Appendix — Gepfrich v. Gepfrich

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i ieee Mid Nida

. Supreme Court, U.S.

+ FILED

93137 1 FEB 2 8 1994

No. OFFICE OF THE CLERK

In the

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1993

THOMAS FRANCIS GEPFRICH, Petitioner,

MARJORIE LOIS GEPFRICH; JAMES FOX

MILLER and MILLER & SCHWARTZ, P.A.,

Respondents

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Eleventh Circuit

APPENDIX TO PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Samuel L. Heller

Counsel for Petitioner

1290 E. Oakland Park Blvd.

Suite 101

Ft. Lauderdale, FL 33334

(305) 566-6440

INDEX

DESCRIPTION PAGE

Orders, etc. - U.S. Bankruptcy Court,

Southern District of Florida;

Case No. 89-22892-BKC-AJC, Main

Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Proceeding

[In re Thomas Francis Gepfrich,

Debtor]:

Memorandum Decision Sustaining Objection 5

and Supplemental Objection to

Exemptions entered July 6, 1990

Order Directing Turnover entered 7

July 6, 1990

Order on Motion to Compel and 9

Entry of Final Judgment against

Thomas Francis Gepfrich entered

December 7, 1990

Orders, etc. - U.S. Bankruptcy Court,

Southern District of Florida; Adv.

No. 89-0433-BKC-AJC-A [Adversary

suit] [Thomas Francis Gepfrich,

Plaintiff, v. Marjorie Lois Gep-

frich; James Fox Miller and Miller

& Schwartz, P.A., a Florida Pro-

fessional Service Corporation,

Defendants]:

Final Judgment (denying Debtor's 12

discharge) entered July 6, 1990

Findings of Fact and Conclusions 13

of Law (regarding the claims of

Defendants Miller, Miller &

Schwartz, P.A. and Marjorie Lois

Gepfrich for denial of the debtor's

discharge) entered July 6, 1990

ee ee TenT

Orders, etc. - U.S. Bankruptcy Court,

Southern District of Florida; Adv.

No. 89-0465-BKC-AJC-A [Adversary

suit] [Daniel L. Bakst, Trustee,

Plaintiff, v. Thomas Francis

Gepfrich, Defendant]:

Final Judgment (avoiding annuity 26

purchase as postpetition transfer

or as fraudulent transfer) entered

July 6, 1990

Findings of Fact and Conclusions 28

of Law (regarding the Trustee's

claim for invalidating the

annuity purchase as a post-

petition transfer or alternatively

as a fraudulent transfer) entered

July 6, 1990

Order Determining Plaintiff's Motion 38

to Alter or Amend Final Judgment

entered August 28, 1990

Amended Final Judgment entered 42

August 28, 1990 in favor of

Plaintiff Daniel L. Bakst

Orders - U.S. District Court,

Southern District of Florida;

Case No. 91-6398-CIV-GONZALEZ

(Appeal proceeding from i F

Bankruptcy Court for Southern

District of Florida) [In re

Thomas Francis Gepfrich, Debtor;

Thomas Francis Gepfrich, Plaintiff/

Counterdefendant/Appellant v.

Marjorie Lois Gepfrich, et al.»

Defendants/Counter-plaintiffs/

Appellees; Thomas Francis

Gepfrich, Defendant/Appellant v.

Daniel L. Bakst, Trustee, Plaintiff/

Appellee]

Order (affirming all orders and 44

judgments of Bankruptcy Court)

entered August 19, 1992

Orders - U.S. Court of Appeals for

the Eleventh Circuit; Case No.

92-4858 [In the matter of Thomas

Francis Gepfrich, Debtor; Thomas

Francis Gepfrich, Plaintiff/

Counterdefendant/Appellant v.

Marjorie Lois Gepfrich; James

Fox Miller and Miller & Schwartz,

P.A., Defendant/Counterplaintiff/

Appellees; Thomas Francis Gepfrich,

Defendant/Appellant v. Daniel L.

Bakst, Trustee, Plaintiff/

Appellee]

Order (affirming per curiam the 53

order of the United States District

Court for the Southern District of

Florida) entered October 19, 1993

rder (denying motion for rehearing) 54

entered November 30, 1993

Transcript of Proceedings Held April

20, 1989, Circuit Court of Broward

County, Florida; Case No. 836-23375

CO (Price); In re The Marriage of

Marjorie Lois Gepfrich and Thomas F.

Gepfrich:

Testimony of Joseph M. Guillotti, on 55

behalf of Husband Thomas F. Gepfrich

Statutes Involved:

§222.11, Florida Statutes 58

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO: 89-22892-BKC-AJC

In Re THOMAS FRANCIS GEPFRICH, Debtor

MEMORANDUM DECISION SUSTAINING OBJECTION

AND SUPPLEMENTAL OBJECTION TO EXEMPTIONS

Filed July 6, 1990

THIS MATTER was tried on March 1, 1990,

continued over to April 3, 1990, in Miami,

Florida, upon the creditor's Objection to

Exempt Property and Supplemental Objection,

which was joined into by the Trustee. The

Court having heard the testimony, examined the

evidence presented, observed the candor and

demeanor of witnesses, considered the

arguments of counsel, and being otherwise

fully advised in the premises, it is therefore

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that

2 This Court has entered Findings of

act and Conclusions of Law in Adversary No.:

29-0433-BKC-AJC-A, concerning the debtor's

eee >

purchase of the annuity from First Colony Life

Insurance Company, which is claimed exempt.

For the reasons set forth in those Findings

and Conclusions, the Court finds that the

objection to exemption is sustained as to this

annuity.

2. e# e

3. The debtor has also claimed as exempt

his proceeds under a stock purchase agreement

referred to as deferred compensation. These

are monies due to the debtor from Ambassador

from the sale of his Heritage stock. The

debtor claims that these proceeds are wages as

he alleges that the stock purchase agreement

is intertwined with his employment agreement

with Ambassador.

4. The evidence is undisputed from a

review of the debtor's tax returns, that he

receives two different forms of compensation

from Ambassador. One form of compensation is

treated clearly as wages, which constitutes

compensation under the employment agreement.

This .is, listed as wages on his tax returns.

