Appellees Brief — Idaho Irrigation Co. v. Gooding

Supreme Court brief1924

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INDEX AND LIST OF CASES CITED

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Argument:

No method provided by Carey Act whereby is-

suance of patent to state can be contested...

Determination of Secretary of Interior not final

Decisions of Cireuit Court not conflicting...

Determination of Secretary in issuing patent does

not conclude the issues of this cause...

Construction company can sell the water for use

upon a smaller acreage than that patented

Water sold for use upon certain land does not

become inseparably appurtenant thereto...

Contract of Carey Act settler conveys a definite

amount of water

Provision for rotation has to do with method of

application and does not limit the ET

Construction company not entitled to lien until

water rendered permanently available...

State owns the water and the government the land

Appellees are in court with clean hands...

Relief sought by appellees is not contrary to publie

poliey

District Court did not err in determining the

amount of water available...

Amendments of pleadings to conform to proof

proper

District Court did not err in paki amount of

losses

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Appendix containing Idaho statutes referred to........

Cases and authorities cited:

Bennett v. Twin Falls ete. Co., 150 Pac. 336..........

Boley v. Twin Falls ete. Co., 917 Pae. 258....15, 19, 28, 31

Burke v. Southern P. R. Co., 58 Law Fd. 1627... 9

Caldwell v. Twin Falls ete. Co., 225 Fed. 5354... 8

Childs v. Neitzel, 141 Pac. 77.........-...:200- s+. caus -

Evans v. Swendsen, 200 Pac. 136..........-.-:----

Farm Inv. Co. v. Carpenter, 61 Pace, 208................

Furbee v. Alexander, 176 Pace. 97.......-.--.---:-:0+

Idaho Irr. Co. v. Gooding, 285 Fed. 458..........0.....

Ide v. United States, 68 Law Ed, 201..... ...............

Powers v. Webster, 91 Pac. 569.............

Short v. Praisewater, 208 Pac, 844-.......--.....-

St. Louis Smelting Co. v. Kemp, 26 Law Ed. 875

Sanderson v. Salmon River Canal Co., 200 Pae.

Oe -cabtaneuneanibeesand eqnkencannayntiaemintenesiges 40 Be

State v. Twin Falls ete. Co., 121 Pac. 1039............

State v. Twin Falls ete. Co., 166 Pae. 220.0...

Fe cs ca idcadauanaxiaweetlsavaxsDreateryaneaeyns 11, 15, 23, 24, «

State v. Twin Falls ete. Co., 217 Pace. napa 96, ;

Twin Falls ete. Co. v. Alexander, 260 Fed. 2 wy

Twin Falls ete. Co. v. Caldwell, 242 Fed. 177. 1, 15, 2

Twin Falls ete. Co. v. Caldwell, 272 Fed. 356. Ree 15, 3

Twin Falls ete. Co. v. Davis, 267 Fed. 382........ 15, 29, 3:

Twin Falls ete. Co. v. Lind, 94 Pace. 348.........---

Twin Falls ete. Co. v. Martens, 271 Fed. 428

15, 18, 23, 28, 29, :

Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U.S. aa cesceasen sie

Sec, 4685 U. S. Comp. Stats.........-.-------- err 8,

Sec, 4686 U. S. Comp. Stats..........--.------eeee 8,

Sec. 917 et seq. R. S. Wyo. 1889......---------ee--

Art. 15, See. 1, Constitution SNR chiomennen

ili

Sec, 2998 Ida. Comp, Stats, .....0.cccececcccocevesosescoveneees 28,

Sec. 3004 Ida. Comp. Stats... 00ccccccccccccceceeeeeeee.

Bec, SUGE Tele. Comp, Btate eon n....cccccceccececececesesess....

Sec. 3065 Ida, Comp, Stats... cccccccccccccecceeee. 28,

Sec. 5636 Ida. Comp Stats... 24,

Sec. 5640 Ida, Comp. Stats... ccc cccccee ee.

Sec. 5582 Ida. Comp. Stats... cccccccccc..-... 33,

See, 7033 Ida, Comp, Stats... ccccccccccccecceceeee...

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SES ae eS

The Supreme Court of the Anited States

February Term, 1924

The Idaho Irrigation Company, Limited;

The Kquitable Trust Company of New York,

a corporation, and Lyman Rhodes, as trus-

tees, et al,

Appellants, No. 324

vs.

Fred W. Gooding, Novinger & Darrah Sheep

Company, Limited, T. B. Jones, et al,

Appellees

BRIEF OF APPELLEES GOODING, ET AL

This brief is on behalf of the appellees Gooding, et al,

who were the original plaintifs in the trial court, and

is in reply to the brief of appellant, Idaho Irrigation

Company, Limited. In this brief all figures in paren-

theses refer to the respective page numbers of the

transcript of the record, and all bold faced type

appearing in the quotations is that of the writers.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

As appelless have attempted to make a full statement

of the facts and issues in their brief upon the cross-

appeal in this cause we assume that it is not necessary

to do so again here. There are one or two matters

Which we feel counsel for appellant have inadvertently

gotten confused in the statement of facts contained in

appellant’s brief, which we hope to correct,

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On page six appellant’s brief various acreage figures

are quoted which appear to have been taken from de-

fendants’ exhibit 11. The full text of this exhibit is

as follows:

Carey Act entries ...........-.-:-eeceeceeeeeeeeneee 69,107.20

Non-Carey Act, School, Desert, ete......... 19,728.51

Total water shares sold.............-......+ 88,835.7

Held by company at time suit commenced 8,467.07

Held by purchasers at time

Suit COMMENCEM ............--ccceeeeeeeeeeees 80,368.64

Acquired by company since suit commenced 4,255.57

Held by purchasers at present time 76,113.07

Land entries subject to cancellation (Ix 27) 887.49

Net lands in hands of seters............ veee 4 Oy220,62

This exhibit is entitled ‘Ownership of land under

Idaho Irrigation system.’’ Appellant concludes that

12,045.80 of said 19,728.51 shares had been traded for

decreed water. We are unable to find any showing in

the record supporting this statement. The Idaho Irr-

gation Company (which company will hereafter be

referred to as the ‘‘construction company ’’) did purchase

some decreed rights and issue in lieu thereof shares in

the company, but these purchased rights are considered

as a part of the construction company’s water right,

and the shares issued therefor are considered a part

of the outstanding water contracts and water rights

which must be supplied from the available supply of

the company. All of said 19,728.51 shares have to he

supplied with water from the supply of the construction

company. Apparently counsel have confused these

decreed rights that were bought by the construction

company with certain ‘‘old rights’’ that are referred to

at several points in the record. It is also very apparent

that the Cireuit Court did not thoroughly understand

the exact situation as to these various shares and old

rights (675-6). We hope the following detailed state-

ment renders the situation entirely clear to this court.

At the time the construction company filed upon the

waters in question a number of appropriations had

already been perfected upon the same streams and of

the same aggregate supply by individual settlers. A

number of these rights were of many years standing

and because of their priority their water supply was

generally adequate even in low water seasons. Others

of these rights were of more recent years and were often

inadequate during seasons of low water. The con-

struction company aequired quite a number of the latter

class of water rights. This it was able to do because

the individuals considered that with the storage facilities

contemplated their water right would be made consistent

throughout the varying seasons, These individuals were

issued shares of stock in the construction company in

liew of such water rights, which shares had to be on a

parity with all other contract holders deriving their

water from the same system (50). See also, Sanderson

V. Salmon River Canal Company, 200 Pae. (Ida.) 341.

The owners of many of the “old rights’? retained their

rights. The extent of these old rights is approximately

100,000 acre feet (254 and 258). Since the filings of

the construction company were perfected many other

filings have been made by individuals, which filings

tend to absorb the excess and flood waters during

seasons of unusually high water (259). It will therefore

be understood that at the time of the trial of instant

SN ee ae

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eause there were three classes of water rights all de-

pending upon the same source of supply, which supply

the construction company contend constituted the *‘avail-

able’? supply for the purchasers of its contracts alone

(pp. 10, 67, et al. brief). These three classes have right

of priority in and to the aggregate water supply in the

order named, to-wit; (1)Old rights, (2) Construction com-

pany rights, and (3) Flood rights. This state of faets

appears from plaintiffs’ exhibit 3 (249), which is ex-

plained at page 248 of the record; the testimony of witness

Tallman at pages 254, 258 and 259; plaintiffs’ exhibit 9

(305); intervener’s exhibit 1 (430); plaintiffs’ exhibit 2

(245); the testimony of witness Baer (279), and other

parts of the record.

At some points in the record these ‘‘old rights’? are

described as ‘‘decreed rights.’? By reading testimony of

Watermaster Chapman on pages 244 and 245 it can be

readily understood that ‘‘decreed rights”’ refers to those

decreed rights which are of prior right to the water

right of the construction company and its purchasers.

And from this and the above portions of the record it

will also be understood that the water for all of these

three classes of water rights comes from the same general

watershed and that all of it must of necessity pass

through the reservoir and system of the appellant con-

struction company.

Therefore, it must be concluded, as stated by Mr.

Kays, vice-president and general manager of the con-

struction company (430), at page 454, that the figure

$8,835.71, as shown in defendants’ exhibit 11 supra

‘‘represents the total number of shares of stock sold

for Carey Act land, for school land, desert land,

homestead land, and all other lands on the date

mentioned. At that time, there were certain lands

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standing in the name of M. R. Kays, trustee, Lyman

Rhoades, trustee, and Equitable Trust “ompany of

New York, trustee. I believe the Idaho Irrigation

Company to be the owner, the beneficial owner, of

lands standing in the names of the various parties

mentioned and was the beneficial owner at the time

of the filing of the complaint and lis pendens in

the district court.’’

The District Court evidently considered that these

shares standing in the names of the various trustee de-

fendants, of which the Idaho Irrigation Company was

the ‘beneficial owner,’’ should properly be treated as

the property of the construction company for the pur-

poses of this suitand in sofar as the rights of the

appellees are concerned, because they were enjoined

from selling the same, The Cireuit Court’s decree permits

certain of these shares so held by the trustee defendants

to be sold. This latter decree is the basis of the eross-

appeal in this cause, and is presented by separate briefs.

Such matters as percentage loss and the effect of

raising the spillway, discussed at pp. 8 and 9 of appel-

lant’s brief, will be taken up at the appropriate place

in our argument.

BRIEF OF THE ARGUMENT

When patent for lands under a Carey Act project

issues to a state and as a condition precedent thereto

the Secretary of the Interior concludes that an ample

supply of water has been furnished, this conclusion is

merely for the purpose of issuing the patent and passing

title to the lands to the state, and this conclusion does

not relieve the Carey Act construction company of its

liability upon contracts made with settlers upon the

Project to furnish them with a definite and positive

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amount of water. Argued and authorities cited at pages

8 to 23 hereof.

