Appendix — Lucero v. New Mexico
Supreme Court brief1994
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39
THE SUPREME COURT OF
NEW MEXICO
SEPTEMBER 22, 19
8
OF NEW MEXICO,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
coming on for consideration
for writ of
, and the Court having considered
ion, and being sufficiently
on
THEREFORE,
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ORDERED that the Recor
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40
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF
THE STATE OF NEW MEXICO
STATE OF NEW MEXICO
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs
CHRIS LUCERO,
Defendant-Appellant.
APPEAL FROM
THE DISTRICT COURT OF CHAVES COUNTY
WILLIAM J. SCHNEDAR, District Judge
TOM UDALL, Attorney General
PATRICIA A. GANDERT,
Assistant Attorney General
Santa Fe, New Mexico
Attorneys for Plaintiff-Appellee
RAMON I. GARCIA
Roswell, New Mexico
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
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41
MEMORANDUM OPINION
PICKARD, Judge.
Defendant appeals his conviction
of possession of fourteen ounces of
marijuana with intent to distribute
pursuant to NMSA 1978, Section 30-31-
22 (Cum. Supp. 1991). Defendant raises
three issues on appeal: (1) whether
the trial court erred in ¢enying
Defendant’s motion to suppress the
evidence on the basis that the affidavit
was facially invalid for failure to
establish probable cause; (2) whether
the information contained in the
affidavit is stale because the affidavit
states that a small amount of marijuana
was seen at Defendant’s residence
seventy-two hours before the warrant
was issued; and (3) whether failure
to raise the issue of the “no knock
rule” constitutes fundamental error.
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43
cause exists. Jd, at 213, 784 P.2d at
32. The search warrant affidavit must
therefore set forth a substantial
basis for both believing the informant
and concluding that the informant
gathered the information of illegal
activity ina reliable fashion. Jd,:;
gee SCRA 1986, S-211(E) (Repl. 1992).
Regarding the first prong of the
test, on its face the affidavit sets
forth the following bases for a
determination that the informant can
be believed: (1) on two prior occasions,
information provided by the informant
proved to be reliable and truthful;
and (2) the informant was sufficiently
reliable to have been entrusted by the
police to make controlled buys of
illegal drugs within six months of the
affidavit. Therefore, the affidavit
in this case is distinguishable from
the affidavit in State v. Therrien,
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44
110 N.M. 261, 794 P.2d 735 (Ct. App.
1990), Qverruled on other grounds by
State v,. Barker, 114 N.M. 589, 584,
844 P.2d 839, 844 (Ct. App. 1992),
relied on by Defendant. In Therrien,
the mere statement without any
Substantiating details by a police
officer that the officer personally
knew that the informant was reliable
was insufficient to satisfy the veracity
prong. IG, Ge 203, 138 Pecan Oe Tet.
As in Cordova, the informant in the
instant case satisfied the veracity
prong because the informant furnished
information to the affiant that had
proven to be true and correct on past
occasions. See Cordova, 109 N.M. at
aié@, 66 P.24G4 @¢ 31. In oreer, ¢6
establish a record of veracity for the
purpose of probable cause, it is not
necessary, as Defendant suggests, for
the informant’s past tips to have led
45
1 to conviction. State v. Gutierrez, 91
211 N.M. $42, 547, 577 P.24 440, 445 (Ct.
App. 1978). On its face, there is
5 sufficient information inthe affidavit
. to support a determination that the
) confidential informant can be believed.
4 Regarding the second prong of the
" test, the affidavit contains the
cs following information to support a
13 conclusion that the informant’s basis |
+ of knowledge’is sufficient: (1) extensive,
a long-term dealings with marijuana
17 that demonstrate the informant’s |
a8 familiarity with marijuana and his |
rf ability to identify it when seen; and |
21 (2) the informant ‘'s personal observation |
#¢ of a small amount of marijuana at |
a Defendant’s residence. Personal |
25 observation is sufficient to satisfy |
#8 the basis of knowledge prong. State
i Vv. Ramirez, 95 N.M. 202, 204, 619 P.2d |
1246, 1248 (Ct. App. 1980); see state
46
v. Cervantes, 92 N.M. 643, 647, 593
P.2d 478, 482 ices . aD.2.. . Cate.
denied, 92 N.M. 621, 593 P.2d 62
(1979). On its face, there is sufficient
information inthe affidavit to support
a determination that the informant
had a sufficient basis of knowledge.
STALENESS
Defendant also asserts that the
information inthe affidavit regarding
the presence of a small amount of
marijuana at Defendant’s residence
seventy-two hours prior to the issuance
of the warrant is stale and fails to
establish probable cause that marijuana
would still be found at Defendant’s
residence seventy-two hours later.
