than ten

feet from either end of the engine. In that case. therefore,

there were facts in evidence from which the inference could

reasonably be drawn that the defective power brake was the

proximate cause of Huxolls fatal injuries.

In the present case it has net been shown that the bend

in the air pipe line or that the air pipe line had anything

to do with the accident or that the accident occurred at the

point where the air pipe line was bent. On the contrary, the

evidence shows the accident cecurred from 15 to 35 feet east

of the bend in the air pipe.

In the Huxoll case the defective power brake was applied

to stop the engine and the only inference which it wees

necessary for the jury to decide in the Huxoll case was what

effec: the defect in the power brake had in the stopping of

the engine and whether or not THuxell would have been

killed if the power brake had been in good condition. In

the instant case there is no causal connection between the

air pipe line and the accident.

Respondent cites Wyers rv. Pittsburgh Coal Company, 233

U.S. Sd, 34 Sup. Cr. Rep. Sot, which reverses an opinion

bee

of the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Third Cireuit, to-wit :

Pittshurgh Coal Co. vr. Myers, 208 Federal 221. Petitioners

were not aware that this case had been decided by the United

States Supreme Court when cited in their brief. We con-

sidered this case as a rather extreme one and were inelined

to be skeptical of the soundness of the decision. Neverthe

less, in as much as it was a decision of the Circuit: Court

of Appeals we felt that it should be given some weight uncil

overruled by the United States Supreme Court. Tt will be

noted that the case was cited without comment. The United

States Supreme Court brought out certain facts mot) dis-

closed in the opinion of the Cirenit: Court of Appeals. on

the Mvers case the decedent was a brakeman on an electric

train used underground ina coal mine. The electrie motor

kicked several cars to make a movement known as a flying

switeh. Decedent at this time and when last seen alive was

sanding on the bumper of the last ear. The flying switch

was made and the cars proceeded down on the track on which

they were to move. Shortly thereafter the electrie motor

in following these cars ran over Myers. In the immediate

Vieinity of the accident an electric wire crossed the track

only five feet and eight inches above the rails and it) was

shown that at this height a man standing on the car would

be struck by the wire. Myers’ hat with a lighted lantern

upright lay beside him at the time he was run ever. The

headlight on the electric engine was defective so that Myers

Was not noticed on the track and it wis shown that if the

light had been in proper condition Myers could have been

seen and the engine stopped,

The Cirenit Court of Appeals’ decision did not bring out

the fact that Myers was alive when run over. The United

States Supreme Court decision showed this fact and showed

15

that he was alive even after he was run over. The Supreme

Court decision also brought out the fact that he was a voung

man of unusual strength and vigor immediately before the

aecident, On page 22h of the Circuit Court of Appeals’ de-

cision the Cirenit Court indicated that it was of the opinion

that Myers may have been killed by the current in the wire

or by the fall from the ear. The United States Supreme

Court decision brings out the fact that this could not be

true because he was alive after being run over by the electric

motor The evidence was sneh that the jury contd prop:

erly find that Myers was not killed by coming in contact

with the wire and could find that he was run over and

killed on account of the defective headlight. The United

States Supreme Court decision as indicated brought out the

faet that he was an excellent pliysieal specimen and it was

also shown that the voltage in the wire was intermittent

only and that it was doubtful whether or not the voltage

would be of sufficient strength to materially injure the man

in question. We think it clear. therefore, that the Myers

cause is not controlling.

On page 16 of her brief respondent quotes from the case of

Chesepeake & Ohio Raiticay vr. Ware, 95 8. Eo 1838, whieh in

turn cites Hinshaw rv. State, VAT Ind. 334. The rule stated

in the case just mentioned seems to be in conflict with the

rule laid down by this Court. The correct rule is stated in

Inited States vr. Ross, 92 US. TOT. 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 281

at 2St. and is as follows:

“A presumption which the jury is te make is nota

circumstance in proof: it is not, therefore. a legitimate

foundation for a presumption.”

