Prologue — Maryland v. Soper (No. 1)
Supreme Court brief1926
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INDEX.
Morion ror Leave tro Fite Petirion ror WRIT OF
RN 2 > rigs Vig ola ba eine WHE a eR
Petition ror Writ or MANDAMUS.............-000-
‘“Exuipir A’’—Certiriep Copy oF ALL ORIGINAL
Papers AND Docker E\nrrigs IN THE District Court
OF THE UNITED States FoR THE District or Mary-
SE EP RP Pend ee ee" Pais sucks Sala a anes wal dee
Docket Entries ............ CSET ee OR EK Oe
Original petition for removal, ete., and order of
Se re rarer es tree re
Order of removal, writ of certiorari and habeas
rrr rr errr rer re
Motion to quash and remand oe original peti-
eer errr rr ry Seed Panes
Order granting leave to amend petition........
Amended petition for removal and order of
|, ES A Serge Ske eRe ee eeas
Seer reer yr Pr reo Pierre ,
Order overruling motion to quash and remand.
| PORE ETTE Teer CTT ee eT eee eee
“Wxurpit B’’—Certiriep Copy or Recorp or PRocEEp-
incs or Crrcuir Court ror Harrorp County, Fmep
IN THE District Court oF THE UNITED STATES FOR
THE District or Mary.anp, Fespruary 21, 1925...
Presentment
15-41
16-17
18-22
23-24
25-26
28-35
36-37
38-39
40-41
42-49
I kan on Sanee son bbe ea dns 44-46
DR ce tae ddudabcdcss aces eweede< ss 46-47
Order of District Court of the United States for
the District of Maryland, commanding the
transmission of record of proceedings to Dis-
trict Court of the United States for the Dis-
IND bindccccdccncasndcksicnnen 47
Certificate of the Clerk of the District Court of
the United States for the District of Maryland
to the aforegoing papers, comprising ‘‘ Exhibit
A’’ and ‘‘ Exhibit B’’, and to the docket entries
IEE IS ond on dn udeen cde anesenas 48
Certified eupy of docket entries—Cirecuit Court
a Scan caacadseakase wie 49
In THE
Supreme Court of the United States
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF THE
STATE OF MARYLAND FOR A WRIT OF MAN-
DAMUS DIRECTED TO THE HONORABLE,
MORRIS A. SOPER, JUDGE OF THE DISTRICT
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND, AND DIRECTED
ALSO TO SAID COURT.
CASE “A”.
MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE PETITION FOR
WRIT OF MANDAMUS.
Mr. CLERK:
Please file.
THOS. H. ROBINSON,
Attorney General of Maryland,
HERBERT LEVY,
Assistant Attorney General of Maryland,
Attorneys for the State of Maryland.
to
Srate oF MaryLanpv
vs.
Morris A. Soprer, JuDGE oF
tHE District Court oF IN THE
THE Unirep SraTes FOR SUPREME COURT
THE District oF Mary- OF THE
LAND, AND THE District UNITED STATES.
Court OF THE UNITED
States FoR THE DistRIcT
oF MaryLanp.
CASE “A”.
To the Honorable, William Howard Taft, Chief Justice,
and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of
the United States:
Now comes the petitioner, the State of Maryland, by
Albert C. Ritchie, its Governor, and moves the Court for
leave to file the petition for writ of mandamus hereto
annexed; and further moves that an order and rule be
entered and issued directing Morris A. Soper, Judge of
the District Court of the United States for the District
of Maryland, and also directing the said District Court
to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not issue
against them and each of them in accordance with the
prayer of said petition, and why your petitioner should
not have such relief and such other and further relief in
the premises as may be just and meet.
THOS. H. ROBINSON,
Attorney General of Maryland,
HERBERT LEVY,
Assistant Attorney General of Maryland,
Attorneys for Petitioner.
55
eo, eee .
y eres, De en
In THE
Supreme Court of the United States
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF THE
STATE OF MARYLAND FOR A WRIT OF MAN-
DAMUS DIRECTED TO THE HONORABLE,
MORRIS A. SOPER, JUDGE OF THE DISTRICT
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND, AND DIRECTED
ALSO TO SAID COURT.
CASE “A”.
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS.
Mr. CLERK:
Please file.
THOS. H. ROBINSON,
Attorney General of Maryland,
HERBERT LEVY,
Assistant Attorney General of Maryland,
Attorneys for the State of Maryland.
Stare or Maryann
vs.
Morris A. Soper, JUDGE OF
IN THE
THE District Court oF SUPREME COURT
tHE UNITED STATES FOR oo “en
THE District or Mary- UNITED STATES.
LAND, AND THE DistRICT
Court or THE UNITED
States FoR THE DIsTRICT
or MarRYLAND.
CASE “A”.
To the Honorable, William Howard Taft, Chief Justice,
and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of
the United States:
Your petitioner, the State of Maryland, by Albert C.
Ritchie, its Governor, respectfully shows unto your Honors
that the jurisdiction of the Cireuit Court fer Harford
County, a Court clothed by the Constitution and laws of the
State of Maryland with original criminal jurisdiction, has
beer. invaded by Morris A. Soper, Judge of the District
Court of the United States for the District of Maryland,
and by the said District Court, whose acts and doings com-
plained of are as follows, to wit:
1. On the 10th day of February, 1925, Robert D. Ford,
John M. Barton, E. Franklin Ely, Wilton L. Stevens and
William Trabing were indicted in the Circuit Court for
Harford County, State of Maryland, for the murder, on or
about the 19th day of November, 1924, of one Lawrence
Wenger, a citizen of the State of Maryland. On the 11th
day of February, 1925, said Judge, Morris A. Soper, and the
5
said District Court, issued an order, directed to the Cir-
cuit Court for Harford County and the Judge and the
Clerk thereof, whereby he caused the said prosecution,
styled ‘‘State of Maryland vs. Robert D. Ford, John M.
Barton, E. Franklin Ely, Wilton L. Stevens and William
Trabing,’’ to be removed from the Circuit Court for Har-
ford County to the District Court of the United States for
the District of Maryland, upon the supposed authority of
Section 33 of the Judicial Code (U. S. Comp. St., Sec. 1015,
being Judicial Code, Sec. 33, as amended, Act Aug. 23,
1916, c. 99). The petition, upon which the said removal
was granted, alleged that on the day when the murder is
alleged to have been committed, ‘‘the petitioner William
Trabing was a chauffeur of the Reliable Transfer Com-
pany, and was at the time above mentioned, engaged and
employed by Edmund Budnitz, the Federal Prohibition
Director of the State of Maryland, in the capacity of a
chauffeur for Federal Prohibition Agents, Robert D. Ford,
John M. Barton, Wilton L. Stevens and E. Franklin Ely, all
being officers of the Internal Revenue Service of the United
States; that the said petitioner, William Trabing, was at
the said time a person acting under and by authority of the
said Federal Prohibition Director, Edmund Budnitz and
the said Federal Prohibition Agents, Robert D. Ford, John
M. Barton, Wilton L. Stevens and E. Franklin Ely, and
that the said agents were on November 19th, 1924, and now
are Federal Prohibition Agents of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue of the Treasury Department of the United States.’’
For convenience, however, all of the said petitioners will be
hereafter designated as ‘‘ Federal Prohibition Agents.”’
2. Upon said petition, the said Judge, Morris A. Soper,
by ‘‘writ of habeas corpus cum causa,’’ also took the
bodies of the aforesaid Federal Prohibition Agents from
the custody of the jailor of Harford County, and let said
Federal Prohibition Agents to bail.
6
3. After the record of the proceedings of the Circuit
Court for Harford County was filed in the said District
Court of the United States for the District of Maryland,
the State of Maryland, on the 12th day of March, 1925,
appeared specially in the said District Court, held at Bal-
timore, Maryland, and moved the said Court to quash the
writ and rescind the order issued by the said District Court
on the 11th day of February, 1925, as aforesaid, and to
remand the said case to the Circuit Court for Harford
County, for the following reasons:
(a) Because the allegations of the petition for removal
failed to disclose a state of facts entitling the Federal Pro-
hibition Agents to have the said writ issued.
(b) Because the allegations set forth in said petition
were contradictory, evasive, founded on hearsay and in part
untrue.
(c) Because the issuance of said writ upon the allega-
tions of said petition and the certificate of counsel attached
thereto was beyond the power and jurisdiction of the said
District Court as limited by the Constitution and laws of
the United States.
(d) Because the said writ, if allowed to stand, consti-
tuted an interference by the said District Court with the
due and orderly administration of justice in the Circuit
Court for Harford County, contrary to the Constitution
and laws of the United States.
(e) Because there was no allegation in the petition that
authorized the said District Court to issue any writ what-
soever against the Judge or the Clerk of the Circuit Court
for Harford County.
4. The said motion to remand was fully argued before
the said Judge of the said District Court on the 17th day
7
of March, 1925, and on the same day the said Judge, being
of the opinion that the said petition for removal was de-
fective, upon application by the United States on behalf of
the said Federal Prohibition Agents, granted leave to the
United States to amend said petition for removal.
5. Thereafter, to wit, on the 31st day of March, 1925, the
said Federal Prohibition Agents filed their amended peti-
tion in said cause, pursuant to the leave granted them by
the aforesaid order of March 17th, 1925, whereupon the
State of Maryland again appeared specially in said cause
and again moved to quash the writ and rescind the order
of February 11th, 1925, and to remand the said case to the
Circuit Court for Harford County, and assigned substan-
tially the same reasons for the said ‘‘motion to quash and
remand’’ as those set forth in its ‘‘motion to quash and
remand’? filed in reply to the original petition for removal,
as aforesaid.
6. On the 5th day of May, 1925, after a second hearing
the said Judge and the said Court denied the motion to
remand the case to ite Circuit Court for Harford County,
and ratified and confirmed the order of February 11th, 1925,
removing the said cause to the said District Court from the
Cireuit Court for Harford County.
7. Your petitioner files with its petition, and prays to be
taken as part and parcel hereof, a certified copy of the
record in ‘‘State of Maryland vs. Robert D. Ford, John M.
Barton, E. Franklin Ely, Wilton L. Stevens and William
Trabing,’’ in the District Court of the United States for
the District of Maryland, marked ‘‘ Exhibit A,’’ and a cer-
tified copy of the record in ‘‘State of Maryland vs. Robert
D. Ford, John M. Barton, E. Franklin Ely, Wilton L.
Stevens and William Trabing,’’ in the Cireuit Court for
Harford County, marked ‘‘ Exhibit B.’’
8
8. Your petitioner avers and charges that the action
and conduct of Judge Soper were a gross violation of the
Constitution and laws of Maryland and of the Constitution
and laws of the United States, because neither the said
District Court of the United States for the District of
Maryland nor Judge Soper had jurisdiction over the case
unlawfully removed by the said Judge Soper, as aforesaid.
The prosecuiton is in the name of your petitioner; the crime
—murder—was committed within its territorial limits by
said Federal Prohibition Agents upon one Lawrence
Wenger, its citizen.
9. Your petitioner alleges that Judge Soper was not
authorized to remove the said prosecution, under Section
33 of the Judicial Code, upon the allegations of the orig-
inal petition for removal, because (inter alia) :
(a) Federal Prohibition Agents are not officers ‘“ap-
pointed under or acting by authority of any Revenue Law
of the United States’’ or persons ‘‘acting under or by auth-
ority of any such officer,’’ within the meaning of Section 33
of the Judicial Code.
(b) Said petition does not show that the criminal prose-
eution pending in the Cireuit Court for Harford County
was on account of any act done under color of the office of
the defendants in said prosecution, or under color of any
Revenue Law of the United States, or on account of any
right, title or authority claimed by the said defendants
under any Revenue Law of the United States, within the
meaning of said Section 33 of the Judicial Code.
(c) The said petition does not set forth any facts to show
that the prosecution for murder arose out of the discharge
of the official duties of the petitioners, as Federal Prohibi-
tion Agents, or in the discharge of their duties under the
National Prohibition Law, or that the said prosecution
9
grew out of an effort on the part of said Federal Prohibi-
tion Agents to protect themselves and each other in the dis-
charge of their duty.
(d) The said petition does not allege any facts to show
that the prosecution grew out of the performance by the
said petitioners of their official duties as Federal Prohibi-
tion Agents in making and attempting to make an investi-
gation of any violation of the National Prohibition Law by
Lawrence Wenger, the deceased, and further does not al-
lege that the said Lawrence Wenger had committed or was
suspected to having committed any violation of said Na-
tional Prohibition Law.
10. Your petitioner avers that the murder of the said
Lawrence Wenger by the said Federal Prohibition Agents
was wanton, wilful, deliberate, premeditated and without
any justification whatsoever, and that the said Federal
Prohibition Agents not only failed to set up any facts to
show that said prosecution grew out of an act done by them
under color of their office or of any Revenue Law, but, on
the contrary, their original petition for removal denies that
they were in any menner responsible, lawfully or otherwise,
for the homicide of the said Lawrence Wenger.
11. Your petitioner further avers that the amended peti-
tion for removal is also defective and insufficient for the
following reasons:
(a) It alleges that the said Federal Prohibition Agents
were acting under the direction of the Commsisioner of In-
ternal Revenue, the Federal Prohibition Commissioner and
the Federal Prohibition Director for the State of Maryland,
and were acting under the authority of and for the purpose
of enforcing the National Prohibition Act and acts supple-
mental thereto and all Internal Revenue Laws relating to
10
the manufacture, sale, transportation, control and taxation
of intoxicating liquors, with authority to execute and per-
form all the duties delegated to such officers by law, and
that at the time of the act alleged to have been done by them,
they were engaged in the discharge of their official duties
as Federal Prohibition Officers, in making and attempting
to make an investigation concerning a violation of the Na-
tional Prohibition Act and other Internal Revenue Laws
and in reporting the result of said investigation and in pro-
tecting themselves in the discharge of their duty, but
said amended petition does not specify the connection, if
any, of the said Lawrence Wenger, deceased, with the
breach of the provisions of the National Prohibition Act
or other Internal Revenue laws, which they were investi-
gating, or any other facts tending to show that the prosecu-
tion, which they sought to remove, grew out of any act done
under color of their office or of any such law.
(b) Taken in connection with the allegations of the orig-
inal petition, the amended petition clearly shows that in the
investigation which the said Federal Prohibition Agents
claim to have been making at the time of the acts and hap-
penings for which they were indicted they were acting in
the capacity of Federal Prohibition Officers under the Na-
tional Prohibition Law, and as such, they were not ‘‘Reve-
nue Officers’’ and are not entitled to have the prosecution
against them removed to the Federal Court under the pro-
visions of Section 33 of the Judicial Code.
(c) Section 28 of Title Ll of the National Prohibition
Act, upon which the amended petition relies as additional
authority for the removal of the prosecution, does not,
either in its letter or spirit, authorize the removal of a
criminal prosecution pending in a State Court against a
Federal Prohibition Agent.
11
(d) The statement in the amended petition of the facts
alleged to bring the prosecution within the provisions of
Section 33 of the Judicial Code, clearly negatives the con-
tention of the said Federal Prohibition Agents that the
prosecution arose out of any act done under color of their
office or of the Revenue Laws and Prohibition Laws of the
United States. Said amended petition goes into great de-
tail with reference to the investigation which the said Fed-
eral Prohibition Agents were carrying on in Harford
County, but it does not point out that the said investigation
or any act done in pursuance thereof resulted in the prose-
cution sought to be removed. On the contrary, the amend-
ed petition specifically alleges that the said Federal Pro-
hibition Agents were returning to Baltimore to report to
the office of the Maryland Federal Prohibition Director con-
cerning the result of their investigation when they dis-
covered the said Lawrence Wenger, mortally wounded and
lying beside the path along which they were walking. They
deny they were in any manner responsible, either lawfully
or unlawfully, for the homicide of the said Lawrence Wen-
ger, or that they had any knowledge of how the said Wen-
ger came to his death, and in view of this denial, it is in-
conceivable that the prosecution against them, based as it
was upon said homicide, could have arisen on account of
any act done by them under color of their office or of any
Revenue Law or Prohibition Law of the United States.
(e) Section 33 of the Judicial Code does not contemplate
that the officers mentioned therein should be entitled to re-
move all causes or prosecutions brought against them dur-
ing their tenure of office merely by reason of their holding
said offices, but said act only applies to those actions and
prosecutions which arise out of any act done under color
of their office or the law under which they are acting, or on
account of any right, title or authority claimed by such
officers or other persons under any such law.
12
12. Your petitioner alleges that the constitution does
not confer upon Congress authority to define and punish
crimes against the State; that to permit such interven-
tion by the Federal power, your petitioner charges would
be the utter and complete destruction of the State sov-
ereignty and State automony.
13. Your petitioner is advised that murder is a com-
mon law offense; that Federal Courts have no common law
jurisdiction in criminal cases; therefore, the trial of the
ease of ‘‘State of Maryland vs. Robert D. Ford, John M.
Barton, E. Franklin Ely, Wilton L. Stevens and William
Trabing’’ must be held in the Circuit Court for Harford
County, which Court only has jurisdiction, and your peti-
tioner charges that Judge Soper by removing the said
case from the Circuit Court for Harford County to the Dis-
trict Court of the United States for the District of Mary-
land, and taking the said Federal Prohibition Agents from
the custody of the jailor of said county, acted not only with-
out authority and sanction of law, but in violation of law,
and his every act and order are null and void and should be
so adjudged.
14. Your petitioner further avers that in the prosecu-
tion aforesaid, no Federal question is involved; and that
the original and amended petitions for removal filed by
the said Robert D. Ford, John M. Barton, E. Franklin Ely,
Wilton L. Stevens and William Trabing pleaded no righ:
or privilege conferred by the Constitution and laws of the
United States.
