Opposition Brief — United States v. Villegas

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ORIGINAL © ORIGINAL

Supreme Court, U.S.

FILED

98-1572 MAY 31 1994

| OFFICE OF THE CLERK

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1993

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Petitioner,

GERONIMO VILLEGAS,

Respondent.

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

VIVIAN SHEVITZ*

Attorney for Respondent

Geronimo Villegas

19 N. Moger Avenue

Mt. Kisco, New York 10549

(914) 241-1249

*Counsel of Record

JANE SIMKIN SMITH

Of Counsel

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether the Court of Appeals properly concluded that at

least under the rule of lenity, respondent's conduct -- placing

refuse vials of blood, some contaminated with hepatitis B, which

he had taken home from his blood lab, in the bulkhead at the

apartment complex in which he lived -- was conduct which, though

unsavory and unjustifiable, was not criminally prosecutable under

the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1311l(a) and § 1319(c), in that

the Act outlaws only "discharges" from "point sources" -- a term

which the Act's language and structure show to refer to fixed

outlets of pollutants at fixed industrial or municipal plants,

not random individual polluters or their personal automcbiles.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ..... «

A. The Evidence At Trial

B. Knowing Endangerment . .

C. The Jury Charge ....

D. The Rule 29 Decision .

E. The Court of Appeals' Decision

ARGUMENT: THE WRIT SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED

CONCLUSION .. + +«-s-eceeve e

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

American Paper Institute v. United States Environmental

Protection Administration, 996 F.2d 346,

302 U.S. App. D.C. 80 (D.C. Cir.

Avoyelles Sportsmen's League v. Marsh,

715 F.2d 879 (5th Cir. 1983) .

Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222 (1980)

Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100 (1979)

1993)

E.I. du Pont de Nemours v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977) .

Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U.S. 112 (1879)

National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch,

693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982) .

Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808 (1971)

Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co., 473 U.S. 479 (1985)

United States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S.

United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc.,

599 F.3d 368 (10th Cir. 1979)

i

293 (1971)

Page

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9

. so

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- 39

29

ate af

13-14

e be

34-35

. 27

27, 38

» as

« 27

27, 38

17, 18

18 U.S.C.

§ 1546

Clean Water Act,

EPA Regulations

ew

33 U.S.C.

33 U.S.C.

33 U.S.C.

33 U.S.C.

33 U.S.C.

33 U.S.C.

33 U.S.C.

33 U.S.C.

33 U.S.C.

33 U.S.C.

33 U.S.C.

33 U.S.C.

40 C.F.R.

40 C.F.R.

40 C.F.R.

40 C.F.R.

40 C.F.R.

40 C.F.R.

s

N.J. Stat.

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

§

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)

33 U.S.C.

1251(b)

Sagan © ¢

1316(c)

1318 ..

1319(c)

1319(c) (2)

1319(c) (3)

1342(f)

1362 (11)

1362 (12)

1362 (13)

1362(14)

122.2 .

403.1 .

420.01 .

433.10.

463.1 .

469.10 .

t

58:10A-6

§ 1251

ii

34

29

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES (continued)

Other Authorities:

1972 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3668

1972 U.S.C.C.A.N.

3668

Environmental Reporter,

19 Env. Rptr.

Environmental Reporter,

19 Env. Rptr. 2573 (April 7,

EPA Office of Water, Officer of Water Regulations

and Standards, Nonpoint Source Guideance (1987)

Senate Report No.

92-414

1908 (January 27,

1989)

iii

1989)

33

16

34

31

20

16

——

In the Supreme Court of the United States \ 2

October Term, 1993 4

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Petitioner

Vv.

GERONIMO VILLEGAS

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

TO PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

Respondent Geronimo Villegas respectfully submits this Brief

in Opposition to the Petition of the Solicitor General for a writ

of certiorari.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case arose from the irresponsible conduct of Respondent

Geronimo Villegas in disposing of blood vials, some of which were

contaminated with the hepatitis B virus, in some rocks forming a

bulkhead at the apartment building at which Villegas lived,

adjacent to the Hudson River. Respondent was criminally

prosecuted under the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq.,

on the theory that a "discharge" of these "pollutants" had

occurred "from" a "point source" into navigable waters.

Partly granting respondent's post-verdict motions,’ Hon.

Edward R. Korman set aside the convictions premised on the so-

called “knowing endangerment" provision of the Act, 33 U.S.C. §

1319(c) (3), on the ground that respondent was not shown to have

"known" of any danger, much less an “imminent” one, and that

indeed, there was no "imminent" danger. However, the district

court sustained the verdicts on the charges under 33 U.S.C. §

1319(c)(2), prohibiting "knowing" discharges, but only by

adopting the unprecedented holding that a human being is a "point

source" under the Act.

A. The Evidence At Trial: On two occasions, once before May

1988 and once before September 1988, respondent Villegas, then

part-owner of a blood laboratory, was shown to have placed a

number of vials of blood (including five found to contain blood

infected with the hepatitis B virus) in the bulkhead behind the

condominium complex in New Jersey, which is where Villegas lived.

A maintenance superintendent who noticed the vials in a

container between the rocks of the bulkhead separating the

buildings from the Hudson River testified that the night before

he saw the vials, the water had come "[hjigher" than he had ever

seen it before (Tr. 73, 83), not only covering the rock formation

where he found the vials, but coming “inland a little bit

further" and flooding the parking area (Tr. 73, 79-80).

. After the verdicts, Judge Korman appointed present

counsel pursuant to the Criminal Justice Act. The Court of

Appeals continued counsel's appointment on appeal.

2

:

Investigators found some vials in the water in front of the

complex after this discovery.

Some four months earlier, a number of other vials had been

found by school children on a trip to a Staten Island beach.

Fortunately, though some vials had "cracked" (most had, however,

remained sealed with stoppers in plastic containers or ziplock

bags), no one was injured. The schoolgirl-witnesses testified

that they knew that they should not touch the vials, and that

they had not done so.

The vials were traced to Plaza Health Laboratories, Inc., of

which respondent Villegas was a 50% owner and in the operation of

which he did non-technical marketing work. Villegas reportedly

stated to investigators that, in around June 1988, after the

lab's refrigerator was filled with vials, he had "filled two

plastic containers and several plastic zip-lock bags with blood

vials and drove them over to where he lived in New Jersey"; then,

"rwjhen he got there to the parking lot, he saw the rocks [and]

placed two containers and the zip-lock bags into the rocks".?

The vials found in September matched this description.

A professor of coastal engineering testified for the

government that Staten Island was a “likely spot for washup" of

2 ——s« (GX8 & Tr.132-33). Villegas stated that he had

disposed of vials on two other occasions as well, but not near

the river. Once, he had put "junk" in the storage room at the

condominium complex, including "a small amount of blood vials and

needles in a plastic bag and I think Corvac tubes" (Tr. 136).

Another time he had put some vials in the garbage can at the

Binghamton health club where he used to run a pro shop (Tr. 137).

He reportedly intended to put the vials in his incinerator on

this occasion, but was attracted to the bulkhead instead.

3

items drifting in the water from the New Jersey area where

Villegas lived. He also stated that water would not often rise

over the bulkhead at that location. Rather, it would take a

"storm surge", which was a "rare occurrence", the prime time for

which is in September as a result of hurricanes or tropical

storms (Tr. 329-30).