A Carey Act construction company is not required to

sell and distribute its water over all the patented area

if there is not enough water to properly irrigate the

same. Argued and authorities cited at pages 25 to 2

hereof.

When title of government lands passes to the state,

under the provisions of the Carey Act, the water does

not thereby become an inseparable appurtenance to the

land, but may be sold and conveyed separately. Argued

and supporting authorities cited at pages 25 to 26 hereof,

Under the contracts between the State of Idaho and

the construction company and between the latter com-

pany and the settlers the settlers are entitled to a definite

and positive amount of water, together with a propor

tionate interest in the system; and this construction is

not contrary to the spirit or letter of the state or na

tional Carey Act. Argued and authorities cited at

pages 26 to 28 hereof.

The rotation system provided for

mentioned in the preceding paragraph

with the method of applying the water to the

does not mean that the contracted amount of water for

each settler shall be reduced. Argued and authorities

cited at pages 28 to 29 hereof.

It is contrary to the laws of Idaho for a Carey Act

construction company, or any other company, to contract

to sell more water than it has title to; and the fact that

patent to the lands under a Carey Act project may have

been issued to the state by the government does not

warrant the construction company in contracting to sell

the entire patented area, if as a matter of fact it has

not sufficient water to supply said contracts at the rate

in the contracts

has to do merely

land, and

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provided therein. In the event the water supply is not

sufficient to supply the entire patented area at the

contract rate the acreage must be restricted. Argued

and authorities cited at pages 31 to 34 hereof,

The appellees are in this court with clean hands.

Argued at pages 34 to 37 hereof,

The relief asked for by appellees is not contrary to

public policy nor inequitable, Argued at pages 37 to 38

hereof,

The Distriet Court did not err in determining the

amount of water available to the construction company,

nor in determining the transmission losses, nor in fixing

the duty of water. Argued and supporting authorities

cited at page 38,

ARGUMENT

Appellant's First Specification of Error

This specification is to the effeet that in issuing

patent to the lands in this project the Secretary of the

Interior determined that there was a sufficient available

supply of water to irrigate all the lands patented, to-wit,

7,677.24 acres, and that such finding is conclusive upon

the issues raised in this cause,

Under subdivision one of the first specification, ap-

pellant cites several cases to the effect that the decision

of the land department upon questions of fact is con-

elusive, As to this general statement we can not take

exception, but we strenuously question the application

of such rule to the issues now before the court, for the

reason that the issues in the cited cases and those in the

instant case are entirely foreign, The cited cases having

to do with attacks upon patents and similar questions,

While the instant ease is founded upon contracts in

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writing between individuals. Neither the government

nor its officials are parties to these contracts.

The second subdivision of the first specification, is

that by the issuance of a patent to the lands under the

project the Secretary of the Interior determined that

an ample supply of water had been furnished, (The

patent to 117,000 odd acres issued from the government

to the State of Idaho in 1915 (448), and this suit was

not filed until 1917). Appellant contends that this

patent was issued after due notice thereof was given to

the publie and after protests and contests had been

invited by posted and published notices (brief 16), and

since no opposition was made and the patent issued the

question of the sufficiency of the water supply cannot

now be questioned in any manner of proceeding.

In the first place, from a careful study of the state

and federal Carey Acts it will be noted that this pro

cedure of posting and publishing notices calling for

protests and contests is not authorized, either direetly

or indirectly. No mention is made thereof, Under such

circumstances what rights did the participants gain!

True the act of August 18, 1894, U.S. C. 5. 4685, makes

reference to reclamation of land as under the desert land

law, but the act of June 11, 1896, U.S. C. 8, 4686, under

which appellant claims to have made proof and obtained

a patent to the state, makes no reference to the desert

land law, and it must be assumed that under the new

law such proof as made in the instant case was nol

intended, Therefore, nothing could have been gained by

a protest or contest of the issuance of the patent because

there is no provision therefor, and an attempted contest

would have had no standing in court.

In the second place, and admitting that a contest eould

have been made, the notice in question was dated April 9,

1912, and required any contemplated contests or protests

to be made ‘‘within the next xty days following the

date of this notice’? (444). At) oat time a comparatively

small number of contracts were outstanding (564), Of

course, we understand that the figure of 25.068, taken

from exhibit 10 at page 564 does not accurately represent

the actual number of land then sold, but it will serve

to illustrate, The contract holders would certainly be

the only parties who could contest under any cireum-

stances, because a mere private citizen, having no special

interest in the patented area, would not be able to main-

tain the contest. Powers v. Webster, 91 Pae, (Wash,) 569,

St. Louis Smelting Co, v. Kemp, 104 U. S, 636, 26 Law

Kd 875-9,

‘Does the fact that the appellant was not. in

privity with the government in any respect at the

time when the patent was issued to the railroad

company prevent him from attacking the patent on

the grounds of fraud, error, or irregularity in the

issuance thereof as so alleged in the appeal?

‘**Answer—It does,’’

Burke v. Southern P. R. Co., 234 U.S, 669, 58 Law

Kd 1527-1556,

Then contests could have been made only as to a com-

paratively small portion of the patented area, and even

had such contests been made it is more than likely that

at that time there was sufficient water for the lands sold,

It is the land that has been sold since that time and since

the institution of this suit for which water is wanting, and

for these lands the remedy by contest, which appellant

contends is the only remedy, is no remedy at all. Every

wrong has its remedy, If the allegations of appellees’

complaint are true, as the District Court has found to be

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the case, it is certain that they have a grievous wrong.

In the third place, it is the contention of appellees that

the determination, if any there was, of the Secretary of

the Interior in issuing the patent was made merely for

the purpose of passing the legal title from the government

to the state. That has been done, and appellees are not

seeking to undo it. Let the title to those lands remain

unmolested forever.

Under the Wyoming statutes having to to do with the

appropriation of water and the acquisition of permits

therefor, sec. 917 et seq. R. S. Wyo. 1889, the procedure

is somewhat similar to that followed in passing title of

the lands from the government to the state in the present

ease. In considering a permit issued by a state officer

this court recently said:

‘The permits were based on ex parte applications

and were mere licenses to appropriate in accordance

with the laws of the state, if the water was

available.”’

Ide v United States, (Adv .Ops. Oct. Term, 1923),

68 Law Ed. 201-9.

The patent was issued long before the project had

been completed and it was a physical impossibility for

the secretary to have actually determined and found

that sufficient water for all the lands patented had been

furnished. Such an amount of water has not been

furnished at this time. Under the very nature of the

transaction it must have been intended by Congress that

the Secretary of the Interior should estimate the acreage

that could be reclaimed. This is the view that the Cireuit

Court took of a similar situation:

‘“‘The word ‘determined’, so used, was evidently

used in the sense of estimated; for in the nature of

things it could not then—in advance of even the

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beginning of any work or the actual diversion of

any of the water—be known what would be the

exact capacity of the system. It was necessarily

but the estimate of the proposer of the plan ap-

proved by the state engineer and the state board of

land commissioners, and subsequently by the Seere-

tary of the Interior in segregating the tract applied

for from the publie domain. How greatly all of

them erred in their estimate is shown by the record

in the case; the capacity of the system being, as has

been said, only about one-third of what it was then

thought it would be.’’

Twin Falls Salmon River Land & W. Co. v Cald-

well, 242 Fed. 177-192.

‘*Tlowever, it is well known that the water supply

of streams in the arid region fluctuates considerably

from year to year so that the question of the suf-

ficiency of the water supply for the irrigation of a

tract of land must always be a matter of approximate

estimate.’’

State v Twin Falls Salmon River L. & W. Co.,

166 Pae. (Idaho) 220-228,

By the act of August 18, 1894 (U.S. C. S. 4685) it

will be noted that the lands had to be ‘*reclaimed and

oecupied by actual settlers’? before patent would issue.

By the act of June 11, 1896, (U. S. C. S. 4686) patent

may issue ‘‘when an ample supply of water is actually

furnished in a substantial ditch or canal.” The latter

provision is extremely uncertain. Does the canal have

to be within one mile or forty miles of the land, or does

it have to be on the land to be reclaimed? It is generally

known that irrigation canals are often many miles in

length. When the indefiniteness of this provision is

considered, together with the further fact that this latter

act provides for the creation of a lien upon the land

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immediately after patent issues, which lien shall include

‘‘the actual cost and necessary expenses of reclamation,”

it is apparent that it was the intention of Congress in

enacting the latter act to hasten the issuance of the

patent and thereby make the lien possible, which would

in turn encourage the construction of Carey Act projects

by making security for the investment available at an

earlier stage of the construction. In order to accomplish

this intent less exacting proof was required before is-

suance of patent. All of which tends to prove thiat the

Secretary of the Interior, in issuing the patent, was

merely of the opinion that there was enough water to

warrant the passing of title of the lands to thie state,

‘n order that a lien might attach thereto and security

be made available for the construction of the project.

It can not be reasonably said that under such an wt-

certain requirement as that above noted the secretary

really conclusively determined that there was sufficient

water to produce ordinary agricultural crops on each of

the 117,000 odd acres.

If we are wrong in the foregoing proposition and this

court is of the opinion that the Secretary of the Interior

in fact found that there was ample water for the patented

lands. that would not be equivalent to holding that such

finding of the Secretary concludes the issues raised by

the pleadings in the present controversy. We think this

is one of the vital points of the case. Namely, that the

present action is based upon the contracts between the

construction company and the settlers, and not upon the

patent. We are not attacking the patent, either directly

or collaterally.

Independent of the patent proceedings the construction

company has entered into contracts with the settlers

and issued them certificates of stock which provide,

among other things, that

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‘‘Kach share entitles the owner thereof to receive

one-eightieth of a cubie foot of water per second of

time for the irrigation of and domestic uses on the

following described land . . . in the County of

Lincoln and State of Idaho; and this certificate also

entitles the owner to a proportionate interest in the

dam, canal, reservoir, water rights and all other

rights and franchises of this company, based upon

the number of shares finally sold, in accordance with

the contract between the Idaho Irrigation Company,

Limited, and the State of Idaho, dated August 21,

1907, as amended.’’ (89),

The amended contract with the state of Idaho referred

to requires this provision—71, 79 and 82. It is apparent

that the Secretary of the Interior, in issuing patent, was

only required to determine that an ample supply of water

had been actually furnished in a ditch or canal, while

the construction company agreed with the state and

settlers to do a great deal more than that. The con-

struction company has contracted, not only that there

‘is an ample amount of water to irrigate the settler’s

land and make it produce ordinary agricultural crops,

but also that it will construct (or has constructed) a

reservoir and irrigation system sufficient to keep and

continue that ample supply available at all seasonable

pericds and in all ordinary seasons for use by the settler.

In other words, the Secretary of the Interior only deter-

mined, at most, that the ample supply was there at that

particular moment, but the construction company has

contracted that such supply will continue to be available

during the life of the contract. It is these latter contracts

that this action is founded upon.

