Prologue — Maryland v. Soper (No. 1)

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INDEX.

Morion ror Leave tro Fite Petirion ror WRIT OF

RN 2 > rigs Vig ola ba eine WHE a eR

Petition ror Writ or MANDAMUS.............-000-

‘“Exuipir A’’—Certiriep Copy oF ALL ORIGINAL

Papers AND Docker E\nrrigs IN THE District Court

OF THE UNITED States FoR THE District or Mary-

SE EP RP Pend ee ee" Pais sucks Sala a anes wal dee

Docket Entries ............ CSET ee OR EK Oe

Original petition for removal, ete., and order of

Se re rarer es tree re

Order of removal, writ of certiorari and habeas

rrr rr errr rer re

Motion to quash and remand oe original peti-

eer errr rr ry Seed Panes

Order granting leave to amend petition........

Amended petition for removal and order of

|, ES A Serge Ske eRe ee eeas

Seer reer yr Pr reo Pierre ,

Order overruling motion to quash and remand.

| PORE ETTE Teer CTT ee eT eee eee

“Wxurpit B’’—Certiriep Copy or Recorp or PRocEEp-

incs or Crrcuir Court ror Harrorp County, Fmep

IN THE District Court oF THE UNITED STATES FOR

THE District or Mary.anp, Fespruary 21, 1925...

Presentment

15-41

16-17

18-22

23-24

25-26

28-35

36-37

38-39

40-41

42-49

I kan on Sanee son bbe ea dns 44-46

DR ce tae ddudabcdcss aces eweede< ss 46-47

Order of District Court of the United States for

the District of Maryland, commanding the

transmission of record of proceedings to Dis-

trict Court of the United States for the Dis-

IND bindccccdccncasndcksicnnen 47

Certificate of the Clerk of the District Court of

the United States for the District of Maryland

to the aforegoing papers, comprising ‘‘ Exhibit

A’’ and ‘‘ Exhibit B’’, and to the docket entries

IEE IS ond on dn udeen cde anesenas 48

Certified eupy of docket entries—Cirecuit Court

a Scan caacadseakase wie 49

In THE

Supreme Court of the United States

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF THE

STATE OF MARYLAND FOR A WRIT OF MAN-

DAMUS DIRECTED TO THE HONORABLE,

MORRIS A. SOPER, JUDGE OF THE DISTRICT

COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

DISTRICT OF MARYLAND, AND DIRECTED

ALSO TO SAID COURT.

CASE “A”.

MOTION FOR LEAVE TO FILE PETITION FOR

WRIT OF MANDAMUS.

Mr. CLERK:

Please file.

THOS. H. ROBINSON,

Attorney General of Maryland,

HERBERT LEVY,

Assistant Attorney General of Maryland,

Attorneys for the State of Maryland.

to

Srate oF MaryLanpv

vs.

Morris A. Soprer, JuDGE oF

tHE District Court oF IN THE

THE Unirep SraTes FOR SUPREME COURT

THE District oF Mary- OF THE

LAND, AND THE District UNITED STATES.

Court OF THE UNITED

States FoR THE DistRIcT

oF MaryLanp.

CASE “A”.

To the Honorable, William Howard Taft, Chief Justice,

and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of

the United States:

Now comes the petitioner, the State of Maryland, by

Albert C. Ritchie, its Governor, and moves the Court for

leave to file the petition for writ of mandamus hereto

annexed; and further moves that an order and rule be

entered and issued directing Morris A. Soper, Judge of

the District Court of the United States for the District

of Maryland, and also directing the said District Court

to show cause why a writ of mandamus should not issue

against them and each of them in accordance with the

prayer of said petition, and why your petitioner should

not have such relief and such other and further relief in

the premises as may be just and meet.

THOS. H. ROBINSON,

Attorney General of Maryland,

HERBERT LEVY,

Assistant Attorney General of Maryland,

Attorneys for Petitioner.

55

eo, eee .

y eres, De en

In THE

Supreme Court of the United States

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF THE

STATE OF MARYLAND FOR A WRIT OF MAN-

DAMUS DIRECTED TO THE HONORABLE,

MORRIS A. SOPER, JUDGE OF THE DISTRICT

COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

DISTRICT OF MARYLAND, AND DIRECTED

ALSO TO SAID COURT.

CASE “A”.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS.

Mr. CLERK:

Please file.

THOS. H. ROBINSON,

Attorney General of Maryland,

HERBERT LEVY,

Assistant Attorney General of Maryland,

Attorneys for the State of Maryland.

Stare or Maryann

vs.

Morris A. Soper, JUDGE OF

IN THE

THE District Court oF SUPREME COURT

tHE UNITED STATES FOR oo “en

THE District or Mary- UNITED STATES.

LAND, AND THE DistRICT

Court or THE UNITED

States FoR THE DIsTRICT

or MarRYLAND.

CASE “A”.

To the Honorable, William Howard Taft, Chief Justice,

and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court of

the United States:

Your petitioner, the State of Maryland, by Albert C.

Ritchie, its Governor, respectfully shows unto your Honors

that the jurisdiction of the Cireuit Court fer Harford

County, a Court clothed by the Constitution and laws of the

State of Maryland with original criminal jurisdiction, has

beer. invaded by Morris A. Soper, Judge of the District

Court of the United States for the District of Maryland,

and by the said District Court, whose acts and doings com-

plained of are as follows, to wit:

1. On the 10th day of February, 1925, Robert D. Ford,

John M. Barton, E. Franklin Ely, Wilton L. Stevens and

William Trabing were indicted in the Circuit Court for

Harford County, State of Maryland, for the murder, on or

about the 19th day of November, 1924, of one Lawrence

Wenger, a citizen of the State of Maryland. On the 11th

day of February, 1925, said Judge, Morris A. Soper, and the

5

said District Court, issued an order, directed to the Cir-

cuit Court for Harford County and the Judge and the

Clerk thereof, whereby he caused the said prosecution,

styled ‘‘State of Maryland vs. Robert D. Ford, John M.

Barton, E. Franklin Ely, Wilton L. Stevens and William

Trabing,’’ to be removed from the Circuit Court for Har-

ford County to the District Court of the United States for

the District of Maryland, upon the supposed authority of

Section 33 of the Judicial Code (U. S. Comp. St., Sec. 1015,

being Judicial Code, Sec. 33, as amended, Act Aug. 23,

1916, c. 99). The petition, upon which the said removal

was granted, alleged that on the day when the murder is

alleged to have been committed, ‘‘the petitioner William

Trabing was a chauffeur of the Reliable Transfer Com-

pany, and was at the time above mentioned, engaged and

employed by Edmund Budnitz, the Federal Prohibition

Director of the State of Maryland, in the capacity of a

chauffeur for Federal Prohibition Agents, Robert D. Ford,

John M. Barton, Wilton L. Stevens and E. Franklin Ely, all

being officers of the Internal Revenue Service of the United

States; that the said petitioner, William Trabing, was at

the said time a person acting under and by authority of the

said Federal Prohibition Director, Edmund Budnitz and

the said Federal Prohibition Agents, Robert D. Ford, John

M. Barton, Wilton L. Stevens and E. Franklin Ely, and

that the said agents were on November 19th, 1924, and now

are Federal Prohibition Agents of the Bureau of Internal

Revenue of the Treasury Department of the United States.’’

For convenience, however, all of the said petitioners will be

hereafter designated as ‘‘ Federal Prohibition Agents.”’

2. Upon said petition, the said Judge, Morris A. Soper,

by ‘‘writ of habeas corpus cum causa,’’ also took the

bodies of the aforesaid Federal Prohibition Agents from

the custody of the jailor of Harford County, and let said

Federal Prohibition Agents to bail.

6

3. After the record of the proceedings of the Circuit

Court for Harford County was filed in the said District

Court of the United States for the District of Maryland,

the State of Maryland, on the 12th day of March, 1925,

appeared specially in the said District Court, held at Bal-

timore, Maryland, and moved the said Court to quash the

writ and rescind the order issued by the said District Court

on the 11th day of February, 1925, as aforesaid, and to

remand the said case to the Circuit Court for Harford

County, for the following reasons:

(a) Because the allegations of the petition for removal

failed to disclose a state of facts entitling the Federal Pro-

hibition Agents to have the said writ issued.

(b) Because the allegations set forth in said petition

were contradictory, evasive, founded on hearsay and in part

untrue.

(c) Because the issuance of said writ upon the allega-

tions of said petition and the certificate of counsel attached

thereto was beyond the power and jurisdiction of the said

District Court as limited by the Constitution and laws of

the United States.

(d) Because the said writ, if allowed to stand, consti-

tuted an interference by the said District Court with the

due and orderly administration of justice in the Circuit

Court for Harford County, contrary to the Constitution

and laws of the United States.

(e) Because there was no allegation in the petition that

authorized the said District Court to issue any writ what-

soever against the Judge or the Clerk of the Circuit Court

for Harford County.

4. The said motion to remand was fully argued before

the said Judge of the said District Court on the 17th day

7

of March, 1925, and on the same day the said Judge, being

of the opinion that the said petition for removal was de-

fective, upon application by the United States on behalf of

the said Federal Prohibition Agents, granted leave to the

United States to amend said petition for removal.

5. Thereafter, to wit, on the 31st day of March, 1925, the

said Federal Prohibition Agents filed their amended peti-

tion in said cause, pursuant to the leave granted them by

the aforesaid order of March 17th, 1925, whereupon the

State of Maryland again appeared specially in said cause

and again moved to quash the writ and rescind the order

of February 11th, 1925, and to remand the said case to the

Circuit Court for Harford County, and assigned substan-

tially the same reasons for the said ‘‘motion to quash and

remand’’ as those set forth in its ‘‘motion to quash and

remand’? filed in reply to the original petition for removal,

as aforesaid.

6. On the 5th day of May, 1925, after a second hearing

the said Judge and the said Court denied the motion to

remand the case to ite Circuit Court for Harford County,

and ratified and confirmed the order of February 11th, 1925,

removing the said cause to the said District Court from the

Cireuit Court for Harford County.

7. Your petitioner files with its petition, and prays to be

taken as part and parcel hereof, a certified copy of the

record in ‘‘State of Maryland vs. Robert D. Ford, John M.

Barton, E. Franklin Ely, Wilton L. Stevens and William

Trabing,’’ in the District Court of the United States for

the District of Maryland, marked ‘‘ Exhibit A,’’ and a cer-

tified copy of the record in ‘‘State of Maryland vs. Robert

D. Ford, John M. Barton, E. Franklin Ely, Wilton L.

Stevens and William Trabing,’’ in the Cireuit Court for

Harford County, marked ‘‘ Exhibit B.’’

8

8. Your petitioner avers and charges that the action

and conduct of Judge Soper were a gross violation of the

Constitution and laws of Maryland and of the Constitution

and laws of the United States, because neither the said

District Court of the United States for the District of

Maryland nor Judge Soper had jurisdiction over the case

unlawfully removed by the said Judge Soper, as aforesaid.

The prosecuiton is in the name of your petitioner; the crime

—murder—was committed within its territorial limits by

said Federal Prohibition Agents upon one Lawrence

Wenger, its citizen.

9. Your petitioner alleges that Judge Soper was not

authorized to remove the said prosecution, under Section

33 of the Judicial Code, upon the allegations of the orig-

inal petition for removal, because (inter alia) :

(a) Federal Prohibition Agents are not officers ‘“ap-

pointed under or acting by authority of any Revenue Law

of the United States’’ or persons ‘‘acting under or by auth-

ority of any such officer,’’ within the meaning of Section 33

of the Judicial Code.

(b) Said petition does not show that the criminal prose-

eution pending in the Cireuit Court for Harford County

was on account of any act done under color of the office of

the defendants in said prosecution, or under color of any

Revenue Law of the United States, or on account of any

right, title or authority claimed by the said defendants

under any Revenue Law of the United States, within the

meaning of said Section 33 of the Judicial Code.

(c) The said petition does not set forth any facts to show

that the prosecution for murder arose out of the discharge

of the official duties of the petitioners, as Federal Prohibi-

tion Agents, or in the discharge of their duties under the

National Prohibition Law, or that the said prosecution

9

grew out of an effort on the part of said Federal Prohibi-

tion Agents to protect themselves and each other in the dis-

charge of their duty.

(d) The said petition does not allege any facts to show

that the prosecution grew out of the performance by the

said petitioners of their official duties as Federal Prohibi-

tion Agents in making and attempting to make an investi-

gation of any violation of the National Prohibition Law by

Lawrence Wenger, the deceased, and further does not al-

lege that the said Lawrence Wenger had committed or was

suspected to having committed any violation of said Na-

tional Prohibition Law.

10. Your petitioner avers that the murder of the said

Lawrence Wenger by the said Federal Prohibition Agents

was wanton, wilful, deliberate, premeditated and without

any justification whatsoever, and that the said Federal

Prohibition Agents not only failed to set up any facts to

show that said prosecution grew out of an act done by them

under color of their office or of any Revenue Law, but, on

the contrary, their original petition for removal denies that

they were in any menner responsible, lawfully or otherwise,

for the homicide of the said Lawrence Wenger.

11. Your petitioner further avers that the amended peti-

tion for removal is also defective and insufficient for the

following reasons:

(a) It alleges that the said Federal Prohibition Agents

were acting under the direction of the Commsisioner of In-

ternal Revenue, the Federal Prohibition Commissioner and

the Federal Prohibition Director for the State of Maryland,

and were acting under the authority of and for the purpose

of enforcing the National Prohibition Act and acts supple-

mental thereto and all Internal Revenue Laws relating to

10

the manufacture, sale, transportation, control and taxation

of intoxicating liquors, with authority to execute and per-

form all the duties delegated to such officers by law, and

that at the time of the act alleged to have been done by them,

they were engaged in the discharge of their official duties

as Federal Prohibition Officers, in making and attempting

to make an investigation concerning a violation of the Na-

tional Prohibition Act and other Internal Revenue Laws

and in reporting the result of said investigation and in pro-

tecting themselves in the discharge of their duty, but

said amended petition does not specify the connection, if

any, of the said Lawrence Wenger, deceased, with the

breach of the provisions of the National Prohibition Act

or other Internal Revenue laws, which they were investi-

gating, or any other facts tending to show that the prosecu-

tion, which they sought to remove, grew out of any act done

under color of their office or of any such law.

(b) Taken in connection with the allegations of the orig-

inal petition, the amended petition clearly shows that in the

investigation which the said Federal Prohibition Agents

claim to have been making at the time of the acts and hap-

penings for which they were indicted they were acting in

the capacity of Federal Prohibition Officers under the Na-

tional Prohibition Law, and as such, they were not ‘‘Reve-

nue Officers’’ and are not entitled to have the prosecution

against them removed to the Federal Court under the pro-

visions of Section 33 of the Judicial Code.

(c) Section 28 of Title Ll of the National Prohibition

Act, upon which the amended petition relies as additional

authority for the removal of the prosecution, does not,

either in its letter or spirit, authorize the removal of a

criminal prosecution pending in a State Court against a

Federal Prohibition Agent.

11

(d) The statement in the amended petition of the facts

alleged to bring the prosecution within the provisions of

Section 33 of the Judicial Code, clearly negatives the con-

tention of the said Federal Prohibition Agents that the

prosecution arose out of any act done under color of their

office or of the Revenue Laws and Prohibition Laws of the

United States. Said amended petition goes into great de-

tail with reference to the investigation which the said Fed-

eral Prohibition Agents were carrying on in Harford

County, but it does not point out that the said investigation

or any act done in pursuance thereof resulted in the prose-

cution sought to be removed. On the contrary, the amend-

ed petition specifically alleges that the said Federal Pro-

hibition Agents were returning to Baltimore to report to

the office of the Maryland Federal Prohibition Director con-

cerning the result of their investigation when they dis-

covered the said Lawrence Wenger, mortally wounded and

lying beside the path along which they were walking. They

deny they were in any manner responsible, either lawfully

or unlawfully, for the homicide of the said Lawrence Wen-

ger, or that they had any knowledge of how the said Wen-

ger came to his death, and in view of this denial, it is in-

conceivable that the prosecution against them, based as it

was upon said homicide, could have arisen on account of

any act done by them under color of their office or of any

Revenue Law or Prohibition Law of the United States.

(e) Section 33 of the Judicial Code does not contemplate

that the officers mentioned therein should be entitled to re-

move all causes or prosecutions brought against them dur-

ing their tenure of office merely by reason of their holding

said offices, but said act only applies to those actions and

prosecutions which arise out of any act done under color

of their office or the law under which they are acting, or on

account of any right, title or authority claimed by such

officers or other persons under any such law.

12

12. Your petitioner alleges that the constitution does

not confer upon Congress authority to define and punish

crimes against the State; that to permit such interven-

tion by the Federal power, your petitioner charges would

be the utter and complete destruction of the State sov-

ereignty and State automony.

13. Your petitioner is advised that murder is a com-

mon law offense; that Federal Courts have no common law

jurisdiction in criminal cases; therefore, the trial of the

ease of ‘‘State of Maryland vs. Robert D. Ford, John M.

Barton, E. Franklin Ely, Wilton L. Stevens and William

Trabing’’ must be held in the Circuit Court for Harford

County, which Court only has jurisdiction, and your peti-

tioner charges that Judge Soper by removing the said

case from the Circuit Court for Harford County to the Dis-

trict Court of the United States for the District of Mary-

land, and taking the said Federal Prohibition Agents from

the custody of the jailor of said county, acted not only with-

out authority and sanction of law, but in violation of law,

and his every act and order are null and void and should be

so adjudged.

14. Your petitioner further avers that in the prosecu-

tion aforesaid, no Federal question is involved; and that

the original and amended petitions for removal filed by

the said Robert D. Ford, John M. Barton, E. Franklin Ely,

Wilton L. Stevens and William Trabing pleaded no righ:

or privilege conferred by the Constitution and laws of the

United States.

