Appendix — Collins Licensing v. American Telephone & Telegraph Co.

la

NOTE: Pursuant to Fed. Cir. R. 47.6, this disposition is not

citable as precedent. It is a public record. The disposition

will appear in tables published periodically.

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

92-1201, -1294 -1302

COLLINS LICENSING, L.P.,

Plaintiff/Cross-Appellant,

Vv.

AMERICAN TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellant,

DECIDED: November 5, 1993

BEFORE NIES, Chief Judge, PLAGER, Circuit Judge, and

COHN, District Judge.*

Per Curiam.

Collins Licensing, L.P., sued American Telephone and

Telegraph Company (AT&T) in the District Court for the West-

ern District of Texas for infringement of U.S. Patent No.

3,956,593 (‘593 patent). After a jury trial, judgment was en-

tered against AT&T in accordance with special verdicts that

claims 29, 34, 37-39, 43 and 47-48 are not invalid and that

AT&T had infringed only claim 29 of the asserted claims. The

court further ruled that the patent was not unenforceable.

Both parties appeal, seeking reversal of the rulings adverse

to their positions. AT&T also appeals from the order of the

district court holding it in contempt. Because we conclude that

claim 29 is invalid and that the verdicts of non-infringement

of the other asserted claims cannot be overturned, we reverse

the judgment of liability. We vacate and remand for reconsid-

eration of the contempt order.

* HonorableAvern Cohn, District Judge for the Eastern District of Michi-

gan, sitting by designation.

2a

I.

Validity of Claim 29

AT&T contends that three prior art references render

claim 29 obvious. The first, A. Mack & B. Patrusky, Time

Division Digital Switch Matrix Technique Evaluation, in

IEEE International Conference on Communications 40-1

(June 1972), evaluates four different digital switch archi-

tectures for cost, reliability and grade of service. Another

prior art reference, Guido Granello, Switching Networks for

PCM Time Division Exchanges, in International Switching

Symposium Record 81 (June 1972), analyzes the optimal

switching configuration for tandem PCM exchanges.' The

final piece of prior art, Rome Air Development Center, Fi-

nal Technical Report RADC-TR-72-27, Integrated Circuit /

Message Switch Feasibility Model Development, Test, and

Evaluation (1972) (hereinafter “Final Technical Report”) con-

sists of several volumes of technical reports on digital tele-

phony. Because we hold that claim 29 would have been ob-

vious, if not fully anticipated by the prior art, we agree that

the district court erred by failing to grant AT&T’s motion

for judgment as a matter of law.

Claim 29, the only claim the jury found infringed by

AT&T, provides:

The switch of claim 27, wherein said individual time

division digital signal switch element means are in

two basic configurations, a space switch eleme([n|t

and a time switch element interconnectable in plu-

ralities of each said space and time switch elements

through an extensive range of time division multi-

plex switch sizes and configurations.

The claim from which Claim 29 depends, Claim 27, was can-

celled by the PTO during reexamination and thus cannot

' A tandem exchange is a telephone switch handling traffic between those

switches in which subscriber’s lines are terminated. Dennis Longley &

Michael Shain, Dictionary of Information Technology 197, 331 (2d ed.

1986). PCM refrs to pulse code modulaton, a technique for transmitting

analog information in digital form through sampling, converssion of the

sampled value into a fixed length binary number, and transmission of

that number as a corresponding set of pulses. Id at 278.

3a

independently serve as a basis for infringement. Collins does

not argue here that claim 27 is itself patentable over the

aforementioned prior art. Claim 27 reads:

In a switch for interconnecting between data incom-

ing and outgoing digital time division multiplex com-

munications lines:

individual time division digital signal switch

element control means, including,

control store means for storage of the status of

interstage links in a switch;

cyclic retrieval means connected to said control

store means for cyclic retrieval of stored status

information from said control store means;

control data source means interconnected with

said control store means for interrogating and

modifying information stored in said control store

means:

and step said control signal input means to said

control store means for activating information re-

trieval and modification.