Defendant contends that the information
contained in the affidavit is
insufficiently related to the time
of the issuance of the warrant because
the nature of the criminal activity
47
is merely an isolated transaction.
See State v. Garcia, 90 N.M. 577, 578,
566 P.2€ 426; 427 (Cc... App.), cert.
denied, 90 N.M. 636, 567 P.2d 485
(1977). Defendant further contends
that other relevant factors such as
(1) the smallness of the amount of
marijuana observed by the informant,
(2) a lack of information in the
affidavit to indicate whether the
person in possession of drugs is a
resident of the premises, and (3) a
lack of information regarding the
prior history of the suspects combine
to render the information in the
affidavit stale. See State v. Scheer,
620 P.2d 973, 974-75 (or. Ct. App.
1980); State v, Kittredge, 585 P.2d
423, 424-25 (or. Ct. App. 1978).
Probable cause to authorize the
issuance of a search warrant requires
a factual showing that “an accused,
Co wo monn oO Fe BY ND
—)
48
at the time of the application for
warrant, is in possession of illegal
property or the fruits of a crime or
that evidence relating to the commission
of a crime exists on the premises
sought to be searched.” State yv.,
RDenaldson, 100 N.M. 111, 115, 666 P.2d
1258, 1262 (Ct. App.), cert. denied,
100 N.M. 53, 665 P.2d 809 (1983). The
degree of proof necessary to justify
a search warrant supported by probable
cause 1S “more than a suspicion or
possibility but less than a certainty
of proeot.* 2s. at: 2367 9666: Bi2e at
1263.
The relevance of the time factor
depends on whether the alleged criminal
activity indicates an isolated transaction
or a continuing series of events.
Garcia, 90 N.M. at 578, 566 P.2d at
427. Regarding the time factor, the
Garcia Court also stated the following:
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49
"If there is a reasonable basis
in the affidavit for the conclusion
that the criminal activity alleged
by the informer is of a continuing,
ongoing nature, the passage of
time between the informer’s
last observations of that activity
and the issuance of the warrant
is less significant than when
no such showing is made in the
affidavit.”
id. at 579, 566 P.2d at 428 (quoting
State v, Austria, 524 P.2d 290, 294
(Haw. 1974)).
Under the circumstances of this
case, the affidavit contains the
following information to support a
conclusion that Defendant, who was
listed in the affidavit as residing
at the address where the marijuana had
been observed, was engaged in possession
of illegal drugs on a continuing basis
rather than just a single occurrence:
(1) based on information from the New
Mexico Department of Probation and
Parole, Defendant had just completed
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50
a probation period for possession of
marijuana two months before issuance
of the warrant; (2) based on information
provided by officer Hill of the
Roswell Police Department, Hill had
arrested Defendant on prior occasions
for possession of illegal drugs. See
Garcia, 90 N.M. at 579, 566 P.2d at
428 (month-old information from informants
regarding their personal observation
of heroin on premises on separate
occasions and statements regarding
the defendant’s personal heroin habit
demonstrated criminal activity of a
continuing and ongoing nature that
was not stale for purpose of establishing
probable cause). Nor are we persuaded
by Defendant’s argument that seventy-
two hours is necessarily an extensive
amount of time between a reliable
informant’s observation and the issuance
of a warrant. The circumstances of the
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51
instant case can be distinguished
from those in State v, Powell, 96 N.M.
569, 632 P.2d 1207 (Ct. App. 1981),
in which the only reliable information
indicated-criminal drug activity that
ended six months prior to the issuance
of the warrant. See id, at 570-71, 632
P.2d at 1208-09.
Unlike the Oregon cases upon
which Defendant relies, the affidavit
in the instant case contains information
that would indicate that the marijuana
might still be on Defendant’s premises
at the time the warrant was issued.
see Scheer, 620 P.2dat 974-75 (affidavit
failed to establish probable cause
when there were no distinguishing
details to show why “a quantity of
green vegetable substance” identified
as marijuana would still be on the
premises forty-eight hours later);
Kittredge, 585 P.2d at 424-25 (evidence
uw
52
was suppressed the affidavit failed
to provide any details as to the
amount of drugs observed, who occupied
the premises that were searched, who
possessed the marijuana, or any prior
history regarding the suspects). The
court in Kittredge acknowledged that
the scales might have been tipped to
uphold the affidavit had there been
details specifying who resided at the
premises being searched and details
regarding a history of drug activity
on the part of the suspects. Jd, at
425; see State v, Scheidemann, 448
P.2d 358, 360 (or. 1968); State vy,
Black, 585 P.2d 44, 46 (or. Ct. App.