15. Your petitioner is advised that the said Judge, Mor-

ris A. Soper, in removing the said case and in refusing to

remand the same upon the application of your petitioner,

has transcended the jurisdiction of his Court and has un-

dertaken the exercise of powers not vested in him or his

Court by any law of the United States.

a

PA ae

oe

13

16. Your petitioner is informed and believes and

charges that it is the intention of the said Judge, Morris

A. Soper, by color of his office as Judge aforesaid, to try

the said Federal Prohibition Agents in the District Court

of the United States for the District of Maryland at the

present term of said Court, now being held in the City of

Baltimore, for the offense aforesaid, committed against the

laws of the State of Maryland, and thereby violate the Con-

stitution of Maryland, set aside its laws and usurp the jur-

isdiction of its Courts.

Your petitioner, therefore, prays that a rule may be

awarded by this Court requiring the said Morris A. Soper,

Judge of the District Court of the United States for the

District of Maryland, and the said District Court to show

cause why a mandamus should not be issued, forbidding

and preventing the said Judge and the said Court from

taking cognizance of said case, and from any, all and

every act connected with said trial, and commanding them

to remand the said case to the Circuit Court for Harford

County and to redeliver to the jailor of said Harford

County the bodies of the said Federal Prohibition Agents,

to be dealt with according to the laws of the said State.

And as in duty bound, ete.

ALBERT C. RITCHIE,

Governor of Maryland.

THOS. H. ROBINSON,

Attorney General of Maryland,

HERBERT LEVY,

Assistant Attorney General of Maryland,

Attorneys for the State of Maryland.

14

State oF Maryann,

Crry or Bautimorg, to wit:

I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this twenty-fourth day

of September, 1925, before me the subscriber, a Notary

Public of the State of Maryland, in and for Baltimore City

aforesaid, personally appeared Albert C. Ritchie, Governor

of the State of Maryland, and made oath that the allega-

tions contained in the petition for mandamus hereto an-

nexed are true to the best of his knowledge, information and

belief.

WITNESS My hand and Notarial Seal.

(Notarial Seal.) ANNA DAVIS GREER,

Notary Public.

15

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF THE

STATE OF MARYLAND FOR A WRIT OF MAN.

DAMUS DIRECTED TO THE HONORABLE,

MORRIS A. SOPER, JUDGE OF THE DISTRICT

COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND,

AND DIRECTED ALSO TO SAID DISTRICT

COURT.

CASE “A.”

EXHIBIT A.

Mr. CLERK:

Please file.

THOS. H. ROBINSON,

Attorney General for the State

of Maryland.

HERBERT LEVY,

Asst. Attorney General of the

State of Maryland.

16

EXHIBIT A.

5

Strate or Marytanp IN THE

vs. District Court OF THE

Rosert D. Forp, E. Frank Unitep States

Exy, Joun M. Barron, | FOR THE

Witton L. Stevens and District or MaryLanb.

WILuLiAM TRABING.

No. 7189 Criminal.

,

DOCKET ENTRIES.

1925.

Feby. 11—Petition of Defendants for removal of case

from Criminal Court of Harford County and

for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Cum Causa and

Order of Court directing Writ of Habeas Corpus

Cum Causa to issue to the Criminal Court of

Harford County filed.

Feby. 11—Writ of Habeas Corpus Cum Causa retble with-

in ten days issued. Copy of Writ, Copy Peti.

tion and Order sent to Marshal to be served.

(Copy of Writ and Petition and Order served

on J. H. Bradford, Deputy Clerk, Circuit Court

for Harford County, at Belair, Md., 12 Febr-

uary, 1925.)

Feby. 12—Defendants John M. Barton, Wilton L. Stevens,

EK. Frank Ely and William Trabing each recog-

nized in sum of Ten Thousand Dollars with

John W. Famous, John W. Galbreath, James

R. Galbreath and William B. Taylor in same

17

amount as to each recognizor for their appear-

ance from day to day as required to answer the

charge in this case.

Feby. 13—Defendant Robert D. Ford recognized in sum

of Ten Thousand Dollars with Albert G. Buf-

fington and Jesse H. Bratten in same amount

for his appearance from day to day as required

to answer the charge in this case.

Feby. 21—Record of Proceedings of Circuit Court for

Harford County filed.

Mch. 12—Motion to Quash Writ and rescind Order of

Court filed.

Mch. 17—Order of Court granting leave to the United

State to amend its petition filed.

Mch. 31—Amended Petition of Defendants for removal of

Case from Criminal Court of Harford County

and for a Writ of Habeas Corpus Cum Causa

filed.

April 11—Motion to Quash and remand Indictment for

Murder on Amended Petition filed.

May 5—Order of Court overruling Motion to Quash

and remand filed.

May 5—Stipulation filed.

18

PETITION FOR REMOVAL AND ORDER

OF COURT THEREON.

Filed February 11, 1925.

‘

State oF Maryann

vs. IN THE

Rosert D. Forp, Joun M. District Court oF THE

Barton, EK. Frank Ezy, Unirep States

Witton L. Stevens and FOR THE

Wiu1am TRaBina. District or Maryuanp.

To the Honorable, the Judge of said Court:

The Petition of Robert D. Ford, John M. Barton, E.

Frank Ely, Wilton L. Stevens and William Trabing, re-

spectfully represents:

1. That on or about the tenth day of February, in the

year of our Lord, nineteen hundred and twenty-five, an

indictment was returned into the Criminal Court for Har-

ford County, State of Maryland, by a Grand Jury of the

said Court, which indictment charged yonr Petitioners

with the crime of murder, contrary to the laws of the State

of Maryland, by reason of the fact that on or about the

nineteenth day of November, nineteen hundred and twenty-

four, it is alleged that your petitioner unlawfully and

feloniously did murder one Lawrence Wenger.

2. That on the nineteenth day of November, nineteen

hundred and twenty-four, the petitioner William Trabing

was a chauffeur of the Reliable Transfer Company and

was at the time above mentioned engaged and employed by

Edmund Budnitz, Federal Prohibition Director of the State

19

of Maryland, in the capacity of a chauffeur for Federal

Prohibition Agents, Robert D. Ford, John M. Barton, Wil-

ton L. Stevens and E. Frank Ely, all being officers of the

Internal Revenue Service of the United States; that the

said Petitioner William Trabing was at the said time a per-

son acting under and by authority of the said Prohibition

Director Edmund Budnitz and the said Federal Prohibition

Agents Robert D. Ford, John M. Barton, Wilton L. Stevens

and E. Frank Ely; and that the said agents were on Novem-

ber 19, 1924, and now are Federal Prohibition Agents of

the Bureau of Internal Revenue for the Treasury Depart-

ment of the United States.

3. That the act or acts done by the Petitioner William

Trabing, at the time when they are alleged to have been

guilty of the murder of one Lawrence Wenger, which charge

he denies was done by him while acting under and by

authority of Federal Prohibition Director Edmund Bud-

nitz and Federal Prohibition Officers Robert D. Ford, John

M. Barton, Wilton L. Stevens and E. Frank Ely, in the dis-

charge of their official duties as Prohibition Agents as

aforesaid and in discharge of his duty as chauffeur and

helper of the said agents in making and attempting to make

an investigation in the discharge of their duty and of his

duty as aforesaid and in protecting himself and the said

officers of the Internal Revenue in the discharge of his and

their duty.

4. That the act or acts done by the Petitioners Robert

D. Ford, John M. Barton, Wilton L. Stevens and E. Frank

Ely, at the time when they are alleged to have been guilty

of the murder of Lawrence Wenger, which charge they

deny, was done by them in the discharge of their official

duties as Prohibition Agents as aforesaid in making and

attempting to make an investigation in the discharge of

their duties as aforesaid and in protecting themselves us

20

fellow officers of the Internal Revenue in the discharge of

their duty.

5. That the said criminal prosecution commenced by

said indictment is now pending in the Criminal Court for

Harford County and is a criminal prosecution on account

of the acts alleged to have been done by your petitioners

in the course of the performance of their duties as Federal

Prohibition Agents, which acts they deny having done.

WHEREFORE, your Petitioners pray that the said suit

may be removed from the Criminal Court for Harford

County, aforesaid, to this Honorable Court and that writs

of certiorari and habeas corpus cum causa issue for that

purpose pursuant to the statute of the United States in

such case made and provided. (U.S. Compiled Statutes,

Sec. 1015, being Judicial Code, Sec. 33, as amended, Act

August 23, 1916, C. 399.)

E. FRANK ELY,

JOHN M. BARTON,

WILTON L. STEVENS,

WILLIAM M. TRABING,

ROBERT D. FORD,

By A. W. W. WOODCOCK,

United States Attorney for the

2/11/25. District of Maryland.

Unrrep Srares or America, District or MARYLAND, TO WIT:

I Hereby Certify, that before me, the undersigned, per-

sonally appeared John M. Barton, E. Frank Ely, Wilton

21

L. Stevens, Federal Prohibition Agents, William Trabing,

chauffeur for the said agents, and Amos W. W. Woodcock,

United States Attorney for the District of Maryland, and

made oath in due form of law that they are the persons

whose names are subscribed to the aforegoing petition, and

that they have read the petition, and the matters contained

therein are true in substance and in fact.

CHAS. W. ZIMMERMANN,

Chief Deputy Clerk of the District Court

of the United States for the District of

Maryland.

_

I, A. W. W. Woodcock, United States Attorney in and

for the District of Maryland, Do Hereby Certify that, as

attorney for the petitioners named above, I have examined

the proceedings against them mentioned in the aforegoing

petition and have carefully inquired into all the matters

set forth in the said petition and I believe the same to be

true. .

A. W. W. WOODCOCK,

United States Attorney.

———_--—-—_

ORDER.

Upon motion of A. W. W. Woodcock, United States At-

torney, attorney for Robert D. Ford, John M. Barton, E.

Frank Ely, Wilton L. Stevens and William Trabing, and

on filing the petition of the said Robert D. Ford, John M.

Barton, E. Frank Ely, Wilton L. Stevens and William

Trabing, praying for the removal to this Court from the

Criminal Court of Harford County, in the State of Mary-

land, in the criminal prosecution for murder against the

ie

aa a eeneenieen

22

said Robert D. Ford, John M. Barton, E. Frank Ely, Wil-

ton L. Stevens and William Trabing in said Court, entitled

State of Maryland versus Robert D. Ford, John M. Barton,

KE. Frank Ely, Wilton L. Stevens and William Trabing, and

for the issuance of writs of certiorari and habeas corpus

cum causa for that purpose, pursuant to Section 33 of the

Judicial Code of the United States, and the Court having

read said petition, it is ORDERED this eleventh day of

February, nineteen hundred and twenty-five, that writs of

certiorari and habeas corpus cum causa issue herein di-

rected to the said Court requiring said Court to transmit

to this Court within ten days the record and proceedings

in said case.

MORRIS A. SOPER,

United States District Judge, United

States District Court for the Dis-

trict of Maryland.

23

ORDER OF REMOVAL, WRIT OF CERTIORARI AND

HABEAS CORPUS CUM CAUSA.

Issued February 11, 1925.

>

Sratre or Mary.anp

vs. IN THE

Rosert D. Forp, Joun M. District Court oF THE

Barton, E. Frank E ty, ‘ Unirep States

Witton L. Srevens and FOR THE

Wr1am Traine. District or MaRyuanp.

;

To the Honorable, the Circuit Court of Harford County

in the State of Maryland, the Judge of the Said Court

and the Clerk of the Said Court, Greeting:

Being informed that there is now pending before you a

suit in which the State of Maryland is plaintiff and Robert

D. Ford, John M. Barton, E. Frank Ely, Wilton L. Stevens

and William Trabing are the defendants, which said suit

is a criminal prosecution against the said Robert D. Ford,

John M. Barton, E. Frank Ely, Wilton L. Stevens and Wil-

liam Trabing, charging the defendants with the murder of

Lawrence Wenger, the said suit arising out of facts which

occurred while the said William Trabing was discharging

his duties as chauffeur and helper of the Prohibition

Agents, Officers of the Internal Revenue, the co-defendants,

and acting in and by authority of Federal Prohibition Di-

rector Edmund Budnitz and Federa) Prohibition Officers

Robert D. Ford, John M. Barton, Wilton L. Stevens and

KE. Frank Ely, who were acting in the discharge of their

official duties as Prohibition Agents, Officers of the Inter-

nal Revenue Service of the United States as aforesaid in

making and attempting to make an investigation in the

we

iat

24

discharge of their duty and in protecting themselves in the

discharge of their duty under the National Prohibition Act

of the said United States; and which said suit has not yet

been heard and determined.

Now, therefore, we being willing that said cause and the

records and proceedings therein should be certified by said

Judge of the Circuit Court of Harford County in the State

of Maryland, do hereby command you that you immediately

deliver the bodies of Robert D. Ford, John M. Barton, E.

Frank Ely, Wilton L. Stevens and William Trabing to the

castody of the United States Marshal to be dealt with in

this cause according to law and the order of the District

Court for the District of Maryland; and that you send,

without delay and within ten days to the District Court of

the United States, the records and proceedings in said cause

so that the said District Court of the United States may

act thereon as of right and according to the laws and cus-

toms of the said United States, among others, Section 1015

of the United States Compiled Statutes, being Judicial

Code, Sec. 33, as amended by its Act of August 23, 1916,

C. 399.

WITNESS the Honorable Morris A. Soper, Judge of

said District Court of the United States, this eleventh day

of February, A. D. nineteen hundred and twenty-five.

ARTHUR L. SPAMER,

Clerk of the District Court of the United

(Seal. ) States for the District of Maryland.

The foregoing Writ is thus endorsed:

“‘Copy of within Writ of Habeas Corpus Cum Causa and

Copy Petition for and Order of Removal, left with J. H.

Bradford, Deputy Clerk, Circuit Court of Harford County,

at Belair, Md., 12th day of February, 1925.

GEORGE W. COLLIER,

United States Marshal,

District of Maryland,

By: Gero. H. Epeten,

Chief Deputy Marshal.’’

25

MOTION TO QUASH AND REMAND. *

Filed March 12, 1925.

,

State or Maryann

vs. IN THE

Rosert D. Forp, Joun M. District Court oF THE

Barton, E. Frankun Exy, ' Unitep States

Witton L. Srevens and FOR THE

WituiaM TRaBING. District or Mary.anp.

7 (InpictMENT ror Murper.)

To the Honorable, Morris A. Soper, Judge of said Court:

The State of Maryland, by Thomas H. Robinson, its

Attorney General, and W. Worthington Hopkins, State’s

Attorney for Harford County, who appear specially for

the purposes of this motion, and for no other purpose,

move this Honorable Court to quash the writ and rescind

the order issued in the above entitled case, directed to the

Judge of the Circuit Court for Harford County, and the

Clerk thereof, and to remand the said case to the Circuit

Court for Harford County, for the following reasons:

(1) Because the allegations of the petition filed in this

case do not disclose a state of facts entitling the petitioners

to have said writ issued, or the charge against them re-

moved into this Court.

(2) Because the allegations set forth in said petition

are contradictory, evasive, founded on hearsay, and in part

untrue.

(3) Because the issuance of said writ upon the allega-

tions of said petition and attached certificate of counsel is

26

beyond the power and jurisdiction of this Court as limited

by the Constitution and laws of the United States.

(4) Because the said writ, if allowed to stand, consti-

tutes an interference by this Court with the due and orderly

administration of justice in the Circuit Court for Harford

County contrary to the Constitution and laws of the United

States.

(5) Because there is no allegation in said petition that

authorizes this Court to issue any writ whatsoever against

the Judge or the Clerk of the Circuit Court for Harford

County.

(6) And for other good and sufficient reasons to be

shown at the hearing.

THOS. H. ROBINSON,

Attorney General of Maryland.

W. WORTHINGTON HOPKINS,

State’s Attorney for Harford County.

27

ORDER GRANTING LEAVE TO AMEND PETITION.

Filed May 17, 1925.

State or Maryitanp IN THE

vs. District Court oF THE

Rozsert D. Forp, Joun M. Unitep States

Barton, E. Franxurn Ey, r FOR THE

Witton L. Srevens and District or MaRyLanp.

WituraM TRABING.

INDICTMENT FoR MuRDER.

This cause standing ready for hearing, and being sub-

mitted upon motion of the State of Maryland to quash the

writ and rescind the order issued in the above entitled case

on the 11th day of February, 1925, directed to the Judze

of the Circuit Court for Harford County, and the Clerk

thereof, and to remand the said case to the Cireuit Court

for Harford County, the counsel for the parties were heard

and the proceedings were read and considered; and the

United States having applied for leave of court to amend

the petition, it is therefore ordered this 17th day of March,

in the year 1925, by the District Court of the United States

for the District of Maryland:

That leave be and it is hereby granted to the United

States to amend said petition.

MORRIS A. SOPER,

United States District Judge.

28

AMENDED PETITION FOR REMOVAL AND

ORDER OF COURT.

Filed March 31, 1925.

%

State or Marytanp

vs. IN THE

Rosert D. Forp, Joux M. District Court oF THE

Barton, KE. Franxuin Ey, ‘ Unirep States

Witton L. Stevens and FOR THE

Wru1aAm TRaBING. District or Mary.anp.

J

——___.

AMENDED PETITION.

ns

To the Honorable, the Judge of said Court:

The Petition of Robert D. Ford, John M. Barton, E.

Franklin Ely, Wilton L. Stevens and William Trabing,

respectiully represents:

1. That on or about the tenth day of February, in the

year of our Lord nineteen hundred and twenty-five, an in-

dictment was returned in the Circuit Court of the Third

Judicial Circuit of the State of Maryland by the Grand

Inquest of the State of Maryland for the body of Harford

County, which indictment charged your Petitioners with

the crime of murder, as follows:

“The Jurors of the State of Maryland, for the body of

Harford County, do on their oath present that Wilton L.

Stevens, John M. Barton, Robert D. Ford, E. Franklin Ely,

and William Trabing, late of Harford County aforesaid,

on the nineteenth day of November in the year of our Lord

29

nineteen hundred and twenty-four, at the County aforesaid,

feloniously, wilfully, and of their deliberate premeditated

malice aforethought did kill and murder Lawrence Wenger;

contrary to the form of the Act of Assembly in such case

made and provided; and against the peace, government,

and dignity of the State.

W. WortHincton Hopkins,

State’s Attorney for Harford County.”’

