Transcript of Record — Southern Pacific Co. v. United States

Supreme Court brief1925

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

(30,120)

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1923

No. 810

SOUTHERN PACIFIC COMPANY, APPELLANT

3

THE UNITED STATES

APPEAL FROM COURT OF CLAIMS

INDEX

Original

Record trom Court Of CIs. oc. cas cavece ccoukdsscascocn cues 1

RRMCOR HOE SOCMRUOR oi 6 09. UKd cules cos eek eek eeeeae

PROG BINONOON POCIIGE sa ois a a ccae bo kaatka a etaencaae nee >

SeMONR AMON hoa vedas Meena ts Gacaba ei aan hore ry

Argument and submission of case........0.000.0 00.0 cc eee 7

History of further proceedings

Reargument and submission of case

SCOCC HOC CeO SEEK CCE OCH DEERE SSES s

ETE EOE Sie 5 i 64s 0k 6 Fae Ke ee caw eee COR es +]

MMMM ard eh OLS Le kg iste kn hale Ctr ae eT 13

ER RENOU Ey adr -b salev accion nets Ca ek he nicked re is

a RII MAE N= CMAN a bce 4 aia va sass kes. oee kd eevee eee a0

Plaintiff's application for appeal...................0005 ; 1)

Order of court allowing plaintiff's applieation............ Bo

MPMI MECN SCO ore casa Vv dn eis be ee Ree en x

Jvpp & Derwetter (INc.), Prinvers, Wasuinarox, D U.. APRIL 11,

BOB pec 12 Late hn Day RL ae i ea caer le BO

l’rint

1924

oe de dm de a de he he be bet fest

Lt ONG

ROE TALE,

{fol. 1] COURT OF CLAIMS OF THE UNITED STATES

No. 33946

SourTueRN Paciric COMPANY

vs.

The Unirep STATES

|. Hisrory or PROCEEDINGS

On Mareh 1. 191S. the plaimtiY filed its original petition,

On May 1. 191S, a general traverse was entered under Rule 3.

Subsequently, to wit, on May 4. 1918, by leave of court, the plain-

tiff filed an amended petition.

On December 31, 1919. by leave of court, the plaintiff filed its

Second Amended Petition,

On January 3, 1922, the plaintiff filed a motion to amend the

second amended petition by striking out Paragraph V thereof. Said

motion was allowed Ly the court, January %, 1922, so that said pe-

tition new reads as follows:

Il. Secoxp AMENDED Prririon——Filed December 31, 1919, as

Amended by Court’s Order of January 9, 1922

The Southern Pacifie Company, claimant, respectfully represents :

]

Claimant is a corporation duly created, organized and existing

under the laws of the State of Kentucky, and as such corporation

now is, and was, during all of the times when the services herein-

after mentioned were performed, engaged as a common carrier by

(fol. 2| railroad in the transportation of passengers and freight in

and through various States of the United States and between the

points referred to herein, either directly over its own lines or in con-

junction with connecting carriers.

Il

Under the Acts of Congress granting lands in aid of railroads and

Acts of Congress regulating the expenditure of appropriations by

the United States for Army transportation over such land-grant

railroads, said land-grant railroads were required to transport troops

of the United States for certain less amounts than those charged

private parties for similar transportation ; but in none of said Acts

were said land-grant railroads required, nor have they ever agreed.

1—-$10

OR ETRE

POA SPEED?

chs Ag?

AIAN SS

TSIM

oer

aed

4

”

y

4

By

¥

3

ee ee —

CC AIR ABI RAR OO EMOTE SIR eat tit eis ote

Ae SPAR iA nti! RASTA _

r Rint mint ADT a Tet FS Aid aan RAS a ‘

to transport for such less amounts, as “troops of the United States,”

nor at other than full tariff fares, the certain persons more particu-

larly referred to in Paragraph 1V hereof.

Ill

Some years ago, and prior to the times when the services herein-

after mentioned were performed, the railroad companies of the

United States generally, including claimant, severally agreed with

the Quartermaster-General of the United States Army (subject to

certain exceptions not necessary here to be stated) to accept, for the

transportation of troops of the United States, the lowest net fare.

and lowest net excess baggage rate. lawfully available as derived

through deductions on account of land-grant distance via a usually

[fol. 8] traveled route for military traflie from a lawful fare filed

with the Interstate Commerce Commission as applying from point

of origin to destination at time of movement. These agreements,

commonly known 2s “Tand-Grant Equalization Agreements”, were

in force at the times of the transactions hereinafter referred to. (Cir-

cular No. 23. Quartermaster General's Office, 1911, dated November

15. 1911. and Cirevlar No. 6 Office of the Chief, Quartermaster

Corps. 1913. dated March 1, 1913. entitled “Prejoht and Passenger

Land-Grant Equalization Agreements and List of Carriers Partici-

pating,” printed and published by the Government.)

IV

At various times between March 1, 1912. and the date of the filing

of the original petition herein. claimant, upon transportation re-

quests issued by the War and Navy Departments of the United

States, transported certain persons belonging to the following classes,

to wit:

1. Applicants for enlistment in the Army:

(a) Accepted applicants. i. ¢.. applicants examined at general

recruiting stations and found mentally, morally and physically fit

for service and being forwarded to reeruiting depots or depot posts

for final examination and actual enlistment.

Lh) Rejected applicants. i. o.. those finally rejected at the recruit-

ing depots or depot posts and being returned to the reeruiting sta-

tions whence they came.

2. Discharged military prisoners, 1. ¢., discharged enlisted men en

route to their homes or elsewhere after serving sentence as military

prisoners.

(fol. 4] 3. Discharged soldiers. i. e., former enlisted men of the

Army en route to their homes after discharge.

4. Retired soldiers. i. ¢., enlisted men of the Army en route to

their homes after retirement.

s ae “ “ Sila cee pit ET ae Se coene acta MR arene Wa Ra es RM i I Ne pl TN SPT

5. Furloughed soldiers, i. e., enlisted men of the Army on fur-

lough en route back to their proper stations.

3

6. Deserters from the Army and Navy, payment for whose trans-

portation was charged and collected by the Government from said

deserters at full tariff fares.

7. Coast Guard, while under the Treasury Department.

8. Members of the National Guard prior to their muster into, or

subsequent to their muster out of, the service of the United States.

9. Selective service men prior to their muster into, or subsequent

to their muster out of, the service of the United States.

10. Other persons not mustered inte the military or naval service

of the United States.

In making payment for said transportation services the United

States, through its accounting oflicers. (in many instances against

the express protest and objection of the claimant) paid claimant for

said transportation only the less amounts authorized for the trans-

portation of “troops of the United States” over land-grant railroads,

instead of at the published tariff fares.

VI

The total difference between the amounts so paid claimant for

fol. 5] such transportation at land-grant rates, as for the transpor-

tation of “troops of the United States’, and the amounts which

claimant was entitled to receive therefor at published tariff fares

without land-grant deductions. is. according to the claimant’s books

and records, $219,091.26.

VIT

Wherefore claimant says there is now justly due and owing it by

the United States the sum of Two Hundred and Nineteen Thousand

and Ninety-one Dollars and Twenty-six Cents ($219,091.26), ex-

clusive of all just credits and offsets, for which amount it prays judg-

ment.

Claimant has at all times borne true allegiance to the United

States, and has made no assignment or transfer of the aforesaid

claims or of any interest therein.

Southern Pacifie Company. Claimant, by Charles TT. Bates,

Its Attorney in’ Fact. Tfarr & Bates, Attorneys for

Claimant.

ffol.6] Jurat showing the foregoing was duly sworn to by Chas.

IT. Bates: omitted in printing.

nace pemenos Bruns —_— a

pS E DR AA ELBA. nat ITE SNe DT BBA Nain og eR. FAA OE eee ae

7 hii oles

4

[fol. 7] III. Generat TRAVERSE

No demurrer, plea, answer, counterclaim, set-off, claim of damages.

- demand, or defense in the premises, having been entered on the part

of the defendant, a general traverse 1s entered as provided by Rule 34.

+

: IV. ArGUMENT AND SuBMISSION OF CASE

:

: On December 14, 1921, this case was argued and submitted on

merits by Mr. William R. Harr, for the plaintiff, and by Mr. Perry

_ _ W. Howard, for the defendant.

‘ V. History or FurTHEr PROCEEDINGS

‘ On December 19, 1921, the court filed an order remanding the

ease to the Calendar, and allowing plaintiff to amend its petition

and for the introduction of further testimony by either party.