The other form of compensation is under the

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the Court having heard argument of counsel and

being otherwise fully advised in the premises,

it is therefore

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that

1. The Court has entered a separate

Order sustaining the objections to the

exemptions claimed by the debtor as to the

annuity policy purchased by the debtor on the

date of filing bankruptcy through First Colony

Life Insurance Company, the debtor's right to

receive monies under a stock purchase

agreement dated March 18, 1987, and a wage

account. By that separate Order, the Court

has determined that these assets are not

exempt.

r The debtor shall turnover to the

Trustee, forthwith, the original annuity

policy number 1518193 purchased through First

Colony Life Insurance Company, together with

all payment received under that annuity since

the date of filing, together with the proceeds

of the wage account in the sum of $922.00.

The debtor shall also turnover to the Trustee

received under the stock purchase

, 1987, since the date

together with the proceeds of the

INITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

the Trustee having requested the entry of a

judgment, and the Court being otherwise fully

advised in the premises, it is therefore

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that

A. The Trustee's Motion to compel

turnover of the original annuity policy is

rendered moot, based on the debtors turnover

of that annuity at the previous hearing on

November 5, 1990.

B. The Court hereby enters sanctions

against the debtor in the amount of $500.00,

to reimburse the Trustee for attorneys fees

incurred as a result of the debtors failure to

turnover the original annuity policy at an

earlier date.

oe The Trustee's Motion to compel

turnover as to the monies received post

petition in the amount of $25,000.00 and the

wage account in the amount of $922.00, is

hereby denied in part however, the Court finds

that the Trustee is entitled to a judgment

against the debtor in these amounts.

D. The Court hereby enters judgment

against Thomas Francis Gepfrich in the amount

of $25,922.00, representing the amounts

collected by the debtor post petition under

the stock purchase agreement and the value of

the wage account, together with attorneys fees

awarded as set forth above, for a total

judgment of $26,422.00. Judgment is hereby

entered in favor of the Trustee and against

Thomas Francis Gepfrich in this amount, for

all of which let execution issue.

DONE AND ORDERED at Miami, in said

ict, this the 7th day of December, 1990.

A. JAY CRISTOL

United States Bankruptcy Judge

zxaxeaenaeKeKeKe KK EEK

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO: 89-22892-BKC-AJC

In Re THOMAS FRANCIS GEPFRICH, Debtor

ADV. NO. 89-0433-BKC-AJC-A

THOMAS FRANCIS GEPFRICH, Plaintiff/

CounterDefendant

. ae

MARJORIE LOIS GEPFRICH, JAMES FOX

MILLER, and MILLER & SCHWARTZ, P.A.,

a Florida Professional Service

Corporation, Defendants/Counter-

Plaintiffs

FINAL JUDGMENT

Filed July 6, 1990

THIS MATTER having come before this Court

on April 3, 1990 at 1:30 o'clock P.M., on the

continued trial in this cause, and in

conformity with the Findings of Fact and

Conclusions of Law entered contemporaneously

with this Final Judgment, it is hereby

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the Debtor,

THOMAS FRANCIS GEPFRICH, is denied discharge

eens oe

of his debts pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section

727(a) (2).

DONE AND ORDERED in Miami, Florida, on

this 6th day of July, 1990.

A. JAY CRISTOL

United States Bankruptcy Judge

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO: 89-22892-BKC-AJC

In Re THOMAS FRANCIS GEPFRICH, Debtor

ADV. NO. 89-0433-BKC-AJC-A

THOMAS FRANCIS GEPFRICH, Plaintiff/

CounterDefendant

Vv.

MARJORIE LOIS GEPFRICH, JAMES FOX

MILLER, and MILLER & SCHWARTZ, P. Acs

a Florida Professional Service

Corporation, Defendants/Counter-

Plaintiffs

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

FILED JULY 6, 1990

THIS MATTER having come before this Court

on April 3, 1990 at 1:30 o'clock p.m., on the

bifricated (sic) trial in this cause, on the

Defendant/Counter-Plaintiffs, JAMES FOX

MILLER, MILLER & SCHWARTZ, P.A., n/kK/a MILLER,

SCHWARTZ & MILLER, P.A., (hereinafter referred

to as "MILLER") and MARJORIE LOIS GEPFRICH's

(hereinafter referred to as "wife" )

counterclaims objecting to the discharge of

the Plaintiff/Counter-Defendant, THOMAS

FRANCIS GEPFRICH, (hereinafter referred to as

"Debtor"), under 11 U.S.C. Section 727 (a) (2)

and after considering the argument of counsel,

the evidence submitted, the credibility and

demeanor of the witnesses, and the testimony

of the witnesses, the Court makes’ the

following findings of fact and conclusions of

law:

The Debtor filed his petition for relief

under Chapter 7 of the United States

Bankruptcy Code on June 13, 1989 at 2:27 p.m.

At the time of the filing, the Debtor was

insolvent in that his liabilities exceeded his

assets and he was not paying his debts as they

matured. In fact the Debtor had been

insolvent since May 1989.

A Final Judgment of Dissolution of

Marriage was entered on the 26th day of

February, 1986 which obligated the Debtor to

MARJORIE LOIS GEPFRICH for child support and

alimony. The state court judge in the Final

Judgment of Dissolution of Marriage, found

that Mrs. Gepfrich was in need of alimony and

child support, as well as reasonable attorney

fees. The state court decided not encumber

the marital assets which included but were not

limited to: Debtor's pension and profit

sharing plan, a Hatteras yacht, 50% ownership

interest in Heritage Quality Construction Co.,

Inc. and a Mercedes Benz automobile. This was

done so that the Debtor would be permitted

maximum flexibility to pay the financial

obligations required of him under the final

judgment. The Debtor and his wife were

ordered to take each and every reasonable and

necessary action, and to conduct themselves in

such a manner as to carry out the intent and

purposes of the final judgment.

At the time of the filing of his petition

in bankruptcy, the Debtor owed $200,000.00,

plus an arrears of at least $20,000.00, to his

wife. Additionally, the Debtor owed MILLER,

the divorce attorney for MARJORIE LOIS

GEPFRICH, the sum of $59,148.55 since 1986 and

had not paid any sums toward the obligation

Since 1986.