2. That on the twentieth day of N ovember, nineteen

hundred and twenty-four, the Petitioner William Trabing

was a chauffeur of the Reliable Transfer Company and was

at the time mentioned engaged and employed by Edmund

Budnitz, Federal Prohibition Director of the State of

Maryland, in the capacity of a chauffeur for Federal Pro-

hibition Agents Robert D. Ford, John M. Barton, Wilton

L. Stevens and E. Franklin Ely, all being officers of the

Bureau of Internal Revenue of the Treasury Department

of the United States, to act under the direction of the Com-

missioner of Internal Revenue, the Federal Prohibition

Commissioner, and the Federal Prohibition Director for

the State of Maryland, and to act under the authority of

and to enforce the National Prohibition Act and acts sup-

plemental thereto and all Internal Revenue Laws relating

to the manufacture, sale, transportation, control, and taxa-

tion of intoxicating liquors, with authority to execute and

perform all the duties delegated to such officers by law.

3. That the acts alleged to have been done by the Peti-

tioner William Trabing are alleged to have been done at a

time when he was engaged in the discharge of his duties

while acting under and by authority of Federal Prohibi-

tion Director Edmund Budnitz and Federal Prohibition

Officers Robert D. Ford, John M, Barton, Wilton L. Stevens

and E. Franklin Ely, as aforesaid, while the said officers

30

were engaged in the discharge of their official duties as

prohibition officers in making and attempting to make an

investigation concerning a violation of the National Prohi-

bition Act and other Internal Revenue Laws and while re-

porting and preparing to report the results of said investi-

gation and in protecting himself and the said officers of the

Internal Revenue in the discharge of his and their duty as

set out in Paragraph 4 below.

4. That the acts alleged to have been done by the ee

tioners Robert D. Ford, John M. Barton, Wilton L. Stevens,

and EK. Franklin Ely are alleged to have been done at a

time when they were en d_in the discharge of their

official duties as Federal Prohibition Officers, and in making

and attempting to make an investigation concerning a vio-

lation of the National Prohibition Act and other Internal

Revenue Laws, and in reporting the results of said investi-

gation, and in protecting themselves in the discharge of

their duty as follows:

That on November nineteenth, nineteen hundred and

twenty-four, your petitioners were directed by Maryland

Federal Prohibition Director Edmund Budnitz to investi-

gate the alleged unlawful distillation of intoxicating liquor

on a farm known as the Harry Carver Farm situated ap-

proximately three miles from the village of Madonna,

about twelve miles northwest from Bel Air, Maryland,

which said property was then unoccupied. Your petition-

ers reached the said farm premises shortly after midday

on November nineteenth, nineteen hundred and twenty-

four, and discovered there in a secluded wooded valley and

swamp materials for an illicit distilling operation, to wit,

nine empty mash boxes, three fifty-gallon metal drums, a

fifty-gallon condenser, about one thousand pounds of rye

meal in bags, a lighted fire, and men’s working clothes.

Your petitioners thereupon concealed themselves in woods

and shrubbery nearby the still site and shortly thereafter

31

became aware of the approach of a number of men bringing

with them a still. Your petitioners thereupon made their

presence known to the men who were approaching, and the

men immediately dropped the still and fled; and though

your etitioners 5 them across the oN no one of

etnies

we ‘petitioners poset to the still oy destroyed the

materials above mentioned which constituted the unlawful

distilling plant, and started to return to their ear which

had been left some distance from the still site, for the pur-

pose of returning to Baltimore to report to the office: of the

Maryland Federal Prohibition Direcior concerning the re-

sults of their investigation, when they discovered a man,

whom they afterwards learned to be one Lawrence Wegner,

mortally wounded and lying beside the path along which

they were walking, some 400 or 500 yards from the still

site and in a direction opposite to that from which the un-

known men had approached and towards which they fled.

Whereupon your petitioners carried the wounded man to

their car and took him to Jarrettsville, Maryland, for med-

ical treatment, but, finding none there available, proceeded

with all speed to Bel Air, where they sought out in turn

Doctors Richardson, Sappington and Archer, without suce-

cess, and finally placed the said Lawrence Wegner in charge

of Doctor Van Bibber, who pronounced him dead. Your

petitioners then, acting under the advice of the said Doctor

Van Bibber, removed the body of the said Lawrence Weg-

ner to the undertaking establishment of Dean and Foster

in Bel Air. Your petitioners then proceeded to the State’s

Attorney’s office in Bel Air and related the facts aforesaid

to the State’s Attorney; whereupon, on being informed by

them that your petitioners Robert D. Ford, John M. Bar-

ton, Wilton L. Stevens, and E. Franklin Ely were prohibi-

tion officers and that your petitioner William Trabing was

employed by the Federal Prohibition Director as their

chauffeur, they were placed under arrest by the Sheriff of

Harford County at the instance of the State’s Attorney

32

and were confined in the Harford County Jail until the

following morning, November twentieth, nineteen hundred

and twenty-four. On the morning of November twentieth,

nineteen hundred and twenty-four, your petitioners were

taken by the Sheriff and State’s Attorney, in company with

a number of men who that afternoon served upon the Cor-

oner’s Jury mentioned in the indictment, and in company

with two Baltimore City Police Headquarters Detectives,

to the scene of their investigation of the previous day.

They they related the facts concerning their investigation

of the unlawful distilling operation and their finding of the

said Lawrence Wenger on November nineteenth, and then

and there went over the scene of the said occurrences, relat-

ing freely and without reservation the events which took

place November nineteenth, in accordance with their duty

as investigating and reporting officers of the Federal Gov-

ernment and in compliance with their duties as Federal

Prohibition Officers. Likewise on the afternoon of Novem-

ber twentieth your petitioners were called before the Cor-

oner’s Inquest heretofore described in the indictment, and

freely and without reservation in accordance with their

duty as investigating and reporting officers of the Federal

Government and acting under the direction of the Mary-

land Federal Prohibition Director, related the facts afore-

mentioned. And thereupon they were again placed in the

Harford County Jail and held for the action of the Harford

County Grand Jury until their release on bail upon the

evening of November twentieth, nineteen hundred and twen-

ty-four, at the instance of the United States Attorney for

the District of Maryland acting on their behalf.

\eininten

5. That the said criminal prosecution was commenced

in the manner following:

A presentment against your petitioners was returned in

the Circuit Court for Harford County, February ninth,

nineteen hundred and twenty-five, following which present-

33

ment the State of Maryland, by the State’s Attorney for

Harford County, prosecuted and sued forth out of the Cir-

cuit Court for Harford County a Writ of the State of

Maryland of Capias Ad Respondendum against your peti-

tioners, to which there was no return by the Sheriff of Har-

ford County, whereupon the indictment heretofore set forth

was returned.

The said indictment is now pending in the Circuit Court

for Harford County and is a criminal prosecution on ac-

count of acts alleged to have been done by your petitioners

at a time when they were engaged in the performance of

their duties as Federal Prohibition Officers and chauffeur

for Federal Prohibition Officers as set forih in aforegoing

paragraphs.

WHEREFORE, your petitioners pray that the said sut

may be removed from the Circuit Court for Harford Coun-

ty, aforesaid, to this Honorable Court and that writs of

certiorari and habeas corpus cum causa may issue for that

purpose pursuant to the Statute of the United States in

such case made and provided. (U.S. Compiled Statutes,

Sec. 1015, being Judicial Code, See. 33, as amended, Act

August 23, 1916, C. 399; National Prohibition Act, Title II,

Section 28.)

ROBERT D. FORD,

JOHN M. BARTON,

E. FRANKLIN ELY,

WILTON L. STEVENS,

WILLIAM M. TRABING,

By A. W. W. WOODCOCK,

United States Attorney for the

District of Maryland.

3/30/25.

34

Unirep States or America, District or MaryLanp, To WIT:

I Hereby Certify that before me, the undersigned, per-

sonally appeared Robert D. Ford, John M. Barton, Wilton

L. Stevens, E. Franklin Ely, Federal Prohibition Agents,

and William Trabing, a chauffeur employed by the Federal

Prohibition Director, and made oath in due form of law

that they are the persons whose names are subscribed to

the aforegoing petition, and that they have read the peti-

tion, and the matters contained therein are true in sub-

stance and in fact.

CHAS. W. ZIMMERMANN,

Chief Deputy Clerk of the District Court

of the United States for the District of

11-30-25. Maryland.

I, A. W. W. Woodcock, United States Attorney in and

for the District of Maryland, do hereby certify that, as

attorney for the petitioners named above, I have examined

the proceedings against them mentioned in the aforegoing

petition and have carefully inquired into all the matters

set forth in the said petition and I believe the same to be

true.

A. W. W. WOODCOCK,

3/30/25. United States Attorney.

ORDER.

Upon motion of A. W. W. Woodcock, United States At-

torney, Attorney for Robert D. Ford, John M. Barton,

Wilton L. Stevens, E. Franklin Ely, and William Trabing,

praying for the removal to this Court from the Circuit

Court for Harford County in the State of Maryland, of the

35

Criminal Prosecution for Murder against the said Robert

D. Ford, John M. Barton, Wilton L. Stevens, E. Franklin

Ely, and William Trabing, and for the issuance of writs

of certiorari and habeas corpus cum causa for that purpose,

pursuant to Section 33 of the Judicial Code of the United

States, and Section 28 of Title II of the National Prohi-

bition Act, and the Court having read said petition, it is

ORDERED, this thirty-first day of March, nineteen

hundred and twenty-five, that writs of certiorari and habeas

corpus cum causa issue herein directed to the said Court

and to the Clerk of the said Court requiring them to trans-

mit to this Court within ten days the records and proceed-

ings in said case.

United States District Judge, United

States District Court for the District

of Maryland.

{

a SALIENT RAEI ATG MER

36

MOTION TO QUASH AND REMAND ON

AMENDED PETITION.

Filed April 11, 1925.

+

State oF Marytanp In THE

vs. District Court oF THE

Rosert D. Forp, Joun M. Unitep States

Bazton, KE. Franxuin Ey, FOR THE

Witton L. Stevens and District or MaryLanp.

Wiu1am TRraBIna.

(AmENDED Petition.)

MOTION TO QUASH AND REMAND—INDICTMENT

FOR MURDER.

To the Honorable, Morris A. Soper, Judge of said Court:

The State of Maryland, by Thomas H. Robinson, its At-

torney General, and W. Worthington Hopkins, State’s

Attorney for Harford County, who appear specially for

the purposes of this motion, and for no other purpose,

moves this Honorable Court to quash the writ and rescind

the order issued in the above entitled case, directed to the

Judge of the Circuit Court for Harford County, and the

Clerk thereof, and to remand the said case to the Circuit

Court for Harford County, for the following reasons:

1. Because the allegations of the second paragraph of

the amended petition are untrue.

2. Because the allegations of the petition filed in this

case do not disclose a state of facts entitling the petitioners

to have said writ issued or the charge against them re-

moved into this Court.

37

4. Because the issuance of said writ upon the allegations

of said petition and attached certificate of counsel is be-

yond the power and jurisdiction of this Court as limited by

the Constitution and laws of the United States.

5. Because the said writ, if allowed to stand, constitutes

an interference by this Court with the due and orderly ad-

ministration of justice in the Cireuit Court or Harford

County contrary to the Constitution and laws of the United

States.

6. Because there is no allegation in said petition that

authorizes this Court to issue any writ whatsoever against

the Judge or the Clerk of the Circuit Court for Harford

County.

7. And for other good and sufficient reasons to be

shown at the hearing.

THOMAS H. ROBINSON,

Attorney General of Maryland.

W. WORTHINGTON HOPKINS,

State’s Attorney for Harford County.

ROTEL LG RE RTS

38

ORDER OVERRULING MOTION TO QUASH

AND REMAND.

Filed May 5, 1925.

State or Maryianp IN THE

vs. District Court OF THE

Rosert D. Forp, Joun M. Unitep States

Barton, KE. Franxuiy Ey, j FOR THE

Witton L. Srevens and District oF MaryLanp.

Wiiuram TRaBING.

INDICTMENT FOR MURDER.

This cause standing ready for hearing and being submit-

ted upon motion of the State of Maryland to quash the writ

and rescind the order issued in the above entitled case on

the 11th day of February, 1925, directed to the Judge of

the Circuit Court for Harford County, and the Clerk there-

of, and to remand the said case to the Cireuit Court for

Harford County, the counsel for the parties were heard and

the proceedings were read and considered.

It is, therefore, this 5th day of May, 1925, ordered by the

District Court of the United States for the District of Mary-

land, that the said motion of the State of Maryland be and

the same is hereby overruled, and that the removal of this

cause to this Court from the Circuit Court for Harford

County, in the State of Maryland, as directed by the said

order of this Court dated February 11th, 1925, be and the

same is hereby ratified and confirmed.

The United States District Court for the District of

Maryland does further certify to the Supreme Court of the

United States that the sole issue before the said District

39

Court of the United States for the District of Maryland

in the said motion to quash and remand filed by the Stat

of Maryland, was the jurisdiction of the said Court to re

move this cause to said Court from the Circuit Court fo:

Harford County, in the State of Maryland, and that ix

hereby ordering said removal, the said Court does hereby

adjudicate said question of jurisdiction adversely to the

State of Maryland.

MORRIS A. SOPER,

United States District Judge.

40

STIPULATION.

Filed May 5, 1925.

=

State or Maryann IN THE

vs. District Court oF THE

Rosert D. Forp, Jonun M. Unitep States

Barton, EK. Franxurn Ety, FOR THE

Witton L. Stevens and . District or MARYLAND.

Wiruuiam TRaBING.

INDICTMENT FOR MuRDER.

It is stipulated by and between the parties hereto that

Robert D. Ford, John M. Barton, Wilton L. Stevens and

E. Franklin Ely, during the month of November, in the

year 1924, and prior to said time, and at the time of the

matters and facts charged in the indictment in the Circuit

Court for Harford County, were Federal Prohibition Offi-

cers, holding a commission under the Commissioner of In-

ternal Revenue and countersigned by the Federal Prohi-

bition Commissioner, in the form following, that is to say:

‘‘Date No.

THE UNITED STATES

TREASURY INTERNAL REVENUE

DEPARTMENT. SERVICE.

ye err ee rereeT Tee is hereby employed

as a Federal Prohibition Officer to act under the authority

of and to enforce the National Prohibition Act and Acts

supplemental thereto and all Internal Revenue Laws, re-

lating to the manufacture, sale, transportation, control, and

taxation of intoxicating liquors, and he is hereby author-

41

ized to execute and perform all the duties delegated to such

officers by law.

Countersigned :

Federal Prohibition Commissioner of Internal

Commissioner. Revenue.

This Commission is void if photograph of bearer does not

appear above.’’

And that William Trabing was, at the time of the acts

alleged in the indictment in the Circuit Court for Harford

County, a chauffeur of the Reliable Transfer Company,

engaged and employed by Edmund Budnitz, Federal Pro-

hibition Director of the State of Maryland, in the capacity

of chauffeur for the Prohibition Agents above named.

42

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

IN THE MATTER OF THE APPLICATION OF THE

STATE OF MARYLAND FOR A WRIT OF MAN.

DAMUS DIRECTED TO THE HONORABLE,

MORRIS A. SOPER, JUDGE OF THE DISTRICT

COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND,

AND DIRECTED ALSO TO SAID DISTRICT

COURT.

CASE “A,”

EXHIBIT B.

Mr. CueRxk:

Please file.

THOS. H. ROBINSON,

Attorney General for the State

of Maryland.

HERBERT LEVY,

Asst. Attorney General of the

State of Maryland.

43

EXHIBIT B.

RECORD OF PROCEEDINGS OF THE CIRCUIT COURT

FOR HARFORD COUNTY, FILED IN THE DIS-

TRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR

THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND, FEBRUARY 21,

1925.

State oF Maryianp, Harrorp County, To wit:

At a session of the Cireuit Court of the Third Judicial

Circuit of the State of Maryland, begun and held for Har-

ford County, at the Court House in the Town of Bel Air, in

the same County, on the second Monday of February, it

being the ninth day of the same month, in the year of our

Lord one thousand nine hundred and twenty-five.

Present:

The Honorable, T. Scott Offutt, Chief Judge,

The Honorable, Frank I. Duncan, Associate Judge,

The Honorable, William H. Harlan, Associate Judge,

The Honorable, Walter W. Preston, Associate Judge,

Isaac W. Thompson, Esq., Sheriff,

D. Gilpin Wilson, Clerk.

Among others were the following proceedings, to wit:

oD fo) os?

State oF MaryLanp )

vs.

Wirton L. Stevens, Roperr

D. Foro, E. Fran kuin Exy,

Joun M. Barton, Witu1AM

TRABING.

Be it remembered, that at the present term of this Hon-

orable Court, held as aforesaid, Frederick C. Jones, A.

Lynn Baker, Wilson R. Mitchell, Isaac A. Hoffman, Harry

+4

F. Daughton, George K. Livezey, Louis Amrein, Charles

W. Walker, William A. Bodt, Harry E. Martin, Hargraves

Spalding, T. Norman Harkins, Lawrence E. Bauer, Preston

C. Snodgrass, J. Henry Baird, Edward Breibenbaugh, Seth

B. Taylor, Harry F. Pyle, Frederick O. Veile, Samuel E.

Walker, Harry E. Sheridan, George C. Proctor and John

E. Webster, good and lawful men of the County aforesaid,

who being empannelled, sworn and charged as the Grand

Inquest of the State of Maryland for the body of Harford

County, having withdrawn from the Bar of this Honorable

Court here did afterwards return and present to this Hon-

orable Court a presentment in the words and form follow-

ing, to wit:

In tHe Crecurr Court ror Harrorp County:

February Term, 1925.

The Grand Inquest of the State of Maryland for the body

of Harford County do, on their oath present that Wilton

L. Stevens, Robert D. Ford, E. Franklin Ely, John M. Bar-

ton and William Trabing, late of Harford County afore-

said, at County aforesaid, on the nineteenth day of Novem-

ber, nineteen hundred and twenty-four, did kill and murder

Lawrence Wenger, against the peace, government and dig-

nity of the State.

FRED C. JONES, Foreman.

Witness:

Abraham Woods,

Ralph T. Woods,

James Patterson,

John H. Henson,

Dr. P. F. Sappington,

Dewey F. Bowman.