B. Knowing Endangerment: One Wayne Pizzuti, the Director of

immunologic laboratory services at the New Jersey Department of

Health, testified that his lab had tested blood in some of the

vials retrieved at the condominium in September 1988, and stated

that five had been positive for hepatitis B (Tr.346-47). Pizzuti

testified that the hepatitis B virus could cause liver damage and

that the infection can be fatal (though one infected can also

recover). He also said that the virus is contagious, and that,

were someone to step on a blood vial containing contaminated

blood, the virus could enter the system (Tr. 339). When asked

whether it would be "possible for someone who is swimming in

water which contains blood that was infected with hepatitis B to

contract hepatitis B", this expert answered that he "imagine[d]"

so. When pressed by the trial judge to explain what he meant by

"imagine", Pizzuti answered that "(i]f circumstances were right,

it could be transmitted that way" -- which meant (upon further

inquiry) that the person who happened to be swimming next to a

vial containing infected blood would have to have "breaks in the

skin or breaks in the mucus membranes so that. . . exposure at

those points then you could contract it that way" (Tr. 339-40).

Though purported to be an expert, Pizzuti did not have a

ready answer to the question as to what effect the elements --

water, air and sun -- would have on the virus (Tr. 351). Nor did

he know even “in general terms" what the effect would be if a

contaminated vial were to fall into the water and break (Tr. 5l-

52). Pizzuti generalized that, if you had a "high enough

concentration of the virus", then it could still be infectious.

He said, however, that there had not been a high concentration in

the vials he had examined (Tr. 355). Pressed by the trial judge,

Pizzuti expressed his belief that it would not be likely to

contract the disease from swimming (Tr. 356).

Another expert, one Dr. Prince, the senior investigator and

the head of the biology lab at New York Blood Center who had also

written 200 papers about hepatitis B (Tr. 360), testified that

hepatitis B could be "self-limited" and result in recovery, but

could also be "quite severe", and on rare occasions could result

in death. Prince confirmed Pizzuti's testimony that permeation

of skin by the virus would cause infection (Tr. 362). Prince

further testified that an extremely small amount of blood on a

piece of glass could cause contamination (Tr. 362).

Though Pizzuti had not known the effect of water on the

virus, Prince testified that the cool river water would tend to

preserve the virus, which is "heat stable" (Tr. 362-63). In

fact, Prince's lab had tested five vials that had been retrieved

from the Staten Island beach area a year after the event (Tr.

367). Though stored in a non-refrigerated, heated area

(presumably by investigators who did not know the virus'

properties), one vial still had tested positive for hepatitis B.

(Tr. 367). Out of the jury's presence, Judge Korman inquired on

the issue at the core of the "knowing endangerment" charges:

THE COURT: .. . Doctor, if three or four or five

vials like -- of the kinds we have been talking about

were dropped in the Hudson River, would you say that

that would place any verson in imminent danger of death

or serious bodily injury?

The witness responded (Tr. 371):

THE WITNESS: If those vials were to land on the

shore and someone were to step on them and puncture

their skin, they would be in danger of infection,

hepatitis B, yes. Those vials that were infected, of

course. They all were not.

The witness concluded, however: "The risk of this happening is

low but it is a risk."

For unknown reasons, Villegas' trial counsel, though thus

made aware of the expert's highly favorable answer, declined to

ask Dr. Prince the same question in the jury's presence (Tr. 372)

-- a factor that prompted District Judge Korman to observe,

during post-verdict Rule 29 argument, that he believed that trial

counsel had been "less then competent in his representation here"

(9/16/91 Tr. 32-33, 96-99) .3

. The district court entertained a motion pursuant to

Rule 29(d) for a new trial based on ineffective assistance of

trial counsel, contingent on his denying the Rule 29 motion (see

6/16/91 Tr. 96). In granting Mr. Villegas' Rule 29 motion in

part, the court did not rule on this contingent Rule 29(d)

motion. It did, however, state that, if it was wrong in holding

(continued...)

The remaining proof pertained to whether Villegas "knew" of

the "danger": A niece of Villegas who had worked at the lab

testified that Villegas had worked at other labs previously (Tr.

247). At Plaza, she had seen him almost every day bringing blood

in vials in ziplock bags, which he would put in the refrigerator

or number them with Plaza's lab number (Tr. 247-48). She stated,

however, that the person who would write a number on the vials or

on the request form does not know results of the tests (Tr. 257).

An individual licensed as both a supervisor and technician

by the New York City Department of Health (Tr. 260-62) testified

that there was an assigned area for hepatitis testing, and the

technicians wore a gown and gloves for protection (Tr. 264).

About 35-50% of blood samples at Plaza were tested for hepatitis.

After a hepatitis test, vials were placed in a rack in the lab;

at the end of the day, the rack went into the refrigerator (Tr.

270). Though Villegas would "come and go" in the lab for a few

minutes “here and there", «he supervisor confirmed that Villegas

was "not a technician" (Ir. 271-74).

A part-time pathologist testified that one Dennis Chandra

and respondent Villegas were in charge of the lab (Tr. 278-80)

and identified a Policy and Procedure Manual kept in the Plaza

offices (GX-1l, Tr. 283). The witness identified Chandra, not

respondent, as the chief contact person for Plaza. Chandra

3(...continued)

the evidence insufficient on the "knowing endangerment" counts,

then a new trial would have to be held anyway because the

instructions had been erroneous on the knowing endangerment issue

(Memorandum and Order at 17 n.5, Pet. App. 49a-50a).

7

apparently had a Ph.D. in chemistry (Tr. 285-86). The witness

did not know what Villegas' profession or function was, except

that Villegas neve

carried vials (Tr. 287). After the discovery

of the vials, Villegas purportedly told this witness that "it's

stupid of me to have done that" (Tr. 285).

Although Villegas' trial counsel did not sum up to the jury

using Villegas' statement, that statement included an expression

of this defendant's state of mind that negated an inference that

he "knew" he had endangered others with his conduct. Explaining

why he had disposed of the vials, Villegas said that his

“refrigerator was getting full" and went on to explain: "And

besides, the thing is, it's in the containers and would not harm

nobody, I guess" (GX-8, Tr. 137).

C. The Jury Charge: After extensive consideration, District

Judge Korman declined to instruct the jury in accordance with the

government's position that a human being is a point source.* He

. EPA environmental engineer Durack had testified as a

government witness that it was his job to "determine what the

point sources are and to make sure that they have permits to

control the discharge of pollutants." Durack went on to describe

a point source as any of several types: "There are discharge

pipes. There are vessels which could be a truck, could be a

ship. Or it could be a person or persoiis" (Tr. 184). Though

Durack posited that a “point source" could be a human being, he

conceded that his office had never granted a permit for a human

being to discharge as point source (192): "Not for the person to

put the pollutants in himself, no," he admitted.

District Judge Korman, after struggling with the

concept of "point source", ultimately told the jury to disregard

Durack's testimony about the meaning of a "point source", and

instead charged the jury (see Pet. App. 65a):

(continued...)

decided to tell the jury instead that it could "assume" that "it

was a point source", allowing the defendant to reserve his

objection on the question of law which in any event, as the

district court properly understood, could not be waived because

"rijf it is not a crime, it is not a crime" (Tr. 293; 292-99).

In accordance with this plan, the trial court instructed the jury

that "[r]Jemoving pollutants from a container, and a vehicle is a

container, parked next to a navigable body of water constitutes a

discharge from a point source" (Tr. 470).