After the Debtor defaulted under his

obligations to his wife, on April 21, 1989 a

hearing was conducted on the wife's Petition

to Compel Payment of Lump Sum Alimony. At the

contested hearing on the matter, the state

court entered its order dated May 29, 1989

wherein the Court determined:

At the time of the hearing in this

matter, the Husband had sold his

interest in Heritage Construction,

disposed of his pension and profit

sharing plan, sold his Hatteras

yacht, sold his Mercedes Benz

automobile, built and disposed of

one (1) single family residence and

at present, is living in a Two

Hundred Seventy Five Thousand Dollar

home encumbered by a first mortgage

of Two Hundred Forty Thousand

Dollars. The record also reflects

other various asset transfers by the

Husband during the approximate three

(3) years from the entry of the

final judgment. Due to the nature

of the final judgment allowing the

Husband maximum flexibility in which

to utilize the assets for payment to

the wife, the Court finds that the

Husband, after disposing of the

majority of the marital assets,

failed to pay the wife the monies

due her. In addition, the Husband

had, pursuant to the record, at

least One Hundred Thousand Dollars,

in discretionary spending which he

used for the purchase of stocks, a

new home, and gifted approximately

Fifteen Thousand Dollars to his

children by a prior marriage.

i The Court specifically finds

that the Husband did not act in the

Spirit and intent of the Final

Judgment in this matter despite the

fact that each party was ordered to

take each and every reasonable and

necessary action and conduct

themselves in such manner as to

carry out the intent and purpose of

the Final Judgment.

The state court concluded that the Debtor

was ordered to pay to the former wife by May

21, 1989, the sum of One Hundred Seventy

Thousand Dollars which was the sum due, as

principal, under the final judgment. If the

Debtor failed to comply with the order the

Court said it would consider, upon proper

application from the wife, any remedies to

compel payment including but not limited to

appropriate contempt orders if available. The

state court order of \May 25, 1989 was affirmed

by the state appellate court.

It was also at this hearing that the

Debtor, through its agents, represented to the

state court that he had $50,000.00 from the

sale of his interest in Heritage Quality

Construction, Inc. However, this sum was in

the form of a certificate of deposit and was

held as collateral with Ambassador Savings and

Loan Association and could not be reached

until at least September 1989.

After the Debtor failed to make the

payment of the $170,000.00 to his former wife,

the Debtor sought the advice from his

bankruptcy counsel, Samuel Heller, Esquire.

The Debtor learned from Mr. Heller that if he

were to file a bankruptcy petition he would

lose his interest in the $50,000.00

certificate of deposit to the Trustee and

creditors of this estate. The Debtor was

advised that the only possible way of

protecting the $50,000.00 would be to get the

sum released from the bank and convert same

into an annuity.

When it became apparent to the wife that

the Debtor was not going to honor the state

court order for payment she filed a Motion for

Contempt and Sanctions against the Debtor and

set the matter for hearing on June 13, 1989 at

3:00 p.m. The Debtor fearing he may be

incarcerated for his failure to pay any sums

as ordered contacted the representative of the

bank and an insurance salesman recommended by

his bankruptcy attorney for the purpose of

converting the $50,000.00 certificate of

deposit to an annuity.

On the day of tho scheduled contempt

hearing in state court the Debtor succeeded in

cashing in the certificate of deposit at a

penalty and having the net proceeds of

$49,012.09 issued in a cashier's check made

payable to himself. Then, at a prearranged

meeting at his bankruptcy counsel's office

with the insurance salesman, Mr. Williams, the

Debtor endorsed the check over to First Colony

Life Insurance Company. The Debtor gave the

check to Mr. Williams who in turned delivered

the check to First Colony Life Insurance

Company's agent, E. Donald Fuerst, whose

office is located in Fort Lauderdale, Florida.

Mr. Fuerst did not have banking authority

and could not negotiate the check which he

received about 1:50 p.m. on June 13, 1989, so

by federal express at the close of business

that day, he mailed the application made by

the Debtor for the annuity and the cashier's

check to First Colony Life Insurance Company's

home office in Lynchburg, Virginia. Thus, the

check was not negotiated until after the

Debtor had filed his petition in bankruptcy at

2:27 p.m. on June 13, 1989.

The Debtor has claimed the annuity he

purchased as exempt under Florida Statute

222.14 in this proceeding. It is with this

background of these facts that the wife and

MILLER seek to have this Court deny the

discharge of the Debtor for his transfer of

$49,012.09 into an annuity with the intent to

delay, hinder, or defraud creditors pursuant

to 11 U.S.C. 727 (a) (2). The Debtor admits

that one of the reasons he put the money into

an annuity was to ensure that his wife and

MILLER would not b able to collect against

this money.

As a general rule the conversion of

nonexempt assets into exempt assets is

allowable. In fact both the House and Senate

Reports validate this approach by stating the

foliowing: "As under current law, the debtor

will be permitted to convert nonexempt

property into exempt property before the

filing of the bankruptcy petition. This

practice is not fraudulent as to creditors, as

it permits the debtor to make full use of the

exemptions to which he is entitled under the

law.. H.R. Rep. 95595, 95 Cong., lst Sess. 361

(1977); S. Rep. No. 95-989, 95 Cong.. 2nd

Sess. 76 (1978).

These comments were made in view of the

federal exemptions which are more limiting

than the exemptions provided under Florida

Statute 222.14 which is unlimited as to

amount. This general rule has limits as the

conversion of nonexempt assets into exempt

must be made prior to the filing and not made

with the intent to defraud creditors. Where

the nonexempt property is converted either

post petition or is tied to a claim of a

specific creditor, then the debtor's conduct

will be objectionable under 11 O86. ota

(a) (2). See In re Reed, 700 F.2d 986 (5th Cir.

1983); In re Mehrer., 2 B.R. 309 (Bankr. WA

1980); In re Collins. 19 B.R. 874 (Bankr. M.D.

Fla. 1982); In_re Ford. 773 F.2d 52 882 (4th

Cir. 1985) and In re Smiley, 864 F.2d 562 (7th

Cir. 1989).

The Court finds that the property being

converted by the Debtor was proceeds of the

50% ownership interest in Heritage Quality

Construction, Inc., which was a marital asset.

It is clear the wife had an interest in this

asset at the time of the dissolution of

marriage and the state court specifically

entrusted this assets[sic], as well as others,

to the Debtor to allow him maximum flexibility

to utilize the assets to pay the alimony

obligations required under the final judgment

to the wife and MILLER.