Whereupon, the State of Maryland, by W. Worthington

Hopkins, E'sq., State’s Attorney for Harford County, prose-

45

euted and sued forth out of this Honorable Court the Writ

of the State of Maryland of Capias ad respondendum

against the said Wilton L. Stevens, Robert D. Ford, E.

Franklin Ely, John M. Barton and William Trabing, to

the Sheriff of Harford County, in the words and form

following :

SraTeE oF Mary.anp,

To the Sheriff of Harford County—Greeting:

You are hereby commanded to take the bodies of Wilton

L. Stevens, Robert D. Ford, E. Franklin Ely, John M. Bar-

ton and William Trabing, late of Harford County, if they

shall be found in your bailiwick, and that them so taken,

you safely keep, so that you have their bodies before the

Cireuit Court for Harford County, at the Court House in

the same county at once, to answer unto the State of Mary-

land on a presentment and indictment did kill and murder

Lawrence Wenger contrary to the Act of Assembly in such

case made and provided, and against the peace, government

and dignity of the State.

Hereof fail not at your peril, and have you then and

there this Writ.

WITNESS the Honorable T. Scott Offutt, Chief

Judge of our said Court, the 9th day of Feb-

(Seal.) ruary, 1925. Issued the 10th day of Feb-

ruary, 1925.

Test: D. G. WILSON, Clerk.

Witness:

Abraham Woods,

Ralph T. Woods,

James Patterson,

Charles Cook,

John Cook (col.),

John H. Henson,

Robert Atwell,

Charles Bobbitt,

Dr. P. F. Sappington.

To which said Writ of the State of Maryland of Capias

ad respondendum (which was delivered to said Sheriff of

Harford County to be executed) there has been no Return

to this Honorable Court, and the said Wilton L. Stevens,

Robert D. Ford, FE. Franklin Ely, John M. Barton and

William Trabing, as shown by the Records of this Honor-

able Court are still at large.

And the said W. Worthington Hopkins, Esq., the State’s

Attorney for Harford County, exhibits to the Grand In-

quest of the State of Maryland, for the Body of Harford

County, an indictment against the said Wilton L. Stevens,

Robert D. Ford, E. Franklin Ely, John M. Barton and Wil-

liam Trabing in the words and form following, to wit:

Stare or Mary.anp, Harrorp County, To wir:

The Jurors of the State of Maryland, for the body of

Harford County, do on their oath present that Wilton L.

Stevens, John M. Barton, Robert D. Ford, E. Franklin Ely

and William Trabing, late of Harford County aforesaid,

on the nineteenth day of November, in the year of our Lord

nineteen hundred and twenty-four, at the County aforesaid,

feloniously, wilfully and of their deliberately premeditated

malice aforethought did kill and murder Lawrence Wenger;

contrary to the form of the Act of Assembly in such case

made and provided; and against the peace, government and

dignity of the State.

W. WORTHINGTON HOPKINS,

State’s Attorney for Harford County.

47

Whereupon, the said Grand Inquest of the State of Mary-

land for the Body of Harford County, returned the said

Indictment to our Honorable Court here thereon endorsed:

True Bill.

FRED C. JONES, Fvreman.”’

And afterwards, to wit, on the 12th day of February,

1925, a Petition, Affidavit and Order of Court issuing out

of the Honorable, the United States District Court for the

District of Maryland, commanding the transmission of the

Record of Proceedings in the case be sent to the Honorable,

the United States District Court for the District of Mary-

land, were received by the Clerk of the Honorable, the Cir-

euit Court of the Third Judicial Circuit of the State of

Maryland, for Harford County, under protest.

State or Maryann, Harrorp County, ro wir:

I, D. Gilpin Wilson, Clerk of the Cireuit Court for Har-

for County, the same being a Court of Law and Record,

hereby certify that the aforegoing is a true, full and com-

plete transcript of the Record of Proceedings in the there-

in entitled case, as the same remains of record in this office.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF I hereto sub-

scribe my name and affix the seal of the Cir-

euit Court for Harford County, this 21st day

(Seal.) of February, 1925.

D. GILPIN WILSON,

Clerk of the Cireuit Court of the Third

Judicial Circuit of the State of Mary-

land, for Harford County.

48

Whereupon, the Record of Proceedings is transmitted

accordingly.

D. GILPIN WILSON, Clerk.

Unirep Srates or AMERICA,

District or Maryann, to wit:

I, ARTHUR L. SPAMER, Clerk of the District Court of

the United States for the District of Maryland, do hereby

certify that the foregoing papers comprising Exhibits ‘‘A”’

and ‘‘B’’ are true copies respectively of all the original

papers filed on the respective dates set forth in the captions

thereto, in the case of the State of Maryland versus Robert

D. Ford, E. Franklin Ely, John M. Barton, Wilton L.

Stevens and William Trabing, No. 7189 Criminal, in the

District Court of the United States for the District of

Maryland; and I further certify that the Docket Entries

above set forth are truly taken from the record of proceed-

ings in said case.

IN TESTIMONY WHEREOF, I hereunto set

my hand and affix the seal of said District

Court, this 24th day of September, A. D.

1925.

ARTHUR lL. SPA MER,

Clerk.

(Seal.)

49

CERTIFIED COPY OF DOCKET ENTRIES—CIRCUIT

COURT FOR HARFORD COUNTY.

State or Marytanp 7

vs.

Witton L. Stevens, Rosert In tHE Crrcuir Court

D. Forp, E. Franxuin Ety, ( FOR

Joun M. Barton, WILLIAM Harrorp County.

TRABING. }

Feby. 10, 1925—Present. for Murder filed and Capias

Issd. Same day Indictment endorsed and True Bill filed.

Feby. 12, 1925—Petition and Affidavit of the District

Attorney of the United States District Court for the Dis-

trict of Maryland for Removal and Order of said Court

commanding the Record of Proceedings be sent to said

United States District Court for the District of Maryland

recorded by the Clerk of this Court under Protest and copy

of same left and filed.

State or Maryann, Harrorp County, Scr:

I hereby certify that the above is a true copy of the

Docket Entries in the above entitled case, as same remains

of record in this office.

In Testimony Whereof, I hereto subscribe my

name and affix the Seal of the Circuit Court

for Harford County, this 11th day of Septem-

ber, 1925.

D. GILPIN WILSON,

Clerk of the Circuit Court

(Seal.) for Harford County.

FiLKD

93 Ori oO. OCT 24 1925

In Tue

Supreme Court of the United States

STATE OF MARYLAND

versus

MORRIS A. SOPER, JUDGE OF THE DISTRICT

COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

DISTRICT OF MARYLAND, AND THE DIS-

TRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR

THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND.

CASE “A.”

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR MAN-

DAMUS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE

OF MARYLAND.

Mr. Clerk:

Please file:

THOS. H. ROBINSON,

Attorney General of Maryland.

HERBERT LEVY,

Assistant Attorney General of Maryland.

The Daily Record Company Print, Baltimore, Md,

INDEX.

ieee PAGES

STATEMENT OF THE CASE........................ 1-4

I ready ns Diasec te bic hee 5-45

Enumeration of points discussed.............. 5-6

I. This Court is vested with jurisdiction to

entertain the petition for mandamus in this

case. Mandamus lies from this Court to

compel a Federal District Court to remand

a criminal prosecution to the State Court,

where it is apparent from the record that

the Federal Court has no jurisdiction what-

OO ED 5 i db oe sckackdaasse cn... 6-12

If. Removal acts are strictly construed. They

are not enlarged by construction.......... 12-14

III. The jurisdiction of the Federal Court under

removal acts rests and depends upon the

statements made in the petition for removal

and verified by the oath of the petitioner. . 14

IV. The scope of Section 33 of the Judicial

UR ana teventacuie sep Rc ere 14-45

A. The persons to whom it is applicable:

It is not applicable to Federal Prohi-

tion Agents, because Federal Prohi-

tion Agents, acting under the National

Prohibition Act, are not Revenue Offi-

cers, and theNational Prohibition Act

is not a Revenue Law.............. 14-21

3

B. The actions and prosecutions embraced

within it:

ConcLusION

Appenpix—Text of Section 33 of the Judicial Code 49-51

The removal act applies only where

the act which is the Seals of the action

or prosecution has some rational con-

nection with official duties under a

‘Revenue Law,’’ and in some way

affects the revenue of the government.

In this case the amended petition,

which sets forth in detail the facts

upon which the petitioners rely, does

not meet the jurisdictional require-

ments for the removal of the prosecu-

7 epee peor re er Ser t yr Tee

“wi ae ee eS ee Oe Oe ee ee ee ee

en ee ape ae Per)

ssn repamrecnanepcarsrees ene eitI

aa

iii

; TABLE OF CASES.

PAGES

Alabama, State of, vs. Peak, 252 Fed. 306 (D. C. 8. D., Ala.)...... 39-42

Blake vs. McKim, 103 U. 8. 336, 26 L. ed. 563.................... 12

Bogan vs. Commonwealth of Mass., 285 Fed. 668................. 16, 44

Boston & L. R. Co. vs. Salem & L. R. Co., 21 Fed. Cases p. 228,

Fed. Cas. No. 12249

[Jawa rahPrrseadans emedenm sass ceeuakudecns 14, 34

Castle vs. Lewis, 254 Fed. 917 (C. C. A., 8th Cir.)............... 27

Commonwealth of Mass. vs. Bogan, 285 Fed. 668................ 16, 44

Commonwealth of Pa. vs. U. S., 293 Fed. 931................... . 16-17

Cunningham vs. Neagle, 135 U. 8. 1, 34 L. ed. 55, 10 8. Ct. Rep. 658 27

Davis vs. South Carolina, 107 U. S. 597, 27 L. ed. 574, 2 Sup. Ct.

Me MN 66.6 05s a pacar nsec tecdasewsseareuewceedeauess sen suc 31

Davis vs. Tennessee, 100 U. S. 257, 25 L. ed. 648............... 13, 28-31

DeHart vs. Virginia (C. C., 1902), 119 Fed. 626..... icais.atee aca 14, 34-36

Drury vs. Lewis, 200 U. 8. 1, 50 L. ed. 343, 26 S. Ct. Rep. 229.... 27

Ex parte Gruetter, 217 U. 8. 586, 54 L. ed. 892, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 690 7

Ex parte Hoard, 105 U. S. 578, 26 L. ed. 1176..................2.. 6

Ex parte Nebraska, 209 U. 8. 436, 52 L. ed. 876, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 581 6

Ex parte Park Square Automobile Station, 244 U. 8. 412, 61 L. ed.

BN et SU A REN, SR oo os as od wi Sajain sin eases abla ec badengane

7

Ex parte Riddle, 255 U. 8. 450, 65 L. ed. 725, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 370. . 7

Ex parte Roe, 234 U. 8. 70, 58 L. ed. 1217, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 722.. 7

Ex parte Wisner, 203 U. 8S. 449, 51 L. ed. 264, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 150... 4 7

Felts vs. Virginia, 133 Fed. 85 (C. C., W. D. Va.)................. 36-38

Fletcher vs. Illinois, 22 Fed. 776 (C. C., N. D. UL).......... 32-33, 40, 41

Gibney vs. Wolkin, 3 Fed. Rep. 2nd Series 960................... 17

Gillian vs. Smith, 282 Fed. 628.................... 16, 17, 18-21, 43-44

Goodwin vs. People’s United States Bank (C. C. E. D., Mo.), 162

ies Rd EE Ey OE OE EE OE Te A Sr eee 13, 38-39

Gruetter, ex parte, 217 U. S. 586, 54 L. ed. 892, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 690 7

Harding, re: 219 U. 8. 363, 55 L. ed. 252, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 324, 37

is es ey A crc a swnigaic saw k sand chaledwsns <esacosuee ts 7

Higgins vs. Morse, 273 Fed. 830.................. See aaneubencae 16

Higgins va. Moree, 873 Fed. S32. . oo... cccccccsccccccccecccscese 16

Hoard, ex parte, 105 U. 8. 578, 26 L. ed. 1176..................... 6

Illinois vs. Fletcher, 22 Fed. 776 (C. C., N. D. IIL).......... 32-33, 40, 41

In re: Marsh, 51 Fed. 277

PE eI sn pas or ett bon tsa oe ET .

iv

Kentucky vs. Powers, 201 U. 8. 1, 50 L. ed. 633, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep.

387, 5 A. & E. Annotated Cases 692.......... eee eS ere 8,11

Lederer vs. Lipke, 259 U. S. 557, 66 L. ed. 1061............... 15, 16, 17

Lewis vs. Castle, 254 Fed. 917 (6. ©, Bi, GER Cite) os on case ees she 27

Lewis vs. Drury, 200 U. S. 1, 50 L. ed. 343, 26 S. Ct. Rep. 229..,... 27

Lipke vs Lederer, 259 U. 8. 557, 66 L. ed. 1061......... canoe 15, 16, 17

pie Be Paes 1 Oa a a 27

Massachusetts, Commonwealth of, vs. Bogan, 285 Fed. 668........ 16, 44

McKim vs. Blake, 103 3 DO, AO 8s OF SOS is icici deceives 12

MecLish vs. Roff, 141 U. S. 661, 35 L. ed. 893.............0..0000- 12

Moore, re: 209 U. S. 490, 52 L. ed. 904, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 585, 14

Bi Ge TE, DOUGIOR TOE DIG a oso sions ie acces scesecdsacecse 7

Morse va: Tiggine, B70 Fad, GIO. ooo cain s 60 ocas css ecceees ns wae 16

Morse vs. Higgins, 273 Fed. 832............. PPEre ror errr re tree a0 16

Neagle vs. Cunningham, 135 U. S. 1, 34 L. ed. 55, 10 S. Ct. Rep. 658 27

Nebraska, ex parte, 209 U. 8. 436, 52 L. ed. 876, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 581 6

Come We. WOR, Bee POG: OIG. oie ieee ivkaccenecdes ee 15, 42-43

Pales vs. Paolo, (C. C. A. Ist Circuit), Adv. Sheets, Fed. Rep. July

A MN cg Nat ohn a ay pn asd aKa yee Pan eEREE yo ae

Paolo vs. Pales, (C. C. A. lst Circuit), Adv. Sheets, Fed. Rep. July

Be NR Ua soi Ss ahaa s hod dew ed baie ae Kanne dress 27

Park Square Automobile Station, ex parte, 244 U. 8. 412, 61 L. ed.

1231, 37 Sup. Ct. Rep. 732......... Ee PP eS ee ree erer ti

Paul vs. Virginia, 148 U. 8. 107, 37 L. ed. 386, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep.

ON ed wie dann cass chia ceius csGatacasunmecda desea sae@ass 8,10, 11

Peak vs. State of Alabama, 252 Fed. 306 (D. C., S. D., Ala.)...... 39-42

Pennsylvania, Commonwealth of, vs. U. S., 293 Fed. 931........... 16-17

People’s United States Bank vs. Goodwin (C. C., E. D. Mo.), 162

OA, US ois cisco aie Sina alaha pla es bx ee aielavese adie claims s asia aOR bid 13, 38-39

Pollitz, re: 206 U. S. 323, 51 L. ed. 1081, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 729...... 6

Powers vs. Kentucky, 201 U.S. 1, 50 L. ed. 633, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep.

SBT, SB. Be Ba CO ais as aks kaieese case snasaaicccns 8,11

Re: Harding, 219 U. 8. 363, 55 L. ed. 252, 31 Sup. Ct. Rep. 324, 37

Me i a es here os KS 4s coal ce has cu cuwnicke oesslea cain 7

Re: Moore, 209 U. S. 490, 52 L. ed. 904, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 585, 14

re Ne a ee eee err errr eee ee 7

Re: Pollitz, 206 U. S. 323, 51 L. ed. 1081, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 729..... 6

Re: Winn, 213 U. S. 458, 53 L. ed. 873, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 515...... 7

Riddle, ex parte, 255 U. 8. 450, 65 L. ed. 725, 41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 370.. 7

Rives vs. Virginia, 100 U. 8. 313, 25 L. ed. 667, 3 Am. Crim. Rep.

Wg a eae cisco cad esti ok esis 6 3 cue ne nce edie Woe usp ai tek wale 8-10, 11

Roe, ex peste, 234 U. 8. 70, 58 L. ed. 1217, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 722. 7

Roff vs. McLish, 141 UV. 8. 661, 35 L. ed. 893...................... 12

Salem & L. R. Co. vs. Boston & L. R. Co., 21 Fed. Cas. p. 228, Fed.

eee ie MON oo tae ok nsroac/poies sxe ele cm Wedieehe tise sek eee cours 14, 34

en

_—

Vv

Sanges vs. U. 8., 144 U. 8. 310, 36 L. ed. 445..................... 11,12

Sewing Mach. Co.’s Case, 18 Wall. 553, 21 L. ed. 914........ Sada 12

South Carolina vs. Davis, 107 U. 8. 597, 27 L. ed. 574, 2 Sup. Ct.

Rep. 636........ MOAASRORAES RRS He ch SES Ce whennne kee baaeen 31

Smith ve. Gillian, 282 Fed. 628...................... 16, 17, 18-21, 43-44

State of Alabama vs. Peak, 252 Fed. 306 (D. C., 8. D. Ala.)........ 39-42

Tennessee vs. Davis, 100 U. 8. 257, 25 L. ed. 648............... 13, 28-31

U. 8. vs. Commonwealth of Pa., 203 Fed. 981.................... 16-17

U. 8. vs. Sanges, 144 U. 8. 310, 36 L. ed. 445..................... 11,12

U. 8. vs. Weeden, 24 Fed. Cas. 738, Fed. Cas. No. 14412........... 27

Virginia vs. DeHart (C. C., 1902), 119 Fed. 626...... prea 14, 34-36

Virginia vs. Felts, 133 Fed. 85 (C. C., W. Py UR Ansabatdnedatia 36-38

Virginia vs. Paul, 148 U. 8. 107, 37 L. ed. 386, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep.

MENSA S © DRARENGE Shes ndieenadnadileadunnhesauneccaericece 8, 10-11, 14

Virginia vs. Rives, 100 U. 8. 313, 25 L. ed. 667, 3 Am. Crim. Rep.