15. Your petitioner is advised that the said Judge, Mor-
ris A. Soper, in removing the said case and in refusing to
remand the same upon the application of your petitioner,
has transcended the jurisdiction of his Court and has un-
dertaken the exercise of powers not vested in him or his
Court by any law of the United States.
a
PA ae
oe
13
16. Your petitioner is informed and believes and
charges that it is the intention of the said Judge, Morris
A. Soper, by color of his office as Judge aforesaid, to try
the said Federal Prohibition Agents in the District Court
of the United States for the District of Maryland at the
present term of said Court, now being held in the City of
Baltimore, for the offense aforesaid, committed against the
laws of the State of Maryland, and thereby violate the Con-
stitution of Maryland, set aside its laws and usurp the jur-
isdiction of its Courts.
Your petitioner, therefore, prays that a rule may be
awarded by this Court requiring the said Morris A. Soper,
Judge of the District Court of the United States for the
District of Maryland, and the said District Court to show
cause why a mandamus should not be issued, forbidding
and preventing the said Judge and the said Court from
taking cognizance of said case, and from any, all and
every act connected with said trial, and commanding them
to remand the said case to the Circuit Court for Harford
County and to redeliver to the jailor of said Harford
County the bodies of the said Federal Prohibition Agents,
to be dealt with according to the laws of the said State.
And as in duty bound, ete.
ALBERT C. RITCHIE,
Governor of Maryland.
THOS. H. ROBINSON,
Attorney General of Maryland,
HERBERT LEVY,
Assistant Attorney General of Maryland,
Attorneys for the State of Maryland.
14
State oF Maryann,
Crry or Bautimorg, to wit:
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this twenty-fourth day
of September, 1925, before me the subscriber, a Notary
Public of the State of Maryland, in and for Baltimore City
aforesaid, personally appeared Albert C. Ritchie, Governor
of the State of Maryland, and made oath that the allega-
tions contained in the petition for mandamus hereto an-
nexed are true to the best of his knowledge, information and
belief.
WITNESS My hand and Notarial Seal.
(Notarial Seal.) ANNA DAVIS GREER,
Notary Public.
15
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF THE
STATE OF MARYLAND FOR A WRIT OF MAN.
DAMUS DIRECTED TO THE HONORABLE,
MORRIS A. SOPER, JUDGE OF THE DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND,
AND DIRECTED ALSO TO SAID DISTRICT
COURT.
CASE “A.”
EXHIBIT A.
Mr. CLERK:
Please file.
THOS. H. ROBINSON,
Attorney General for the State
of Maryland.
HERBERT LEVY,
Asst. Attorney General of the
State of Maryland.
16
EXHIBIT A.
5
Strate or Marytanp IN THE
vs. District Court OF THE
Rosert D. Forp, E. Frank Unitep States
Exy, Joun M. Barron, | FOR THE
Witton L. Stevens and District or MaryLanb.
WILuLiAM TRABING.
No. 7189 Criminal.
,
DOCKET ENTRIES.
1925.
Feby. 11—Petition of Defendants for removal of case
from Criminal Court of Harford County and
for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Cum Causa and
Order of Court directing Writ of Habeas Corpus
Cum Causa to issue to the Criminal Court of
Harford County filed.
Feby. 11—Writ of Habeas Corpus Cum Causa retble with-
in ten days issued. Copy of Writ, Copy Peti.
tion and Order sent to Marshal to be served.
(Copy of Writ and Petition and Order served
on J. H. Bradford, Deputy Clerk, Circuit Court
for Harford County, at Belair, Md., 12 Febr-
uary, 1925.)
Feby. 12—Defendants John M. Barton, Wilton L. Stevens,
EK. Frank Ely and William Trabing each recog-
nized in sum of Ten Thousand Dollars with
John W. Famous, John W. Galbreath, James
R. Galbreath and William B. Taylor in same
17
amount as to each recognizor for their appear-
ance from day to day as required to answer the
charge in this case.
Feby. 13—Defendant Robert D. Ford recognized in sum
of Ten Thousand Dollars with Albert G. Buf-
fington and Jesse H. Bratten in same amount
for his appearance from day to day as required
to answer the charge in this case.
Feby. 21—Record of Proceedings of Circuit Court for
Harford County filed.
Mch. 12—Motion to Quash Writ and rescind Order of
Court filed.
Mch. 17—Order of Court granting leave to the United
State to amend its petition filed.
Mch. 31—Amended Petition of Defendants for removal of
Case from Criminal Court of Harford County
and for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Cum Causa
filed.
April 11—Motion to Quash and remand Indictment for
Murder on Amended Petition filed.
May 5—Order of Court overruling Motion to Quash
and remand filed.
May 5—Stipulation filed.
18
PETITION FOR REMOVAL AND ORDER
OF COURT THEREON.
Filed February 11, 1925.
‘
State oF Maryann
vs. IN THE
Rosert D. Forp, Joun M. District Court oF THE
Barton, EK. Frank Ezy, Unirep States
Witton L. Stevens and FOR THE
Wiu1am TRaBina. District or Maryuanp.
To the Honorable, the Judge of said Court:
The Petition of Robert D. Ford, John M. Barton, E.
Frank Ely, Wilton L. Stevens and William Trabing, re-
spectfully represents:
1. That on or about the tenth day of February, in the
year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and twenty-five, an
indictment was returned into the Criminal Court for Har-
ford County, State of Maryland, by a Grand Jury of the
said Court, which indictment charged yonr Petitioners
with the crime of murder, contrary to the laws of the State
of Maryland, by reason of the fact that on or about the
nineteenth day of November, nineteen hundred and twenty-
four, it is alleged that your petitioner unlawfully and
feloniously did murder one Lawrence Wenger.
2. That on the nineteenth day of November, nineteen
hundred and twenty-four, the petitioner William Trabing
was a chauffeur of the Reliable Transfer Company and
was at the time above mentioned engaged and employed by
Edmund Budnitz, Federal Prohibition Director of the State
19
of Maryland, in the capacity of a chauffeur for Federal
Prohibition Agents, Robert D. Ford, John M. Barton, Wil-
ton L. Stevens and E. Frank Ely, all being officers of the
Internal Revenue Service of the United States; that the
said Petitioner William Trabing was at the said time a per-
son acting under and by authority of the said Prohibition
Director Edmund Budnitz and the said Federal Prohibition
Agents Robert D. Ford, John M. Barton, Wilton L. Stevens
and E. Frank Ely; and that the said agents were on Novem-
ber 19, 1924, and now are Federal Prohibition Agents of
the Bureau of Internal Revenue for the Treasury Depart-
ment of the United States.
3. That the act or acts done by the Petitioner William
Trabing, at the time when they are alleged to have been
guilty of the murder of one Lawrence Wenger, which charge
he denies was done by him while acting under and by
authority of Federal Prohibition Director Edmund Bud-
nitz and Federal Prohibition Officers Robert D. Ford, John
M. Barton, Wilton L. Stevens and E. Frank Ely, in the dis-
charge of their official duties as Prohibition Agents as
aforesaid and in discharge of his duty as chauffeur and
helper of the said agents in making and attempting to make
an investigation in the discharge of their duty and of his
duty as aforesaid and in protecting himself and the said
officers of the Internal Revenue in the discharge of his and
their duty.
4. That the act or acts done by the Petitioners Robert
D. Ford, John M. Barton, Wilton L. Stevens and E. Frank
Ely, at the time when they are alleged to have been guilty
of the murder of Lawrence Wenger, which charge they
deny, was done by them in the discharge of their official
duties as Prohibition Agents as aforesaid in making and
attempting to make an investigation in the discharge of
their duties as aforesaid and in protecting themselves us
20
fellow officers of the Internal Revenue in the discharge of
their duty.
5. That the said criminal prosecution commenced by
said indictment is now pending in the Criminal Court for
Harford County and is a criminal prosecution on account
of the acts alleged to have been done by your petitioners
in the course of the performance of their duties as Federal
Prohibition Agents, which acts they deny having done.
WHEREFORE, your Petitioners pray that the said suit
may be removed from the Criminal Court for Harford
County, aforesaid, to this Honorable Court and that writs
of certiorari and habeas corpus cum causa issue for that
purpose pursuant to the statute of the United States in
such case made and provided. (U.S. Compiled Statutes,
Sec. 1015, being Judicial Code, Sec. 33, as amended, Act
August 23, 1916, C. 399.)
E. FRANK ELY,
JOHN M. BARTON,
WILTON L. STEVENS,
WILLIAM M. TRABING,
ROBERT D. FORD,
By A. W. W. WOODCOCK,
United States Attorney for the
2/11/25. District of Maryland.
Unrrep Srares or America, District or MARYLAND, TO WIT:
I Hereby Certify, that before me, the undersigned, per-
sonally appeared John M. Barton, E. Frank Ely, Wilton
21
L. Stevens, Federal Prohibition Agents, William Trabing,
chauffeur for the said agents, and Amos W. W. Woodcock,
United States Attorney for the District of Maryland, and
made oath in due form of law that they are the persons
whose names are subscribed to the aforegoing petition, and
that they have read the petition, and the matters contained
therein are true in substance and in fact.
CHAS. W. ZIMMERMANN,
Chief Deputy Clerk of the District Court
of the United States for the District of
Maryland.
_
I, A. W. W. Woodcock, United States Attorney in and
for the District of Maryland, Do Hereby Certify that, as
attorney for the petitioners named above, I have examined
the proceedings against them mentioned in the aforegoing
petition and have carefully inquired into all the matters
set forth in the said petition and I believe the same to be
true. .
A. W. W. WOODCOCK,
United States Attorney.
———_--—-—_
ORDER.
Upon motion of A. W. W. Woodcock, United States At-
torney, attorney for Robert D. Ford, John M. Barton, E.
Frank Ely, Wilton L. Stevens and William Trabing, and
on filing the petition of the said Robert D. Ford, John M.
Barton, E. Frank Ely, Wilton L. Stevens and William
Trabing, praying for the removal to this Court from the
Criminal Court of Harford County, in the State of Mary-
land, in the criminal prosecution for murder against the
ie
aa a eeneenieen
22
said Robert D. Ford, John M. Barton, E. Frank Ely, Wil-
ton L. Stevens and William Trabing in said Court, entitled
State of Maryland versus Robert D. Ford, John M. Barton,
KE. Frank Ely, Wilton L. Stevens and William Trabing, and
for the issuance of writs of certiorari and habeas corpus
cum causa for that purpose, pursuant to Section 33 of the
Judicial Code of the United States, and the Court having
read said petition, it is ORDERED this eleventh day of
February, nineteen hundred and twenty-five, that writs of
certiorari and habeas corpus cum causa issue herein di-
rected to the said Court requiring said Court to transmit
to this Court within ten days the record and proceedings
in said case.
MORRIS A. SOPER,
United States District Judge, United
States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Maryland.
23
ORDER OF REMOVAL, WRIT OF CERTIORARI AND
HABEAS CORPUS CUM CAUSA.
Issued February 11, 1925.
>
Sratre or Mary.anp
vs. IN THE
Rosert D. Forp, Joun M. District Court oF THE
Barton, E. Frank E ty, ‘ Unirep States
Witton L. Srevens and FOR THE
Wr1am Traine. District or MaRyuanp.
;
To the Honorable, the Circuit Court of Harford County
in the State of Maryland, the Judge of the Said Court
and the Clerk of the Said Court, Greeting:
Being informed that there is now pending before you a
suit in which the State of Maryland is plaintiff and Robert
D. Ford, John M. Barton, E. Frank Ely, Wilton L. Stevens
and William Trabing are the defendants, which said suit
is a criminal prosecution against the said Robert D. Ford,
John M. Barton, E. Frank Ely, Wilton L. Stevens and Wil-
liam Trabing, charging the defendants with the murder of
Lawrence Wenger, the said suit arising out of facts which
occurred while the said William Trabing was discharging
his duties as chauffeur and helper of the Prohibition
Agents, Officers of the Internal Revenue, the co-defendants,
and acting in and by authority of Federal Prohibition Di-
rector Edmund Budnitz and Federa) Prohibition Officers
Robert D. Ford, John M. Barton, Wilton L. Stevens and
KE. Frank Ely, who were acting in the discharge of their
official duties as Prohibition Agents, Officers of the Inter-
nal Revenue Service of the United States as aforesaid in
making and attempting to make an investigation in the
we
iat
24
discharge of their duty and in protecting themselves in the
discharge of their duty under the National Prohibition Act
of the said United States; and which said suit has not yet
been heard and determined.
Now, therefore, we being willing that said cause and the
records and proceedings therein should be certified by said
Judge of the Circuit Court of Harford County in the State
of Maryland, do hereby command you that you immediately
deliver the bodies of Robert D. Ford, John M. Barton, E.
Frank Ely, Wilton L. Stevens and William Trabing to the
castody of the United States Marshal to be dealt with in
this cause according to law and the order of the District
Court for the District of Maryland; and that you send,
without delay and within ten days to the District Court of
the United States, the records and proceedings in said cause
so that the said District Court of the United States may
act thereon as of right and according to the laws and cus-
toms of the said United States, among others, Section 1015
of the United States Compiled Statutes, being Judicial
Code, Sec. 33, as amended by its Act of August 23, 1916,
C. 399.
WITNESS the Honorable Morris A. Soper, Judge of
said District Court of the United States, this eleventh day
of February, A. D. nineteen hundred and twenty-five.
ARTHUR L. SPAMER,
Clerk of the District Court of the United
(Seal. ) States for the District of Maryland.
The foregoing Writ is thus endorsed:
“‘Copy of within Writ of Habeas Corpus Cum Causa and
Copy Petition for and Order of Removal, left with J. H.
Bradford, Deputy Clerk, Circuit Court of Harford County,
at Belair, Md., 12th day of February, 1925.
GEORGE W. COLLIER,
United States Marshal,
District of Maryland,
By: Gero. H. Epeten,
Chief Deputy Marshal.’’
25
MOTION TO QUASH AND REMAND. *
Filed March 12, 1925.
,
State or Maryann
vs. IN THE
Rosert D. Forp, Joun M. District Court oF THE
Barton, E. Frankun Exy, ' Unitep States
Witton L. Srevens and FOR THE
WituiaM TRaBING. District or Mary.anp.
7 (InpictMENT ror Murper.)
To the Honorable, Morris A. Soper, Judge of said Court:
The State of Maryland, by Thomas H. Robinson, its
Attorney General, and W. Worthington Hopkins, State’s
Attorney for Harford County, who appear specially for
the purposes of this motion, and for no other purpose,
move this Honorable Court to quash the writ and rescind
the order issued in the above entitled case, directed to the
Judge of the Circuit Court for Harford County, and the
Clerk thereof, and to remand the said case to the Circuit
Court for Harford County, for the following reasons:
(1) Because the allegations of the petition filed in this
case do not disclose a state of facts entitling the petitioners
to have said writ issued, or the charge against them re-
moved into this Court.
(2) Because the allegations set forth in said petition
are contradictory, evasive, founded on hearsay, and in part
untrue.
(3) Because the issuance of said writ upon the allega-
tions of said petition and attached certificate of counsel is
26
beyond the power and jurisdiction of this Court as limited
by the Constitution and laws of the United States.
(4) Because the said writ, if allowed to stand, consti-
tutes an interference by this Court with the due and orderly
administration of justice in the Circuit Court for Harford
County contrary to the Constitution and laws of the United
States.
(5) Because there is no allegation in said petition that
authorizes this Court to issue any writ whatsoever against
the Judge or the Clerk of the Circuit Court for Harford
County.
(6) And for other good and sufficient reasons to be
shown at the hearing.
THOS. H. ROBINSON,
Attorney General of Maryland.
W. WORTHINGTON HOPKINS,
State’s Attorney for Harford County.
27
ORDER GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND PETITION.
Filed May 17, 1925.
State or Maryitanp IN THE
vs. District Court oF THE
Rozsert D. Forp, Joun M. Unitep States
Barton, E. Franxurn Ey, r FOR THE
Witton L. Srevens and District or MaRyLanp.
WituraM TRABING.
INDICTMENT FoR MuRDER.
This cause standing ready for hearing, and being sub-
mitted upon motion of the State of Maryland to quash the
writ and rescind the order issued in the above entitled case
on the 11th day of February, 1925, directed to the Judze
of the Circuit Court for Harford County, and the Clerk
thereof, and to remand the said case to the Cireuit Court
for Harford County, the counsel for the parties were heard
and the proceedings were read and considered; and the
United States having applied for leave of court to amend
the petition, it is therefore ordered this 17th day of March,
in the year 1925, by the District Court of the United States
for the District of Maryland:
That leave be and it is hereby granted to the United
States to amend said petition.
MORRIS A. SOPER,
United States District Judge.
28
AMENDED PETITION FOR REMOVAL AND
ORDER OF COURT.
Filed March 31, 1925.
%
State or Marytanp
vs. IN THE
Rosert D. Forp, Joux M. District Court oF THE
Barton, KE. Franxuin Ey, ‘ Unirep States
Witton L. Stevens and FOR THE
Wru1aAm TRaBING. District or Mary.anp.
J
——___.
AMENDED PETITION.
ns
To the Honorable, the Judge of said Court:
The Petition of Robert D. Ford, John M. Barton, E.
Franklin Ely, Wilton L. Stevens and William Trabing,
respectiully represents:
1. That on or about the tenth day of February, in the
year of our Lord nineteen hundred and twenty-five, an in-
dictment was returned in the Circuit Court of the Third
Judicial Circuit of the State of Maryland by the Grand
Inquest of the State of Maryland for the body of Harford
County, which indictment charged your Petitioners with
the crime of murder, as follows:
“The Jurors of the State of Maryland, for the body of
Harford County, do on their oath present that Wilton L.
Stevens, John M. Barton, Robert D. Ford, E. Franklin Ely,
and William Trabing, late of Harford County aforesaid,
on the nineteenth day of November in the year of our Lord
29
nineteen hundred and twenty-four, at the County aforesaid,
feloniously, wilfully, and of their deliberate premeditated
malice aforethought did kill and murder Lawrence Wenger;
contrary to the form of the Act of Assembly in such case
made and provided; and against the peace, government,
and dignity of the State.
W. WortHincton Hopkins,
State’s Attorney for Harford County.”’