After entry of the final judgment the

Debtor began liquidating the majority of the

marital assets and failed to pay the wife or

MILLER. This was done even when the Debtor

had at least $100,000.00 in discretionary

spending which he used for a new home, stocks,

gifts of $15,000.00 to his children by a

previous marriage and the $50,000.00

certificate of deposit.

This Court follows those decisions which

have denied a debtor's discharge which found

extrinsic fraud such as where there was a

diversion of business assets into exempt

property or where borrowed monies are placed

into exempt property. See In re Reed, 700

F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1983); In re Mehrer, 2 B.R.

309 (Bankr. WA 1980); In re Collins. 19 B.R.

874 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982); In re Ford, 773

F.2d 52 882 (4th Cir. 1985); In re Smiley.

864 F.2d 562 (7th Cir. 1989). Here, after

considering the amounts involved, the timing,

the fact that the proceeds were derived from

marital assets the wife had an interest in,

the misleading impression given to the wife

and the state court as to the availability of

the certificate of deposit and the insolvency

of the Debtor clearly supports the conclusion

that the Debtor's actions, in converting the

certificate of deposit into the annuity, were

done with the requisite fraudulent purpose to

hinder, delay and defraud the wife and MILLER.

For the Court to conclude otherwise would set

the precedent to allow parties obligated under

marital decrees to convert all of the marital

properties into annuities or exempt property

to avoid the obligations called for under such

decrees.

The Debtor argues that the prior ruling

of In re Blum, 41 B.R. 816 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.

1984) should govern this case. In Blum the

Court stated the mere act of converting

property into exempt property, without more is

not prohibited by the Bankruptcy Code. Here

the facts and circumstances are clearly

distinguishable from those presented in Blum.

The Court also concludes that’ the

transfer into the annuity was not completed

prior to the filing of the bankruptcy

petition.

The Court follows the Uniform Commercial

Code and those decisions which hold that the

transfer of a check occurs when the check is

honored by the bank. Fitzpatrick v. Philco

Finance Corp., 491 F.2d 1288 (7th Cir. 1974)

and In re Sims Office Supply, Inc.., 18 B.C.D.

1006 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1988).

Here it is clear the check could not have

been negotiated until it was received by the

home office of First Colony Life Insurance

Company in Lynchburg, Virginia, which was not

until June 14, 1989, the day after the filing

of the petition in bankruptcy. Thus, the

transfer was an improper post’ petition

transfer clearly made with the intent to

delay, hinder and defraud not only the former

ife and MILLER, but also the Trustee.

Consequently, a separate judgment will be

entered in this adversary in accordance with

these findings of fact and conclusions of law.

Dated: July 6, 1990

A. JAY CRISTOL

United States Bankruptcy Judge

a ee ee ee

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO: 89-22892-BKC-AJC

In Re THOMAS FRANCIS GEPFRICH, Debtor

ADV. NO. 89-0465-BKC-AJC-A

DANIEL L. BAKST, Trustee

Vv.

THOMAS FRANCIS GEPFRICH, Defendant

FINAL JUDGMENT

Filed July 6, 1990

In conformity with the Findings of Fact

and Conclusions of Law of even date, it is

hereby

ORDERED AND ADJUDGED

A. Judgment is hereby entered in favor

of the Trustee, Daniel L. Bakst against the

debtor/defendant, THOMAS FRANCIS GEPFRICH.

The debtor's purchase of an annuity from First

Colony Life Insurance Company in the amount of

$49,012.09 is hereby avoided as a post-

petition transfer pursuant to 111 U.S.C.

Section 549 or in the alternative, as 4a

fraudulent transfer pursuant to 11 U.S.C.

Section 548.

DONE AND ORDERED at Miami, Florida, this

6th day of July, 1990.

A. JAY CRISTOL

United States Bankruptcy Judge

* ” “ ” nm * «

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO: 89-22892-BKC-AJC

In Re THOMAS FRANCIS GEPFRICH, Debtor

ADV. NO. 89-0465-BKC-AJC-A

DANIEL L. BAKST, Trustee

Vv.

THOMAS FRANCIS GEPFRICH, Defendant

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

FILED JULY 6, 1990

THIS CASE was tried by the Court on March

1, 1990, continued over to April 3, 1990, in

Miami, Florida. The Court having heard the

testimony, examined the evidence presented,

observed the candor and demeanor of witnesses

and considered the arguments of counsel, and

being otherwise fully advised in the premises,

does hereby make the following Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law:

The Trustee, DANIEL L. BAKST, filed an

Amended Complaint Objecting to Discharge and

to set aside fraudulent transfer, as well as a

further amendment to add a count under Section

549. The Court has entered separate findings

and conclusions concerning the objection to

discharge. The debtor has filed an answer

raising several affirmative defenses. The

issue to be determined is whether the Trustee

can set aside the debtor's purchase of an

annuity as a fraudulent transfer under i11

U.S.C. §548, or as a post-petition transfer

under 11 U.S.C. §549.

Many of the facts in this case are

undisputed. In 1987, the debtor sold stock in

a company known as Heritage Quality

Construction Company, Inc. The stock was sold

to Ambassador Real Estate Equities

Corporation. Out of the proceeds of sale,

$100,000.00 was placed into a certificate of

deposit at Ambassador Savings and Loan

Association. The debtor had a one-half

interest in these proceeds. The other one-

half interest belonged to another stockholder,

Ronald Blum. Although the funds were

allegedly subject to a lien in favor of

Ambassador until September, 1989, the lien was

released on the morning of June 13, 1989, and

the debtor took his one-half interest in the

funds and purchased an annuity. The actual

check received from Ambassador was used to

purchase the annuity in the amount of

$49,012.09, which represented the proceeds

from the certificate of deposit less a penalty

for early withdrawal.

The debtor filed his voluntary petitior.

under Chapter 7 at 2:27 P.M. on June 13, 1989.

The debtor had to file his petition before

3:00 P.M. that day in order to avoid a hearing

in State Court on a motion to hold him in

contempt filed by his ex-wife, Marjorie

Gepfrich. The debtor had a fear of going to

jail and filed bankruptcy in order to avoid

this hearing and also the monetary obligations

owed to his ex-wife and her attorneys. The

debtor testified that bankruptcy was the only

option he had to relieve himself from

enforcement of a lump sum alimony award that

he was unable to pay.