Claim 29 differs from claim 27 in that claim 29 adds a

modular switch architecture. The dispute of the parties con-

cerns whether the prior art teaches this modular architec-

ture, i.e., a digital telephone switch with individually con-

trolled, distinct time and space switch components. Both

the inventors during prosecution of the ‘593 patent, and

Collins during the subsequent reexaminations, stressed the

invention’s use of standardized, individually controlled time

and space switch components, which allow for flexibility in

switch implementation. The specification of the 593 patent

states that:

It is... a principal object of this invention to pro-

vide a time space time (TST) switch system achiev-

ing significant improvements in operation and in

minimized equipment costs, in using two basic

modules, a time switching module and a space

switching module....

Another object is to provide such a TST switch

4a

system wherein the two basic modules may be in-

terconnected to realize virtually any size and con-

figuration of a time division switch.

Collins later indicated that the patented invention employed

“the ingenious and novel modularization of the time and

space switch elements, associating individual control stores

with each element.” Request for Reexamination at 9 (June

21, 1989) (emphasis added).

Our examination of the prior art reveals that both

Granello, supra, and the Final Technical Report, supra,

teach individual space and time switch modules. Where de-

picting “(t]he graph representation of a three-stage network”

in Figure 5, Granello, supra at 84, plainly illustrates that

each stage is composed of multiple discrete components.

While these modules are interconnected within a stage, and

are further connected to other components in other stages,

they are individually controlled, distinct modules. Granello

explains that “(t]he graphs shown in Fig. 5 can be imple-

mented as follows: i) Time-space-time (TST) implementa-

tion. Stages 1 and 3 are made up of time matrices, stage 2

is a space matrix.” Jd. at 85. Where the Final Technical

Report refers to the three stages of the TST switch, it indi-

cates that “different primary, secondary and tertiary stages

should be package[d] [sic] on separate modules .. . [with]

any given primary, secondary or (sic, tertiary] function

including control . .. packaged wholly on one to three cards

....” 3 Final Technical Report at 92. All three references

further teach the advantages of a modular design, allowing

flexible implementation of switches through different space

and time switch combinations. Both Mack & Patrusky,

supra at 40-5, and Granello, supra at 87, further provide

data on cost, reliability and other factors for different sizes

of differently configured switches. See also 3 Final Techni-

cal Report, supra at 92.

The additional limitations of claim 29 are taught within

the prior art references. Mack & Patrusky, supra at 40-1,

indicates that the architectural approach of the compared

switches “had to be modular.” The Final Technical Report

also makes extensive use of a “basic module” for purposes

5a

of its analysis. 3 Final Technical Report, supra at 73. The

prior art references thus expressly teach one of skill in the

art to employ uniform, interconnectible switch components.

The tabular data that the references provide on different

switches also indicates that no switch architecture predomi-

nates; instead, an optimal switch architecture varies de-

pending upon the size of the subscriber base, traffic pat-

terns, reliability concerns and other factors. In any event, a

well known principle of design engineering is that a modu-

lar design is desirable to achieve flexibility in the modifica-

tion of existing switches and the implementation of new

ones.

In reaching this conclusion, we are not unmindful that

on reexamination the PTO, after initial rejection of claim

29 based on Mack & Patrusky, supra, withdrew that rejec-

tion. However, the basis for allowance indicates a misun-

derstanding that the prior art did not disclose, inter alia,

modular time and space switches under individual control.

On the incontrovertible record before us, we reach the op-

posite conclusion. “[W]e see nothing untoward about the

PTO upholding the validity of a reexamined patent which

the .. . court later finds invalid. This is essentially what

occurs when a court finds a patent invalid after the PTO

has granted it.” Ethicon, Inc. v. Quigg, 849 F.2d 1422, 1428,

7 USPQ2d 1152, 1157 (Fed. Cir. 1988). We review a trial

record which includes live testimony and cross-examina-

tion, none of which was before the examiner. The governing

statute and regulations limit third party involvement in a

reexamination to the initiation of the procedure. 35 U.S.C.