The inference must be drawn from a faet proved in the

case, This is rather aptly expressed in Reading Company v.

oithtaeeremcitien

cos |

ee ———

Royer (Cirenit Court of Appeals, Third Cirenit) 6 PL ¢2d)

ISS. at page IS6. In this case Brakeman Bover was last

seen getting off the engine that ran over him. [Tt was claimed

that he stepped on the ground and lest his footing for the

reason that at the place in question the track was unhal

lasted and that he fell ander the train in consequence there

of and was killed. The Court said:

“As there were other wavs in which Bover might

have met his death which did net invelve negligence of

the defemdant, the ease falls, we think, within the rule

of Marrvray vr. Pittshurah, ete. R. R. Co., 962 Pa. 28s,

Wi, POT AL 2h 28. followed bw this court in Philadel

phia a Reading Ru. Co. cr. Cannon, 26 FL Or. wherein

the Supreme Court of Pennsvivania said:

‘Tt is net enough for plaintiff? to show his injury

might have been due te mere than one possible cause,

for only one of which defendant is responsible. Te

is obliged to go further amd show the canse that

fastens liability upon defemdant was the proximate

one and the jury should not be permitted to hase a

verdict upen a mere conjecture that the injury was

caused by one or the others

This ix but another statement of the old rule that a

party seeking to recover damages for injuries occasioned

by negligenee must establish negligence by afirmative

testimony. Of course, this docs not mean that neagliqeuce

must alicays be proved by the testimony of eye wit-

nesses, Philadephia & Reading Ry. Co. rv. Effinger

moe. AL. Oo FL O50, bat it does mean that it must be

established if not by the testimony of eye witnesses, then

hy surrounding facts and circumstances which, though

inanimate, speak the truth and affirmatively prove the

ss

.

Ce A a IN FE a Be er

fact. We cannot find in the record any testimony which

tends to prove how Bover met his death and, accord.

ingly, we have not found any evidence to support the

verdiet of the jury that his death was occasioned by

negligence of the defendant.” (Tialies my own.)

In the Bover case the Court, on page IS6. also said :

“There is no evidence which remotely indicates that

the deeedent ‘lost his footing and was thrown under the

train’ beenuse of lack of ballast.”

In the instant case there is no evidence which remotely in-

dicates that Coogan canght his left foot under the pipe where

it was alleged to be defective and was caught by the rigging

of the cars and thrown under the wheet.

On page 17 of her brief, respondent in endeavoring to dis-

tinguish ation vr. Teras & Pacific Raitleuy Company, 179

US. G58, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 275, says:

“In the Patton ease there was no evidence tending

to point to any one particular cause for which the mas

ter would be responsible”

We think a like statement sheeld properly be applied to

this case, Coogan was the rear brakeman. Men in that

position ordinarily ride in the caboose or in other words, the

rear end of the train. Tle must have known that the train

would leave ina very shert time on its journey but he may

net have known that the train was te be moved immediate:

Iv. At the time of the accident it is very probable that he

was in the act of getting on the caboose and had his right

foot on the step and that his left foot was still in the air

when the cars were moved so that the caboose moved away

from him and he lost his balance and fell on the track be-

tween the caboose and the car attached te it and was run

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over by the last mentioned car. Under these circumstances

his left leg and arm would be apt to be inside the rail and

the right side of his body outside the rail Tf the accident

happened in this manner there would, of course, be no Tia

bility.

He may have been approaching the caboose from the south

and tripped over the end of the ties and fallen on the rail

just as the train was moved and in endeavoring to scramble

out was caught and run over. Tf the accident happened in

this manner there, of course, would be no liability,

Ile may. as railroad emploves sometimes do, have stepped

in between the caboose and the ear attached to it to answer

acallof nature. Tie may have been entirely inside the rails

preparing to couple the air hoses and have been knocked

down by the train when the cars were shoved to the east.