In June, 1989, the debtor sought the

advice of Samuel Heller, his bankruptcy

counsel. The first meeting with Mr. Heller

was on June 7, 1989. The subject of annuities

was discussed. The debtor was well aware that

he would lose his one-half interest in the

certificate of deposit if he filed bankruptcy,

and that if he placed it into an annuity, he

could claim the annuity as exempt. There is a

conflict in testimony of the debtor concerning

the date that he first contacted Steve Eppel

at Ambassador concerning a release of the lien

on the certificate of deposit. In an

affidavit filed with the Court to support his

Motion for Summary Judgment, the debtor stated

that he and Mr. Blum had already. had informal

discussions with Mr. Eppel long before the

bankruptcy and that Eppel told the debtor and

Blum in May 1989 that Ambassador would release

the lien pledge whenever they wanted it. The

debtor later recanted that testimony at the

time of trial, which is also contrary to the

testimony of Blum and Eppel. The Court has

considered this inconsistent testimony in

determining the credibility of Mr. Gepfrich,

who waited until the second day of trial to

change his testimony from that contained in an

affidavit filed with the Court several months

prior.

The debtor was able to easily obtain the

funds trom Ambassador on the morning of June

13, 1989. The check was taken to Samuel

Heller's office for a meeting which had been

set up with Sam Williams. Sam Williams had

been referred to Mr. Gepfrich by Mr. Heller.

Mr. Williams is a certified financial planner

with a life insurance license. Mr. Williams

testified that he was a broker for First

Colony Life Insurance Company in Virginia, as

well as other life insurance companies.

Mr. Williams was aware that the debtor

had problems with his ex-wife. He had been

told that the debtor was planning to file

bankruptcy that same day, and that the policy

had to be in force on June 13, 1989. The

meeting took place in Samuel Heller's office

around 12:00 noon on June 13, 1989. Mr.

Williams left the office sometime before 1:50

p.m. The application is dated 1:05 p.m. with

a special request that the policy be dated

June 13, 1989. These notations are in the

handwriting of Sam Williams.

Mr. Williams then left Samuel Heller's

office to go to the office of Douglas Fuerst,

a general agent for a number of life insurance

companies, including First Colony Life

nsurance Company of Virginia. His office is

in Ft. Lauderdale, Florida. Douglas Fuerst

testified that the first time he learned of

the annuity was on the morning of June 13,

1989, at approximately 11:00 a.m., when he was

contacted by Sam Williams who stated that he

needed a policy that day. Both Sam Williams

and Douglas Fuerst testified that this was an

extraordinary request, and that they had never

before handled this type of unusual request.

A facsimile was sent by Sam Williams to

Samuel Heller from the office of Douglas

Fuerst at approximately 1:50 P.M. Douglas

Fuerst testified that he was out to lunch from

approximately 1:00 to 2:00 P.M. There is no

direct facsimile from Douglas Fuerst to Samuel

Heller. Douglas Fuerst did testify that he

called his home office to see if he could date

the policy the same date that he received the

money. He also testified that he had no

authorization to deposit the check on behalf

of First Colony Life Insurance Company of

Virginia. A copy of the check and application

was not telecopied to the home office until

3:11 P.M. on June 13, 1989, which was after

the filing of the bankruptcy petition. The

actual check and original application were not

deposited into the mail until after 5:00 P.M.

on June 13, 1989, when they were sent by

overnight delivery to First Colony Life

Insurance Company in Virginia. The check

mailed was the third party check from

Ambassador made out to Thomas Gepfrich, and

endorsed over to First Colony Life Insurance

Company of Virginia. The policy was not

physically issued until June 15, 1989, and was

not delivered to the debtor until sometime

after June 20, 1989.

Douglas Fuerst testified that had the

check not cleared, the policy would have been

cancelled. The only reference to the June 13,

1989 date on the policy itself is the

effective date. This is the date that

interest begins to accrue. The issue date of

the policy is June 15, 1989.

The issue before the Court is whether the

policy was operable before the filing of the

bankruptcy, or after the filing of the

bankruptcy. Although the debtor attempted to

Shield his assets from his creditors by

purchasing an annuity just minutes before he

filed bankruptcy, the Court finds that this

attempt failed. The policy itself was issued

after the filing of bankruptcy with a

retroactive date back to before the filing of

the bankruptcy. The insurance company was not

even sent a facsimile of the application or

the check until 3:11 P.M. on June 13, 1989,

which was after the time of the filing of the

bankruptcy. The check and application were

delivered the next day, and the policy issued

on June 15, 1989. The transfer did not occur

until the check was honored by the bank,

pursuant to the Uniform Commercial Code at

Florida Statute Section 673.409; and In Re;

Sims Office Supply. Inc,, 18 B.C.D, 1006 (M.D.

Fla. 1988). The Court finds that this is a

post-petition transaction, avoidable by the

Trustee pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §549.

In the alternative, the Court finds that

the purchase of this annuity within minutes of

the filing of the bankruptcy, was not

permissible pre-bankruptcy planning, and was

done with the intent to hinder, delay and

defraud creditors. In the absence of other

facts, the mere purchase of the annuity would

not be fraudulent. In this particular case

however, the ex-wife had attempted to reach

the certificate of deposit in earlier

proceedings before the State Court in the

post-dissolution proceeding. In a State Court

proceeding on April 17, 1989, the debtor

testified before the State Court that the

certificate of deposit could not be reached

until September, 1989. Yet, the debtor was

able to reach these funds on the morning of

his bankruptcy proceeding in order to purchase

the annuity, which he has claimed as exempt in

his bankruptcy proceeding. This transfer of

non-exempt assets into an exempt annuity was a

fraud with regard to the debtor's ex-wife and

her attorneys who had been trying to reach

this particular asset earlier. The funds used

to purchase the annuity came from the sale of

a business interest. The debtor was aware of

pending litigation and testified he was

insolvent. See In re: Gefen, 35 B.R. 368

(S.D. Fla. 1984). Therefore, the Court finds

in the alternative that this was a fraudulent

transfer pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §548, avoidable

by the Trustee.

A separate Final Judgment of even date

has been entered in conformity herewith.

July 6, 1990

A. JAY CRISTOL

United States Bankruptcy Judge

~x*unKerneenneuKRE

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO: §89-22892-BKC-AJC

In Re THOMAS FRANCIS GEPFRICH, Debtor

ADV. NO. 89-0465-BKC-AJC-A

DANIEL L. BAKST, Trustee

Vv.

