Opposition Brief — Abuan v. General Electric Co.

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No. 93-992 | a

In THE | orrie Ob THE CLERK

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1993

BARTOLOME E. ABUAN, et al.,

7 Petitioners,

GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY and

MONSANTO COMPANY,

Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

Unitcd States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

STEVEN R. KUNEY CHARLES F’. PREUSS

Counsel of Record Counsel of Record

MARK A. GRANNIS VERNON I. ZVOLEFF

WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY PREUSS WALKER & SHANAGHER

725 Twelfth Street, N.W. 595 Market Street

Washington, D.C. 20005 San Francisco, California 94105

(202) 484-5000 (415) 978-2600

JOHN E. MOORE J. BRADLEY KLEMM

MooreE, CHING, BOERTZEL KLEMM, BLAIR, STERLING

& LAWLER & JOHNSON

Suite 400, GCIC Building 1008 Pacific News Building

414 West Soledad Avenue 238 Archbishop F.C. Flores St.

Agana, Guam 96910 Agana, Guam 96910

(671) 472-8868/9/0 (671) 477-7858

Attorneys for Respondent Attorneys for Respondent

General Electric Company Monsanto Company

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WILSON - Eras PRINTING Co.,. INC. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether, under the law of Guam, the plaintiffs sub-

mitted evidence of sufficient exposure to a toxic substance

to prevent summary judgment against them on their com-

mon-law claims for increased risk of future injury and for

future medical monitoring?

(i)

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RULE 29.1 STATEMENT

Pursuant to rule 29.1 of the Rules of the Supreme

Court of the United States, Respondents General Electric

Company and Monsanto Company hereby identify all

parent companies and subsidiaries (except wholly-owned

subsidiaries) that have issued shares to the public.

General Electric Company has no parent corporation.

General Electric Company has a number of subsidiaries in

the United States and elsewhere, but only a limited num-

ber of these subsidiaries have any outstanding equity or

debt securities that are publicly held. These are: GECC

Financial Corporation; General Electric Capital Corpora-

tion (formerly General Electric Credit Corporation); Gen-

eral Electric Capital Canada, Inc.; General Electric Credit

International, N.V.; General Electric Capital Services,

Inc. (formerly General Electric Financial Services, Inc.);

Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc.; and CAMCO, Inc. (Can-

ada). The public holdings of GECC Financial Corpora-

tion, General Electric Capital Canada, Inc., General Elec-

tric Credit International, N.V., General Electric Capital

Services. Inc., and Montgomery Ward & Co., Inc. are

limited to debt seuurities. General Electric Company

itself has common stock and debt securities that are pub-

licly traded.

Monsanto Company has no publicly-owned parent com-

pany. The following five Monsanto Company subsidiaries

have issued shares to the public: Southwell Technologies,

Inc.: the Macneal-Schwendler Corp.; Micro General Corp.;

Dura Pharmaceuticals; and Microfluidics.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT ....................

I. THE DECISION OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT

WAS STRICTLY EVIDENTIARY, AND IS

THEREFORE INAPPROPRIATE FOR THIS

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II. THE CONSIDERATIONS THAT USUALLY

SUPPORT CERTIORARI ARE ABSENT

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iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES Page

Abuan v. General Electric Co., 3 F.3d 329 (9th

> 2 ee . Leveeeee-PASSIM

Brown v. Monsanto Co. (In re Paoli R.R. Yard

PCB Litigation), 916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990),

cert. denied sub nom. General Elec. Co. v. Knight,

ee casiniseaivenbliogmenanens 3,4

Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113

> |: a_i slsaids 4

Graver Tank & Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co.

got Fn eee cad 8

United States v. Johnston, 268 U.S. 220 (1925)... 3

RULE

a kc:

TREATISE

R. Stern, E. Gressman, S. Shapiro, and K. Geller,

Supreme Court Practice (7th ed. 1993) .

or

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1993

No. 93-992

BARTOLOME E. ABUAN, et al.,

. Petitioners,

GENERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY and

MONSANTO COMPANY,

Respondents.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Ninth Circuit

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT'

This case arises out of the pressurized release on May

25, 1987 of about eight gallons of liquid polychlorinated

biphenyls—“PCBs”—from the junction box of a forty-

year-old electric transformer at the Piti Power Plant on

the Navy base on Guam. The incident itself was relatively

unremarkable: no one was injured at the time of the

release, and no one has sustained any injuries subsequent

to that date as a result.

