Opinion — Silberschein v. United States

SILBERSCHEIN v. UNITED STATES.

ERROR TO THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR

THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN,

No. 66. Argued October 13, 1924—Decided November 17, 1924.

i the Director upon a right to compensation claimed

act, is final

been erroneously awarded. P. 224.

i compensable under the statute, must have re-

from injury or disease caused or aggravated in the line of

222 OCTOBER TERM, 1924.

Opinion of the Court. 266 U.S.

5. Evidence tending to prove the unsoundness of the Director’s de-

termination of a matter properly submitted to his judgment, held

to fall far short of proving the determination arbitrary. P. 224.

285 Fed. 397, affirmed.

Error to a judgment of the District Court dismissing

an action brought against the United States under sub-

division 20 of Jud. Code § 24, on a claim for compensation

under the War Risk Insurance Act, upon the ground that

the determination of the matter by the Director of the

Veterans’ Bureau was final and not reviewable by the

courts.

Mr. Rowland W. Fizel for plaintiff in error.

Mr. Assistant Attorney General Donovan, with whom

Mr. Solicitor General Beck and Mr. Harry S. Ridgely

were on the brief, for the United States.

Mr. Justice SurHERLAND delivered the opinion of the

Court.

This writ of error brings here for determination the

question whether the United States may be sued under

subd. 20, § 24 of the Judicial Code, upon a claim for com-

pensation arising under § 300 of the War Risk Insurance

Act, as amended by § 10, c. 104, 40 Stat. 609, 611, and

subsequent acts; and, if so, under what circumstances

such suit may be maintained. That section, so far as

necessary to be stated, provides that compensation shall

be paid to any enlisted man for a disability resulting from

personal injury suffered or disease contracted in the line

of duty when employed in active military service. The

statute fixes a scale of monthly payments, dependent upon

the extent of the disability. See § 11, c. 16, 41 Stat. 371,

373. The administration of the originel act was com-

mitted to the Director of the War Insurance Bureau, § 13,

ce, 105, 40 Stat. 399, and so remained until the creation

of the Veterans’ Bureau by the Act of August 9,.1921, c.

57, 42 Stat. 147, when the authority was devolved upon

Bech i et, LES EE A

SILBERSCHEIN v. UNITED STATES. 2238

221 Opinion of the Court.

the Director of that Bureau. The official, in each in-

stance, was directed to administer, execute and enforce the

provisions of the act, with authority to make rules and

regulations not inconsistent therewith necessary or ap-

propriate to carry out its purposes and “ decide all ques-

tions arising under this Act,” except as otherwise provided

therein. See § 2 of the 1921 Act, 42 Stat. 148.

An examination of the original act and the various

amendatory acts fails to disclose, so far as this question

is concerned, any exception to or limitation upon the au-

thority of the Director. There is no provision therein ex-

pressly granting the right to maintain any suit against the

United States in respect of claims for such compensation.

The original Act of 1917 and subsequent amendatory

acts conferred upon the Bureau the authority to revise an

award at any time, in accordance with the facts found,

and to end, diminish or increase compensation previously

awarded. § 305, c. 105, 40 Stat. 398, 407; § 19, ¢. 57, 42

Stat. 154.

The court below, after a very full review, dismissed the

petition, holding that it was the evident intention of Con-

gress to confer upon the Director full and exclusive au-

thority to decide all questions arising under the act, in

so far as they involved the exercise of executive duties and

required the determination of disputed questions of fact,

and to the extent indicated, to make his decision final and

not reviewable by the courts. 285 Fed. 397; 280 Fed. 917.

Plaintiff in error was in the military service as an en-

listed man from December 9, 1917, until February 8, 1918,

_ when he was discharged on account of physical disability.

He was, at first, awarded compensation as for a total tem-

porary disability, which was subsequently reduced to

twenty per cent. as for a temporary partial disability, § 11,

c. 16, 41 Stat. 371,373, and finally taken away altogether

on and after March 18, 1921, on the ground that the. dis-

ability had ceased to be compensable.

24 OCTOBER TERM, 1924.

Opinion of the Court. 266 U.8.

The petition alleged that the decision of the Director

was arbitrary, unjust and unlawful, constituted a usurpa-

tion of power, was “ contrary to the proofs, if any,” and

“ yontrary to the weight of evidence on file in petitioner’s

case.” The action of the Director was alleged to be arbi-

(1) Because after allowing compensation he discon-

tinued it, although petitioner’s physical condition had not

improved but had become worse, being the same and re-

sulting from the same causes for which compensation was

originally allowed. But this is to say only that the Di-

rector had changed his mind; and, for aught that appears,

that may have been based upon another and better view

of the facts. Ample authority for his action is found in

the provision already referred to, conferring power upon

the Bureau to revise an award at any time and to end,

diminish or increase the compensation.

(2) Because he allowed for temporary partial disability

when the undisputed evidence as found showed that pe-

titioner was temporarily totally disabled. But, as the

court below pointed out, it is not alleged that such evi-

dence showed that such disability resulted from mjury

or disease caused or aggravated “in the line of duty,” as

provided by the statute.

(3) Because petitioner was suffering from disabilities

shown by entries in the Adjutant General’s Office not to

exist at the time of his entering into the service, and

_ there was no cause therefor other than petitioner’s mili-

tary service; that it was admitted by the Veterans’ Bureau

hospital authorities that since his discharge petitioner had

been suffering from disabilities incurred in the military

service, as evidenced by communications and letters at-

tached to petition. These are all matters bearing, at most,

upon the soundness of the Director’s determination upon

& matter properly submitted to his judgment, and fall far

short of establishing its arbitrary character.

SILBERSCHEIN v. UNITED STATES. 225

221 Opinion of the Court.

The general allegations of the petition that the Direc-

tor’s decision was arbitrary, unjust and unlawful, and a

usurpation of power, are merely legal conclusions.

Clearly, the petition does not present a case where the

facts are undisputed and the only conclusion properly to

be drawn is one favorable to petitioner, or where the law

was misconstrued, or where the action of the executive

officer was arbitrary or capricious.

We pass, without deciding, the question raised by the

contention of the Government that the claim is in fact for

a pension and, hence, expressly excluded from judicial

review by the terms of subd. 20, § 24, of the Judicial Code,

and that, in any event, it is for a mere g.atuity for which

no suit can be maintained, even if the United States were

otherwise suable; since, in any view of the matter, we

conclude that no case is made for judicial intervention.

The statute which creates the asserted right, commits

to the Director of the Bureau the duty and authority of

administering its provisions and deciding all questions

arising under it; and in the light of the prior decisions of

this Court, we must hold that his decision of such ques-

tions is final and conclusive and not subject to judicial

review, at least unless the decision is wholly unsupported

by the evidence, or is wholly dependent upon a question

of law or is seen to be clearly arbitrary or capricious.

Bates & Guild Co. v. Payne, 194 U. 8S. 106, 108-110;

Medbury v. United States, 173 U. S. 492, 497-498; Ness

v. Fisher, 223 U. 8. 683, 691-692; Degge v. Hitchcock,

229 U. 8. 162, 171; Int. Com. Comm. v. Union Pacific

R. R. Co., 222 U.S. 541, 547; Int. Com. Comm. v. Louis.

& Nash. R. R. Co., 227 U. 8. 88, 91.

Since it is not made to appear from the allegations of

the petition that any of these exceptional conditions exist,

the judgment of the District Court must be and it is

: Affirmed.