THOMAS FRANCIS GEPFRICH, Defendant

ORDER DETERMINING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION

TO ALTER OR AMEND FINAL JUDGMENT

Entered August 28, 1990

THIS MATTER Came On for hearing before

the Court on August 6, 1990 on the Motion to

Alter or Amend Final Judgment filed by

Plaintiff Thomas Francis Gepfrich, and the

Court having considered argument of counsel,

it is therefore

ORDERED by the Court as follows:

ay The Debtor's request in Paragraph 1

(PART I) of the aforementioned motion is

granted; the Court will enter an amended final

judgment separately adjudicating each of the

Trustee's claims for relief against the Debtor

in Counts I, II and II of the Trustee's

Amended Complaint.

2 The Debtor's request in Paragraph 2

(PART I) that the Court amend the following

Statement that appears on the third and fourth

pages of the Court's seven-page Findings of

Fact and Conclusions of Law entered July 6,

1990, to-wit:

There is a conflict in testimony of

the debtor concerning the date that

he first contacted Steve Eppel at

Ambassador concerning a release of

the lien on the certificate of

deposit. In an affidavit filed With

the Court to support his Motion for

Summary Judgment, the debtor stated

that he and Mr. Blum had already had

informal discussions with Mr. Eppel

long before the bankruptcy and that

Eppel told the debtor and Blum in

May 1989 that Ambassador would

release the lien pledge whenever

they wanted it. The debtor later

recanted that testimony at the time

of trial, which is also contrary to

the testimony of Blum and Eppel.

The Court has considered this

inconsistent testimony in

determining the credibility of Mr.

Gepfrich, who waited until the

second day of trial to change his

testimony from that contained in an

affidavit filed with the Court

several months prior

be and the same, is hereby denied.

LP The Debtor's request in Paragraph 3

of PART II of said motion that the Court amend

its Final Judgment so as to adjudicate each of

the several claims for relief relating to

denial of the Debtor's discharge (by reason of

the fraudulent transfer within the year

preceding bankruptcy) is granted; the Court

will enter separate amended final judgments in

favor of the Trustee and against the Debtor in

Adversary No. 89-0465-BKC-AJC-A and in favor

of Marjorie Lois Gepfrich and her attorneys

and against the Debtor in Adversary No. 89-

0433-BKC-AJC-A.

4. The Debtor's request in Paragraph 4

of PART II of said motion that the Court make

determination

is moot in view of

the fact that (in the Amended Final Judgment

being entered this day) the Court is fully

majudicating all claims for relief in both

Adversary No 89-0433-BKC-AJC-A and Adversary

No 89-0465-BKC-AJC-A, and therefore said

request Or a Rule 54(b) determination is

nereby enied

JRDERED at Miami, Florida this 28th day

f Augu 1990

A. JAY CRISTOL

nited ate Bankruptcy Judge

an on on en

res

IN THE UNITED STATES BANKRUPTCY COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO: 89-22892-BKC-AJC

In Re THOMAS FRANCIS GEPFRICH, Debtor

ADV. NO. 89-0465-BKC-AJC-A

DANIEL L. BAKST, Trustee

V «

THOMAS FRANCIS GEPFRICH, Defendant

AMENDED FINAL JUDGMENT

Filed August 28, 1990

THE COURT having this day entered its

Order Determining Plaintiff's Motion to Alter

or Amend Final Judgment and in conformity with

the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law

entered by the Court July 6, 1990, it is

therefore

ORDERED and ADJUDGED as follows:

As ith respect to Count I of the

Trustee's amended complaint, judgment is

hereby entered in favor of the Trustee, Daniel

L. Bakst and against Debtor/Defendant Thomas

Francis Gepfrich and the Debtor, Thomas

Francis Gepfrich, is denied a discharge of his

debts pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 727(a) (2).

rp With respect to Count II of the

Trustee's amended complaint, judgment is

hereby entered in favor of the Trustee, Daniel

Bakst and against Debtor/Defendant Thomas

rancis Gepfrich. The Debtor's purchase of an

annuity from First Colony Life Insurance

Company in the amount of $49,012.09 is hereby

avoided as a fraudulent transfer pursuant to

as With respect to Count III of the

Trustee's amended complaint, judgment is

hereby entered in favor of the Trustee, Daniel

L. Bakst and against Debtor/Defendant Thomas

Francis Gepfrich. The Debtor's purchase of an

annuity from First Colony Life Insurance

Company in the amount of $49,012.09 is hereby

avoided as a post-petition transfer pursuant

to 11 U.S.C. Section 549.

c. The provisions of this amended final

judgment shall supersede the final judgment

entered on July 6, 1990.

ORDERED at Miami, Florida this 28th day

of August, 1990.

A. JAY CRISTOL

United States Bankruptcy Judge

kaka KeKeK KKK

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO.: 91-6398-CIV-GONZALEZ

In Re THOMAS FRANCIS GEPFRICH, Debtor

THOMAS FRANCIS GEPFRICH, Plaintiff/

Counterdefendant/Appellant,

Vv.

MARJORIE LOIS GEPFRICH, et al.,

Defendants/Counterplaintiffs/Appellees

THOMAS FRANCIS GEPFRICH,

Defendant/Appellant,

DANIEL L. BAKST, TRUSTEE,

Plaintiff/Appellee

ORDER

Filed August 20, 1992

THIS CAUSE has come before the Court upon

the debtor Thomas Francis Gepfrich's

consolidated appeal from five appealable

orders and judgments of the United States

Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of

Florida. The parties have briefed the issues

fully, and the Court heard argument of counsel

on Friday, May 29, 1992. For the reasons

explained below, the Court will affirm the

orders and the judgments of the bankruptcy

court.

Standard of Review

In considering an appeal from the United

States Bankruptcy Court, this Court reviews

the bankruptcy court's conclusions of law de

novo. See In Re Sublett, 895 F.2d 1381, 1383

(llth Cir. 1990). Where an issue raises a

mixed question of law and fact, the Court

likewise will review the bankruptcy court's

determinations de novo. In Re Mader, i108

Bankr. 643, 644 (N.D. Ill. 1989). However,

this Court will not overturn the bankruptcy

court's factual findings unless the Court

determines that those findings are clearly

erroneous. In Re Pepenella. 103 Bankr. 299,

300 (M.D. Fla. 1988).