It is safe to state that the settlers relied upon the

plain and unequivoeal statements contained in the con-

tracts providing that a certain amount of water, together

as at

ent

USER Pee

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with an interest in the dam and system, would be

delivered for use upon the lands they were buying. They

were not then concerned with the determination the

Secretary of the Interior may have made; a large ani

then financially responsible corporation, which had built

a large reservoir and irrigation system, tenedered them

contracts whereby such corporation obligated itself to

furnish the purchasers with a positive and ample supply

of water. It is ecrtainly not unreasonable to conclude

that the purchasers relied upon these contracts, rather

than, as appellant maintains, upon the finding of the

government in issuing patent. We do not believe that

the patent proceedings have any place in the case at all.

A proper determination of the issues involves merely

the construction of contracts between private citizens

and the responsibilties and obligations flowing there-

from. The Secretary of the Interior has not attempted

to construe these contracts.

The fifth subdivision of appellant’s first specification

of error (brief 23) points out wherein certain decisions

of the Circuit Court, upon the question of whether or not

the determination of the Secretary of the Interior in

issuing patent to the state concludes the issues now

before this court, are conflicting. A discussion of a

large number of these cases must necessarily be made

in answering both the second and fifth parts of appel-

lant’s argument, beginning on pages 14 and 23, respec-

tively, of its brief. Therefore, these two points will be

discussed jointly.

The following decisions dealing directly or indirectly

with this point have been rendered by the federal District

and Circuit Courts whose decisions are now before this

15

court for review, and by the supreme court of the state

of Idaho: j

Caldwell v Twin Falls Salmon River Land & W.

Co., 225 Fed. 584 (D. C.);

Twin Falls Salmon River Land & W. Co. v Cald-

well, 242 Fed. 177 (C. C. A.);

Twin Falls, ete., Co. v. Caldwell, 272 Fed. 356

(C. C. A.);

Twin Falls Salmon River Land & W. Co. v Alex-

ander, 260 Fed. 270 (D. C.)

Twin Falls Salmon River Land & W. Co. v Davis,

267 Fed. 382 (C. C. A.);

Twin Falls Oakley Land & Water Co. v Martens,

271 Fed. 428 (C. C. A.);

Idaho Irr. Co. v Gooding (instant case), 285 Fed.

453 (C. C. A..)

.

,

State v Twin Falls-Salmon River Land & Water

Company, 166 Pac. (Ida.) 220 (on rehearing) ;

State v Twin Falls Land & Water Co., 217 Pae.

Ida.) 252; and,

Boley v Twin Falls Canal Co., 217 Pace. (Ida.)

258-62.

We admit that a complete and entirely satisfactory

explanation can not be made of these various decisions.

However, when the opinions are carefully studied and

it is noted that the issues involved are so varied and the

relief sought so different, it is not surprising that the

decisions do not seem to be entirely harmonious. We

do not believe that the decisions conflict fatally or in-

expliciably.

The three Caldwell decisions were rendered in one

and the same case. A Carey Act project was authorized

in excess of 80,000 acres, and contracts for 73,000 acres

. eee i Tit a lee Car uli pA le Ra De Rts OAS Tai ana

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were actually entered into with the settlers. Alleging

that the water supply was wholly inadequate and only

sufficient for 30,000 acres the plaintiffs prayed that all

contracts subsequent to the first 30,000 acres be can-

celled, that the company and its trustees be enjoined

from enforcing collection of the contracts, that a receiver

be appointed to take charge of the project and that

the company be enjoined from selling further contracts.

At the time of filing suit patent had not issued, The

Distiret court did not attempt to make a final deter-

mination of the case, because the proper parties were

not before it, but the District Court did order that the

company should be restrained from selling further water

contracts (225 Fed. 601). It is interesting to note that

the injunctional relief is the approximate relief asked for

in the instant case. The Circuit Court affirmed the

District Court as to the injunctional feature of the case

in the following words (242 Fed. 191):

“| and in view of the fact, shown by the

record and which is here undisputed, that the con-

struction company has already sold water rights

far beyond the available supply of water, we are

also of the opinion that the court below was entirely

right in enjoining it from making any further sales.”

When this Caldwell case was again before the Circuit

Court the injunction was again affirmed, witness the

following language appearing on page 367 (272nd Fed.);

‘We accordingly direct that an order be entered

that the decree of the District Court be reversed

save and except as to the injunctional provisions

thereof, .. .

It is apparent that as to the injunctional features there

is no lack of harmony in the Caldwell decisions and all

of these decisions unquestionably support the District

Court’s decision in the instant case, because the only

Jelaebt ee BENE Re ay A we

17

relief sought in the instant ease is the injunction (36-7).

We believe that all of the decisions agree upon this

matter.

As to whether or not the issuance of patent con-

elusively and finally determined that an adequate supply

of water is available, and coneludes the issues of this

ease, the District Court said (144-5):

‘To the contention that the plaintiff are concluded

by the patent proceedings in the General Land

Office, it is sufficient to respond that they were not

parties to the proceedings, and are. not bound

thereby. They hold contracts imposing upon them

heavy obligations, and in turn conferring upon them

valuable rights. It would be shocking to hold that

these rights could be taken away or substantially

impaired by a finding of fact or conclusion of law

(we are not advised which) made by an adminis-

trative officer in an ex parte proceeding in which

they did not have an opprtunity to be heard.’’

And upon the same question the Circuit Court said

(679):

“They (defendants-appellants) contend that. the

Secretary of the Interior, when he issued a patent

to the state, determined, as a matter of fact, that

the water supply was sufficient for the reclamation

of the irrigable portion of the 117,677.24 acres of

land conveyed to the state, and that such deter-

mination binds this court in this case. We cannot

accept that view of the law as applicable to this

controversy. This suit is upon a contract between

the parties. Neither the United States nor the

Secretary of the Interior is a party to this action.

It is true the State of Idaho, the trustee of the tract

of land conveyed by the Secretary of the Interior,

isanintervener, But the state is here, not in support

of the defendant’s claim that the Secretary of the

Interior has determined that the available water

Oy ars ae ea

PEN,

18

supply, as now ascertained, is sufficient for the

whole tract; nor is it here even as a neutral, On

the contrary, the state is here to say, and to urge

upon the court that the a railable supply of water,

as now ascertained, is not sufficient, and that further

sales of water rights for the project should be

enjoined.

“This action of the state does not aid us in

determining the legal question now under consider-

ation, nor does it determine for this court the fact

that the outstanding issue of water stock of the

Big Wood River Reservoir & Canal Company has

exhausted the available water supply for this

project; but it tends to prove the fact, and is pe-

suasive official action on the part of the state that

the authority and jurisdiction of the Secretary of

the Interior should not be extended by the court to

questions not clearly and distinetly within his ad-

ministrative authority and jurisdiction.

In effect. the state agrees with this court in Twin

Falls Oakley Land & Water Co. v. Martens, 271 Fed.

948, 433, where this court, speaking through Judge

Hunt, said:

‘© ‘We believe that, in a proceeding to ascertain

whether patents should issue, the finding by the

land department upon the question whether the

supply is ample is conclusive for the purpose of

issuing patent; but that is far from ruling that it

is conclusive upon the question whether the plain-

tiff construction company has provided water at the

rate of 1.5 acre-feet per acre as required by its

contract with the settler. That is a matter which

the Land Department has not undertaken to pas

upon, and could not.’

‘‘We see no reason for changing our opinion 0!

that question.”’

Upon this question the supreme court of Idaho had

— Bi Deng A LAOS tl LRN

SORIA pte tar hen ewe CE

19

the following to say, in the recent case of Boley v. Twin

Falls Canal Company, 217 Pae. 258, quoting from page

262: ,

“It is urged on behalf of respondent that the

state having procured patent from the government

for the lands purchased by respondent, it holds these

lands in trust for subsequent purchasers; that it

obtained patent to the same by reason of having

represented to the government that it had provided

sufficient water in a substantial canal system to

reclaim such lands, and not having offered to re-

convey, or given notice of the withdrawal of such

lands from further settlement, it is an act of bad

faith on the part of the state to refuse water for

their reclamation, We do not think that this result

follows, for as appears from the record in State and

Rayl v. Twin Falls Salmon River L. & W. Co., 30

Idaho, 41, 166 Pae, 220, Caldwell v. Twin Falls

Salmon River, Ete., Co., (D. C.) 225 Fed. 584, and

Twin Falls Salmon River, ete., Co. vy. Caldwell, 242

Fed. 177, 155 C. C. A. 17, it is apparent that both

tle state and the government have been led into

error with regard to the available water supply for

a particular segregation, and that the practice has

heen for such lands to be released to the government

and opened for settlement under some other pro-

vision of the. federal land law. But whatever may

he said with regard to an error by the state and

the government to patenting to the state a greater

amount of lands than ean actually be reclaimed

under a given system, neither the government nor

the state should insist on depriving prior settlers

who have located upon this segregation, spent a

large amount in improving their lands and bringing

them to a high state of cultivation, of the amount

of water necessary to reclaim such lands, such water

not being in excess of the amount to which the

granting clauses in their deeds of conveyance en-

titled them to receive. ****** No further sale should

et

20

be 2ilowed when it would result in diminishing the

prior settler’s right to less than the maximum

amount which they have purchased, that amount

being necessary for the successful irrigation of their

lands.”’

The foregoing decisions do not reveal any conflicts,

nor even inconsistencies. But these quoted decisions do

show the interpretation which the courts have placed

upon the question under consideration. This question

was fairly raised in these cases and the determinations

made are authoritative.

At pages 23 et seq. of their brief counsel for appellant

point out instances in which it is claimed the decisions of

the Cireuit Court are in conflict with its decisions in the

instant case and in the Martens case, supra. The thiree

following cases are cited in this connection:

Twin Falls, ete., Co. v. Caldwell, 272 Fed. 356-65-7;

Twin Falls, ete., Co. v. Caldwell, 242 Fed. 177-199;

Twin Falls, ete., Co. v. Davis, 267 Fed. 382-9.

In the Davis ease the object of the suit was to prevent

the state officials from relinquishing certain segregated

lands back to the government. That is, the suit involved

the question of the issuance of the patent to the state.

The Martens and other cases quoted from above do not

have to do with similar issues, The relief sought in the

Caldwell case is difficult to describe in a few words, but

is summarized to some extent by the Cireuit Court in its

last decision therein, at page 361 of the 272 Fed, reporter.

Furthermore, the Caldwell case has never been finally

determined, but it was sent back to the Distriet Cour

with instructions that new pleadings be drawn, ne¥

parties be brought in, ete. (272 Fed. 367-8). As best

we can determine, the purpose, or at least one of the

ie Pt eth Hen AA Pie Noel) A) Com I tie MONO SiR Lah ar Os Maal) aT alae

21

purposes, in both the Davis and the Caldwell cases was

to determine what lands should be patented. In other

words, those actions affected the patent and land titles;

while the instant action affects, not the land title or

the patent, but the contractual relation between the

construction company and the settlers, under written

contracts. Therefore, when the relief sought and the

issues are considered we do not believe that there is

any serious conflict in the decisions of the Cireuit Court.

