Reply Brief of Petitioner — Chicago, M. & St. PR Co. v. Coogan
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APR15 1
Noa 268 WM. R. Sian
Supreme Court of the United States
CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE & St. Patt RAtway Company,
Petitioner,
Vs.
Epirn F. CooGaAn, AS SPECIAL ADMINISTRATRIX OF THE Es-
TATE OF WILLIAM CooGAN, DECEASED, Respondent.
REPLY BRIEF AND ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF
PETITIONER.
IF. W. Roor,
C. O. NEWCOMB,
A. C. ERDALL,
29 Milwaukee Station,
Minneapolis, Minnesota,
Attorneys for Petitioner.
Of Counsel:
0. W. Dynes, Esq.,
Chicago, Illinois.
Hayward Brief Company, 601-607 Fourth Ave. So., Minneapolis
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= United States v. Ross, 92 U.S. T07, 23
TABLE OF CASES
Brauckman vy. @., St. P.M. & O Ry. Co. 110 Minn. 309 .. ve
Chesepeake & Ohio Railway vy. Ware, 95 8. EL IS3 22... 15
Chicago, Rock Island & PL. Ry. Co. vo Brown, 229 UL Ss.
ee NS ees OR MOOD gy p's a unis eck wn edie eked Bae 1)
Gilo Valley Ry. Co. vo Hall, 232 UL S294, 34 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 220
ith CP ie, CE Pe FAVE EER STREET Oe eee eee 19
OS Ct 0 Ae < © In
Myers vy. Pittsburgh Coal Co. 238 U.S. 184. 54 Sup. Ct.
ON zal eds 54a bi don eaaaeny es 13
nw Ae. Ie. BRU, 0 O,, BOR MEUM, CE cs cn eee rf
Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Myers, 203 Fed. 221
Philadelphia & Reading Ry. Co. v. Eftinger (CL CL AL),
ER TEE SIR i Ren AE Se, Rip oe 16
Patton vo Texas & Pacific Railway Co.. 179 Ul oS. G58, 21
CB oO SU a ae ies Sos eae ee re 17
Pee We ee eee, OO. Bee BOUIN, Se nce eee sh vas y
Reading Co. vo Boyer (Circuit: Court of Appeals, Third
NT EE BM sg a Ae se a vin ao ws A 16
Texas and Pacific Railway Co. v. Harvey, 228 U.S. 319,
ey ND nS en ss a's cy HOD OR RO 8 ws 20
Texas & Pacific Railway Co. vo Swearingen, 196 U.S, 57,
A I oa cag and @onlaks bdg alae ee ap ess eae 20)
; Truax v. M., St. P.& S.S. M. Ry. Co., 89 Minn, 143 .... 22
Union Pacitie Company v. Huwoll, 245 U.S. 535. 38 Sup.
Se IS ores aan Gaia veh a hb ae LAW am ark dik mie 13
Ti
up. Ct. Rep. 28b. 15
PP LOLA CNGEGOI LE. PERE DEALS PEO BELLY OOF 2 a A AE SISO OL LAI AGS Ol SEE
«© ped
Supreme Court of the United States
CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE & St. Patt RAILWAY COMPANY,
Petitioner,
Epiru FL CooGaN, AS SPECIAL ADMINISTRATRIX OF THLE [s-
TATE OF WILLIAM CooGAaN, DECEASED, Respondeut,
REPLY BRIEF AND ARGUMENT ON BEHALF OF
PETITIONER.
Statements are made in respondent's brief which are in-
accurate and misleading and for that reason it is thought
advisable to file this bricf and argument in reply to respon-
dent.
It is important to keep in mind that only one act of
negligence was pleaded or is claimed by the respondent,
towit: That the air pipe located on top of the ties and
south of the rails of track No. 1, was defective and that
such defective condition was the proximate cause of dece-
dents death. Respondent does not and could not) claim
that the train itself was improperly handled.
Her claim is that it was the duty of decedent to couple
up the air hoses on the train in question. That certain air
hoses had been coupled up and, therefrom infers that de-
cedent was attempting to couple up the air hoses between
the caboose and the car attached to it when he was killed.
aE a is Nain a ae ars
<p:
Relying on testimony of Odekirk she claims men, in COUp-
ling air hoses, face the engine and under the circumstances
would have their left foot outside the rails. She also claims
that decedent's left shoe was under the air pipe line and
became fastened under same at the alleged defective place
When the train was shoved to clear the lead track. In SUp-
port of this she relies on the slight indentation appearing
on the outside counter of the heel of decedent's left shoe.
noticed sometime after the funeral.
