Appendix — Topink v. Commonwealth Edison Co.
Supreme Court brief1999
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App. 1
IN THE
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 98-2417
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY and TRUSTEES OF THE
COMMONWEALTH EDISON SERVICE ANNUITY FUND,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
SARAH D. VEGA, in her official capacity as Director,
State of Illinois Department of Financial Institutions,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Dlinois, Eastern Division.
No. 97 C 6—Blanche M. Manning, Judge.
ARGUED FEBRUARY 16, 1999—DECIDED APRIL 13, 1999
Before: POSNER, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and ROVNER,
Circuit Judges.
POSNER, Chief Judge. Commonwealth Edison Company
and its defined-benefit pension plan brought this suit
under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq., against the admin-
istrator of the Illinois Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed
Property Act, 765 ILCS 1025, seeking a declaration that
ERISA preempts the Illinois statute to the extent that the
statute regulates such plans. The district court agreed,
precipitating this appeal by the state. A threshold ques-
areas
App. 2
tion unremarked by the parties or the district judge con-
cerns the state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity to being
sued in a federal court without its consent. A suit against
a state officer in his or (in this case) her official capacity
is deemed a suit against the state, e.g., Kentucky v.
Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169-70 (1985); V-1 Oil Co. v. Utah
State Dept. of Public Safety, 131 F.3d 1415, 1421 (10th Cir.
1997), and a mere failure to raise an Eleventh Amend-
ment defense in court is not treated as a waiver, e.g.,
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677-78 (1974); Estate of
Porter by Nelson v. Illinois, 36 F.3d 684, 691 n. 3 (7th Cir.
1994); V-1 Oil Co. v. Utah State Dept. of Public Safety, supra,
131 F.3d at 1419-20; Suarez Corporation Industries v.
McGraw, 125 F.3d 222, 227 (4th Cir. 1997), even though
the Supreme Court has now made clear that a violation
of the Eleventh Amendment does not deprive the federal
court of jurisdiction over the suit. Patsy v. Board of
Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 515 n. 19 (1982); Idaho v. Coeur
d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267 (1997). But the
only relief sought by the plaintiffs in this case is an in-
junction against enforcing a state statute that they con-
tend is unenforceable by virtue of the supremacy clause
of the Constitution, and that is relief equally available,
with no Eleventh Amendment hurdle to overcome, by a
suit against the responsible official in her private-capaci-
ty. See Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, supra, 521 U.S.
at 269, for the general principle, and Shaw v. Delta Air-
lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 n. 14 (1983), and Burgio & Cam-
pofelice, Inc. v. New York State Dept. of Labor, 107 F.3d 1000,
1006-07 (2d Cir. 1997), for its application to ERISA. In
consequence, federal suits against state officials for purely
injunctive relief are treated in effect as suits against them
in their personal capacity, lifting the Eleventh Amend-
ment bar. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,
71 n. 10 (1989); Kentucky v. Graham, supra, 473 U.S. at 167
n. 14.
App. 3
The Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act, in
force in about a third of the states, requires anyone in
possession of intangible property that is unclaimed by its
owner for seven years (five under the Illinois version of
the Act) to transfer the property to the custody of the
state. A subsequent uniform law, the Uniform Unclaimed
Property Act of 1981, is in force in most of the rest of the
states; so far as relates to this case, the provisions of the
two uniform laws are the same. These are not escheat
statutes. The state does not acquire title to the property.
It is merely a custodian. The owner can reclaim his prop-
erty at any time. Prefatory Note to 1995 Act, 8B Uniform
Laws Annot., 1998 Supp. 84. But not only does the state
have the free use of the property unless and until the
owner reclaims it; the state is not required to (and Illinois
does not) pay any interest to a reclaiming owner. 765
ILCS § 1025/15; see also Uniform Unclaimed Property
Act of 1981, § 21 (§ 11 of the 1995 revision of this Act). In
effect, the property is an interest-free loan to the state—in
perpetuity if the owner never shows up to claim it.
Illinois seeks to apply the Uniform Act to benefits pay-
able under Com Ed’s pension plan that are not claimed
by a plan beneficiary within five years. When benefits are
due to a participant in the plan, the plan writes a check
to the participant. Until the participant deposits or cashes
the check and the check is paid by the plan through the
system for clearing bank transactions, the money due the
participants remains in the plan’s coffers. It is placed in
a separate account as soon as the check is written, but if
the check isn’t cashed within a year the money is retrans-
ferred to the general account and is available to pay other
participants. Com Ed does not and could not (without ad-
verse tax consequences) impose a deadline on when the
beneficiary may cash his check. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.411(a)-
4(b)(6). It could be five, or ten, or even more than ten
years after the check was written. All this time the plan
will have the use of the money due the beneficiary. Were
App. 4
the plan to be terminated, the administrator would have
a legal duty to search and make provision for missing
beneficiaries. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1056(f), 1350. But until then, the
plan’s only duty of search is whatever is implicit in the
fiduciary obligation that ERISA imposes on plans. 29
U.S.C. § 1104(a).
The Com Ed plan owes about $125,000 to beneficiaries
who have not yet cashed or deposited their checks even
though more than five years have passed since the checks
were written. The state wants this money. The plan wants
to retain it. Com Ed wants the plan to retain it too, for
even though money in the plan cannot be kicked back to
Com Ed unless and until the plan is terminated and is
determined to be overfunded, 29 U.S.C. § 1344(d); Mead
Corp. v. Tilley, 490 U.S. 714, 718 (1989); Brillinger v. General
Electric Co., 130 F.3d 61, 62 (2d Cir. 1997), the more
money there is in the plan, the less money Com Ed will
be required to contribute to it to make sure that the plan
has enough to meet its obligations. 26 U.S.C. §§ 412(a),
(b)(3); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 119 S. Ct. 755, 761
(1999); Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.,
446 U.S. 359, 363-64 n. 5 (1980). The parties are thus fight-
ing over who gets to keep the interest on this money—the
plan, and perhaps ultimately Com Ed, or the state.