The contractual rights and responsibilities of the

parties to this action were not submitted to the Secretary

of the Interior and he has never attempted to determine

the same. The Secretary’s determination that there was

ample water furnished to justify the issuance of patent

to the state does not mean that the construction company

has complied with its contracts with the appellees and

their fellow-settlers. The Secretary may have determined

that only a comparatively small amount of water was

necessary to warrant the issuance of patent; but this

most certainly does not prevent the construction company

and the settlers from agreeing among themselves as to

what amount of water is necessary for the irrigation of

the land so patented. And if the construction company

and the settlers make such an agreement it is a matter

as between them privately and about which the Secretary

has never been in the least concerned. In an unpublished

opinion filed in the U.S. District Court for the Southern

Division of Idaho May 5, 1923, Judge Dietrich thus

tersely summarizes this situation:

ee

i -_ —- |S |

ce eo FS or

: whatever view may be taken in the

patent proceedings by the Secretary of the Interior

or Commissioner of the General Land Office touching

the sufficiency or insufficiency of the water supply

to warrant the issuance of patent, it still devolves

22

upon the courts to entertain and independently to

adjudicate controversies such as the one here

presented. Briefly to amplify: In the one case the

question is between the state and the government,

an inquiry whether the state has complied with

certain statutory requirements, without respect to

the obligations the promoting company may have

assumed toward the settlers. And in the other, as

already suggested, we have only questions of con-

tract rights between private individuals who have

chosen to enter into certain agreements conferring

and imposing reciprocal rights and obligations.”

The title of the case just quoted from is, Common-

wealth Trust Co. of Pittsburg v. Glavin. The purpose of

the suit was the same as that in the Martens case, namely,

an action brought by the assignee of the construction

company against a settler for the foreclosure of a water

contract, the settler being in default upon his contract

payments. The only difference in the two cases is that

they arose upon different Carey Act projects in the State

of Idaho.

Wherever in this brief the statement is made that a

settler is entitled to his contract amount of water, or

where a similar statement is made, what is meant is that

a settler is entitled to the contract amount of lis water,

provided that amount is necessary for the beneficial

irrigation of his land. JudgeDietrich found the latter

amount to be 2%4 acre feet (149). This is less than the

contract amount by far, but the trial court had in mind

the following Idaho statutory provisions upon this

question:

“| | The amount of water. so alloted shall

never be in excess of the amount actually used for

beneficial purposes for which such right is claimed.”

C. 8. 7033.

Oe ee en a a A ee

23

‘‘No person entitled to the use of water from any

such diteh or canal, must, under any circumstances,

use more water than good husbandry requires for

the crop or crops that he cultivates; . . ’’C. S. 5640.

Upon this point also, State v. Twin Falls-Salmon River

Land & Water Co., 166 Pae. (Ida.) 220-233,

The third subdivision of appellant’s first specification

of error presents the argument that

‘“‘The reasoning of the Cireuit Court of Appeals is

fallacious beeause it assumed that the Company

could contract to apply the entire water supply to

a smaller acreage than the land officials had deter-

mined the water supply was sufficient to reclaim.

The state had no authority to reapportion the water

supply.’’ Appeilant’s brief, page 19.

In other words, the water rights of the construction

company must be sold to and distributed for use upon

the entire irrigable portion of the patented area, and

none other. Counsel can not consistently urge this

proposition, because their client has already sold several

thousand shares of such water for use upon other lands

than those described in the patent. See Ex. 11, at page

2 of this brief, and Twin Falls Oakley Land & Water

Co, v. Martens, 271 Fed, 428-32, par. 4. The contract

between the construction company and the state also

clearly shows that it was not the real intention of the

contracting parties that the water should be scattered

out over more land than the dictates of good husbandry

and the needs of the lands warranted, witness the fol-

lowing language therefrom:

“The second party (Idaho Irrigation Company)

stipulates and agrees that to the extent of the

capacity of the irrigation works and to the extent

of its water rights, it will, as rapidly as lands are

E

i

i

¥

z,

open for entry and settlement, sell, or contract to

sell, water rights or shares for land to be filed upon

to qualified entrymen, (50) ....

‘‘But in no ease shall water rights or shares he

dedicated to any of the lands aforementioned or sold

beyond the carrying capacity of the said canal

system or in excess of the appropriation of wate as

hereinbefore mentioned.’’ (54)

In this connection it is also important to note that it

is unlawful for a Carey Act construction company to

sell water in excess of its appropriation. Sees. 3065 &

5636, Ida. Comp. Stats. Full text of these sections is

contained at pages 28 et seq. of cross-appellants brief

herein). Another reason which renders this position of

counsels’ inconsistent is that the appellant has alleged

in its answer that when it has sold shares representing

the total water appropriated

‘« | |. then and in that event, the said Idaho Iri-

gation Company should make no further sales of

water rights by means of selling and issuing shares

of stock in the said Big Wood River Reservoir &

Canal Company, Limited.’’ (114)

These citations would seem to refute counsels’ theory

and establish the proposition that the entire water appro-

priated by a Carey Act construction company does not

necessarily have to be sold for use upon the entire

patented area, but may be sold for use upon other lands

and for use upon a lesser acreage than that patented.

See par. 18 of state contract (84); and also the following

excerpt from the case of State v. Twin Falls ete. Co., 166

Pac. (Ida.) 220-9:

“The West and Weaver cases do not hold that

where the water supply is inadequate, it must be

divided up so as to make it impossible to reclaim

—_

the land in the project. Those decisions have no

appliction to the case at bar. It was not the in-

tention of the framers of the Constitution nor of the

several irrigation acts of the legislature to have the

public waters of the state so distributed as not to

properly irrigate the agricultural lands for which

they may be appropriated, and thus make a failure

of the proper reclamation of our arid lands.’’

25

Witness Harris states this proposition thusly (399):

“If it (the water) is spread over so large an area

that the farmers can only get part of what they

need, it is impossible for them to prosper, we get

discontented farmers, farmers who are not good

citizens hecause of the lack of content, and we have

an undesirable condition, . .. the idea being that

there is no particular advantage in having a great

number of people, if those people are not prosperous,

if they are not able to make a living, and are not

contented :”’

The Distriet Court states the same idea in these words,

in the Caldwell ease, 225 Fed. 596:

‘Better four prosperous farmers than five who

are unsuccessful because of the uncertainty in the

water supply, and better four farms uniformly fruit-

ful than five upon which failure is ever imminent,

and to which it is bound to come on the average

one year in five.’’

The fourth subdivision of appellant’s first specifi-

cation of error deals with the effect of the decision of

the Cireuit Court and, as we interpret the argument, it

is claimed that the decision is erroneous because it would

permit a part of the water to be detached from the land

which the issuance of patent had automatically made

such water appurtenant to permanently. To support

this theory they cite sees, 3018 and 3019 Ida. Comp.

Stats. In Idaho there is no longer any question but that

26

water, which has become appurtenant to specific land,

can thereafter be sold and conveyed and separated from

said land, just as a tree, building or any other appur-

tenance to real property may be. This question is

thoroughly briefed at pages 33 et seq. of cross-appellants’

brief in this cause. There the two Idaho cases of Bennett

v. Twin Falls ete. Co., 150 Pac. 336-40, and Sanderson y,

Salmon River Canal Co., 199 Pac. 999-1002, and other

authorities, are cited and quoted. These authorities

show beyond doubt that it is permissible and proper to

transfer water from one tract of land to other lands,

in Idaho.

At page 29 of its brief appellant states that at least

one of the appellees, the state, took part in the patent

proceedings and is bound thereby. The state in dealing

with the Carey Act projects acts by virtue of its sover-

eignty and not in the capacity of a private owner, State

y. Twin Falls ete. Co., 166 Pac. (Ida.) 220-33 (679-0).

Appellant’s Second Specification of Error

Appellant contends that the water rights sold by the

construction company should be construed in harmony

with all the provisions of the Carey Act, and that this

means that each purchaser only acquires a proportionate

interest in the total water right of the company, rather

than a definite amount. Appellant further claims that

the amount was specified in the contracts merely for

the purpose of establishing a maximum. This theory

has been unsuccessfully advanced in practically every

case of the same general nature for a number of years

To date every court has unhesitatingly decided this point

against appellant’s contention. During the current year

the supreme court of Idaho, in the case of State v. Twin

Falls Land & Water Co., 217 Pac. 252-6, stated the law

upon this matter as follows:

‘It cannot be presumed that the present users of

water under this system, when they acquired their

rights to its use, intended or understood that they

were to receive only an indefinite fractional part of

this original appropriation of 3000 second feet,

instead of the definite, specifie quantity mentioned

in the granting clause of their contracts. Such

meaning is clearly contrary to the language used.

If the state, which subject only to the limitations of

law had plenary power to fix the terms and con-

ditions of these contracts between the construction

company and the settler, intended that he should

have only a fractional, indefinite, and uncertain

amount of this appropriation that might remain

after all subsequent purchasers of lands lying within

the exterior boundaries of the segregation had been

granted similar rights, it should have made this

condition of the contract clear and unequivocal.

Instead of doing so, it was made to read as above

stated... ..

“The state land board is without authority to

authorize a construction company to sell settlers

under a Carey Act project an indefinite, fractional

water right, but is required to limit such sales to the

amount of water available from the company’s ap-

priation which can be seasonably delivered by the

proposed system.’’

The case just quoted from and the Boley case, which

is reported in the same volume at page 258, are of

unusual interest and importance upon many of the issues

before this court now, and we request the court to

consider both of these decisions in detail. With this

in mind we will not oceupy space in this brief with

statement of the facts of said cases. For further author-

ities disapproving the proportionate share theory see

the following cases:

28

Boley v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 217 Pace. (Ida)

258-62;

State v. Twin Falls ete. Co., 166 Pac. (Ida.) 220-

9-232;

Caldwell v. Twin Falls ete. Co., 225 Fed. (DC)

584-91;

Twin Falls ete. Co. v. Caldwell, 242 Fed. (CCA)

177-93;

Twin Falls ete. Co. v. Martens, 271 Fed. (CCA)

428-31;

Sees. 2998 and 3064, Ida. Comp. Stats.