He may have been between the caboose and ear attached to

it for the purpose of coupling the air hoses, as claimed by

respondent, but with his right foot outside the rail and

his left foot inside the rail. facing the angle cock and while

in such position have been hit by the cars moving backward

and knocked on the rail so that the left arm and leg were

inside the rail and the right side was outside the rail. Under

any of the above presumptions there would, of course, be

no liability and we feel that the above inferences are just as

consistent with the evidence as respondent's theory. We

feel, however, that there is insufficient evidence on which a

jury could find that any one ef the above presumptions or

the presumption indulged in by the respondent was the actial

manner in which Mr. Coogan lost his life

1)

ASSUMPTION OF RISK.

Certain cases were cited by respondent on the question of

assumption of risk. In Gilo Valley Ry. Co. vr. Mall, 232.0.

S.94 Sb Sup. Ct Rep. 229. it wais held that an employe in-

jured by the derailment of a three-wheeled gasoline car on

which there was a defective flange, was not presumed to know

of the defect where he had been emploved in work that re-

quired him to ride on such gasoline car fora period of a few

days only prior to the accident. This case does not appear

to be in point. Coogan had worked on trains YL and 92 for

three or four months and had had considerable experience

on trains running in and out of the Farmington Yard prior

to that period of time (RR. 56, 62.63. 64 and 75). Tt would

seem that Coogan should be presumed to know of the condi-

tions existing on and around the track on account of his ex-

tensive experience working in and around that track,

Chicago, Rock Island & P. Ry. Co. rv. Brown, 229 US. 317,

2h Sup. Ct. Rep. S40. is a case where a brakeman after re-

peated unsuecessful attempts to uncouple moving cars by the

uncoupling lever, found it necessary to reach in between the

cars to lift the pin. The cause of action, therefore, was gov-

erned by the Federal Safety Appliance Aet. Under that

act contributory negligence and assumption of risk are not

available as defenses.

In the present case the rights and liabilities of the parties

are governed by the ederal Emplover’s Liability Act. Un-

der this act contributory negligence is a comparative de-

fense while assumption of risk is an absolute defense. The

Brown case, therefore, is mot in point as the statutes in-

volved are radically different. The Brown case is so dis-

similar from the present case as to be of no assistance to

the Court on any phase of the matter before them,

The quotation from the Brown case on page 20 of respon-

dent's brief, if read in connection with the balance of the

decision, shows that the United States Supreme Court agreed

with the conclusion reached by the trial court and the Cir

cenit Court of Appeals and therefore aflirmed the lower court.

Teras & Pacific Railway Co. v. Harvey, 228 Ul OS. ST 33

Sup. Ct. Rep. SES, involved the interpretation of the stat

ute of the state of Texas relating to assumption of risk and

that portion of the decision should, of course, he disregarded.

In Teras & Pacific Railieay Company v. Sivearingen, 16

UL S057, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 164. it appears that a switchman

riding on the side of a string of box cars was swept off the

car by coming in contact with a scale box located only two

feet from the rail. The accident happened at night and he

was looking to the rear for signals. Tle had not observed

the scale box carefully, prior to the accident, had taken no

measurements and had merely observed it) from a distance

and was unaware of its nearness to the track. This decision

would also appear to be of little benefit: in the instant case.

The decisions cited by petitioner in its brief in chief on

assumption of risk would seem to be controlling.

MINNESOTA DECISIONS.

On page 13 and on page 15 of her brief respondent has

referred to certain decisions of the Minnesota Supreme

Court. None of these decisions involve facts similar to those

of the instant case. The decisions speak for themselves and

a discussion of them in this brief would not seem to be par-

ticularly helpful. Most of these decisions were discussed in

petitioner's brief on the appeal to the State Supreme Court

21

and features distinguishing them from the Coogan case were

pointed out,

The Minnesota Supreme Court apparently placed consid

erable reliance on the case of Melutosh ro GN. Ry. Co. V1

Minn. 527. In that decision the Chief Justice and one of

the four Associate Justices, on reareument, dissented to the

opinion of the majority. We feel that that decision is at

varkince with the rule adopted by this Court,

It is clear that the Minnesota Supreme Court was very

skeptical of the soundness of their position in the instant

case. The decision is reported on pages 104 and 105 of the

record and contains the following :

“On the left side of the defendants left) shoe just

above the heel was an indentation such as might have

been made if it had been caught beneath the air line.”