The important ultimate facts to be determined are: Was
decedent's left foot caught under the air pipe line at) the
time of the accident and did this proximately contribute to
his fatal injuries,
Respondent must, of course, show petitioner violated a
duty which it owed to decedent. Respondent's claim is that
decedent at the time of the accident: was coupling air be-
tween the caboose and car attached to it and that it: was
his duty to do so. That the petitioner owed the duty to
furnish decedent a safe place to work and the claimed de-
fective air pipe line made it unsafe.
In the last paragraph of page 3 of respondent's brief. it
is stated that Dubke coupled up the air four cars from the
engine and then found that air was escaping from the end
of the train. This is misleading as Dubke testified he made
other couplings before the body was discovered (R. 241).
This undisputed testimony conclusively shows that Coogan
did not couple the air hoses on all of the ears as claimed
by respondent.
On page 4 respondent states:
“The kicked up condition of the ground and the blood
found just opposite the south rail of track 1. indieated
Coogan’s body had been dragged a distance of 15 feet.”
a — aaa
Respondent's witness, Coroner Engelbert, testified the
body appeared to have been dragged for ten feet, that is,
the ground was scuffed up to a point about ten feet west
of the body (R. 10 and 11). Her witness, Jeffers, testified
the ground looked as though Coogan had been dragged eight
or ten feet (R. 18), while her witness, Odekirk, said the body
LRAT, LOPE
had been dragged, he would judge, a distance of ten or twelve
feet, maybe fifteen. The testimony of respondent's own wit-
nesses indicates the body was dragged about ten feet.
On page 5 respondent states that fifteen feet west of the
body the air pipe line was in a defective condition. In
support of her statement respondent refers to pages 39,
10 and 41 of the record. The only testimony on this feature,
on the pages mentioned, is that of the witness, Odekirk, alias
Murphy, who testified :
“How far from the body was it that, or how far from
the body was it to where vou noticed the condition of
the pipe that I have called your attention to?
A. About a car length and a half. Perhaps I don't
understand your question.
Q. How far from the body was it to the particular
place where you noticed the condition of this air pipe?
A. It was a half a car length, | should judge.”
Odekirk also testified that the average box car is forty —
feet long (R. 45) or in other words, he testified the bend —
in the pipe was from 20 to 60 feet west of the body.
Several pictures were taken showing the location of the
body and the nearby cars. Several of them showed the en-
tire second car ahead of the caboose and about half of the
third car ahead of the caboose, or in other words, showed
the cars and air pipe line for a distance of about 20 feet
west of the body. Mr. Lieb, who took the pictures men-
EY POP URE HARES PE BALI ERS SN LN IS TREE A PACS he Son OS ORG
tioned, testified the bend or bulge in the pipe was west of
the area shown in the pietures (R. 64). He also testified
the bend or bulge in the pipe was 40 or 50 feet west of
the body.
Exhibit *G™ referred to on page 5 of respondent's: brief
Was taken from under the third car ahead of the caboose
for the purpose of and did show the ties and ballast in the
opening between the second and third car where the hat was
found (R. 72).
There was no evidence indicating that Coogan, on the
Inorning of the accident, was in the immediate Vicinity of
the bend in the air pipe line. Respondent's statement that
the bulge or bend in the pipe was 15 feet west of the body,
is incorrect,
On page o of her brief respondent states the counter of
the left shoe had a round depression running parallel with
the sole of the shoe. This is misleading as the depression
Was nearly round in shape. On page 5 respondent states:
“The shoes were in the same condition at the time
they were taken from the body as when offered in evi-
.
denee.
This statement is merely a presumption not based upon
the evidence. Messrs. Goodwin and Gephart, witnesses for
respondent, were the sole witnesses on the condition of the
left shoe. The evidence actually shows that Goodwin. one
of the attorneys for respondent, visited the undertaker about
ten days after the accident and saw the shoes (R. 32) that
Undertaker Gephart, after removing the shoes from. the
body, put them in his garage. That quite a while after the
body was shipped to Austin, Messrs. Sheehan and Goodwin.
the respondent's attorneys, called on Gephart and he gave
the shoes to them (R. 27). The shoes were kept) because
a a NC SE hte YOY OTRAS SL ELA IU DARTS TILT OEY 8 NIA AYN bk WON a |
ie
SS
+
hums ask for them and not because of any peculiar condi-
Sie ee
tion of the shoes (R. 28). Gephart paid no particular at-
try
tention to the shoes when in the garage (R, 29). He kept
acar, a delivery truck, packing for furniture and sometimes
hoxes, in the garage (R. 29). This witness testified on
direct examination as follows:
“Q. At the time you gave those shoes to me was vour
attention called to anything in connection with the
near ee *
A. Yes, vou said there was a mark on the counter
of one shoe, and vou said, ‘Look at that.’