D. The Rule 29 Decision: Though Judge Korman was "terribly

troubled" by the government's broad argument that a human being

is a "point source" (9/16/91 Tr. 90), he sustained Villegas’

convictions by determining that a human being is a point source

*(...continued)

Congress chose to distinguish between "point sources"

and "non-point sources" with the specific purpose of

excluding various kinds of pollution runoff, that is,

runoff produced principally by rainfall that cannot be

traced to one polluter. Congress did not intend to

exempt from regulation any activity that emits

pollution from an identifiable point. Congress did not

intend by the term "point source" to distinguish

between a person who drives a truck to the edge of the

Hudson River and dumps blood vials, clearly a point

source, and a person who gets out of a truck, takes the

vials from the truck, walks to the river's edge and

dumps them from his hand. Removing pollutants from a

container, and a vehicle is a container, parked next to

a navigable body of water and physically throwing the

the [sic] pollutant into the water constitutes a

discharge from a point source.

In this respect I ask to you [sic] forget and

disregard the testimony of Patrick Durack on this

issue.

within the meaning of the Clean Water Act. Acknowledging that

the image of a human being is not "conjured up" by the definition

of "point source" -- defined as "any discernible, confined and

discrete conveyance . . . from which pollutants are or may be

discharged", 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) -- Judge Korman nonetheless was

of the view that, where the source of a pollutant is "no mystery"

but is rather identified (Tr. 294), then that source -- even if

it is a human being -- should be considered a "point source" of

pollutants, and that the Act applies to that "discharge". Judge

Korman believed that this result was not inconsistent with the

statute, since the definition of "point source" does not

"exclude" a human being from its ambit. Further assuming -- but

citing no authority to support the assumption -- that Congress

must have meant to include all pollution other than "nonpoint

source" pollution within the criminal prohibitions of the Clean

Water Act (Pet. App. 39a),° Judge Korman determined that it made

. Judge Korman's conclusions in this regard, like

dissenting Circuit Judge Oakes' conclusions, were posited as the

statute's purpose without citation to any legislative history or

other authority that so suggests. Nor are we aware of any

legislative suggestion that Congress' purpose "in specifically

proscribing pollution from a 'point source’ was to ensure that

naturally-induced, random run-off of pollutants would not result

in criminal or civil liability under the Clean Water Act", but

that all other pollution was within the Act, as Judge Korman

construed it (Pet. App. 39a). Congress' purpose was not to

exempt some forms of pollution; it was to regulate some forms of

pollution. Had Congress meant to reach everything except

identified exemptions, it could have said so.

Indeed, Congress never defined "non-point source"

pollution in the statute. Its statement that run-off is not

"point source" pollution merely shows an intent not to regulate

that type of pollution (because it is near impossible to do so),

(continued...)

10

no sense to hold that "'point source' does not encompass the

deliberate discharge of pollutants produced in the course of a

waste-generating activity, merely because a person directly

deposits those pollutants into the water" (Pet. App. 39a-40a).

Thus, said the district court, a human being should be deemed a

"point source" even if that person is only an "intermittent

polluter", since the statute defines a discharge to include "any

addition of a pollutant to navigable waters from any point

source" (Pet. App. 42a, citing 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12)) (emphasis

added by Judge Korman).

In the very next breath, however, Judge Korman somewhat

contradictorily agreed that Congress did not intend the Clean

Water Act to apply to "any addition of a pollutant... froma

[human being]" (Pet. App. 42a) (emphasis added). Trying to

rationalize how the statute could be applied in this case and yet

deemed inapplicable when a person flings a candy wrapper or

urinates into the waters, Judge Korman went on to re-craft the

rule, not found in the Act, by which the term "point source"

should be read

to include any discrete and identifiable conduit --

including a human being -- designated to collect or

discharge pollutants produced in the course of a waste-

generating activity.

(Pet. App. 42a). Judge Korman did not, however, explain what is

meant by "designated" to collect or discharge pollutants; nor did

>(...continued)

but it does not show an intent to include within its definition

of "discrete, discernible conveyance" something like a human

being that just does not fit within the Act's terms.

11

he point to any place in the statute where that limitation, or

the limitation "produced in the course of a waste-generating

activity", might have come from. Nor, indeed, did the court

explain why that definition would in fact exclude a human being

who urinates in the water, given that a human body involves many

"“waste-generating activities" and produces pollutants.

The district court went on to hold that, as to the counts

dealing with the September 1988 discovery of the vials in the

bulkhead, there was also "an independent basis" to hold that

Villegas' conduct was within the Act: Even if a human being were

not a "point source", the rocks forming the bulkhead at the

condominium complex "comes within the definition of that phrase"

(Pet. App. 43a). Alternatively, the district court continued,

"even if the bulkhead does not constitute a 'point source,' the

very containers holding the blood vials" can be deemed a "point

source" because they are also "containers" (id.). Thus, although

the jury was never charged on any of these shifting and novel

theories of criminal liability (a factor that rendered the

convictions unsustainable for reasons stated in the footnote

below)® -- and despite the fact that this "anything-can-be-a-

° At oral argument, District Judge Korman indicated that

the theory he was considering was based on a new way of looking

at the statute and that the "appropriate question" was "[w]hether

pollutants were generated during the course of a continuous waste

generating activity and then deliberately dumped from a discrete

and identifiable point" (9/16/91 Tr. 7). The court concluded

that, because under that theory, the defendant was "generating"

pollutants" and deliberately "dump[ed] them from a discrete and

identifiable point", the defendant could be liable under the Act.

(continued...)

12

conveyance"-type of rationale suggests even more strongly that

the formulation reads out of the statute entirely the concept of

"discernible, confined and discrete conveyance" that is an

element of the definition of "point source" -- the district court

held that these grounds, too, warranted sustaining the charges.’

E. The Court of Appeals' Decision: The Court of Appeals'

majority first held that the district court's "post-verdict

definitional efforts" to arrive at an alternate theory upon which

to sustain the convictions ran afoul of this Court's decision in

*(...continued)

Judge Korman acknowledged that this theory was "not

precisely what [he] charged the jury"; however, he believed that

this shift was not "significant" because "the facts are not

really in dispute here" (9/16/91 Tr. 8). With all respect to

Judge Korman, his belief in this instance is just not in accord

with the principle that an uncharged theory cannot be used to

salvage a criminal conviction. Chiarella v. United States, 445

U.S. 222, 236-37 (1980); Rewis v. United States, 401 U.S. 808,

814 (1971); Dunn v. United States, 442 U.S. 100, 106-07 (1979)).

As these cases show, when legal theories are not submitted to the

jury, it is inappropriate to later inject them as a basis to

sustain a conviction.

. The district court then went on to grant the Rule 29

motion as to the "knowing endangerment" counts, counts One and

Three. The court held that to satisfy that provision, a

discharge must "actually place another person in imminent danger

of death or serious bodily injury", not merely create a

"potential" consequence (Pet. App. 49a). The district court also

held that the defendant must know that such a "high probability"

of danger existed at the time pollutants are discharged into the

waters (id.), and concluded that the evidence did not sustain a

finding that respondent was so aware (Pet. App. 52a). The court

further held that its previous instruction to the jury -- that

some lesser degree of probability would suffice -- was wrong. As

a consequence, the district court concluded that, even if the

appellate court were to disagree that the evidence was

insufficient to show "knowing endangerment", a new trial would be

required at which proper jury instructions are provided (Pet.