WORN <5 SiAR Mia ndnunhdnseeeinmbbebendbakadien ik cecs cs 8-10, 11

Weeden vs. U. 8., 24 Fed. Cas. 738, Fed. Cas. No. 14412.......... 27

Wells Fargo & Co. vs. Johnson (C. C., 1899), 98 Fed. 3............ 14

Winn, re: 213 U. 8. 458, 53 L. ed. 873, 29 Sup. Ct. Rep. 515........ ?

Wisner, ex parte, 203 U. 8. 449, 51 L. ed. 264, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 150.. ?

Wolkin vs Gibney, 3 Fed. Rep. 2nd Series 960........... ere 17

Wood vs. Oregon, 268 Fed. 975...........0cccccecsccceccceee, 15, 42-43

STATUTES CITED.

Judicial Code:

gta OE EL OA Saale See aa SaaS Wee haemo kd 13-45, 49-51

PE ME sata daca nnehavdnddecendstncakhcescceuus eet ye 9

National Prohibition Act:

Geetion 88, Title TZ... ....ccccscccccces re eee eee 16-31

Revised Statutes:

RCM Gh hwh 6k o0sbacnabenkacadinda kuuns cuwiin coetes

UE, Snakavannacaus eer re ere

cy SESE ea Ta Nn soe een oe AS axeknes

MOSEOR FTE 6 vsiccc iccicscacs senanene eee Tere ee

U. 8. Compiled Statutes, 1916, Annotated:

Section 1011, Vol. 1, pp. 972-973.................

Section 1015, Vol. 1, pp. 1015-1026................0.0055

Section 1211, Vol. 2, pp. 1567, 1570-1579.............c.ccccccee

Section 1211, 1919 Supp., Vol. 1, pp. 214-215

I My WI MW I vk nv dc ccccadacuvcenaccceccecces

I: BN Ws Oh NI ion win id snc vncaccncedacncucces

——

os

State oF Mary.anp )

vs.

Morris A. Sorzr, JupcE or

THE District Court or In THE

THE Unitep States ror SUPREME COURT

THE District or Mary- OF THE

LAND, AND THE District UNITED STATES.

Court or tHE Uwnirep

SvTates ror THE District

or MaryLanp.

CASE “A”.

BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF PETITION FOR MAN.

DAMUS ON BEHALF OF THE STATE

OF MARYLAND.

Statement of the Case.

On the 10th of February, 1925, Robert D. Ford, John

M. Barton, E. Franklin Ely, Wilton L. Stevens and Wil-

liam Trabing, were indicted in the Circuit Court for

Harford County, State of Maryland, for the murder on

or about the 19th day of November, 1924, of one Law-

rence Wenger, a citizen of the State of Maryland.

On the 11th day of February, 1925, the defendants in

said indictment, through the United States Attorney for

the District of Maryland, filed a petition in the District

Court of the United States for the District of Maryland

(Morris A. Soper, Judge), for the removal of said case

from the Cireuit Court for Harford County to the said

District Court, under the provisions of Section 33 of the

2

Judicial Code, and for a writ of habeas corpus cum causa

for that purpose.

The petition alleged that the petitioners were, with

the exception of Trabing, Federal Prohibition Agents

of the Bureau of Internal Revenue of the Treasury De-

partment of the United States, and at the time of the

murder, were acting under and by authority of the Fed-

eral Prohibition Director of the State of Maryland, and

that Trabing was acting as chauffeur for said Federal

Prohibition agents, under and by authority of said Fed-

eral Prohibition Director of the State of Maryland, and

of the said Federal Prohibition Agents.

For convenience, however, no distinction will be here-

after made between Trabing and the others. All will be

designated and referred to as ‘‘Federal Prohibition

Agents.’’

The petition further alleged that at the time of the

murder the petitioners were in the discharge of their

official duties as Prohibition Agents in making and at-

tempting to make an investigation in the discharge of

their duty and in protecting themselves in the discharge

of their duty, but it denied they were guilty of the murder.

Upon this petition the Court passed an order removing

the case and directing the writ of habeas corpus cum

causa to issue as prayed.

The writ was served and the petitioners were admitted

to bail by the District Court of the United States for the

District of Maryland.

After the record of the proceedings of the Circuit

Court for Harford County was filed in said District

Court pursuant to said order of removal, the State of

Maryland appeared specially in said District Court and

filed a motion to quash the writ and rescind the order of

removal.

Upon a hearing of said motion, the Court ruled that

the petition for removal was defective, but granted leave

to the petitioners to amend the same.

Thereafter, the petitioners filed an amended petition

for removal. The amended petition differed from the

original in the following particulars:

(1) It alleged that the petitioners were acting under

the authority of, and enforcing not only the National

Prohibition Act and acts supplemental thereto, but all

internal revenue laws relating to the manufacture, sale,

transportation, control and taxation of intoxicating

liquors, with authority to execute and perform all the

duties delegated to such officers by law.

(2) It further alleged, in general terms, that at the

time of the murder the petitioners were engaged in their

official duties as prouibition officers in making and at-

tempting to make an investigation concerning a viola-

tion, not only of the National Prohibition Act, but of

other internal revenue laws.

(3) It set out in great detail the acts and movements

of the petitioners on the day of the murder. It set forth

that after the petitioners had completed an investigation

in Harford County, Maryland, of a violation of the

National Prohibition Law, they started to return to their

automobile for the purpose of returning to Baltimore to

report to the office of the Federal Prohibition Director

concerning the results of their investigation when they

discovered a man whom they afterwards learned to be

one Lawrence Wenger, mortally wounded and lying be-

4

side the path along which they were walking. They car-

ried the wounded man to their automobile and took him

to Jarrettsville, Maryland, and thence to Belair, Mary-

land, for the purpose of obtaining medical attention for

him, and finally placed the said Wenger in charge of a

doctor in Belair, who pronounced him dead. They then

removed the body to an undertaker’s establishment in

Belair. The said petition did not allege that Wenger

was involved in the violation of the National Prohibition

Law which the petitioners were investigating, or that

they were responsible, either lawfully or unlawfully, for

the death of said Wenger, or that any act performed by

them under color of their office resulted in the death of

Wenger, or that they had knowledge of the manner in

which Wenger came to his death, or that Wenger’s death

resulted from any act performed by them in their self-

protection as Federal Prohibition officers in the discharge

of their duties.

(4) The removal was sought under Section 28, Title

II of the National Prohibition Act, as well as under

Section 33 of the Judicial Code.

Upon the filing of the amended petition, the State of

Maryland again appeared specially and again moved to

‘‘quash and remand.’’ On May Sth, 1925, by order of

the District Court, this motion to ‘‘quash and remand’’

was overruled, and the original order removing the case

was ratified and confirmed.

In this proceeding, the State of Maryland asks this

Court to entertain a petition for mandamus directed to

Morris A. Soper, Judge of the District Court of the

United States for the District of Maryland, and said

District Court to compel the said Judge and said Court

to remand the said prosecution to the Circuit Court for

Harford County, Maryland.

LN ak i BES Re ES ORT ad a a a EE ee POP RITES OE at 5

5

ARGUMENT.

Points To Be Discussed.

1.

This Court is vested with jurisdiction to entertain the

petition for mandamus in this case. Mandamus lies

from this Court to compel a Federal District Court to

remand a criminal prosecution to the State Court where

it is apparent from the record that the Federal Court

has no jurisdiction whatever of the case.

Il.

Removal acts are strictly construed. They are not

enlarged by construction.

ITI.

The jurisdiction of the Federal Court under removal

acts rests and depends upon the statements made in the

petition for removal and verified by the oath of the

petitioner.

IV.

The scope of Section 33 of the Judicial Code.

A. The persons to whom it is applicable.

1. It does not apply to Federal Prohibition Agents.

2. Section 28 of Title II of the National Prohibition

Act does not enlarge its Scope, so as to confer the right

of removal upon Federal Prohibition Agents.

B. The actions and prosecutions embraced within it.

1. It applies only where the act which is the basis of

the action or prosecution has some rational connection

a a -

6

with official duties under a ‘‘Revenue Law’’ and in some

way affects the revenue of the Government.

L

This Court is vested with jurisdiction to entertain the

petition for mandamus in this case. Mandamus lies

from this Court to compel a Federal District Court to

remand a criminal prosecution to the State Court where

it is apparent from the record that the Federal Court

has no jurisdiction whatever of the case.

It has been decided in a number of cases that the extra-

ordinary remedy of mandamus cannot be resorted to in

a civil proceeding to compel an inferior Federal Court

to remand a case pending therein to the State Courts,

after denial by the inferior Federal tribunal of a motion

so to remand. The basis for this rule, as stated in Re

Pollite, 206 U. S. 323, 51 L. ed. 1081, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep.

729 (page 331), is that ‘‘mandamus cannot be issued to

compel the Court below to decide a matter before it ina

particular way, or to review its judicial action had in the

exercise of legitimate jurisdiction, nor can the writ be

used to perform the office of an appeal or writ of error.”’

Ordinarily, mandamus is not to be used when another

statutory method has been provided for reviewing the

action below, or to reverse a decision of record.

It has been broadly asserted that the inferior Federal

tribunals have the power to decide whether or not they

have jurisdiction to try a civil cause properly brought

before them, and that such decisions are not open to

collateral attack.

Ex parte Hoard, 105 U. S. 578, 26 L. ed. 1176;

Re Pollitz, supra;

Ex parte Nebraska, 209 U. S. 436, 52 L. ed.

876, 28 Sup. Ct. Rep. 581;

~

(

ny Ex parte Gruetter, 217 U. S. 586, 54 L. ed.

892, 30 Sup. Ct. Rep. 690;

Re Harding, 219 U. S. 363, 55 L. ed. 252, 31

Sup. Ct. Rep. 324, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 392;

Ex parte Roe, 234 U.S. 70, 58 L. ed. 1217, 34

Sup. Ct. Rep. 722;

Ex parte Park Square Automobile Station,

244 U. S. 412, 61 L. ed. 1231, 37 Sup. Ct.

Rep. 732;

Ex parte Riddle, 255 U. S. 450, 65 L. ed. 725,

41 Sup. Ct. Rep. 370.

Until the decision in Re H arding, supra, there was an

apparent conflict between certain decided cases dealing

with the right to review by mandamus orders of inferior

Federal tribunals refusing to remand, and a long and

settled line of other cases relating to the same subject,

but in the Harding opinion, all of the cases upon the

subject are set out at length and discussed, and the Court

announced the general rule, above stated, to be applied

in civil cases. In doing so, it disapproved and qualified

the following cases:

Ex parte Wisner, 203 U. S. 449, 51 L. ed.

264, 27 Sup. Ct. Rep. 150;

Re Moore, 209 U. S. 490, 52 L. ed. 904, 28

Sup. Ct. Rep. 585, 706, 14 A. & E. Anno-

tated Cases 1164; 3

Re Winn, 213 U. S. 458, 53 L. ed. 873, 29 Sup. q

Ct. Rep. 515, :

to the extent that said cases were in conflict with the

general doctrine announced in Ex parte Hoard, supra,

and the cases which have followed it:

In the Harding case an exception to the general rule

above stated, which had been recognized in several earlier

Piemre.- ete ; RNR ERG IER PROSE TOO a ONY a

cases was referred to with approval and affirmed. This

exception related to the power of this Court to utilize

the writ of mandamus to remand a criminal prosecution

‘‘which, if wrong was committed, no power otherwise to

redress than by mandamus existed’’ (page 378).

This exception has been recognized in the following

cases :

Virgima vs. Rives, 100 U. S. 313, 25 L. ed.

667, 3 Am. Crim. Rep. 524;

Virginia vs. Paul, 148 U.S. 107, 37 L. ed. 386,

13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 636;

Kentucky vs. Powers, 201 U. S. 1, 50 L. ed.

633, 26 Sup. Ct. Rep. 387, 5 A. & E. An-

notated Cases 692.

The State of Maryland, in asking this Court to enter-

tain this petition for mandamus, contends that the case

at bar falls within the exception announced in the cases

last cited. A careful examination of said cases dis-

closes their marked similarity with the instant case.

In Virginia vs. Rives, supra, a prosecution of persons

accused of murder was removed from a State Court toa

Cireuit Court of the United States. The latter Court,

moreover, under a writ of habeas corpus cum causa, took

the prisoners from the custody of the State authorities.

The Commonwealth of Virginia made application to the

Supreme Court of the United States for a rule to show

cause why the prisoners should not be returned to the

State Court for trial. On hearing, the Court took juris-

diction over the cause, issued the writ of mandamus and

directed the return of the accused.

The grounds for the assumption of jurisdiction by the

Cireuit Court, as they appear from the opinion of the

9

Court and the concurring opinion, may be summarized

as follows:

(1) The jurisdiction is conferred by Section 688 of the

Revised Statutes (Second Edition, 1878), pages 127-128;

Act, 24 Sept., 1789, e. 20, s. 13, v. 1, p. 80; Judicial Code,

Section 234; Act March 3, 1911, ¢. 231, s. 234; 36 St.

1156), which reads, in part, as follows:

‘‘The Supreme Court shall have power to issue

* * * writs of mandamus, in cases warranted by

the principals and usages of law, to any Courts

appointed under the authority of the United States,

or to persons holding office under the authority of

the United States, where a State * * * isa party.’’

See also:

United States Compiled Statutes, 1916, Anno-

tated, Vol. 2, Sec. 1211, pp. 1567; 1570-

1579;

Ibid, 1919 Supplement, Vol. 1, pp. 214-215.

(2) It is the function of the writ of mandamus to con-

trol judicial discretion when that discretion has been

abused.

‘*It is a remedy where the case is outside of the

exercise of this discretion, and outside the jurisdic-

tion of the Court or officer to which or to whom the

writ is addressed’’ (100 U. S. 323).

(3) The asserted power of the inferior Federal tri-

bunal implied a confusion and disregard of constitu-

tional limitations.

(4) No power would otherwise have existed to correct

the wrongful assumption of jurisdiction by the Circiut

Court.

‘‘The jurisdiction invoked is, in its nature appel-

late; and there is no other mode provided for its

BACCARAT DOI LE LAI SETS EG LA NE EY

10

exercise in the case at bar than by the writ prayed.

‘‘ And so in the case at bar, without the use of this

writ, the greatest possible injury would be inflicted

upon the Commonwealth of Virginia, without any

redress, if the Circuit Court, as contended, trans-

cended its jurisdiction. In no case, therefore, could

the writ be more properly issued in the interest of

justice, order and good government. Nor was there

any necessity for a previous demand upon that Court

in the way of a motion to remand the prisoners.”’

lala opinion, Mr. Justice Ficld, 25 L. ed.

73).

In Virginia vs. Paul, supra, a person in the custody of

the State authorities, charged with murder, was released

under a writ of habeas corpus, issued by a District

Judge. Subsequently the Cireuit Court of the United

States took, by way of removal, jurisdiction over the

prosecution. The Commonwealth of Virginia applied

to this Court for a mandamus to remand the prosecution

and restore the accused to the custody of the State au-

thorities. The Court reaffirming the doctrine of Vir-

ginia vs. Rives, pointed out that to wrongfully devest the

State of its right to prosecute in its own Court for crimes

committed against its authority was a gross abuse of

discretion, which, if not corrected by mandamus could

not be done in any other form. A mandamus to remand

was issued.

In passing upon the jurisdictional question, Mr. J ustice

Gray, who delivered the opinion of the Court said (pp.

122-123) :

‘The result is that the Circuit Court of the United

States has, without authority of law, assumed juris-

diction of an indictment found in the Courts of the

State of Virginia for a crime against the laws of the

State, and that the State is entitled to have the

Hi D ei ee ty AS at a ef ah ISS TRAD TIN, NY SEEN IE IS METS E se USOC ,

a a os STE Heo PETE

11

prosecution remanded to its Courts, to be there dealt

with according to law. For aught that appears on

this record, the State is not bound to commence or

to carry on the prosecution in the Courts of another

Ss but is entitled to resume its own right-

ul jurisdiction and authority and to try the offender

in its own Courts. If the case should be allowed to

proceed in the Circuit Court of the United States,

and should finally result in an acquittal of the

charge, in whole or in part, the State could not have

a writ of error to review the judgment. United

States vs. Sanges, 144 U. S. 310. A stronger case

for issuing a writ of mandamus can hardly be imag-

ined. The writ may be directed to the J udge who

has lawfully assumed jurisdiction of the prosecu-

tion; and no prevoius motion to him to remand the

case was necessary. The case is governed in every

eng by Virginia vs. Rives, 100 U. 8. 313, 316,

323, 324.”’

In Kentucky vs. Powers, supra, upon the petition of

the Commonwealth of Kentucky for a writ of mandamus

to compel the Circuit Court of the United States for the

Eastern District of Kentucky to remand a criminal

prosecution which had been removed to that Court from

the Circuit Court of Scott County in that State and to

restore the custody of the accused to the State authori-

ties, the rule for mandamus was made absolute. The

doctrine of Virginia vs. Rives as to the jurisdiction of

the Court was applied, without comment in the opinion.

It will be observed that the case at bar clearly falls

within the exception to the rule. It bears the closest

resemblance to Virginia vs. Paul, where, as here, the in-

ferior Federal Court had ordered a removal under the

alleged authority of Section 33 of the Judicial Code.

It may be contended that the petitioner’s remedy is

by appeal from the order of the District Court of the

United States refusing to remand the case to the State

ae RRA PIA ORO OED

12

Court. But it is well established that such a review can

be had only after final judgment.

McLish vs. Roff, 141 U. S. 661, 35 L. ed. 893.

But if the final judgment is one of acquittal of the

charge, in whole or in part, the State could not have a

writ of error to review the judgment (U. S. vs. Sanges,

144 U.S. 310, 36 L. ed. 445).

It thus appears that unless this Court entertains the

petition for mandamus in this case, the State of Mary-

land is without any redress, if the District Court, as con-

tended, has transcended its jurisdiction in removing this

case from the State Court, and in denying the State’s

motion to remand the same.

II.

Removal acts are strictly construed. They are not

enlarged by construction.

In dealing with statutes intended to affect or claimed

---te-affect the continuation of jurisdiction in courts of orig-

inal and general authority the law has always recognized

a principle of construction which served to favor the

retention of jurisdiction. This Court has held that even

under the Judiciary Act of 1875, which was designed to

increase the Federal jurisdiction by removal, the Court

was ‘‘not disposed to enlarge that jurisdiction by mere

construction.’’