Q. Did T show it to vou?
A. Yes.
Q. 1 called your attention to the left shoe, the out-
side of the counter above the heel?
A. TP domt remember which shoe it was (R. 29),
He further testified :
“Q. That is the first time you had any recollection
of seeing this mark on the counter of the shoe was when
Mr. Sheehan called vour attention to it?
A. Yes” (R. 29).
“QQ. Have you any personal recollection of the con:
dition of those shoes at the time they were taken off
Mr. Coogan’s body?
AL Nov (R, 29 and 30),
In the first paragraph on page ft of respondent's brief
it is stated:
“Tt appears that it was the duty of Coogan to conple
the air on this freight train.”
Plaintiff bases this solely upon the following quoted testi
mony of her witness, (hlekirk, whe wae @ mnemew off the
switehing crew:
“(2 Was it any part of the detiee of your crew,
yourself and Dube or amy off wane crew, tee compile What
air?
A. Ne
(2) Whese duty was in?
A. The duty of that crew of Ge
(2 Whe, of the crew of ae
A. Mr. Congan amd Dethomty amd dediiens ©
Hewpmotelemt’s wittmesne Edible, tthe comlly cttw wiltmwee fee
fest ify com this feutare cf the cmee mmmles it dhedimiite ae tee
Which member af this crew mwa the dete te Ee aL ae
nel staten that it wus the chute of Me Pneliaiw, tlhe feud
brakeman ef crm 9 Me Dtealdhie teed ilfieadl
“t), Was it seme date tee eompihe age tie alle”
A. Ne
(2 Whee wae iv”
A. The Beewnel Repo Rrmmanm calf tlhe wenn coniew
42 Whee wane the bee hewiemnnm
A. Me. Dhethowty
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A, 0 lid it foe Dine fe a fewer lid ast enw te
the te 608, Shy
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whew thiaet it wane thee ollawt y co Mle Bikelhcmant y , Merstedl Meriplhor ween
amd mot the daty of Me (‘wang fee compile ip tlhe ailee ie
agent inom — “TT herewame, part it iver ait Mee Milian fi cqpteeset lane
comwal mee chat y tee Hairmiieh Comgsnm ae eine ipllanrw fen weenie: agp
ait hemes
The Henlow fimg: ew timmernime eftaiiermeeriit ihe alle iepenedby fogs Hlbes
ee eo ee er
Ss
that both sides were satistied that it was Delhanty'’s duty.
There is no evidence that Coogan coupled up the air on any
eur and respondent's own witnesses show that Delhanty and
hot Coogan owed the duty to couple up the air on the train
in question, Respondent's proof also shows that the air wits
also coupled up at more than one place in the train hy her
Witness, Dubke. On page 9 of her brief respondent: states
in substance, that petitioner did not, in the State Court,
dispnte that if was Coogan’s duty to couple the air This
mattter was not referred to specifically in petitioner's brief
in chief in the State Supreme Court and no reply brief
Wis introduced in the State Supreme Court. Counsel ap
parently has either overlooked or forgotten that petitioner
arened this matter orally before the State Supreme Court,
The proof shows it was not Coogan’s duty and no conces-
sion has been made in this respect.
On page 9 respondent in stimmary states :
“It being his duty to make this coupling and the
fact that he had made all the other couplings of the
air with the exception hereinbefore referred to. and: it
heing shown that he was at this point. it is ao fair in
ference that he was engaged in the performance of his
duty."
As previously stated it was Delhanty’s and not Coogan’s
duty to couple up the air. There is no proof that Coogan
coupled up any air on the train. Therefore, the inference
that he was engaged in the performance of a duty owed the
defendant at the time of the accident is not based upon any
fact proven in this case.