Therefore, if a settler under this project acquired a

definite and positive amount of water by his contract,

then when sufficient contracts have been issued to absorb

the water right of the construction company, clearly no

further sales should be made, because as each sale is

made after that time the water rights of the prior pur-

chasers would be proportionately diminished and le

would be deprived of a vested, contractual and valuabie

right. It should be remembered that the purpose of the

present action was not to cut off vested rights, as is the

situation in some of the reported cases, but its sole

purpose is to prevent further rights accruing. ‘‘It is

one thing to prevent any more righits vesting, in order to

avoid a hardship to those whose rights have already

vested, and it is another thing to wipe out riglits which

have already vested through the issuance of contracis

and the use of the water.’’? Sanderson v. Salmon River

Canal Company, 200 Pac. (Ida.) 341-3.

In this connection appellant takes the position (brief

p. 40-1) that the provisions in the contract providing for

the installation of a system of rotation shows that the

company was not obligated to deliver a definite amount

of water. This same question was raised in the Caldwell

Ne AA ruil a Sh tae er Raced

29

ease, so often referred to. In that case the District Court

concluded that these provisions had to do with the

‘‘method of delivery,’’ rather than the ‘‘extent of the

right.’’ 225 Fed. 598. The Cireuit Court agreed with the

District Court upon this matter. 242 Fed. 193 and 4.

The evidence shows that the rotation system can only

be used to a limited extent between the smaller owners

(349); where a larger head of water is used by the

rotation system the waste is greater, (376); the soil will

be injured (417); and upon several of the tracts the

canals and ditches are not constructed large enough to

permit the practical adaptation of the rotation system

(373-4).

Under this specification of error, and at other points

of its brief, appellant contends that the action of the

District Court in enjoining further sales deprives the

construction company of its contemplated lien upon all

the patented area, and thereby prevents the company

from being remunerated for its work. As the construction

company contended in the Cireuit Court, the action of

the District Court deprives the construction company

and its assignees of the lien on some 13,000 acres of land.

To this contention we make the brief reply that a Carey

Act construction company is not entitled to a lien until

it has made permanently available to the settlers suffie-

ient water to reasonably irrigate the land and render it

productive; it is not sufficient that the land may be

reclaimed :

Childs v. Neitzel, 141 Pac. (Ida.) 77-85;

Twin Falls ete. Co. v. Davis, 267 Fed. (CCA) 382-7;

Twin Falls ete. Co. v Alexander, 260 Fed. (D. C.)

270-5;

Twin Falls ete. Co. v. Martens, 271 Fed. (CCA)

428-33;

To the general statement made by appellant’s counsel

numerous time, that the one and only purpose of the

Carey Act is the reclamation of the land, and that all

contracts and court decisions must be interpreted in that

light, we do not take any exception. However, we do

desire to add to this statement by stating that it is the

intent and purpose of the state and national Carey Act

and all proceedings thereunder that the desert lands

shall be ‘‘thoroughly reelaimed,’’ reclaimed in such

manner as to enable them to produce ordinary agricul-

tural crops.

“The purpose of the Carey Act of Congress and

of our legislative enactments accepting for Idaho

its benefits is the reclamation and irrigation of

desert lands in a manner and to an extent that will

make them productive and valuable for agricultural

purposes.”’

State v. Twin Falls ete. Co., 166 Pae. (Ida.) 220-51,

The best available authority for our position upon

this question is that of common sense and _ practical

thought. To say to a settler, who holds a written con-

tract providing that he shall have a definite amount of

water, that he shall not in fact receive that defimte

amount of water nor even euough thereof to thoroughly

irrigate his lands, but that as a matter of law he is only

entitled to receive a proportionate interest of such water

as is available, would be equivalent to advising the

settler that he had no water right at all. Or at best

he would only be getting an uncertain and chimerical

proportion in an unknown quantity.

It is generally known that many settlers on western

projects are former residents of the east,who buy without

personal knowledge of the water and conditions existing,

but in reliance upon the representations and agreements

E_ —_—— —

eT

of the construction company. If a construction company

is not limited in its sales by the amount of water on

hand and is not required to deliver to its purchasers

| any definite amount of water under the prescribed con-

| tracts, it could continue indefinitely with sales to unwary

purchasers. Every purchaser under a Carey Act has

| equal priority of right with the other purchasers. If

appellant’s theories are upheld a state of affairs could

be arrived at, and not in the far distant future, whereby

the appellees and their co-settlers would not have enough

water to irrigate one-tenth of the land they now have

under cultivation. Certainly no such fraudulent and

unfair results are contemplated by the various Carey Act

enactments.

Under this specification of error, and at page 43 of its

brief, appellant quotes from the case of State v. Twin

Falls ete. Co., 121 Pae. (Ida.) 1039-50, which quotation

apparently tends te support the ‘‘proportionate share

theory.”’ This court dismissed the appeal from that

decision for want of jurisdiction. See 59 Law Ed. 427.

However, the case has recently been discussed by the

supreme court of Idaho in two instances, and, so far as

it holds that the proportionate share theory applies to

situations like that now in hand, it has been effectively

overruled,

State v. Twin Falls ete. Co., 217 Pac. (Ida.) 252-7;

Boley v. Twin Falls Canal Co., 217 Pace. (Ida.)

258-61.

Appellant’s Third Specification of Error

This specification claims that the Secretary of the

Interior has determined that the water supply was ample

to irrigate the patented area and because of this deter-

mination neither the state nor its Commissioner of

Reclamation can reapportion that water supply to a

31

smaller acreage. Appellant states that there was no law

in existence at the time the lands were patented author-

izing the state officers to limit the area for which water

rights might be sold, and points out that sec. 3004 C. 5.

was not enacted until after the issuance of the patent.

In making this statement counsel apparently overlook

the provisions of secs. 3065 and 5636 C. S., both of whieh

were in force prior to the issuance of the patent. (Full

text of these two sections may be found at pages 28-9

of cross-appellants’ brief in this cause). These two

sections apply to all persons, officers and corporations.

Sec, 3004 merely points out a method of procedure

whereby the law as represented by said sections 5636 and

3065 may be made more effective.

Further, said sec. 3004 does not impair the obligation

of appellant’s contract, as its counsel assert. As here-

tofore pointed out, the contract in question specifically

limits the sale of water and water contracts by the

Idaho Irrigation Company ‘‘to the extent of the capacity

of the irrigation works and to the extent of its water

rights.’’ (72). See also last part of paragraph eight of

the same contract (76). Under this contract the appel-

lant did not have the legal right to sell more water than

it actually had title to, therefrom section 3004 did not

deprive appellant of any right under the contract. In

this connection counsel asserts (brief, 45) that to permit

this power to be in a state officer in effect transfers

the administration of the public lands from the goverl-

ment to the state officials. The answer to that is, that

the purpose of this action is merely to control the water,

and there is no conscious effort or desire to in any Way

control or hamper the free and unlimited sale and dis

position of land titles. The prayer of the complaint

directed toward the water only. As to the water, it is

§3

only proper and lawful that the state officials should

have absolute control. The federal and state courts

recognize this.

‘The relation of the federal government to the

state government in the reclamation of desert lands

arises out of the fact that the federal government

owns the lands, and Congress is invested by the

constitution with the power of disposing of the

same, while the state has been given jurisdiction to

provide for the appropriation and beneficial use of

the waters of the state which necessarily includes

a use for the reclamation of such lands.”’

Twin Falls ete. Co., v. Caldwell, 272 Fed. (CCA)

356-7.

“The provision of C. 8. No. 5556, which declares

all the waters of the state, when flowing in their

natural channels, including the waters of all springs

and lakes within the boundaries of the state, to be

the property of the state, being in harmony with

article 15, No. 1, of the constitution, this right of

tlle state was recognized by the act of Congress

admitting the state into the Union, which thereby

confirmed this provision of the constitution the

people of the state had formed, and consented to

such appropriation by the state. Farm Investment

Co. v. Carpenter, 9 Wyo. 110, 61 Pac. 258, 50 L. R. A.

747, 87 Am. St. Rep. 918.”’

Short v. Praisewater, 208 Pac. (Ida.) 844-7.

Under these authorities it must be clear that the State

of Idaho is absolutely the owner of all the waters within

its boundaries, which flow in their natural channels. In

fact title to the public waters never leaves the state

completely, because

‘All rights to the use of water acquired under

this chapter or otherwise shall be lost and aban-

doned by a failure for the term of five years to apply

34

it to the beneficial use for which it was appropriated,

and when any right to the use of water shall be lost

through nonuse or abandonment such rights to such

water shall revert to the state and be again subject

to appropriation under this chapter. . . .”’ See, 5582,

Comp. Stats. Idaho.

Counsel place some reliance upon the two Idaho cases

of Furbee v. Alexander, 176 Pac. 97 and Evans v. Swend-

sen, 200 Pac. 136. It will be noted that the decisions in

these cases turn upon the point that the applicant in each

case had complied with all the laws and the board had

no authority to determine any matters other than the

qualifications of an entryman, The facts and issues in

the instant case are so entirely different that we can not

see how the cited cases are authoritative upon any poiut.

Appellant’s Fourth Specification of Error

By this specification appellants assert that the ap-

pellees are not in a court of equity with clean hands

and are therefore not entitled to relief. Practically all

of appellant’s argument upon this point is directed

against the appellee, the State of Idaho, and it is

claimed that, since the state officials have ap

proved the patent proceedings, they should not now

be permitted to assert that there is an inadequate

that the State of Idaho is only in this case incidentally.

The records will show that the Attorney General of Idaho

did not file a brief in the Cireuit Court, and the writer's

information is that he does not intend to do so in this

court. This action was instituted and is being prosecuted

by the bona fide settlers and contract holders under the

Idaho Irrigation Company project, and the questions

involved should be determined with this fact in mind.

If the public officers of the State of Idaho have inad-

vertently reported an adequate supply of water and

a SE a a a a a

35

recommended the issuance of the patent, that fact should

not deprive the appellees of their contract rights with

the construction company. The contracts of the settlers

which form the basis of the present action are not that

the State of Idaho will furnish such contract holders with

certain water, but the contracts are that the appellant

Idaho Irrigation Company will do so. Any conclusions

or findings of state officials prior to the execution of said

contracts can not legally affect the obligations and rights

afforded by the contracts.

‘* ... The report of that official (state engineer)

eannot be held to have been information upon which

plaintiff entered into the contract. The State of

Idaho made no representations to the original pro-

jectors in reliance upon which they were induced to

enter upon a project pursuant to the Carey Act.”

Twin Falls ete. Co. v. Davis, 267 Fed. (CCA) 382-9,

It is undoubtedly true that either the settlers or the

construction company will suffer a considerable loss

because of the outcome of the enterprise. Naturally appel-

lant contends that the settlers should bear the loss, and

visa versa, Admitting for the sake of argument only that

appellant and appellees are equally innocent of wrong

doing and improper motives; and likewise admitting that

the state and government officials, in approving the

project and issuing patent, were of the opinion that the

same was feasible; nevertheless it is true beyond question

that the construction company and its promoters made

the first error. The first step in organizing such a project

is the proposal for the segregation made by the construe-

tion company to the state. Sec, 2998 et seq. C. S. Idaho.