§§ 304, 305 (1988); 37 C.F.R. § 1.510 (1992). Our precedent

mandates that courts considering the validity of reexam-

ined patents proceed on the record in the litigation, and not

merely conform to or review exclusively the examiner’s ac-

tions during the reexamination proceedings. Greenwood uv.

Hattori Seiko Co., 900 F.2d 238, 241, 14 USPQ2d 1474, 1476

(Fed. Cir. 1990).

We also recognize the great deference due to jury ver-

dicts. Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722 F.2d 1542, 1546,

220 USPQ 193, 196 (Fed. Cir. 1983). However, the jury would

6a

have had to find that the prior art does not show individual

control of a time module or a space module. On this record,

substantial evidence does not support such a finding. “Def-

erence due a jury’s fact findings in a civil case is not so

great ...as to require acceptance of findings where, as

here, these findings are clearly and unquestionably not sup-

ported by substantial evidence. To do so would render a

trial and the submission of evidence a farce.” Connell, 722

F.2d at 1546, 220 USPQ at 196. Because the judgment can-

not stand upon application of the statutory standard of 35

U.S.C. § 103 (if not § 102), we reverse the denial of AT&T's

motion for judgment as a matter of law respecting the in-

validity of claim 29. See Newell Cos. v. Kenney Mfg. Co.,

864 F.2d 757, 9 USPQ2d 1417 (Fed. Cir. 1988), cert. denied,

493 U.S. 814 (1989).

Il.

Infringement

In its cross-appeal, Collins asserts that the jury erro-

neously found that AT&T did not infringe claims 34, 37-39,

43, and 47-48 of the ‘593 patent. On appeal, Collins argues

only that those claims were literally infringed.

Claim 34 of the ‘593 patent provides (emphasis added):

In a switch for interconnecting between data incom-

ing and outgoing digital time division multiplex com-

munication lines, said switch having both time and

space stages and interstage links therebetween, the

improvement comprising:

a plurality of individual time division digital

signal switch element control modules, each such

module combined with an associated time signal

path switching means of said switch for switch-

ing between the time slots of the inputs and out-

puts of a single digital time division multiplex

communication line of said switch, but said mod-

ule not being combined with any space signal path

switching means, or said module is combined with

an associated space signal path switching means

of said switch for switching selected time slots

OD al aR Re eh MB Na Nis Bats Nie rt, Otte NNR BI See et a as at yn lle

7a

from any of multiple time division digital multiplex

communication lines of said switch to a single digi-

tal time division multiplex communication line, but

said module not being combined with any time sig-

nal path switching means of said switch, to form a

time or space switch element, each control module

including its own control store means for storage of

the status of said interstage links in said switch:

a plurality of cyclic retrieval means, each con-

nected to and combined with one of said control

store means for cyclic retrieval of stored status

information from said control store means;

control data source means interconnected with

said control store means for interrogating and

modifying information stored in said control store

means; and

step control signal input means to said contro!

store means for activating information retrieval

and modification, whereby said switch is capable

of distributed operation, allowing time switch el-

ements to be physically separated from space

switch elements of the switch and allowing space

switch elements to be physically separated from

time switch elements of said switch.

The remaining asserted claims, 37-39, 43 and 47-48, each

ultimately depend from claim 34. Claim 38, claiming “[t |he

improvement of the switch of claim 34 further character-

ized by said control store means being a random access

memory,” is typical.