The inference that Coogan had coupled up the air hose
on other cars of the train and that he was coupling up the
air between the caboose and car attached to it is very im
probable. The air hoses just mentioned were net coupled
after the accident. When the first cut of cars was coupled
onto the caboose Coogan was standing next to the caboose
ip. 25). Tf it was his duty to couple the air hoses het ween
the caboose and ear attached to it he would, of course, be
apt to couple up the air at onee after the first cut of cars
coupled onte the enboose because he would Know that the
ears would net be moved until Dubke returned with another
ent of ears. The inference in which respondent indulges,
to the effect that Coogan at the time of the accident was
in the act of coupling the air between the caboose and the
carattiched to the enboose, seems inconsistent with the fiaets
proved in this case,
On pages Mand TO of her brief. respondent: states the
position Which she claims Coogan Was in at the time of the
accident. The claim is that the natural position for Coogan
to take would be to place his right foot inside the rail and
left foot outside the rails and inside of the air pipe line, fie-
ine the engine. There is no proof as to the position Coogan
ordinarily took in doing work of this character. Respondent
claims testimony of her witness. Odekirk, as to the natural
position in doing this work, ix sufficient basis for the jury
finding that Coogan coupled up air in the nammner they claim,
that is, with right foot inside and left: foot ontside of the
rails.
Petitioners witness Binko, a yard master and trainman
of twenty vears, testified he had never seen a man couple
up cars with his right foot inside the rails and his left foot
outside the rails and pointed out it would be dangerous to
do the work in that way (RL 90, 9D and 92). The testimony
of Trainmaster Lieb (R. 61). General Car Poreman Palmer
(R. TO and 90). and General Freight Car Foreman Tem,
10
sev (RO S9) coincides with that of Binko. It is sated,
however, that some sinall men teive both feet inside the rails
(Ro SS and S89). Coogan’s shoes were small and) possibly
he was smuill enough so that he could couple air hoses with
both feet inside the rails. Tt is clear from the proof, there
fore. that the best that can be said for plaintill!s conten
tion is that there are several different methods of going
in between cars to couple up the air and there is ne proof
ts fo what method Coogan ordinarily used in doing this
work. The burden, of course, is upon the respondent. to
show Coogan was doing the work claimed and that he was
doing it in the manner contended for. There is ne proof to
support either contention,
On page TO the statement is made that petitioner's wit-
nesses Lieb. Palmer and THemsey had no experience in
coupling air hoses. Of course. the statement is erroneous.
The train master has supervision over the trainmen and,
of course, in order to supervise and instruet the trainmen
Inust Know how todo the work. Train Master Lieb testified
the Jasi owitching he did was for a period of two months,
two vears before the trial (Ro TO and 71). General Car
Poreman Palmer testified he had experience in coupling and
nncoupling cars, and of course, this includes air hoses, prac:
tically all of his life (Ro St). General Freight Car Fore-
man THemsey testified he had had considerable experience in
coupling and uncoupling cars and had observed switchmen,
traimmen and carmen doing such work (RL SS).
Respondent had the burden of proving Coogan was cou
pling air hoses on the cars. She called Conductor Jetfers
and Switchman Dubke as her witnesses but didn't ask them
any question as to how to couple or uncouple air hoses. A
statement that a train master and general car foreman are
not familiar with the manner of coupling air hoses on trains
seems ridienlous. Petitioner's witness Binko also testified
as fo the manner of coupling air hoses and disagreed with
Odekirk. Binkeo testified he had considerable experience in
coupling and uncoupling air hoses as a yard foreman and
trainman. Tle had worked for petitioner for ten vears stead.
ily and off and on for 20 vears as brakeman, switehman and
yard foreman (RL S99 and 90),
It seems inconceivable that a foot could become caught be-
tween a round iron pipe one and three-fourths ineh outside
diameter OR. TS amd Soy. and flat ties and ballast. The bulge
in the pipe was 12 or 15 feet long (RR. 69) and could be
bent by putting vour foot against it CR. Gs). At the maxi
mum bulge the pipe was six inches or more south of the
south rail of track Noo TOR. dl and 68) and was bent up
three and one-half or four inches above the ties @R. 4b).
This is not like a crossing frog with sharp edges and flat sur
faces where a foot may become wedged in and caught. The
altimate presumption indulged in’ by the respondent not
only is not based on any fact in the ease but is also an im-
probable one.
On page 19 of her brief, respondent refers to “defendant's
admitted negligence.” Defendant has made no such admis-
sion.
Respondent indulges in a large series of presumptions not
supported by the facts in the case. Respondent presumes :
1. That it was Coogan’s duty to couple the air hoses in
the train.