Blake vs. McKim, 103 U. S. 336, 26 L. ed. 563;

Sewing Mach. Co.’s Case, 18 Wall. 553, 21 L.

ed. 914.

Although the successive removal acts of Congress have

a common object, namely, the transfer of actions from

State to Federal Courts, they provide for different and

13

distinct grounds on which the right of removal is to

depend and no case is subject to removal, which is not by

its facts brought completely within some defined class.

It is always helpful to a Court in interpreting a statute

to consider the evil which the statute was designed to

prevent or remedy.

Section 33 of the Judicial Code, as amended by the Act

of August 23rd, 1916, c. 399 (R. S. Sec. 643, Act March

3rd, 1875, c. 130, Sec. 8, 18 Stat. 401. Act February 8,

1894, c. 25, Sec. 1, 28 Stat. 36. Act March 3, 1911, «.

231, Sec. 33, 36 Stat.1097. Act August 23rd, 1916, c. 399,

39 Stat. Compiled St. (1916), Sec. 1015, V. 1, pp. 1019-

1020)*, involved in this case, was passed in consequence

of an attempt, by one of the States to make penal the

collection by United States officers within the State of

duties under the tariff laws.

Tennessee vs. Davis, 100 U. S. 257, 25 L. ed.

648.

People’s United States Bank vs. Goodwin (C

C., 1908), 162 Fed. 937.

Its purpose is to protect the Federal Officers of th:

Government in the discharge of their official duties, and

those who are employed to act under them in the per-

formance of such duties; but, further than providing

this necessary protection to the administration of its

revenues, the Federal Government is not interested. The

statute must be interpreted with reference to its mani-

fest spirit and general purpose, and a word or phrase

should not be extended beyond its proper relation to give

“See Appendix.

—— a

14

jurisdiction where the jurisdiction does not appear to

have been intended.

Johnson vs. Wells Fargo & Co., (C. C., 1899),

- 98 Fed. 3, 8.

Virginia vs. DeHart (C. C., 1902), 119 Fed.

626, 629.

III.

The jurisdiction of the Federal Court under removal

acts rests and depends upon the statements made in the

petition for removal and verified by the oath of the

petitioner.

This rule was applied by this Court to Section 33 of

the Judicial Code, in the case of Virginia vs. Paul, supra,

and in this respect it is the same as that which obtains

in proceedings for removal under the general removal

acts.

See authorities collected, U. S. Compiled

Statutes, 1916, Annotated, Vol. 1, pages

972-973 ;

Salem & L. R. Co. vs. Boston & L. R. Co., 21

Fed. Cases p. 228, Fed. Cas. No. 12249.

IV.

The scope of Section 33 of the Judicial Code.

A. The persons to whom it is applicable.

(1) ‘‘Any officer appointed under or acting by author-

ity of any revenue law of the United States now or here-

after enacted.’’

(2) ‘‘Any person acting under or by authority of any

such officer.’’

15

(3) ‘‘ Any officer of the courts of the United States.’’

(4) ‘‘Any person * * * * while an officer of either

House of Congress.’

It is asserted that the officers and agents who claim the

right of removal in this case come within classifications

(1) and (2), supra.

But it is respectfully submitted that FEDERAL

PROHIBITION AGENTS ACTING UNDER THE

NATIONAL PROHIBITION LAW ARE NOT REV-

ENUE OFFICERS AND THE NATIONAL PROHIBI.

TION LAW IS NOT A REVENUE LAW.

The National Prohibition Act is not a revenue law.

Lipke vs. Lederer, 259 U. §S. 557, 66 L. ed.

1061.

Whether officers enforcing the National Prohibition

Law are entitled to remove prosecutions against them in

State Courts, under Section 33 of the Judicial Code, has

never been passed upon by this Court.

However, the question has been determined in six

jurisdictions by the inferior Federal tribunals. The

decisions are not in accord.

The first case in which the question arose was Oregon

vs. Wood, 268 Fed. 975, in the District Court of Oregon.

That case, decided before Lipke vs. Lederer, supra, held

that the National Prohibition Law was a revenue law,

Federal Prohibition Agents were revenue officers anid

prosecutions against them in the State Courts were

removable.

16

Morse vs. Higgins, 273 Fed. 830, decided by the Dis-

trict Court of New Hampshire, is next in point of time.

It first denied the right of removal upon the ground that

the National Prohibition Act was not a revenue law.

However, upon a reconsideration of the case (273 Fed.

832), it was held that Section 28, Title Il, of the Na-

tional Prohibition Law seemed to contemplate Federal

protection of officers acting under its authority, and the

removal was granted.

Then follows Smith vs. Gillian, 282 Fed. 628, decided

by the District Court of the Western District of Ken-

tucky, which denied the removal upon the following

grounds:

(1) Prohibition officers are not revenue agents.

(2) The prohibition law is not a revenue law.

(3) Section 28, Title 11, of the National Prohibition

Law does not authorize the removal.

This is a well-reasoned opinion.

Commonwealth vs. Bogan, 285 Fed. 668, decided by

the District Court of Massachusetts, followed this Court

in Lipke vs. Lederer in holding that the National Prohi-

bition Law was not a revenue law, but refused to adopt

the reasoning of Smith vs. Gillian as to the applicability

of Section 28, Title 11, of the National Prohibition Law.

The Court held that the right of removal was a ‘‘ proteec-

tion’’ to prohibition agents in the enforcement of the

act, within the meaning of the latter section, and ordered

the removal.

The District Court of Pennsylvania in U. S. vs. Com-

monwealth of Pennsylvania, 293 Fed. 931, followed the

CREE ET ET LET IS NE Ie eR RE Moma R

17

District Courts of Uregon, New Hampshire and Massa-

chusetts, but in doing so, Judge Dickinson frankly stated

that he was following ‘‘the main current of decisions

without an expression of what might otherwise have

been our individual opinion,”’ with the idea that the rule

in these cases should be made uniform throughout the

United States.

The last adjudication upon the question was by Judge

Bondy in the United States District Court for the South-

ern District of New York in the case of Wolkin vs. Gib-

ney, 3 Fed. Rep., 2nd Series, 960. J udge Bondy fol-

lowed Smith vs. Gillian and denied the right of removal.

It thus appears that all of the Courts which have had

occasion to pass upon the question since Lipke vs. Led-

erer have accepted the view that the National Prohibi.

tion Law is not a revenue measure, and that revenue

officcrs are, therefore, not within the provisions of Sec.

tion 33 of the Judicial Code.

There is, however, a diversity of opinion as to the

effect to be given to Section 28, Title II, of the National

Prohibition Law, with reference to the right of Federal

Prohibition Agents to remove prosecutions against them

in the State Courts. But it is respectfully submitted that

SECTION 28, TITLE Il, OF THE NATIONAL PRO.

HIBITION ACT, DOES NOT EN LARGE THE SCOPE

Section 28, Title 11, of the National Prohibition Act

reads as follows:

18

all the power and protection in the enforcement of

this act or any provisions thereof which is conferred

by law for the enforcement of existing laws relating

to the manufacture or sale of intoxicating liquors

under the law of the United States.’’

It was urged in Smith vs. Gillian that the word ‘‘pro-

tection’’ in the above section, must be so construed as

to include the right of removal. But after a careful

analysis of the body of the then existing internal revenue

laws, and a thorough research of the ‘‘history of the

times when efforts were being made to prepare and

enact such laws as might be deemed proper to enforce

the Eighteenth Amendment to the Constitution,’’ the

learned Judge found that nothing was included in the

National Prohibition Law which in any way indicated an

intention to provide for the removal of actions, nor for

any amendment of Section 33 of the Judicial Code.

The Court said (pp. 638-639) :

‘‘With these statutes before us, we have sought to

ascertain what ‘power and protection’ in the enforce-

ment of that act had been given by Section 28, which,

in express terms, had provided that it should be the

same as that ‘conferred by law for the enforcement

of existing laws relating to the manufacture or sale

of intoxicating liquors under the law of the United

States,’ inasmuch as that seemed clearly to be its full

scope, and, limiting our efforts to those ‘then exist-

ing laws,’ our analysis of them seems clearly to show

what ‘power and protection’ were in the mind of

Congress when it enacted the statute to enforce the

Kighteenth Amendment.

‘‘In short, internal revenue officers under those

laws were authorized and empowered—

(1) To enter at all times upon the premises of a

distiller, and, if demand for admission was refused,

to break into such premises or a distillery thereon

19

(Section 3177, R. S.), and if they were hindered or

obstructed in this fines were imposed.

(2) To collect taxes by distraint, and, if needful,

» =~ repeated seizures of property (Section 3187,

. 8.).

(3) To break into any distillery by force if refused

admission thereto (Section 3276, R.S.).

(4) To break up and into the ground on the prem-

ises where any distillery was located (Section 3277,

R.S.).

(5) To make seizures of property under Sections

3166, 3200, 3453 and 3460, R. S. (Sections 5886, 5922,

6355 and 6362, Comp. Stats.) ; and

(6) District Judges were authorized to issue

search warrants.

‘*We have in this painstaking way gone into these

features of ‘then existing laws’ because of the novelt

as well as the importance of the questions involved,

and find that, while the N ational Prohibition Act has

throughout made elaborate provision for the drastic

enforcement of its own requirements, including the

usual powers given prohibition officers and agents

in respect to seizures and destruction of property

and otherwise, these provisions are not important

here, as they are new, and no one of them con ers the

right to remove a case from a state to a federal

court.

‘*It seems, therefore, to be clear that the legal

authority and ‘power,’ and therefrom resulting ‘pro-

tection,’ thus given by pre-existing law were what

Congress had in mind when it enacted Section 28, If

anything else, including any removal of cases, had

been intended, a clause to that effect would have been

inserted, for, obviously, the ‘protection’ resulting

from the provisions of the Revised Statutes is clearly

and certainly available in all courts, state and federal

alike, without any removal from one to another, in-

asmuch as such statutes are the supreme law of the

land upon the subject.’’

20

The Court further said (pp. 640-641) :

“It would, we think, be fair to say that a con-

clusion that there was such intention would be

forced and inadmissible, if not extravagant. To do

as urged on behalf of the defendants would indeed

be legislation, and not an interpretation of legisla-

—_ already in force, and not amendable by the

urts.

‘While the removal of a case should always be

made if authorized by law, a removal which is not

so authorized should always be refused and the

previously acquired jurisdiction of the State Court

respected.

“The laws of the United States are supreme.

They reach and ‘protect’ citizens in the State Courts

as fully as they could here whether the plea therein

be self defense (apparently applicable here), or one

based upon conduct made lawful by some statute of

the United States or of Kentucky.

‘‘Here, however, the question presented is not on

the merits of the controversy, but is one of jurisdic-

tion only. That was first acquired by the State

Court, and cannot be taken from it, unless clearly

authorized by some law of the United States. None

has been found, and we have concluded that Con-

gress did not give, nor intend to give the power or

right of removal in cases like this.”’

It may be contended that the applicability of the pro-

visions of Section 33 of the Judicial Code and of Section

28 of Article II of the National Prohibition Law to Fed-

eral Prohibition officers is not involved in this case be-

cause of the allegations in the amended petition for

removal that the petitioners therein were acting under

the authority of and were enforcing all internal revenue

laws relating to the manufacture, sale, transportation,

control and taxation of intoxicating liquors with author-

ity to execute and perform all the duties delegated to

such officers by law, and because of the further allega-

JORUSS fA SE PLATTE RE Te —

21

tion that the acts alleged to have been done by said peti-

tioners were alleged to have been done at a time they

were engaged in the discharge of their official] duties not

only as Federal Prohibition officers, but in. the perform-

ance of their duties ‘‘under other revenue laws.’’

But it is respectfully submitted that when the allega-

tions of the amended petition are read together with the

allegations of the original petition, it is patent that the

express purpose of these additional allegations in the

amended petition was to avoid the contention that the

removal statute did not include Federal Prohibition Offi-

cers within its terms. The facts of the case, as set out in

the amended petition, make it abundantly clear that the

duties which these petitioners were alleged to have been

performing at the time of the happenings which form

the basis of the indictment were being performed in their

capacity as Federal Prohibition Officers and not as gen-

eral revenue officers enforcing ‘‘other revenue statutes.”’

We submit, therefore, that despite the effort on the

part of the said petitioners to avoid this question, the

problem is nevertheless before the Court for its deter-

mination.

Moreover, we submit that the reasoning of the Court

in Smith vs. Gillian is sound and logical and should be

adopted, and this Court should hold that the removal

statutes are not applicable to Federal Prohibition

Officers.

B. The actions and prosecutions embraced within

Section 33 of the Judicial Code.

Section 33 of the Judicial Code, so far as it affects

revenue officers appointed under or acting by authority

22

of revenue laws, provides for the removal at any time

before trial or before hearing thereof, of

‘«* * * any civil suit or criminal prosecution * * *’’

against any such officer,

(1) ‘fon account of any act done under color of his office

or any such law, or on account of any right, title

or authority claimed by such officer or other person

under any such law,’’ or

(2) ‘‘on account of any right, title or authority claimed

by such officer or other person under any such law,’’

or

(3) against any person holding property or estate by

title derived from any such officer, where the suit or

——- affects the validity of any such revenue

aw.

In order to bring the prosecution involved in this case

within the above provisions, it must be found:

(1) That the facts upon which it is based bring it com-

pletely within one of the defined classes; and

(2) Such facts must appear on the face of the indict-

ment or the petition for removal.

In the consideration of these questions, the following

facts are pertinent:

(1) The Federal Prohibition Agents in their petition

for removal deny they brought about the death of

Wenger, or

(2) Had any knowledge of who was responsible there-

for, or how the said Wenger came to his death.

(3) It is nowhere alleged in either the original or

amended petitions for removal that the deceased was

23

engaged in the violation of the National Prohibition Law

or any other revenue law at the time of his decease; or

(4) That the agents suspected Wenger of any viola-

tion of the National Prohibition Law or any other rev-

enue law, or

(5) That Wenger was connected in any way with any

investigation in which the agents allege they were en-

gaged, or

(6) That the homicide was the result of any act upon

the part of said agents to protect themselves or each

other in the discharge of any duty they were perform-

ing.

(7) Their amended petition sets forth that on the day

of the murder they were engaged in an investigation, di-

rected by the Maryland Federal Prohibition Director,

of the alleged unlawful distillation of intoxicating liquor

on a farm known as the Harry Carver Farm, which was

situated approximately three miles from the village of

Madonna, about twelve miles northwest from Belair,

Maryland, which said property was then unoccupied.

They reached the farm premises shortly after midday,

and discovered there in a secluded wooded valley and

swamp, materials for an illicit distilling operation. They

concealed themselves in the woods and shrubbery nearby

the still site, and shortly thereafter became aware of the

approach of a number of men bringing with them a still.

They made their presence known to the men who were

approaching, and the men immediately dropped the still

and fled, and though they pursued them across the fields,

no one of the fleeing men was overtaken or arrested.

Thereupon the agents returned to the still site, destroyed

the material which constituted the unlawful distilling

plant, and started to return to their car which had been

24

left some distance from the still site, for the purpose of

returning to Baltimore to report to the office of the

Maryland Prohibition Director the results of their in-

vestigation, when they discovered a man, whom they

afterwards learned to be one Lawrence Wenger, mortally

wounded and lying beside the path along which they

were walking, some four or five hundred yards from the

still site and in a direction opposite to that from which

the unknown men had approached and towards which

they fled. They carried the wounded man to their car

and took him to Jarrettsville, Maryland, for medical at-

tention. Finding none available, they proceeded with

all speed to Belair where they finally succeeded in plac-

ing the said Wenger in charge of a physician, who pro-

nounced him dead. They then removed his body to an

undertaking establishment in Belair.

Under the above facts, what act done by them under

color of their office or any revenue law can be said to

have resulted in the prosecution?

The investigation they were conducting? No.

Any act of self-protection or for the protection of each

other? No.

Any act in attempting to apprehend the supposed vio-

lators of the National Prohibition Law? No.

Any act in returning to Baltimore to report their in-

vestigation? No.

Any act in attempting to obtain medical attention for

the deceased? No.

If the prosecution was not on account of any act done

under color of their office or under color of any revenue

25

law, then the prosecution should not have been removed,

because it is obvious that the prosecution did not arise

(1) on account of any right, title or authority claimed

by them under any revenue law, and (2) said prosecu-

tion was not commenced against any person holding

property or estate by title derived from any revenue

officer and did not affect the validity of any revenue

law,—the other two classes of prosecutions to which the

statute is applicable. So we must find that the prosecu-

tion arose out of an act done under the color of their

office or under the color of a revenue law, unless the

statute is construed to mean that the right of removal

is accorded to every officer described in the Act merely

by virtue of his office, irrespective of the nature of the

act or of the circumstances under which it was com-

mitted.

To permit of this latter construction, it would be neces-

sary to hold that Congress intended to authorize the

removal of all actions and prosecutions against revenue

officers, irrespective of their origin or their connection

with the duties of said officers under the law.

Such a construction would be in disregard of the plain

language of the statute. The words ‘‘act done under

color of his office or any such law’’ would be rendered

meaningless and would have to be eliminated from the

statute by construction. Every revenue officer would be

entitled to have tried all actions brought against him, be-

fore Courts of his own choice, and in all criminal prose-

cutions against him, to have the benefit of the legal

services of the United States District Attorney. Certain-

ly, if this result was constitutionally possible, Congress

did not intend it in the enactment of the law. The his-

tory of the law belies it. It was passed to prevent the

States from interfering with Federal collection of rev-

enue. How is this purpose subserved by granting the

26

unusual privilege of removal in all cases, whether or not

the action or prosecution against the officer has any ra-

tional connection with his official duty, or whether or not

it in any way affects the revenues of the Government.

There are many actions and crimes which cannot have

any reasonable connection with the officer’s duties or

with the collection of the Government’s revenue,

The wanton, deliberate and unwarranted use of a gun,

even during an “‘investigation,’’ where there is no ex-

cuse of self-protection or any other excuse; the use of a

weapon upon an innocent man, not charged with the vio-

lation of the law or with attempting to resist the enforce-

ment of the law; the sexual crimes, such as incest,

bigamy, rape, ete.—all these are examples—(and others

might be cited) of cases which could not possibly be

brought within the Act. Can it be seriously contended

that because any of the aforementioned acts have been

committed during the hours of duty of an officer they

are acts done under color of his office or of any revenue

law?