¥

VI. REARGUMENT AND SUBMISSION OF CAsE

On January 30, 1925, the case was argued and submitted on merits

by Mr. William R. Harr, for the plaintiff, and by Mr. Perry W.

Howard, for the defendants.

$ VII. History or Purtier PROCEEDINGS

5 On February 19, 1928, the court filed an order filing tentative

findings, and setting same for hearin- March 5, 1923.

BS

< IX. ARGUMENT AND SUBMISSION ON TENTATIVE FinpINnGs

On March 5, 1928, the case was argued and submitted on tentative

findings of fact.

[fol. 8] X. History or FurTHER PROCEEDINGS

On May 16, 1923, the plaintiff filed a motion for leave to take

further testimony.

On May 21, 1928, the court filed an order allowing said motion.

5b apna EPL eh SPT he tH Le RETR.

XJ. Frxar Susmission or CAsE

On December 3, 1923, the case was submitted on merits, without

argument, on stipulation of parties, by Messrs. Harr & Bates, for the

plaintiff, and by Messrs. Perry W. Howard and Louis R. Mehlinger,

for the defendant.

| fol. 9] XII. Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law, and Opinion

of the Court by Downey, J.—Entered January 7, 1924

This case having been heard by the Court of Claims, the court.

upon the evidence, makes the following

FINDINGS OF Fact

I

Plaintiff is a corporation of the State of Kentucky and during all

of the times when the services hereinafter mentioned were performed

was engaged as a common carrier by railroad in the transportation

of passengers and freight in and through various States of the United

States and between the points referred to herein, either directly over

its own lines or in conjunction with other carriers.

I]

Under acts of Congress granting lands in aid of railroads and acts

of Congress regulating the expenditure of appropriations by the

United States for Army transportation over such land-grant rail-

roads, said land-grant railroads were required to transport “troops

of the United States,” for certain less amounts than those charged

private parties for similar passenger transportation.

IIT

Prior to the times when the services hereinafter mentiened were

performed, the railroad companies of the United States generally,

including plaintiff, severally agreed with the Quartermaster General

of the United States Army (subject to certain exceptions not neces-

sary here to be stated) to accept, for the transportation of troops of

the United States, the lowest net fare and lowest net excess baggage

rate lawfully available as derived through deductions on account

of land-grant distance via a usually traveled route for military traffic

from a lawful fare filed with the Interstate Commerce Commission

|fol. 10] as applying from point of origin to destination at time of

movement. These agreements, commonly known as “land-grant

equalization agreements,” were in force at the times of the transac-

tions hereinafter referred to.

e

E

e

3.

4

Pd

a ie alle ata

RRA SOARED LNA PLA BEERS IIe CBRL ile GPA OS

Tae AG Dee 8s De Bete ha De Hh ge BT gn wa

IV

Between March 1, 1912, and December 31, 1917, both dates in-

clusive, plaintiff transported, upon transportation requests issued by

the War and Navy Departments, a number of persons for the de-

fendent, all of whom, with the exceptions hereinafter stated, belonged

to the several classes of persons enumerated in case No. 33056 in this

court, Union Pacific Railroad Company, plaintiff, decided February

19, 1917 (52 Ct. Cl. 226; affirmed 249 U. S. 354), to wit applicants

for enlistment in the Army, including accepted as well as rejected

applicants prior to actual enlistment, discharged military prisoners;

discharged soldiers, retired soldiers and furloughed soldiers.

Among the persons so transported were also certain persons desig-

nated as “civilian employees of the War Department,” some “com-

mnissioned oflicers, Engineer Office, War Department” and certain

other persons designated in the reports of the Treasury Department

herein as “guard,” “nurse,” “attendant,” ete.

V

For all of the aforesaid transportation plaintiff was paid by de-

fendant in the reduced amounts required by the aforesaid railroad

land-grant acts and Army appropriation acts for the transportation

of “troops of the United States” over land-grant railroads.

For all such transportation plaintiff stated its bills on the prescribed

form of voucher for transportation subject to land-grant deduc-

tions, stating therein in appropriate columns the mileage of land-

- grant road, the number of men, the rate per man, the gross amount,

~ the “amount to be deducted on account of land grant” and in the

4 final column the “amount claimed” which was the gross amount

less land-grant deduction, and certified the account as stated to be

correct.

VI

Upon a part of the vouchers for the transportation here involved

there was written, typewritten, or stamped by the plaintiff! company,

before the voucher was paid, one of two forms of “protest,” referred

to as the “short form” and the “long form,” as follows:

The short form: “Amounts claimed in this bill accepted under

protest.”

The long form; “As U. S. Government accounting officers claim

they have no authority to allow or pay for the transportation of dis-

charged soldiers more than the fares for troops of the U. S. such

fares are shown herein but under protest and S. P. Co. for itself and

connecting carriers does not waive any of its rights to full published

tariff fares and any payment at any less amount will be accepted as

part payment only for the services performed.”

The “short form” was understood by the clerk who handled these

bills in the ollice of the disbursing quartermaster at San Francisco

as addressed to the matter of land-grant rates and to be for the

purpose, on the part of the plaintiff, of reserving a right to present

ee bay

Pees

[fol. 11] a further claim for full commercial fares to the accounting

officers or the courts.

Note.—The use of the word “protest” in this and other findings

with refernce to the two forms of indorsement set out imports no

finding by the court as to the nature or effect of those indorsements,

VII

The total amount claimed and paid for the transportation here

involved from January 1, 1914, to October 1, 1914, was $128,475.31,

which sum by reason of land-graut deductions shown upon the

vouchers as presented was $71,560.92 less than plaintiff! would have

been entitled to receive at full commercial rates. The number of

vouchers presented therefor was 508.

Of said 508 vouchers involving said sum of $71,560.92 an aceount

of land grant, 201 thereof involving $24,176.62 of land grant had the

short form of protest stamped thereon, 4 thereof involving $843.96

of land grant had the long form of protest written or typewritten

thereon (making the total presented land-grant deductions during

this period $24.443.81), and 303. thereof involving $46,540.34 of

land grant bore neither form of protest.

Of the vouchers protested during said period, the amount of land

grant involved in the transportation of each of the following classes

was as follows: Applicants for enlistment, accepted and rejected,

$1,745.45; discharged military prisoners, $876.61; discharged sol-

diers, $15,484.62; retired soldiers, $336.46: furloughed soldiers,

$5,733.48, and civilian employees of the War Department, $267.19,

making a total of $24,443.81, of which the amount of land grant

involved in the vouchers bearing the long form of protest was

$843.96, all on account of the transportation of discharged soldiers.

Vill

Beginning with October i, 1914, the plaintiff began systematically

to type on its bills, before presentment, the long form of protest, and,

with some exceptions, used it on its bills for the classes of trans-

portation here involved during the period from that date to June

18, 1916, on which date the interterritorial military arrangement

between the United States and the railroads, this plaintiff included,

hecame effective.

The bills for transportation here involved during that period

were all upon the prescribed form for transportation subject to land

grant as stated in the preceding finding with reference to the bills

for the period therein referred to. They were 728 in number for an

aggregate amount claimed and paid of $109,150.64, which, by reason

of land grant, was $75,467.74 less than full commercial rates, and

516 thereof involving land grant to the amount of $50,678.94 bore

the long form of protest, 212 thereof involving land grant to the

amount of $24,788.80 not bearing any protest.

Of those protested the amount of deducted land grant involved

in the transportation of each of the several classes of travelers was

4

eppahichiter sR a eee

PU Sey a Ree

Bi ONS Seer ON

Rickie aed”

ah lp SLE REG HE ta NAA PODER BPRS RE. 8

8

as follows: Applicants for enlistment, accepted and_ rejeeted,

$9,235.56; discharged military prisoners, $3,431.34; discharged

soldiers, $7,865.96; retired soldiers, $202.87: furloughed soldiers,

[fol. 12] $29,767.28; and civilian employees of the War Depart-

ment, $175.93, making a total of $50,678.94.

The apportionment to enumerated classes of land grant involved

in unprotested bills during this period ($24,788.80) is not shown.