App. at 49a-50a n.5).

13

Chiarella v. United States, 445 U.S. 222, 236 (1980) (court may

not affirm conviction on basis of theory not presented to jury).

Since, though the government had argued at trial that a human

being was a point source, the district court, rejecting that

suggestion at the time, took the issue from the jury and charged

that "[rjemoving pollutants froma... vehicle. . . parked

next to a navigable body of water and physically throwing the

pollutant into the water constitutes a discharge from a point

source" (Pet. App. 65a), the Court of Appeals held that there

would be a "serious problem" in upholding the conviction on the

basis that a human being is a point source" (Pet. App. 7a).

The more significant problem, however, said the majority,

was that, as the district court's analytical struggle only

highlighted, "the statute was never designed to address the

random, individual polluter" such as respondent.

The majority first looked to the language and structure of

the Clean Water Act. Although the statute defines "point source"

in nonexclusive terms (as quoted in the footnote below) ,*® the

terms used in the statute neither include a "human being", nor

"conjure up" the image of a human being as the type of

§ 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) defines "point source" as follows:

The term "point source" means any discernible, confined

and discrete conveyance including but not limited to

any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well,

discrete fissure, container, rolling stock,

concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or

other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may

be discharged. The term does not include agricultural

stormwater discharges and return flows from irrigated

agriculture.

14

"discernible . .. conveyance" that Congress meant to target in

enacting the Clean Water Act. Moreover, as the majority aptly

noted, "[{h]jad Congress intended to punish a human being who

polluted navigational waters, it could readily have said: ‘any

person who places pollutants in navigable waters without a permit

is guilty of a crime'" (Pet. App. 8a).

More than simply being a case of an omission of the term

"human being" from the definitional "point source" section of the

statute, the majority agreed that the Clean Water Act as a whole

uses the term "point source" in a way that refers to fixed

industrial plants, and simply does not make sense when applied to

an individual polluter (or his or her personal automobile). The

majority cited as examples 33 U.S.C. § 1311, which refers to the

"owner or operator" of a "point source"; § 1311(e), which

requires that effluent limitations "be applied to all point

sources of discharge"; § 1311(g)(2), which allows an "owner or

operator of a point source" to apply to EPA for modification of

its limitations requirements; § 1342(f), which refers to classes,

categories, types and sizes of point sources; and a host of other

references, all of which make it clear that individual pollution

was not what the statute was meant to cover. "As the statute

stands today," the majority concluded, "the term 'point source'

is comprehensible only if it is held to the context of industrial

and municipal discharges" (Pet. App. 9a).

The majority next noted that, though the purpose of the

Clean Water Act is broad and admirable, the mere declaration of a

15

broad purpose could not substitute for "comprehensible" meaning.

The majority quoted the words of Senator Robert Dole, whose words

in discussing the 1972 amendments to the Act suggested, as did

respondent below, that a human polluter is more akin to "non-

point source pollution", which is not within the meaning of

"discharge" and thus not covered by the Act, than to "point

source" pollution, which is covered by the Act's terms, because

the Act was designed to apply to sources of pollution that

"confine [their] polluting discharge to [a] specific outlet".

Senator Dole's quoted words are:

Most of the problems of agricultural pollution deal

with non-point sources. Very simply, a non-point

source of pollution is one that does not confine its

polluting discharge to one fairly specific outlet, such

as a sewer pipe, a drainage ditch or a conduit; thus a

feedlot would be considered to be a non-point source as

would pesticides and fertilizers.

(S. Rep. No. 92-414, reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3760,

quoted at Pet. App. lla (emphasis added)). The majority found no

suggestion "either in the act itself or in the historv of its

passage" that Congress intended to reach pollution caused by

individuals who "do[] not confine [their] polluting discharge to

one fairly specific outlet".

Finally, looking to case law under the Act, the majority

found that, unlike this case, there was a clear "point source" --

one that fit comfortably within the terms of the definitional

section of the Act, and within an industry targeted by Act as

well -- in the prior criminal cases decided under 33 U.S.C. §

1319(c) (see cases cited at Pet. App. 13a). Noting that, while

16

there may have been "greater flexibility of interpretation" in

civil cases, see Avoyelles Sportsmen's League, Inc. v. Marsh, 715

F.2d 897, 922 (5th Cir. 1983) ("point source" includes bulldozing

equipment discharging dredged materials onto wetland), there is

no room for ambiguity in criminal cases because of the rule of

lenity, the majority also determined that none of the civil cases

-- and not even the broad dicta in one of the earliest civil

cases, United States v. Earth Sciences, Inc., 599 F.3d 368, 373

(10th Cir. 1979), to the effect that the Act embraces "the

broadest possible definition of any identifiable conveyance from

which pollutants might enter the waters" in order to effectuate

the purposes of the act -- provided a sufficient basis to make

the "leap" to including a human being in the statutory language

since such a construction would "do[] violence to the language

and structure of the CWA" (Pet. App. 14a).

So, too, the majority noted, even in the regulations of the

EPA itself -- the agency whose interpretations are entitled to

"deference" -- there was no support for the broad position that

an individual is a "point source" of pollution. Rather, the EPA

regulation (40 C.F.R. § 122.2) provides that "discharge" of a

pollutant includes "discharges through pipes, sewers or other

conveyances owned by a State, municipality, or other person which

do not lead to a treatment works", and does not include "an

addition of pollutants by any ‘indirect discharger'" (Pet. App.

15a). Adopting the government's theory, the majority concluded,

"would effectively read the 'point source' element of the crime

17

ee

out of the statute" (Pet. App. 15a). Because the meaning of

"point source” was thus at least ambiguous, the rule of lenity

prohibited a conviction on these facts.’

Judge Oakes, in dissent, stated that he did not agree that a

person "can never be a point source". Starting with the

proposition that, though the "classic" point source is "something

like a pipe", there were other "discernible, confined and

discrete conveyances" that have also been deemed point sources by

various courts (Pet. App. 19a-2la), Judge Oakes determined "in

short" that the term "point source" "has been broadly construed"

to cover "a wide range of polluting techniques" and that it

should be broadly construed. Apparently recognizing that the Act

was not completely limitless, however, Judge Oakes fashioned his

own formulation for exclusions from the Act's coverage -- which

carried no citation to any provision of the Clean Water Act --

that "polluting techniques" were within the Act

so long as the pollutants involved are not just

humanmade, but reach the navigable waters by human

effort or by leaking from a clear point at which waste

water was collected by human effort.

(Pet. App. 2la). Judge Oakes then determined, with a quotation

to the early Earth Sciences case, supra, 599 F.2d 368 (10th Cir.

? The majority determined that, because it was dismissing

the charges for a failure to prove a “point source", the same

defect existed vis-a-vis the "knowing endangerment" counts. The

majority thus did not address the government's claim that the

district court had applied the wrong standard of "knowing

endangerment" or that the evidence had been sufficient to prove

the enhanced offense.

18

1979)*° (certiorari was apparently never sought in Earth

Sciences, and the decision has been criticized), that a "broad

reading" of "point source" along the lines he had just formulated

was “essential to fulfill the mandate of the Clean Water Act".

(Pet. App. 22a, quoting 599 F.2d at 373).