Issues Presented

The debtor's consolidated appeal presents

six questions:

(1) Whether the bankruptcy court

erred in determining that the

debtor's annuity purchase was not

completed until after he filed his

bankruptcy petition?

(2) Even if the debtor did complete the

annuity purchase pre-petition, whether

the bankruptcy court erred in determining

that the purchase constituted a

fraudulent transfer which justified a

denial of the debtor's discharge?

(3) If the bankruptcy court did err in

invalidating the annuity purchase and in

denying the discharge, whether the

bankruptcy court also erred in dismissing

the debtor's adversary complaint which

sought to determine the dischargeability

under i1 U.S.C. 3 523(a)(5)(B) of the

debtor,s obligation to pay his ex-wife a

$270,000 equitable distribution award and

his obligation to pay some $60,000 in

attorney's fees to his ex-wife,s

attorneys?

(4) Whether the bankruptcy court

erred in entering a turnover order

and a separate money judgment in the

amount of $25,000 against the debtor

and in favor of the trustee

representing the debtor,s post-

petition receipt of monies under his

stock purchase agreement with

Ambassador?

(5) Whether the bankruptcy court erred in

excluding the testimony of Ambassador

Vice-President Thomas Blake?

(6) Whether the bankruptcy court erred in

denying the debtor's claim of exemption

for wages in the amount of $922 where one

of the objecting parties was the debtor's

ex-wife who held a claim against the

debtor for alimony?

The Court will address each issue separately.

Discussion

The debtor first claims that the

bankruptcy court erred when it found that the

debtor did not purchase the subject annuity

until after the debtor filed his bankruptcy

petition. It is unnecessary, however, for the

Court to pass on this issue because even if

the Court assumes the annuity was purchased

pre-petition, the Court finds that the

bankruptcy court correctly invalidated the

annuity purchase and denied the debtor's

discharge on the ground that the purchase of

the annuity constituted a fraudulent transfer

under 11 U.S.C. §§ 548 and 727.

As a general rule, a debtor's conversion

of non-exempt property into exempt property,

in and of itself, will not work to deprive a

debtor of an exemption to which the debtor

otherwise would have been entitled. Norwest

Bank Nebraska, N.A, v. Tveten, 848 F.2d 871,

873-74 (8th Cir. 1988). However, this rule is

limited by the power of the bankruptcy court

to deny a discharge if there is extrinsic

evidence of the debtor's intent to defraud

creditors. Id. at 874. Evidence that the

debtor transferred property "with intent to

hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor" within

one year before the date of the filing of the

petition will suffice to allow the Court to

deny a discharge. See 11 U.S.C. § 727(a) (2).

A bankruptcy court's finding that a debtor

made a pre-petition transfer with the intent

to hinder, delay, or defraud may be reversed

only if clearly erroneous. McCormick Vv.

security State Bank, 822 F.2d 806, 808 (8th

Cir. 1987).

After careful consideration of the record

and the arguments of the parties, the Court

finds that the debtor has not demonstrated

that the bankruptcy court's finding concerning

the debtor's intent was Clearly erroneous.

Accordingly, this Court will affirm those

Orders and judgments of the bankruptcy court

which invalidated the purchase of the annuity

and denied the discharge. See In Re Reed, 700

F.2d 986 (5th Cir. 1983); Tveten, Supra, 848

F.2d 871.

Because the Court will affirm the

bankruptcy court's invalidation of the annuity

purchase and the denial of the discharge, the

Court further finds that the bankruptcy court

did not err in dismissing as moot the debtor's

adversary complaint-- which complaint sought

to determine the dischargeability under 11

U.8.c. § 523 (a) (5) (B) of the debtor's

obligation to pay his ex-wife a $270,000

equitable distribution award and his

obligation to pay some $60,000 in attorney's

fees to his ex-wife's attorneys.

Next, the debtor contends that the

bankruptcy court erred in issuing a turnover

order, and ultimately a separate money

judgment, in the amount of $25,000 against the

debtor and in favor of the trustee,

representing the debtor,s post-petition

receipt of monies under the stock purchase

agreement he had entered into with Ambassador.

After the debtor sold his Heritage stock to

Ambassador in 1987 he received each month 4a

salary of $5,000 under his employment contract

and $3,080 per month pursuant to the 1987

stock purchase agreement. At issue are the

monies received under the stock purchase

agreement. The bankruptcy court characterized

these monies as "stock purchase proceeds" and

sustained the objection to the debtor's

exemption. The debtor argues that this

characterization was error. In response, the

trustee contends that the subject monies were

proceeds received from the sale of an asset

and therefore are property of the estate

pursuanc to 11 U.S.C. § 541.

The debtor has not persuaded the Court

hat the bankruptcy court erred in

characterizing the subject monies as proceeds

from the sale of the Heritage stock.

Therefore, the Court finds that the bankruptcy

court properly sustained the objection to the

exemption and ordered the turnover of the

$25,000. Additionally, the Court finds that

tne bankruptcy court did not commit reversible

error when it sustained the objection to the

estimony of Thomas Blank.

Finally, the debtor contends that the

DankKruptcy court erred in denying the debtor's

claim that $922 of wages held in an ear-marked

wage account at the time of bankruptcy was

exempt. Wages are not exempt from creditors

lding claims for alimony. See Fla. Stat. §

61.12. The debtor,s ex-wife, who obtained an

limony judgment against the debtor, objected

to the exemption of the $922. Accordingly,

bankruptcy court correctly denied the

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ngly, having reviewed the record,

1d otherwise dauly advised, it is

that the orders and

>f the United States Bankruptcy

ic Wiis

ies oo P

thern District of Florida,

the Sout

er and judgments were consolidated

irposes of this appeal, are AFFIRMED.

AND ORDERED in chambers at Fort

e. Florida, this _19th day of August,

JOSE A. GONZALEZ, JR.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

xz“anennunuQnuqgue wn ®

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OP APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

CASE NO: 92-4858

In Re THOMAS FRANCIS GEPFRICH, Debtor

THOMAS FRANCIS GEPFRICH, Plaintiff-

Counterclaim Defendant-Appellant,

MARJORIE LOIS GEPFRICH, JAMES FOX

MILLER, and MILLER & SCHWARTZ, P.A.,

@ Florida Professional Service

Corporation, De fendants-Counter-

claim Plaintiffs-Appellees

DANIEL L. BAKST, TRUSTEE,

Plaintiff-Appellee

THOMAS FRANCIS GEPFRICH,

Defendant-Appellant,

Vv.