IX

All of the bills for transportation here involved for the period

from March 1, 1912, to January 1, 1914, were upon the regular

form of land-grant voucher in form as stated in Finding V and

were unprotested except one bill for transportation furnished in Sep-

tember, 1913, which bore the short form of protest, and involved

deducted land grant to the amount of $294.06, distributed as fol-

lows: 16 discharged soldiers, the land-grant deductions on which

were $220.20; 2 discharged military prisoners, land-grant deductions

$27.59; 2 retired soldiers, land-grant deductions $14.67, and 2 per-

sons not classified other than as falling within the several lists men-

tioned in the Union Pacifie case, land-grant deductions $31.60. The

total amount of land grant deducted in the rendition of bills during

this period for the transportation of the classes of persons enumerated

in the preceding findings was $39,253.54.

All bills herein involved for the entive period from March 1, 1912,

to June 18, 1916, inclusive, were paid at land-grant rates as pre-

sented and in the amounts stated therein under the column heading

“Amount claimed.”

X

The plaintiff, asserting its nonintention to concede in principle

the application of land-grant rates to the travel of such classes of

persons, waives, so far as this case is concerned, all claims on account

of travel of persons other than those enumerated above whose status

was determined in the Union Pacific case, 52 Ct. Cl. 226; 249 U.S.

854, and civilian employees of the War Department.

Plaintiff also waives all claims herein on account of transportation

furnished subsequent to the taking effect of the interritorial mili-

tary arrangement, June 18, 1916.

Plaintiff has not ineluded herein and consideration is not given to

certain claims for transportation between April 17, 1914, and June

18, 1916, which at the time of the commencement of this suit were

pending on supplemental bills before the Comptroller of the Treas-

ury and which are embraced in case No. 34564 subsequently com-

menced and under submission herewith.

XI

At various times prior to the fu.aishing of the transportation

here involved the Comptroller of the Treasury had held that land-

grant railroads could be paid for the transportation of the classes

ryeee

(lis

dis

th

of persons enumerated in the Union Pacifie case, supra, only at

land-erant rates and disbursing oflicers were authorized to make

pavinent on that basis only,

Because of such rulings the plaintifi company previous to January

1, PIA. had presented its bills for sueh transportation at land-grant

[folo PS] rates and accepted paytnent thereof at such retes, without

protest, and had taken mo steps to enforce payinent at any other or

different rate.

After January 1. 1914, it continued io present its bills to disburs-

ing officers at land-grant rates and accept payment thereof as pre-

sented, but on a part thereof, for services between that date and

October 1. 1914. it wrote. typed. or, for the most part, staamped pro-

tests on the voucher in the form: and to the extent heretofore found.

It knew that disbursing officers were not authorized to and would

not pay such bills at other than land-grant rates and payment could

he more promptly secured by presentment to disbursing officers than

otherwise.

It began systematically to endorse protests in the long form on its

bills on October 1. 1914, and thereafter followed that practice as

and to the extent shown in Finding VITL.

At some time in the latter part of 1914. the Union Pacitie Railway

Company, which was ther represented in Washington in the matter

of claims against the Government by the same attorney who repre-

sented the plaintiff? company in the same capacity, presented its

claim to the Auditor for the War Departinent for the transportation

at regular published passenger rates of certain rejected applicants for

enlistment, discharged military prisoners, discharged enlisted men,

retired enlisted men, and furloughed men returning to their stations,

which the auditor disallowed to the extent of the applicable land

grant, and upon appeal to the Comptroller of the Treasury, the

comptroller, on March 24, 1915, aflirmed the action of the auditor.

Thereupon that company commeneed its action in this court (case

No, 83056) on April 29, 1915, whieh was decided by this court Feb-

ruary 19, 1917 (52 Ct. Cl. 226), and on appeal aflirmed by the

Supreme Court (249 U.S. 354).

CONCLUSION or Law

On the facts found the court concludes as matter of law that the

plaintiff is not entitled to recover, and that its petition ought to be

dismissed,

It is therefore adjudged that plaintiff's petition be and the same is

dismissed with judgment against the plaintiff for cost of printing

the record herein, to be taxed and collected by the clerk.

OPINION

Downey, Judge, delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff seeks to recover on account of a large number of items of

personal transportation furnished between March 1, 1912, and June

LETS IOT LT Eo VET LR RE ETI

~ ee ems

Fas Pee, Hae ay BME ree eS

e

<

%

}

4

“4

4

6

,

a

,

oD

¥

e

4

4

:

10

18, 1916, in exchange for the usual Government transportation re- stat

quests, the basis of the claim being the difference between the pur

amounts claimed in its bills and paid as claimed, at land-grant trib

rates, and the full tarilf rates for such transportation; in other pen

words, it is a suit te recover, on account of this transportation, the ata

amounts deducted from full tariff rates on account of land grant. of t

such deduction having been made by the plaintiff itself in the ren- on .

dition of its bills. 1

The claim as originally presented, covering the period from Mareh jeri

1, 1912. to December 31, 1917, inclusive, has been reduced by the ary

abandonment of that portion subsequent to June 18, 1916, because to J

[fol. 14] of the taking effect on that date of what is known as the thes

interterritorial military arrangement, and by the abandonment of T

claims on account of the transportation of persons other than those ima

belonging to the following classes: Applicants for enlistment, both | fol

accepted, but traveling before final acceptance, and rejected: dis- vou

charged military prisoners: discharged soldiers. retired soldiers; fur- lame

loughed soldiers; and civilian employees of the War Department. pres

It may now be said that the status of the elasses named, civilian of t

employees excepted, is no longer in question for the purposes of this Act.

case, since it was held by this court in the case of the Union Paeitic the

Railway Company, decided February 19, 1914 (52 Ct. Clis. 226), “Da

that they were not within the designation “troops” and therefore tance

not within the provisions of the lind grant acts as to transportation “Gr

of troops and property of the United States, a decision which upon and

appeal was ailirmed by the Supreme Court (249 0. 8. 354), but thin

because of other features of the case determinative of plaintiff the

rights and necessarily for consideration, the situation previous to ne

the decision referred to must be looked to. And since it is apparent bill

that questions involved in this case growing out of procedure with with

reference to these claims are important for determination not only T

as affecting the rights of this plaintiff in this particular case but teat ie

because we must know that they, under like or similar circumstances, late

are involved in other pending or to be anticipated litigation, we shall with

feel justified in treating the situation somewhat in detail. T

But preliminarily it is perhaps well to dispose of the status of ont

“civilian employees of the War Department” imeluded to a limited out

extent in this action, but not included in the decision above referred all

to, by concluding. without discussion, that such travelers were not for |

“troops” of the United States within the purview of the land grant A

acts, this expression, however, invelving no opinion as to the possible pase

status, under some circumstances, of civilian employees, of the Army. pria

It may be said generally that previous to the decision of this court subj

in the Union Pacific case and for some time previous to the period land

involved herein, the status of the classes of persons considered therein sal

wag, for transportation purposes, that of troops of the United States fern

by reason of holdings by the Comptroller of the Treasury that for othe

their transportation railroad companies could be paid at land-grant _

rates only. And sueh matters being unquestionably within the juris- the

diction of the comptroller, whose decisions as to the expenditure of “

appropriated moneys were conclusive, such holdings established the

status of these various classes of travelers for transportation pay

purposes at least so long as resort was not had to a a judicial

tribunal in an attempt to enforce a right to other and different com-

pensation and no attempt along this line was made by this plaintiff

at any time or by any other railroad company until the institution

of the Union Pacitie ease, supra, which was commenced in this court

on April 29, 1915.

The case naturally divides itself for consideration into three

periods, viz., Mareh 1, 1912. to December 31. 1013. inelusive; Janu-

ary 1, 1914. to September 30, 1914, inelusive: and October 1, 1914,

to June 18, 1916, inelusive, and separate findings are addressed to

these periods.

To avoid repetition of facts common te each of these periods, it

may here be said that all of plaintiffs bill< for transportation here

[fol. 15] involved were stated upon the regular approved form of

voucher for sach transportation of passengers as was subject to

land-grant deduction, and by “approved” form is meant a form

preseribed by the Comptroller of the Treasury with the approval

of the Secretary of the Treasury under authority of the Dockery

Act. See 28 Stat. 206, see. 5. This form required the stating of

the claims im separate columns under the following headings:

“Date.” “No. of transportation request.” “From.” “To.” “Total dis-

tance.” “Miles of land-grant read.” “No. of men.” “Rate per man,”

“Gross amount.” “Amount to be dedueted on account of land grant,”

and “Amount claimed.” A certificate followed stating among other

things that “the above account is correct and just.” to be siened by

the transportation company by some proper representative, and

npon the form was the following instruction: “Certifieation and

bill to be completely filled in by pavee or before signature by pavee,

without alteration or erasure thereafter.” See 14 Comp. Dee. 977.