Judge Oakes recognized that the term "point source" must

also be read to "set[{] significant definitional limits on the

reach of the Clean Water Act" (Pet. App. 23a). His reason for

this conclusion was based on what he termed the "assumption" of

most cases and commentators that "all water pollution is either

point source pollution or nonpoint source pollution" (Pet. App.

23a n.2), and the view stemming from that assumption and from the

Act's broad goals that the Act covers all "point source"

pollution and "exempts" only "nonpoint source discharges" (Pet.

App. 23a). Though the Act does not define "nonpoint source",

Judge Oakes offered his suggestion of what that term means,

though again this determination carried no citation to any

provision of the Act. Deviating from the description given by

Senator Dole that "a non-point source of pollution is one that

does not confine its polluting discharge to one fairly specific

= The court in Earth Sciences had expressed the view that

"it contravenes the intent of the [Act] .. . to exempt from

regulation any activity that emits pollution from an identifiable

point".

= Earth Sciences was criticized by the D.C. Court of

Appeals in National Wildlife Fed'n v. Gorsuch, 224 U.S. App. D.C.

41, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982), in which the EPA had taken

contradictory positions.

19

outlet such as a sewer pipe", which the majority had quoted (Pet.

App. lla), Judge Oakes concluded that

Nonpoint source pollution is, generally, runoff: salt

from roads, agricultural chemicals from farmlands, oil

from parking lots, and other substances washed by rain,

in diffuse patterns, over the land and into navigable

waters.

(Pet. App. 23a-24a).

Apparently finding no provision in the Act itself that

supported the view that only the conditions identified by Judge

Oakes as "non-point source" pollution were "exempted" from the

Act, Judge Oakes pointed instead to a publication the EPA: EPA

Office of Water, Officer of Water Regulations and Standards,

Nonpoint Source Guidance 3 (1987) (cited at Pet. App. 24a n.3).

That document, however, defines "nonpoint source pollution" only

with the circular definition that it is pollution "caused by

diffuse sources that are not regulated as point sources".

Judge Oakes nonetheless continued with his analysis by suggesting

that the rationale for treating point and nonpoint sources

differently was that nonpoint sources are "more difficult to

control" (Pet. App. 25a). Because "point sources" are known, and

“= The EPA publication goes on to state that the concept

normally is associated with agricultural, silvicultural

and urban runoff, runoff from construction activities,

etc. Such pollution results in the human-made or

human-induced alteration of the chemical, physical,

biological and radiological integrity of water. In

practical terms, nonpoint source pollution does not

result from a discharge at a specific, single location

(such as a single pipe) but generally results from land

runoff, precipitation, atmospheric deposition, or

percolation.

20

thus easier to control, the dissenter concluded that Congress

must have meant to control all identifiable sources of pollution

as "point sources".

Judge Oakes acknowledged that respondent's activities "were

not prototypical point source discharges" since respondent could

have disposed of the pollutants on land and "so did not need a

permit or a pipe" (Pet. App. 26a). However, the dissent

concluded, because the discharge "was [supposedly] directly into

the water, and came from an identifiable point", this must be a

"point source" discharge within the Act.

Judge Oakes also opined that it was not necessary "to

determine whether it was Villegas himself who was the point

source, or whether it was his car, the vials, or the bulkhead".

This was because, to Judge Oakes, "the entire stream of Mr.

Villegas' activity functioned as a ‘discrete conveyance' or point

source" (Pet. App. 26a). Just because Congress did not list this

method of disposing of waste in the statute, Judge Oakes said,

that should not mean that the Act should be deemed ambiguous as

to its intent to cover respondent's conduct (id.) Were he to

read the Act any other way, Judge Oakes said, it would "encourage

corporations perfectly capable of abiding by the Clean Water

Act's requirements to ask their employees to stand between the

company trucks and the sea, thereby transforming point source

pollution (dumping from trucks) into nonpoint source pollution"

(Pet. App. 27a).

21

After expressing his views on the matter, Judge Oakes turned

to the majority's counterarguments. Though he "granted" that it

"sounds odd" to read the term "point source" to include a

"person" when it would lead to a statutory statement prohibiting

“any addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from a person

by a person", that "oddity" could be cured if one did not

"“assum(e] that the term 'person' means the same thing in both

parts of the sentence, and that in both cases it means what it

means in everyday language”. Judge Oakes' solution was to use

the "first term 'person'" to mean "'a person acting as a point

source'" and the second term “person” to mean a “responsible

party” (Pet. App. 28a-29a).

Judge Oakes went further -- opining that a person "can be

both point and nonpoint sources of pollution" (Pet. App. 28a n.6

(emphasis added)), depending on whether he or she "deposit{[s]

waste directly into water", in which case the person is a "point

source", or “spread[{s] fertilizer on the ground or deposit[s] oil

in a driveway", in which case the person is a non-point source of

pollution.

Judge Oakes admitted that he was "given pause .. . by the

nature of the criminal sanctions" under the Act. Though given

his broad definition, the Act could include "intentionally

throwing a candy wrapper into the ocean" -- which Judge Oakes was

though Congress had probably not intended the Act to cover (Pet.

App. 29a-30a) -- Judge Oakes fashioned his own formulation of the

limitation by "read[ing] the statute as ambiguous as it pertains

22

to individual litterers, as opposed to disposers of industrial

and municipal waste" (Pet. App. 30a).

Judge Oakes concluded that, since there was no "essential"

dispute as to facts, there should be no difficulty in sustaining

the verdict even though the jury did not expressly find guilt

based on Judge Oakes' formulation. Nor, said Judge Oakes, did

the rule of lenity require reversal, because, even though some

human pollution was to be excluded from the Act's coverage, the |

statute was, to him, unambiguous "with respect to an individual

physically disposing of medical wastes, in quantity, directly

into navigable waters, by means of a controllable, discrete

conveyance and court of action" (Pet. App. 3la).

ARGUMENT

THE WRIT SHOULD NOT BE GRANTED

The government seeks a writ of certiorari because of the

supposed "mistake" by the Court of Appeals in deeming the Act's

"breadth" an “ambiguity. Accusing the majority of "creat[ing] a

non-textual requirement" that is "incapable of principled

administration", the government urges review by this Court on the

ground that the Court of Appeals' reading of the Act "conflicts

with the Act's plain language".

Although the government seizes on the statutory word "any"

and argues that, as District Judge Korman and dissenting Judge

Oakes concluded, the use of the term signifies Congress' intent

23

to cover the conduct at issue here,’ the term "any" does not

stand alone: it precedes the phrase "discharge of any

pollutant". While seemingly a broad and encompassing phrase, the

term "discharge" is limited by the statutory definition: "any

addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point

source". 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12). Like it or not, the term "point

source" limits the reach of the Clean Water Act. The Court of

Appeals properly interpreted the statute as having not been

intended to cover the random individual pollution caused by

Geronimo Villegas. Indeed, it is the government, as well as

District Judge Korman and dissenting Judge Oakes, who urge a

"non-textual requirement", simply to shoehorn an individual's

pollution into the statute's terms: they would subject an

individual to criminal liability if the source of the pollution

was “industrial waste", but not otherwise. Such a limitation of

the word "pollutant" does not exist in the statute. The Court of

Appeals correctly determined the issue before the Court.