2. That on the twentieth day of N ovember, nineteen
hundred and twenty-four, the Petitioner William Trabing
was a chauffeur of the Reliable Transfer Company and was
at the time mentioned engaged and employed by Edmund
Budnitz, Federal Prohibition Director of the State of
Maryland, in the capacity of a chauffeur for Federal Pro-
hibition Agents Robert D. Ford, John M. Barton, Wilton
L. Stevens and E. Franklin Ely, all being officers of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue of the Treasury Department
of the United States, to act under the direction of the Com-
missioner of Internal Revenue, the Federal Prohibition
Commissioner, and the Federal Prohibition Director for
the State of Maryland, and to act under the authority of
and to enforce the National Prohibition Act and acts sup-
plemental thereto and all Internal Revenue Laws relating
to the manufacture, sale, transportation, control, and taxa-
tion of intoxicating liquors, with authority to execute and
perform all the duties delegated to such officers by law.
3. That the acts alleged to have been done by the Peti-
tioner William Trabing are alleged to have been done at a
time when he was engaged in the discharge of his duties
while acting under and by authority of Federal Prohibi-
tion Director Edmund Budnitz and Federal Prohibition
Officers Robert D. Ford, John M, Barton, Wilton L. Stevens
and E. Franklin Ely, as aforesaid, while the said officers
30
were engaged in the discharge of their official duties as
prohibition officers in making and attempting to make an
investigation concerning a violation of the National Prohi-
bition Act and other Internal Revenue Laws and while re-
porting and preparing to report the results of said investi-
gation and in protecting himself and the said officers of the
Internal Revenue in the discharge of his and their duty as
set out in Paragraph 4 below.
4. That the acts alleged to have been done by the ee
tioners Robert D. Ford, John M. Barton, Wilton L. Stevens,
and EK. Franklin Ely are alleged to have been done at a
time when they were en d_in the discharge of their
official duties as Federal Prohibition Officers, and in making
and attempting to make an investigation concerning a vio-
lation of the National Prohibition Act and other Internal
Revenue Laws, and in reporting the results of said investi-
gation, and in protecting themselves in the discharge of
their duty as follows:
That on November nineteenth, nineteen hundred and
twenty-four, your petitioners were directed by Maryland
Federal Prohibition Director Edmund Budnitz to investi-
gate the alleged unlawful distillation of intoxicating liquor
on a farm known as the Harry Carver Farm situated ap-
proximately three miles from the village of Madonna,
about twelve miles northwest from Bel Air, Maryland,
which said property was then unoccupied. Your petition-
ers reached the said farm premises shortly after midday
on November nineteenth, nineteen hundred and twenty-
four, and discovered there in a secluded wooded valley and
swamp materials for an illicit distilling operation, to wit,
nine empty mash boxes, three fifty-gallon metal drums, a
fifty-gallon condenser, about one thousand pounds of rye
meal in bags, a lighted fire, and men’s working clothes.
Your petitioners thereupon concealed themselves in woods
and shrubbery nearby the still site and shortly thereafter
31
became aware of the approach of a number of men bringing
with them a still. Your petitioners thereupon made their
presence known to the men who were approaching, and the
men immediately dropped the still and fled; and though
your etitioners 5 them across the oN no one of
etnies
we ‘petitioners poset to the still oy destroyed the
materials above mentioned which constituted the unlawful
distilling plant, and started to return to their ear which
had been left some distance from the still site, for the pur-
pose of returning to Baltimore to report to the office: of the
Maryland Federal Prohibition Direcior concerning the re-
sults of their investigation, when they discovered a man,
whom they afterwards learned to be one Lawrence Wegner,
mortally wounded and lying beside the path along which
they were walking, some 400 or 500 yards from the still
site and in a direction opposite to that from which the un-
known men had approached and towards which they fled.
Whereupon your petitioners carried the wounded man to
their car and took him to Jarrettsville, Maryland, for med-
ical treatment, but, finding none there available, proceeded
with all speed to Bel Air, where they sought out in turn
Doctors Richardson, Sappington and Archer, without suce-
cess, and finally placed the said Lawrence Wegner in charge
of Doctor Van Bibber, who pronounced him dead. Your
petitioners then, acting under the advice of the said Doctor
Van Bibber, removed the body of the said Lawrence Weg-
ner to the undertaking establishment of Dean and Foster
in Bel Air. Your petitioners then proceeded to the State’s
Attorney’s office in Bel Air and related the facts aforesaid
to the State’s Attorney; whereupon, on being informed by
them that your petitioners Robert D. Ford, John M. Bar-
ton, Wilton L. Stevens, and E. Franklin Ely were prohibi-
tion officers and that your petitioner William Trabing was
employed by the Federal Prohibition Director as their
chauffeur, they were placed under arrest by the Sheriff of
Harford County at the instance of the State’s Attorney
32
and were confined in the Harford County Jail until the
following morning, November twentieth, nineteen hundred
and twenty-four. On the morning of November twentieth,
nineteen hundred and twenty-four, your petitioners were
taken by the Sheriff and State’s Attorney, in company with
a number of men who that afternoon served upon the Cor-
oner’s Jury mentioned in the indictment, and in company
with two Baltimore City Police Headquarters Detectives,
to the scene of their investigation of the previous day.
They they related the facts concerning their investigation
of the unlawful distilling operation and their finding of the
said Lawrence Wenger on November nineteenth, and then
and there went over the scene of the said occurrences, relat-
ing freely and without reservation the events which took
place November nineteenth, in accordance with their duty
as investigating and reporting officers of the Federal Gov-
ernment and in compliance with their duties as Federal
Prohibition Officers. Likewise on the afternoon of Novem-
ber twentieth your petitioners were called before the Cor-
oner’s Inquest heretofore described in the indictment, and
freely and without reservation in accordance with their
duty as investigating and reporting officers of the Federal
Government and acting under the direction of the Mary-
land Federal Prohibition Director, related the facts afore-
mentioned. And thereupon they were again placed in the
Harford County Jail and held for the action of the Harford
County Grand Jury until their release on bail upon the
evening of November twentieth, nineteen hundred and twen-
ty-four, at the instance of the United States Attorney for
the District of Maryland acting on their behalf.
\eininten
5. That the said criminal prosecution was commenced
in the manner following:
A presentment against your petitioners was returned in
the Circuit Court for Harford County, February ninth,
nineteen hundred and twenty-five, following which present-
33
ment the State of Maryland, by the State’s Attorney for
Harford County, prosecuted and sued forth out of the Cir-
cuit Court for Harford County a Writ of the State of
Maryland of Capias Ad Respondendum against your peti-
tioners, to which there was no return by the Sheriff of Har-
ford County, whereupon the indictment heretofore set forth
was returned.
The said indictment is now pending in the Circuit Court
for Harford County and is a criminal prosecution on ac-
count of acts alleged to have been done by your petitioners
at a time when they were engaged in the performance of
their duties as Federal Prohibition Officers and chauffeur
for Federal Prohibition Officers as set forih in aforegoing
paragraphs.
WHEREFORE, your petitioners pray that the said sut
may be removed from the Circuit Court for Harford Coun-
ty, aforesaid, to this Honorable Court and that writs of
certiorari and habeas corpus cum causa may issue for that
purpose pursuant to the Statute of the United States in
such case made and provided. (U.S. Compiled Statutes,
Sec. 1015, being Judicial Code, See. 33, as amended, Act
August 23, 1916, C. 399; National Prohibition Act, Title II,
Section 28.)
ROBERT D. FORD,
JOHN M. BARTON,
E. FRANKLIN ELY,
WILTON L. STEVENS,
WILLIAM M. TRABING,
By A. W. W. WOODCOCK,
United States Attorney for the
District of Maryland.
3/30/25.
34
Unirep States or America, District or MaryLanp, To WIT:
I Hereby Certify that before me, the undersigned, per-
sonally appeared Robert D. Ford, John M. Barton, Wilton
L. Stevens, E. Franklin Ely, Federal Prohibition Agents,
and William Trabing, a chauffeur employed by the Federal
Prohibition Director, and made oath in due form of law
that they are the persons whose names are subscribed to
the aforegoing petition, and that they have read the peti-
tion, and the matters contained therein are true in sub-
stance and in fact.
CHAS. W. ZIMMERMANN,
Chief Deputy Clerk of the District Court
of the United States for the District of
11-30-25. Maryland.
I, A. W. W. Woodcock, United States Attorney in and
for the District of Maryland, do hereby certify that, as
attorney for the petitioners named above, I have examined
the proceedings against them mentioned in the aforegoing
petition and have carefully inquired into all the matters
set forth in the said petition and I believe the same to be
true.
A. W. W. WOODCOCK,
3/30/25. United States Attorney.
ORDER.
Upon motion of A. W. W. Woodcock, United States At-
torney, Attorney for Robert D. Ford, John M. Barton,
Wilton L. Stevens, E. Franklin Ely, and William Trabing,
praying for the removal to this Court from the Circuit
Court for Harford County in the State of Maryland, of the
35
Criminal Prosecution for Murder against the said Robert
D. Ford, John M. Barton, Wilton L. Stevens, E. Franklin
Ely, and William Trabing, and for the issuance of writs
of certiorari and habeas corpus cum causa for that purpose,
pursuant to Section 33 of the Judicial Code of the United
States, and Section 28 of Title II of the National Prohi-
bition Act, and the Court having read said petition, it is
ORDERED, this thirty-first day of March, nineteen
hundred and twenty-five, that writs of certiorari and habeas
corpus cum causa issue herein directed to the said Court
and to the Clerk of the said Court requiring them to trans-
mit to this Court within ten days the records and proceed-
ings in said case.
United States District Judge, United
States District Court for the District
of Maryland.
{
a SALIENT RAEI ATG MER
36
MOTION TO QUASH AND REMAND ON
AMENDED PETITION.
Filed April 11, 1925.
+
State oF Marytanp In THE
vs. District Court oF THE
Rosert D. Forp, Joun M. Unitep States
Bazton, KE. Franxuin Ey, FOR THE
Witton L. Stevens and District or MaryLanp.
Wiu1am TRraBIna.
(AmENDED Petition.)
MOTION TO QUASH AND REMAND—INDICTMENT
FOR MURDER.
To the Honorable, Morris A. Soper, Judge of said Court:
The State of Maryland, by Thomas H. Robinson, its At-
torney General, and W. Worthington Hopkins, State’s
Attorney for Harford County, who appear specially for
the purposes of this motion, and for no other purpose,
moves this Honorable Court to quash the writ and rescind
the order issued in the above entitled case, directed to the
Judge of the Circuit Court for Harford County, and the
Clerk thereof, and to remand the said case to the Circuit
Court for Harford County, for the following reasons:
1. Because the allegations of the second paragraph of
the amended petition are untrue.
2. Because the allegations of the petition filed in this
case do not disclose a state of facts entitling the petitioners
to have said writ issued or the charge against them re-
moved into this Court.
37
4. Because the issuance of said writ upon the allegations
of said petition and attached certificate of counsel is be-
yond the power and jurisdiction of this Court as limited by
the Constitution and laws of the United States.
5. Because the said writ, if allowed to stand, constitutes
an interference by this Court with the due and orderly ad-
ministration of justice in the Cireuit Court or Harford
County contrary to the Constitution and laws of the United
States.
6. Because there is no allegation in said petition that
authorizes this Court to issue any writ whatsoever against
the Judge or the Clerk of the Circuit Court for Harford
County.
7. And for other good and sufficient reasons to be
shown at the hearing.
THOMAS H. ROBINSON,
Attorney General of Maryland.
W. WORTHINGTON HOPKINS,
State’s Attorney for Harford County.
ROTEL LG RE RTS
38
ORDER OVERRULING MOTION TO QUASH
AND REMAND.
Filed May 5, 1925.
State or Maryianp IN THE
vs. District Court OF THE
Rosert D. Forp, Joun M. Unitep States
Barton, KE. Franxuiy Ey, j FOR THE
Witton L. Srevens and District oF MaryLanp.
Wiiuram TRaBING.
INDICTMENT FOR MURDER.
This cause standing ready for hearing and being submit-
ted upon motion of the State of Maryland to quash the writ
and rescind the order issued in the above entitled case on
the 11th day of February, 1925, directed to the Judge of
the Circuit Court for Harford County, and the Clerk there-
of, and to remand the said case to the Cireuit Court for
Harford County, the counsel for the parties were heard and
the proceedings were read and considered.
It is, therefore, this 5th day of May, 1925, ordered by the
District Court of the United States for the District of Mary-
land, that the said motion of the State of Maryland be and
the same is hereby overruled, and that the removal of this
cause to this Court from the Circuit Court for Harford
County, in the State of Maryland, as directed by the said
order of this Court dated February 11th, 1925, be and the
same is hereby ratified and confirmed.
The United States District Court for the District of
Maryland does further certify to the Supreme Court of the
United States that the sole issue before the said District
39
Court of the United States for the District of Maryland
in the said motion to quash and remand filed by the Stat
of Maryland, was the jurisdiction of the said Court to re
move this cause to said Court from the Circuit Court fo:
Harford County, in the State of Maryland, and that ix
hereby ordering said removal, the said Court does hereby
adjudicate said question of jurisdiction adversely to the
State of Maryland.
MORRIS A. SOPER,
United States District Judge.
40
STIPULATION.
Filed May 5, 1925.
=
State or Maryann IN THE
vs. District Court oF THE
Rosert D. Forp, Jonun M. Unitep States
Barton, EK. Franxurn Ety, FOR THE
Witton L. Stevens and . District or MARYLAND.
Wiruuiam TRaBING.
INDICTMENT FOR MuRDER.
It is stipulated by and between the parties hereto that
Robert D. Ford, John M. Barton, Wilton L. Stevens and
E. Franklin Ely, during the month of November, in the
year 1924, and prior to said time, and at the time of the
matters and facts charged in the indictment in the Circuit
Court for Harford County, were Federal Prohibition Offi-
cers, holding a commission under the Commissioner of In-
ternal Revenue and countersigned by the Federal Prohi-
bition Commissioner, in the form following, that is to say:
‘‘Date No.
THE UNITED STATES
TREASURY INTERNAL REVENUE
DEPARTMENT. SERVICE.
ye err ee rereeT Tee is hereby employed
as a Federal Prohibition Officer to act under the authority
of and to enforce the National Prohibition Act and Acts
supplemental thereto and all Internal Revenue Laws, re-
lating to the manufacture, sale, transportation, control, and
taxation of intoxicating liquors, and he is hereby author-
41
ized to execute and perform all the duties delegated to such
officers by law.
Countersigned :
Federal Prohibition Commissioner of Internal
Commissioner. Revenue.
This Commission is void if photograph of bearer does not
appear above.’’
And that William Trabing was, at the time of the acts
alleged in the indictment in the Circuit Court for Harford
County, a chauffeur of the Reliable Transfer Company,
engaged and employed by Edmund Budnitz, Federal Pro-
hibition Director of the State of Maryland, in the capacity
of chauffeur for the Prohibition Agents above named.
42
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF THE
STATE OF MARYLAND FOR A WRIT OF MAN.
DAMUS DIRECTED TO THE HONORABLE,
MORRIS A. SOPER, JUDGE OF THE DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND,
AND DIRECTED ALSO TO SAID DISTRICT
COURT.
CASE “A,”
EXHIBIT B.
Mr. CueRxk:
Please file.
THOS. H. ROBINSON,
Attorney General for the State
of Maryland.
HERBERT LEVY,
Asst. Attorney General of the
State of Maryland.
43
EXHIBIT B.
RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT
FOR HARFORD COUNTY, FILED IN THE DIS-
TRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR
THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND, FEBRUARY 21,
1925.
State oF Maryianp, Harrorp County, To wit:
At a session of the Cireuit Court of the Third Judicial
Circuit of the State of Maryland, begun and held for Har-
ford County, at the Court House in the Town of Bel Air, in
the same County, on the second Monday of February, it
being the ninth day of the same month, in the year of our
Lord one thousand nine hundred and twenty-five.
Present:
The Honorable, T. Scott Offutt, Chief Judge,
The Honorable, Frank I. Duncan, Associate Judge,
The Honorable, William H. Harlan, Associate Judge,
The Honorable, Walter W. Preston, Associate Judge,
Isaac W. Thompson, Esq., Sheriff,
D. Gilpin Wilson, Clerk.
Among others were the following proceedings, to wit:
oD fo) os?
State oF MaryLanp )
vs.
Wirton L. Stevens, Roperr
D. Foro, E. Fran kuin Exy,
Joun M. Barton, Witu1AM
TRABING.
Be it remembered, that at the present term of this Hon-
orable Court, held as aforesaid, Frederick C. Jones, A.
Lynn Baker, Wilson R. Mitchell, Isaac A. Hoffman, Harry
+4
F. Daughton, George K. Livezey, Louis Amrein, Charles
W. Walker, William A. Bodt, Harry E. Martin, Hargraves
Spalding, T. Norman Harkins, Lawrence E. Bauer, Preston
C. Snodgrass, J. Henry Baird, Edward Breibenbaugh, Seth
B. Taylor, Harry F. Pyle, Frederick O. Veile, Samuel E.
Walker, Harry E. Sheridan, George C. Proctor and John
E. Webster, good and lawful men of the County aforesaid,
who being empannelled, sworn and charged as the Grand
Inquest of the State of Maryland for the body of Harford
County, having withdrawn from the Bar of this Honorable
Court here did afterwards return and present to this Hon-
orable Court a presentment in the words and form follow-
ing, to wit:
In tHe Crecurr Court ror Harrorp County:
February Term, 1925.
The Grand Inquest of the State of Maryland for the body
of Harford County do, on their oath present that Wilton
L. Stevens, Robert D. Ford, E. Franklin Ely, John M. Bar-
ton and William Trabing, late of Harford County afore-
said, at County aforesaid, on the nineteenth day of Novem-
ber, nineteen hundred and twenty-four, did kill and murder
Lawrence Wenger, against the peace, government and dig-
nity of the State.
FRED C. JONES, Foreman.
Witness:
Abraham Woods,
Ralph T. Woods,
James Patterson,
John H. Henson,
Dr. P. F. Sappington,
Dewey F. Bowman.