Certainly, therefore, a mere denial of guilt does not

create a presumption that the acts with which the officer

is charged were done under color of his office.

It may be asserted that the construction contended for

by the State of Maryland would require revenue officers

to admit their guilt or to establish their legal justifica-

tion for the act done as a condition precedent to the

exercise of their right of removal. That this argument

is fallacious is apparent from a comparison of Section

33 of the Judicial Code with Revised Statutes, Section

753 (U. S. Comp. St. 1916, V. 2, Sec. 1281, page 2070).

The latter Act provides that the Federal Courts shall

have the power to release by habeas corpus, persons ‘‘in

27

custody for an act done or omitted in pursuance of a law

of the United States.’’ To warrant the exercise of this

jurisdiction, this Court has held that it must be estab-

lished :

(1) That under the circumstances disclosed, the peti-

tioner for habeas corpus was acting in pursuance of the

law of the United States and within the scope of his

authority as a Federal officer;

(2) That his confinement will injure and seriously

affect the authority and operations of the National Gov-

ernment; and

(3) That the case was one of extreme urgency where

the Federal Court having heard the facts believes that a

proper exercise of the discretion vested in it demands

the discharge of the prisoner.

Drury vs. Lewis, 200 U. S. 1, 50 L. ed. 343,

26 S. Ct. Rep. 229.

See also:

Pales vs. Paolo, (C. C. A., 1st Circuit), Adv.

Sheets, Fed. Rep. July 23, 1925, p. 280;

U.S. vs. Weeden, 24 Fed. Cas. 738; Fed. Cas.

No. 14412;

In re: Marsh, 51 Fed. 277;

Castle vs. Lewis, 254 Fed. 917 (C. C. A., 8th

Circuit).

The celebrated case of Cunningham vs. N eagle, 135 U.

S. 1, 34 L. ed. 55, 10 S. Ct. Rep. 658, also arose under the

section last above referred to.

It follows that under Rev. St. Section 753, petitioner

must establish, inter alia, his innocence of the crime

charged as a condition of his release.

‘2k Gen no

28

If the requirements for removal were the same as those

for release by habeas corpus, it would follow that there

would be no necessity for removal to and trial in the

Federal Court. The petitioner having already estab-

lished his innocence, no trial would be necessary.

But the distinction between the two provisions of the

law lies in those words found in the removal statute;

“‘under color of his office or of any such law.’ The

phrase, ‘‘under color’’ implies that for removal, the

officer must establish prima facie, that is to say, he must

set up in his petition such facts as show affirmatively,

that the act upon which the prosecution is grounded was

done in the probable pursuance of his duties or was with.

in the apparent scope of his authority.

When he seeks his release by habeas corpus he must

go further. He must show that the act was actually

within the scope of his authority.

A review of the cases arising under Section 33 of the

Judicial Code shows that in every instance where the

removal was granted, some specific act under color of

his office or under color of a revenue law, was set forth,

either expressly or impliedly, in the petition for removal.

In every case, there was no mere **traverse,’’ but there

was a ‘‘confession and avoidance,’’ that is to say, there

was a statement of the act done by the officer, resulting

in his prosecution, which showed prima facie, that said

act was done under color of his office.

In Tennessee vs. Davis, 100 U. S. 257, 25 L. ed. 648, the

facts, as stated in the syllabus, were as follows:

**A. was, in the State Court of Tennessee, indicted

for murder. In his petition, duly verified, for re-

moval of the prosecution to the Circuit Court of the

United States, he stated that, although indicted for

murder, no murder was committed; that the killing

was done in necessary self-defense, to save his own

life; that at the time the alleged act for which he was

indicted was committed, he was and still is an officer

of the United States, to wit, a deputy collector of in-

ternal revenue; that the act for which he was indict-

ed was performed in his own necessary self-defense

while engaged in the discharge of his duties as dep-

uty collector and while acting by and under the au-

thority of the internal revenue laws of the United

States; that what he did was done under and by

right of his said office; that it was his duty to seize

illicit stills and apparatus used for the illicit and un-

lawful distillation of spirits; and that while so at-

tempting to enforce said laws, as de uty collector as

aforesaid, he was assaulted and fired. upon by a num-

ber of armed men, and that in defense of his life

he returned the fire, which is the killing mentioned

in the indictment.’’ (Italics ours.)

It was held that the petition was in conformity with

the statute, and, upon being filed, the prosecution was

removed to the Cireuit Court of the United States.

The following lanzuage of Mr. Justice Strong, who

wrote the opinion, as to the purpose and intent of the

law, shows very clearly that it was never intended to

embrace a case such as the one at bar (pp. 261-262) :

‘*Now certainly the petition for the removal rep-

resented that the act for which the defendant was

indicted was done not merely under color of his of-

fice as a revenue collector or under color of the

revenue laws, not merely while he was engaged in

performing his duties as a revenue officer, but that

it was done under and by right of his office and while

he was resisted by an armed force in his attempts to

discharge his official duty. This is more than a claim

of right and authority under the law of the United

States for the act for which he has been indicted. It

is a positive assertion of the existence of such au-

30

thority. But the act of Congress authorizes the re-

moval of any cause when the acts of the defendant

complained of were done, or claimed to have been

done in the discharge of his duty as a Federal of-

ficer. It makes such a claim a basis for the assump-

tion of Federal jurisdiction of the case, and for re-

taining it, at least, until the claim proves un-

fonnded.”’

And again (pp. 262-263) :

‘‘As was said in Martin vs. Hunter (1 Wheat.

363), ‘the General Government must cease to exist

whenever it loses the power of protecting itself in

the exercise of its constitutional powers.’ It can act

only through its officers and agents, and they must

act within the States. If, when thus acting and

within the scope of their authority, those officers can

be arrested and brought to trial in a State Court, for

an alleged offense against the law of the State, yet

warranted by the Federal authority they possess,

and if the General Government is powerless to inter-

fere at once for their protection,—if their protection

must be left to the action of the State Court,—the

operations of the General Government may at any

time be arrested at the will of one of its members.

The legislation of a State may be unfriendly. It

may affix penalties to acts done under the immediate

direction of the National Government, and in obed-

ience to its laws. It may deny the authority con-

ferred by those laws. The State Court may admin-

ister not only the laws of the State but equally Fed-

eral law, in such a manner as to paralyze the opera-

tions of the Government. And even if, after trial

and final judgment in the State Court, the case can

be brought into the United States Court for review,

the officer is withdrawn from the discharge of his

duty during the pendency of the prosecution, and the

exercise of acknowledged Federal power arrested.

, a wee OR Oa ee SRN CR LPT PT eT OTE pe

TOY So MPEOE OR GS Cee in py aC ee OR RE EAA SM LOT MRI Sad OR PO TCE T cenit ts EN ASE PE OE ARE ERIE OMS ,

RAE SS aa Ie Ne eel cia im GS i Ee i oat nina sar

‘‘We do not think such an element of weakness

is to be found in the Constitution. The United

States is a government with authority extending

—s a >)

31

over the whole territory of the Union, acting upon

the States and upon the people of the States.

While it is limited in the number of its powers, so

far as its sovereignty extends it is supreme. No

State government can exclude it from the exercise

of any authority conferred upon it by the Constitu-

tion, obstruct its authorized officers against its will,

or withhold from it, for a moment, the cognizance

of any subject which that instrument has commit-

ted to it.’’

In Davis vs. South Carolina, 107 U. S. 597, 27 L. ed.

574, 2 Sup. Ct. Rep. 636, the facts were these:

Davis was detailed to serve as one of a guard of the

United States soldiers to aid the deputy marshal in

making the arrest of one Hall under a warrant issued

by the United States Commissioner, for violation of in-

ternal revenue laws, as a distiller. For the purpose of

making the arrest the house of said Hall was surrounded

by the guard. Davis was stationed at the back door of

the house for the purpose of guarding the same and pre-

venting the escape of said Hall. Hall made his escape

through a hole in the side of the house near where Davis

was standing, ‘‘sprang past him, frightening his horse,

and accidentally discharging his piece.’?

‘‘By the discharge of his said piece the said Hall was

shot and mortally wounded, and subsequently died of

said wound.’’ Davis was indicted in the State Court for

murder. The case was removed to the Federal Court,

upon a petition setting forth the above facts and alleging

that at the time of said accident Davis was in the dis-

charge of his duty, and that the shooting of Hall was

purely accidental, and Davis was in no way responsible

therefor. Upon appeal to this Court, the removal of

the case was approved.

32

In Illinois vs. Fletcher, 22 Fed. 776 (C. C., N. D., IL),

there was an indictment against deputy marshals of the

United States for a murder committed at a Federal

election. There was a petition to remove the case from

the State Court to the Federal Court.

The petition contained an averment that the indict-

ment was found against the petitioners for acts done by

them, if done at all, in their own necessary self defense,

and while engaged in the discharge of their duties as

deputy marshals of the United States.

Judge Gresham said (pp. 778-779) :

‘*They did the killing or contributed to it, or they

did not; and nothing short of a positive averment

that they did the act for which they stand indicted,

and did it in the line of their duty as deputy mar-

shals of the United States, or under the color of

their authority as such officers, will entitle them to

a removal of the case from the State Court to this

Court for trial. The mere holding of a commission

as a deputy marshal of the United States at the

time a party is indicted for murder, or any other

offense against the laws of a State is not of itself

sufficient ground for depriving the State Court of

jurisdiction of the case.

‘*The petitioners state that James Smith, their

co-defendant in the indictment, and also a deputy

United States marshal and a number of other per-

sons, incited thereto by special constables of Cook

County, were engaged in a disturbance and a breach

of the peace at the polls; that Smith was threatened

by the special constables, and such other persons,

with personal violence; that, ‘in order to quell said

disturbance and protect said Smith and to preserve

order at the polling place,’ they, the petitioners,

took Smith into custody; that while proceeding with

him to the office of Philip Hoyne, a Commissioner

of the United States, there to make complaint

EN NEC

33

against him ‘for disturbing the peace at said polling

place’, they were fired upon by a large body of

armed men including Curnan, the deceased, who de-

manded that Smith should be taken to the Harri-

son Street Police Station in the City of Chicago,

and threatened both them and Smith unless he was

taken there; and that, refusing to comply with this

demand, they were fired upon, and some one of the

attacking party, shot and killed Curnan. It is not

claimed by the District Attorney, who appears for

the petitioners that Smith was in the line of his duty

as a deputy marshal when he was engaged in a

breach of the peace at the polls, or that he had com-

mitted an offense against the United States for

which Commissioner Hoyne might have held him

for trial or for which any Court of the United States

had jurisdiction to try and punish him. Instead of

doing his duty as a deputy marshal, Smith was en-

gaged in a disturbance and breach of the peace at

the polls. The petitioners had a right to arrest him

for this offense, and in a reasonable time, turn him

over to the proper State authorities. He was sim-

ply a law breaker and the fact that he was a deputy

marshal of the United States entitled him to no

more consideration or protection than others en-

gaged in the same disturbance and breach of the

peace. The District Attorney admits that there is

no Federal statute making a disturbance at the polls

amounting to a breach of the peace an offense

against the United States. This is not a case in

which deputy marshals of the United States in re-

pelling force by force in defense of themselves or

their prisoner shot and killed an assailant. Smith

had violated the laws of the State and the petition-

ers refused to turn him over te the State authorities.

They held him, it may fairly be inferred, to protect

him because he was a deputy United States Mar-

shal, and to take him before Commissioner Hoyne,

who had no jurisdiction to hear a complaint against

him or to detain him.” (Italics ours. )

34

. In Salem & L. R. Co. vs. Boston &: L. R. Co., 21 Fed.

Cases, p. 228, Feceral Case No. 12249, it was held that

an application for a writ of certiorari to remove a case

from a State Court to the Circuit Court of the United

States, under the Act of Congress of March 2, 1883 (4

St. 632), must state facts sufficient to enable the Court

to decide whether the case is one within the provisions

of the Act. It is not enough that the petitioner alleges

in general terms that he intends to rely in his defense

to the suit upon revenue laws of the United States.

A just interpretation of the Act does not authorize a

writ of certiorari upon a statement of the mere opinion

of the petitioner and his counsel that the act was done

under color of the office of an agent under the revenue

laws of the United States.

Facts, not mere opinions or conclusions of law, should

be set forth, so that it may appear whether in judgment

of law such a case exists as enables the petitioner to call

for removal.

Virginia vs. Dehart, 119 Fed. 626 (C.C., W. D., Va.):

Criminal prosecution removed from State Court. Mo-

tion to remand. Denied. Ground of motion that petition

did not allege a state of facts necessary to give the Court

jurisdiction.

Petition alleged that petitioner, while acting as a

posseman under a deputy collector of internal revenue,

had assisted in destroying an illicit distillery belonging

to one N. K. Thomas; that he appeared as a witness and

had testified against Thomas at the preliminary hearing,

and was recognized as a government witness to appear

and testify against Thomas at the next term of the Fed-

eral Court. At this juncture—between the examining

35

trial and the term of court at which Thomas was to be

tried for operating an illicit distillery—the petitioner

was summoned by a deputy United States Marshal to

assist in an effort to arrest one Agee for a violation of

the Federal Revenue Law.

‘“‘While in the discharge of such duty, and while

acting under and by authority of said officer, your

petitioner was set upon by said N. K. Thomas, who

told your petitioner that, on account of his having

reported said Thomas’ still to the said Government

officers and on account of his having, while acting

under and by authority of a deputy collector of the

United States, assisted in the cutting up and de-

struction of said Thomas’ still, and on account of

the evidence given by your petitioner against him

before the Commissioner and to prevent such evi-

dence being repeated by your petitioner at the No-

vember Term of said District Court, he intended to

kill your petitioner. As he said this, said N. K.

Thomas thrust his hand in his pocket and drew

therefrom a pistol. Your petitioner, acting in the

capacity of a Government officer, also had on his

person a pistol, which he drew from his pocket, and,

without attempting to fire on the said N. K. Thomas,

struck him in self defense, and thereby prevented

the said N. K. Thomas from carrying out the threats

made not only at that time, but on previous occa-

sions.’’

It was held that a person acting under a deputy

marshal while executing, or on the way to execute, a war-

rant for the arrest of one charged with a violation of an

internal revenue statute, is ‘‘an officer acting by author-

ity of a revenue law,’’ if the prosecution is on account of

an act done under color of office or of any revenue law or

if the prosecution is on account of any right or authority

claimed under any revenue law; that the mere fact that

the assault made by Thomas on the petitioner grew out

of the prior actions of the petitioner while acting under

36

the deputy revenue collector would not make it one done

under color of office or of any revenue law; also, where

the officer is not engaged in any official duty, and is

attacked because of some act previously done by him in

the performance of his official duty, he would not be act-

ing under color of his office or of any revenue law. In

both of the above cases he would be merely exercising the

right of self-defense.

However, where as in this case an attack is made on a

revenue officer while he is in actual pursuit of a violator

of the revenue laws, by a third party actuated by mere

personal malice toward the officer, and the officer, in re-

pelling the attack wounds or kills the person attacking

him, such act is one done, at least colorably in the line

of official duty, nor can a distinction be properly drawn,

if instead of being in actual pursuit, the officer is merely

on the way to make an arrest, or merely seeking an of-

fender with intent to arrest him when found.

Virginia vs. Felts, 133 Fed. 85 (C. C., W. D., Va.):

The petitioner, a deputy United States Marshal, was

indicted in the State Court for murdering one Vaughn

and wounding with intent to kill one Alford. Petition

for removal. Motion to remand. Denied.

The petition alleges that Felts was on a train, in the

course of his official duties, on his way to serve warrants

upon two persons charged with violations against Fed-

eral statutes. On the train he met Vaughn and Alford

who, on account of previous acts of the petitioner in con-

nection with his duties as deputy marshal, had conspired

to murder said petitioner.

Vaughn and Alford viciously attacked him, and in

defending himself against the said assault he found it

37

necessary to shoot and kill the said Vaughn and wound

the said Alford. It is further stated that ‘‘in conse-

quence of said assault and interference on the part of

the said Vaughn and Alford, he was hindered and pre-

vented from discharging his duty as such officer as re-

quired by the process aforesaid.”?

In discussing the manner of contesting the jurisdiction

of the Court in such cases, the Court said (p. 89):

‘‘Where an objection to the jurisdiction of the

Federal Court appears on the face of the removal

papers, the point is raised by a motion to remand.

But when the party resisting the removal desires to

contest the truth of some essential jurisdictional

fact,’’ set forth in the petition, this issue may be de-

termined preliminary to the hearing of the case on

the merits.

(p. 90): ‘*While a plea to the jurisdiction is not

necessary (where a jurisdictional fact in the petition

for removal is denied), for the Court will sua sponte

remand the case if, after the evidence is in, it appears

that it has not jurisdiction, yet the better practice is

to file such a plea.

**Such a plea, with replication, raises an issue of

fact.’’ This should be submitted to the jury, subject

to the right of the Court to direct a verdict on this

issue when proper.

(p. 91): ‘Ordinarily, in Courts of general juris-

diction pleas in abatement are not favored and must

be filed at an early stage in the proceedings. The Fed-

eral Courts are, in some sense of limited jurisdiction,

and will remand a removed cause at any stage of

the case if it appears that the Court has not juris-

diction. It follows that the ordinary technical

Wie

38

rules as to the time of filing the pleas in abatement

do not apply in removal cases. If offered too late

to have the issue tried by the jury, the effect can be

obtained by a motion to remand which the Court can

pass upon after hearing the evidence.’’