We agree with AT&T that substantial evidence sup-

ports the jury’s verdict that the 5ESS switch does not liter-

ally infringe claim 34. The focus of the dispute is on the

limitations requiring separate time and space switch mod-

ules. Two witnesses for AT&T, Professor Stephen Szygenda

and Mr. Ralph Wilson, testified that the TSIU time divi-

sion module contains time and space switches subject to

common control. Ample documentary evidence and trial

exhibits, including technical literature, demonstrative

charts and circuit diagrams, buttressed this testimony. Al-

8a

though Collins cross-examined AT&T's witnesses and of-

fered its own testimony, principally to the end of establish-

ing that the time and space switches of the accused device

may also operate under individual control, a finding of in-

fringement on that basis ignores the claim language that

time and space switches must not be “combined with any

time signal path switching means ... .” Viewing all the

evidence presented at trial in the light most favorable to

AT&T, see Read, 970 F.2d at 823, 23 USPQ2d at 1432, we

conclude that the jury reasonably determined that Collins

did not prove by a preponderance of the evidence that the

5ESS switch literally met the properly interpreted language

of claim 34.

Claim 34 is the only independent claim of the ‘593

patent that Collins asserts against AT&T. Because claim

34 is not literally infringed, no dependent claim can be lit-

erally infringed. See Wahpeton Canvas Co. v. Frontier. Inc.,

870 F.2d 1546, 1552 n.9, 10 USPQ2d 1201, 1207 n.9 (Fed.

Cir. 1989). We thus conclude that a reasonable jury could

only have found that AT&T did not infringe claims 34, 37-

39, 43, and 47-48 of the ‘593 patent.

iil.

Discovery Sanctions

AT&T also appeals the order of the district court hold-

ing it in contempt for abuse of discovery, contending that it

was a criminal contempt sanction entered without the re-

quired procedural safeguards. According to AT&T, the dis-

trict court failed to provide notice of the prosecution of a

criminal contempt as mandated by Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(b).?

*Fed. R. Crim. P. 42(b) provides:

A criminal contempt .. . shall be prosecuted on notice. The notice

shal] state the time and place of hearing, allowing a reasonable time

for the preparation of the defense, and shall state the essential facts

constituting the criminal contempt charged and describe it as such.

The notice shal] be given orally by the judge in open court in the

presence of the defendant, or, on application of the United States at-

torney or of an attorney appointed by the court for that purpose, by

an order to show cause or an order of arrest... . Upon a verdict or

finding of guilt the court shall enter an order fixing the punishment.

7 — sett ities a

a eee ae ae

9a

Collins instead asserts that the contempt order was civil in

nature and thus not requiring of notice.

A “contempt order . . . is characterized as either civil

or criminal depending upon its primary purpose.” Lamar

Fin. Corp. v. Adams, 918 F.2d 564, 566 (5th Cir. 1990); ac-

cord Petroleos Mexicanos v. Crawford Enters., 826 F.2d 392,

399 (5th Cir. 1987); Port v. Heard, 764 F.2d 423, 426 (5th

Cir. 1985); In re Dinnan, 625 F.2d 1146, 1149 (5th Cir. 1980).

If the order has a punitive purpose and is intended to vin-

dicate the authority of the court, it will be considered a

criminal order. Hicks v. Feiock, 485 U.S. 624, 631-35 (1988):

United States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258, 302-

03 (1947); Lamar Fin. Corp., 918 F.2d at 566: Port 764 F 2d

at 426; Dinnan, 625 F.2d at 1149: In re Stewart, 571 F.2d

958, 963 (5th Cir. 1978). A civil contempt sanction is in-

stead intended “to coerce the contemnor into compliance

with a court order, or to compensate another party for the

contemnor’s violation.” Lamar Fin. Corp., 918 F.2d at 566:

accord Hicks, 485 U.S. at 631-35; United States v. United

Mine Workers, 330 U.S. at 303-04; Port, 764 F.2d at 426:

Dinnan, 625 F.2d at 1149; Stewart, 571 F.2d at 963.