Whereupon, the State of Maryland, by W. Worthington
Hopkins, E'sq., State’s Attorney for Harford County, prose-
45
euted and sued forth out of this Honorable Court the Writ
of the State of Maryland of Capias ad respondendum
against the said Wilton L. Stevens, Robert D. Ford, E.
Franklin Ely, John M. Barton and William Trabing, to
the Sheriff of Harford County, in the words and form
following :
SraTeE oF Mary.anp,
To the Sheriff of Harford County—Greeting:
You are hereby commanded to take the bodies of Wilton
L. Stevens, Robert D. Ford, E. Franklin Ely, John M. Bar-
ton and William Trabing, late of Harford County, if they
shall be found in your bailiwick, and that them so taken,
you safely keep, so that you have their bodies before the
Cireuit Court for Harford County, at the Court House in
the same county at once, to answer unto the State of Mary-
land on a presentment and indictment did kill and murder
Lawrence Wenger contrary to the Act of Assembly in such
case made and provided, and against the peace, government
and dignity of the State.
Hereof fail not at your peril, and have you then and
there this Writ.
WITNESS the Honorable T. Scott Offutt, Chief
Judge of our said Court, the 9th day of Feb-
(Seal.) ruary, 1925. Issued the 10th day of Feb-
ruary, 1925.
Test: D. G. WILSON, Clerk.
Witness:
Abraham Woods,
Ralph T. Woods,
James Patterson,
Charles Cook,
John Cook (col.),
John H. Henson,
Robert Atwell,
Charles Bobbitt,
Dr. P. F. Sappington.
To which said Writ of the State of Maryland of Capias
ad respondendum (which was delivered to said Sheriff of
Harford County to be executed) there has been no Return
to this Honorable Court, and the said Wilton L. Stevens,
Robert D. Ford, FE. Franklin Ely, John M. Barton and
William Trabing, as shown by the Records of this Honor-
able Court are still at large.
And the said W. Worthington Hopkins, Esq., the State’s
Attorney for Harford County, exhibits to the Grand In-
quest of the State of Maryland, for the Body of Harford
County, an indictment against the said Wilton L. Stevens,
Robert D. Ford, E. Franklin Ely, John M. Barton and Wil-
liam Trabing in the words and form following, to wit:
Stare or Mary.anp, Harrorp County, To wir:
The Jurors of the State of Maryland, for the body of
Harford County, do on their oath present that Wilton L.
Stevens, John M. Barton, Robert D. Ford, E. Franklin Ely
and William Trabing, late of Harford County aforesaid,
on the nineteenth day of November, in the year of our Lord
nineteen hundred and twenty-four, at the County aforesaid,
feloniously, wilfully and of their deliberately premeditated
malice aforethought did kill and murder Lawrence Wenger;
contrary to the form of the Act of Assembly in such case
made and provided; and against the peace, government and
dignity of the State.
W. WORTHINGTON HOPKINS,
State’s Attorney for Harford County.
47
Whereupon, the said Grand Inquest of the State of Mary-
land for the Body of Harford County, returned the said
Indictment to our Honorable Court here thereon endorsed:
True Bill.
FRED C. JONES, Fvreman.”’
And afterwards, to wit, on the 12th day of February,
1925, a Petition, Affidavit and Order of Court issuing out
of the Honorable, the United States District Court for the
District of Maryland, commanding the transmission of the
Record of Proceedings in the case be sent to the Honorable,
the United States District Court for the District of Mary-
land, were received by the Clerk of the Honorable, the Cir-
euit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit of the State of
Maryland, for Harford County, under protest.
State or Maryann, Harrorp County, ro wir:
I, D. Gilpin Wilson, Clerk of the Cireuit Court for Har-
for County, the same being a Court of Law and Record,
hereby certify that the aforegoing is a true, full and com-
plete transcript of the Record of Proceedings in the there-
in entitled case, as the same remains of record in this office.
IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF I hereto sub-
scribe my name and affix the seal of the Cir-
euit Court for Harford County, this 21st day
(Seal.) of February, 1925.
D. GILPIN WILSON,
Clerk of the Cireuit Court of the Third
Judicial Circuit of the State of Mary-
land, for Harford County.
48
Whereupon, the Record of Proceedings is transmitted
accordingly.
D. GILPIN WILSON, Clerk.
Unirep Srates or AMERICA,
District or Maryann, to wit:
I, ARTHUR L. SPAMER, Clerk of the District Court of
the United States for the District of Maryland, do hereby
certify that the foregoing papers comprising Exhibits ‘‘A”’
and ‘‘B’’ are true copies respectively of all the original
papers filed on the respective dates set forth in the captions
thereto, in the case of the State of Maryland versus Robert
D. Ford, E. Franklin Ely, John M. Barton, Wilton L.
Stevens and William Trabing, No. 7189 Criminal, in the
District Court of the United States for the District of
Maryland; and I further certify that the Docket Entries
above set forth are truly taken from the record of proceed-
ings in said case.
IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I hereunto set
my hand and affix the seal of said District
Court, this 24th day of September, A. D.
1925.
ARTHUR lL. SPA MER,
Clerk.
(Seal.)
49
CERTIFIED COPY OF DOCKET ENTRIES—CIRCUIT
COURT FOR HARFORD COUNTY.
State or Marytanp 7
vs.
Witton L. Stevens, Rosert In tHE Crrcuir Court
D. Forp, E. Franxuin Ety, ( FOR
Joun M. Barton, WILLIAM Harrorp County.
TRABING. }
Feby. 10, 1925—Present. for Murder filed and Capias
Issd. Same day Indictment endorsed and True Bill filed.
Feby. 12, 1925—Petition and Affidavit of the District
Attorney of the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Maryland for Removal and Order of said Court
commanding the Record of Proceedings be sent to said
United States District Court for the District of Maryland
recorded by the Clerk of this Court under Protest and copy
of same left and filed.
State or Maryann, Harrorp County, Scr:
I hereby certify that the above is a true copy of the
Docket Entries in the above entitled case, as same remains
of record in this office.
In Testimony Whereof, I hereto subscribe my
name and affix the Seal of the Circuit Court
for Harford County, this 11th day of Septem-
ber, 1925.
D. GILPIN WILSON,
Clerk of the Circuit Court
(Seal.) for Harford County.
FiLKD
93 Ori oO. OCT 24 1925
In Tue
Supreme Court of the United States
STATE OF MARYLAND
versus
MORRIS A. SOPER, JUDGE OF THE DISTRICT
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND, AND THE DIS-
TRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR
THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND.
CASE “A.”
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR MAN-
DAMUS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE
OF MARYLAND.
Mr. Clerk:
Please file:
THOS. H. ROBINSON,
Attorney General of Maryland.
HERBERT LEVY,
Assistant Attorney General of Maryland.
The Daily Record Company Print, Baltimore, Md,
INDEX.
ieee PAGES
STATEMENT OF THE CASE........................ 1-4
I ready ns Diasec te bic hee 5-45
Enumeration of points discussed.............. 5-6
I. This Court is vested with jurisdiction to
entertain the petition for mandamus in this
case. Mandamus lies from this Court to
compel a Federal District Court to remand
a criminal prosecution to the State Court,
where it is apparent from the record that
the Federal Court has no jurisdiction what-
OO ED 5 i db oe sckackdaasse cn... 6-12
If. Removal acts are strictly construed. They
are not enlarged by construction.......... 12-14
III. The jurisdiction of the Federal Court under
removal acts rests and depends upon the
statements made in the petition for removal
and verified by the oath of the petitioner. . 14
IV. The scope of Section 33 of the Judicial
UR ana teventacuie sep Rc ere 14-45
A. The persons to whom it is applicable:
It is not applicable to Federal Prohi-
tion Agents, because Federal Prohi-
tion Agents, acting under the National
Prohibition Act, are not Revenue Offi-
cers, and theNational Prohibition Act
is not a Revenue Law.............. 14-21
3
B. The actions and prosecutions embraced
within it:
ConcLusION
Appenpix—Text of Section 33 of the Judicial Code 49-51
The removal act applies only where
the act which is the Seals of the action
or prosecution has some rational con-
nection with official duties under a
‘Revenue Law,’’ and in some way
affects the revenue of the government.
In this case the amended petition,
which sets forth in detail the facts
upon which the petitioners rely, does
not meet the jurisdictional require-
ments for the removal of the prosecu-
7 epee peor re er Ser t yr Tee
“wi ae ee eS ee Oe Oe ee ee ee ee
en ee ape ae Per)
ssn repamrecnanepcarsrees ene eitI
aa
iii
; TABLE OF CASES.
PAGES
Alabama, State of, vs. Peak, 252 Fed. 306 (D. C. 8. D., Ala.)...... 39-42
Blake vs. McKim, 103 U. 8. 336, 26 L. ed. 563.................... 12
Bogan vs. Commonwealth of Mass., 285 Fed. 668................. 16, 44
Boston & L. R. Co. vs. Salem & L. R. Co., 21 Fed. Cases p. 228,
Fed. Cas. No. 12249
[Jawa rahPrrseadans emedenm sass ceeuakudecns 14, 34
Castle vs. Lewis, 254 Fed. 917 (C. C. A., 8th Cir.)............... 27
Commonwealth of Mass. vs. Bogan, 285 Fed. 668................ 16, 44
Commonwealth of Pa. vs. U. S., 293 Fed. 931................... . 16-17
Cunningham vs. Neagle, 135 U. 8. 1, 34 L. ed. 55, 10 8. Ct. Rep. 658 27
Davis vs. South Carolina, 107 U. S. 597, 27 L. ed. 574, 2 Sup. Ct.
Me MN 66.6 05s a pacar nsec tecdasewsseareuewceedeauess sen suc 31
Davis vs. Tennessee, 100 U. S. 257, 25 L. ed. 648............... 13, 28-31
DeHart vs. Virginia (C. C., 1902), 119 Fed. 626..... icais.atee aca 14, 34-36
Drury vs. Lewis, 200 U. 8. 1, 50 L. ed. 343, 26 S. Ct. Rep. 229.... 27
Ex parte Gruetter, 217 U. 8. 586, 54 L. ed. 892, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 690 7
Ex parte Hoard, 105 U. S. 578, 26 L. ed. 1176..................2.. 6
Ex parte Nebraska, 209 U. 8. 436, 52 L. ed. 876, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 581 6
Ex parte Park Square Automobile Station, 244 U. 8. 412, 61 L. ed.
BN et SU A REN, SR oo os as od wi Sajain sin eases abla ec badengane
7
Ex parte Riddle, 255 U. 8. 450, 65 L. ed. 725, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 370. . 7
Ex parte Roe, 234 U. 8. 70, 58 L. ed. 1217, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 722.. 7
Ex parte Wisner, 203 U. 8S. 449, 51 L. ed. 264, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 150... 4 7
Felts vs. Virginia, 133 Fed. 85 (C. C., W. D. Va.)................. 36-38
Fletcher vs. Illinois, 22 Fed. 776 (C. C., N. D. UL).......... 32-33, 40, 41
Gibney vs. Wolkin, 3 Fed. Rep. 2nd Series 960................... 17
Gillian vs. Smith, 282 Fed. 628.................... 16, 17, 18-21, 43-44
Goodwin vs. People’s United States Bank (C. C. E. D., Mo.), 162
ies Rd EE Ey OE OE EE OE Te A Sr eee 13, 38-39
Gruetter, ex parte, 217 U. S. 586, 54 L. ed. 892, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 690 7
Harding, re: 219 U. 8. 363, 55 L. ed. 252, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 324, 37
is es ey A crc a swnigaic saw k sand chaledwsns <esacosuee ts 7
Higgins vs. Morse, 273 Fed. 830.................. See aaneubencae 16
Higgins va. Moree, 873 Fed. S32. . oo... cccccccsccccccccecccscese 16
Hoard, ex parte, 105 U. 8. 578, 26 L. ed. 1176..................... 6
Illinois vs. Fletcher, 22 Fed. 776 (C. C., N. D. IIL).......... 32-33, 40, 41
In re: Marsh, 51 Fed. 277
PE eI sn pas or ett bon tsa oe ET .
iv
Kentucky vs. Powers, 201 U. 8. 1, 50 L. ed. 633, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep.
387, 5 A. & E. Annotated Cases 692.......... eee eS ere 8,11
Lederer vs. Lipke, 259 U. S. 557, 66 L. ed. 1061............... 15, 16, 17
Lewis vs. Castle, 254 Fed. 917 (6. ©, Bi, GER Cite) os on case ees she 27
Lewis vs. Drury, 200 U. S. 1, 50 L. ed. 343, 26 S. Ct. Rep. 229..,... 27
Lipke vs Lederer, 259 U. 8. 557, 66 L. ed. 1061......... canoe 15, 16, 17
pie Be Paes 1 Oa a a 27
Massachusetts, Commonwealth of, vs. Bogan, 285 Fed. 668........ 16, 44
McKim vs. Blake, 103 3 DO, AO 8s OF SOS is icici deceives 12
MecLish vs. Roff, 141 U. S. 661, 35 L. ed. 893.............0..0000- 12
Moore, re: 209 U. S. 490, 52 L. ed. 904, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 585, 14
Bi Ge TE, DOUGIOR TOE DIG a oso sions ie acces scesecdsacecse 7
Morse va: Tiggine, B70 Fad, GIO. ooo cain s 60 ocas css ecceees ns wae 16
Morse vs. Higgins, 273 Fed. 832............. PPEre ror errr re tree a0 16
Neagle vs. Cunningham, 135 U. S. 1, 34 L. ed. 55, 10 S. Ct. Rep. 658 27
Nebraska, ex parte, 209 U. 8. 436, 52 L. ed. 876, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 581 6
Come We. WOR, Bee POG: OIG. oie ieee ivkaccenecdes ee 15, 42-43
Pales vs. Paolo, (C. C. A. Ist Circuit), Adv. Sheets, Fed. Rep. July
A MN cg Nat ohn a ay pn asd aKa yee Pan eEREE yo ae
Paolo vs. Pales, (C. C. A. lst Circuit), Adv. Sheets, Fed. Rep. July
Be NR Ua soi Ss ahaa s hod dew ed baie ae Kanne dress 27
Park Square Automobile Station, ex parte, 244 U. 8. 412, 61 L. ed.
1231, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 732......... Ee PP eS ee ree erer ti
Paul vs. Virginia, 148 U. 8. 107, 37 L. ed. 386, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep.
ON ed wie dann cass chia ceius csGatacasunmecda desea sae@ass 8,10, 11
Peak vs. State of Alabama, 252 Fed. 306 (D. C., S. D., Ala.)...... 39-42
Pennsylvania, Commonwealth of, vs. U. S., 293 Fed. 931........... 16-17
People’s United States Bank vs. Goodwin (C. C., E. D. Mo.), 162
OA, US ois cisco aie Sina alaha pla es bx ee aielavese adie claims s asia aOR bid 13, 38-39
Pollitz, re: 206 U. S. 323, 51 L. ed. 1081, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 729...... 6
Powers vs. Kentucky, 201 U.S. 1, 50 L. ed. 633, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep.
SBT, SB. Be Ba CO ais as aks kaieese case snasaaicccns 8,11
Re: Harding, 219 U. 8. 363, 55 L. ed. 252, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 324, 37
Me i a es here os KS 4s coal ce has cu cuwnicke oesslea cain 7
Re: Moore, 209 U. S. 490, 52 L. ed. 904, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 585, 14
re Ne a ee eee err errr eee ee 7
Re: Pollitz, 206 U. S. 323, 51 L. ed. 1081, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 729..... 6
Re: Winn, 213 U. S. 458, 53 L. ed. 873, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 515...... 7
Riddle, ex parte, 255 U. 8. 450, 65 L. ed. 725, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 370.. 7
Rives vs. Virginia, 100 U. 8. 313, 25 L. ed. 667, 3 Am. Crim. Rep.
Wg a eae cisco cad esti ok esis 6 3 cue ne nce edie Woe usp ai tek wale 8-10, 11
Roe, ex peste, 234 U. 8. 70, 58 L. ed. 1217, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 722. 7
Roff vs. McLish, 141 UV. 8. 661, 35 L. ed. 893...................... 12
Salem & L. R. Co. vs. Boston & L. R. Co., 21 Fed. Cas. p. 228, Fed.
eee ie MON oo tae ok nsroac/poies sxe ele cm Wedieehe tise sek eee cours 14, 34
en
_—
Vv
Sanges vs. U. 8., 144 U. 8. 310, 36 L. ed. 445..................... 11,12
Sewing Mach. Co.’s Case, 18 Wall. 553, 21 L. ed. 914........ Sada 12
South Carolina vs. Davis, 107 U. 8. 597, 27 L. ed. 574, 2 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 636........ MOAASRORAES RRS He ch SES Ce whennne kee baaeen 31
Smith ve. Gillian, 282 Fed. 628...................... 16, 17, 18-21, 43-44
State of Alabama vs. Peak, 252 Fed. 306 (D. C., 8. D. Ala.)........ 39-42
Tennessee vs. Davis, 100 U. 8. 257, 25 L. ed. 648............... 13, 28-31
U. 8. vs. Commonwealth of Pa., 203 Fed. 981.................... 16-17
U. 8. vs. Sanges, 144 U. 8. 310, 36 L. ed. 445..................... 11,12
U. 8. vs. Weeden, 24 Fed. Cas. 738, Fed. Cas. No. 14412........... 27
Virginia vs. DeHart (C. C., 1902), 119 Fed. 626...... prea 14, 34-36
Virginia vs. Felts, 133 Fed. 85 (C. C., W. Py UR Ansabatdnedatia 36-38
Virginia vs. Paul, 148 U. 8. 107, 37 L. ed. 386, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep.
MENSA S © DRARENGE Shes ndieenadnadileadunnhesauneccaericece 8, 10-11, 14
Virginia vs. Rives, 100 U. 8. 313, 25 L. ed. 667, 3 Am. Crim. Rep.
WORN <5 SiAR Mia ndnunhdnseeeinmbbebendbakadien ik cecs cs 8-10, 11
Weeden vs. U. 8., 24 Fed. Cas. 738, Fed. Cas. No. 14412.......... 27
Wells Fargo & Co. vs. Johnson (C. C., 1899), 98 Fed. 3............ 14
Winn, re: 213 U. 8. 458, 53 L. ed. 873, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 515........ ?