ERISA preempts any state regulation that “relates to”
an ERISA plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a); De Buono v. NYSA-
ILA Medical & Clinical Services Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 809 n.
1 (1997); Dranchak v. Akzo Nobel Inc., 88 F.3d 457, 459 (7th
Cir. 1996). The Uniform Act, although it does not refer
explicitly to ERISA plans, relates to the Com Ed plan
directly and substantially. Remember that until the check
to the beneficiary is actually presented to the plan for
payment through the banking system, and paid, the
money due to the beneficiary is an asset of the plan. The
state thus wants to take a chunk of an ERISA plan’s
assets and put it in the state treasury. After that happens,
any beneficiary of the plan who wants his benefits will
App. 5
have to apply to the state for them. The state becomes the
plan administrator with respect to those assets. Not only
does the state become the custodian of the assets, in vio-
lation of ERISA’s provisions regarding plan administra-
tion, especially 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1); see Boggs v. Boggs,
520 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1997); it depletes those assets, by
taking the interest that accrues on them. If the ERISA
plan entitled a beneficiary to interest for the period be-
tween when benefits were due him and when he actually
collected them, the state would actually be reducing his
ERISA benefits. Even if the plan does not provide for in-
terest, as Com Ed’s does not, the state would still be re-
ducing the plan’s assets. Suppose the benefits due the
participant in year t are $10,000, and he doesn’t claim
them until year t+6, by which time $10,000 in plan assets
would have grown through the operation of compound
interest to $14,000. Then, were it not for the Uniform Act,
the assets of the plan would be greater by $4,000. The Act
is the device by which the state appropriates those assets
for itself.
It depletes those assets in another way, by subjecting
the plan to the varying laws of the different states. New
York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 657-58 (1995). Participants
in the Com Ed plan are scattered over 44 states. Though
there are only two basic state-law regimes governing un-
claimed property (the two uniform laws), states have
tended to custom-tailor whichever uniform law they have
chosen to their particular needs. The consequence is nu-
merous variations in the amount of time before the state
takes over the money (recall that Illinois has shortened
the period of the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Prop-
erty Act) and in the formalities for claiming the money
from the state. Russell E. Greenblatt, “ERISA Preemption
of State Unclaimed Property and Escheat Laws,” 9 Benefits
L.J. 51 (1996). Several states have not even modeled their
App. 6
unclaimed-property laws on either of the uniform laws,
but have gone their own way completely.
We do not put too much weight on this point, because
Com Ed has made no effort to quantify the burden of
compliance. We are more concerned about the confisca-
tion of interest and the usurpation of administration. At
argument we asked the state’s lawyer whether it would
make any difference to his argument if the Illinois version
of the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act re-
quired the plan to hand over benefits unclaimed for two
weeks rather than five years, and he said it would not. In
such a case it would be blindingly obvious that the state
was taking over the administration of an ERISA plan; it
is only a little less obvious when the period is longer.
The state reinforces this characterization of the opera-
tion of the Uniform Act when it argues that its having
custody of the unclaimed benefits gives the beneficiaries
more secure protection than the retention of custody by
the plan would. The State of Illinois has better credit than
Commonwealth Edison. And while the pension plan is
funded—that is, its assets, which Com Ed cannot touch,
are actuarially equivalent to its expected obligations to
participants and beneficiaries, 29 U.S.C. § 1082; Hughes
Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, supra, 119 S. Ct. at 761-62 (1999),
and vested benefits under a defined-benefits plan are
federally insured, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1322, 1361, participants
and beneficiaries are not completely protected. Actuarial
projections are by definition probabilistic rather than
certain, and the federal insurance is capped at a fairly
modest level. § 1322(b)(3); Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508
U.S. 248, 250 (1993). So state custody does add a dollop
of safety to unclaimed ERISA benefits, though given the
State of Illinois’s reputation as a late payer, the tiny incre-
ment in safety may well be offset by delay in payment
and resulting loss in the interest value of the money. In
any event, ERISA’s preemption clause, and the case law
interpreting it, make clear that a state cannot take over
App. 7
the operation of an ERISA plan, no matter how forcefully
it argues that it can do a better job than the plan’s
trustees and administrators. See Mackey v. Lanier Collection
Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 829-30 (1988); cf. Shaw
v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., supra, 463 U.S. at 104-06; Alessi v.
Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 524 (1981); Maclean
v. Ford Motor Co., 831 F.2d 723, 727-28 (7th Cir. 1987).
The state argues that Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency
& Service, Inc., supra, 486 U.S. at 835-38, which holds that
ERISA does not preempt the application of state garnish-
ment statutes to employee welfare plans, controls the
present case. A vital distinction is overlooked. If an
ERISA beneficiary owes money, the creditor can use garn-
ishment to get that money from the plan rather than
having to wait until it is paid out to the beneficiary. But
the state in such a case is not taking plan assets or ad-
ministering the plan. It is merely eliminating an interme-
diate transaction in the process by which benefits are
paid to the beneficiary and seized by the creditor. The
amount of assets in the plan is unaffected by whether the
money is checked out to the beneficiary or the benefici-
ary’s creditor.
Two cases uphold the application of state escheat laws
to unclaimed benefits under ERISA plans, Aetna Life Ins.
Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1989), and Attorney
General v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 424 N.W.2d
54, 58-59 (1988) (per curiam). A third disagrees. Blue Cross
& Blue Shield of Florida, Inc. v. Department of Banking &
Finance, 791 F.2d 1501 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). We
need not takes sides. Escheat laws determine title. If state
law vests title to the state in unclaimed benefits, those
benefits no longer belong to the beneficiary; they belong
to the state. In fact, the state is the beneficiary. Compare
two cases. In one, the plan participant designates his
spouse as the beneficiary if the participant dies. He dies,
and so the benefits are paid to the surviving spouse. This
is no more a depletion of fund assets than when the
App. 8
benefits are paid to a creditor. In the other case, the plan
participant has failed to designate a beneficiary, and sup-
pose that the state, by operation of its escheat law (which
makes the state in effect the heir of the heirless), becomes
the beneficiary. Just as in the first case, payment to the
state, if the participant dies, does not deplete the assets of
the fund; it is simply payment to the participant’s desig-
nated-by-law beneficiary.
This case is different because the state does not claim to
have an ownership interest in unclaimed benefits. It
doesn’t want to step into the shoes of the beneficiary; it
wants to step into the plan’s shoes. That is precisely what
ERISA bars. So clear is this (see Chevron, USA Inc. v. Na-
tional Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43
(1984)) that we don’t have to get into the issue, much
discussed in the briefs, of the precise weight to be given
the Department of Labor’s advisory opinion letters (and
its amicus curiae brief), which advise that ERISA indeed
preempts state unclaimed-property laws. The issue of the
weight to be given under the Chevron doctrine to informal
expressions of agencies’ views is unresolved, see Commis-
sioner v. Keystone Consolidated Industries, Inc., 508 U.S. 152,
162 n. 3 (1993), and compare Kilgore v. Outback Steakhouse
of Florida, Inc., 160 F.3d 294, 302 (6th Cir. 1998), with
Morton Community Unit School District No. 709 v. J.M., 152
F.3d 583, 585 (7th Cir. 1998), with Herman v. NationsBank
Trust Co., 126 F.3d 1354, 1363 (11th Cir. 1997), though
Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997), indicates that
some deference, at least, is to be paid to views set forth
in an amicus curiae brief filed by an agency. A further
complication here is the uncertainty of whether it is ap-
propriate to defer to an agency that is seeking to expand
federal power at the expense of the states through a gen-
erous construal of a preemption clause. For varying views
on that question, compare Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v.
FERC, 28 F.3d 1281, 1283-84 (D.C. Cir. 1994), and Indus-
trial Truck Ass’n, Inc. v. Henry, 125 F.3d 1305, 1311 (9th
App. 9
Cir. 1997), with Colorado Public Utilities Comm’n v. Harmon,
951 F.2d 1571, 1579 (10th Cir. 1991), and Teper v. Miller, 82
F.3d 989, 998 (11th Cir. 1996) (opinion of one judge). A
final complication is that the administration of ERISA is
shared between the Labor Department and the Treasury
Department. Treasury has issued a regulation that can be
interpreted to assume that uncashed ERISA plan bene-
fits checks are subject to state escheat laws. 26 C.F.R.
§ 1.411(a)-4(b)(6). But we have seen that escheat laws are
pertinently different from unclaimed-property laws. So
there is no conflict between the two agencies and there-
fore no need to decide which should have the whip hand.
AFFIRMED.
A true Copy:
Teste:
Clerk of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
App. 10
[Dated May 8, 1998]
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS
EASTERN DIVISION
COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY
and THE TRUSTEES OF THE
COMMONWEALTH EDISON SERVICE
ANNUITY FUND,
Plaintiffs,
v. 97 C 0006
FRANK C. CASILLAS, in his official
capacity as DIRECTOR, STATE OF
ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL
INSTITUTIONS,
ee
Defendants.
MEMORANDUM AND ORDER
This case turns on the reach of § 514 of the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”),
which is ERISA’s preemption provision. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1144. Specifically, the parties dispute whether ERISA
preempts the Illinois Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed
Property Act (“IUPA”), 765 ILCS 1025/7, and thus
prohibits the IUPA from reaching unclaimed pension
benefit payments of employee benefit plans covered by
ERISA. Plaintiffs Commonwealth Edison Company
(“ComEd”) and the Trustees of the Commonwealth
Edison Service Annuity Fund (the “Trustees”) seek a
declaratory judgment against defendant Director of the
Illinois Department of Financial Institutions (the “Di-
rector”) finding that ERISA preempts the IUPA.
App. 11
The parties have filed cross-motions for summary
judgment and amicus curiae The National Association
of Unclaimed Property Administrators and the Secre-
tary of Labor have filed memoranda addressing the
preemption issue. For the following reasons, the plain-
tiffs’ motion for summary judgment is granted and, the
defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment is de-
nied.
I. Jurisdiction and Venue
According to the plaintiffs, jurisdiction is proper
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 1332(e)
because ERISA preempts the IUPA. Federal question
jurisdiction thus turns on this court’s resolution of the
preemption issue. The court notes, however, that venue
in this district is appropriate pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1391(b), as the defendant maintains an office in this
district, a substantial part of the events giving rise to
the claim occurred in this district, and a substantial
part of the property that is the subject of this case is
located in this district.
Il. Background
A. The Parties
Plaintiff ComEd is a public utility company that em-
ploys a workforce of over 16,800. It is a corporation
organized under the laws of the State of Illinois, and
maintains its principal offices in Chicago, Illinois.
ComEd is the plan sponsor, the administrator, and a
named fiduciary of the Commonwealth Edison Service
Annuity System (the “Plan”), which is an employee pen-
App. 12
sion benefit plan under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(16)
and 1102(a). The plaintiff Trustees, who are also mem-
bers of ComEd’s Board of Directors and its parent,
Unicom Corporation, are “named fiduciaries” of the
Commonwealth Edison Service Annuity Fund (the
“ComEd Annuity Fund”) under ERISA. 29 U.S.C.
§ 1102(a). The ComEd Annuity Fund is an employee
benefit fund within the meaning of ERISA. 29 U.S.C.
§§ 1002(2) and (3).
Defendant Frank Casillas is the Director of the State
of Illinois Department of Financial Institutions and is
sued in his official capacity. The State of Illinois De-
partment of Financial Institutions (*DFI”) is an agency
of the State of Illinois. It maintains offices in Chicago
and is responsible for administering the IUPA.
B. The Facts
The essential facts are undisputed. ComEd’s Plan pro-
vides pension benefits to more than 9750 annuitants,
who reside in 44 states. ComEd’s Annuity Fund was
created under a written agreement between ComEd and
predecessors of the Trustees to establish a trust fund
for the payment of service annuities under the Plan. In
accordance with the terms of the agreement establish-
ing ComEd’s Annuity Fund, the assets of the Annuity
Fund are maintained exclusively for the benefit of
participants under ComEd’s Plan. The ComEd Annuity
Fund holds a general pool of assets for the benefit of all
Plan participants. Individual Plan participants do not
have separately identified accounts in the ComEd An-
nuity Fund or under ComEd’s Plan.
App. 13
A determinable annuity payment as computed under
the Plan is payable to eligible annuitants each payment
period after benefits payments commence. Eligible an-
nuitants, as defined by the Plan, are entitled to regular
annuity payments made from the ComEd Annuity
Fund. These annuitants receive bimonthly service-an-
nuity payments from the ComEd Annuity Fund, either
by check or by direct deposit into their bank accounts.
To accommodate the issuance of the bimonthly pay-
ments, the Trustees maintain, as part of the ComEd
Annuity Fund, a checking account from which benefit
payments are made. The checking account constitutes
part of the assets of the ComEd Annuity Fund. The
checking account balance is kept at an adequate level
to ensure that sufficient funds are available to cover
checks issued for current benefit payments.
If a ComEd annuitant fails to cash a check issued
pursuant to ComEd’s Plan within one year, the amount
of funds periodically transferred to the ComEd Annuity
Fund’s checking account is reduced by the amount of
the uncashed checks. After one year, these amounts are
considered assets available generally for payment of |
benefits under ComEd’s Plan. The level of current
assets available for payment of benefits is one of the
many factors used in making the actuarial determina-
tion of the amount of contributions, if any, that ComEd
should make to the Annuity Fund.
ComEd’s Plan does not require annuitants to cash
their benefit-payment checks within a certain time
period in order to be entitled to receive the funds
specified in their checks. The general practice of the
ComEd Annuity Fund and the ComEd Plan is to honor
a” Cl ee
App. 14
claims for payment of stale checks. DFI has advised
ComEd of its position that the ComEd Plan is a holder
of unclaimed property subject to the requirements of
the IUPA, and has asked ComEd to file a report under
the IUPA and to remit to DFI the value of benefit
payment checks which have remained uncashed for
more than five years.
The plaintiffs filed suit, seeking a declaratory judg-
ment that ERISA preempts the application of the [UPA
to obtain the value of annuity checks that are un-
claimed and uncashed for more than five years. Amicus
curiae the Secretary of Labor supports the plaintiffs,
while amicus curiae the National Association of Un-
claimed Property Administrators supports the defen-
dant.
C. The Parties’ Positions
ComEd argues that ERISA preempts the application
of the IUPA to funds held in trust by ComEd’s Plan,
which, as noted above, is an employee pension benefit
plan subject to ERISA. It asserts that, if the IUPA
applies, it would have to make payments directly from
the ComEd Annuity Fund to the Illinois Department of
Financial Institutions, thereby reducing the amount of
Plan assets held in trust for the benefit of all Plan
participants and beneficiaries. ComFd also points to
ERISA’s broad preemptive reach, as well as an advisory
opinion from the United States Department of Labor
stating that ERISA preempts the IUPA and other
states’ escheat laws. Finally, ComEd argues that pay-
ment of the unclaimed funds to the State would violate
ERISA’s anti-alienation provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d).
App. 15
Amicus curiae the Secretary of Labor contends that
the phrase “relate to” in § 514(a) encompasses the
IUPA. In addition, the Secretary argues that the IUPA
is preempted under general conflict preemption prin-
ciples, Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997), as well
as because it mandates employee benefit structures and
plan administration, and provides an alternative en-
forcement mechanism. Finally, the Secretary of Labor
contends that the IUPA violates ERISA’s prohibition
against assignment or alienation of plan benefits.
The Director argues that the IUPA does not “relate
to” the value of checks issued to annuitants under
ComEd’s Plan because Illinois’ actions with respect to
the IUPA affect the plan in a tenuous, remote manner.
He also notes that the IUPA is a law of general appli-
cation addressing abandoned property and does not
expressly refer to ERISA plans. In addition, he con-
tends that the IUPA fails to have a connection with any
ERISA plans. Finally, he cites to Aetna Life Insurance
Company v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1989), and
Attorney General v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich-
igan, 168 Mich. App. 372, 424 N.W.2d 54 (1988).
Amicus curiae the National Association of Unclaimed
Property Administrators argues that giving the un-
claimed funds to the State would not reduce the bene-
fits available to the Plan’s participants and benefi-
ciaries. It also asserts that ComEd should not be
permitted to use the unclaimed monies to offset its
obligation to contribute and that doing so is a “prohibit-
ed transaction.”
App. 16
D. The Illinois Unclaimed Property Act
The relevant provisions of the IUPA provide:
§ 7. All intangible personal property and any
income or increment thereon, held in a fiduciary
capacity (other than as a trustee of an active
express trust) for the benefit of another person
is presumed abandoned unless the owner has,
within 5 years after it becomes payable or
distributable, increased or decreased the princi-
pal, accepted payment of principal or income,
corresponded in writing concerning the prop-
erty, or otherwise indicated an interest as
evidenced by a memorandum on file with the
fiduciary;
(a) If the property is held by a banking
organization or a financial organization, or
by a business association organized under
the laws of or created in this State; or
(b) If it is held by a business association,
doing business in this States, but not orga-
nized under the laws of or created in this
State, and the records of the business asso-
ciation indicate that the last known address
of the person entitled thereto is in this
State; or
(c) If it is held in this State by any other
person.
765 ILCS 1025/7.
§ 20. (a) The Director shall consider any claim
filed under this Act and may, in his discretion,
hold a hearing and receive evidence concerning
it. . . . The Director or hearing officer shall
prepare a finding and a decision in writing on
each hearing, stating the substance of any
App. 17
evidence heard by him, his findings of fact
thereto, and the reasons for his decision. The
Director shall review the findings and decision
of each hearing conducted by a hearing officer
and issue a final written decision. The final de-
cision shall be a public record. Any claim of an
interest in property that is filed pursuant to
this Act shall be considered and a finding and
decision shall be issued by the Department in a
timely and expeditious manner.
765 ILCS 1025/20(a).
E. The Agency View of the Preemption Issue
As noted above, the Secretary of Labor has filed an
amicus curiae brief supporting the plaintiffs. In addi-
tion, the United States Department of Labor issued an
opinion letter addressing the impact of ERISA on the
IUPA. U.S. Dept. of Labor Advisory Opinion 78-32A
(1978). In that letter, the Administrator of Pension and
Welfare Benefit Programs and the United States
Department of Labor quoted the IUPA and § 514 of
ERISA and concluded that ERISA preempts the IUPA,
explaining:
Section 514(a) does not merely preempt state
laws which conflict with ERISA but all state
laws related to employee benefit plans. The
reasons for broad preemption of state laws
under ERISA were succinctly stated by Senator
Jarvis, a major sponsor and floor manager of
the bill, during final consideration:
Both House and Senate bills provided for
preemption of State law but—with one
major exception appearing in the House
App. 18
bill—defined the perimeters of preemption
in relation to the area regulated by the bill.
Such a formulation raised the possibility of
endless litigation over the validity of State
action that might impinge on Federal regu-
lation, as well as opening the door to multi-
ple and potentially conflicting State laws
hastily contrived to deal with some partic-
ular aspect of private welfare or pension
plans not clearly connected to the Federal
regulatory scheme.
Although the desirability of further regula-
tion—at either the State or Federal level—
undoubtedly warrants further attention, on
balance, the emergence of a comprehensive
and pervasive Federal interest and the in-
terests of uniformity with respect to inter-
state plans required—but for certain excep-
tions—the displacement of State action in
the field of private employee benefit pro-
grams. 120 Cong. Rec. S15751 (daily ed.
Aug. 22, 1974).
Although the Illinois Act expressly exempts
active trusts from coverage under its provisions,
inactive trusts are not exempted. The Depart-
ment of Labor has previously taken the position
that employee benefit plan trusts which are
merely awaiting future distribution to partici-
pants/beneficiaries are covered as employee
benefit plans within the meaning of ERISA.
Therefore, it is the position of the Department
of Labor that the Illinois Act is preempted
under ERISA section 514. Further, it is the
Department’s position that § 514(b)(2)(A) [which
addresses state laws regulating insurance,
App. 19
banking, or securities] is inapplicable in regard
to the Illinois Act ....
III. Discussion
A. Standard for A Motion For Summary Judg-
ment
Summary judgment is proper when the “pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions
on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that
there is no genuine issue of any material fact.” Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,
322 (1986). The party opposing the summary judgment
motion “may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of the adverse party’s pleading’; rather, it must
respond with “specific facts showing that there is a
genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). “The
evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all
justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”
Valenti v. Qualex, Inc., 970 F.2d 363, 365 (7th Cir.
1992), citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.
242, 255 (1986). A court should grant a motion for
summary judgment only when the record shows that a
reasonable jury could not find for the nonmoving party.
Valenti v. Qualex, Inc., 970 F.2d at 365; Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248.
B. Does ERISA Preempt Illinois’ Escheat Stat-
ute?
Three reported cases, all involving ERISA welfare
plans, rather than pension plans, address whether
ERISA preempts a state escheat statute. See Aetna Life
App. 20
Ins. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493
U.S. 811 (1989) (ERISA does not preempt Connecticut’s
escheat law); Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida v.
Department of Banking and Finance, 791 F.2d 1501
(11th Cir. 1986) (ERISA preempts Florida’s escheat
statute); Attorney General v. Blue Cross and Blue
Shield of Michigan, 168 Mich. App. 372, 424 N.W. 54
(Mich. App. 1988) (ERISA does not preempt Michigan’s
escheat law). The court will provide a brief overview of
preemption principles, summarize these cases, and then
turn to the parties’ arguments.
1. General Preemption Principles
Section 514(a) of ERISA provides that:
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this
section, the provisions of this subchapter and
subchapter III of this chapter shall supercede
any and all State laws insofar as they may now
or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan
described in section 1003(a) of this title and not
exempt under section 1003(b) of this title.
29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).
ERISA’s preemption provision is “deliberately ex-
pansive” and was “designed to ‘establish pension plan
regulation as exclusively a federal concern.’” Pilot Life
Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45 (1987), quoting
Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523
(1981). Courts considering preemption focus on the
interpretation of only two words in the preemption
provision—whether or not a state statute “relates to”
ERISA. The Supreme Court instructs us to read these
words broadly, as ERISA’s reach is not limited to state
App. 21
laws specifically designed to affect employee benefit or
welfare plans or to state laws meant to address ERISA
matters such as reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary
responsibilities. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S.
85, 98 (1983).
On the other hand, the Supreme Court has also
stated that, when Congress drafted the ERISA’s pre-
emption language, it did not intend to preempt all laws
that “relate to” an ERISA plan in only a small or
tangential way. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S.
at 100 n. 21. Instead, it-intended to preempt any law
that “has a connection with or reference to [a covered
employee benefit plan].” California Division of Labor
Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Construction,
N.A., Inc., 117 S. Ct. 832, 837 (1997). Preemption is
meant to ensure that a single set of regulations will
govern the administrative practices of an ERISA plan,
as opposed to a patchwork of potentially inconsistent
state laws. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S.
133, 142 (1990) (in enacting § 514(a), Congress sought
to ensure a uniform body of benefits law and to avoid
conflicts between federal and state laws which could
work to the detriment of plan beneficiaries); Fort
Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987).
In order to further this purpose, state statutes must
affect an ERISA plan in a meaningful way to “relate to”
ERISA—state laws that only have a “tenuous, remote,
or peripheral” effect on a plan do not rise to the level of
relatedness necessary to support a finding of preemp-
tion. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. at 100
n.21. Thus, claims that affect the structuring of ERISA
plans or claims that purport to determine the substan-
App. 22
tive rights and duties among the parties who created
and administer the plan are preempted. Rice v. Pan-
chal, 65 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 1995). Similarly, rules gov-
erning payment to plan participants necessarily “relate
to” ERISA pension and welfare plans. Dranchak v. Akzo
Nobel, Inc., 88 F.3d 457, 459 (7th Cir. 1996).
In addition, ERISA preempts claims which interfere
with a plan’s administration, even where plan benefi-
ciaries do not assert the state law claims. For example,
in Plumber’s Pension Fund, Local 130 v. Niedrich, 891
F.2d 1297 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 930
(1990), the Seventh Circuit held that ERISA preempted
Illinois law addressing the personal liability of corpo-
rate officers and thus barred a suit based on that state
law seeking to hold the corporate officers personally
liable for delinquent pension contributions. Accord First
Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Sunshine Jr. Food Stores, Inc., 960
F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1992) (ERISA barred insurer’s suit
against employer alleging that the employer breached
its obligations under a group policy that funded an
ERISA plan), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1079 (1993). See
also California Division of Labor Standards Enforce-
ment v. Dillingham, Construction, 117 S. Ct. at 837
(collecting cases finding preemption).
In considering the reach of the phrase “relate to” in
ERISA, the Eighth Circuit’s comprehensive, although
slightly dated, survey is quite helpful. See Arkansas
Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. St. Mary’s Hospital, Inc.,
947 F.2d 1341, 1344 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504
U.S. 957 (1992). Specifically, when considering whether
ERISA preempted Arkansas’ assignment statute, the
Eighth Circuit stated that courts:
App. 23
... have relied on a variety of factors when
determining whether a state statute of general
application “relates to” ERISA plans. [footnote
omitted]. These factors include whether the
state law negates an ERISA plan provision,
Baxter v. Lynn, 886 F.2d 182, 185 (8th Cir.
1989), whether the state law affects relations
between primary ERISA entities, Firestone Tire
& Rubber Co. v. Neusser, 810 F.2d 550, 556
(6th Cir. 1987); Sommers Drug Stores v. Cor-
rigan Enters., 793 F.2d 1456, 1467 (5th Cir.
1986), whether the state law impacts the struc-
ture of ERISA plans, United Food & Commer-
cial Workers v. Pacyga, 801 F.2d 1157, 1160
(9th Cir. 1986), whether the state law impacts
the administration of ERISA plans, Fort Halifax
Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1987),
whether the state law has an economic impact
on ERISA plans, Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges,
869 F.2d 142, 147-48 (2d Cir. 1989), whether
preemption of the state law is consistent with
other ERISA provisions, Mackey v. Lanier Col-
lection Agency & Serv., 486 U.S. 825, 832-40
(1988), and whether the state law is an exercise
of traditional state power, Aetna Life Ins. Co.,
869 F.2d at 148; Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,
810 F.2d at 555.
947 F.2d at 1344.
The Eighth Circuit then explained that “all these
factors can be relevant to an ERISA preemption analy-
sis. Like any list of factors, however, they only serve to
focus and clarify the court’s analysis. The court must
still look to the totality of the state statute’s impact on
the plan—both how many of the factors favor preemp-
tion and how heavily each individual factor favors
App. 24
preemption are relevant.” Jd. The court then concluded
that, although no one factor was determinative of the
ERISA preemption issue, the aggregate of the factors
militated in favor of a finding that Arkansas’ assign-
ment statute “related to” ERISA welfare benefit plans
and thus was preempted. Jd. at 1344-45.
No Seventh Circuit authority addresses whether a
state law controlling unclaimed property held by a an
ERISA fund “relates to” ERISA. Accordingly, this suit
lies in the netherworld between clearly preempted suits
which implicate the interpretation or administration of
an ERISA plan, and suits that merely address the
relationships among parties incidental to the adminis-
tration of beneficiaries’ rights under a plan. See Fox,
Curtis & Associates, Inc. v. Employee Benefit Plans,
Inc., No. 92 C 5828, 1993 WL 265474 *4 (N.D. Ill. Jul.
13, 1993). Thus, the court turns to the decisions of
other courts addressing this issue for assistance in
determining whether ERISA preempts Illinois’ escheat
law.
ii. Cases Addressing Preemption of Escheat
Statutes
In Aetna Life Ins. v. Borges, the Second Circuit held
that ERISA does not preempt Connecticut’s escheat law
as it applies to uncollected drafts for employee benefits.
Aetna Life Ins. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1989).
The Borges court, however, was confronted with a dis-
pute about entitlement to monies held in reserve by the
plaintiff insurance company, rather than ERISA plan
assets. In a thorough opinion, the Second Circuit noted
that ERISA preemption is triggered by a state law’s
— Ree EE Tl a re
App. 25
effect on a plan’s primary administrative functions,
such as determining an employee’s eligibility for a
benefit and the amount of the benefit, rather than an
indirect effect on administrative procedures.
According to the Second Circuit, ERISA preempts
state laws that provide an alternative cause of action to
employees to collect ERISA benefits, refer specifically
to ERISA plans or apply solely to such plans, or inter-
fere with the calculation of benefits owed to employees.
Id. at 146. It does not, however, preempt laws of gen-
eral application which have only an indirect effect on
an ERISA plan. Id. at 146-47. Applying these principles
to Connecticut’s escheat law, the Second Circuit con-
cluded that ERISA did not require a finding of pre-
emption. First, the Second Circuit explained that the
escheat law applies generally to lost or abandoned prop-
erty, and does not focus specifically on ERISA plans or
benefits. Jd. at 147. It also noted that escheat of aban-
doned property is an area of traditional state authority
and thus should not be preempted by federal law unless
that conclusion is unavoidable. /d.
Finally, it acknowledged that the escheat law would
impact ERISA plans both economically and administra-
tively, because: (1) the insurance company would have
to include the value of escheated claims in the experi-
ence rating of employers, which would likely lead to
some combination of higher premiums for employers,
lower benefits for employees, lower profits for the in-
surer administering the plan; (2) it would affect rela-
tions with principal ERISA entities as beneficiaries
would have to seek payment from the State rather than
the insurer after the initial escheat period had passed;
App. 26
and (3) it would burden beneficiaries, as collecting
benefits from the State would be more difficult than
presenting an uncollected draft to the insurer.
Nevertheless, analogizing escheated claims to gar-
nishment laws, the Second Circuit concluded that the
effects of the escheat law were too insubstantial to
persuade the court that Congress meant to preempt it.
Specifically, the court noted that the law’s impact was
far less than a state garnishment statute, which allows
a creditor to seize benefits immediately, as it only
affected benefits unclaimed for many years. It also
noted that escheat laws present no greater threat of
inconsistency among state laws than does garnishment.
Id. at 147-48. In addition, it stated that the procedures
for collecting previously unclaimed benefits from the
State were not so much more complex than collecting a
draft more than three years old. Jd. at 148. Finally, the
Second Circuit rejected the insurer’s argument that the
escheat law provided beneficiaries with an alternative
cause of action of recovering benefits, explaining that it
affects the method by which certain beneficiaries may
collect drafts, rather than the issuance of the drafts in
the first instance. Jd. at 148-49.
In Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Florida, Inc. v.
Department of Banking and Finance, 791 F.2d 1501
(11th Cir. 1986), the Eleventh Circuit held that ERISA
preempted Florida’s unclaimed property act because
Florida’s law conflicted with a provision in Blue Cross’
federal health benefit program regarding the disposition
of unclaimed benefits. Specifically, the government’s
contract with Blue Cross specified that uncashed bene-
fit checks over two years old shall be voided and cred-
App. 27
ited to the plan’s reserve fund for the net excess of
premium payments over claims and expenses. In Blue
Cross & Blue Shield of Florida, the court declined to
independently determine whether the state escheat law
was related to the ERISA plan. Instead, it opted to
defer to the conclusion of the agency charged with
administering Blue Cross’ ERISA program that ERISA
preempted the escheat law.
Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that, to
sustain the agency’s position, it “need not find that its
construction is the only reasonable one, or even that it
is the result we would have reached had the question
arisen in the first instance in judicial proceedings.” Jd.
at 1506, citing Unemployment Compensation Com-
mission of Alaska v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 153 (1946).
Concluding that the agency’s position was reasonable
(and that the opposite conclusion might also be reason-
able), the Eleventh Circuit deferred to the agency and
found that ERISA preempted Florida’s escheat statute.
Finally, in Attorney General v. Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Michigan, 168 Mich. App. 372, 424 N.W.2d 54
(Mich. App. 1988), the Michigan Appellate court held
that ERISA did not preempt the application of Michi-
gan’s escheat law to an ERISA fund. The Blue Cross &
Blue Shield of Michigan court, like the Borges court,
was confronted with a dispute about entitlement to
monies held in reserve by the plaintiff insurance com-
pany, rather than ERISA plan assets. The court consid-
ered whether the state law: (1) represented a tradition-
al exercise of state authority; (2) affected relations
among principal ERISA entities and an outside party or
between two outside parties with only an incidental
App. 28
effect on the plan; and (3) affected ERISA plans in a
non-incidental way. Jd. 168 Mich. App. at 382, 424
N.W.2d at 58. The court then concluded that the state
escheat law was not preempted, largely because the
state escheat law was a statute of general application
that affected the defendant in its capacity as a holder
of abandoned property, not its capacity as an ERISA
entity and because the escheat law did not affect the
structure, administration, or types of benefits provided
under the ERISA plan. Jd.
3. Illinois’ Escheat Statute
Determining whether Illinois’ escheat statute “relates
to” an ERISA plan is difficult, as the preemption
provision is “unhelpful,” California Division of Labor
Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham, Construction,
117 S. Ct. 832, 837 (1997), and there are pros and cons
to each side’s position. As noted above, however, the
United States Department of Labor has issued an
advisory opinion that specifically addresses ERISA’s
impact on the IUPA and concludes that the IUPA is
preempted. U.S. Dept. of Labor Advisory Opinion 78-
32A (1978). In addition, the Secretary of Labor has filed
an amicus curiae brief supporting the plaintiffs view
that the ERISA preempts the IUPA.
The United States Department of Labor is the federal
agency charged with administering and enforcing
ERISA, and has the authority to render authoritative
interpretations of ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2); Her-
man v. Nationsbank Trust Co., 126 F.3d 1354, 1363
(11th Cir. 1997); see generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1145.
As such, its interpretation of ERISA, while not conclu-
App. 29
sive, is entitled to “great deference.” Blue Cross & Blue
Shield of Florida v. Dep’t of Banking & Finance, 791
F.2d at 1506, quoting Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1
(1965).
In other words, the well-known standard set forth in
Chevron, U.S.A. v. National Resources Defense Counsel,
Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), applies. Under Chevron, a
court does not search for what is, in the court’s view,
the best possible construction of a statute. Herman v.
Nationsbank Trust Co., 126 F.3d at 1363. Instead, if a
“statute is ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,
the question for the courts is whether the agency’s
answer is based on a permissible construction of the
statute.” Huppeler v. Oscar Mayer Foods Corp., 32 F.3d
245, 251-52 (7th Cir. 1994), citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at
843.
Thus, the Supreme Court instructs that, if an agency
interpretation does not do violence to the purpose and
wording of the regulation or otherwise cross into for-
bidden terrain, courts should defer to it. Martin v.
Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission,
499 U.S. 144, 150 (1991). The fact that the agency’s
opinion is reflected in litigation documents (i.e., an
amicus brief) and an opinion letter, rather than a
formal regulation, does not render it meaningless.
Agency opinions that are not embodied in formal regu-
lations promulgated by the Secretary are nevertheless
entitled to deference. See, e.g., Herman v. Nationsbank
Trust Co., 126 F.3d at 1363 (collecting cases).
The court will, therefore, defer to the Secretary’s
position regarding the IUPA if that position is reason-
able. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida v. Dep't of
App. 30
Revenue and Finance, 791 F.2d at 1506 (holding that
the federal Office of Personnel Management’s interpre-
tation of a federal health benefits contract was reason-
able and that ERISA thus preempted Florida’s Un-
claimed Property Act). In making this determination,
the court looks to “the objectives of the ERISA statute
as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress
understood would survive . . . as well as to the nature
of the effect of the state law on ERISA plans.” Califor-
nia Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v.
Dillingham, 117 S. Ct. at 838, quoting New York State
Conference of Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans v.
Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1671, 1677 (1995).
The following reasons support the agency’s interpreta-
tion. First, as discussed more fully above, the “relate to”
language in § 514(a) has a broad reach and, if the
IUPA is not preempted, it would reach and capture
plan benefits. This impact on an ERISA plan is more
than tenuous and remote and thus falls within the
ambit of § 514(a). Second, ERISA’s preemption provi-
sion was meant to prevent a patchwork of state laws
affecting benefits. If the IUPA (and other state’s un-
claimed property laws) reach unclaimed pension bene-
fits, this goal would be subverted. Third, under the
defendant’s interpretation of ERISA, the IUPA reaches
plan assets and imposes its own set of procedures upon
plan beneficiaries or participants seeking to claim those
benefits. This affects plan administration and overrides
ERISA’s regulations affecting plan benefits.
Although the defendants and amicus the National
Association of Unclaimed Property Administrators raise
a number of well-reasoned arguments in opposition,
App. 31
this court’s task is not to divine the best possible inter-
relation between ERISA and the IUPA. As the Eleventh
Circuit remarked when concluding that ERISA pre-
empted Florida’s Unclaimed Property Act, “although the
opposite conclusion might also be reasonable, [the agen-
cy’s] determination is entitled to deference” if it also is
reasonable. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida v.
Dep’t of Revenue and Finance, 791 F.2d at 1506.
Because the agency’s position here is reasonable, the
plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment.
IV. Conclusion
For the above reasons, the plaintiffs’ motion for sum-
mary judgment [15-1] is granted and, the defendant’s
cross-motion for summary judgment [19-1] is denied.
The court commends counsel for their thoroughly re-
searched and well-written briefs and thanks the amicus
for providing the court with their views on the novel
and important issue presented by this case.
DATE: MAY 8 1998
Blanche M. Manning
United States District Court Judge
App. 32
United States District Court
Northern District of Illinois
Eastern Division
JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE
ComEd
Vv. Case Number: 97 C 6
Casillas
O Jury Verdict. This action came before the Court for
a trial by jury. The issues have been tried and the jury
rendered its verdict.
& Decision by the Court. This action came to hearing
before the Court. The issues have been heard and a
decision has been rendered.
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that
Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (#15-1) is
granted and, the defendant’s cross-motion for summary
judgment (#19-1) is denied.
Michael W. Dobbins,
Clerk of Court
Date: 5/11/1998
Christopher A. Lavizzo,
Deputy Clerk
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.