’ That all the air hoses on the train were coupled im-
mediately after the accident,
3. That Coogan coupled the air hoses on the entire train
except the air hose coupling four cars from the engine,
| enaameaas Se ee
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The first three prestimptions are disputed by respondent's
Withess Dubke
f. That at the time of the accident Coogan was about
to couple the ain between the eahoose gad the car atiaehed
to it. .
ae eg P oe ee
> That he was standing in oa steeping position and bis
foot slipped baek.
6. That at the time he was at the point where the iron
air pipe was bent or bulged.
7 That at the time of the accident he was standing with
his right foot inside and lett foot outside the rails.
S. That his left shoe did not have a dent on the counter
before the accident.
9 That the dent in the counter of the left shoe. first
noticed some time after the funeral was enused in the aeei
dent.
10. That the shoe did not become seratcehed or dented
While on the floor of the undertakers garage.
11. That the shoe was indented in the accident but not
on account of hitting some part of the ear. rail pebble. tie
or air pipe line,
1.) That the dent in the shoe was caused by the shoe
and foot being eaught under the round air pipe line.
3. That while his foot was fastened under the round
air pipe his clothing was caught in the rigging of the ear
and he was thrown under the train and run over.
AUTIIORITIES.
In her brief, respondent quotes from the case of ( aiou
Pacific Company ¢. HWierall, 2A VOR. SIS AS Sup. Ct. Rep.
IST. In the Huxell case it was claimed that the power brake
on the locomotive was defective. The engineer was notified
instantly that the engine had strnuek a oman and he imme
diately applied the brake. The proof showed that if the
power brake was in good order the engine conld have been
stopped in eight or ten feet and the proof showed it actually
moved [35 feet. Tuxolls arm was run ever by the middle
driving wheel. This is, of course, considerably more than ten
feet from either end of the engine. In that case. therefore,
there were facts in evidence from which the inference could
reasonably be drawn that the defective power brake was the
proximate cause of Huxolls fatal injuries.
In the present case it has net been shown that the bend
in the air pipe line or that the air pipe line had anything
to do with the accident or that the accident occurred at the
point where the air pipe line was bent. On the contrary, the
evidence shows the accident cecurred from 15 to 35 feet east
of the bend in the air pipe.
In the Huxoll case the defective power brake was applied
to stop the engine and the only inference which it wees
necessary for the jury to decide in the Huxoll case was what
effec: the defect in the power brake had in the stopping of
the engine and whether or not THuxell would have been
killed if the power brake had been in good condition. In
the instant case there is no causal connection between the
air pipe line and the accident.
Respondent cites Wyers rv. Pittsburgh Coal Company, 233
U.S. Sd, 34 Sup. Cr. Rep. Sot, which reverses an opinion
bee
of the Circuit Court of Appeals of the Third Cireuit, to-wit :
Pittshurgh Coal Co. vr. Myers, 208 Federal 221. Petitioners
were not aware that this case had been decided by the United
States Supreme Court when cited in their brief. We con-
sidered this case as a rather extreme one and were inelined
to be skeptical of the soundness of the decision. Neverthe
less, in as much as it was a decision of the Circuit: Court
of Appeals we felt that it should be given some weight uncil
overruled by the United States Supreme Court. Tt will be
noted that the case was cited without comment. The United
States Supreme Court brought out certain facts mot) dis-
closed in the opinion of the Cirenit: Court of Appeals. on
the Mvers case the decedent was a brakeman on an electric
train used underground ina coal mine. The electrie motor
kicked several cars to make a movement known as a flying
switeh. Decedent at this time and when last seen alive was
sanding on the bumper of the last ear. The flying switch
was made and the cars proceeded down on the track on which
they were to move. Shortly thereafter the electrie motor
in following these cars ran over Myers. In the immediate
Vieinity of the accident an electric wire crossed the track
only five feet and eight inches above the rails and it) was
shown that at this height a man standing on the car would
be struck by the wire. Myers’ hat with a lighted lantern
upright lay beside him at the time he was run ever. The
headlight on the electric engine was defective so that Myers
Was not noticed on the track and it wis shown that if the
light had been in proper condition Myers could have been
seen and the engine stopped,
The Cirenit Court of Appeals’ decision did not bring out
the fact that Myers was alive when run over. The United
States Supreme Court decision showed this fact and showed
15
that he was alive even after he was run over. The Supreme
Court decision also brought out the fact that he was a voung
man of unusual strength and vigor immediately before the
aecident, On page 22h of the Circuit Court of Appeals’ de-
cision the Cirenit Court indicated that it was of the opinion
that Myers may have been killed by the current in the wire
or by the fall from the ear. The United States Supreme
Court decision brings out the fact that this could not be
true because he was alive after being run over by the electric
motor The evidence was sneh that the jury contd prop:
erly find that Myers was not killed by coming in contact
with the wire and could find that he was run over and
killed on account of the defective headlight. The United
States Supreme Court decision as indicated brought out the
faet that he was an excellent pliysieal specimen and it was
also shown that the voltage in the wire was intermittent
only and that it was doubtful whether or not the voltage
would be of sufficient strength to materially injure the man
in question. We think it clear. therefore, that the Myers
cause is not controlling.