A principal distinction between the two sorts of orders

is whether the imposed sanctions are absolute or condi-

tional. Hicks, 485 U.S. at 633-35; Lamar Fin. Corp., 918

F.2d at 566; Jn re Rumaker, 646 F.2d 870, 871 (5th Cir. 1980);

Dinnan, 625 F.2d at 1149. A fine payable “regardless of pur-

gation of the contempt could not be classified as other than

punitive,” and therefore as a criminal contempt sanction.

Port, 764 F.2d at 426 (citations omitted). In contrast, an

important factor indicating that a contempt adjudication

is civil is the ability of the contemnor to avoid the sanction

by complying with the order. Spindelfabrik Suessen-Schurr.

Stahlecker & Grill GmbH v. Schubert & Salzer Maschin-

enfabrik Aktienaesellschaft, 903 F.2d 1568, 1578-79, 14

USPQ2d 1913, 1922 (Fed. Cir. 1990).

By its December 18, 1991 Order, the district court ap-

proved the magistrate judge’s October 8, 1991 order sanc-

tioning AT&T, which stated in part:

In order to deter further abuses of discovery proce-

10a

dures, and, hopefully, to prevent further contentious

violations of the Orders of the Court, IT IS OR-

DERED that Defendant AT&T shall, on or before

October 10, 1991 at 12:00 p.m. Central Standard

Time, pay to Plaintiff the sum of $50,000.00.

It is immediately apparent that the required payment could

not be mitigated; AT&T could do nothing to purge its con-

tempt. The unconditional nature of an order’s sanctions

weighs heavily against a finding of a coercive purpose. Al-

though the Order names Collins Licensing as the recipient

of this payment, we also cannot conclude that the court’s

purpose was compensatory. No evidence suggests that the

$50,000 figure accounts for any actual expenses or other

losses incurred by Collins Licensing due to AT&T’s conduct

during discovery. United States v. United Mine Workers, 330

U.S. at 304.

While the court’s stated rationale was one of deter-

rence, rather than punishment, such characterizations do

not control our determination. Shillitani v. United States,

384 U.S. 364, 369 (1966); Rumaker, 646 F.2d at 871; Dinnan,

625 F.2d at 1149. Indeed, we have noted that “most crimi-

nal punishment is intended, among other things, to deter

the criminal from committing other crimes.” Spindelfabrik,

903 F.2d at 1580, 14 USPQ2d at 1922-23; see also Hicks,

485 U.S. at 635-36 (noting the overlapping aspects of civil

and criminal contempt). Even if we consider the district

court to have possessed dual purposes when issuing its or-

der, contempt orders containing both punitive and coercive

aspects are generally to be considered criminal in nature.

Lamar Fin. Corp., 918 F.2d at 567; Port, 764 F.2d at 426;

Rumaker, 646 F.2d at 872. See also Union Tool Co. v. Wil-

son, 259 U.S. 107, 110 (1922) (“Where a fine is imposed

partly as compensation to the complainant and partly as

punishment, the criminal feature of the order is dominant

and fixes its character for purposes of review.”). From our

reading of the record, see Rumaker, 646 F.2d at 871, we con-

clude that the order was at least partially criminal in na-

ture and was entered without the appropriate procedural

safeguards.

ee OE eV 4g lm Re

Bs

lla

This outcome is unaltered by Collins’ citation of

Brown v. Braddick, 595 F.2d 961, 203 USPQ 95 (5th Cir.

1979), for the proposition that “[t]he absence of compliance

with [Fed. R. Crim. P.] 42(b) supports an inference that the

contempt order was intended to be civil.” Jd., 595 F.2d at

965 n.6, 203 USPQ at 100 n.6 (citation omitted). In Brown,

an appeal stemming from discovery in a patent interfer-

ence, the Court of Appeals stayed the district court’s con-

tempt proceedings. Id., 595 F.2d at 964, 203 USPQ at 99.

But unlike the instant case, the district court in Brown had

not yet issued an order. Where a contempt order has is-

sued, we are compelled by Hicks, 485 U.S. 624 (1988), to

reach “conclusions about the purposes for which relief is

imposed . . . from an examination of the character of the

relief itself.” Jd. at 636.