In other words the indentation didn't point to the fact that

the shoe was caught, but they merely held that if the shoe

was caught such an indentation might have been made. The

important thing is, was the shoe caught. The Court also

said :

“The position of the body of a man who has met his

death in a violent accident, or physical marks thereon,

usnally do not furnish persuasive proof of the manner

of the occurrence.”

In other words, the State Supreme Court recognized the

fact that the nature of Coogan’s injury to his left lew and

left arim were inconsistent with a theory that his left foot

was outside of the rails.

If physical marks on a body do not furnish persuasive

proof of the manner of the occurrence it} would seem the

sume reasoning would apply to physical marks on a shoe

on the foot of the same body. In other words, the dent in

the counter of the shoe doesn’t show that it was caught under

the air pipe line.

The Court also stated:

“Though the case is a close one we reach the conclu

sion that the finding of a causal connection between the

bent air line and the death of the decedent has sub-

stantial evidence in its support.” (italics my own.)

In some of their decisions the Minnesota Supreme Court

has adhered more closely to the rule that verdicts must not

be based on speculation and conjecture.

See Perkins ro Go N. Ry. Co., 152 Minn. 226.

Bruckwan ve OC. St. Po. Mb OL Ry. Co., 110 Minn, 309.

This last decision, in the index to petitioner's brief in

chief, was erroneously cited as 220 Federal 555.

The case of Truar v. Mpls., St. Po & SNS. SN. ML Ry. Co. 89

Minn. 143, is a well reasoned decision. In that case a mail

avent while throwing a mail bag from a depot platform toa

passing mail car, lost his balance and fell between the plat-

form and train and was seriously injured. Two weeks after

the accident he investigated the premises and decided that

he was at a particular point on the platform because the

platform gave under his weight in the same manner that it

did at the time of the accident. On page 146 of the de-

cision, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated as follows:

“At the trial he said he did not slip or stumble on

anything and did not know what it was that caused him

to lose his balance until about two weeks after the ac-

cident when upon examining the platform he discovered

the loose planks and that when stepped upon at the

outer edge they would give under his weight. THis only

2 bel Ae RETR ENA CRM

— —————— Pee ns ATT ARES TITS

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method of connecting this condition of the platform

with the accident was the facet that he found by stepping

upon the planks he experienced ao similar sensation

to that which he felt after throwing the bag into the

-

MELE ELLY

On page LIT, the Court further said:

PRE yyy

“Tn the absence of positive proof that the planks were

actually stepped upon and ata point where they gare e

way under the weight imposed upon them, the whole

matter is left in the realm of pure conjecture. Verdicts

based upon evidence of this character cannot be per

mitted to stand. There must bea definite and reason-

able connection between the cause and effect. Juries

are not permitted to speculate in arriving ata conclu

sion, howerer unfortunate the result man be for the in-

jured person” (Wtalies my own.)

The above case, we feel. is controlling for the reason that :

in that case the plaintif! was unable te connect the de- :

fective condition up with the accident. In the instant case

there is absolutely no competent evidence either direct. or

circumstantial to show or indicate that William Coogan‘s

foot was caught or fastened under the alleged defective air

pipe line, There is absolutely no proof to show that either ——

of his feet were ever under the air pipe line at the point ¢

Where if was bent or at any other point. There is no proof

that he was on the day in question, ever in the immediate

Vicinity of the air pipe line where it was claimed to be de-

fective, There is absolutely no proof whatever that the air

pipe line caused or contributed or had anything whatever to

do with Coogan’s death.

We respectfully suggest that the decisions of this Court

| a

Seer etree st seers

a4

cited by the petitioner in its brief in chief are controlling in

the instant case.

Respectfully submitted,

Ee. W. Beer,

C. O. NEWCOMER,

A. ©. EADARL.,

25 Milirauhee Station,

Vinneapolis, Vinnesota,

Ifforneys for Petitioner

Of Counsel:

O. W. DYNES, Esy.,

Chicago, [linots.

April, 1926,

S. A. ANDERSON,

ittorney for Respondent.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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