On page 16 of her brief respondent quotes from the case of
Chesepeake & Ohio Raiticay vr. Ware, 95 8. Eo 1838, whieh in
turn cites Hinshaw rv. State, VAT Ind. 334. The rule stated
in the case just mentioned seems to be in conflict with the
rule laid down by this Court. The correct rule is stated in
Inited States vr. Ross, 92 US. TOT. 23 Sup. Ct. Rep. 281
at 2St. and is as follows:
“A presumption which the jury is te make is nota
circumstance in proof: it is not, therefore. a legitimate
foundation for a presumption.”
The inference must be drawn from a faet proved in the
case, This is rather aptly expressed in Reading Company v.
oithtaeeremcitien
cos |
ee ———
Royer (Cirenit Court of Appeals, Third Cirenit) 6 PL ¢2d)
ISS. at page IS6. In this case Brakeman Bover was last
seen getting off the engine that ran over him. [Tt was claimed
that he stepped on the ground and lest his footing for the
reason that at the place in question the track was unhal
lasted and that he fell ander the train in consequence there
of and was killed. The Court said:
“As there were other wavs in which Bover might
have met his death which did net invelve negligence of
the defemdant, the ease falls, we think, within the rule
of Marrvray vr. Pittshurah, ete. R. R. Co., 962 Pa. 28s,
Wi, POT AL 2h 28. followed bw this court in Philadel
phia a Reading Ru. Co. cr. Cannon, 26 FL Or. wherein
the Supreme Court of Pennsvivania said:
‘Tt is net enough for plaintiff? to show his injury
might have been due te mere than one possible cause,
for only one of which defendant is responsible. Te
is obliged to go further amd show the canse that
fastens liability upon defemdant was the proximate
one and the jury should not be permitted to hase a
verdict upen a mere conjecture that the injury was
caused by one or the others
This ix but another statement of the old rule that a
party seeking to recover damages for injuries occasioned
by negligenee must establish negligence by afirmative
testimony. Of course, this docs not mean that neagliqeuce
must alicays be proved by the testimony of eye wit-
nesses, Philadephia & Reading Ry. Co. rv. Effinger
moe. AL. Oo FL O50, bat it does mean that it must be
established if not by the testimony of eye witnesses, then
hy surrounding facts and circumstances which, though
inanimate, speak the truth and affirmatively prove the
ss
.
Ce A a IN FE a Be er
fact. We cannot find in the record any testimony which
tends to prove how Bover met his death and, accord.
ingly, we have not found any evidence to support the
verdiet of the jury that his death was occasioned by
negligence of the defendant.” (Tialies my own.)
In the Bover case the Court, on page IS6. also said :
“There is no evidence which remotely indicates that
the deeedent ‘lost his footing and was thrown under the
train’ beenuse of lack of ballast.”
In the instant case there is no evidence which remotely in-
dicates that Coogan canght his left foot under the pipe where
it was alleged to be defective and was caught by the rigging
of the cars and thrown under the wheet.
On page 17 of her brief, respondent in endeavoring to dis-
tinguish ation vr. Teras & Pacific Raitleuy Company, 179
US. G58, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 275, says:
“In the Patton ease there was no evidence tending
to point to any one particular cause for which the mas
ter would be responsible”
We think a like statement sheeld properly be applied to
this case, Coogan was the rear brakeman. Men in that
position ordinarily ride in the caboose or in other words, the
rear end of the train. Tle must have known that the train
would leave ina very shert time on its journey but he may
net have known that the train was te be moved immediate:
Iv. At the time of the accident it is very probable that he
was in the act of getting on the caboose and had his right
foot on the step and that his left foot was still in the air
when the cars were moved so that the caboose moved away
from him and he lost his balance and fell on the track be-
tween the caboose and the car attached te it and was run
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over by the last mentioned car. Under these circumstances
his left leg and arm would be apt to be inside the rail and
the right side of his body outside the rail Tf the accident
happened in this manner there would, of course, be no Tia
bility.