Wisner, ex parte, 203 U. 8. 449, 51 L. ed. 264, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 150.. ?
Wolkin vs Gibney, 3 Fed. Rep. 2nd Series 960........... ere 17
Wood vs. Oregon, 268 Fed. 975...........0cccccecsccceccceee, 15, 42-43
STATUTES CITED.
Judicial Code:
gta OE EL OA Saale See aa SaaS Wee haemo kd 13-45, 49-51
PE ME sata daca nnehavdnddecendstncakhcescceuus eet ye 9
National Prohibition Act:
Geetion 88, Title TZ... ....ccccscccccces re eee eee 16-31
Revised Statutes:
RCM Gh hwh 6k o0sbacnabenkacadinda kuuns cuwiin coetes
UE, Snakavannacaus eer re ere
cy SESE ea Ta Nn soe een oe AS axeknes
MOSEOR FTE 6 vsiccc iccicscacs senanene eee Tere ee
U. 8. Compiled Statutes, 1916, Annotated:
Section 1011, Vol. 1, pp. 972-973.................
Section 1015, Vol. 1, pp. 1015-1026................0.0055
Section 1211, Vol. 2, pp. 1567, 1570-1579.............c.ccccccee
Section 1211, 1919 Supp., Vol. 1, pp. 214-215
I My WI MW I vk nv dc ccccadacuvcenaccceccecces
I: BN Ws Oh NI ion win id snc vncaccncedacncucces
——
os
State oF Mary.anp )
vs.
Morris A. Sorzr, JupcE or
THE District Court or In THE
THE Unitep States ror SUPREME COURT
THE District or Mary- OF THE
LAND, AND THE District UNITED STATES.
Court or tHE Uwnirep
SvTates ror THE District
or MaryLanp.
CASE “A”.
BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR MAN.
DAMUS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE
OF MARYLAND.
Statement of the Case.
On the 10th of February, 1925, Robert D. Ford, John
M. Barton, E. Franklin Ely, Wilton L. Stevens and Wil-
liam Trabing, were indicted in the Circuit Court for
Harford County, State of Maryland, for the murder on
or about the 19th day of November, 1924, of one Law-
rence Wenger, a citizen of the State of Maryland.
On the 11th day of February, 1925, the defendants in
said indictment, through the United States Attorney for
the District of Maryland, filed a petition in the District
Court of the United States for the District of Maryland
(Morris A. Soper, Judge), for the removal of said case
from the Cireuit Court for Harford County to the said
District Court, under the provisions of Section 33 of the
2
Judicial Code, and for a writ of habeas corpus cum causa
for that purpose.
The petition alleged that the petitioners were, with
the exception of Trabing, Federal Prohibition Agents
of the Bureau of Internal Revenue of the Treasury De-
partment of the United States, and at the time of the
murder, were acting under and by authority of the Fed-
eral Prohibition Director of the State of Maryland, and
that Trabing was acting as chauffeur for said Federal
Prohibition agents, under and by authority of said Fed-
eral Prohibition Director of the State of Maryland, and
of the said Federal Prohibition Agents.
For convenience, however, no distinction will be here-
after made between Trabing and the others. All will be
designated and referred to as ‘‘Federal Prohibition
Agents.’’
The petition further alleged that at the time of the
murder the petitioners were in the discharge of their
official duties as Prohibition Agents in making and at-
tempting to make an investigation in the discharge of
their duty and in protecting themselves in the discharge
of their duty, but it denied they were guilty of the murder.
Upon this petition the Court passed an order removing
the case and directing the writ of habeas corpus cum
causa to issue as prayed.
The writ was served and the petitioners were admitted
to bail by the District Court of the United States for the
District of Maryland.
After the record of the proceedings of the Circuit
Court for Harford County was filed in said District
Court pursuant to said order of removal, the State of
Maryland appeared specially in said District Court and
filed a motion to quash the writ and rescind the order of
removal.
Upon a hearing of said motion, the Court ruled that
the petition for removal was defective, but granted leave
to the petitioners to amend the same.
Thereafter, the petitioners filed an amended petition
for removal. The amended petition differed from the
original in the following particulars:
(1) It alleged that the petitioners were acting under
the authority of, and enforcing not only the National
Prohibition Act and acts supplemental thereto, but all
internal revenue laws relating to the manufacture, sale,
transportation, control and taxation of intoxicating
liquors, with authority to execute and perform all the
duties delegated to such officers by law.
(2) It further alleged, in general terms, that at the
time of the murder the petitioners were engaged in their
official duties as prouibition officers in making and at-
tempting to make an investigation concerning a viola-
tion, not only of the National Prohibition Act, but of
other internal revenue laws.
(3) It set out in great detail the acts and movements
of the petitioners on the day of the murder. It set forth
that after the petitioners had completed an investigation
in Harford County, Maryland, of a violation of the
National Prohibition Law, they started to return to their
automobile for the purpose of returning to Baltimore to
report to the office of the Federal Prohibition Director
concerning the results of their investigation when they
discovered a man whom they afterwards learned to be
one Lawrence Wenger, mortally wounded and lying be-
4
side the path along which they were walking. They car-
ried the wounded man to their automobile and took him
to Jarrettsville, Maryland, and thence to Belair, Mary-
land, for the purpose of obtaining medical attention for
him, and finally placed the said Wenger in charge of a
doctor in Belair, who pronounced him dead. They then
removed the body to an undertaker’s establishment in
Belair. The said petition did not allege that Wenger
was involved in the violation of the National Prohibition
Law which the petitioners were investigating, or that
they were responsible, either lawfully or unlawfully, for
the death of said Wenger, or that any act performed by
them under color of their office resulted in the death of
Wenger, or that they had knowledge of the manner in
which Wenger came to his death, or that Wenger’s death
resulted from any act performed by them in their self-
protection as Federal Prohibition officers in the discharge
of their duties.
(4) The removal was sought under Section 28, Title
II of the National Prohibition Act, as well as under
Section 33 of the Judicial Code.
Upon the filing of the amended petition, the State of
Maryland again appeared specially and again moved to
‘‘quash and remand.’’ On May Sth, 1925, by order of
the District Court, this motion to ‘‘quash and remand’’
was overruled, and the original order removing the case
was ratified and confirmed.
In this proceeding, the State of Maryland asks this
Court to entertain a petition for mandamus directed to
Morris A. Soper, Judge of the District Court of the
United States for the District of Maryland, and said
District Court to compel the said Judge and said Court
to remand the said prosecution to the Circuit Court for
Harford County, Maryland.
LN ak i BES Re ES ORT ad a a a EE ee POP RITES OE at 5
5
ARGUMENT.
Points To Be Discussed.
1.
This Court is vested with jurisdiction to entertain the
petition for mandamus in this case. Mandamus lies
from this Court to compel a Federal District Court to
remand a criminal prosecution to the State Court where
it is apparent from the record that the Federal Court
has no jurisdiction whatever of the case.
Il.
Removal acts are strictly construed. They are not
enlarged by construction.
ITI.
The jurisdiction of the Federal Court under removal
acts rests and depends upon the statements made in the
petition for removal and verified by the oath of the
petitioner.
IV.
The scope of Section 33 of the Judicial Code.
A. The persons to whom it is applicable.
1. It does not apply to Federal Prohibition Agents.
2. Section 28 of Title II of the National Prohibition
Act does not enlarge its Scope, so as to confer the right
of removal upon Federal Prohibition Agents.
B. The actions and prosecutions embraced within it.
1. It applies only where the act which is the basis of
the action or prosecution has some rational connection
a a -
6
with official duties under a ‘‘Revenue Law’’ and in some
way affects the revenue of the Government.
L
This Court is vested with jurisdiction to entertain the
petition for mandamus in this case. Mandamus lies
from this Court to compel a Federal District Court to
remand a criminal prosecution to the State Court where
it is apparent from the record that the Federal Court
has no jurisdiction whatever of the case.
It has been decided in a number of cases that the extra-
ordinary remedy of mandamus cannot be resorted to in
a civil proceeding to compel an inferior Federal Court
to remand a case pending therein to the State Courts,
after denial by the inferior Federal tribunal of a motion
so to remand. The basis for this rule, as stated in Re
Pollite, 206 U. S. 323, 51 L. ed. 1081, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep.
729 (page 331), is that ‘‘mandamus cannot be issued to
compel the Court below to decide a matter before it ina
particular way, or to review its judicial action had in the
exercise of legitimate jurisdiction, nor can the writ be
used to perform the office of an appeal or writ of error.”’
Ordinarily, mandamus is not to be used when another
statutory method has been provided for reviewing the
action below, or to reverse a decision of record.
It has been broadly asserted that the inferior Federal
tribunals have the power to decide whether or not they
have jurisdiction to try a civil cause properly brought
before them, and that such decisions are not open to
collateral attack.
Ex parte Hoard, 105 U. S. 578, 26 L. ed. 1176;
Re Pollitz, supra;
Ex parte Nebraska, 209 U. S. 436, 52 L. ed.
876, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 581;
~
(
ny Ex parte Gruetter, 217 U. S. 586, 54 L. ed.
892, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 690;
Re Harding, 219 U. S. 363, 55 L. ed. 252, 31
Sup. Ct. Rep. 324, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 392;
Ex parte Roe, 234 U.S. 70, 58 L. ed. 1217, 34
Sup. Ct. Rep. 722;
Ex parte Park Square Automobile Station,
244 U. S. 412, 61 L. ed. 1231, 37 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 732;
Ex parte Riddle, 255 U. S. 450, 65 L. ed. 725,
41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 370.
Until the decision in Re H arding, supra, there was an
apparent conflict between certain decided cases dealing
with the right to review by mandamus orders of inferior
Federal tribunals refusing to remand, and a long and
settled line of other cases relating to the same subject,
but in the Harding opinion, all of the cases upon the
subject are set out at length and discussed, and the Court
announced the general rule, above stated, to be applied
in civil cases. In doing so, it disapproved and qualified
the following cases:
Ex parte Wisner, 203 U. S. 449, 51 L. ed.
264, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 150;
Re Moore, 209 U. S. 490, 52 L. ed. 904, 28
Sup. Ct. Rep. 585, 706, 14 A. & E. Anno-
tated Cases 1164; 3
Re Winn, 213 U. S. 458, 53 L. ed. 873, 29 Sup. q
Ct. Rep. 515, :
to the extent that said cases were in conflict with the
general doctrine announced in Ex parte Hoard, supra,
and the cases which have followed it:
In the Harding case an exception to the general rule
above stated, which had been recognized in several earlier
Piemre.- ete ; RNR ERG IER PROSE TOO a ONY a
cases was referred to with approval and affirmed. This
exception related to the power of this Court to utilize
the writ of mandamus to remand a criminal prosecution
‘‘which, if wrong was committed, no power otherwise to
redress than by mandamus existed’’ (page 378).
This exception has been recognized in the following
cases :
Virgima vs. Rives, 100 U. S. 313, 25 L. ed.
667, 3 Am. Crim. Rep. 524;
Virginia vs. Paul, 148 U.S. 107, 37 L. ed. 386,
13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 636;
Kentucky vs. Powers, 201 U. S. 1, 50 L. ed.
633, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 387, 5 A. & E. An-
notated Cases 692.
The State of Maryland, in asking this Court to enter-
tain this petition for mandamus, contends that the case
at bar falls within the exception announced in the cases
last cited. A careful examination of said cases dis-
closes their marked similarity with the instant case.
In Virginia vs. Rives, supra, a prosecution of persons
accused of murder was removed from a State Court toa
Cireuit Court of the United States. The latter Court,
moreover, under a writ of habeas corpus cum causa, took
the prisoners from the custody of the State authorities.
The Commonwealth of Virginia made application to the
Supreme Court of the United States for a rule to show
cause why the prisoners should not be returned to the
State Court for trial. On hearing, the Court took juris-
diction over the cause, issued the writ of mandamus and
directed the return of the accused.
The grounds for the assumption of jurisdiction by the
Cireuit Court, as they appear from the opinion of the
9
Court and the concurring opinion, may be summarized
as follows:
(1) The jurisdiction is conferred by Section 688 of the
Revised Statutes (Second Edition, 1878), pages 127-128;
Act, 24 Sept., 1789, e. 20, s. 13, v. 1, p. 80; Judicial Code,
Section 234; Act March 3, 1911, ¢. 231, s. 234; 36 St.
1156), which reads, in part, as follows:
‘‘The Supreme Court shall have power to issue
* * * writs of mandamus, in cases warranted by
the principals and usages of law, to any Courts
appointed under the authority of the United States,
or to persons holding office under the authority of
the United States, where a State * * * isa party.’’
See also:
United States Compiled Statutes, 1916, Anno-
tated, Vol. 2, Sec. 1211, pp. 1567; 1570-
1579;
Ibid, 1919 Supplement, Vol. 1, pp. 214-215.
(2) It is the function of the writ of mandamus to con-
trol judicial discretion when that discretion has been
abused.
‘*It is a remedy where the case is outside of the
exercise of this discretion, and outside the jurisdic-
tion of the Court or officer to which or to whom the
writ is addressed’’ (100 U. S. 323).
(3) The asserted power of the inferior Federal tri-
bunal implied a confusion and disregard of constitu-
tional limitations.
(4) No power would otherwise have existed to correct
the wrongful assumption of jurisdiction by the Circiut
Court.
‘‘The jurisdiction invoked is, in its nature appel-
late; and there is no other mode provided for its
BACCARAT DOI LE LAI SETS EG LA NE EY
10
exercise in the case at bar than by the writ prayed.
‘‘ And so in the case at bar, without the use of this
writ, the greatest possible injury would be inflicted
upon the Commonwealth of Virginia, without any
redress, if the Circuit Court, as contended, trans-
cended its jurisdiction. In no case, therefore, could
the writ be more properly issued in the interest of
justice, order and good government. Nor was there
any necessity for a previous demand upon that Court
in the way of a motion to remand the prisoners.”’
lala opinion, Mr. Justice Ficld, 25 L. ed.
73).
In Virginia vs. Paul, supra, a person in the custody of
the State authorities, charged with murder, was released
under a writ of habeas corpus, issued by a District
Judge. Subsequently the Cireuit Court of the United
States took, by way of removal, jurisdiction over the
prosecution. The Commonwealth of Virginia applied
to this Court for a mandamus to remand the prosecution
and restore the accused to the custody of the State au-
thorities. The Court reaffirming the doctrine of Vir-
ginia vs. Rives, pointed out that to wrongfully devest the
State of its right to prosecute in its own Court for crimes
committed against its authority was a gross abuse of
discretion, which, if not corrected by mandamus could
not be done in any other form. A mandamus to remand
was issued.
In passing upon the jurisdictional question, Mr. J ustice
Gray, who delivered the opinion of the Court said (pp.
122-123) :
‘The result is that the Circuit Court of the United
States has, without authority of law, assumed juris-
diction of an indictment found in the Courts of the
State of Virginia for a crime against the laws of the
State, and that the State is entitled to have the
Hi D ei ee ty AS at a ef ah ISS TRAD TIN, NY SEEN IE IS METS E se USOC ,
a a os STE Heo PETE
11
prosecution remanded to its Courts, to be there dealt
with according to law. For aught that appears on
this record, the State is not bound to commence or
to carry on the prosecution in the Courts of another
Ss but is entitled to resume its own right-
ul jurisdiction and authority and to try the offender
in its own Courts. If the case should be allowed to
proceed in the Circuit Court of the United States,
and should finally result in an acquittal of the
charge, in whole or in part, the State could not have
a writ of error to review the judgment. United
States vs. Sanges, 144 U. S. 310. A stronger case
for issuing a writ of mandamus can hardly be imag-
ined. The writ may be directed to the J udge who
has lawfully assumed jurisdiction of the prosecu-
tion; and no prevoius motion to him to remand the
case was necessary. The case is governed in every
eng by Virginia vs. Rives, 100 U. 8. 313, 316,
323, 324.”’
In Kentucky vs. Powers, supra, upon the petition of
the Commonwealth of Kentucky for a writ of mandamus
to compel the Circuit Court of the United States for the
Eastern District of Kentucky to remand a criminal
prosecution which had been removed to that Court from
the Circuit Court of Scott County in that State and to
restore the custody of the accused to the State authori-
ties, the rule for mandamus was made absolute. The
doctrine of Virginia vs. Rives as to the jurisdiction of
the Court was applied, without comment in the opinion.
It will be observed that the case at bar clearly falls
within the exception to the rule. It bears the closest
resemblance to Virginia vs. Paul, where, as here, the in-
ferior Federal Court had ordered a removal under the
alleged authority of Section 33 of the Judicial Code.
It may be contended that the petitioner’s remedy is
by appeal from the order of the District Court of the
United States refusing to remand the case to the State
ae RRA PIA ORO OED
12
Court. But it is well established that such a review can
be had only after final judgment.
McLish vs. Roff, 141 U. S. 661, 35 L. ed. 893.
But if the final judgment is one of acquittal of the
charge, in whole or in part, the State could not have a
writ of error to review the judgment (U. S. vs. Sanges,
144 U.S. 310, 36 L. ed. 445).
It thus appears that unless this Court entertains the
petition for mandamus in this case, the State of Mary-
land is without any redress, if the District Court, as con-
tended, has transcended its jurisdiction in removing this
case from the State Court, and in denying the State’s
motion to remand the same.
II.
Removal acts are strictly construed. They are not
enlarged by construction.
In dealing with statutes intended to affect or claimed
---te-affect the continuation of jurisdiction in courts of orig-
inal and general authority the law has always recognized
a principle of construction which served to favor the
retention of jurisdiction. This Court has held that even
under the Judiciary Act of 1875, which was designed to
increase the Federal jurisdiction by removal, the Court
was ‘‘not disposed to enlarge that jurisdiction by mere
construction.’’
Blake vs. McKim, 103 U. S. 336, 26 L. ed. 563;
Sewing Mach. Co.’s Case, 18 Wall. 553, 21 L.
ed. 914.