The use of this and other forms relating to Government transpor-

tation was specifically prescribed by Department Cireular No. 62,

dated October 29, 1907, issued by the Comptroller of the Treasury

with the approval of the Secretary. (14 Comp. Dee. 967.)

This form was slightly changed. principally in its “make-up,”

on two oceasions subsequent to the promulgation of the form set

out in 14 Comp.. but the essential requirements above stated were

all retained and appeared in all land-grant voncher forme prescribed

for use from 14 Comp. to and throughout the period here involved.

At the same time that this voucher form for transpertation of

passengers subject to land-grant deduction was preserthed appro-

priate forms were also prescribed for vonchering transpertation not

subject to land grant. From them the columns headed “Mes of

land-grant road,” “Gross amount.” and “Amount te be d acted

on account of land grant” were omitted. (See cireular avove re-

ferred to and Form No. 8 on page 980, same volume.) These and

other prescribed voucher forms were available to the railroad com-

panies in such quantities as they might desire. and it was therefore

the option of a railroad company, in the first instance, to state its

claim on such form as it calela deem appropriate thereto.

For the first of these periods beginning March 1, 1912, all bills

LEO ata ae eth tan

12

involving land grant to the amount of $39,253.54 were thus pre-

sented and paid as presented and there was no other action with

reference thereto except that upon one bill for transportation in

September, 1918, involving land grant to the amount of $294.06,

there was stamped what is now called the short form of protest, viz.,

“Amounts claimed in this bill accepted under protest.” Throughout

this period. therefore, with the single exception stated, the effect of

which, if any, we will hereafter consider, there was manifest no in-

tention otherwise than to acquiesce in the then prevailing rule as to

the status of these travelers and to claim for their transportation land

grant rates only, and we may reasonably prestune that this had been

the attitude of plaintiff for some time preceding this period, for the

rulings as to the status of these persons had considerably antedated

it except as to discharged soldiers who were not furnished Govern-

ment transportation until after the passage of the act of August 24,

1912 (37 Stat. 576), but had theretofore received travel pay, and

there is no indication that the fixing of March 1, 1012, as the be-

[fol. 16] ginning of this period indicated any change of policy or

anything other than that it was the utmost limit to which the period

of six years before the commencement of this suit on March 1, 1918,

would reach, As to this period it is sufficient to say that recovery is

precluded under the authority of Baltimore & Ohio Railroad Com-

pany v. United States. 52 (4, Clms. 468, and Oregon-Washington

Railroad and Navigation Company v. United States, 54 Ct. Clms.

131, affirmed 255 U.S. 539,

With the second period here involved, commencing January 1,

1914, began a practice of typing, or for the most part stamping

on the vouchers, rendered and certified as heretofore stated, a form

of “protest,” although ali vouchers were not se “protested.” And

it is the alleged practice of the plaintiff with reference to the pro-

testing of vouchers whieh divides the case into the three periods, a

different practice prevailing in each period to such an extent as to

justify the separation, although there was not coniplete uniformity

The first period is therefore treated as a period of no protest, which

is true as to all of that period with the single exception noted; the

second period is the period during whieh the prevailing practice was

to stamp on the vouchers the “short-form” protest; and the third

period is one during which, upon most vouchers, the “long form”

of protest was used. The use of the word “protest” is for con-

venience and in line with plaintiffs presentment of its case without

intention thereby to commit ourselves as to the legal effeet of the

words used under the circumstances.

During the second period, from January 1, 1914, to October 1.

1914, there were 508 bills involving a total land grant of $71,560.92,

of which 201 involving $24,176.62 of land grant bore the short form

of protest, 4 involving $845.96 of land grant bore the long form of

protest, and 303 involving $46,540.34 of land grant bore no protest.

Thus of 508 bills involving $71,560.92. of land grant 201 thereot

involving $24,176.62 of land grant had stamped on them before

presentment the words, “.\mounts claimed in this bill accepted under

protest,” and, eliminating from the discussion for the present the

few cases in which another form was used and which must be the

13

subject of discussion as to the third period, we must consider the

legal effect of this procedure. It is contended that when plaintiff

began in January, 1/14, the practice “of noting on its bills its formal

protest against a settlement at land-grant fares” and continued the

practice with some degree of regularity although it «pears that it

“protested” less than half its bills, it put the accounting officers on

notice that it was claiming full tariff fares for all such transporta-

tion and was rendering its bills and accepting payment at land-grant

fares under protest and as part payment only. If its practice de-

‘ermines its policy it is for consideration that in a majority of cases

its bills bore no protest.

The striking feature of this situation is that the plaintiff puts

itself in the position of roidering a bill for a stated amount, found

under the heading “Amount claimed,” arrived at by the application

of correct mathematics to previously stated amounts, certifying that

the amount is correct and just, and then stamping on the voucher

before presentment a stutement that the “amount elaimed,” neces-

sarily by it, and shown by its certification to be correct, is accepted

under protest.

‘fol. I] We are conversant with the argument. that disbursing

cHlicers, under rulings of the comptroller, could pay no more, and

that it Was useless to present to them a claim for more, but we have

iully pointed out in the Baltimore & Ohio and Oregon-Washington

Cases, supra, the methods of precedure open to claimants if they de-

sired in fact to present their claims upon a different basis. And it

thay be said that railroad companies and their officers and attorneys

vere very familiar with all these methods. Such a eonclusion must

iollow from the exten. and frequeney of their claims, neeessitatine

resort: to established) settlement methods, and. indeed, familiarity

with the accounting system appears from the testimony of plaintitl's

attorney in this case. Any other conelusion would no doubt be re-

sarded as a reflection on his loug experience and competent service

in the interest of railroad clatmants. But, notwithstanding the

wvailability of this other and better procedure, if a claimant desired

in fact to assert a right to something more than it could obtain at

the hands of a disbursing officer, we need not now determine whether

could not preserve a right by a proper protest, since that question

will naturally be for later consideration in its application to any

form of protest. As to the procedure now under consideration, we

do hold that such a so-called protest was not in facet an effective

protest, if there could be one. and under the circumstanees could

wail the plaintiff nothing.

We frequently encounter the apparent belief that a “protest” is

“something to conjure with” under almost any circumstances: that

it wipes out the disastrous results of any course of conduct: and that

it creates as well as preserves rights, Equally is it sometimes the

view that whatever its form: or applicability it is only necessary to

label it a “protest” and it is a protest. And these o' servations are

hot at all antagonistic to the idea that there may in fact be protests.

rightly so called, and that they may at times he very efficacious in

the accomplishment of their intended purpose, but sv vest rather the

hecessity of determining whether a so-called “protest is in fact and

SPOATALE Ny tet

FREI SILI RINT ELLIS

14

in legal effect a protest, and whether, under the circumstances, it

accomplishes anything as affecting the rights of the protestor. In

one of our early cases, 13 Ct. Cls. 70, a protest was characterized as

“so much waste paper,” and in numerous cases they have heen held

ineffective for any purpose.

We find no established rule with reference to any particular form

of protest in general, and this quite naturally <o since the eireum-

stances of each case must largely determine the applicable form,

although in some cases in which prote-t= are provided for by statute

particularity is required as, for example, in the matter of protests

as to customs duties when the requirement is that it shall set forth

“distinetly and specifically and in respeet to each entry or payment

the reasons for his objections thereto.” while in other cases wherein

the action taken is of such specific character that there is but one

possible subject matter for protest the requirement only is that there

shall he protest. whieh by necessary implication addresses itself to

hut the one matter, and that the action of a party other than ihe

protestor,

To us it seems but reasonable te hold that if the transaction itself

does not so define the situation that a protest in general terms can

have but one application, and that an application entirely consistent

[fol. 18] with the relations of both parties to the transaction, then a

protest must so specifically state its subject matter and the respect in

which action had is objected to that its purpose may clearly appear

on its face.

We know now, in our consideration of this ease, that plaintiff's

contention is that the transportation in question was not subject

to land-grant deduction, but the short form of protest used pre-

sented no question of land grant to the disbursing officer any more

than it presented any one of the several other questions which might

he involved in data stated in the voucher. So far as appears it might

have Leen a question as to the number of men, the aailacole traveled,

the correct land-grant mileage. or the gross rate as well as the

applieability of land-grant rates.