He may have been approaching the caboose from the south
and tripped over the end of the ties and fallen on the rail
just as the train was moved and in endeavoring to scramble
out was caught and run over. Tf the accident happened in
this manner there, of course, would be no liability,
Ile may. as railroad emploves sometimes do, have stepped
in between the caboose and the ear attached to it to answer
acallof nature. Tie may have been entirely inside the rails
preparing to couple the air hoses and have been knocked
down by the train when the cars were shoved to the east.
He may have been between the caboose and ear attached to
it for the purpose of coupling the air hoses, as claimed by
respondent, but with his right foot outside the rail and
his left foot inside the rail. facing the angle cock and while
in such position have been hit by the cars moving backward
and knocked on the rail so that the left arm and leg were
inside the rail and the right side was outside the rail. Under
any of the above presumptions there would, of course, be
no liability and we feel that the above inferences are just as
consistent with the evidence as respondent's theory. We
feel, however, that there is insufficient evidence on which a
jury could find that any one ef the above presumptions or
the presumption indulged in by the respondent was the actial
manner in which Mr. Coogan lost his life
1)
ASSUMPTION OF RISK.
Certain cases were cited by respondent on the question of
assumption of risk. In Gilo Valley Ry. Co. vr. Mall, 232.0.
S.94 Sb Sup. Ct Rep. 229. it wais held that an employe in-
jured by the derailment of a three-wheeled gasoline car on
which there was a defective flange, was not presumed to know
of the defect where he had been emploved in work that re-
quired him to ride on such gasoline car fora period of a few
days only prior to the accident. This case does not appear
to be in point. Coogan had worked on trains YL and 92 for
three or four months and had had considerable experience
on trains running in and out of the Farmington Yard prior
to that period of time (RR. 56, 62.63. 64 and 75). Tt would
seem that Coogan should be presumed to know of the condi-
tions existing on and around the track on account of his ex-
tensive experience working in and around that track,
Chicago, Rock Island & P. Ry. Co. rv. Brown, 229 US. 317,
2h Sup. Ct. Rep. S40. is a case where a brakeman after re-
peated unsuecessful attempts to uncouple moving cars by the
uncoupling lever, found it necessary to reach in between the
cars to lift the pin. The cause of action, therefore, was gov-
erned by the Federal Safety Appliance Aet. Under that
act contributory negligence and assumption of risk are not
available as defenses.
In the present case the rights and liabilities of the parties
are governed by the ederal Emplover’s Liability Act. Un-
der this act contributory negligence is a comparative de-
fense while assumption of risk is an absolute defense. The
Brown case, therefore, is mot in point as the statutes in-
volved are radically different. The Brown case is so dis-
similar from the present case as to be of no assistance to
the Court on any phase of the matter before them,
The quotation from the Brown case on page 20 of respon-
dent's brief, if read in connection with the balance of the
decision, shows that the United States Supreme Court agreed
with the conclusion reached by the trial court and the Cir
cenit Court of Appeals and therefore aflirmed the lower court.
Teras & Pacific Railway Co. v. Harvey, 228 Ul OS. ST 33
Sup. Ct. Rep. SES, involved the interpretation of the stat
ute of the state of Texas relating to assumption of risk and
that portion of the decision should, of course, he disregarded.
In Teras & Pacific Railieay Company v. Sivearingen, 16
UL S057, 25 Sup. Ct. Rep. 164. it appears that a switchman
riding on the side of a string of box cars was swept off the
car by coming in contact with a scale box located only two
feet from the rail. The accident happened at night and he
was looking to the rear for signals. Tle had not observed
the scale box carefully, prior to the accident, had taken no
measurements and had merely observed it) from a distance
and was unaware of its nearness to the track. This decision
would also appear to be of little benefit: in the instant case.
The decisions cited by petitioner in its brief in chief on
assumption of risk would seem to be controlling.
MINNESOTA DECISIONS.
On page 13 and on page 15 of her brief respondent has
referred to certain decisions of the Minnesota Supreme
Court. None of these decisions involve facts similar to those
of the instant case. The decisions speak for themselves and
a discussion of them in this brief would not seem to be par-
ticularly helpful. Most of these decisions were discussed in
petitioner's brief on the appeal to the State Supreme Court
21
and features distinguishing them from the Coogan case were
pointed out,
The Minnesota Supreme Court apparently placed consid
erable reliance on the case of Melutosh ro GN. Ry. Co. V1
Minn. 527. In that decision the Chief Justice and one of
the four Associate Justices, on reareument, dissented to the
opinion of the majority. We feel that that decision is at
varkince with the rule adopted by this Court,
It is clear that the Minnesota Supreme Court was very
skeptical of the soundness of their position in the instant
case. The decision is reported on pages 104 and 105 of the
record and contains the following :
“On the left side of the defendants left) shoe just
above the heel was an indentation such as might have
been made if it had been caught beneath the air line.”