The government claims, however, that the definition of

"point source" is not "susceptible to [the supposedly] narrow

interpretation" given it by the Second Circuit majority, and

further claims that, whether it includes human beings or not, the

term "clear[{ly]" includes respondent's automobile, supposedly

used to transport blood to the bank of the Hudson River (Petition

= As Judge Oakes and District Judge Korman noted, the

phrase "discharge of a pollutant" is defined as "any addition of

any pollutant to navigable waters from any point source". 33

U.S.C. § 1362(12).

24

9-10) since it is a “conveyance”. (See also Petition at ll

(issue whether human "conveyance" is within Act is "not pertinent

to the validity of respondent's conviction" since jury was

charged that "vehicle was the statutory 'conveyance'")).

Notwithstanding the government's argument, even if a

personal automobile could be deemed a "point source" without

doing violence to the statutory language, the conduct would still

not be within the Clean Water Act because respondent took the

vials out of the car before they came anywhere near the navigable

waters. It was respondent, not the vehicle, who "added" the

pollutant to the bulkhead. There was thus no discharge "from"

any point source, as the statute requires.

The term "discharge", again, is thus defined as "any

addition of any pollutant to navigable waters from any point

source", 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (emphasis added). Just as the

government claims the word "any" cannot be deemed surplusage, nor

is the word "from" mere surplusage. Indeed, it was the basis of

a holding by the United States Court of Appeals for the District

of Columbia Circuit -- not cited by the government in its

petition” -- that the EPA did not have a duty to require dam

” The government argues that the Second Circuit "cited no

statutory language" calling for an "exception" to liability for

discharges by one's personal vehicle when there is the

“intervention of a human being between that conveyance and the

water" (Petition at 11). The government further suggests in a

footnote (Petition at 11 n.3) that, though the Second Circuit's

analysis “appears to be based on th[{e] assumption" that the Act

requires that the "last chain in the link of conveyances itself

be a ‘point source'", "nothing in the act requires it". Id.

(continued...)

25

operators to apply for certain pollutant discharge permits under

the Act. National Wildlife Federation v. Gorsuch, 693 F.2d 156

(D.C. Cir. 1982). The issue in the case was not whether the dams

contributed to pollution: they did. Further, there was no issue

that certain "conveyances" in dams were point sources for some

purposes: the spillways through which water flowed from

reservoirs through the dams had been determined to be "point

sources" by the EPA in the past. 693 F.2d at 165 & n.22.

Instead, the sole issue was whether the water quality changes

that resulted from release of water through the dams constituted

the "discharge of a pollutant" as that term is defined under 33

U.S.C. § 1362(12) such as to require the EPA to regulate dams.

According deference to the EPA's position on the matter, the

Court of Appeals held that the EPA had no duty to regulate dams.

The EPA's position was that the "addition [of a pollutant] from a

point source occurs only if the point source itself physically

introduces a pollutant into water from the outside world" -- that

the "point or nonpoint character of pollution is established when

the pollutant first enters navigable water... ." 693 F.2d at

175. Since in Gorsuch the polluted water passed through the dam

from one body of navigable water (the reservoir) to the other

4#(,...continued)

As discussed in the text above, however, the statute

pertains to additions of pollutants "from" point sources, and the

EPA believes that the Act does require that the "last chain in

the link of conveyances itself [must] be a point source". The

language of the Act would be meaningless if the Act were read as

the government wishes.

26

(the downstream water), the pollutant had not been added "from"

the dam, and it was thus not a "point source".

For the same reasons as in Gorsuch -- under the EPA's

reasonable and judicially approved position -- there was no

discharge "from" Geronimo Villegas' vehicle. Even if one's

personal automobile could otherwise be deemed a "point source",

there was thus no criminal violation of the statute here.

In positing that the automobile is a "point source" and the

conduct a "discharge" within the meaning of the Clean Water Act,

the government -- though acknowledging that "the language

actually enacted by Congress" controls the interpretation of the

statute (Petition at 12, citing Sedima, S.P.R.L. v. Imrex Co.,

473 U.S. 479, 495 & n.13 (1985) -- offers a conclusion drawn from

only one word of the statute: "conveyance". That word, however,

is not only limited by words that the government and, indeed,

many prior court decisions have not sufficiently analyzed,

preferring instead to speak of the broad goals of the statute,

but it is given its context and content from the words used by

Congress through the statute, all of which must be read in

conjunction and none of which should be rendered superfluous by a

court's construction of a portion of the statute. See United

States v. Campos-Serrano, 404 U.S. 293, 301 & n.14 (1971),

quoting Market Co. v. Hoffman, 101 U.S. 112, 115-116 (1879) ("[A]

statute ought, upon the whole, to be so construed that, if it can

27

be prevented, no clause, sentence, or word shall be superfluous,

void, or insignificant") .»

The Court of Appeals' rightly concluded, through a sound

analysis of the statute itself, that the language and structure

= In Campos-Serrano, this Court held that possession of

a counterfeit alien registration receipt card was not an act

punishable under 18 U.S.C. § 1546, which criminally punishes one

who "knowingly . . . possesses" any "immigrant or nonimmigrant

visa, permit, or other document required for entry into the

United States". While the INS at the time permitted an alien

registration card to be used for an alien's re-entry into the

United States, it was not a "required" document. This Court,

invoking the rule of lenity, said (citations omitted):

It has long been settled that "penal statutes are to be

construed strictly," .. . and that one "is not to be

subjected to a penalty unless the words of the statute

plainly impose it," .. . "When choice has to be made

between two readings of what conduct Congress has made

a crime, it is appropriate, before we choose the

harsher alternative, to require that Congress should

have spoken in language that is clear and definite."

- « In § 1546, Congress did speak in "clear and

definite" language. But, taken literally and given its

plain and ordinary meaning, that language does not

impose a criminal penalty for possession of a

counterfeited alien registration receipt card. Alien

registration receipt cards may be used for re-entry by

certain persons into the United States. They are not

required for entry.

* *& &

The language of § 1546 denotes a very special class of

"entry" documents -- documents whose primary raison

d'etre is the facilitation of entry into the country.

The phrase, “required for entry into the United

States," is descriptive of the nature of the documents;

it is not simply an open-ended reference to future

administrative regulations.

The Court's words apply equally in this case. "Point

source" is "descriptive" of an origin of pollutants. Dissenting

Judge Oakes' suggestion that a human being can be a point source

if the pollutants he carries consist of "industrial and municipal

waste" instead of "individual litter[]" merely substitutes Judge

Oakes' predilection of what the statute should have covered for

what it does cover.

28

of the Act as a whole demonstrate that individual pollution was

not what the Clean Water Act was meant to cover. It meant to

regulate some pollution, not to regulate all pollution with only

some exceptions, as district judge Korman, dissenting Judge

Oakes, and the government contend.

Indeed, in enacting the Clean Water Act, Congress

specifically recognized that it is the "primary responsibilit[y]"

of the States to prevent, reduce, and eliminate water pollution,

33 U.S.C. § 1251(b).** Accord, American Paper Institute v.

United States Environmental Protection Agency, 996 F.2d 346, 302

” The respondent caused the pollution from his home in

New Jersey. New Jersey, in fact, commenced a prosecution against

respondent and Plaza Health Laboratories, but dismissed the

criminal case. It was only after the dismissal that the federal

prosecutors took up the torch, so to speak, and tried to cram

this case into the gaps of the Clean Water Act because of their

sense that there should be some criminal punishment. Of course,

the prosecutors, like the judges of the federal courts, are not

legislators. Their sense of outrage is no substitute for a

statute that reaches the conduct at issue.