‘“‘On the issue raised by the plea to the jurisdic-

tion the burden of proof is on the petitioner. ’’

People’s U. S. Bank vs. Goodwin, 162 Fed. 937 (C. C.,

E. D., Mo.) :

This action was instituted in a State Court to recover

damages for an alleged libel charged to have been wrong-

fully and maliciously written, composed and published

by the defendants, an Assistant Attorney General for the

Post Office Department and an inspector of such depart-

ment. The libel was based on the promulgation by them

of a fraud order against the plaintiff. It was sought to

remove the case to the Federal Court by certiorari under

Section 33 of the Judicial Code. The Court, in holding

that the action was not removable, said (p. 945):

“In my opinion, to permit the removal of the

cause under this section of the law, the acts which

constitute the cause of action must have some ra-

tional connection with official duties ‘under a reve-

nue law,’ and in some way affect the revenue of the

Government. It could hardly be claimed that

* * * a revenue collector, if sued for some act

claimed to have been committed, in the performance

of his official duties, would have the right to remove

the cause under Section 643 (R. S.) if neither the

declaration nor the petition for certiorari showed

that the act for which he was sued was in fact in

the performance of an official duty imposed on him

by law, having some relation to ‘the collection of

revenue for the Government. These facts must ap-

pear on the face of the complaint in the action or in

the petition for the writ of certiorari, otherwise a Na-

tional Court is without jurisdiction. (Citing Vir-

RARE A EOI, ULE AIE

39

gia vs. Rives and Virginia vs. Paul, supra). To

merely state the opnion of the petitioner or his

counsel that such a question is involved is insuf.

ficient to justify the granting of the writ.’’

State of Alabama vs. Peak, 252 Fed. 306 (D. C., S. D.,

Ala.) :

Peak was indicted in the Alabama State Court for

grand larceny and the cause was removed to the Fed-

eral Court on petition under Section 33 of the Judicial

Code. A motion to remand was denied.

The petitioner in this case denied in his petition that

the larceny was committed; and alleged that at the time

of the alleged act for which he was indicted, he was an

officer duly appointed under and acting by authority of,

a revenue law of the United States, that is to say, he

was a narcotic inspector duly appointed and acting under

the Harrison Narcotic Act, which is an internal revenue

law; that he was assigned as such inspector in charge of

the States of Tennessee and Alabama; that he was in

Mobile, Alabama, and surrounding territory, acting

under orders for the purpose of investigating violations

of the said Act, as well as other internal revenue laws,

including the laws in reference to vinous, spirituous or

malt liquors; that he was investigating violations of the

internal revenue laws about seven or eight miles from

Mobile, Alabama, and was on his way back to Mobile to

report the same to his superior officer, when the alleged

act for which he was indicted occurred; that is to say,

on his return journey he encountered one J ames W. Len-

ford, who was in an automobile with his chauffeur and

others; that said Lenford afterwards claimed that he

had been robbed of some money while on said journey

and when he reached Mobile had warrants issued for the

petitioner and two chauffeurs, but petitioner denies that

40

he was guilty, on that or any other occasion of any act

of grand larceny, of Lenford’s or anyone else’s money,

but that the whole course of his conduct and acts on said

occasion was in the performance of his official duty as

aforesaid.

The removal was contested upon the ground that the

petitioner alleged that he ‘‘did not feloniously take and

carry away said sum of money or any other sum,’’ and

further denied that he was ‘‘ guilty of any act of grand

larceny or the felonious taking of Lenford’s or anyone

else’s money.’’ It was contended that under the ruling

in Illinois vs. Fletcher, supra, the case must be re-

manded. But the Court said (pp. 307-308) :

‘*Tn the first place, it occurs to me that the State’s

Attorney overlooked a distinction between the de-

nial of an act and a denial of the criminality of such

act; in other words, that where a petitioner denies

that he was guilty of grand larceny, or the felonious

taking of money, this is merely a denial that the act

as done was a criminal one, and distinctly consti-

tuted a denial that the taking was a felonious one,

in that there was no felonious intent in the taking.

If the petitioner was required to specifically admit

the facts as charged in the indictment, and the in-

tent also charged, this would amount to a plea of

guilty, and there would be nothing to try in the Fed-

eral Court. All that would be required would be to

enter judgment.’’

The Court then holds (contrary to the weight of au-

thority, we believe) that it is unnecessary for the petition

to set out the facts which it is averred constituted the

acts for which the petitioner was indicted, but it was

also held that if the facts are set out they should be

sufficient to establish the right of removal claimed by

the petitioner.

41

The Court makes this distinction between the case be-

fore it from Illinois vs. Fletcher:

In Illinois vs. Fletcher the facts constituting the act

upon which the indictment was based were set out in the

petition; in the Peak case the petition does not under-

take to set out the facts which transpired at the time the

petitioner was accused in the indictment of taking Len-

ford’s money. The Court sustained the petition upon

the ground that it set up in general terms that the whole

course of the petitioner’s conduct and acts on said occa-

sion was a performance of his official duties as a revenue

officer.

In the course of the opinion, the Court stated the

proposition upon which we rely in this case, in the fol-

lowing language (p. 309):

‘“‘Certainly the officer must admit the doing of

some act under color of his office or of the law for

which he is indicted but he is not required to admit

the doing of the act as charged in the indictment.”’

(Italics ours.)

It is respectfully submitted that the Peak opinion is

unsound because it is based upon the erroneous assump-

tion that the petition need not set forth affirmatively

facts which it is averred constitute the acts upon which

the indictment is based. But, assuming the facts to have

been stated, it is clear that this case is in accord with

the other decisions upon the same subject. It requires,

as a condition precedent for removal, the admission by

the officer that the indictment arose out of some act done

by him under color of his office, or under color of the

revenue law, although the criminality of the act or the

accuracy or correctness of the statement thereof in the

indictment may be denied. In other words, there must

be a ‘‘confession and avoidance.’’

42

That this is the basis for the decision is borne out by

the following language (p. 311):

‘It is urged that there can be no right of removal

where one is charged with a larceny, because there

could be no possible connection between the official

capacity of a revenue officer and the felonious tak-

ing of money or property. This proposition is so

manifestly unsound that I think it needs but one

statement to refute it. Suppose a revenue officer

finding money or property in the possession of a

man he was pursuing or seeking to make a ease

against, and he abstracts this money or property

to be used as evidence in a prosecution against the

person in whose possession it was found. Unex-

plained, the taking and carrying away by the of.

ficer of the money would constitute larceny, but,

when it was shown that it was taken and carried

away for the purpose of being preserved and used

in the prosecution of such person, there would be no

criminality in the act.’’

Oregon vs. Wood, 268 Fed. 975 (D. C., Oregon) :

This case holds that it is not enough that the petition

for removal, under Section 33 of the Judicial Code, al-

leges, in general terms, that the petitioner intends to

rely in his defense to the prosecution upon the revenue

laws of the United States. ‘‘The statute requires that

the petition shall set forth the nature of the action or

prosecution’’ (p. 978).

The petition averred (1) that the petitioners were

officers appointed under the revenue laws of the United

States, by the Commissioner of Internal Revenue; (2)

that prosecution was commenced in the State Court

against the petitioners and others, wherein the grand

jury of such court indicted the petitioners for involun-

tary manslaughter and charged that petitioners, while

in the performance of a lawful act, killed one Hedderly

43

by shooting him, which indictment is still pending, no

trial having been had; (3) that petitioners did not kill

Hedderly; (4) that at the time of the occurrence of the

act for which petitioners were indicted they ‘‘were and

still are officers of the United States as aforesaid”’ and

were acting as such officers and under color of their

office, to wit: attempting to effect the arrest of Hedderly ;

(5) that petitioners believe Hedderly was in the act of

violating the revenue and prohibition laws of the United

States, and for that reason the arrest was attempted;

(6) that such attempted arrest was the same act as re-

ferred to in the indictment as the performance by peti-

tioners of their lawful act.

It was held that it was not necessary that the officers

state more fully the capacity in which they were acting

or why petitioners attempted to make the arrest or what

revenue laws they were acting under or that such laws

were still in force, or what particular acts Hedderly was

engaged in at the time.

Smith vs. Gillian, 282 Fed. 628 (D. C., W. D., Ky.):

In this case a civil action was sought to be removed

under the provisions of Section 33 of the Judicial Code.

The petition stated that the petitioners on a date stated,

under orders of the Federal Prohibition Director for the

State of Kentucky, proceeded to Nelson County, Ken-

tucky, where they were engaged in the performance of

their official duties in an effort to suppress the violation

of liquor laws and to arrest those guilty of such viola-

tions ; that while so engaged in the performance of their

official duties in close proximity to where a moonshine

distillery was located they and other officers associated

with them on that occasion were fired upon by the men

who were engaged in the violation of the Prohibition Act

and certain sections of the Revised Statutes of the United

44

States ‘‘in the Setting up and operation of the distil-

lery’’; that in order to protect themselves from an at-

tack by those persons after they had been fired upon as

stated, ‘‘certain of the officers named’? returned the fire;

and that in the exchange of shots it was afterwards

learned that Francis Marion Smith, husband of the plain-

tiff, Lucey Smith, and the father of her co-plaintaiffs,

was shot and killed. The Court said (p. 635) :

“It may, at the outset, be most suggestive and

important to note that neither in the original peti-

tion of the defendants nor in the statement filed later

was it, in any affirmative way stated or adequate-

ly shown that the presumptively innocent Francis

Marion Smith was himself to any extent ‘engaged’

either in the ‘manufacture or sale of intoxicating

liquor,’ within the meaning of that phrase as used

in Section 28, of the National Prohibition Act. Fur-

thermore it is most important to note that no case

to which that phrase is not applicable can by any

means be brought within Section 28 of the Act.’’

The case was remanded upon the ground that under

the removal statute, the right to remove is not conferred

upon Federal Prohibition Officers.

Commonwealth of Massachusetts vs. Bogan, 285 Fed.

668 (D. C., Mass.) :

The petition for removal in this case alleged that the

petitioner, while he was engaged in the performance of

his duty, was attacked by one Sequeria and shot him

fatally in self-defense.

A prosecution, based upon this act of self-defense,

pending in the State Court, was ordered to be removed

by the District Court.

It will be observed that in every one of the cases cited

the petitioner alleged, either expressly or by the clearest

45

inference, some act done by him under color of his office

or under color of some revenue law which resulted in the

prosecution.

In other words, in every case, there was either a con-

fession of the act charged in the indictment and the denial

of its criminality, or the setting up of some independent

overt act alleged to constitute the act under color of

office for which the petitioner was indicted.

It is respectfully submitted:

THAT THE REMOVAL ACT APPLIES ONLY

WHERE THE ACT WHICH IS THE BASIS OF THE

ACTION OR PROSECUTION HAS SOME RATION.

AL CONNECTION WITH OFFICIAL DUTIES

UNDER A ‘“‘REVENUE LAW,”’ AND IN SOME WAY

AFFECTS THE REVENUE OF THE GOVERN.

MENT, AND THAT IN THIS CASE THE AMENDED

PETITION WHICH SETS FORTH IN DETAIL THE

FACTS UPON WHICH THE PETITIONERS RELY,

DOES NOT MEET THE JURISDICTIONAL RE.

QUIREMENTS FOR THE REMOVAL OF THE

PROSECUTION, EVEN THOUGH THIS COURT

MAY BE OF THE OPINION THAT IN A PROPER

CASE THE REMOVAL ACTS ARE APPLICABLE

TO OFFICERS SUCH AS THOSE DESCRIBED IN

THE PETITIONS FOR REMOVAL FILED IN THIS

CASE.

CONCLUSION.

It has been the universal practice (probably under the

authority of the Rev. St. Sec. 771; U.S. Comp. St. 1916,

Vol. 2, Sec. 1296, p. 2156), for the United States District

Attorney to appear in the Federal Court on behalf of

revenue officers in all prosecutions against them removed

el ns Se

46

from the State Courts. The United States District At-

torney, who daily appears before the petit juries in the

District Court as the prosecuting officer, in these special

eases changes his role from prosecutor to defense coun-

sel, and urges the acquittal of defendants, accused of

serious crimes against the sovoreignty of the State gov-

ernment.

Certainly, this change of front upon the part of the

District Attorney must have its effect upon the jury.

The jurymen, who have probably learned to trust and

respect the District Attorney, undoubtedly will give more

credence to what he says in defense of the accused, espe-

cially when his usual and customary plea is for convic-

tion. If he asks in some special case for an acquittal,

there must indeed be some special circumstances to

justify such action upon his part.

In removed criminal prosecutions even the Federal

Judge, who hears the case and determines the punish-

ment if there is a conviction, is expected to lean more

favorably toward the accused than in the ordinary crim-

inal case coming before him.

And this should be so, because the very purpose of the

removal statute is to afford protection to those officers

embraced within it in the performance of their official

acts. There is, and ought to be a strong presumption

that any act done in the course of official duties is within

the scope of the officer’s authority under the law.

Thus in the trial of removed prosecutions in the Fed-

eral Court, the atmosphere is surcharged with kindli-

ness, leniency and protection to the accused.

It is, therefore, meet that the right of removal be

strictly limited to those cases in which the accused is

entitled to the benefit of such pre-disposition toward

a8

£

oy

47

him, that is to Say, to cases where the prosecution has

arisen out of an act done under the semblance, at least, of

the authority conferred upon the officer by the law.

The removal statute aims to protect officers who have,

in good faith, attempted to enforce at least what they

consider to be their duty under the law, and not to pro-

tect them in acts committed by them in their private

capacity, having no rational connection with their duties.

The protection of the removal act has its historical

inception in the effort of a State to nullify revenue laws

of the Government, and this historical purpose should

always be borne in mind in the application of said statute

by the Courts.

Is the action of the State authorities in commencing

4 prosecution calculated to embarrass the Federal Gov-

ernment in the execution of its revenue laws? That is

the test to be applied in every case in which removal of

a prosecution is attempted.

We respectfully submit that in the case at bar the

defendants in the indictment in the State Court have not

shown that they are revenue officers within the meaning

of the removal statute, nor have they shown by their

petition that the prosecution which they seek to remove

is embraced within the terms of said Act.

Judge Soper and the District Court, in removing this

prosecution from the State Court have clearly exceeded

the authority vested in them under the Act. Under the

precedents in this Court, hereinbefore cited, this Court

is vested with jurisdiction to compel the remand of the

48

prosecution to the State Court, and we respectfully and

earnestly request that this be done.

Respectfully submitted,

THOS. H. ROBINSON,

Attorney General,

HERBERT LEVY,

Assistant Attorney General,

Attorneys for the State of Maryland,

Petitioner.

one

figs

49

a APPENDIX.

-—_

SECTION 33, JUDICIAL CODE, R. S. SEC. 643;

ACT, MARCH 3, 1875, C. 130, SEC. 8, 18 STAT. 401,

ACT, FEBRUARY 8, 1894, C. 25, SEC. 1, 28 STAT. 36,

ACT, MARCH 3, 1911, C. 231, SEC. 33, 36 STAT. 1097.

ACT, AUGUST 23, 1916, C. 399, 39 STAT..

‘“When any civil suit or criminal prosecution is com-

menced in any court of a State against any officer ap-

pointed under or acting by authority of any revenue law

of the United States now or hereafter enacted, or against

any person acting under or by authority of any such |

officer, on account of any act done under color of his office :

or of such law, or on f any right, title, or |

authority claimed by such officer or other person under |

any.such law, jor is commenced against any person hold- —

ing property or estate by title derived from any such

officer and affects the validity of any such revenue law,

or against any officer of the courts of the United States

for or on account of any act done under color of his

office or in the performance of his duties as such officer,

or when any civil suit or criminal] prosecution is com-

menced against any person for or on account of anything

done by him while an officer of either House of Congress

in the discharge of his official duty in executing any order

of such House, the said suit or prosecution may at any

time before the trial or final hearing thereof be removed

for trial into the district court next to be holden in the

district where the same is pending upon the petition of

such defendant to said district court and in the following

manner: Said petition shall set forth the nature of the

suit or prosecution and be verified by affidavit and, to-

gether with a certificate signed by an attorney or coun-

selor at law of some court of record of the State where

00

such suit or prosecution is commenced or of the United

States stating that, as counsel for the petitioner, he has

examined the proceedings against him and carefully in-

quired into all the matters set forth in the petition, and

that he believes them to be true, shall be presented to the

said district court, if in session, or if it be not, to the

clerk thereof at his office, and shall be filed in said office.

The cause shall thereupon be entered on the docket of

the district court and shall proceed as a cause originally

commenced in that court; but all bail and other security

given upon such suit or prosecution shall continue in like

force and effect as if the Same had proceeded to final

judgment and execution in the State court. When the

suit is commenced in the State court by summons, sub-

poena, petition, or any other process except capias, the

clerk of the district court shall issue a writ of certiorari

to the State court requiring it to send to the district court

the record and the proceedings in the cause. When it

is commenced by capias or by any other similar form of

proceeding by which a personal arrest is ordered, he

shall issue a writ of habeas corpus cum causa, a dupli-

cate of which shall be delivered to the clerk of the State

court or left at his office by the marshal of the district or

his deputy or by some other person duly authorized

thereto; and thereupon it shall be the duty of the State

court to stay all further proceedings in the cause, and the

suit or prosecution, upon delivery of such process, or

leaving the same as aforesaid, shall be held to be re-

moved to the district court and any further proceedings,

trial, or judgment therein in the State court shall be void.

If the defendant in the suit or prosecution be in actual

custody on mesne process therein, it shall be the duty of

the marshal, by virtue of the writ of habeas corpus cum

causa, to take the body of the defendant into his custody,

to be dealt with in the cause according to law and the

order of the district Court, or, in vacation, of any judge

51

thereof; and if, upon the removal of such suit or prose-

cution, it is made to appear to the district court that no

copy of the record and proceedings therein in the State

court can be obtained, the district court may allow and

require the plaintiff to proceed de novo and to file a

declaration of his cause of action, and the parties may

thereupon proceed as in actions originally brought in

said district court. On failure of the plaintiff so to pro-

ceed, judgment of non prosequitur may be rendered

against him, with costs for the defendant.”

ne

Office Suprame @ourt,

FILED

NOV 23 192

NO. 23, ORIGINAL. WM. R. STANS2

| ©

In Tue

Supreme Court of the United States.

STATE OF MARYLAND

Versus

MORRIS A. SOPER, JUDGE OF THE DISTRICT

COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE

DISTRICT OF MARYLAND, AND THE DIS-

TRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR

THE DISTRICT OF MARYLAND.

CASE sine Ti

REPLICATION.

Mr. Cuerx:

Please file.

THOMAS H. ROBINSON,

Attorney General of Maryland

HERBERT LEVY,

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