In other words the indentation didn't point to the fact that
the shoe was caught, but they merely held that if the shoe
was caught such an indentation might have been made. The
important thing is, was the shoe caught. The Court also
said :
“The position of the body of a man who has met his
death in a violent accident, or physical marks thereon,
usnally do not furnish persuasive proof of the manner
of the occurrence.”
In other words, the State Supreme Court recognized the
fact that the nature of Coogan’s injury to his left lew and
left arim were inconsistent with a theory that his left foot
was outside of the rails.
If physical marks on a body do not furnish persuasive
proof of the manner of the occurrence it} would seem the
sume reasoning would apply to physical marks on a shoe
on the foot of the same body. In other words, the dent in
the counter of the shoe doesn’t show that it was caught under
the air pipe line.
The Court also stated:
“Though the case is a close one we reach the conclu
sion that the finding of a causal connection between the
bent air line and the death of the decedent has sub-
stantial evidence in its support.” (italics my own.)
In some of their decisions the Minnesota Supreme Court
has adhered more closely to the rule that verdicts must not
be based on speculation and conjecture.
See Perkins ro Go N. Ry. Co., 152 Minn. 226.
Bruckwan ve OC. St. Po. Mb OL Ry. Co., 110 Minn, 309.
This last decision, in the index to petitioner's brief in
chief, was erroneously cited as 220 Federal 555.
The case of Truar v. Mpls., St. Po & SNS. SN. ML Ry. Co. 89
Minn. 143, is a well reasoned decision. In that case a mail
avent while throwing a mail bag from a depot platform toa
passing mail car, lost his balance and fell between the plat-
form and train and was seriously injured. Two weeks after
the accident he investigated the premises and decided that
he was at a particular point on the platform because the
platform gave under his weight in the same manner that it
did at the time of the accident. On page 146 of the de-
cision, the Minnesota Supreme Court stated as follows:
“At the trial he said he did not slip or stumble on
anything and did not know what it was that caused him
to lose his balance until about two weeks after the ac-
cident when upon examining the platform he discovered
the loose planks and that when stepped upon at the
outer edge they would give under his weight. THis only
2 bel Ae RETR ENA CRM
— —————— Pee ns ATT ARES TITS
o>?
method of connecting this condition of the platform
with the accident was the facet that he found by stepping
upon the planks he experienced ao similar sensation
to that which he felt after throwing the bag into the
-
MELE ELLY
On page LIT, the Court further said:
PRE yyy
“Tn the absence of positive proof that the planks were
actually stepped upon and ata point where they gare e
way under the weight imposed upon them, the whole
matter is left in the realm of pure conjecture. Verdicts
based upon evidence of this character cannot be per
mitted to stand. There must bea definite and reason-
able connection between the cause and effect. Juries
are not permitted to speculate in arriving ata conclu
sion, howerer unfortunate the result man be for the in-
jured person” (Wtalies my own.)
The above case, we feel. is controlling for the reason that :
in that case the plaintif! was unable te connect the de- :
fective condition up with the accident. In the instant case
there is absolutely no competent evidence either direct. or
circumstantial to show or indicate that William Coogan‘s
foot was caught or fastened under the alleged defective air
pipe line, There is absolutely no proof to show that either ——
of his feet were ever under the air pipe line at the point ¢
Where if was bent or at any other point. There is no proof
that he was on the day in question, ever in the immediate
Vicinity of the air pipe line where it was claimed to be de-
fective, There is absolutely no proof whatever that the air
pipe line caused or contributed or had anything whatever to
do with Coogan’s death.
We respectfully suggest that the decisions of this Court
| a
Seer etree st seers
a4
cited by the petitioner in its brief in chief are controlling in
the instant case.
Respectfully submitted,
Ee. W. Beer,
C. O. NEWCOMER,
A. ©. EADARL.,
25 Milirauhee Station,
Vinneapolis, Vinnesota,
Ifforneys for Petitioner
Of Counsel:
O. W. DYNES, Esy.,
Chicago, [linots.
April, 1926,
S. A. ANDERSON,
ittorney for Respondent.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.