1In lieu of a “Statement of the Case,” Respondents adopt the

statement of facts contained in the opinion of the Ninth Circuit.

Abuan v. General Elec. Co., 3 F.3d 329 (9th Cir. 1993).

2

The petitioners in this Court (hereafter referred to as

the plaintiffs) sought and received public funds from the

Legislature of Guam to finance litigation against the

United States Navy (whom the plaintiffs believed had

failed to adhere to proper procedures in conducting the

clean-up), General Electric (the manufacturer of the

transformer), and Monsanto Company (the manufacturer

of the PCBs).* Yet after more than two years of blood

tests, expert reports, and other discovery, they still could

not provide legally sufficient evidence that a single person

had, as a result of the incident, received a dose of PCBs

sufficient to require future medical monitoring or create

an increased risk of future illness or injury. The District

Court so held, and the Ninth Circuit unanimously affirmed.

Abuan v. General Elec. Co., 3 F.3d 329 (9th Cir. 1993).

The plaintiffs apparently want the Supreme Court of

the United States to repeat this sifting of evidence, but

that is not a proper task for this Court. Moreover, none

of the factors that make certiorari appropriate, listed in

Supreme Court Rule 10.1, are present in this case. Ac-

cordingly, the petition should be denied.

I. THE DECISION OF THE NINTH CIRCUIT WAS

STRICTLY EVIDENTIARY, AND IS THEREFORE

INAPPROPRIATE FOR THIS COURT’S REVIEW.

The Ninth Circuit affirmed the District Court’s grant of

summary judgment on the first of two grounds offered by

the District Court: that the plaintiffs had failed to intro-

duce evidence sufficient to demonstrate that any plaintiff

had been exposed to a level of PCBs that could possibly

cause the future health effects for which the plaintiffs were

trying to recover in advance.* Thus, granting a writ of

* The U.S. Navy was sued separately, in a case captioned Figueroa

v. United States, following the denial of the plaintiffs’ administra-

tive claims.

3 The District Court also held that summary judgment was appro-

priate because the plaintiffs had failed to prove any present, physi-

3

certiorari would require this Court to sift the evidence

already reviewed by both lower courts in order to deter-

mine whether they erred in finding that the plaintiffs’

evidence failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact.

That is rarely an appropriate task for this Court’s atten-

tion. Indeed, this Court has stated that it will not usually

grant certiorari for this purpose, and there is no com-

pelling reason to depart from that longstanding practice

here. See, e.g., United States v. Johnston, 268 U.S. 220,

227 (1925). “A court of law, such as this Court is,

rather than a court for the correction of errors in fact

finding, cannot undertake to review concurrent findings

of fact by two courts below in the absence of a very

obvious and exceptional show of error.” Graver Tank &

Mfg. Co. v. Linde Air Products Co., 336 U.S. 271, 275

(1949).

Il. THE CONSIDERATIONS THAT USUALLY SUP-

PORT CERTIORARI ARE ABSENT HERE.

Rule 10.1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of the

United States sets forth the considerations this Court

weighs in granting or denying certiorari. From among

these considerations, the plaintiffs have suggested that the

decision of the Ninth Circuit “conflicts directly with other

courts of appeals on the same issues, prior decision of the

Supreme Court of the United States as well as the Fed-

eral Rules of Evidence.” Petition for Writ of Certiorari at

16. However, the Ninth Circuit’s decision creates none of

cal injury, and such proof was essential under the common law of

Guam. The Ninth Circuit did not address this ground for summary

judgment because it found the evidence would be insufficient even

if the plaintiffs were permitted to proceed in the absence of present,

physical injury. Abuan v. General Elec. Co., 3 F.3d 329, 331 n.3

(9th Cir. 1933). Both the District Court and the Court of Appeals

also held that the plaintiffs had failed to submit evidence sufficient

to invoke Guam’s Toxic Substances Exposure Compensation Act,

but the plaintiffs do not seek review of that portion of the case in

this Court.