It is true that we were requested to find as a faet that the plain-

tiff’s procedure after January 1. 114. put the accounting officers on

notice that plaintiff was claiming full tariff fares and was render-

ing its bills and accepting payment at land-grant rates “under pro-

test and as part payment only” and, upen submission of tentative

findings, we were again requested to find that:

“It appears from the evidence that the short form of protest was

understood by the accounting oflicers of the Government to mean

that the plaintiff protested against the requirement of land-grant. de-

ductions on the classes of transportation covered by the bills to which

said protest was attached.”

And it is true that a passenger rate clerk on the transportation rate

board in the General Accounting Office testified that it was a part of

his official duties to audit such bills and that it was his understand-

ing that in using such form of protest the plaintiff company was

protesting against making any land-grant deduction; but aside from

the competency of this testimony for this purpose, which we more

than question, the transactions us to the presentment and payment

De a ee Bs NE ils ae a s a vere > —- fn

j hte

> e 1

eRe —=>naD = —-— ©

15

of these bills relate back to the time of their presentment to and pay-

ment by the disbursing officer, and we are unable to see how that sit-

uation can be affected by the understanding of anyone in the account-

ing office when the disbursing oflicer’s accounts were thereafter being

audited. The clerks in the account office were then determining

the credits to whieh the disbursing oflieer was entitled, in the settle-

ment of his accounts, by reason of the payments made on these

vouchers and with that determination their duties with reference

thereto ended. They were not then considering any claim of the

plaintiff submitted for allowanee or otherwise and had no question

hefore them as to the purpose or effect of the protest, and authority to

speak as to the “understanding” of the accounting oflicers does not

appear,

It should now be suggested that during consideration of this case

on first submission certain information then came to our attention

with reference to possible practices in the oflices of disbursing officers

by way of departure from authorized procedure, indicating ihe

possibility that injustice to the plaintiff might result if the case were

considered solely in the light of authorized rather than actual pro-

cedure on the part of disbursing officers, and the case was remanded

with leave to take further testimony if desired.

Upon resubmission the record contains the testimony of a witness

Who was a clerk and for a part of the time head clerk in the office

of the disbursing officer by whom these bills were paid, this clerk

[fol. 19] having in usual course handled the bills or at least. a part of

them so that he had knowledge of the use thereon of this short-form

protest,

Based upon his testimony and that already in the record above

referred to we are now asked to modify the tentative findings by

adding a finding to the effect that it was understood by the disbursing

officer and by the accounting officers that in using this short-form

protest the plaintiff was protesting against the settlement of its bills

at land-grant rates and was preserving a right to make further claim

for full commercial rates before the accounting officers and the courts.

We are very willing to give the plaintiff any finding to which it

may be entitled and prefer to err through liberality rather than

otherwise, but we do not find that this witness qualified himself

to testify as to the understanding of the disbursing officer, and we

have, we think, gone as far if not further than justified when we in-

corporate in the findings of facts a statement as to the understanding

of this witness himself as to the meaning and purpose of this protest.

And in connection with the testimony of this witness we may suggest

that if all his statements as to practice in the disbursing office were

converted into findings of fact. it would be of very doubtful value

to plaintiff, for it must carry with the things relied upon as of value

other matters clearly not so to be regarded by the plaintiff, notably

the refusal to settle disputed claims and the settlement only of those

matters as to which the claimant and the disbursing officer were in

agreement. Comment upon this testimony, not incorporated in the

findings, is only justified for the purpose of indicating its careful

consideration in all its phases.

Aside from the probative value of the testimony as to the under-

ce ceca AAS aaa babes

4

ASG RH ale aA iit ORS ESL ES

16

standing of the disbursing officer, it is to be suggested in this con-

nection, perhaps to be again referred to, that whatever the under-

standing of the disbursing officer may have been as to the purpose

or effect. of this protest, he was an officer of very limited powers,

and his understanding or even his approval could not have served

to create any liability against the United States not otherwise ex-

istent. .

Other testimony upon resubmission, apparently intended to in-

dicate the continuing intention of the plaintiff to contest the appli-

cation of land-grant rates to the classes of transportation involved,

is largely a recital of communi ‘ations between railroad officials on

the subject, not a proper basis for a finding of fact, and probably

with fyll comprehension of that fact no request for a finding based

thereon is submitted.

In addition to suggestions made as to the indefinite character of

this protest, we are asked to conclude that a public voucher made in

the detailed form indicated and certified to be correct, not only as

to its details but as to the “amount claimed,” and which is re-

quired to be completely filled in before certification, without alteration

or erasure all to the evident purpose that there shall be stated a

clean-cut demand which may be paid by a disbursing officer at the

“amount claimed” and that only, for which it becomes his ae-

quittance, can be converted into a claim for a partial payment with

reserved right to make further claim as to the same service by

stamping thereon the statement that the “amount claimed” which

has been stated and certified by the claimant, is “accepted under

rotest.””

[fol. 20] We can not subscribe to such a theory. Its inconsistency,

as well as its apparent purpose to take advantage of a method of settle-

ment designed to accomplish finality while at the same time subvert-

ing that purpose, condemns it. And in that connection the neces-

sities of Government accounting are properly for consideration and

perhaps ought to be reverted to more than they.are. With these ne-

cessities and the disadvantages of lack of finality in Government ac-

counting those doing business with the Government not only are,

for the most part, familiar, but should be chargeable with knowl-

edge and, unless required for the protection of a legal right not

otherwise to be asserted, practices which impose unnecessary bur-

dens on the governmental system should not be encouraged by

judicial sanction. And for consideration also is the fact that appro-

priations are for the service of fiscal years—that they are available

for such time thereafter as Congress has thought reasonable to

permit the adjustment of claims payable therefrom, a situation

indicative of intention to accomplish reasonably prompt present-

ment and settlement of claims.

And if by such a procedure as that under consideration the finality

of a settlement such as those here involved may be suspended and an

account thus settled be held to be still open for further claims,

predicated on the same service, to be asserted at any time within

the six-year period of limitation, is there any reason why such a pro-

test stamped upon any voucher in settlement of any claim of any

sh ih RE el EO

17

character might not obviate its finality and serve to hold the whole

matter open and subject to further claim at least until the interven-

tion of the statute of limitation’ Tf there is one thing apparent,

predicated upon our observation in these matters, it is the great

need for a revised system which shall require the prompt presenta-

tion of claims not only to the administrative and accounting offices

but to this court as well, and while we can mot assume legislative

function, ad we certainly can not but recognize and protect: any

right legal under the present system, we are not disposed by judicial

construction to extend beyond legal requirements the effect of unnee-

essary and detrimental practices.

We think it quite clear that the use during this period of this

form of protest could avail the plaintiff nothing. Aside from the

infirmity in the form of the protest, whieh sufficiently determines its

value, what must be said in the discussion of the following period as

to the efficacy of any protest will be applicable.

As to the third period the contention is that at the beginning

thereof, on October 1, 1914, a different practice was inaugurated in

that on the vouchers, all stated on the approved form as hereinbe-

fore outlined, there was typed, before presentment, the long form

of protest, as follows:

As U.S. Government accounting officers claim they have no

authority to allow or pay for the transportation of discharged soldiers

more than the fares for troops of the U. S., such fares are shown

herein but under protest, and S. P. Co. for itself and connecting ear-

riers does not waive any of its rights to full published tariff fares and

wy payinent at any less amount will be accepted as part payment

only for the service performed.”

During this period extending to the taking effect of the inter-

territorial military arrangement on June 138, 1916, there was pre-

[fol. 21] sented 728 vouchers involving land grant to the amount of

875.467.74 516 of which, involving land grant to the amount of

$50,678.94, bore this long form of protest; and 212 involving

$24.788.80 of land grant bore no protest, so that the practice was not

uniform but sufficiently so as to justify the treatment of the period

on the basis of the long-form protest.

It is for observation first that this form of protest is not subject

to the objection of indefiniteness suggested as to the short form. It

pointed out the specifie subject matter of the protest and the reason

therefor.

But while it is specific, the very respect in which it is specifie pre-

cludes the construction sought to be put upon it. Tt is urged as

preserving a right in the plaintiff to seek additional compensation

as to all persons within any of the classes under discussion, whereas

by its express terms it is addressed only to “discharged soldiers,”

And it is to be interpreted not alone upon the inclusion of this class

only in its terms but also upon the familiar-rule, Inclusio unius est

exclusio alterius. Any right preserved, therefore, by this form of

protest must be limited to discharged soldiers. the class, however,

which involves the larger part of the claim.