Although the successive removal acts of Congress have
a common object, namely, the transfer of actions from
State to Federal Courts, they provide for different and
13
distinct grounds on which the right of removal is to
depend and no case is subject to removal, which is not by
its facts brought completely within some defined class.
It is always helpful to a Court in interpreting a statute
to consider the evil which the statute was designed to
prevent or remedy.
Section 33 of the Judicial Code, as amended by the Act
of August 23rd, 1916, c. 399 (R. S. Sec. 643, Act March
3rd, 1875, c. 130, Sec. 8, 18 Stat. 401. Act February 8,
1894, c. 25, Sec. 1, 28 Stat. 36. Act March 3, 1911, «.
231, Sec. 33, 36 Stat.1097. Act August 23rd, 1916, c. 399,
39 Stat. Compiled St. (1916), Sec. 1015, V. 1, pp. 1019-
1020)*, involved in this case, was passed in consequence
of an attempt, by one of the States to make penal the
collection by United States officers within the State of
duties under the tariff laws.
Tennessee vs. Davis, 100 U. S. 257, 25 L. ed.
648.
People’s United States Bank vs. Goodwin (C
C., 1908), 162 Fed. 937.
Its purpose is to protect the Federal Officers of th:
Government in the discharge of their official duties, and
those who are employed to act under them in the per-
formance of such duties; but, further than providing
this necessary protection to the administration of its
revenues, the Federal Government is not interested. The
statute must be interpreted with reference to its mani-
fest spirit and general purpose, and a word or phrase
should not be extended beyond its proper relation to give
“See Appendix.
—— a
14
jurisdiction where the jurisdiction does not appear to
have been intended.
Johnson vs. Wells Fargo & Co., (C. C., 1899),
- 98 Fed. 3, 8.
Virginia vs. DeHart (C. C., 1902), 119 Fed.
626, 629.
III.
The jurisdiction of the Federal Court under removal
acts rests and depends upon the statements made in the
petition for removal and verified by the oath of the
petitioner.
This rule was applied by this Court to Section 33 of
the Judicial Code, in the case of Virginia vs. Paul, supra,
and in this respect it is the same as that which obtains
in proceedings for removal under the general removal
acts.
See authorities collected, U. S. Compiled
Statutes, 1916, Annotated, Vol. 1, pages
972-973 ;
Salem & L. R. Co. vs. Boston & L. R. Co., 21
Fed. Cases p. 228, Fed. Cas. No. 12249.
IV.
The scope of Section 33 of the Judicial Code.
A. The persons to whom it is applicable.
(1) ‘‘Any officer appointed under or acting by author-
ity of any revenue law of the United States now or here-
after enacted.’’
(2) ‘‘Any person acting under or by authority of any
such officer.’’
15
(3) ‘‘ Any officer of the courts of the United States.’’
(4) ‘‘Any person * * * * while an officer of either
House of Congress.’
It is asserted that the officers and agents who claim the
right of removal in this case come within classifications
(1) and (2), supra.
But it is respectfully submitted that FEDERAL
PROHIBITION AGENTS ACTING UNDER THE
NATIONAL PROHIBITION LAW ARE NOT REV-
ENUE OFFICERS AND THE NATIONAL PROHIBI.
TION LAW IS NOT A REVENUE LAW.
The National Prohibition Act is not a revenue law.
Lipke vs. Lederer, 259 U. §S. 557, 66 L. ed.
1061.
Whether officers enforcing the National Prohibition
Law are entitled to remove prosecutions against them in
State Courts, under Section 33 of the Judicial Code, has
never been passed upon by this Court.
However, the question has been determined in six
jurisdictions by the inferior Federal tribunals. The
decisions are not in accord.
The first case in which the question arose was Oregon
vs. Wood, 268 Fed. 975, in the District Court of Oregon.
That case, decided before Lipke vs. Lederer, supra, held
that the National Prohibition Law was a revenue law,
Federal Prohibition Agents were revenue officers anid
prosecutions against them in the State Courts were
removable.
16
Morse vs. Higgins, 273 Fed. 830, decided by the Dis-
trict Court of New Hampshire, is next in point of time.
It first denied the right of removal upon the ground that
the National Prohibition Act was not a revenue law.
However, upon a reconsideration of the case (273 Fed.
832), it was held that Section 28, Title Il, of the Na-
tional Prohibition Law seemed to contemplate Federal
protection of officers acting under its authority, and the
removal was granted.
Then follows Smith vs. Gillian, 282 Fed. 628, decided
by the District Court of the Western District of Ken-
tucky, which denied the removal upon the following
grounds:
(1) Prohibition officers are not revenue agents.
(2) The prohibition law is not a revenue law.
(3) Section 28, Title 11, of the National Prohibition
Law does not authorize the removal.
This is a well-reasoned opinion.
Commonwealth vs. Bogan, 285 Fed. 668, decided by
the District Court of Massachusetts, followed this Court
in Lipke vs. Lederer in holding that the National Prohi-
bition Law was not a revenue law, but refused to adopt
the reasoning of Smith vs. Gillian as to the applicability
of Section 28, Title 11, of the National Prohibition Law.
The Court held that the right of removal was a ‘‘ proteec-
tion’’ to prohibition agents in the enforcement of the
act, within the meaning of the latter section, and ordered
the removal.
The District Court of Pennsylvania in U. S. vs. Com-
monwealth of Pennsylvania, 293 Fed. 931, followed the
CREE ET ET LET IS NE Ie eR RE Moma R
17
District Courts of Uregon, New Hampshire and Massa-
chusetts, but in doing so, Judge Dickinson frankly stated
that he was following ‘‘the main current of decisions
without an expression of what might otherwise have
been our individual opinion,”’ with the idea that the rule
in these cases should be made uniform throughout the
United States.
The last adjudication upon the question was by Judge
Bondy in the United States District Court for the South-
ern District of New York in the case of Wolkin vs. Gib-
ney, 3 Fed. Rep., 2nd Series, 960. J udge Bondy fol-
lowed Smith vs. Gillian and denied the right of removal.
It thus appears that all of the Courts which have had
occasion to pass upon the question since Lipke vs. Led-
erer have accepted the view that the National Prohibi.
tion Law is not a revenue measure, and that revenue
officcrs are, therefore, not within the provisions of Sec.
tion 33 of the Judicial Code.
There is, however, a diversity of opinion as to the
effect to be given to Section 28, Title II, of the National
Prohibition Law, with reference to the right of Federal
Prohibition Agents to remove prosecutions against them
in the State Courts. But it is respectfully submitted that
SECTION 28, TITLE Il, OF THE NATIONAL PRO.
HIBITION ACT, DOES NOT EN LARGE THE SCOPE
Section 28, Title 11, of the National Prohibition Act
reads as follows:
18
all the power and protection in the enforcement of
this act or any provisions thereof which is conferred
by law for the enforcement of existing laws relating
to the manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquors
under the law of the United States.’’
It was urged in Smith vs. Gillian that the word ‘‘pro-
tection’’ in the above section, must be so construed as
to include the right of removal. But after a careful
analysis of the body of the then existing internal revenue
laws, and a thorough research of the ‘‘history of the
times when efforts were being made to prepare and
enact such laws as might be deemed proper to enforce
the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution,’’ the
learned Judge found that nothing was included in the
National Prohibition Law which in any way indicated an
intention to provide for the removal of actions, nor for
any amendment of Section 33 of the Judicial Code.
The Court said (pp. 638-639) :
‘‘With these statutes before us, we have sought to
ascertain what ‘power and protection’ in the enforce-
ment of that act had been given by Section 28, which,
in express terms, had provided that it should be the
same as that ‘conferred by law for the enforcement
of existing laws relating to the manufacture or sale
of intoxicating liquors under the law of the United
States,’ inasmuch as that seemed clearly to be its full
scope, and, limiting our efforts to those ‘then exist-
ing laws,’ our analysis of them seems clearly to show
what ‘power and protection’ were in the mind of
Congress when it enacted the statute to enforce the
Kighteenth Amendment.
‘‘In short, internal revenue officers under those
laws were authorized and empowered—
(1) To enter at all times upon the premises of a
distiller, and, if demand for admission was refused,
to break into such premises or a distillery thereon
19
(Section 3177, R. S.), and if they were hindered or
obstructed in this fines were imposed.
(2) To collect taxes by distraint, and, if needful,
» =~ repeated seizures of property (Section 3187,
. 8.).
(3) To break into any distillery by force if refused
admission thereto (Section 3276, R.S.).
(4) To break up and into the ground on the prem-
ises where any distillery was located (Section 3277,
R.S.).
(5) To make seizures of property under Sections
3166, 3200, 3453 and 3460, R. S. (Sections 5886, 5922,
6355 and 6362, Comp. Stats.) ; and
(6) District Judges were authorized to issue
search warrants.
‘*We have in this painstaking way gone into these
features of ‘then existing laws’ because of the novelt
as well as the importance of the questions involved,
and find that, while the N ational Prohibition Act has
throughout made elaborate provision for the drastic
enforcement of its own requirements, including the
usual powers given prohibition officers and agents
in respect to seizures and destruction of property
and otherwise, these provisions are not important
here, as they are new, and no one of them con ers the
right to remove a case from a state to a federal
court.
‘*It seems, therefore, to be clear that the legal
authority and ‘power,’ and therefrom resulting ‘pro-
tection,’ thus given by pre-existing law were what
Congress had in mind when it enacted Section 28, If
anything else, including any removal of cases, had
been intended, a clause to that effect would have been
inserted, for, obviously, the ‘protection’ resulting
from the provisions of the Revised Statutes is clearly
and certainly available in all courts, state and federal
alike, without any removal from one to another, in-
asmuch as such statutes are the supreme law of the
land upon the subject.’’
20
The Court further said (pp. 640-641) :
“It would, we think, be fair to say that a con-
clusion that there was such intention would be
forced and inadmissible, if not extravagant. To do
as urged on behalf of the defendants would indeed
be legislation, and not an interpretation of legisla-
—_ already in force, and not amendable by the
urts.
‘While the removal of a case should always be
made if authorized by law, a removal which is not
so authorized should always be refused and the
previously acquired jurisdiction of the State Court
respected.
“The laws of the United States are supreme.
They reach and ‘protect’ citizens in the State Courts
as fully as they could here whether the plea therein
be self defense (apparently applicable here), or one
based upon conduct made lawful by some statute of
the United States or of Kentucky.
‘‘Here, however, the question presented is not on
the merits of the controversy, but is one of jurisdic-
tion only. That was first acquired by the State
Court, and cannot be taken from it, unless clearly
authorized by some law of the United States. None
has been found, and we have concluded that Con-
gress did not give, nor intend to give the power or
right of removal in cases like this.”’
It may be contended that the applicability of the pro-
visions of Section 33 of the Judicial Code and of Section
28 of Article II of the National Prohibition Law to Fed-
eral Prohibition officers is not involved in this case be-
cause of the allegations in the amended petition for
removal that the petitioners therein were acting under
the authority of and were enforcing all internal revenue
laws relating to the manufacture, sale, transportation,
control and taxation of intoxicating liquors with author-
ity to execute and perform all the duties delegated to
such officers by law, and because of the further allega-
JORUSS fA SE PLATTE RE Te —
21
tion that the acts alleged to have been done by said peti-
tioners were alleged to have been done at a time they
were engaged in the discharge of their official] duties not
only as Federal Prohibition officers, but in. the perform-
ance of their duties ‘‘under other revenue laws.’’
But it is respectfully submitted that when the allega-
tions of the amended petition are read together with the
allegations of the original petition, it is patent that the
express purpose of these additional allegations in the
amended petition was to avoid the contention that the
removal statute did not include Federal Prohibition Offi-
cers within its terms. The facts of the case, as set out in
the amended petition, make it abundantly clear that the
duties which these petitioners were alleged to have been
performing at the time of the happenings which form
the basis of the indictment were being performed in their
capacity as Federal Prohibition Officers and not as gen-
eral revenue officers enforcing ‘‘other revenue statutes.”’
We submit, therefore, that despite the effort on the
part of the said petitioners to avoid this question, the
problem is nevertheless before the Court for its deter-
mination.
Moreover, we submit that the reasoning of the Court
in Smith vs. Gillian is sound and logical and should be
adopted, and this Court should hold that the removal
statutes are not applicable to Federal Prohibition
Officers.
B. The actions and prosecutions embraced within
Section 33 of the Judicial Code.
Section 33 of the Judicial Code, so far as it affects
revenue officers appointed under or acting by authority
22
of revenue laws, provides for the removal at any time
before trial or before hearing thereof, of
‘«* * * any civil suit or criminal prosecution * * *’’
against any such officer,
(1) ‘fon account of any act done under color of his office
or any such law, or on account of any right, title
or authority claimed by such officer or other person
under any such law,’’ or
(2) ‘‘on account of any right, title or authority claimed
by such officer or other person under any such law,’’
or
(3) against any person holding property or estate by
title derived from any such officer, where the suit or
——- affects the validity of any such revenue
aw.
In order to bring the prosecution involved in this case
within the above provisions, it must be found:
(1) That the facts upon which it is based bring it com-
pletely within one of the defined classes; and
(2) Such facts must appear on the face of the indict-
ment or the petition for removal.
In the consideration of these questions, the following
facts are pertinent:
(1) The Federal Prohibition Agents in their petition
for removal deny they brought about the death of
Wenger, or
(2) Had any knowledge of who was responsible there-
for, or how the said Wenger came to his death.
(3) It is nowhere alleged in either the original or
amended petitions for removal that the deceased was
23
engaged in the violation of the National Prohibition Law
or any other revenue law at the time of his decease; or
(4) That the agents suspected Wenger of any viola-
tion of the National Prohibition Law or any other rev-
enue law, or
(5) That Wenger was connected in any way with any
investigation in which the agents allege they were en-
gaged, or
(6) That the homicide was the result of any act upon
the part of said agents to protect themselves or each
other in the discharge of any duty they were perform-
ing.
(7) Their amended petition sets forth that on the day
of the murder they were engaged in an investigation, di-
rected by the Maryland Federal Prohibition Director,
of the alleged unlawful distillation of intoxicating liquor
on a farm known as the Harry Carver Farm, which was
situated approximately three miles from the village of
Madonna, about twelve miles northwest from Belair,
Maryland, which said property was then unoccupied.
They reached the farm premises shortly after midday,
and discovered there in a secluded wooded valley and
swamp, materials for an illicit distilling operation. They
concealed themselves in the woods and shrubbery nearby
the still site, and shortly thereafter became aware of the
approach of a number of men bringing with them a still.
They made their presence known to the men who were
approaching, and the men immediately dropped the still
and fled, and though they pursued them across the fields,
no one of the fleeing men was overtaken or arrested.
Thereupon the agents returned to the still site, destroyed
the material which constituted the unlawful distilling
plant, and started to return to their car which had been
24
left some distance from the still site, for the purpose of
returning to Baltimore to report to the office of the
Maryland Prohibition Director the results of their in-
vestigation, when they discovered a man, whom they
afterwards learned to be one Lawrence Wenger, mortally
wounded and lying beside the path along which they
were walking, some four or five hundred yards from the
still site and in a direction opposite to that from which
the unknown men had approached and towards which
they fled. They carried the wounded man to their car
and took him to Jarrettsville, Maryland, for medical at-
tention. Finding none available, they proceeded with
all speed to Belair where they finally succeeded in plac-
ing the said Wenger in charge of a physician, who pro-
nounced him dead. They then removed his body to an
undertaking establishment in Belair.
Under the above facts, what act done by them under
color of their office or any revenue law can be said to
have resulted in the prosecution?
The investigation they were conducting? No.
Any act of self-protection or for the protection of each
other? No.
Any act in attempting to apprehend the supposed vio-
lators of the National Prohibition Law? No.
Any act in returning to Baltimore to report their in-
vestigation? No.
Any act in attempting to obtain medical attention for
the deceased? No.
If the prosecution was not on account of any act done
under color of their office or under color of any revenue
25
law, then the prosecution should not have been removed,
because it is obvious that the prosecution did not arise
(1) on account of any right, title or authority claimed
by them under any revenue law, and (2) said prosecu-
tion was not commenced against any person holding
property or estate by title derived from any revenue
officer and did not affect the validity of any revenue
law,—the other two classes of prosecutions to which the
statute is applicable. So we must find that the prosecu-
tion arose out of an act done under the color of their
office or under the color of a revenue law, unless the
statute is construed to mean that the right of removal
is accorded to every officer described in the Act merely
by virtue of his office, irrespective of the nature of the
act or of the circumstances under which it was com-
mitted.
To permit of this latter construction, it would be neces-
sary to hold that Congress intended to authorize the
removal of all actions and prosecutions against revenue
officers, irrespective of their origin or their connection
with the duties of said officers under the law.
Such a construction would be in disregard of the plain
language of the statute. The words ‘‘act done under
color of his office or any such law’’ would be rendered
meaningless and would have to be eliminated from the
statute by construction. Every revenue officer would be
entitled to have tried all actions brought against him, be-
fore Courts of his own choice, and in all criminal prose-
cutions against him, to have the benefit of the legal
services of the United States District Attorney. Certain-
ly, if this result was constitutionally possible, Congress
did not intend it in the enactment of the law. The his-
tory of the law belies it. It was passed to prevent the
States from interfering with Federal collection of rev-
enue. How is this purpose subserved by granting the
26
unusual privilege of removal in all cases, whether or not
the action or prosecution against the officer has any ra-
tional connection with his official duty, or whether or not
it in any way affects the revenues of the Government.
There are many actions and crimes which cannot have
any reasonable connection with the officer’s duties or
with the collection of the Government’s revenue,
The wanton, deliberate and unwarranted use of a gun,
even during an “‘investigation,’’ where there is no ex-
cuse of self-protection or any other excuse; the use of a
weapon upon an innocent man, not charged with the vio-
lation of the law or with attempting to resist the enforce-
ment of the law; the sexual crimes, such as incest,
bigamy, rape, ete.—all these are examples—(and others
might be cited) of cases which could not possibly be
brought within the Act. Can it be seriously contended
that because any of the aforementioned acts have been
committed during the hours of duty of an officer they
are acts done under color of his office or of any revenue
law?