4

these conflicts; indeed, it does not involve any question of

federal law.

The plaintiffs’ petition is not entirely clear about the

source of the supposed conflict with other federal courts

of appeals, but the most prominent candidate is Brown

v. Monsanto Co. (In re Paoli R.R. Yard PCB Litigation),

916 F.2d 829 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied sub nom.

General Elec. Co. v. Knight, 499 U.S. 961 (1991). See

Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 23-26. Yet Paoli con-

cerned the admissibility of expert testimony, not its suffi-

ciency. This distinction is crucial. In moving for sum-

mary judgment below, the defendants did not even ad-

dress admissibility. Instead, we pointed out that the

plaintiffs’ own experts steadfastly refused to relate the level

of each plaintiff's alleged exposure to any meaningful

standard, thus rendering the testimony insufficient under

the substantive law even if it were admissible. After re-

viewing the testimony, the Ninth Circuit agreed, and it

even cited Paoli before concluding that the evidence in

this case “failed to meet the Paoli significance standard.”

3 F.3d at 334-35."

For the very same reason, the Ninth Circuit’s decision

does not conflict with Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharma-

ceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993), the only decision

of this Court cited by the plaintiffs. This case simply does

not involve the admissibility of expert testimony. Like-

wise, there is no conflict with rules 702 or 703 of the

Federal Rules of Evidence, which are nowhere referenced

in the opinion of the Court of Appeals.

Finally, the Ninth Circuit did not decide any important

question of federal law. Rather, the Ninth Circuit applied

the common law of Guam, and acknowledged that it was

4To the extent that the supposed conflict is between the Ninth

Circuit’s opinion here and the opinions of other courts of appeals

in other cases alleging exposure to toxic substances, any differences

among the circuits merely reflect differences in the substantive tort

law of the jurisdictions whose law was being applied by the federal

courts.

5

doing so in the absence of any reported Guam cases on

point. 3 F.3d at 332. Nothing in the plaintiffs’ petition

suggests that the lower courts’ interpretations of Guam

law were legally erroneous in any respect, or that the

lower courts stubbornly refused to defer to local lav;

those courts simply failed to incorporate the plaintiffs’

policy preferences into the substantive law of Guam.

Where local law is itself uncertain, this Court has been

strongly reluctant to review the reasonable interpretations

reached by the intermediate federal appellate courts. See

R. STERN, E. GRESSMAN, S. SHAPIRO, AND K. GELLER,

SUPREME CourRT PRACTICE 183 (7th ed. 1993).

CONCLUSION

The sufficiency of the plaintiffs’ evidence under the

common law of Guam is a fact-intensive question; it is a

question of local tort law; and it is a question which the

Ninth Circuit resolved correctly and in a manner that

was in no way inconsistent with decisions of this Court

or the courts of appeals. In short, it is not an appropri-

ate question for this Court’s attention. The writ should

be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

CHARLES F.. PREUSS

Counsel of Record

STEVEN R. KUNEY

Counsel of Record

MARK A, GRANNIS

WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY

725 Twelfth Street, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 434-5000

JOHN E. MOORE

Moore, CHING, BOERTZEL

& LAWLER

Suite 400, GCIC Building

114 West Soledad Avenue

Agana, Guam 96910

(671) 472-8868/9/0

Attorneys for Respondent

General Electric Company

Dated: February 17, 1994

VERNON I. ZVOLEFF

PREUSS WALKER & SHANAGHER

595 Market Street

San Francisco, California 94105

(415) 978-2600

J. BRADLEY KLEMM

KLEMM, BLAIR, STERLING

& JOHNSON

1008 Pacific News Building

238 Archbishop F.C. Flores St.

Agana, Guam 96910

(671) 477-7858

Attorneys for Respondent

Monsanto Company

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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