3—810

;

Ee hing Seta ea eas a oe ae

Raat a hdl ia ae aa ead Wit Teton Fn see 2 oe

The effect of the use of this form of protest upon these vouchers

under such circumstances is the important question for consideration

and one, perhaps, not free from doubt. The findings have stated the

facts separately as to each one of the classes involved, because it was

conceived that under this form of protest there might be a right of

recovery as to discharged soldiers which did not extend to other

classes.

But, after all, does either form of protest under the circumstances

preserve any existing right to additional compensation? The ques-

tion can not be treated with the brevity which is desirable and its

importance must justify such extended discussion as may seem neces-

sary to a comprehensive presentment of the situation dealt with and

our views with reference thereto.

A protest can not create a right. It may preserve an existing

right, although, when opposed by inconsistent action or cireum-

stances, it may not always do that. Its chief function is, under ap-

propriate circumstances, to avoid the effect of apparent acquiescence

in the action of another.

Let us assume that at the time now in question the plaintiff be-

lieved, contrary to the holding of the comptroller, that it was en-

titled to be paid full tariff rates for the transportation in question.

By its protest it indicates knowledge of the fact that the “account-

ing officers” disclaimed any authority. to pay more than for the

transportation of troops of the United States—that is, more than

land-grant rates. It uses the words “accounting officers” although

it was dealing with the presentment of its claims to disbursing of-

ficers, and there is a difference. The accounting officers, as the ae-

counting system was then constituted under the Dockery Act. were,

so far as its business was concerned, the Auditor for the War De-

partment and the Comptroller of the Treasury. A disbursing of-

fier was an accountable officer who accounted to the accounting of-

ficers for funds advanced to him on accountable warrants for which

the vouchers paid by him are his aequittance when his accounts

go to the auditor for settlement.

[fol. 22] An essential difference in practice is found in the fact

that a Government creditor could present him claim to an auditor

for the full amount claimed to be due, in this case full tariff rates.

Upon disallowance by the auditor of any part of an item of a claim,

land grant in this instance, the claimant had a right of appeal to the

comptroller, but by statute it could not accept the part of a claim

allowed by the auditor and have an appeal as to the disallowed part.

(28 Stat., 208.) It must in case of appeal to the comptroller, send

in the warrant issued to it for the allowed part of the claim so that

the comptroller might pass upon the whole claim and adjust an over

as well as an under payment. Then there was, of course, access to

this court, in connection with which it is important to consider that

previous action either by accounting or disbursing officers is not an

essential to the jurisdiction of this court in this class of cases.

Quite materially different was the practice when claims were pre-

sented to a disbursing officer for payment and, aside from the pre-

sumptions, it is quite out of the question to assume anything else

2165 eseie et el Mb eat

19

than actual knowledge of dis! ising officer’s practice and authority

on the part of those dealing so frequently with them. The number

of claims involved in this case is illustrative of the extensive resort

to this method of settlement and necessarily resultant knowledge,

A disbursing officer was not permitted to receive a claim, disallow

a part and pay the remainder as was the auditor, Reasons are too

apparent to need amplification. A disbursing officer could only pay

a claim when he deemed himself authorized to pay the “amount

claimed.” This is in line with and explains the suggestion fre-

quently made in this class of cases, and in the instant case, that

when claims were sometimes presented to disbursing officers for

such transportation at full tariff rates claimants were informed that

they could not be paid as presented and if it was desired to procure

payment at the hands of the disbursing oflice, the most expeditious

way of realizing on a claim, it was necessary to restate the bill on

a basis upon which the disbursing offieer was authorized to pay,

since, as stated, the disbursing officer could not disallow in part and

pay in part as might the auditor, and the necessary restatement of

accounts, fo procure payment by this method, is the basis of econten-

tion that the claim is thus under duress.

It is perhaps as well here as later to say that with this contention

we can not agree, for in point of fact there is to be found in the

transaction no element of duress at all, and this seems so apparent

that it is hardly worth while to diseuss at length what may consti-

tute duress. The disbursing officer, in such circumstances, does in

effect say to the claimant, “You must state your claim on the basis

upon whieh T ean pay it and none other if you want payment at

my hands,” but there is noe compulsion so to proceed, for other doors

are open wherein the claimant may state its claim as it sees fit. And

if it suggests, as has so often been done, the probable futility of

proceeding through the accounting officers, where it could, at least

be in the position of asserting its full claim, no matter what the

result, its contention is not aided, for in addition to the right to so

assert the claim to the accounting officer there was always access

to this court independent of precedent action. And so the stating to

a disbursing officer of an account upon the basis required by him if

he is to pay it is nothing but a compliance with conditions neces-

|fol. 25] sary to procure a settlement by that method, which a

claimant must regard as to its advantage, rather than other pro-

cedure, and can not be regarded otherwise than as purely voluntary

on its part.

This condition, however, is of weight in determining the status

of a disbursing officer’s settlement, a matter of importance in the

consideration of the effect. if anv, to be given a protest indorsed

thereon, a procedure which the disbursing officer should not have

permitted, since its purpose is to convert a disbursing officer’s

voucher into something else than that which, under authoritatively

established practice, it was intended to be. And that was not a right

possessed by a claimant, for it amounted, if it amounted to anything,

to a modification of a voucher form prescribed by proper officers

under authority of law and therefore as essentially a requisite of a

STEM

LEASE LALIT

Pee ee War

ol tT i

ab qapesis eae

Ty Sh ae a te eee Sar es

s

sehen Ay ale RN Rae

ge ene CAE Iho Re apoaet

eo ios Zon

20

proper amount as if prescribed by the law itself, For this form of

voucher, used in the instances under consideration, a form for use

in claiming for transportation subject to land-grant deduction, pro-

vided for the statement in appropriate columns of all the data neces-

sary to the proper determination of the “amount claimed” which

was required to be certified by the claimant as correct, contemplated

a complete statement of the claim in full, nof subject to alteration,

and evidencing, when paid, a completed transaction, the voucher

having no further function than to procure for the disbursing officer

a proper credit for the amount shown thereby to have been claimed

by the creditor and paid by the officer. Mistakes of fact occurring

therein would no doubt be subject to correction, but with that matter

we have nothing to do here.

It is therefore clearly subversive of the intended character and

effect of a settlement made as lawfully prescribed to conclude that

such a settlement in all respects intended to be final, and which

without the element of finality in the sense of payment in full, did

not authorize the payment thereon of appropriated publie funds by

a disbursing officer, to conclude that a claimant by some process of

protest indorsed by it thereon could thus convert such an instrument

into a claim for partial payment with reserved right as to further

compensation for the same service.

The inconsistency of the procedure has heretofore been alluded

to. Its attempt to accomplish by this method that which by usual

processes could not be accomplished is strongly argunfentative. We

have seen that the claimant might not, in one of the instances under

consideration, have presented to a disbursing officer a claim for full

tariff rates, have procured the disbursing officer to disallow a part

and to allow and pay a part, making of the transaction a partial set-

tlement, The requirement in such a case that the claim be stated

on the basis on which it can be paid in full has also been cited. Yet,

the adopted method, if recognized as effective for the intended pur-

pose, does in fact, and that purpose is expressed in the protest, con-

vert the claim into a claim for partial payment and put the disbursing

officer in the position of doing the very thing which it is recognized

he could not do in regular course.

AIL claims were required to be submitted on approved forms,

forms which had back of them the authority of law and the right

to prescribe their use for the intended purposes, There were voucher

forms for the submission of claims for transportation where full

commercial rates were claimed upon the face of which their nature

[fol. 24] and use was indicated by the words “No land grant in-

volved.” They were intended to be and were used where the claim-

ant was asserting a right to compensation at full commercial rates.