Nor should the federal authorities worry that the State

cannot protect the waters. New Jersey has a comprehensive code

that regulates and even criminalizes pollution. See N.J. Stat.

58:10A-6 (entitled "Regulation of discharges of pollutants;

permits; exceptions; right of entry; regulation by local agency;

inspections; priority pollutant analysis; public access to

records"). Section "a" of the statute as it stands today makes

it "unlawful for any person to discharge any pollutant, except in

conformity with a valid New Jersey Pollutant Discharge

Elimination System permit that has been issued by the

commissioner pursuant to this act or a valid National Pollutant

Discharge Elimination System permit issued by the administrator

pursuant to the Federal Act, as the case may be." Whether or not

this provision would have criminalized respondent's conduct at

the time in question, the State is perfectly able to enact

legislation and enforce anti-pollution laws. If the statutes

were not sufficient to cover respondent's conduct at the time,

the remedy is not for the courts to legislate, but to invoke a

legislative cure.

29

U.S. App. D.C. 80 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (discussing "Congress' intent

to cast the states in the featured role" under the Clean Water

Act). Congress' purpose was to place some federal controls on

pollution of the nation's waters: those controls included

regulation of industrial sources of discharges of pollution, and

were accomplished by authorizing the Administrator of the

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to establish limitations

(called “effluent limitations"’’) on "permissible" levels of

discharge of toxic and other pollutants by "sources" to be

identified by the Administrator (with the help of the States) as

"point sources" and categorized.

Congress did not totally prohibit the "discharge" of

"pollutants" -- not even "toxic pollutants"”™ that can cause

great harm to the life and health of the citizenry. Rather, it

expressed as a policy goal the elimination of pollution in the

- "Effluent limitation" means "any restriction

established by a State or the Administrator on quantities, rates,

and concentrations of chemical, physical, biological, and other

constituents which are discharged from point sources into

navigable waters ... , including schedules of compliance." 33

U.S.C. § 1362(11).

= The term "toxic pollutant" means (33 U.S.C. § 1362(13))

those pollutants .. . including disease-causing agents

which after discharge and upon exposure, ingestion,

inhalation, or assimilation into any organism, either

directly from the environment or indirectly by

ingestion through food chains, will, on the basis of

information available to the Administrator, cause

death, disease, behavioral abnormalities, cancer,

genetic mutations, physiological malfunctions ... or

physical deformations in such organisms or their

offspring.

30

)

future,*® provided monies for studies and regulation, and

required "point sources" to obtain permits in order to lawfully

discharge pollutants into the waters. The discharges would have

to comply with whatever limitations were set by the State and

federal governments. There were also reporting and record-

keeping requirements established by the Act.

In framing such a necessary and commendable (though as yet

unachieved) policy, the sense of Congress thus incorporated a

recognition that, while all pollution should be eliminated, every

instance of pollution will not necessarily constitute a violation

of the Clean Water Act. Further, unlicensed instances of

pollution are wrongful only if "discharges" of "pollutants" occur

"from" a “point source" into the "navigable waters".

sad The 1972 Amendments established 1985 as a desired date

for the total elimination of discharges of pollution, and set as

a policy goal that toxic pollutants "in toxic amounts" should be

prohibited. 33 U.S.C. § 1251. The goal of elimination has

obviously not been met. Nor has toxic pollution been

significantly controlled. As reported in the 1989 Environmental

Reporter, 19 Env. Rptr. 2573 (April 7, 1989), the National Toxic

Campaign was complaining that over 2000 pounds of toxic

substances were being discharged into the Boston Harbor each day,

and that most of the 1500 companies involved in the discharges

were in compliance with permits and with State regulations.

31

The definition of “point source" in 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14)”

cannot include everything that could arguably "convey" a

pollutant. If Congress had meant that, it no doubt would have --

and easily could have -- said so clearly. Instead of saying:

"Any person who places pollutants in navigable waters without a

permit is guilty of a crime", what it did say is completely

inconsistent with applying the statute to a human being who

pollutes and shows an intent, as the Second Circuit majority

properly accepted, to regulate industries and industrial waste

from fixed and identified plants. As shown in the footnote

below™ and discussed by the Second Circuit majority (at

20 Again, the definition is:

The term "point source" means any discernible, confined

and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to,

any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well,

discrete fissure, container, rolling stock,

concentrated animal feeding operation, or vessel or

other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may

be discharged. This term does not include agricultural

storm water discharges and return flows from irrigated

agriculture.

= For example, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(f), entitled "Point

source categories", requires the EPA Administrator to

"“establish[] categories of point sources which he determines

shall not be subject to the requirements of subsection (d) of

this section in any State with a program approved pursuant to

subsection (b) of this section", and allows the Administrator to

"distinguish among classes, types, and sizes within any category

of point sources." One wonders how the Administrator would

"distinguish among classes, types, and sizes" of human beings or

personal vehicles.

Likewise, 33 U.S.C. § 1316(d) refers to "any point source

the construction of which is commenced after October 18, 1972".

This language also is hardly explainable in terms of an

individual's polluticn. Finally, by way of example, 33 U.S.C. §

1318 provides that the EPA Administrator "shall require the owner

(continued...)

32

Petition 8a-9a), "the term point source is used throughout the

statute, but invariably in sentences referencing industrial or

municipal discharges" and plants".

The legislative history is consistent: Not only does the

Senate Report discuss how the permit system “establishes a direct

link between the federal government and each industrial source

[emphasis added] of discharges into the navigable waters" (1972

U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3668, at 3675), but there are

numerous other similar references in the historical documents

that cannot be reconciled with a holding that an individual or

his personal automobile should be treated as a "point source".

E.g., U.S. Code Cong., supra, at 3710 (refers to the application

of technology to “industrial point sources"); id. at 3723

(stating that the new "sources" of pollution in twenty-eight

specified industries are to be constructed to meet "no-discharge"

limitations if possible, and then identifying industrial "groups"

such as pulp and paper mills, paperboard industry, meat product

processing, dairy processing, rubber processing, etc.); id. at

3728 (discussing how the "owner" of an “effluent source" should

install monitoring equipment); id. at 3737 (discussing permits,

and indicating that the Act will allow the Administrator to

establish "classes and categories of point sources" for which no

permit-by-permit review will be undertaken); and id. at 3736

71(,...continued)

or operator of a point source" to establish and maintain records,

make reports, install monitoring equipment, and do a variety of

other things that make no sense when applied to an individual who

pollutes.

33

(citing studies that reveal that there are at least 40,000

industrial sources of discharges into the navigable waters). (Oof

course, if every vehicle owned by an individual were counted,

there would be many, many more than 40,000 sources.) Further,

the regulations of the EPA themselves are consistent with the

view that the federal regulation concerns various identified

industries (as noted in the footnote below) and demonstrate the

Agency's understanding that the Act regulates industries, not

individual persons.”

In accord is this Court’s discussion of the Act in E.I. du

Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977). That case

involved an issue of regulation of "point sources" that existed

on the effective date of the 1972 Clean Water Act, which were to

be subject to certain limitations, and of "new sources" (those to

= E.g., 40 C.F.R. § 469.10 et seg. (Electrical and

electronic components point source category); 40 C.F.R. § 403.1

et seq. (General pretreatment regulations for existing and new

sources of pollution); 40 C.F.R. § 420.01 et seq. (Iron and steel

manufacturing point source category); 40 C.F.R. § 433.10 et seq.