ORDER

Filed October 19, 1993

BEFORE: FAY and CARNES, Circuit Judges, and

JOHNSON, Senior Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM: AFFIRMED. See 11th Cir. Rule 36-

Judgment Entered: October 19, 1993

For The Court: Miguel J. Cortez, Clerk

By: Karleen McNabb, Deputy Clerk

ISSUED AS MANDATE: December 8, 1993

ENTERED FOR THE COURT:

Ed Carnes

United States Circuit Judge

ee ee es

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

CASE NO: 92-4858

In Re THOMAS FRANCIS GEPFRICH, Debtor

THOMAS FRANCIS GEPFRICH, Plaintiff-

Counterclaim Defendant-Appellant,

MARJORIE LOIS GEPFRICH, JAMES FOX

MILLER, and MILLER & SCHWARTZ, P.A.,

a Florida Professional Service

Corporation, Defendants-Counter-

claim Plaintiffs-Appellees

DANIEL L. BAKST, TRUSTEE,

Plaintiff-Appellee

THOMAS FRANCIS GEPFRICH,

Defendant-Appellant,

Vv.

ORDER

Filed November 30, 1993

ON PETITION FOR REHEARING

BEFORE: FAY and CARNES, Circuit Judges, and

JOHNSON, Senior Circuit Judge.

PER CURIAM: The petition for rehearing filed

Dy appellant Thomas Francis Gepfrich is

ENTERED FOR THE COURT:

Ed Carnes

United States Circuit Judge

ee ee oe

TESTIMONY OF JOSEPH M. GUILLOTTI

In the Circuit Court of the

Seventeenth Judicial Circuit

In and For Broward County, Plorida

Case No. 83-23375 CO (Price)

In Re the Marriage of

MARJORIE LOIS GEPFRICH, Petitioner/Wife,

and

THOMAS F. GEPFRICH, Respondent/Husband.

On April 20, 1989 before the Honorable J.

Cail Lee, Circuit Judge, the following

proceedings were had in the above-styled and

number cause:

Appearances: Val Osinski, Esq., Coral

Springs, Florida, for Petitioner/Wife

Gary Maisel, Esq.

for Respondent/Husband

PROCEEDINGS

JOSEPH M. GUILLOTTI, then called as a

witness on behalf of Respondent/Husband being

first duly sworn, was examined and testified

on his oath as follows:

By Mr. Maisel:

Q Mr. Osinski mentioned there was

a hundred thousand dollar C.D.

remaining in Mr. Gepfrich's

name and I believe Mr. (Blum's)

mame; are you with familiar

with that?

A Yes, I am.

Q How did that C.D. come about?

A That's additional sale price on

QO)

the sale to Ambassador Savings

and Loan ... I forget the

terms, but at the end of two

years if they didn't have to

forfeit the money for, you

Know, the company losing money,

not making money, I forget the

exact terms, the money would be

available to them.

Out of the hundred thousand

dollars, if it is received, how

much of that would be Mr.

Gepfrich's?

$50,000.

When is that due and owing?

September, 1989.

And if he receives it at all it

would be September, 1989?

Yes. (Cir.Tr. 4/20/89, P 27, L

12-18, 23-25; P 28, 1-14, 24-

25 P 423. & i}

ee ee ee ee

Se he a

STATUTES INVOLVED

-- §222.11, Florida Statutes

(Exemption of wages from garnishment) :

No writ of attachment or

garnishment or other process shall

issue from any of the courts of this

state to attach or delay the payment

of any money or other thing due to

any person who is the head of a

family residing in this state, when

the money or other thing is due for

the personal labor or services of

such person. As used in this

section, the term "head of family"

includes any unmarried, divorced,

legally separated, or widowed person

who is providing more than one-half

of the support for a child or other

dependent. This exemption shall

apply to any wages deposited in any

bank account maintained by the

debtor when said funds can be traced

and properly identified as wages.

# §222..14, Florida Statutes

(Exempti'on of cash surrender value of

life insurance policies and annuity

contracts from legal process):

The cash surrender values of

life insurance policies issued upon

the lives of citizens or residents

of the state and the proceeds of

annuity contracts issued to citizens

or residents of the state, upon

whatever form, shall not in any case

be liable to attachment, garnishment

or legal process in favor of any

creditor of the person whose life is

so insured or of any creditor of the

person who 1s the beneficiary of

such annuity contract, unless the

estat

insurance policy or annuity contract

was effected for the benefit of such

creditor.

11 U.S.C. §541 (Property of the

(a) The commencement of a case

under section 301, 302, or 303 of

this title creates an estate. Such

estate is comprised of all the

following property, wherever located

and by whomever held:

(1) Except as provided in

Subsections (b) and (c)(2) of this

section, all legal or equitable

interests of the debtor in property

is Of the commencement of the case.

(6) Proceeds, product,

offspring, rents, or profits of or

from property of the estate except

Such aS are earnings from services

performed by an individual debtor

after the commencement of the case.

11 U.S.C. §548 (Fraudulent

transfers and obligations):

(a) The trustee may avoid any

transfer of an interest of the

debtor in property, or any

obligation incurred by the debtor,

that was made or incurred on or

within one year before the date of

the filing of the petition, if the

debtor voluntarily or involuntarily

intent to hinder, delay, or defraud

any entity to which the debtor was

or became, on or after the date that

such transfer was made or such

obligation was incurred, indebted;

11 U.S.C. §549 (Postpetition

transactions):

(a) Except as provided in

subsection (b) or in (c) of this

section, the trustee may avoid a

transfer of property of the estate -

(1) that occurs after the

commencement of the case; and

7: .

11 U.S.C. §727 (Discharge):

(a) The court shall grant the

debtor a discharge, unless -

* . *

(2) The debtor, with intent to

hinder, delay, or defraud a creditor

or an officer of the estate charged

with custody of property under this

title, has transferred, removed,

destroyed, mutilated, or concealed,

or has permitted to be transferred,

removed, destroyed, mutilated, or

concealed -

(a) property of the debtor

within one year before the date of

the filing of the petition; or

. 7 .

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.