Because we conclude that the district court imposed

criminal sanctions against AT&T, we vacate that portion of

its contempt order ordering the payment of $50,000.00 to

Collins on or before October 10, 1991. However, we do not

preclude the district court from sanctioning any miscon-

duct by AT&T committed prior to October 7, 1991.

IV.

Costs

Each party to bear their own costs.

12a

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

92-1201, -1294, -1302

COLLINS LICENSING, L.P.,

Plaintiff/Cross-Appellant,

v.

AMERICAN TELEPHONE AND TELEGRAPH COMPANY,

Defendant-Appellant.

JUDGMENT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

ON APPEAL from the WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

90-201

in CASE NO(S).

This CAUSE having been heard and considered, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED:

REVERSE, VACATE AND REMAND

ENTERED BY ORDER OF THE COURT

DATED Nov. 5, 1993 _

Francis X. Gindhart, Clerk

ISSUED AS A MANDATE: January 19, 1994

COLLINS LICENSING L.P.,

¥.

AMERICAN TELEPHONE AND

TELEGRAPH COMPANY,

13a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

MIDLAND-ODESSA DIVISION

Plaintiff,

MO-90-CA-201

i

Defendant.

ORDER

BEFORE THIS COURT came the above-captioned

cause for trial before a jury beginning January 27, 1992. At

the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned the following

verdict:

1. DO YOU FIND THE PLAINTIFF, COLLINS

LICENSING, PROVED BY THE PREPONDER-

ANCE OF THE EVIDENCE THE DEFENDANT,

AT&T, INFRINGED ANY ONE OR MORE OF

THE CLAIMS OF THE ‘593 PATENT?

CLAIM YES NO

Claim 29 Xx

Claim 34

Claim 37

Claim 38

Claim 43

Claim 47

Claim 48

“al al al al ala

IF YOUR ANSWER TO QUESTION 1 WAS

“YES” FOR ANY OF THE CLAIMS, PROCEED

TO QUESTION 2. OTHERWISE, DO NOT PRO-

CEED.

l4a

2. DO YOU FIND AT&T PROVED BY CLEAR

AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE ANY ONE OR

MORE OF THE CLAIMS OF THE ‘593 PATENT

ARE INVALID?

z

>< ><

CLAIM YES

Claim 29

Claim 34

Claim 37

Claim 38

Claim 43

Claim 47

Claim 48

alala

PROCEED TO QUESTION 3.

3. DO YOU FIND AT&T PROVED BY CLEAR

AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE COLLINS LI-

CENSING, L.P., OR ANY OF ITS PREDECES.-

SORS, COMMITTED INEQUITABLE CONDUCT

BEFORE THE PATENT OFFICE?

NO

ANSWER “YES” OR “NO”

PROCEED TO QUESTION 4.

4. ON WHAT DATE DO YOU FIND AT&T

PROVED BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE

EVIDENCEARTHURA. COLLINS, INC., OR

ITS SUCCESSORS, KNEW OR SHOULD

HAVE KNOWN OF THE ALLEGED IN-

FRINGING ACTIVITY BY AT&T?

1/86

Date

PROCEED TO QUESTION 5.

l5a

5. WHAT AMOUNT, IF PAID NOW IN CASH,

DO YOU FIND COLLINS LICENSING

PROVED, BY A PREPONDERANCE OF THE

EVIDENCE, WOULD FAIRLY AND REASON-

ABLY COMPENSATE IT FOR INFRINGE.

MENT OF THE ‘593 PATENT?

$_34,687,500.00 |

ANSWER IN DOLLARS AND CENTS OR“NONE”

PROCEED TO QUESTION 6.

6. IS THIS AMOUNT A LUMP-SUM PAID-UP

ROYALTY OR A RUNNING ROYALTY UP TO

AUGUST 31, 1991?