Isn’t it only natural to assume that before making this

proposal and before undertaking such an investment that

the construction company made an investigation of the

water supply and all surrounding conditions?

“It was primarily the irrigation company that

erred in its judgment. But as it made the contracts

with the settlers, who relied upon the ability of the

company to live up to its contracts, and who have

obligated themselves to make deferred payments,

results must be reached upon a recognition of the

contractual relations.’’

Twin Falls ete. Co. v. Martens, 271 Fed. (CCA)

428-32.

In this connection see also the quotation from Childs

vy. Neitzel, 141 Pac. (Ida.) 77-81, contained in cross-

appellants’ brief at pages 46-7, As pointed out in these

decisions, the settlers are not in a position to send engi-

neers into the field to investigate the water supply and

the feasibility of the project, but on the other hand the

settler depends, as he has a right to do, on the ability

of the construction company to make the contract amount

of water available within one-half mile of the settler’s

land. It is a matter of common knowledge that many of

these Carey Act settlers are residents of distant localities

and are thoroughly unfamiliar with the conditions on

western irrigated sections. Appellant has not pointed out

that the settlers are not in this court with clean hands.

These appellees’ hands are clean and there is no reason

why they shcald not nave a good standing in this court.

Appellant further insists that, since the settlers bought

their lands from the State of Idaho, they are the mere

assignees of the state and stand in the same position as

the state with reference to the water supply; that the

state officials found that there was ample water and

neither the state nor the settlers can say otherwise nov.

The answer to this contention is a brief one. Appellees

did not buy the water from the state, and the sale of the

37

water is all that .they are seeking to have enjoined

Appellees purchased their lands from one party and their

water rights from another, and even though there might

have been some equities attached to the land purchases

(which we do not admit), certainly the water purchases

were made in such manner as to be free from any taint

attached to the state’s tilte to the lands.

Appellant’s Fifth Specification of Error

It is claimed that it would be contrary to public policy

to enforce specifie performance of the settlers’ contracts.

It is placing too narrow a construction upon the relief

asked in this cause to denominate it ‘‘specifie perform-

anee.’’ Assuming that the trial court’s findings are any-

thing like correct it is very apparent that the appellees

will not nearly receive the amount of water called for in

their contracts. If this is true they are certainly not get-

ting specifie performance. In fact the District Court’s

decree only allows the settlers a little more than one-half

the amount of water the construction company agreed

that they should have, The remedy sought by appellees

is the only practical one available. At any rate no better

method of procedure has been suggested.

At page 57 of its brief appellant contends that it is

the reeognized policy of the government that the ‘‘dis-

tribution of the water supply available for irrigation’’

was intended to be left in the hands of the federal of-

ficials. We believe that we have shown the contrary to

be the case. See pages 33 et seq, of this brief. We

do not believe that the cases counsel cite upon this propo-

sition support their views, because the cases cited deal

largely with land matters, and not irrigation matters.

Preventing the sale of further rights does not increase

the water rights of appellees, because they have an in-

“7

adequate right, even if the District Court’s decree is

affirmed. And if the Circuit Court’s decree is permitted

to stand their rights will be far below what the District

Court determined they should have for the production of

agricultural crops, and will be very far below the contract

amounts. On the other hand, every share of water that

is sold by the construction company after the available

supply is exhausted necessarily diminishes the water right

of every settler on the project, and thereby impairs the

obligation of the contract between the settlers and the

construction company. If the construction company has

already sold its appropriation it ‘‘would be to ignore

both the spirit and the leter of the contract between the

state and the company’’ to permit it to sell further shares,

State v. Twin Falls ete. Co., 166 Pae. (Ida.) 220-9.

Appellant’s Sixth Specification of Error

Under this specification appellant argues that the

District Court erred in determining the amount of water

available and the amount required for reclamation, and

that in fact the amount available is ample for more lands

than the acreage fixed by the court.

By this specification we believe apellant raises the one

and only real issue worthy of consideration by this court.

We are sincere in this statement, and our reason therefor

is as follows: By their answer herein the appelant and

the trustee appellants

‘« Admit that under and by virtue of the terms of

the said contracts, Exhibits ‘‘C’’ and ‘*D,”’ when the

said Idaho Irrigation Company, Limited, had in truth

and in fact sold shares in said company which should

and did represent the actual amount of water avail-

able and appropriated, and when said sale of shares

should equal the carrying capacity of said irrigation

system, then and in that event, the said Idaho Irn-

38

aaah ~ , - : oii

wa

gation Company should make no further sales of

water rights by means of selling and issuing shares

of stock in the said Big Wood River Reservoir and

Canal Company, Limited.’’ (114).

Exhibits ‘‘C’’ and ‘‘D”’ are the contract and supple-

mental contract between the State of Idaho and the

construction company. In other words, this is an un-

equivocal and unreserved admission by appellant that it

should not sell more water rights than it has water to

supply. This takes every other issue out of the case and

only leaves it for the court to determine whether or not

the construction company has as a matter of fact sold

its entire available supply of water. The District Court

said:

39

‘*But there is no necessity for finding, and hence

I do not attempt to determine, the exact amount of

water available for defendant’s use. It is sufficient

to know that with the duty hereinbefore recognized

the supply is and will be insufficient to meet the

demands of the outstanding contracts, exclusive of

those involved in this suit, and I have no hesitation

in so finding. Accordingly, the prayer of the com-

plaint wil! be granted.’’ (151)

The Cireuit Court said:

‘The evidence submitted by the defendants tends

to establish the fact that not only has the water

supply for this project been exhausted by the sales

of shares already sold of water stock, but that the

available water supply has been very much over-

sold. (676) .....

‘We are of the opinion that the evidence supports

the findings contained in the opinion of the court,

and that the findings and conclusions of law support

on decree. The decree is accordingly affirmed.”’

683) :

= A edad

The situation then is, that the construction company

and its trustees (all the original defendants) have

admitted that if and when the available supply has been

sold they should sell no more water (669); both the

District and Cireuit courts have found that said con-

struction company and its trustees have more than sold

the available supply; this finding was made upon

conflicting evidence. It will be noted that the Cireuit

Court bases its finding upon this point upon ‘‘the

evidence submitted by the defendants.’’ Therefore,

unless appellant can show that this finding is not sup-

ported by the evidence, we urgently insist that the

decree of the District Court must be affirmed. We will

briefly review the evidence submitted upon this phase

of the case.

From our study of the record of this case we conclude

that there were two classes of evidence submitted to the

court upon this question: The first class being repre-

sented by plaintiffs’ exhibit 3 (248), plaintiffs’ exhibit 1

(243), plaintiffs’ exhibit 9 (305), and interveners’

exhibit 1 (430); while the second class of evidence upon

this matter is represented by plaintiffs’ exhibit 10 (370),

defendants’ exhibit 13 (572) and defendants’ exhibit 14

(573).

Neither the District nor the Cireuit Court seems to

have given a great deal of weight to the exhibits named

in the first class. In this respect there is no question

but that the courts acted judiciously. This evidence

was submitted largely by the appellees, but the appellees

were not in possession of the records of the construction

company and, until the trial was well under way and

subpoenas duces tecum had been employed they wer

unable to get the records of the company. This first

class of evidence, and the exhibits named as such, did

41

not constitute data and evidence sufficient for the pur-

poses of this case for the following reasons:

First: These exhibits included the total run-off of the

entire watershed, or the total inflow into the reservoir

(243), and as shown in our statement of the case (page

1 et seq. of this brief) the total inflow into the

reservoir was not available for distribution to the

settlers under the Idaho Irrigation Company system. A

great deal of appellant’s argument upon this point is

based upon this fallacious assumption, namely, that the

total run-off of the entire watershed was available for

use to the purchasers of the construction ccmpany. Such

is far from the fact.

Second: These exhibits included a large quantity of

water which ran over the spillway during seasons of

high water and was wasted into Snake river. There was

not even an approximate record of this wasted water

available. (253, 259, 293, 294, 306 and 575).

Third: These exhibits included a large amount of

water that escaped from the system and became waste

at the Thorpe place. Record of this amount was available

to the court for only a few months during the entire

period of years covered by the exhibits. (301-2).

Third: These exhibits included the amounts of water

that went to supply the flood rights and later users, of

which there was no record at all. (259).

Fourth: These exhibits included the waters belonging

to the ‘‘old rights’? (241, 254 and 258, also see said

exhibits). These rights approximated 100,000 acre feet.

Fifth: These exhibits included the canal loss of 30

per cent (264, 279, 150 and 416).

Sixth: These exhibits included the river loss of 100

acre feet per day. The statutory irrigation period in

Idaho is from April 1 to November 1 (674). Twin Falls

42

ete. Co. v. Lind, 94 Pac. (Ida.) 348-51. This river loss

is not included in the canal loss (279).

Seventh: These exhibits included the reservoir losses

from seepage and evaporation, amounting to 12,500 acre

feet (272).

Eighth: Some of these exhibits include waters that

waste through the Little Wood River. The flow of this

river can be utilized for only a portion of the year by

the users under this project (241-3, 250 and 430).

On the other hand, the other exhibits named under the

second class tended to show the actual amount of water

for use by the settlers upon the project of the Idaho

Irrigation Company. As shown from the remarks of the

District Court 271-2, and the statements contained in

its opinion (149-0), it is easily apparent that the District

Court considered defendants’ exhibits 13 and 14 and

plaintiffs’ exhibit 10 as constituting the most dependable

evidence from which to determine the amount of water

available to the appellees. And the record also makes it

clear that the Cireuit Court was of the same opinion

(674-5).

Considering plaintiffs’ exhibit 10 and defendants’

exhibits 13 and 14 as being the best evidence of the

actual amount of water available for use by the appellees

and their fellow-settlers, was the District Court in error

in finding that the water supply has already been over-

sold? As to plaintiffs’ exhibit 10, it will be noted that

the information contained on this chart was taken from

the records of the Idaho Irrigation Company for the

years 1911 to 1917, inclusive, and from the records of

the reclamation office for the year 1918-19 (369). An

average of these reservoir storings, as enumerated it

figures at pages 369-0 of the record, is 163,222 acre feet.

When this amount undergoes the canal and river losses,

- | al —Te -_- wr ,

43

etc., it certainly will not show that there was more water

available to the settlers under this project than the trial

court found, to-wit, 122,849 acre feet. Defendants’

exhibits 13 and 14 (572-3) show the amount of water

available at the heads of the main canals, and at the

farmers’ headgates, respectively. The difference shows

the amount of waste and loss (574, 150 and 675).

The District Court seems to have taken the average

of said exhibit 14 (150) as the basis for its conclusion.

The average is 122,849, rather than 122,817 acre feet.

Appellants objection to this is put in these words

(brief 67):

‘The trial court, however, ignored all evidence of

water available and based its decision on the water

delivered, treating the two as synonymous.’’

And in support of this proposition appellant seeks to

show that in the early years of the project there was

an over-abundance of water, and that settlers were fur-

nished more water than really necessary, a great deal

was permitted to go to waste, ete. The record does not

prove this situation to us. Mr. Kays the vice-president

and general manager of the construction company tes-

tifies that this situation existed to a certain extent prior

to and including the season of 1913, but that since that

time, except for one flood season, the practice has not

been followed (559-0). On the contrary, the record

shows that the reservoir was completely drained and

the water shut off to the settlers under the Idaho Irri-

gation Company project on August 3, 1918, (295-435)

and on July 29, 1919, (295-435). When it is remembered

that the statutory irrigation season in Idaho extends

to November 1 it is very clear that the company was

not burdened with an over-supply that should have been

wasted down the river or given to settlers in excessive

44

amounts for those two years. This showing certainly

disproves appellant’s theory upon this matter. It is also

of interest to note that at the time of the trial, February

23, 1920, the reservoir was again dry (150). These facts

would justify the court in determining that the amount

delivered and the amount available is oftentimes synon-

ymous. The reservoir was also emptied in 1911 and in

1915 (435). In other words the reservoir has beea

drained five out of nine seasons, This being true, we

cannot see that the District Court assumed an improper

criterion when he decreed that the project must not be

increased beyond its then extent.

The amount that the court found to be available for

actual use by the appellees finds further support in the

testimony of witness Baer. Mr. Baer, a civil engineer

in the employ of the state reclamation service and thor-

oughly familiar with the project in question (261), tes

tified that

‘¢ |. the amount of water that would reach the

farmers’ headgates after deducting all losses, would

be 123,760 acre feet.’’ (279)

In discussing the acreage (brief 61 et seq) counsel

conclude that all the ‘‘sold acreage’’ will never be in

cultivation, and that allowance should be made for road-

ways, waste, ete. In the first pace, the construction

company does not issue shares for waste and nol-

irrigable land; and in the second place, in determining

the duty of water, the amount to be furnished, ete., the

construction company in making its contracts, and the

court in rendering its decree, took into consideration

the fact that every tract has to employ a certain amount

of land for roads, homes and the like (149). These

matters are too elementary and well known to deserve

further discussion.

45

Upon thought it must also be understood that all the

land for which water was purchased could not be put

under cultivation in the first few years, because it takes

a great deal of money and hard labor to transform a

sagebrush desert into an alfalfa field, and the average

settler is not financially or physically able to reclaim

all of his purchase within the first year or two. But

with the passing of years this land for which water has

been purchased will be gradually reclaimed until the

amount under cultivation will be practically equivalent

to the amount sold, that is, if the water can be had.

We believe that it would be manifestly unjust and unfair

for a court to accept apellant’s view and fix the acreage

upon the assumption that some of the land for which

water has been sold will not be cultivated. In the natural

course of events this land will be reclaimed and it is

surely entitled to its water. Is it reasonable that the

construction company should contend otherwise?

Appellant states (brief 64) that appellees pleaded

that there was water for 70,000 acres, and the intimation

is that the court should not have fixed a smaller acreage,

and that apellees are not in a position to ask that a

smaller acreage be fixed. Appellant quotes from para-

graph 20 of the complaint (31), but it will be noted that

the portion of this paragraph which appellant quotes

was stricken out. These lines were drawn through this

portion of the paragraph during the trial. Afterwards,

upon stipulation of counsel it was agreed that the

pleadings should be deemed amended to conform to the

proof (580), and in conformity with this stipulation, and

in order to make the record clear, the court entered its

order amending the last fifteen lines of said paragraph

20 to conform to the proof (98). We do not believe that

it is unreasonable to permit this nature of amendment

46

in eases similar to that at issue, for the plaintiffs did

not have the records and figures at their disposal in

preparing the complaint. True, the court’s order was

not made and entered until after the decree, but this

was merely a ministerial act and the date is not of great

importance, provided the order is substantiated by the

proofs in the case. At any rate, appellants are not in

a position to object to the amendment to conform to the

proof in this case as it was done upon stipulation had

with their counsel (580).

Appellant objects that the court did not give the

construction company credit for the increased storage

capacity effected by raising the spillway in 1917 (67-8).

This spillway was built in 1917, yet the record shows

that the reservoir was drained on August 3, 1918, (295

and 435), again on July 29, 1919, (439), and was dry

February 23, 1920, (150). Evidently the court would

not have been justified in concluding that this spillway

helped the situation materially. We believe that all of

the evidence was considered by the District Court. The

witness Baer, in fixing the amount available at the

farmers’ headgates at the figure of 123,760 acre feet, did

consider the increased storage capacity of the reservoir

(279).

Appellant occupies a couple of pages in an attempt

to show that the District Court should not have taken

the average for all the years covered in the exhibits in

determining the general average. In support of this

the case of Wyoming v. Colorado, 259 U. S. 419 is cited.

But counsel conclude this portion of their argument by

saying: That the method outlined in the cited case

‘‘would not materially change the results as to the water

supply’’ (brief 73). According to our computation the

appelication of the method in the cited eases would alter

0Uwe - ~w a | .

47

the figure the District Court fixed as an average two-

fifths of one per cent. This is hardly material enough

to support an objection upon appeal!

LOSSES

Appellant maintains that the transmission loss, which

the District Court considered as being in excess of 35

per cent (150), should not have been fixed above 30

per cent (brief 74-5). A number of witnesses did fix

the canal loss at 30 per cent and one witness fixed the

loss at 30 to 35 per cent (416) but these estimates do not

take into consideration the river loss (279), which it is

agreed amounts to 100 acre feet per day (283). As the

irrigation season extends from April 1 to November 1

(see page 41 this brief) this river loss would amount

to 21,400 acre feet each season, which would materially

increase the percentage of loss. Further, the District

Court stated the percentage of loss was determined from

the records furnished by the construction company (150),

From a comparison of defendants’ exhibits 13 and 14

(972-3) it is easy to know that there is a tremendous

system loss. It was only proper for the District Court

to have considered this fact in fixing the acreage.

DUTY OF WATER

The trial court found that the duty of water on the

project should be fixed at 24 acre feet (149). Appellants

now claim that it should have been fixed at 2 acre feet

(brief 78). We do not understand how counsel are in

a position to make this assertion. By their answer ap-

pellants (113)

‘Admit that the certificates of stock in the Big

Wood River Reservoir and Canal Company, Limited,

entitle the purchaser thereof to receive one-eightieth

(1-80) of one cubic foot of water per second of time

per acre.’’

5 . 7

ne ae ‘ ” / VO 7 ae

si Sa ie Rt, De Meoses . oo ae

48

If water is delivered to the settlers at the rate specified

in said certificates they would get approximately 5

acre feet (674), rather than the 2%4 which the District

Court limited them to. In view of this admission in

appellants’ answer they certainly are not in a position

to contend that the duty fixed by the District Court be

changed. The settlers have been awarded a great deal

less than appellants admitted they are entitled to and

counsel should be content with this result.

We do not believe that the duty of water as fixed by

other courts in other cases can be of material assistance

in this case. To show this, and also to show that the

project in question requires an unusual amount of water,

we point out the following high points of the evidence

touching this matter:

Senator F. R. Gooding, who has been familiar with

the whole tract since 1889 by virtue of his having heen

a stockman and operating as such over this territory,

gives a good resume of the whole situation, at pages

339 to 357, inclusive, of the record. Water will not

stand in pot holes or low places on the tract, but goes

right down through the soil, through fissures in the

underlying formation of lava strata and disappears

entirely (287). The same is true on the Dietrich tract,

“T have attempted to hold water in reservoirs on

my place it goes down in the ground. I have got

a couple of pot holes on my place, but the water

won’t last only two or three days. The water goes

right down.’’ (308)

On the Richfield tract the same porous condition of

the underlying lava bed exists. A farmer built a cistern

fourteen feet in depth and placed a two-inch drain pipe

in the bottom, and ke states that the wind comes Up

through this pipe, and there are three or four other

i

cisterns in the neighborhood in the same condition (318).

Another witness speaking of the North Gooding tract

states,

‘The lava is cracked and full of fissures. To the

best of my knowledge the substrata of lava on that

tract has fissures, cracks or crevices or caves in

it.’’ (359)

Also speaking of the North Gooding tract it is said:

‘*However, there is on another farm I own a single

hole, not where water stands, but a regular cave,

where a man could go into. There is an air current

that comes through that melts the snow during the

entire winter when there is any snow on the ground.

And again there is a suction in that. Sometimes the

air comes up and again the air goes down.”’ (330)

The South Gooding tract is likewise sandy (322),

potholes will not hold water more than a day or two

(824), and ponds and cisterns will not hold water (325).

Speaking of the North Shoshone tract a witness states:

“It is commonly known as lava ash, with quite

a bit of lava float and lava outcrop. .... (358).

The foregoing extracts alone will readily convince this

court that the tract is a subnormal one in a good many

respects. The conditions exsiting upon this project cer-

tainly warranted the two lower courts in stating that,

“Clearly, the conditions upon the project are not

favorable to a high duty of water. In point of

topography, the lands are comparatively rough, and

in many places reefs of rock project above the

surface. As a consequence the surface runoff is

necessarily above normal. And there is also greater

loss in transmission, owing to the increased length

of service ditches on the farm. The soil is of very

uneven depth, and as a consequence the unavoidable

loss from deep percolation is above normal, and this

50

loss cannot be recovered, because the water escapes

through a substratum of fractured rock to unknown

depths. On portions of the tract the soil is of fair

texture, upon others it is coarse and sandy. The

rainfall is almost negligible, and high winds

prevail.”’ (678)

The District Court stated that under present con-

ditions three acre feet, delivered at the times when same

is needed, is probably sufficient, but not more than

sufficient on the average, for the land actually irrigated.

However, anticipating that the system could be improved

and certain losses checked the court fixed the duty at

934 acre feet (149). It is therefore apparent that the

District Court has taken into consideration the actual

situation, and has given the appellants the benefit of

the possibility of the improvement of the system. The

evidence in the record certainly supports the District

Court’s finding upon this point. The trial court has

made a finding based upon conflicting evidence. This

finding can not be set aside upon the showing made.

Appeliant bitterly assails the action of the lower courts

in refusing to consider the expert testimony upon the

question of ihe duty of water. Taking these experts

one by one, what does the record show their qualifi-

cations to be so far as the project under consideration

is concerned:

Plaintiffs’ expert witness Harris has been in many

schools and is familiar with many irrigation projects,

but as to the present project he can only say that he is

‘somewhat familiar’’ therewith (382). He fixes the

duty at 442 acre feet (398).

Plaintiffs’ expert witness Tallman shows better quali-

fications than the other experts, as he has made exper

iments on most of the projects in Southern Idaho (411).