Certainly, therefore, a mere denial of guilt does not
create a presumption that the acts with which the officer
is charged were done under color of his office.
It may be asserted that the construction contended for
by the State of Maryland would require revenue officers
to admit their guilt or to establish their legal justifica-
tion for the act done as a condition precedent to the
exercise of their right of removal. That this argument
is fallacious is apparent from a comparison of Section
33 of the Judicial Code with Revised Statutes, Section
753 (U. S. Comp. St. 1916, V. 2, Sec. 1281, page 2070).
The latter Act provides that the Federal Courts shall
have the power to release by habeas corpus, persons ‘‘in
27
custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of a law
of the United States.’’ To warrant the exercise of this
jurisdiction, this Court has held that it must be estab-
lished :
(1) That under the circumstances disclosed, the peti-
tioner for habeas corpus was acting in pursuance of the
law of the United States and within the scope of his
authority as a Federal officer;
(2) That his confinement will injure and seriously
affect the authority and operations of the National Gov-
ernment; and
(3) That the case was one of extreme urgency where
the Federal Court having heard the facts believes that a
proper exercise of the discretion vested in it demands
the discharge of the prisoner.
Drury vs. Lewis, 200 U. S. 1, 50 L. ed. 343,
26 S. Ct. Rep. 229.
See also:
Pales vs. Paolo, (C. C. A., 1st Circuit), Adv.
Sheets, Fed. Rep. July 23, 1925, p. 280;
U.S. vs. Weeden, 24 Fed. Cas. 738; Fed. Cas.
No. 14412;
In re: Marsh, 51 Fed. 277;
Castle vs. Lewis, 254 Fed. 917 (C. C. A., 8th
Circuit).
The celebrated case of Cunningham vs. N eagle, 135 U.
S. 1, 34 L. ed. 55, 10 S. Ct. Rep. 658, also arose under the
section last above referred to.
It follows that under Rev. St. Section 753, petitioner
must establish, inter alia, his innocence of the crime
charged as a condition of his release.
‘2k Gen no
28
If the requirements for removal were the same as those
for release by habeas corpus, it would follow that there
would be no necessity for removal to and trial in the
Federal Court. The petitioner having already estab-
lished his innocence, no trial would be necessary.
But the distinction between the two provisions of the
law lies in those words found in the removal statute;
“‘under color of his office or of any such law.’ The
phrase, ‘‘under color’’ implies that for removal, the
officer must establish prima facie, that is to say, he must
set up in his petition such facts as show affirmatively,
that the act upon which the prosecution is grounded was
done in the probable pursuance of his duties or was with.
in the apparent scope of his authority.
When he seeks his release by habeas corpus he must
go further. He must show that the act was actually
within the scope of his authority.
A review of the cases arising under Section 33 of the
Judicial Code shows that in every instance where the
removal was granted, some specific act under color of
his office or under color of a revenue law, was set forth,
either expressly or impliedly, in the petition for removal.
In every case, there was no mere **traverse,’’ but there
was a ‘‘confession and avoidance,’’ that is to say, there
was a statement of the act done by the officer, resulting
in his prosecution, which showed prima facie, that said
act was done under color of his office.
In Tennessee vs. Davis, 100 U. S. 257, 25 L. ed. 648, the
facts, as stated in the syllabus, were as follows:
**A. was, in the State Court of Tennessee, indicted
for murder. In his petition, duly verified, for re-
moval of the prosecution to the Circuit Court of the
United States, he stated that, although indicted for
murder, no murder was committed; that the killing
was done in necessary self-defense, to save his own
life; that at the time the alleged act for which he was
indicted was committed, he was and still is an officer
of the United States, to wit, a deputy collector of in-
ternal revenue; that the act for which he was indict-
ed was performed in his own necessary self-defense
while engaged in the discharge of his duties as dep-
uty collector and while acting by and under the au-
thority of the internal revenue laws of the United
States; that what he did was done under and by
right of his said office; that it was his duty to seize
illicit stills and apparatus used for the illicit and un-
lawful distillation of spirits; and that while so at-
tempting to enforce said laws, as de uty collector as
aforesaid, he was assaulted and fired. upon by a num-
ber of armed men, and that in defense of his life
he returned the fire, which is the killing mentioned
in the indictment.’’ (Italics ours.)
It was held that the petition was in conformity with
the statute, and, upon being filed, the prosecution was
removed to the Cireuit Court of the United States.
The following lanzuage of Mr. Justice Strong, who
wrote the opinion, as to the purpose and intent of the
law, shows very clearly that it was never intended to
embrace a case such as the one at bar (pp. 261-262) :
‘*Now certainly the petition for the removal rep-
resented that the act for which the defendant was
indicted was done not merely under color of his of-
fice as a revenue collector or under color of the
revenue laws, not merely while he was engaged in
performing his duties as a revenue officer, but that
it was done under and by right of his office and while
he was resisted by an armed force in his attempts to
discharge his official duty. This is more than a claim
of right and authority under the law of the United
States for the act for which he has been indicted. It
is a positive assertion of the existence of such au-
30
thority. But the act of Congress authorizes the re-
moval of any cause when the acts of the defendant
complained of were done, or claimed to have been
done in the discharge of his duty as a Federal of-
ficer. It makes such a claim a basis for the assump-
tion of Federal jurisdiction of the case, and for re-
taining it, at least, until the claim proves un-
fonnded.”’
And again (pp. 262-263) :
‘‘As was said in Martin vs. Hunter (1 Wheat.
363), ‘the General Government must cease to exist
whenever it loses the power of protecting itself in
the exercise of its constitutional powers.’ It can act
only through its officers and agents, and they must
act within the States. If, when thus acting and
within the scope of their authority, those officers can
be arrested and brought to trial in a State Court, for
an alleged offense against the law of the State, yet
warranted by the Federal authority they possess,
and if the General Government is powerless to inter-
fere at once for their protection,—if their protection
must be left to the action of the State Court,—the
operations of the General Government may at any
time be arrested at the will of one of its members.
The legislation of a State may be unfriendly. It
may affix penalties to acts done under the immediate
direction of the National Government, and in obed-
ience to its laws. It may deny the authority con-
ferred by those laws. The State Court may admin-
ister not only the laws of the State but equally Fed-
eral law, in such a manner as to paralyze the opera-
tions of the Government. And even if, after trial
and final judgment in the State Court, the case can
be brought into the United States Court for review,
the officer is withdrawn from the discharge of his
duty during the pendency of the prosecution, and the
exercise of acknowledged Federal power arrested.
, a wee OR Oa ee SRN CR LPT PT eT OTE pe
TOY So MPEOE OR GS Cee in py aC ee OR RE EAA SM LOT MRI Sad OR PO TCE T cenit ts EN ASE PE OE ARE ERIE OMS ,
RAE SS aa Ie Ne eel cia im GS i Ee i oat nina sar
‘‘We do not think such an element of weakness
is to be found in the Constitution. The United
States is a government with authority extending
—s a >)
31
over the whole territory of the Union, acting upon
the States and upon the people of the States.
While it is limited in the number of its powers, so
far as its sovereignty extends it is supreme. No
State government can exclude it from the exercise
of any authority conferred upon it by the Constitu-
tion, obstruct its authorized officers against its will,
or withhold from it, for a moment, the cognizance
of any subject which that instrument has commit-
ted to it.’’
In Davis vs. South Carolina, 107 U. S. 597, 27 L. ed.
574, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 636, the facts were these:
Davis was detailed to serve as one of a guard of the
United States soldiers to aid the deputy marshal in
making the arrest of one Hall under a warrant issued
by the United States Commissioner, for violation of in-
ternal revenue laws, as a distiller. For the purpose of
making the arrest the house of said Hall was surrounded
by the guard. Davis was stationed at the back door of
the house for the purpose of guarding the same and pre-
venting the escape of said Hall. Hall made his escape
through a hole in the side of the house near where Davis
was standing, ‘‘sprang past him, frightening his horse,
and accidentally discharging his piece.’?
‘‘By the discharge of his said piece the said Hall was
shot and mortally wounded, and subsequently died of
said wound.’’ Davis was indicted in the State Court for
murder. The case was removed to the Federal Court,
upon a petition setting forth the above facts and alleging
that at the time of said accident Davis was in the dis-
charge of his duty, and that the shooting of Hall was
purely accidental, and Davis was in no way responsible
therefor. Upon appeal to this Court, the removal of
the case was approved.
32
In Illinois vs. Fletcher, 22 Fed. 776 (C. C., N. D., IL),
there was an indictment against deputy marshals of the
United States for a murder committed at a Federal
election. There was a petition to remove the case from
the State Court to the Federal Court.
The petition contained an averment that the indict-
ment was found against the petitioners for acts done by
them, if done at all, in their own necessary self defense,
and while engaged in the discharge of their duties as
deputy marshals of the United States.
Judge Gresham said (pp. 778-779) :
‘*They did the killing or contributed to it, or they
did not; and nothing short of a positive averment
that they did the act for which they stand indicted,
and did it in the line of their duty as deputy mar-
shals of the United States, or under the color of
their authority as such officers, will entitle them to
a removal of the case from the State Court to this
Court for trial. The mere holding of a commission
as a deputy marshal of the United States at the
time a party is indicted for murder, or any other
offense against the laws of a State is not of itself
sufficient ground for depriving the State Court of
jurisdiction of the case.
‘*The petitioners state that James Smith, their
co-defendant in the indictment, and also a deputy
United States marshal and a number of other per-
sons, incited thereto by special constables of Cook
County, were engaged in a disturbance and a breach
of the peace at the polls; that Smith was threatened
by the special constables, and such other persons,
with personal violence; that, ‘in order to quell said
disturbance and protect said Smith and to preserve
order at the polling place,’ they, the petitioners,
took Smith into custody; that while proceeding with
him to the office of Philip Hoyne, a Commissioner
of the United States, there to make complaint
EN NEC
33
against him ‘for disturbing the peace at said polling
place’, they were fired upon by a large body of
armed men including Curnan, the deceased, who de-
manded that Smith should be taken to the Harri-
son Street Police Station in the City of Chicago,
and threatened both them and Smith unless he was
taken there; and that, refusing to comply with this
demand, they were fired upon, and some one of the
attacking party, shot and killed Curnan. It is not
claimed by the District Attorney, who appears for
the petitioners that Smith was in the line of his duty
as a deputy marshal when he was engaged in a
breach of the peace at the polls, or that he had com-
mitted an offense against the United States for
which Commissioner Hoyne might have held him
for trial or for which any Court of the United States
had jurisdiction to try and punish him. Instead of
doing his duty as a deputy marshal, Smith was en-
gaged in a disturbance and breach of the peace at
the polls. The petitioners had a right to arrest him
for this offense, and in a reasonable time, turn him
over to the proper State authorities. He was sim-
ply a law breaker and the fact that he was a deputy
marshal of the United States entitled him to no
more consideration or protection than others en-
gaged in the same disturbance and breach of the
peace. The District Attorney admits that there is
no Federal statute making a disturbance at the polls
amounting to a breach of the peace an offense
against the United States. This is not a case in
which deputy marshals of the United States in re-
pelling force by force in defense of themselves or
their prisoner shot and killed an assailant. Smith
had violated the laws of the State and the petition-
ers refused to turn him over te the State authorities.
They held him, it may fairly be inferred, to protect
him because he was a deputy United States Mar-
shal, and to take him before Commissioner Hoyne,
who had no jurisdiction to hear a complaint against
him or to detain him.” (Italics ours. )
34
. In Salem & L. R. Co. vs. Boston &: L. R. Co., 21 Fed.
Cases, p. 228, Feceral Case No. 12249, it was held that
an application for a writ of certiorari to remove a case
from a State Court to the Circuit Court of the United
States, under the Act of Congress of March 2, 1883 (4
St. 632), must state facts sufficient to enable the Court
to decide whether the case is one within the provisions
of the Act. It is not enough that the petitioner alleges
in general terms that he intends to rely in his defense
to the suit upon revenue laws of the United States.
A just interpretation of the Act does not authorize a
writ of certiorari upon a statement of the mere opinion
of the petitioner and his counsel that the act was done
under color of the office of an agent under the revenue
laws of the United States.
Facts, not mere opinions or conclusions of law, should
be set forth, so that it may appear whether in judgment
of law such a case exists as enables the petitioner to call
for removal.
Virginia vs. Dehart, 119 Fed. 626 (C.C., W. D., Va.):
Criminal prosecution removed from State Court. Mo-
tion to remand. Denied. Ground of motion that petition
did not allege a state of facts necessary to give the Court
jurisdiction.
Petition alleged that petitioner, while acting as a
posseman under a deputy collector of internal revenue,
had assisted in destroying an illicit distillery belonging
to one N. K. Thomas; that he appeared as a witness and
had testified against Thomas at the preliminary hearing,
and was recognized as a government witness to appear
and testify against Thomas at the next term of the Fed-
eral Court. At this juncture—between the examining
35
trial and the term of court at which Thomas was to be
tried for operating an illicit distillery—the petitioner
was summoned by a deputy United States Marshal to
assist in an effort to arrest one Agee for a violation of
the Federal Revenue Law.
‘“‘While in the discharge of such duty, and while
acting under and by authority of said officer, your
petitioner was set upon by said N. K. Thomas, who
told your petitioner that, on account of his having
reported said Thomas’ still to the said Government
officers and on account of his having, while acting
under and by authority of a deputy collector of the
United States, assisted in the cutting up and de-
struction of said Thomas’ still, and on account of
the evidence given by your petitioner against him
before the Commissioner and to prevent such evi-
dence being repeated by your petitioner at the No-
vember Term of said District Court, he intended to
kill your petitioner. As he said this, said N. K.
Thomas thrust his hand in his pocket and drew
therefrom a pistol. Your petitioner, acting in the
capacity of a Government officer, also had on his
person a pistol, which he drew from his pocket, and,
without attempting to fire on the said N. K. Thomas,
struck him in self defense, and thereby prevented
the said N. K. Thomas from carrying out the threats
made not only at that time, but on previous occa-
sions.’’
It was held that a person acting under a deputy
marshal while executing, or on the way to execute, a war-
rant for the arrest of one charged with a violation of an
internal revenue statute, is ‘‘an officer acting by author-
ity of a revenue law,’’ if the prosecution is on account of
an act done under color of office or of any revenue law or
if the prosecution is on account of any right or authority
claimed under any revenue law; that the mere fact that
the assault made by Thomas on the petitioner grew out
of the prior actions of the petitioner while acting under
36
the deputy revenue collector would not make it one done
under color of office or of any revenue law; also, where
the officer is not engaged in any official duty, and is
attacked because of some act previously done by him in
the performance of his official duty, he would not be act-
ing under color of his office or of any revenue law. In
both of the above cases he would be merely exercising the
right of self-defense.
However, where as in this case an attack is made on a
revenue officer while he is in actual pursuit of a violator
of the revenue laws, by a third party actuated by mere
personal malice toward the officer, and the officer, in re-
pelling the attack wounds or kills the person attacking
him, such act is one done, at least colorably in the line
of official duty, nor can a distinction be properly drawn,
if instead of being in actual pursuit, the officer is merely
on the way to make an arrest, or merely seeking an of-
fender with intent to arrest him when found.
Virginia vs. Felts, 133 Fed. 85 (C. C., W. D., Va.):
The petitioner, a deputy United States Marshal, was
indicted in the State Court for murdering one Vaughn
and wounding with intent to kill one Alford. Petition
for removal. Motion to remand. Denied.
The petition alleges that Felts was on a train, in the
course of his official duties, on his way to serve warrants
upon two persons charged with violations against Fed-
eral statutes. On the train he met Vaughn and Alford
who, on account of previous acts of the petitioner in con-
nection with his duties as deputy marshal, had conspired
to murder said petitioner.
Vaughn and Alford viciously attacked him, and in
defending himself against the said assault he found it
37
necessary to shoot and kill the said Vaughn and wound
the said Alford. It is further stated that ‘‘in conse-
quence of said assault and interference on the part of
the said Vaughn and Alford, he was hindered and pre-
vented from discharging his duty as such officer as re-
quired by the process aforesaid.”?
In discussing the manner of contesting the jurisdiction
of the Court in such cases, the Court said (p. 89):
‘‘Where an objection to the jurisdiction of the
Federal Court appears on the face of the removal
papers, the point is raised by a motion to remand.
But when the party resisting the removal desires to
contest the truth of some essential jurisdictional
fact,’’ set forth in the petition, this issue may be de-
termined preliminary to the hearing of the case on
the merits.
(p. 90): ‘*While a plea to the jurisdiction is not
necessary (where a jurisdictional fact in the petition
for removal is denied), for the Court will sua sponte
remand the case if, after the evidence is in, it appears
that it has not jurisdiction, yet the better practice is
to file such a plea.
**Such a plea, with replication, raises an issue of
fact.’’ This should be submitted to the jury, subject
to the right of the Court to direct a verdict on this
issue when proper.
(p. 91): ‘Ordinarily, in Courts of general juris-
diction pleas in abatement are not favored and must
be filed at an early stage in the proceedings. The Fed-
eral Courts are, in some sense of limited jurisdiction,
and will remand a removed cause at any stage of
the case if it appears that the Court has not juris-
diction. It follows that the ordinary technical
Wie
38
rules as to the time of filing the pleas in abatement
do not apply in removal cases. If offered too late
to have the issue tried by the jury, the effect can be
obtained by a motion to remand which the Court can
pass upon after hearing the evidence.’’