(Metal finishing point source category); 40 C.F.R. § 463.1 et

seg. (Plastics molding and forming point source category).

The EPA has taken other action to show its

understanding that "point sources" intended to be covered are

standing facilities. Thus, as reported in the

Reporter, 19 Env. Rptr. 1908 (January 27, 1989), the EPA proposed

a rule directing States to draw up lists of contaminated

waterways and "sources" as a measure under the 1987 amendments to

the Clean Water Act, which require States to identify waterways

with toxic contamination and to identify sources of that

contamination. Plainly, it was contemplated that the State would

be identifying fixed plants, not movable cars. To the extent

that the definition of "point source" in the statute includes

"rolling stock" or other "conveyances", we suggest that what

Congress meant to cover were conveyances such as railroad

equipment within some "confined" location which is a regular part

of that facility.

34

be constructed later), which under the Act were to be limited

more strictly.”? In the course of the opinion, Justice Stevens

discussed various terms of the Act in a way that makes it plain

that "point sources" involve structures -- such as those

mentioned in the definitional section of the Act -- within some

plant or location that is "confined" -- one of the operative

terms in the definition of "point source". See 430 U.S. at 117

n.4.2* Indeed, Justice Stevens, in his discussion of the

issues, substitutes the term "classes of plants" for "classes of

point sources", thus indicating that a fixed plant is the minimum

required for a “source” to be a "point source".

Obviously, there is no "class" of sources that is defined --

or that could reasonably be defined -- as cars driven to

bulkheads by individuals carrying "pollutants" (a term which

= 33 U.S.C. § 1316(c), quoted at 430 U.S. at 120 n.8,

thus states that

[ajfter the effective date of standards of performance

promulgated under this section, it shall be unlawful

for any owner or operator of any new source to operate

such source in violation of any standard of performance

applicable to such source.

The statute obviously does not speak to how one's private vehicle

is "operated", but rather connotes a "facility" and its various

pollution-discharging parts.

as The Court also noted, 430 U.S. at 120, that the

Administrator was directed by the Act to publish within 90 days

"a list of categories of sources discharging pollutants". To the

extent that the statute leaves it to an agency to further define

the meaning of one of its criminal terms, there can be no proper

finding of criminal liability where, as here, the Administrator

has never defined as a "point source", prior to indictment,

whatever entity the indictment alleges as a point source. That

would hardly be notice.

35

includes just about anything other than pure water). The mere

fact that the pollutants carried at one time in the automobile

were traceable to a business and the “source” was thereby in fact

"identified" as a "waste-generating activity" (to use the

limiting principle fashioned by the district court but nowhere

found in the statute) -- or that the individual who polluted was

disposing of “industrial [or] municipal waste" and not "litter"

(to use Judge Oakes' legislative effort) -- does not turn one's

automobile into a "point source". The government's construction

that would include a human being within the Act only at some

times, depending on how one classifies the "waste" he carried to

or near a navigable waterway, is a distinction not made within

the statute itself and one that is at war with the language and

history of the Act. A “point source" is not defined by the

nature of the pollutant.»

Nor does any case cited by the government, or any other case

for that matter, compel a conclusion that Mr. Villegas or his car

can properly be characterized as a "point source". Though the

government argues that the decision below "conflicts with

decisions from other circuits, which have recognized that the

plain language of the Act embraces a broad array of polluting

” To the contrary, the "litter" of human beings is more

like rain runoff -- the prime example of a non-point source --

than a point source. Generally, the source of such litter is not

readily identifiable.

Even if a “litterer" can be identified, with the Act as

it now stands, Congress left it to the States to impose

penalties.

36

conduct that is logically indistinguishable from respondent's

activities" (Petition at 15), the government is wrong: no case

deals with individual pollution or holds an individual or his

personal vehicle a "point source". To the extent that courts --

such as the Court in Earth Sciences, supra, 599 F.2d 368 -- have

employed broad dicta concerning the “breadth" of the term "point

source" because of the goals of the Clean Water Act, the holding

of the case is not entirely inconsistent with this case, because

it does not deal with individual pollution as does this case. No

one comparing the decision in this case with that in Earth

Sciences -- a case in which certiorari was apparently not sought

in this Court and the holding of which has been criticized in any

event -- should be confused by the actual reach of the statute.

One who reads the Second Circuit decision in this case and

compares it to any of a number of prior cases that used broad

dicta but did not adequately analyze the issue, will know that,

to the extent they seek to hold individuals responsible for

pollution, they should go to the State authorities or seek an

amendment of the statute from Congress.”

-” As the Second Circuit majority realized, most of the

prior civil cases do involve "conveyances" in fixed ("confined")

locations, thus giving no basis to reach the conclusion that a

broad construction covers the conduct at issue. E.g., Avoyelles

; , 715 F.2d 879, 922 (5th Cir. 1983)

(bulldozing equipment discharged dredged materials into wetlands

as part of a fixed agricultural activity). To the extent that

the cases suggest a broader reach, they were not decided in a

criminal context, where the rule of lenity applies.

Nor does the Court of Appeals decision suggest, as the

government claims it does (Petition at 16), that "the same

(continued...)

37

Congress may now think that it has the powers to penalize

individual polluters of the waters and may wish to use those

powers, but either it did not think so at the time it enacted the

Clean Water Act, or decided that the States should be responsible

for such pollution. In any event, Congress certainly did not

plainly include conduct such as that of Mr. Villegas in the Act's

coverage; had it wished to do so, it would have, and should have,

stated succinctly: "Any person who pollutes the navigable waters

by placing pollutants in those waters without a permit is guilty

of a crime." This plain forewarning was not given because it was

not what Congress meant to cover when it enacted the "point

source" regulations in the Clean Water Act. See United States v.

Campos-Serrano, supra, 404 U.S. at 299 ("The principle of strict

construction of criminal statutes demands that some determinate

limits be established based upon the actual words of the

statute.") The government's remedy in this case is not with this

Court: it is with Congress.

76(,..continued)

statutory language" should be interpreted "differently depending

on the civil or criminal nature of each particular case". Aside

from the fact that the cases it cites do not support the

proposition that interpretation of the criminal statute should

not be undertaken with less "flexibility", the Court of Appeals'

decision only reflects the fact that, where a statute has

criminal application, as here, the rule of lenity must be invoked

when one reaches a place where two interpretations both make

sense. This, indeed, is the same theory as applies to issues of

whether a court should sustain an agency's own interpretation of

a statute. See Gorsuch, supra, 693 F.2d 156 (D.C. Cir. 1982)

(upholding EPA's decision that dams were not point sources

because both sides' interpretations were reasonable and the law

requires deference to an agency's determination when that is so).

38

CONCLUSION

The Supreme Court has no need to take this case. If the

prosecutors are not happy with the result, their remedy is to

seek an amendment of the Act from the Congress of the United

States. A writ of certiorari should not be granted.

Dated: Mt. Kisco, New York

May 31, 1994

VIVIAN SHEVITZ

(Counsel of Record)

| Attorney for Respondent

GERONIMO VILLEGAS

19 N. Moger Avenue

Mt. Kisco, New York 10549

(914) 241-1249

Of Counsel:

Jane Simkin Smith

39

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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