51

He states that the losses are greater on the Idaho Irri-

gation Company project than on the other projects

because of the peculiar and unfavorable lava formations

(414). His opinion is that the duty of water should be

fixed at 4 or 4% acre feet (417).

Defendants’ expert witness Thom fixed the duty at

two acre feet (553), but admits that the ‘‘foundation’’

for his opinion was experiments conducted at Pullman,

Washington, (558).

Defendants’ expert witness Widstoe likewise fixes the

duty at two acre feet (498), but upon cross examination

admits that most of his experiments were conducted at

Cache Valley, Utah (509).

Defendants’ expert witness Bark places the duty at

2'2 aere feet on the land (528), but his experiments

were made upon ideal conditions (542) and at an ex-

periment station (526).

Defendan »’ farmer witness Hayward resides on the

Salmon River tract (565) and does not appear to have

had any experience on the tract under consideration.

In addition to the above the record contains the

testimony of witness Badley upon this point. Badley

is an engineer of considerable experience (289), and was

employed by the farmers on the Idaho Irrigation Com-

pany project for five years thereby becoming familiar

with the entire project (371). He states that

“Where the farmers were getting their full five-

eighths of an inch of water at their headgates, in

some instances they were getting a fairly good crop.

In other instances . . .

“In my opinion as an irrigation engineer, and

based on my knowledge of this project, the land on

that project can not be watered efficiently and ef-

fectually for the purpose of producing ordinary

52

agricultural crops with a less amount of water than

five-eights of an inch.’’ (374-5)

In other words, plaintiffs’ witnesses have testified as

to a duty varying from 4 to 9514; while defendants’

witnesses have varied from 2 to 24%. The court in fixing

9%, has apparently leaned toward the testimony of defen-

dants’ witnesses. At any rate, there is a serious conflict

in this testimony, and, under the rule of law too old to

require repetition, this finding of the District Court is

conclusive upon appellate courts.

CONCLUSION

By combining defendants’ exhibit 10, 13 and 14 the

Cireuit Court arrived at the following figures (679):

Average amount of water delivered at main

canal headgates for years 1911 to 1919,

SMCHIGIVE ..n<ccececeseveveeeecoresesssenenserorernevnnengensnennense 200,08

Average same period at farmers’ headgates.......... 122.850

Average acreage in cultivation same period.......... 34,291

Average per acre in acre feet... 3,839

The District Court’s decree fixes the acreage in the

project at approximately 76,000 acres. That is, more

than double the acreage used in the above estimates. If

this acreage of 76,000 is used with said average amount

of water it is easily aparent that the duty of water will

be very seriously, if not fatally, affected; passing the

serious question of whether or not there is enough water

to permit the project to reasonably exist under the

District Court’s decree. By reference to defendants’

exhibit 10 (564) it will be noted that the cultivated

acreage has materially increased since 1917; jumping

from 39,121 acres in 1917 to 56,564 acres in 1919. These

facts explain why the reservoir was drained before the

ends of the seasons in 1918 and 1919 (435), and explain

why it was dry at the time of trial (150). Upon this

53

‘ showing isn’t there reasonable ground for alarm by the

appellees as to what the result will be when the full

76,000 acres are in cultivation. If some of these 76,000

acres were not in cultivation at the time of the trial and

therefore were not demanding their water, this fact

eannot effect the outcome of this action. In the natural

course of events all of said 76,000 acres will be in eulti-

vation, and all thereof is entitled to its water under the

Court’s decree just as unquestionably as if it had been

demanding and using the water at the time of the trial.

If the Cirenit Court’s decree, allowing 5322.26 ad-

ditional acres to be sold, is upheld there is no question

but that the rights of the appellees will be seriously

impaired, if not effectively destroyed in some instances.

In view of the whole record and the authorities cited

in this brief, it is respectfully submitted that equity and

justice can only be subserved by an affirmance of the

decree of the Distriet Court. While this relief will not

place the appellees in nearly so favorable a position as

they are entitled to be in under the terms of their

contracts with appellant, and will not even assure them

of receiving an amount approaching the amount the

Distriet Court has found they should have to enable their

lands to produce ordinary agricultural crops, yet it is

the fullest relief that this court ean afford.

Respectfully submitted,

W. G. BiSSELL,

BRANCH BIRD,

Gooding, Idaho.

KARL PAINE,

Beise, Idaho.

Solicitors for Appellees.

APPENDIX

The following appendix includes so much of the state

statutes cited in this brief, as is deemed necessary for

the court’s full information, in accordance with rule 21

of the rules of this court.

Section 1, Article 15, Constitution of Idaho. Use of

waters a public use. The use of all waters now appro

priated, or that may hereafter be appropriated for sale,

rental or distribution; also of all water originally appro-

priated for private use, but which after such appro

priation has heretofore been, or may hereafter be soll,

rented, or distributed, is hereby declared to be a pubile

use, and subject to the regulation and control of the

state in the manner prescribed by law.

Section 2998. Proposals to construct irrigation works.

Any person, company of persons, association or incor:

porated company, constructing, having constructed or

desiring to construct, ditches, canals, or other irrigation

works to reclaim land under the provisions of this

chapter shall file with the department of reclamation a

request for the selection, on behalf of the state, by the

department, of the land to be reclaimed, designating said

land by legal subdivisions.

This request shall be accompanied by a proposal to

construct the ditch, canal or other irrigation works nee

essary for the complete reclamation of the land asked

to be selected. The proposal shall be prepared in aceord-

ance with the rules of the department of reclamation

of Idaho and with the regulations of the department of

the interior; and shall be accompanied by the certificate

of the department of reclamation that application for

permit to appropriate water has been filed in its office,

together with the department’s report thereon. It shall

state the source of water supply, the location and dimen-

sions of the proposed works, the estimated cost thereof,

the price and terms per acre at which perpetual water

rights will be sold to settlers on the land to be reclaimed,

said perpetual rights to embrace a proportionate interest

in the canal or other irrigation works, together with all

the rights and franchises attached thereto, * * * *

Section 3004. Contract for Construction, (See record

671-2 for portion of this section applicable).

Section 3064. Water contracts and deeds, All econ-

tracts and deeds for the sale of water rights shall be of

the form approved by the department of reclamation, as

provided in section 3063, and all such contracts or deeds

shall be numbered plainly and consecutively; and it shall

he the duty of the owner of such irrigation works to file

for record in the proper county recorder’s office all such

contracts or deeds, or duplicate copies thereof, in the

order in which the same are issued to purchasers,

Section 3065, Penalties for unauthorized sale of water

rights. Any pretended deed, contract or other instru-

ment conveying or pretending to convey water rights

in such irrigation works prior to the filing of such cer-

tifieate in the county recorder’s office or in excess of

the water rights or amount of water authorized to be

sold by the department, as shown by the certificate or

certificates so issued and filed for record, shall be abso-

lutely null and void, and the owner of such irrigation

works, or those claiming to he the owner thereof and

the officers, agents and representatives of any such

owner or claimant or those claiming to be the officers,

agents or representatives of any such owner or claimant,

who shall make or attempt to make any deed, contract,

or agreement relative to the sale of water rights in such

56

irrigation works, or for the furnishing of water there-

from, prior to the filing of such certificate, or in

excess of the capacity of such irrigation works, as

shown by the certificate or certificates of the

department of reclamation, or who shall violate any of

the provisions of section 3064, shall be jointly, severally

and personally liable upon and for all such contracts and

agreements and for any and all damages, directly or

indirectly sustained by the purchasers of water rights or

interests in such irrigation works, through the failure

of such owner or claimant, or of the officers, agents or

representatives of such owner or claimant or of those

claiming to be the officers, agents or representatives of

such owner or claimant, to comply with the provisions

of this chapter, and in addition thereto, every such

owner, claimant, officer, agent or representative shall be

guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by a fine not less

than $100 nor more than $300, or by imprisonment in

the county jail not exceeding six months, or by both

such fine and imprisonment.

Section 5556. Nature of property in water. Water

being essential to the industrial prosperity of the state,

and all agricultural development throughout the greater

portion of the state depending upon its just appor

tionment to, and economical use by, those making a bene-

ficial application of the same, its control shall be in the

state, which, in providing for its use, shall equally guard

all the various interests involved. All the waters of the

state, when flowing in their natural channels, including

the waters of all natural springs and lakes within the

boundaries of the state are declared to be the property

of the state, whose duty it shall be to supervise theif

appropriation and allotment to those diverting the same

therefrom for any beneficial purpose, and the right to

57

the use of any of the waters of the state for useful or

beneficial purposes is recognized and confirmed; and the

right to the use of any of the public waters which have

heretofore been or may hereafter be allotted or bene-

ficially applied, shall not be considered as being a prop-

erty right in itself, but such right shall become the

complement of, or one of the appurtenances of, the land

or other thing to which, through necessity, said water

is being applied; and the right to continue the use of any

such water shall never be denied or prevented from any

other cause than the failure on the part of the user

thereoof to pay the ordinary charges or assessments

which may be made to cover the expenses for the

delivery of such water.

Section 5582. Change of place of use: Appeal from

department’s decision. All rights to the use of water

acquired under this chapter or otherwise shall be lost

and abandoned by a failure for the term of five years

to apply it to the beneficial use for which it was appro-

pated, and when any right to the use of water shall

be lost through nonuse or abandonment such rights to

such water shall revert to the state and be again subject

to appropriation under this chapter: * * * *

Section 5636. Company to furnish water on demand.

Any person, company or corporation owning or con-

trolling any canal or irrigation works for the distribution

of water under a sale or rental thereof, shall furnish

water to any person or persons owning or controlling

any land under such canal or irrigation works for the

purpose of irrigating such land or for domestic purposes,

upon a proper demand being made and _ reasonable

security being given for the payment thereof: Provided,

that no person, company or corporation shall contract

to deliver more water than such person, company or

corporation has a title to, by reason of having complied

58

with the laws in regard to the appropriation of the

public waters of this state.

Section 5640. Liability for waste of water. No person

entitled to the use of water from any such ditch or canal,

must, under any circumstances, use more water than

good husbandry requires for the crop or crops that he

cultivates; and any person using an excess of water, is

liable to the owner of such ditch or canal for the value

of such excess; and in addition thereto, is liable for all

damages sustained by any other person, who would have

been entitled to the use of such excess water, as fixed

by this section.

Section 7033. Decreed rights appurtenant to land, In

alloting the waters of any stream by the district court

according to the rights and priorities of those using

such waters, such allotment shall be made to the use to

which such water is beneficially applied, and when such

water is used for irrigation, the right confirmed by such

decree or allotment shall be appurtenant to and become

a part of the land which is irrigated by such water, and

such right will pass with the conveyance of such land,

and such decree shall describe the land to which such

water shall become so appurtenant. The amount of

water so alloted shall never be in excess of the amount

actually used for beneficial purposes for which such

right is claimed. ** °°

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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