‘“‘On the issue raised by the plea to the jurisdic-
tion the burden of proof is on the petitioner. ’’
People’s U. S. Bank vs. Goodwin, 162 Fed. 937 (C. C.,
E. D., Mo.) :
This action was instituted in a State Court to recover
damages for an alleged libel charged to have been wrong-
fully and maliciously written, composed and published
by the defendants, an Assistant Attorney General for the
Post Office Department and an inspector of such depart-
ment. The libel was based on the promulgation by them
of a fraud order against the plaintiff. It was sought to
remove the case to the Federal Court by certiorari under
Section 33 of the Judicial Code. The Court, in holding
that the action was not removable, said (p. 945):
“In my opinion, to permit the removal of the
cause under this section of the law, the acts which
constitute the cause of action must have some ra-
tional connection with official duties ‘under a reve-
nue law,’ and in some way affect the revenue of the
Government. It could hardly be claimed that
* * * a revenue collector, if sued for some act
claimed to have been committed, in the performance
of his official duties, would have the right to remove
the cause under Section 643 (R. S.) if neither the
declaration nor the petition for certiorari showed
that the act for which he was sued was in fact in
the performance of an official duty imposed on him
by law, having some relation to ‘the collection of
revenue for the Government. These facts must ap-
pear on the face of the complaint in the action or in
the petition for the writ of certiorari, otherwise a Na-
tional Court is without jurisdiction. (Citing Vir-
RARE A EOI, ULE AIE
39
gia vs. Rives and Virginia vs. Paul, supra). To
merely state the opnion of the petitioner or his
counsel that such a question is involved is insuf.
ficient to justify the granting of the writ.’’
State of Alabama vs. Peak, 252 Fed. 306 (D. C., S. D.,
Ala.) :
Peak was indicted in the Alabama State Court for
grand larceny and the cause was removed to the Fed-
eral Court on petition under Section 33 of the Judicial
Code. A motion to remand was denied.
The petitioner in this case denied in his petition that
the larceny was committed; and alleged that at the time
of the alleged act for which he was indicted, he was an
officer duly appointed under and acting by authority of,
a revenue law of the United States, that is to say, he
was a narcotic inspector duly appointed and acting under
the Harrison Narcotic Act, which is an internal revenue
law; that he was assigned as such inspector in charge of
the States of Tennessee and Alabama; that he was in
Mobile, Alabama, and surrounding territory, acting
under orders for the purpose of investigating violations
of the said Act, as well as other internal revenue laws,
including the laws in reference to vinous, spirituous or
malt liquors; that he was investigating violations of the
internal revenue laws about seven or eight miles from
Mobile, Alabama, and was on his way back to Mobile to
report the same to his superior officer, when the alleged
act for which he was indicted occurred; that is to say,
on his return journey he encountered one J ames W. Len-
ford, who was in an automobile with his chauffeur and
others; that said Lenford afterwards claimed that he
had been robbed of some money while on said journey
and when he reached Mobile had warrants issued for the
petitioner and two chauffeurs, but petitioner denies that
40
he was guilty, on that or any other occasion of any act
of grand larceny, of Lenford’s or anyone else’s money,
but that the whole course of his conduct and acts on said
occasion was in the performance of his official duty as
aforesaid.
The removal was contested upon the ground that the
petitioner alleged that he ‘‘did not feloniously take and
carry away said sum of money or any other sum,’’ and
further denied that he was ‘‘ guilty of any act of grand
larceny or the felonious taking of Lenford’s or anyone
else’s money.’’ It was contended that under the ruling
in Illinois vs. Fletcher, supra, the case must be re-
manded. But the Court said (pp. 307-308) :
‘*Tn the first place, it occurs to me that the State’s
Attorney overlooked a distinction between the de-
nial of an act and a denial of the criminality of such
act; in other words, that where a petitioner denies
that he was guilty of grand larceny, or the felonious
taking of money, this is merely a denial that the act
as done was a criminal one, and distinctly consti-
tuted a denial that the taking was a felonious one,
in that there was no felonious intent in the taking.
If the petitioner was required to specifically admit
the facts as charged in the indictment, and the in-
tent also charged, this would amount to a plea of
guilty, and there would be nothing to try in the Fed-
eral Court. All that would be required would be to
enter judgment.’’
The Court then holds (contrary to the weight of au-
thority, we believe) that it is unnecessary for the petition
to set out the facts which it is averred constituted the
acts for which the petitioner was indicted, but it was
also held that if the facts are set out they should be
sufficient to establish the right of removal claimed by
the petitioner.
41
The Court makes this distinction between the case be-
fore it from Illinois vs. Fletcher:
In Illinois vs. Fletcher the facts constituting the act
upon which the indictment was based were set out in the
petition; in the Peak case the petition does not under-
take to set out the facts which transpired at the time the
petitioner was accused in the indictment of taking Len-
ford’s money. The Court sustained the petition upon
the ground that it set up in general terms that the whole
course of the petitioner’s conduct and acts on said occa-
sion was a performance of his official duties as a revenue
officer.
In the course of the opinion, the Court stated the
proposition upon which we rely in this case, in the fol-
lowing language (p. 309):
‘“‘Certainly the officer must admit the doing of
some act under color of his office or of the law for
which he is indicted but he is not required to admit
the doing of the act as charged in the indictment.”’
(Italics ours.)
It is respectfully submitted that the Peak opinion is
unsound because it is based upon the erroneous assump-
tion that the petition need not set forth affirmatively
facts which it is averred constitute the acts upon which
the indictment is based. But, assuming the facts to have
been stated, it is clear that this case is in accord with
the other decisions upon the same subject. It requires,
as a condition precedent for removal, the admission by
the officer that the indictment arose out of some act done
by him under color of his office, or under color of the
revenue law, although the criminality of the act or the
accuracy or correctness of the statement thereof in the
indictment may be denied. In other words, there must
be a ‘‘confession and avoidance.’’
42
That this is the basis for the decision is borne out by
the following language (p. 311):
‘It is urged that there can be no right of removal
where one is charged with a larceny, because there
could be no possible connection between the official
capacity of a revenue officer and the felonious tak-
ing of money or property. This proposition is so
manifestly unsound that I think it needs but one
statement to refute it. Suppose a revenue officer
finding money or property in the possession of a
man he was pursuing or seeking to make a ease
against, and he abstracts this money or property
to be used as evidence in a prosecution against the
person in whose possession it was found. Unex-
plained, the taking and carrying away by the of.
ficer of the money would constitute larceny, but,
when it was shown that it was taken and carried
away for the purpose of being preserved and used
in the prosecution of such person, there would be no
criminality in the act.’’
Oregon vs. Wood, 268 Fed. 975 (D. C., Oregon) :
This case holds that it is not enough that the petition
for removal, under Section 33 of the Judicial Code, al-
leges, in general terms, that the petitioner intends to
rely in his defense to the prosecution upon the revenue
laws of the United States. ‘‘The statute requires that
the petition shall set forth the nature of the action or
prosecution’’ (p. 978).
The petition averred (1) that the petitioners were
officers appointed under the revenue laws of the United
States, by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue; (2)
that prosecution was commenced in the State Court
against the petitioners and others, wherein the grand
jury of such court indicted the petitioners for involun-
tary manslaughter and charged that petitioners, while
in the performance of a lawful act, killed one Hedderly
43
by shooting him, which indictment is still pending, no
trial having been had; (3) that petitioners did not kill
Hedderly; (4) that at the time of the occurrence of the
act for which petitioners were indicted they ‘‘were and
still are officers of the United States as aforesaid”’ and
were acting as such officers and under color of their
office, to wit: attempting to effect the arrest of Hedderly ;
(5) that petitioners believe Hedderly was in the act of
violating the revenue and prohibition laws of the United
States, and for that reason the arrest was attempted;
(6) that such attempted arrest was the same act as re-
ferred to in the indictment as the performance by peti-
tioners of their lawful act.
It was held that it was not necessary that the officers
state more fully the capacity in which they were acting
or why petitioners attempted to make the arrest or what
revenue laws they were acting under or that such laws
were still in force, or what particular acts Hedderly was
engaged in at the time.
Smith vs. Gillian, 282 Fed. 628 (D. C., W. D., Ky.):
In this case a civil action was sought to be removed
under the provisions of Section 33 of the Judicial Code.
The petition stated that the petitioners on a date stated,
under orders of the Federal Prohibition Director for the
State of Kentucky, proceeded to Nelson County, Ken-
tucky, where they were engaged in the performance of
their official duties in an effort to suppress the violation
of liquor laws and to arrest those guilty of such viola-
tions ; that while so engaged in the performance of their
official duties in close proximity to where a moonshine
distillery was located they and other officers associated
with them on that occasion were fired upon by the men
who were engaged in the violation of the Prohibition Act
and certain sections of the Revised Statutes of the United
44
States ‘‘in the Setting up and operation of the distil-
lery’’; that in order to protect themselves from an at-
tack by those persons after they had been fired upon as
stated, ‘‘certain of the officers named’? returned the fire;
and that in the exchange of shots it was afterwards
learned that Francis Marion Smith, husband of the plain-
tiff, Lucey Smith, and the father of her co-plaintaiffs,
was shot and killed. The Court said (p. 635) :
“It may, at the outset, be most suggestive and
important to note that neither in the original peti-
tion of the defendants nor in the statement filed later
was it, in any affirmative way stated or adequate-
ly shown that the presumptively innocent Francis
Marion Smith was himself to any extent ‘engaged’
either in the ‘manufacture or sale of intoxicating
liquor,’ within the meaning of that phrase as used
in Section 28, of the National Prohibition Act. Fur-
thermore it is most important to note that no case
to which that phrase is not applicable can by any
means be brought within Section 28 of the Act.’’
The case was remanded upon the ground that under
the removal statute, the right to remove is not conferred
upon Federal Prohibition Officers.
Commonwealth of Massachusetts vs. Bogan, 285 Fed.
668 (D. C., Mass.) :
The petition for removal in this case alleged that the
petitioner, while he was engaged in the performance of
his duty, was attacked by one Sequeria and shot him
fatally in self-defense.
A prosecution, based upon this act of self-defense,
pending in the State Court, was ordered to be removed
by the District Court.
It will be observed that in every one of the cases cited
the petitioner alleged, either expressly or by the clearest
45
inference, some act done by him under color of his office
or under color of some revenue law which resulted in the
prosecution.
In other words, in every case, there was either a con-
fession of the act charged in the indictment and the denial
of its criminality, or the setting up of some independent
overt act alleged to constitute the act under color of
office for which the petitioner was indicted.
It is respectfully submitted:
THAT THE REMOVAL ACT APPLIES ONLY
WHERE THE ACT WHICH IS THE BASIS OF THE
ACTION OR PROSECUTION HAS SOME RATION.
AL CONNECTION WITH OFFICIAL DUTIES
UNDER A ‘“‘REVENUE LAW,”’ AND IN SOME WAY
AFFECTS THE REVENUE OF THE GOVERN.
MENT, AND THAT IN THIS CASE THE AMENDED
PETITION WHICH SETS FORTH IN DETAIL THE
FACTS UPON WHICH THE PETITIONERS RELY,
DOES NOT MEET THE JURISDICTIONAL RE.
QUIREMENTS FOR THE REMOVAL OF THE
PROSECUTION, EVEN THOUGH THIS COURT
MAY BE OF THE OPINION THAT IN A PROPER
CASE THE REMOVAL ACTS ARE APPLICABLE
TO OFFICERS SUCH AS THOSE DESCRIBED IN
THE PETITIONS FOR REMOVAL FILED IN THIS
CASE.
CONCLUSION.
It has been the universal practice (probably under the
authority of the Rev. St. Sec. 771; U.S. Comp. St. 1916,
Vol. 2, Sec. 1296, p. 2156), for the United States District
Attorney to appear in the Federal Court on behalf of
revenue officers in all prosecutions against them removed
el ns Se
46
from the State Courts. The United States District At-
torney, who daily appears before the petit juries in the
District Court as the prosecuting officer, in these special
eases changes his role from prosecutor to defense coun-
sel, and urges the acquittal of defendants, accused of
serious crimes against the sovoreignty of the State gov-
ernment.
Certainly, this change of front upon the part of the
District Attorney must have its effect upon the jury.
The jurymen, who have probably learned to trust and
respect the District Attorney, undoubtedly will give more
credence to what he says in defense of the accused, espe-
cially when his usual and customary plea is for convic-
tion. If he asks in some special case for an acquittal,
there must indeed be some special circumstances to
justify such action upon his part.
In removed criminal prosecutions even the Federal
Judge, who hears the case and determines the punish-
ment if there is a conviction, is expected to lean more
favorably toward the accused than in the ordinary crim-
inal case coming before him.
And this should be so, because the very purpose of the
removal statute is to afford protection to those officers
embraced within it in the performance of their official
acts. There is, and ought to be a strong presumption
that any act done in the course of official duties is within
the scope of the officer’s authority under the law.
Thus in the trial of removed prosecutions in the Fed-
eral Court, the atmosphere is surcharged with kindli-
ness, leniency and protection to the accused.
It is, therefore, meet that the right of removal be
strictly limited to those cases in which the accused is
entitled to the benefit of such pre-disposition toward
a8
£
oy
47
him, that is to Say, to cases where the prosecution has
arisen out of an act done under the semblance, at least, of
the authority conferred upon the officer by the law.
The removal statute aims to protect officers who have,
in good faith, attempted to enforce at least what they
consider to be their duty under the law, and not to pro-
tect them in acts committed by them in their private
capacity, having no rational connection with their duties.
The protection of the removal act has its historical
inception in the effort of a State to nullify revenue laws
of the Government, and this historical purpose should
always be borne in mind in the application of said statute
by the Courts.
Is the action of the State authorities in commencing
4 prosecution calculated to embarrass the Federal Gov-
ernment in the execution of its revenue laws? That is
the test to be applied in every case in which removal of
a prosecution is attempted.
We respectfully submit that in the case at bar the
defendants in the indictment in the State Court have not
shown that they are revenue officers within the meaning
of the removal statute, nor have they shown by their
petition that the prosecution which they seek to remove
is embraced within the terms of said Act.
Judge Soper and the District Court, in removing this
prosecution from the State Court have clearly exceeded
the authority vested in them under the Act. Under the
precedents in this Court, hereinbefore cited, this Court
is vested with jurisdiction to compel the remand of the
48
prosecution to the State Court, and we respectfully and
earnestly request that this be done.
Respectfully submitted,
THOS. H. ROBINSON,
Attorney General,
HERBERT LEVY,
Assistant Attorney General,
Attorneys for the State of Maryland,
Petitioner.
one
figs
49
a APPENDIX.
-—_
SECTION 33, JUDICIAL CODE, R. S. SEC. 643;
ACT, MARCH 3, 1875, C. 130, SEC. 8, 18 STAT. 401,
ACT, FEBRUARY 8, 1894, C. 25, SEC. 1, 28 STAT. 36,
ACT, MARCH 3, 1911, C. 231, SEC. 33, 36 STAT. 1097.
ACT, AUGUST 23, 1916, C. 399, 39 STAT..
‘“When any civil suit or criminal prosecution is com-
menced in any court of a State against any officer ap-
pointed under or acting by authority of any revenue law
of the United States now or hereafter enacted, or against
any person acting under or by authority of any such |
officer, on account of any act done under color of his office :
or of such law, or on f any right, title, or |
authority claimed by such officer or other person under |
any.such law, jor is commenced against any person hold- —
ing property or estate by title derived from any such
officer and affects the validity of any such revenue law,
or against any officer of the courts of the United States
for or on account of any act done under color of his
office or in the performance of his duties as such officer,
or when any civil suit or criminal] prosecution is com-
menced against any person for or on account of anything
done by him while an officer of either House of Congress
in the discharge of his official duty in executing any order
of such House, the said suit or prosecution may at any
time before the trial or final hearing thereof be removed
for trial into the district court next to be holden in the
district where the same is pending upon the petition of
such defendant to said district court and in the following
manner: Said petition shall set forth the nature of the
suit or prosecution and be verified by affidavit and, to-
gether with a certificate signed by an attorney or coun-
selor at law of some court of record of the State where
00
such suit or prosecution is commenced or of the United
States stating that, as counsel for the petitioner, he has
examined the proceedings against him and carefully in-
quired into all the matters set forth in the petition, and
that he believes them to be true, shall be presented to the
said district court, if in session, or if it be not, to the
clerk thereof at his office, and shall be filed in said office.
The cause shall thereupon be entered on the docket of
the district court and shall proceed as a cause originally
commenced in that court; but all bail and other security
given upon such suit or prosecution shall continue in like
force and effect as if the Same had proceeded to final
judgment and execution in the State court. When the
suit is commenced in the State court by summons, sub-
poena, petition, or any other process except capias, the
clerk of the district court shall issue a writ of certiorari
to the State court requiring it to send to the district court
the record and the proceedings in the cause. When it
is commenced by capias or by any other similar form of
proceeding by which a personal arrest is ordered, he
shall issue a writ of habeas corpus cum causa, a dupli-
cate of which shall be delivered to the clerk of the State
court or left at his office by the marshal of the district or
his deputy or by some other person duly authorized
thereto; and thereupon it shall be the duty of the State
court to stay all further proceedings in the cause, and the
suit or prosecution, upon delivery of such process, or
leaving the same as aforesaid, shall be held to be re-
moved to the district court and any further proceedings,
trial, or judgment therein in the State court shall be void.
If the defendant in the suit or prosecution be in actual
custody on mesne process therein, it shall be the duty of
the marshal, by virtue of the writ of habeas corpus cum
causa, to take the body of the defendant into his custody,
to be dealt with in the cause according to law and the
order of the district Court, or, in vacation, of any judge
51
thereof; and if, upon the removal of such suit or prose-
cution, it is made to appear to the district court that no
copy of the record and proceedings therein in the State
court can be obtained, the district court may allow and
require the plaintiff to proceed de novo and to file a
declaration of his cause of action, and the parties may
thereupon proceed as in actions originally brought in
said district court. On failure of the plaintiff so to pro-
ceed, judgment of non prosequitur may be rendered
against him, with costs for the defendant.”
ne
Office Suprame @ourt,
FILED
NOV 23 192
NO. 23, ORIGINAL. WM. R. STANS2
| ©
In Tue
Supreme Court of the United States.
STATE OF MARYLAND
Versus
MORRIS A. SOPER, JUDGE OF THE DISTRICT
COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE
DISTRICT OF MARYLAND, AND THE DIS-
TRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR
THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND.
CASE sine Ti
REPLICATION.
Mr. Cuerx:
Please file.
THOMAS H. ROBINSON,
Attorney General of Maryland
HERBERT LEVY,
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