and they were not used and could not be used to procure a_settle-

ment by a disbursing officer in cases where he eould or would pay

only land-grant rates. If presented to a disbursing officer for pay-

ment under such cireumstances, and the claimant was not willing

to restate its claim on the basis on which it could be paid by the dir-

bursing officer, it became his duty to transmit the claim for direct

settlement by the auditor without making any payment thereon at

no ale

e

a

21

all, for he could not on such a voucher pay the amount due at land- '

grant rates and leave an unpaid balance over. He could not settle

in part a disputed claim, but must send it where there was authority

so todo. His settlement must be a clean-cut settlement of the whole

claim as presented or nothing. If, with full knowledge of all these

facts—and knowledge thereof has never been disputed by any rail-

road company with whose claim we have had to do—a railroad

claimant presents its claim on a land-grant voucher at land-vrant $

rates, certified by it to be correct, for the purpose of procuring pav-

ment at the hands of a disbursing officer, is it possible that it can of

its own motion, by an unauthorized indorsement on an oficial

voucher, convert it into a claim for full commercial rates and make «

of it in effeet just such a claim as the disbursing officer had no an-

thority to settle? Such a right, if a claimant had it, would permit

it to subvert the whole prescribed svstem of settlement and aceount-

ing and to make of an official voucher something else than. that

which by authority of law it is prescribed to be, And, if so, must

he held effective for that purpose without presentment, in connes-

tion with a claim, to any one having authority to consider disputed

claims; for the vouchers upon which they appeared were defunet, as

claims, when paid by the disbursing officer, could not go to the ae- F

counting officers for further allowance thereon as claims and serve] j

only as vouchers te sumport the disbursing officer’s claims in his ac

count current for eredits in the amounts thus shown to have heen $

paid by him out ef the funds for which he was accountable. E

And it may be added that no aet of a dishursing officer outside of £.

his authority could ereate any liability against the United States

|

LA AG TRE ARNE AIT NRE ES OOTP

which did not otherwise exist or abrogate any existing right. and

payment by him of a voucher bearing such a protest could under ne

cireumstances be construed as a recognition on the part of the

United States of a richt to make further claim for the same service

He had no sueh authority. Nor could the elaimant create for itself

ony right by attenmoted desarture from established methods. The

law gave to the Comptroller of the Treasury power to prescribe :

forms and to regulate ‘the methods of expending and acecountin« .

for public funds and conditions imposed by him within the proper 3

exereise of his prerogatives were as if prescribed by the law itself ;

and protest can not in any manner circumvent statutory conditions. :

In Dowdy, Exx., v. United States, 22 Ct, Cls. 97, interpreting an :

act authorizing payment of certain claims allowed by the aceennt- d

ing officers but nroviding that such payments should be accepted a-

a full and final discharee of the claims, it was said, “The faet that

the money was received under protest. although no receipt was re-

[fol. 25] quired except the necessarv indorsement of the Tressur:

check, indicates that the elaimant understood the statute as we wn-

derstand it, and endesvored by a protest to avoid it,” a suggestion

peculiarly anplicable to our interpretation of a disbursing officer's

voucher, and later it is said, “No effect can be given to the protest.”

referring. of course, in that ease to the terms of the aet, but applic

able, we think. to a condition here of equal force. Fr

In Savage, Executrix, v. United States, 92 U. S. 382, we find 1

GON RT I> BG Ua BL AORN

22

many pertinent statements, some of them very much in point on

questions already discussed. Savage had purchased $15,000 of Treas-

ury notes represented by a special agent of the Treasury Department

as payable in gold but held by the Secretary of the Treasury, at

time of payment, as not so payable but payable in currency. Gold

was then worth a premium of 32 cents. It is said that there was an

honest difference of opinion, Savage contending for payment in gold

while the Secretary refused to make payment otherwise than in

currency, and so informed him. Savage sent his Treasury notes

to his banking representatives in Washington and they were pre-

sented at the Treasury Department and gold demanded in payment

which was refused. Savage then instructed his bankers to accept

payment in currency and surrender the notes, but with instructions

to first demand payment in gold, but if refused to accept payment

otherwise than in gold under protest. The bankers presented the

notes and asked for payment in gold which was refused, and they

thereafter, by a communication in writing, in which they recited the

presentation of the notes with a request for payment in gold and

on refusal, presented them for payment “in accordance with the

terms proposed by the Treasury Department,” but stating also that

“at the same time we beg, under our instructions, to enter protest

against payment otherwise than in gold.”

The decision of the Supreme Court was on appeal from this court

where the administratix of Savage had sought to recover the dif-

ference between the value of the currency in which payment was

made and gold, the right to receive which was asserted. In the

Supreme Court questions presented in this court upon which the

decision against the plaintiff was predicated were disregarded and

the case turned upon the final transaction of the surrender by Sav-

age of the Treasury notes and the receipt of payment therefor in

currency even though accompanied by a protest. Much stress is laid

upon the actual surrender of the Treasury notes by Savage, referred

to as a condition precedent to his right to receive payment, but

the stressing of the surrender of the notes was but the natural basis

of the reasoning of the court, under the circumstances of that case,

and does not seem to us to detract from the force of the principles

stated as applicable to the transaction. In faet the surrender of the

notes would not seem to differ so materially from the presentment

of a proper disbursing officer’s voucher as to change the conelusion

to be reached as to the effect of an accompanying protest in either

case, ‘i ie Treasury notes held by Savage and presented for payment

were the evidence that he was a creditor of the United States in

return for-which he received $15,000 of principal in currency because

the Secretary refused payment in gold worth $19,800 to which he

asserted he was entitled, and endeavored by protest to preserve an

asserted right to an additional payment of $4,800 representing the

[f.|. 26] difference in value between what he asserted he was entitled

to receive and what the Secretary was willing to and did pay. The

difference was a difference in medium but it necessarily resolved it-

self into a difference in dollars measured by legal tender currency

and upon such a demand was the suit predicated. The plaintiff's

—

23

vouchers in this case represented its claims as a creditor of the United

States because of services rendered and if stated and presented

for payment at land-grant rates, even though it deemed itself en-

titled to other and higher rates, because it had been informed that

the disbursing officer had refused and would refuse to pay more, it

would seem to be in the same position as Savage when * presented

his notes for payment in currency and received payment in cur-

reney, a lesser value than he claimed, because he had been informed

that the Secretary would not pay otherwise. And it would seem

that a properly stated voucher, certified and paid, was as full an

acquittance of the United States as to the claim stated therein as was

the surrender of the Treasury notes, for it must be conceded, because

so decided, that all vouchers involved in this case, so stated, certified

and paid, if without protest, would preclude further recovery for

the same service. Can a protest, then, avail in the one case when it

was held to be ineffective in the other?

The opinion is replete with apt statements, addressed, of course, in

many instances, to the fact that the Treasury notes were voluntarily

surrendered, but stating conclusions as clearly applicable here, since,

as we have already pointed out, the plaintiff’s statements of its ac-

counts at land-grant rates and acceptance of payment on that basis

was clearly voluntary. Since it is a matter of common knowledge

that disbursing officer’s settlements secure more prompt payment

than otherwise and that this is the reason for resorting thereto in

cases like this the following language is pertinent:

“Prompt payment, no doubt, was desired; but the decedent was

under no legal compulsion to accept any other medium of payment

than that which he demanded. Both he and his agents were doubt-

less convinced that the secretary would not recede from the position

he had taken; but he was at perfect liberty to reject the terms pro-

posed and to refuse to surrender the overdue securities which he

held.”

And summarizing the case with a reference to the effect of the

protest, it is said:

“Taken as a whole, the findings of the court below show beyond all

doubt that the decedent, voluntarily and with a full knowledge of all

the circumstances, elected to accept payment of the Treasury notes in

the manner proposed by the secretary, and that the surrender of the

same to the United States was absolute and unconditional. Nothing

less can be inferred from the communication of his agents inclosing

the securities when the same were transmitted for redemption, in

which his agents say that they ‘present the notes for payment in

accordance with the terms proposed’ by the department. Such an

acceptance, if intended to waive every variation from the terms ante-

cedently demanded, could hardly be more complete or explicit; nor is

its real character changed in any respect by the fact that the agents

asked leave in the same communication ‘to enter protest, under their

instructions, against payment otherwise than in gold.”

(fol. 27] Reverting to our discussion of the form, purpose, and

ae een re

authoritative character of these disbursing officers’ vouchers as stated,

presented, and paid in this case, we can not but conclude that their

real character was not changed in any respect by the attached pro-

test.

Very forcible and peculiarly pertinent is the language of Justice,

afterward Chief Justice, White, speaking for the Supreme Court in

International Contracting Company v. Lamont, 156 U.S. 305 at

310. where, referring in general terms to the efficacy of a protest, it

is said: “A party ean not avoid the legal consequences of his acts by

protesting at the time he does them that he does not intend to sub-

ject himself to such consequences.” The legal consequences of the

presentment of these claims to the disbursing officer as they were

presented without protests thereon and receipt of payment of the

amount claimed have been determined by this court with the ap-

proval of the Supreme Court in cases cited. They precluded further

recovery. From such consequences resulting from its own acts the

plaintiff may not relieve itself by protesting that it didu’t mean it,

There is another condition bearing upon plaintiff's claims herein,

and particularly, i) ems to us, upon the question of proiest ‘which,

while sometimes suggested in other cases, has never received any

lengthy consideration. It is observed that under some decisions of

the Comptroller of the Treasury involving payment to land-grant

railroads for the character of transportation here involved it: has

not been specifically held that classes of persons under consideration

were essentially “troops” of the United States, but the holding has

been that the transportation companies were not entitled to be paid

therefor more than land-grant rates.