CHECK ONE:

X PAID-UP

RUNNING

PROCEED TO QUESTION 7.

7. DO YOU FIND COLLINS LICENSING

PROVED BY CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVI-

DENCE AT&T WILLFULLY INFRINGED THE

COLLINS PATENT?

____NO

ANSWER “YES” OR “NO”

The parties submitted various post-trial motions, which

were ruled on by the Court. On March 23, 1992, the Court

entered its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law deny-

ing AT&T’s claim of laches. All post-verdict matters having

been properly disposed of, the Court determines judgment

should be entered in accordance with the jury’s verdict and

the Court’s previous findings. Accordingly,

l6a

IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGEDAND DECREED Judg-

ment is entered for the Plaintiff, Collins Licensing, L.P. The

jury verdict of February 5, 1992 is hereby entered:

1. AT&T has infringed claim 29 of U.S. Patent

3,956,593. AT&T has not infringed claims 34,

37-39, 43 and 47-48 of U.S. Patent 3,956,593.

2. Claims 29, 34, 37-39, 43, and 47-48 of U.S. Patent

3,956,593 are valid claims.

3. Collins Licensing, L.P. did not commit inequi-

table conduct before the Patent Office.

4. ArthurA. Collins, Inc. or its successors knew or

should have known of the infringing activity by

AT&T by January of 1986.

5. Damages awarded are $34,687,500.00.

6. The damages awarded are a lump-sum paid-up

royalty. No further damages shall be awarded.

7. AT&T did not willfully infringe U.S. Patent

3,956,593.

Post-judgment interest at the rate of 4.58% shall be

assessed on the $34,687,500.00 awarded to the plaintiff as

damages, until paid, for which amount let execution issue.

SIGNED this _ 27th day of March, 1992.

HONORABLE LUCIUS D. BUNTON, III

CHIEF JUDGE

Bete.

cate

ae

17a

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS

MIDLAND-ODESSA DIVISION

COLLINS LICENSING L.P,

Plaintiff,

v. MO-90-CA-201

AMERICAN TELEPHONE AND

TELEGRAPH COMPANY,

Defendant.

Nee Ne Nee Nee ee ee lee

ORDER

BEFORE THIS COURT is Defendant’s Motion for

Judgment as a Matter of Law or New Trial on Liability

Issues. Plaintiff responded in opposition to Defendant’s

motion, and after consideration of the arguments of both

parties, the Court finds Defendant’s motion lacks merit.

Accordingly,

IT IS ORDERED Defendant’s Motion for Judgment as

a Matter of Law or New Trial on Liability Issues is DENIED.

SIGNED this_ 6th day of March, 1992.

HONORABLE LUCIUS D. BUNTON

CHIEF JUDGE

18a

United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit

-_- =

ORDER

A combined petition for rehearing and suggestion for

rehearing in banc having been filed by the CROSS-APPEL-

LANT, and a response thereto having been invited by the

court and filed by the APPELLANT, and the petition for

rehearing having been referred to the panel that heard the

appeal, and thereafter the suggestion for rehearing in banc

and response having been referred to the circuit judges who

are in regular active service,

UPON CONSIDERATION THEREOF, it is

ORDERED that the petition for rehearing be, and the

same hereby is, DENIED and it is further

ORDERED that the suggestion for rehearing in banc

be, and the same hereby is, DECLINED.

The mandate of the court will issue on January 18,

1994.

FOR THE COURT,

FRANCIS X. GINDHART, CLERK

Dated:

January 11, 1994

By

Diane M. Frye

Chief Deputy Clerk

cc: ALBERT E. FEY

ROLF O . STADHEIM

COLLINS LICENSING LP V AT&T CO, 92-1201

(DCT - 90-201)

: Note: Pursuant to Fed. Cir. R. 47.6, this order .

‘ is not citable as precedent. It is a public record. "

®Seeeeveeeeveeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeeene @