Appendix — Topink v. Commonwealth Edison Co.

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App. 1

IN THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 98-2417

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY and TRUSTEES OF THE

COMMONWEALTH EDISON SERVICE ANNUITY FUND,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

SARAH D. VEGA, in her official capacity as Director,

State of Illinois Department of Financial Institutions,

Defendant-Appellant.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Dlinois, Eastern Division.

No. 97 C 6—Blanche M. Manning, Judge.

ARGUED FEBRUARY 16, 1999—DECIDED APRIL 13, 1999

Before: POSNER, Chief Judge, and FLAUM and ROVNER,

Circuit Judges.

POSNER, Chief Judge. Commonwealth Edison Company

and its defined-benefit pension plan brought this suit

under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001 et seq., against the admin-

istrator of the Illinois Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed

Property Act, 765 ILCS 1025, seeking a declaration that

ERISA preempts the Illinois statute to the extent that the

statute regulates such plans. The district court agreed,

precipitating this appeal by the state. A threshold ques-

areas

App. 2

tion unremarked by the parties or the district judge con-

cerns the state’s Eleventh Amendment immunity to being

sued in a federal court without its consent. A suit against

a state officer in his or (in this case) her official capacity

is deemed a suit against the state, e.g., Kentucky v.

Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 169-70 (1985); V-1 Oil Co. v. Utah

State Dept. of Public Safety, 131 F.3d 1415, 1421 (10th Cir.

1997), and a mere failure to raise an Eleventh Amend-

ment defense in court is not treated as a waiver, e.g.,

Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 677-78 (1974); Estate of

Porter by Nelson v. Illinois, 36 F.3d 684, 691 n. 3 (7th Cir.

1994); V-1 Oil Co. v. Utah State Dept. of Public Safety, supra,

131 F.3d at 1419-20; Suarez Corporation Industries v.

McGraw, 125 F.3d 222, 227 (4th Cir. 1997), even though

the Supreme Court has now made clear that a violation

of the Eleventh Amendment does not deprive the federal

court of jurisdiction over the suit. Patsy v. Board of

Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 515 n. 19 (1982); Idaho v. Coeur

d'Alene Tribe of Idaho, 521 U.S. 261, 267 (1997). But the

only relief sought by the plaintiffs in this case is an in-

junction against enforcing a state statute that they con-

tend is unenforceable by virtue of the supremacy clause

of the Constitution, and that is relief equally available,

with no Eleventh Amendment hurdle to overcome, by a

suit against the responsible official in her private-capaci-

ty. See Idaho v. Coeur d’Alene Tribe of Idaho, supra, 521 U.S.

at 269, for the general principle, and Shaw v. Delta Air-

lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85, 96 n. 14 (1983), and Burgio & Cam-

pofelice, Inc. v. New York State Dept. of Labor, 107 F.3d 1000,

1006-07 (2d Cir. 1997), for its application to ERISA. In

consequence, federal suits against state officials for purely

injunctive relief are treated in effect as suits against them

in their personal capacity, lifting the Eleventh Amend-

ment bar. Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,

71 n. 10 (1989); Kentucky v. Graham, supra, 473 U.S. at 167

n. 14.

App. 3

The Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act, in

force in about a third of the states, requires anyone in

possession of intangible property that is unclaimed by its

owner for seven years (five under the Illinois version of

the Act) to transfer the property to the custody of the

state. A subsequent uniform law, the Uniform Unclaimed

Property Act of 1981, is in force in most of the rest of the

states; so far as relates to this case, the provisions of the

two uniform laws are the same. These are not escheat

statutes. The state does not acquire title to the property.

It is merely a custodian. The owner can reclaim his prop-

erty at any time. Prefatory Note to 1995 Act, 8B Uniform

Laws Annot., 1998 Supp. 84. But not only does the state

have the free use of the property unless and until the

owner reclaims it; the state is not required to (and Illinois

does not) pay any interest to a reclaiming owner. 765

ILCS § 1025/15; see also Uniform Unclaimed Property

Act of 1981, § 21 (§ 11 of the 1995 revision of this Act). In

effect, the property is an interest-free loan to the state—in

perpetuity if the owner never shows up to claim it.

Illinois seeks to apply the Uniform Act to benefits pay-

able under Com Ed’s pension plan that are not claimed

by a plan beneficiary within five years. When benefits are

due to a participant in the plan, the plan writes a check

to the participant. Until the participant deposits or cashes

the check and the check is paid by the plan through the

system for clearing bank transactions, the money due the

participants remains in the plan’s coffers. It is placed in

a separate account as soon as the check is written, but if

the check isn’t cashed within a year the money is retrans-

ferred to the general account and is available to pay other

participants. Com Ed does not and could not (without ad-

verse tax consequences) impose a deadline on when the

beneficiary may cash his check. See 26 C.F.R. § 1.411(a)-

4(b)(6). It could be five, or ten, or even more than ten

years after the check was written. All this time the plan

will have the use of the money due the beneficiary. Were

App. 4

the plan to be terminated, the administrator would have

a legal duty to search and make provision for missing

beneficiaries. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1056(f), 1350. But until then, the

plan’s only duty of search is whatever is implicit in the

fiduciary obligation that ERISA imposes on plans. 29

U.S.C. § 1104(a).

The Com Ed plan owes about $125,000 to beneficiaries

who have not yet cashed or deposited their checks even

though more than five years have passed since the checks

were written. The state wants this money. The plan wants

to retain it. Com Ed wants the plan to retain it too, for

even though money in the plan cannot be kicked back to

Com Ed unless and until the plan is terminated and is

determined to be overfunded, 29 U.S.C. § 1344(d); Mead

Corp. v. Tilley, 490 U.S. 714, 718 (1989); Brillinger v. General

Electric Co., 130 F.3d 61, 62 (2d Cir. 1997), the more

money there is in the plan, the less money Com Ed will

be required to contribute to it to make sure that the plan

has enough to meet its obligations. 26 U.S.C. §§ 412(a),

(b)(3); Hughes Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, 119 S. Ct. 755, 761

(1999); Nachman Corp. v. Pension Benefit Guaranty Corp.,

446 U.S. 359, 363-64 n. 5 (1980). The parties are thus fight-

ing over who gets to keep the interest on this money—the

plan, and perhaps ultimately Com Ed, or the state.

ERISA preempts any state regulation that “relates to”

an ERISA plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a); De Buono v. NYSA-

ILA Medical & Clinical Services Fund, 520 U.S. 806, 809 n.

1 (1997); Dranchak v. Akzo Nobel Inc., 88 F.3d 457, 459 (7th

Cir. 1996). The Uniform Act, although it does not refer

explicitly to ERISA plans, relates to the Com Ed plan

directly and substantially. Remember that until the check

to the beneficiary is actually presented to the plan for

payment through the banking system, and paid, the

money due to the beneficiary is an asset of the plan. The

state thus wants to take a chunk of an ERISA plan’s

assets and put it in the state treasury. After that happens,

any beneficiary of the plan who wants his benefits will

App. 5

have to apply to the state for them. The state becomes the

plan administrator with respect to those assets. Not only

does the state become the custodian of the assets, in vio-

lation of ERISA’s provisions regarding plan administra-

tion, especially 29 U.S.C. § 1103(c)(1); see Boggs v. Boggs,

520 U.S. 833, 845-46 (1997); it depletes those assets, by

taking the interest that accrues on them. If the ERISA

plan entitled a beneficiary to interest for the period be-

tween when benefits were due him and when he actually

collected them, the state would actually be reducing his

ERISA benefits. Even if the plan does not provide for in-

terest, as Com Ed’s does not, the state would still be re-

ducing the plan’s assets. Suppose the benefits due the

participant in year t are $10,000, and he doesn’t claim

them until year t+6, by which time $10,000 in plan assets

would have grown through the operation of compound

interest to $14,000. Then, were it not for the Uniform Act,

the assets of the plan would be greater by $4,000. The Act

is the device by which the state appropriates those assets

for itself.

It depletes those assets in another way, by subjecting

the plan to the varying laws of the different states. New

York State Conference of Blue Cross & Blue Shield Plans v.

Travelers Ins. Co., 514 U.S. 645, 657-58 (1995). Participants

in the Com Ed plan are scattered over 44 states. Though

there are only two basic state-law regimes governing un-

claimed property (the two uniform laws), states have

tended to custom-tailor whichever uniform law they have

chosen to their particular needs. The consequence is nu-

merous variations in the amount of time before the state

takes over the money (recall that Illinois has shortened

the period of the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Prop-

erty Act) and in the formalities for claiming the money

from the state. Russell E. Greenblatt, “ERISA Preemption

of State Unclaimed Property and Escheat Laws,” 9 Benefits

L.J. 51 (1996). Several states have not even modeled their

App. 6

unclaimed-property laws on either of the uniform laws,

but have gone their own way completely.

We do not put too much weight on this point, because

Com Ed has made no effort to quantify the burden of

compliance. We are more concerned about the confisca-

tion of interest and the usurpation of administration. At

argument we asked the state’s lawyer whether it would

make any difference to his argument if the Illinois version

of the Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed Property Act re-

quired the plan to hand over benefits unclaimed for two

weeks rather than five years, and he said it would not. In

such a case it would be blindingly obvious that the state

was taking over the administration of an ERISA plan; it

is only a little less obvious when the period is longer.

The state reinforces this characterization of the opera-

tion of the Uniform Act when it argues that its having

custody of the unclaimed benefits gives the beneficiaries

more secure protection than the retention of custody by

the plan would. The State of Illinois has better credit than

Commonwealth Edison. And while the pension plan is

funded—that is, its assets, which Com Ed cannot touch,

are actuarially equivalent to its expected obligations to

participants and beneficiaries, 29 U.S.C. § 1082; Hughes

Aircraft Co. v. Jacobson, supra, 119 S. Ct. at 761-62 (1999),

and vested benefits under a defined-benefits plan are

federally insured, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1322, 1361, participants

and beneficiaries are not completely protected. Actuarial

projections are by definition probabilistic rather than

certain, and the federal insurance is capped at a fairly

modest level. § 1322(b)(3); Mertens v. Hewitt Associates, 508

U.S. 248, 250 (1993). So state custody does add a dollop

of safety to unclaimed ERISA benefits, though given the

State of Illinois’s reputation as a late payer, the tiny incre-

ment in safety may well be offset by delay in payment

and resulting loss in the interest value of the money. In

any event, ERISA’s preemption clause, and the case law

interpreting it, make clear that a state cannot take over

App. 7

the operation of an ERISA plan, no matter how forcefully

it argues that it can do a better job than the plan’s

trustees and administrators. See Mackey v. Lanier Collection

Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U.S. 825, 829-30 (1988); cf. Shaw

v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., supra, 463 U.S. at 104-06; Alessi v.

Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 524 (1981); Maclean

v. Ford Motor Co., 831 F.2d 723, 727-28 (7th Cir. 1987).

The state argues that Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency

& Service, Inc., supra, 486 U.S. at 835-38, which holds that

ERISA does not preempt the application of state garnish-

ment statutes to employee welfare plans, controls the

present case. A vital distinction is overlooked. If an

ERISA beneficiary owes money, the creditor can use garn-

ishment to get that money from the plan rather than

having to wait until it is paid out to the beneficiary. But

the state in such a case is not taking plan assets or ad-

ministering the plan. It is merely eliminating an interme-

diate transaction in the process by which benefits are

paid to the beneficiary and seized by the creditor. The

amount of assets in the plan is unaffected by whether the

money is checked out to the beneficiary or the benefici-

ary’s creditor.

Two cases uphold the application of state escheat laws

to unclaimed benefits under ERISA plans, Aetna Life Ins.

Co. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1989), and Attorney

General v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Michigan, 424 N.W.2d

54, 58-59 (1988) (per curiam). A third disagrees. Blue Cross

& Blue Shield of Florida, Inc. v. Department of Banking &

Finance, 791 F.2d 1501 (11th Cir. 1986) (per curiam). We

need not takes sides. Escheat laws determine title. If state

law vests title to the state in unclaimed benefits, those

benefits no longer belong to the beneficiary; they belong

to the state. In fact, the state is the beneficiary. Compare

two cases. In one, the plan participant designates his

spouse as the beneficiary if the participant dies. He dies,

and so the benefits are paid to the surviving spouse. This

is no more a depletion of fund assets than when the

App. 8

benefits are paid to a creditor. In the other case, the plan

participant has failed to designate a beneficiary, and sup-

pose that the state, by operation of its escheat law (which

makes the state in effect the heir of the heirless), becomes

the beneficiary. Just as in the first case, payment to the

state, if the participant dies, does not deplete the assets of

the fund; it is simply payment to the participant’s desig-

nated-by-law beneficiary.

This case is different because the state does not claim to

have an ownership interest in unclaimed benefits. It

doesn’t want to step into the shoes of the beneficiary; it

wants to step into the plan’s shoes. That is precisely what

ERISA bars. So clear is this (see Chevron, USA Inc. v. Na-

tional Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-43

(1984)) that we don’t have to get into the issue, much

discussed in the briefs, of the precise weight to be given

the Department of Labor’s advisory opinion letters (and

its amicus curiae brief), which advise that ERISA indeed

preempts state unclaimed-property laws. The issue of the

weight to be given under the Chevron doctrine to informal

expressions of agencies’ views is unresolved, see Commis-

sioner v. Keystone Consolidated Industries, Inc., 508 U.S. 152,

162 n. 3 (1993), and compare Kilgore v. Outback Steakhouse

of Florida, Inc., 160 F.3d 294, 302 (6th Cir. 1998), with

Morton Community Unit School District No. 709 v. J.M., 152

F.3d 583, 585 (7th Cir. 1998), with Herman v. NationsBank

Trust Co., 126 F.3d 1354, 1363 (11th Cir. 1997), though

Auer v. Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 462 (1997), indicates that

some deference, at least, is to be paid to views set forth

in an amicus curiae brief filed by an agency. A further

complication here is the uncertainty of whether it is ap-

propriate to defer to an agency that is seeking to expand

federal power at the expense of the states through a gen-

erous construal of a preemption clause. For varying views

on that question, compare Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v.

FERC, 28 F.3d 1281, 1283-84 (D.C. Cir. 1994), and Indus-

trial Truck Ass’n, Inc. v. Henry, 125 F.3d 1305, 1311 (9th

App. 9

Cir. 1997), with Colorado Public Utilities Comm’n v. Harmon,

951 F.2d 1571, 1579 (10th Cir. 1991), and Teper v. Miller, 82

F.3d 989, 998 (11th Cir. 1996) (opinion of one judge). A

final complication is that the administration of ERISA is

shared between the Labor Department and the Treasury

Department. Treasury has issued a regulation that can be

interpreted to assume that uncashed ERISA plan bene-

fits checks are subject to state escheat laws. 26 C.F.R.

§ 1.411(a)-4(b)(6). But we have seen that escheat laws are

pertinently different from unclaimed-property laws. So

there is no conflict between the two agencies and there-

fore no need to decide which should have the whip hand.

AFFIRMED.

A true Copy:

Teste:

Clerk of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit

App. 10

[Dated May 8, 1998]

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

COMMONWEALTH EDISON COMPANY

and THE TRUSTEES OF THE

COMMONWEALTH EDISON SERVICE

ANNUITY FUND,

Plaintiffs,

v. 97 C 0006

FRANK C. CASILLAS, in his official

capacity as DIRECTOR, STATE OF

ILLINOIS DEPARTMENT OF FINANCIAL

INSTITUTIONS,

ee

Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

This case turns on the reach of § 514 of the Employee

Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (“ERISA”),

which is ERISA’s preemption provision. 29 U.S.C.

§ 1144. Specifically, the parties dispute whether ERISA

preempts the Illinois Uniform Disposition of Unclaimed

Property Act (“IUPA”), 765 ILCS 1025/7, and thus

prohibits the IUPA from reaching unclaimed pension

benefit payments of employee benefit plans covered by

ERISA. Plaintiffs Commonwealth Edison Company

(“ComEd”) and the Trustees of the Commonwealth

Edison Service Annuity Fund (the “Trustees”) seek a

declaratory judgment against defendant Director of the

Illinois Department of Financial Institutions (the “Di-

rector”) finding that ERISA preempts the IUPA.

App. 11

The parties have filed cross-motions for summary

judgment and amicus curiae The National Association

of Unclaimed Property Administrators and the Secre-

tary of Labor have filed memoranda addressing the

preemption issue. For the following reasons, the plain-

tiffs’ motion for summary judgment is granted and, the

defendant’s cross-motion for summary judgment is de-

nied.

I. Jurisdiction and Venue

According to the plaintiffs, jurisdiction is proper

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331 and 29 U.S.C. § 1332(e)

because ERISA preempts the IUPA. Federal question

jurisdiction thus turns on this court’s resolution of the

preemption issue. The court notes, however, that venue

in this district is appropriate pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 1391(b), as the defendant maintains an office in this

district, a substantial part of the events giving rise to

the claim occurred in this district, and a substantial

part of the property that is the subject of this case is

located in this district.

Il. Background

A. The Parties

Plaintiff ComEd is a public utility company that em-

ploys a workforce of over 16,800. It is a corporation

organized under the laws of the State of Illinois, and

maintains its principal offices in Chicago, Illinois.

ComEd is the plan sponsor, the administrator, and a

named fiduciary of the Commonwealth Edison Service

Annuity System (the “Plan”), which is an employee pen-

App. 12

sion benefit plan under ERISA, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1002(16)

and 1102(a). The plaintiff Trustees, who are also mem-

bers of ComEd’s Board of Directors and its parent,

Unicom Corporation, are “named fiduciaries” of the

Commonwealth Edison Service Annuity Fund (the

“ComEd Annuity Fund”) under ERISA. 29 U.S.C.

§ 1102(a). The ComEd Annuity Fund is an employee

benefit fund within the meaning of ERISA. 29 U.S.C.

§§ 1002(2) and (3).

Defendant Frank Casillas is the Director of the State

of Illinois Department of Financial Institutions and is

sued in his official capacity. The State of Illinois De-

partment of Financial Institutions (*DFI”) is an agency

of the State of Illinois. It maintains offices in Chicago

and is responsible for administering the IUPA.

B. The Facts

The essential facts are undisputed. ComEd’s Plan pro-

vides pension benefits to more than 9750 annuitants,

who reside in 44 states. ComEd’s Annuity Fund was

created under a written agreement between ComEd and

predecessors of the Trustees to establish a trust fund

for the payment of service annuities under the Plan. In

accordance with the terms of the agreement establish-

ing ComEd’s Annuity Fund, the assets of the Annuity

Fund are maintained exclusively for the benefit of

participants under ComEd’s Plan. The ComEd Annuity

Fund holds a general pool of assets for the benefit of all

Plan participants. Individual Plan participants do not

have separately identified accounts in the ComEd An-

nuity Fund or under ComEd’s Plan.

App. 13

A determinable annuity payment as computed under

the Plan is payable to eligible annuitants each payment

period after benefits payments commence. Eligible an-

nuitants, as defined by the Plan, are entitled to regular

annuity payments made from the ComEd Annuity

Fund. These annuitants receive bimonthly service-an-

nuity payments from the ComEd Annuity Fund, either

by check or by direct deposit into their bank accounts.

To accommodate the issuance of the bimonthly pay-

ments, the Trustees maintain, as part of the ComEd

Annuity Fund, a checking account from which benefit

payments are made. The checking account constitutes

part of the assets of the ComEd Annuity Fund. The

checking account balance is kept at an adequate level

to ensure that sufficient funds are available to cover

checks issued for current benefit payments.

If a ComEd annuitant fails to cash a check issued

pursuant to ComEd’s Plan within one year, the amount

of funds periodically transferred to the ComEd Annuity

Fund’s checking account is reduced by the amount of

the uncashed checks. After one year, these amounts are

considered assets available generally for payment of |

benefits under ComEd’s Plan. The level of current

assets available for payment of benefits is one of the

many factors used in making the actuarial determina-

tion of the amount of contributions, if any, that ComEd

should make to the Annuity Fund.

ComEd’s Plan does not require annuitants to cash

their benefit-payment checks within a certain time

period in order to be entitled to receive the funds

specified in their checks. The general practice of the

ComEd Annuity Fund and the ComEd Plan is to honor

a” Cl ee

App. 14

claims for payment of stale checks. DFI has advised

ComEd of its position that the ComEd Plan is a holder

of unclaimed property subject to the requirements of

the IUPA, and has asked ComEd to file a report under

the IUPA and to remit to DFI the value of benefit

payment checks which have remained uncashed for

more than five years.

The plaintiffs filed suit, seeking a declaratory judg-

ment that ERISA preempts the application of the [UPA

to obtain the value of annuity checks that are un-

claimed and uncashed for more than five years. Amicus

curiae the Secretary of Labor supports the plaintiffs,

while amicus curiae the National Association of Un-

claimed Property Administrators supports the defen-

dant.

C. The Parties’ Positions

ComEd argues that ERISA preempts the application

of the IUPA to funds held in trust by ComEd’s Plan,

which, as noted above, is an employee pension benefit

plan subject to ERISA. It asserts that, if the IUPA

applies, it would have to make payments directly from

the ComEd Annuity Fund to the Illinois Department of

Financial Institutions, thereby reducing the amount of

Plan assets held in trust for the benefit of all Plan

participants and beneficiaries. ComFd also points to

ERISA’s broad preemptive reach, as well as an advisory

opinion from the United States Department of Labor

stating that ERISA preempts the IUPA and other

states’ escheat laws. Finally, ComEd argues that pay-

ment of the unclaimed funds to the State would violate

ERISA’s anti-alienation provision, 29 U.S.C. § 1056(d).

App. 15

Amicus curiae the Secretary of Labor contends that

the phrase “relate to” in § 514(a) encompasses the

IUPA. In addition, the Secretary argues that the IUPA

is preempted under general conflict preemption prin-

ciples, Boggs v. Boggs, 117 S. Ct. 1754 (1997), as well

as because it mandates employee benefit structures and

plan administration, and provides an alternative en-

forcement mechanism. Finally, the Secretary of Labor

contends that the IUPA violates ERISA’s prohibition

against assignment or alienation of plan benefits.

The Director argues that the IUPA does not “relate

to” the value of checks issued to annuitants under

ComEd’s Plan because Illinois’ actions with respect to

the IUPA affect the plan in a tenuous, remote manner.

He also notes that the IUPA is a law of general appli-

cation addressing abandoned property and does not

expressly refer to ERISA plans. In addition, he con-

tends that the IUPA fails to have a connection with any

ERISA plans. Finally, he cites to Aetna Life Insurance

Company v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1989), and

Attorney General v. Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Mich-

igan, 168 Mich. App. 372, 424 N.W.2d 54 (1988).

Amicus curiae the National Association of Unclaimed

Property Administrators argues that giving the un-

claimed funds to the State would not reduce the bene-

fits available to the Plan’s participants and benefi-

ciaries. It also asserts that ComEd should not be

permitted to use the unclaimed monies to offset its

obligation to contribute and that doing so is a “prohibit-

ed transaction.”

App. 16

D. The Illinois Unclaimed Property Act

The relevant provisions of the IUPA provide:

§ 7. All intangible personal property and any

income or increment thereon, held in a fiduciary

capacity (other than as a trustee of an active

express trust) for the benefit of another person

is presumed abandoned unless the owner has,

within 5 years after it becomes payable or

distributable, increased or decreased the princi-

pal, accepted payment of principal or income,

corresponded in writing concerning the prop-

erty, or otherwise indicated an interest as

evidenced by a memorandum on file with the

fiduciary;

(a) If the property is held by a banking

organization or a financial organization, or

by a business association organized under

the laws of or created in this State; or

(b) If it is held by a business association,

doing business in this States, but not orga-

nized under the laws of or created in this

State, and the records of the business asso-

ciation indicate that the last known address

of the person entitled thereto is in this

State; or

(c) If it is held in this State by any other

person.

765 ILCS 1025/7.

§ 20. (a) The Director shall consider any claim

filed under this Act and may, in his discretion,

hold a hearing and receive evidence concerning

it. . . . The Director or hearing officer shall

prepare a finding and a decision in writing on

each hearing, stating the substance of any

App. 17

evidence heard by him, his findings of fact

thereto, and the reasons for his decision. The

Director shall review the findings and decision

of each hearing conducted by a hearing officer

and issue a final written decision. The final de-

cision shall be a public record. Any claim of an

interest in property that is filed pursuant to

this Act shall be considered and a finding and

decision shall be issued by the Department in a

timely and expeditious manner.

765 ILCS 1025/20(a).

E. The Agency View of the Preemption Issue

As noted above, the Secretary of Labor has filed an

amicus curiae brief supporting the plaintiffs. In addi-

tion, the United States Department of Labor issued an

opinion letter addressing the impact of ERISA on the

IUPA. U.S. Dept. of Labor Advisory Opinion 78-32A

(1978). In that letter, the Administrator of Pension and

Welfare Benefit Programs and the United States

Department of Labor quoted the IUPA and § 514 of

ERISA and concluded that ERISA preempts the IUPA,

explaining:

Section 514(a) does not merely preempt state

laws which conflict with ERISA but all state

laws related to employee benefit plans. The

reasons for broad preemption of state laws

under ERISA were succinctly stated by Senator

Jarvis, a major sponsor and floor manager of

the bill, during final consideration:

Both House and Senate bills provided for

preemption of State law but—with one

major exception appearing in the House

App. 18

bill—defined the perimeters of preemption

in relation to the area regulated by the bill.

Such a formulation raised the possibility of

endless litigation over the validity of State

action that might impinge on Federal regu-

lation, as well as opening the door to multi-

ple and potentially conflicting State laws

hastily contrived to deal with some partic-

ular aspect of private welfare or pension

plans not clearly connected to the Federal

regulatory scheme.

Although the desirability of further regula-

tion—at either the State or Federal level—

undoubtedly warrants further attention, on

balance, the emergence of a comprehensive

and pervasive Federal interest and the in-

terests of uniformity with respect to inter-

state plans required—but for certain excep-

tions—the displacement of State action in

the field of private employee benefit pro-

grams. 120 Cong. Rec. S15751 (daily ed.

Aug. 22, 1974).

Although the Illinois Act expressly exempts

active trusts from coverage under its provisions,

inactive trusts are not exempted. The Depart-

ment of Labor has previously taken the position

that employee benefit plan trusts which are

merely awaiting future distribution to partici-

pants/beneficiaries are covered as employee

benefit plans within the meaning of ERISA.

Therefore, it is the position of the Department

of Labor that the Illinois Act is preempted

under ERISA section 514. Further, it is the

Department’s position that § 514(b)(2)(A) [which

addresses state laws regulating insurance,

App. 19

banking, or securities] is inapplicable in regard

to the Illinois Act ....

III. Discussion

A. Standard for A Motion For Summary Judg-

ment

Summary judgment is proper when the “pleadings,

depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions

on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that

there is no genuine issue of any material fact.” Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c); Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317,

322 (1986). The party opposing the summary judgment

motion “may not rest upon the mere allegations or

denials of the adverse party’s pleading’; rather, it must

respond with “specific facts showing that there is a

genuine issue for trial.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e). “The

evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all

justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor.”

Valenti v. Qualex, Inc., 970 F.2d 363, 365 (7th Cir.

1992), citing Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S.

242, 255 (1986). A court should grant a motion for

summary judgment only when the record shows that a

reasonable jury could not find for the nonmoving party.

Valenti v. Qualex, Inc., 970 F.2d at 365; Anderson v.

Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. at 248.

B. Does ERISA Preempt Illinois’ Escheat Stat-

ute?

Three reported cases, all involving ERISA welfare

plans, rather than pension plans, address whether

ERISA preempts a state escheat statute. See Aetna Life

App. 20

Ins. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 493

U.S. 811 (1989) (ERISA does not preempt Connecticut’s

escheat law); Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida v.

Department of Banking and Finance, 791 F.2d 1501

(11th Cir. 1986) (ERISA preempts Florida’s escheat

statute); Attorney General v. Blue Cross and Blue

Shield of Michigan, 168 Mich. App. 372, 424 N.W. 54

(Mich. App. 1988) (ERISA does not preempt Michigan’s

escheat law). The court will provide a brief overview of

preemption principles, summarize these cases, and then

turn to the parties’ arguments.

1. General Preemption Principles

Section 514(a) of ERISA provides that:

Except as provided in subsection (b) of this

section, the provisions of this subchapter and

subchapter III of this chapter shall supercede

any and all State laws insofar as they may now

or hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan

described in section 1003(a) of this title and not

exempt under section 1003(b) of this title.

29 U.S.C. § 1144(a).

ERISA’s preemption provision is “deliberately ex-

pansive” and was “designed to ‘establish pension plan

regulation as exclusively a federal concern.’” Pilot Life

Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41, 45 (1987), quoting

Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504, 523

(1981). Courts considering preemption focus on the

interpretation of only two words in the preemption

provision—whether or not a state statute “relates to”

ERISA. The Supreme Court instructs us to read these

words broadly, as ERISA’s reach is not limited to state

App. 21

laws specifically designed to affect employee benefit or

welfare plans or to state laws meant to address ERISA

matters such as reporting, disclosure, and fiduciary

responsibilities. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S.

85, 98 (1983).

On the other hand, the Supreme Court has also

stated that, when Congress drafted the ERISA’s pre-

emption language, it did not intend to preempt all laws

that “relate to” an ERISA plan in only a small or

tangential way. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S.

at 100 n. 21. Instead, it-intended to preempt any law

that “has a connection with or reference to [a covered

employee benefit plan].” California Division of Labor

Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham Construction,

N.A., Inc., 117 S. Ct. 832, 837 (1997). Preemption is

meant to ensure that a single set of regulations will

govern the administrative practices of an ERISA plan,

as opposed to a patchwork of potentially inconsistent

state laws. Ingersoll-Rand Co. v. McClendon, 498 U.S.

133, 142 (1990) (in enacting § 514(a), Congress sought

to ensure a uniform body of benefits law and to avoid

conflicts between federal and state laws which could

work to the detriment of plan beneficiaries); Fort

Halifax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1 (1987).

In order to further this purpose, state statutes must

affect an ERISA plan in a meaningful way to “relate to”

ERISA—state laws that only have a “tenuous, remote,

or peripheral” effect on a plan do not rise to the level of

relatedness necessary to support a finding of preemp-

tion. See Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. at 100

n.21. Thus, claims that affect the structuring of ERISA

plans or claims that purport to determine the substan-

App. 22

tive rights and duties among the parties who created

and administer the plan are preempted. Rice v. Pan-

chal, 65 F.3d 637 (7th Cir. 1995). Similarly, rules gov-

erning payment to plan participants necessarily “relate

to” ERISA pension and welfare plans. Dranchak v. Akzo

Nobel, Inc., 88 F.3d 457, 459 (7th Cir. 1996).

In addition, ERISA preempts claims which interfere

with a plan’s administration, even where plan benefi-

ciaries do not assert the state law claims. For example,

in Plumber’s Pension Fund, Local 130 v. Niedrich, 891

F.2d 1297 (7th Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 930

(1990), the Seventh Circuit held that ERISA preempted

Illinois law addressing the personal liability of corpo-

rate officers and thus barred a suit based on that state

law seeking to hold the corporate officers personally

liable for delinquent pension contributions. Accord First

Nat'l Life Ins. Co. v. Sunshine Jr. Food Stores, Inc., 960

F.2d 1546 (11th Cir. 1992) (ERISA barred insurer’s suit

against employer alleging that the employer breached

its obligations under a group policy that funded an

ERISA plan), cert. denied, 506 U.S. 1079 (1993). See

also California Division of Labor Standards Enforce-

ment v. Dillingham, Construction, 117 S. Ct. at 837

(collecting cases finding preemption).

In considering the reach of the phrase “relate to” in

ERISA, the Eighth Circuit’s comprehensive, although

slightly dated, survey is quite helpful. See Arkansas

Blue Cross & Blue Shield v. St. Mary’s Hospital, Inc.,

947 F.2d 1341, 1344 (8th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 504

U.S. 957 (1992). Specifically, when considering whether

ERISA preempted Arkansas’ assignment statute, the

Eighth Circuit stated that courts:

App. 23

... have relied on a variety of factors when

determining whether a state statute of general

application “relates to” ERISA plans. [footnote

omitted]. These factors include whether the

state law negates an ERISA plan provision,

Baxter v. Lynn, 886 F.2d 182, 185 (8th Cir.

1989), whether the state law affects relations

between primary ERISA entities, Firestone Tire

& Rubber Co. v. Neusser, 810 F.2d 550, 556

(6th Cir. 1987); Sommers Drug Stores v. Cor-

rigan Enters., 793 F.2d 1456, 1467 (5th Cir.

1986), whether the state law impacts the struc-

ture of ERISA plans, United Food & Commer-

cial Workers v. Pacyga, 801 F.2d 1157, 1160

(9th Cir. 1986), whether the state law impacts

the administration of ERISA plans, Fort Halifax

Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 U.S. 1, 9-10 (1987),

whether the state law has an economic impact

on ERISA plans, Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Borges,

869 F.2d 142, 147-48 (2d Cir. 1989), whether

preemption of the state law is consistent with

other ERISA provisions, Mackey v. Lanier Col-

lection Agency & Serv., 486 U.S. 825, 832-40

(1988), and whether the state law is an exercise

of traditional state power, Aetna Life Ins. Co.,

869 F.2d at 148; Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,

810 F.2d at 555.

947 F.2d at 1344.

The Eighth Circuit then explained that “all these

factors can be relevant to an ERISA preemption analy-

sis. Like any list of factors, however, they only serve to

focus and clarify the court’s analysis. The court must

still look to the totality of the state statute’s impact on

the plan—both how many of the factors favor preemp-

tion and how heavily each individual factor favors

App. 24

preemption are relevant.” Jd. The court then concluded

that, although no one factor was determinative of the

ERISA preemption issue, the aggregate of the factors

militated in favor of a finding that Arkansas’ assign-

ment statute “related to” ERISA welfare benefit plans

and thus was preempted. Jd. at 1344-45.

No Seventh Circuit authority addresses whether a

state law controlling unclaimed property held by a an

ERISA fund “relates to” ERISA. Accordingly, this suit

lies in the netherworld between clearly preempted suits

which implicate the interpretation or administration of

an ERISA plan, and suits that merely address the

relationships among parties incidental to the adminis-

tration of beneficiaries’ rights under a plan. See Fox,

Curtis & Associates, Inc. v. Employee Benefit Plans,

Inc., No. 92 C 5828, 1993 WL 265474 *4 (N.D. Ill. Jul.

13, 1993). Thus, the court turns to the decisions of

other courts addressing this issue for assistance in

determining whether ERISA preempts Illinois’ escheat

law.

ii. Cases Addressing Preemption of Escheat

Statutes

In Aetna Life Ins. v. Borges, the Second Circuit held

that ERISA does not preempt Connecticut’s escheat law

as it applies to uncollected drafts for employee benefits.

Aetna Life Ins. v. Borges, 869 F.2d 142 (2d Cir. 1989).

The Borges court, however, was confronted with a dis-

pute about entitlement to monies held in reserve by the

plaintiff insurance company, rather than ERISA plan

assets. In a thorough opinion, the Second Circuit noted

that ERISA preemption is triggered by a state law’s

— Ree EE Tl a re

App. 25

effect on a plan’s primary administrative functions,

such as determining an employee’s eligibility for a

benefit and the amount of the benefit, rather than an

indirect effect on administrative procedures.

According to the Second Circuit, ERISA preempts

state laws that provide an alternative cause of action to

employees to collect ERISA benefits, refer specifically

to ERISA plans or apply solely to such plans, or inter-

fere with the calculation of benefits owed to employees.

Id. at 146. It does not, however, preempt laws of gen-

eral application which have only an indirect effect on

an ERISA plan. Id. at 146-47. Applying these principles

to Connecticut’s escheat law, the Second Circuit con-

cluded that ERISA did not require a finding of pre-

emption. First, the Second Circuit explained that the

escheat law applies generally to lost or abandoned prop-

erty, and does not focus specifically on ERISA plans or

benefits. Jd. at 147. It also noted that escheat of aban-

doned property is an area of traditional state authority

and thus should not be preempted by federal law unless

that conclusion is unavoidable. /d.

Finally, it acknowledged that the escheat law would

impact ERISA plans both economically and administra-

tively, because: (1) the insurance company would have

to include the value of escheated claims in the experi-

ence rating of employers, which would likely lead to

some combination of higher premiums for employers,

lower benefits for employees, lower profits for the in-

surer administering the plan; (2) it would affect rela-

tions with principal ERISA entities as beneficiaries

would have to seek payment from the State rather than

the insurer after the initial escheat period had passed;

App. 26

and (3) it would burden beneficiaries, as collecting

benefits from the State would be more difficult than

presenting an uncollected draft to the insurer.

Nevertheless, analogizing escheated claims to gar-

nishment laws, the Second Circuit concluded that the

effects of the escheat law were too insubstantial to

persuade the court that Congress meant to preempt it.

Specifically, the court noted that the law’s impact was

far less than a state garnishment statute, which allows

a creditor to seize benefits immediately, as it only

affected benefits unclaimed for many years. It also

noted that escheat laws present no greater threat of

inconsistency among state laws than does garnishment.

Id. at 147-48. In addition, it stated that the procedures

for collecting previously unclaimed benefits from the

State were not so much more complex than collecting a

draft more than three years old. Jd. at 148. Finally, the

Second Circuit rejected the insurer’s argument that the

escheat law provided beneficiaries with an alternative

cause of action of recovering benefits, explaining that it

affects the method by which certain beneficiaries may

collect drafts, rather than the issuance of the drafts in

the first instance. Jd. at 148-49.

In Blue Cross & Blue Shield of Florida, Inc. v.

Department of Banking and Finance, 791 F.2d 1501

(11th Cir. 1986), the Eleventh Circuit held that ERISA

preempted Florida’s unclaimed property act because

Florida’s law conflicted with a provision in Blue Cross’

federal health benefit program regarding the disposition

of unclaimed benefits. Specifically, the government’s

contract with Blue Cross specified that uncashed bene-

fit checks over two years old shall be voided and cred-

App. 27

ited to the plan’s reserve fund for the net excess of

premium payments over claims and expenses. In Blue

Cross & Blue Shield of Florida, the court declined to

independently determine whether the state escheat law

was related to the ERISA plan. Instead, it opted to

defer to the conclusion of the agency charged with

administering Blue Cross’ ERISA program that ERISA

preempted the escheat law.

Specifically, the Eleventh Circuit reasoned that, to

sustain the agency’s position, it “need not find that its

construction is the only reasonable one, or even that it

is the result we would have reached had the question

arisen in the first instance in judicial proceedings.” Jd.

at 1506, citing Unemployment Compensation Com-

mission of Alaska v. Aragon, 329 U.S. 143, 153 (1946).

Concluding that the agency’s position was reasonable

(and that the opposite conclusion might also be reason-

able), the Eleventh Circuit deferred to the agency and

found that ERISA preempted Florida’s escheat statute.

Finally, in Attorney General v. Blue Cross & Blue

Shield of Michigan, 168 Mich. App. 372, 424 N.W.2d 54

(Mich. App. 1988), the Michigan Appellate court held

that ERISA did not preempt the application of Michi-

gan’s escheat law to an ERISA fund. The Blue Cross &

Blue Shield of Michigan court, like the Borges court,

was confronted with a dispute about entitlement to

monies held in reserve by the plaintiff insurance com-

pany, rather than ERISA plan assets. The court consid-

ered whether the state law: (1) represented a tradition-

al exercise of state authority; (2) affected relations

among principal ERISA entities and an outside party or

between two outside parties with only an incidental

App. 28

effect on the plan; and (3) affected ERISA plans in a

non-incidental way. Jd. 168 Mich. App. at 382, 424

N.W.2d at 58. The court then concluded that the state

escheat law was not preempted, largely because the

state escheat law was a statute of general application

that affected the defendant in its capacity as a holder

of abandoned property, not its capacity as an ERISA

entity and because the escheat law did not affect the

structure, administration, or types of benefits provided

under the ERISA plan. Jd.

3. Illinois’ Escheat Statute

Determining whether Illinois’ escheat statute “relates

to” an ERISA plan is difficult, as the preemption

provision is “unhelpful,” California Division of Labor

Standards Enforcement v. Dillingham, Construction,

117 S. Ct. 832, 837 (1997), and there are pros and cons

to each side’s position. As noted above, however, the

United States Department of Labor has issued an

advisory opinion that specifically addresses ERISA’s

impact on the IUPA and concludes that the IUPA is

preempted. U.S. Dept. of Labor Advisory Opinion 78-

32A (1978). In addition, the Secretary of Labor has filed

an amicus curiae brief supporting the plaintiffs view

that the ERISA preempts the IUPA.

The United States Department of Labor is the federal

agency charged with administering and enforcing

ERISA, and has the authority to render authoritative

interpretations of ERISA. 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)(2); Her-

man v. Nationsbank Trust Co., 126 F.3d 1354, 1363

(11th Cir. 1997); see generally 29 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1145.

As such, its interpretation of ERISA, while not conclu-

App. 29

sive, is entitled to “great deference.” Blue Cross & Blue

Shield of Florida v. Dep’t of Banking & Finance, 791

F.2d at 1506, quoting Udall v. Tallman, 380 U.S. 1

(1965).

In other words, the well-known standard set forth in

Chevron, U.S.A. v. National Resources Defense Counsel,

Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984), applies. Under Chevron, a

court does not search for what is, in the court’s view,

the best possible construction of a statute. Herman v.

Nationsbank Trust Co., 126 F.3d at 1363. Instead, if a

“statute is ambiguous with respect to the specific issue,

the question for the courts is whether the agency’s

answer is based on a permissible construction of the

statute.” Huppeler v. Oscar Mayer Foods Corp., 32 F.3d

245, 251-52 (7th Cir. 1994), citing Chevron, 467 U.S. at

843.

Thus, the Supreme Court instructs that, if an agency

interpretation does not do violence to the purpose and

wording of the regulation or otherwise cross into for-

bidden terrain, courts should defer to it. Martin v.

Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission,

499 U.S. 144, 150 (1991). The fact that the agency’s

opinion is reflected in litigation documents (i.e., an

amicus brief) and an opinion letter, rather than a

formal regulation, does not render it meaningless.

Agency opinions that are not embodied in formal regu-

lations promulgated by the Secretary are nevertheless

entitled to deference. See, e.g., Herman v. Nationsbank

Trust Co., 126 F.3d at 1363 (collecting cases).

The court will, therefore, defer to the Secretary’s

position regarding the IUPA if that position is reason-

able. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida v. Dep't of

App. 30

Revenue and Finance, 791 F.2d at 1506 (holding that

the federal Office of Personnel Management’s interpre-

tation of a federal health benefits contract was reason-

able and that ERISA thus preempted Florida’s Un-

claimed Property Act). In making this determination,

the court looks to “the objectives of the ERISA statute

as a guide to the scope of the state law that Congress

understood would survive . . . as well as to the nature

of the effect of the state law on ERISA plans.” Califor-

nia Division of Labor Standards Enforcement v.

Dillingham, 117 S. Ct. at 838, quoting New York State

Conference of Blue Cross and Blue Shield Plans v.

Travelers Ins. Co., 115 S. Ct. 1671, 1677 (1995).

The following reasons support the agency’s interpreta-

tion. First, as discussed more fully above, the “relate to”

language in § 514(a) has a broad reach and, if the

IUPA is not preempted, it would reach and capture

plan benefits. This impact on an ERISA plan is more

than tenuous and remote and thus falls within the

ambit of § 514(a). Second, ERISA’s preemption provi-

sion was meant to prevent a patchwork of state laws

affecting benefits. If the IUPA (and other state’s un-

claimed property laws) reach unclaimed pension bene-

fits, this goal would be subverted. Third, under the

defendant’s interpretation of ERISA, the IUPA reaches

plan assets and imposes its own set of procedures upon

plan beneficiaries or participants seeking to claim those

benefits. This affects plan administration and overrides

ERISA’s regulations affecting plan benefits.

Although the defendants and amicus the National

Association of Unclaimed Property Administrators raise

a number of well-reasoned arguments in opposition,

App. 31

this court’s task is not to divine the best possible inter-

relation between ERISA and the IUPA. As the Eleventh

Circuit remarked when concluding that ERISA pre-

empted Florida’s Unclaimed Property Act, “although the

opposite conclusion might also be reasonable, [the agen-

cy’s] determination is entitled to deference” if it also is

reasonable. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Florida v.

Dep’t of Revenue and Finance, 791 F.2d at 1506.

Because the agency’s position here is reasonable, the

plaintiffs are entitled to summary judgment.

IV. Conclusion

For the above reasons, the plaintiffs’ motion for sum-

mary judgment [15-1] is granted and, the defendant’s

cross-motion for summary judgment [19-1] is denied.

The court commends counsel for their thoroughly re-

searched and well-written briefs and thanks the amicus

for providing the court with their views on the novel

and important issue presented by this case.

DATE: MAY 8 1998

Blanche M. Manning

United States District Court Judge

App. 32

United States District Court

Northern District of Illinois

Eastern Division

JUDGMENT IN A CIVIL CASE

ComEd

Vv. Case Number: 97 C 6

Casillas

O Jury Verdict. This action came before the Court for

a trial by jury. The issues have been tried and the jury

rendered its verdict.

& Decision by the Court. This action came to hearing

before the Court. The issues have been heard and a

decision has been rendered.

IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that

Plaintiff's motion for summary judgment (#15-1) is

granted and, the defendant’s cross-motion for summary

judgment (#19-1) is denied.

Michael W. Dobbins,

Clerk of Court

Date: 5/11/1998

Christopher A. Lavizzo,

Deputy Clerk

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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Appendix — Topink v. Commonwealth Edison Co. · 528 U.S. 873 | Frix