This holding has been predicated upon provisions found in the

Army appropriation acts under the subhead “Transportation of the

Army and its supplies,” which provisions were repeated in all of

such appropriation acts during the period here invelved and for a

number of years theretofore, The appropriation act for the liseal

year 1914, beginning July 1, 1913, 37 Stat. 715, a propriated under

the subhead stated, “For the transportation of the Army and its

supplies; * * * for transportation of recruits and reeruiting

ies; of applicants for enlistment between reeruiting stations and

recruiting depots; for travel allowance to enlisted men on discharge:

of persons on their discharge from the United States military prison

or from any place in which they have been held under a sentence

of dishonorable discharge and confinement for more than six months,

* * ® ‘for the payment of Army transportation lawfully due

such land-grant railroads as have not received aid in Government

bonds (to be adjusted in accordance with the decisions of the Su-

preme Court in cases decided under such land grant acts), but in no

case shall more than fifty per centum of full amount of service be

paid: Provided, That such compensation shall be computed upon

the basis of the tariff or lower special rates for like transportation

SS for the public at large and shall be accepted as in full

or all demands for such service:’” followed by a further proviso

limiting payments to land-grant roads in the expenditure of the

money appropriated by the act and providing again that “the amount

PORE ey — ~* e bl

— Bn a ee

29

so fixed to be paid shall be accepted as in full for all demands for

such service.” =

[fol. 28] The tendency of Congress «enm< to have been to gradually

provide for the payment of the class. of transportation under con-

sideration here out of this appropriation and subject it to the limita-

tions thereof. Some time before the peried in question the trans-

portation of applicants for enlistment had been payable out of

another appropriation, and previous to the fiseal vear of 1914 travel

allowance of discharged soldiers was provided for by a separate item

found in Miscellaneous Provisions in the Army Appropriation Acts,

and for the first time was brought within the provisions for the

transportation of the Army and its supplics om the passage of the

act referred to for the fiseal year 1914.

It is the matter of transportation of discharged soldiers with

which we are particularly concerned. In view of what has already

been said with reference to the situation during the third period here

invelved and in that connection, it is not inappropriate to suggest

that while the appropriation in terms “for travel allowance to enlisted

men on discharge” implics a payment to be made to the enlisted

men, the law had authorized and it was the practice te furnish to the

enlisted man, in lieu of a part of his travel allowance, transportation

in kind which is evidenced by a transportation request issued to him

and finally made the basis of a claim by the transportation company

for the transportation furnished upon that request.

The particular matter for consideration is, of course, the effect of

the limitation put upon the expenditure of the funds appropriated

for this particular purpose by this act. It is limited to fifty per

cent of commercial rates, or, in other words. limited te payment at

land-grant rates, with the specifie provision thet ,avment so made

must be accepted as in full for the tran « furmshed. With

the provisions of this act the transportation com ~ are. of course,

chargeable with knowledge. a Knowledee whieh they. no doubt, pos-

sessed in fact, and it would secon that it meust necessarily follow that

when a transportation company presented te o disbursing officer a

claim for transportation which it knew, or at least was presumed to

know, was payable out of this particular appropriation, and could

not be paid out of any other, it must subject uself te the limitations

of the act and be chargeable with the acceptance of the amount paid

as in full, In Dowdy, Exeeutrix, v. United States, supra, involving

& payment under a statute providing that the amount paid should

be accepted as a full and final discharge of the several claims ex-

amined and allowed by the accounting officers, in which case it was

sought to preserve a further right by a protest, it was said:

“No effect can be given to the protest. The act prescribed the

only terms upon which payment could be tendered or received.

It is very clear to the court that a party accepting money under

positive statutory conditions can not vary the conditions by merely

protesting against them. Acceptance of the money is necessarily an

agreement to the terms. Cape Ann Granite Cu v. The United States,

20 Ct. Cls. R. 1; Savage v. The United States, v2 U.S. R. 382.”

4—810

If it be said that the provisions of this act may not be here invoked

against the plaintiff because it has been held that the classes of per-

sons here involved are not “troops” of the United States, it is suffi-

cient to say that for transportation purpose at least Congress saw

fit to so treat them, and by making their transportation payable out

of this particular appropriation it necessarily made these payments

[fol. 29] subject to the conditions attached to the expenditure of the

moneys appropriated for that purpose. It is not necessary to hold

that the limitations of that act could effect or alter the right of this

court to adjudge whatever compensation it might deem railroad com-

panies entitled to for this class of transportation. The effect of the

act manifests itself not upon the jurisdiction of this court but upon

the transaction as between the claimant and the disbursing officer at

the time of the presentment and payment of a claim payable out of

the moneys appropriated by this act and subjects the claimants to the

limitations prescribed, necessarily precluding any further recovery

by reason thereof.

The question herein presented and diseussed was not involved in

the Union Pacific case, wherein the status of these various classes of

persons was considered and determined, It is noticeable that in that

case, which was prepared for the purpose of testing the status of

these classes of persons as “troops” of the United States and which

was prepared during the period covered by the transactions here

involved and by the same attorney representing that plaintiff and

this, and which was based upon transportation furnished during

1913, 1914, and 1915, relianee was not on “protested” disbursing

officer’s vouchers but upon claims for full commercial rates presented

to the auditor for direct settlement, upon settlement of which that

official disallowed and deducted land grant, a procedure entirely

within his proper powers, against which deduction the plaintiff pro-

tested and appealed to the Comptroller of the Treasury and there-

after brought its suit for the amounts disallowed by the auditor, viz.

the difference between the amount claimed and the amount allowed.

The distinction is manifest.

The views expressed require the conclusion that the plaintiff is not

entitled to recover as to either of the periods considered. A dis-

missal of its petition has therefore been directed.

Reference is made to the opinion by the Chief Justice discussing

practically the same question In case No, 30-A, Western Pacifie Rail-

road Company. this day decided.

Graham, Judge; Hay, Judge; Booth, Judge, and Campbell, Chief

Justice, concur.

[fol. 30] XIII. JunGMent oF THE CouRT

At a Court of Claims held in the City of Washington on the Sev-

enth day of January, A. D., 1924, judgment was ordered to be en-

tered as follows:

The Court, upon due consideration of the premises, find in favor of

the defendant, and do order, adjudge and decree that the plaintiff,

ea a

ba

wine 9 Cte UN hon LES

as aforesaid, is not entitled to recover and shall not have and recover

any sum in this action of and against the United States; and that the

petition herein be and the same is dismissed: And it is further or-

dered, and adjudged that the United States shall have and recover of

and from the plaintiff, as aforesaid, the sum of Three hundred and

twenty-seven dollars and eight cents ($327.08), the cost of printing

the record in this Court, to be colleeted by the Clerk, as provided by

law.

By the Court.

NIV. Prarntirr’s Appiication ror Appeat—Filed January 22,

1924

From the judgment rendered in the above-entitled cause on Janu-

ary 7, 1924, plaintiff hereby makes application for the allowance of

an appeal to the Supreme Court of the United States.

Ilarr & Bates, Attorneys for Plaintiff.

XV. Orper or Court ALLOWING PLAINTIFF’s APPLICATION FOR

Aprrat—Entered February 4, 1924

It is ordered by the court that the plaintiff’s application for appeal

he and the same is allowed,

By the Court.

|fol. 81] Court oF CLAIMS OF THE UNITED States

| Title omitted |

I, F.C, Kleinschmidt, Assistant Clerk Court of Claims, certify that

ihe foregoing are true transcripts of the pleadings in the above-en-

titled cause ; of the arguments and submissions of case; of the findings

of fact, conelusion of law, and opinion of the court by Downey, J.;

of the judgment of the court; of the plaintiffs application for an

appeal; of the order of the court allowing said application,

In testimony whereof I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the

seal of said Court at Washington City this Eighth day of February,

A. D., 1924.

F. C. Kleinschmidt, Assistant Clerk Court of Claims. (Seal

of Court of Claims. )

Endorsed on cover: File No. 30,120. Court of Claims. Term No.

810. Southern Pacifie Company, appeliant, vs. The United States.

Filed February 11th, 1924. File No. 30,120.

(2550)

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.