1978). In the case at hand, the
affidavit contains information to
reasonably support the following
conclusions: (1) Defendant is engaged
in the criminal activity of possession
of drugs on an ongoing basis; (2)
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Defendant resides at the premises to
be searched; and (3) Defendant has a
prior history of involvement with
illegal drugs. Therefore, we determine
that the information in the affidavit
was not stale. Accordingly, we affirm
the trial court’s determination that
the affidavit sufficiently complied
with probable cause requirements.
FUNDAMENTAL ERROR
Defendant contends that it was
fundamental error for his first trial
attorney to fail to raise the “no
knock rule” issue in the motion to
suppress. Defendant further argues
that it was fundamental error for the
trial court to refuse Defendant’s
second trial attorney, who is also the
counsel on appeal, an opportunity to
raise the no knock issue during voir
dire. We are not persuaded by either
of Defendant’s arguments.
54
Any failure by the first attorney
to raise the no knock issue in the
motion to suppress could have been
sured by current counsel. Specifically,
counsel could have requested the
trial court to suppress the evidence
ornrnanw & Ww NY F
9 on this basis. Counsel cites to no
40 such efforts to invoke a ruling of the
11
“3 trial court. In addition, counsel
13 admits that his only attempt to raise
14 this issue at the trial level was made
15
1 during voir dire, even though he was
17 alerted to the possible relevance of
is this issue prior to trial.
19
=e There is no factual basis to
21 support Defendant’s allegation that
22 the trial court would not allow the
23
24 no knock issue to be raised. The trial
25 court merely prevented counsel from
26 raising the issue during the inappropriate
27
= 58 time of voir dire for what was, in all
likelihood, an inappropriate purpose.
5
i.
ne oe ee Oe LO eg Cee ee Be SO ay ee eT ee Gy Te LM ea, ee ye ee aS te
55
see State v. Sheetz, 113 N.M. 324,
327, 825 P.2d 614, 617 (Ct. App. 1991)
(proper standard of police conduct is
a question of law and policy to be
decided by courts). In order to
preserve an issue for review on
onan ny & WwW DY
9 appeal, it must appear that the
40 appellant fairly invoked a ruling of
11
12 the trial court on the same grounds
13 argued in the appellate court. Woolwine
14)! vy. Furr’s Inc,, 106N.M. 492, 496, 745
i P.2d 717, 721 (Ct. App. 1987). Failure
17 to make a specific argument results
48 ina failure to preserve the issue for
7 appellate review. State v. Goss, 111
re N.M. 530, 532-33, 807 P.2d 228, 230-
21) 31 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 111 N.M.
416, 806 P.2d 65 (1991). Accordingly,
25 we determine that Defendant failedto
s¢ preserve this issue for appeal.
27
- In its discretion, an appellate
court may review an issue raised for
I OP EER, OE ae eT ee ee aN” LOE oe ae ee
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56
the first time on appeal if it
involves fundamental error. SCRA1986,
12-216 (B) (2) (Repl. 1992). However,
in the instant case there are no facts
in evidence upon which this Court can
evaluate the merits of a fundamental
error claim. The only information in
the record regarding the no knock
issue consists of comments made by
counsel during voir dire. Arguments
of counsel, unsupported by evidence,
do not constitute evidence. State vy.
Wynne, 108 N.M. 134, 136, 767 P.2d
373, 375 (Ct. App. 1988), gexrt,
denied, 108 N.M. 115, 767 P.2d 354
(1989). Nor can this Court speculate
as to matters outside the record.
State v. Henderson, 81 N.M. 270, 271-
72, 466 P.2d 116, 117-18 (Ct. App.
1970). Due to the total absence of any
factual basis in the record upon which
to evaluate the no knock issue, we are
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unable to decide the merits of this
issue.
For the reasons stated above, we
affirm.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
LYNN PICKARD, Judge
WE CONCUR:
PAMELA B. MINZNER, Chief Judge
WILLIAM W. BIVINS, Judge
58
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF CHAVES COUNTY
STATE OF NEW MEXICO
STATE OF NEW MEXICO,
Plaintiff,
vs
CR-92-103
CHRIS LUCERO,
Defendant.
The Defendant’s Motion to Suppress
came on for hearing on the 15th of June
1992. Based upon review of the Affidavit
for Search Warrant and the memoranda
furnished to the Court, the Court
finds:
1. The time period set out in the
affidavit - within the past 72 hours-
does not render the information stale;
2. There is sufficient information
in the Affidavit regarding the reliability
of the informant that a neutral magistrate
could properly find that the information
furnishes probable cause for the issuanee
of a search warrant.
Accordingly, the Court concludes
that there was probable cause for the
59
issuance of the Search Warrant inthis
case, and the Motion to Suppress Is
denied.
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Submitted by
ERNON
SENIOR TRIAL PROSECUTOR
Noted:
MONICA MUNOZ e
ASSISTANT PUBLIC DEFENDER
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