Opinion — Rodman v. Pothier

Supreme Court brief1924

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RODMAN, UNITED STATES MARSHAL, »v.

POTHIER.

CERTIORARI TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

FIRST CIRCUIT.

No. 546. Argued March 14, 1924—Decided April 7, 1924.

Where a person was held for removal under an indictment charging

murder on a military reservation under exclusive jurisdiction of

the United States, and the existence of such exclusive jurisdiction

involved consideration of many facts and seriously controverted

questions of law, held, that determination of that issue was for the

court where the indictment was found and was not open for deci-

sion in another district in habeas corpus. P. 402,

291 Fed. 311, reversed.

400 OCTOBER TERM, 1923.

Opinion of the Court. 264 U.S.

CrrTIORARI to a judgment of the Circuit Court ef Ap-

peals which reversed a judgment of the District Court

dismissing a writ of habeas corpus, and ordered the pris-

oner discharged.

Mr. Solicitor General Beck, with whom Mr. Alfred A.

Wheat, Special Assistant to the Attorney General, was on

the brief, for petitioner.

Mr. Louis Marshall, with whom Mr. Davis G. Arnold

was on the brief, for respondent.

Mr. Jesse C. Adkins and Mr. Frank F. Nesbit, by leave

of Court, filed a brief as amici curiae.

Mr. Louis Marshall, by leave of Court, filed a brief as

amicus curiae.

Mr. Justice McRerNotps delivered the opinion of the

Court.

Respondent Pothier and another were duly indicted—

October 13, 1922—for the murder of Alexander P. Cronk-

hite, on October 25, 1918, “ within and on lands thereto-

fore acquired for the exclusive use of the United States,

and under the exclusive jurisdiction thereof, and within

the Southern Division of the Western District of Wash-

ington, to wit, within and on the Camp Lewis Military

Reservation.” Pothier was arrested in the State of Rhode

Island and, after hearings before the Commissioner and

the District Court, a warrant for his removal was directed

as provided by § 1014, Rev. Stats. By this habeas

corpus proceeding the validity of the warrant is ques-

tioned and respondent’s release sought. His contention is

that the United States had not acquired exclusive juris-

diction over the place of the crime as alleged by the

indictment because they had not then received a deed to

the land.

EES

SS EE RIN RPE I PONT ES ENTE NE NE IS EN DY

RODMAN v. POTHIER. 401

399 Opinion of the Court.

The District Court said and held, 285 Fed. 632—

“The argument of the defense is that by the terms of

the statute the passing of the deed is a prerequisite to the

exclusive jurisdiction of the United States, and that as

the deed postdates the time of the alleged murder the

United States did not then have exclusive jurisdiction

over the lands conveyed by said deed. But the evidence

shows also that before the passage of the deeds, and be-

fore the date of the alleged murder, Pierce County, acting

as the arm and agent of the State, had acquired by con-

demnation, and had turned over to the United States

military authorities, many tracts of land comprised

within the Camp Lewis Military Reservation, which had

been selected by a representative of the Secretary of

War, and which, when donated to the United States,

the Secretary of War had been authorized to accept.

Buildings had been erected and the camp permanently

occupied before January 29, 1918, and before July, 1918,

there were 50,000 men in camp. There is much evidence

tending to show that as to a number of the tracts of land

comprised in the camp there was, before the date of the

alleged crime, a practical consummation of the donation,

and that the agents of the county and of the United

States had done all that it was necessary to do in order

to vest title and exclusive jurisdiction in the United

States, save the execution and recording of the deeds

whereby the title of the United States should be evi-

denced. The contention of the United States that the

evidence of de facto exercise of exclusive jurisdiction is

sufficient in itself to show probable cause cannot be dis-

regarded, in view of the quaere in Holt v. United States,

218 U.S. 245, 252: ‘ The documents referred to are not

before us, but they properly were introduced, and so

far as we can see justified the finding of the jury, even

if the evidence of the de facto exercise of exclusive juris-

diction was not enough, or if the United States was called

NTS51°—24 26

402 OCTOBER TERM, 1923.

Opinion of the Court. 264 U.S.

on to try title in a murder case.’ ...I am of the

opinion that the defendant has failed to overcome the

prima facie case made by the indictment, and that the

evidence fails to show the want of probable cause.”

The Circuit Court of Appeals, 291 Fed. 311, was “ of

the opinion that no other conclusion can be drawn from

the evidence than that, at the time the crime charged

in the indictment was committed, the United States had

acquired no title in the land embraced within Camp |

Lewis Military Reservation; that the sovereignty of the

State over the tract had not then been yielded up and was

not until the deed, map, etc., were filed in the office of the

County Auditor of Pierce County for record, which was

not until November 15, 1919, more than a year after the

alleged murder. This being so, there is an absolute want

of probable cause for the removal of the appellant to

answer to the crime charged. Greene v. Henkel, 183

U. S. 249, 261.” It accordingly reversed the judgment

of the District Court and directed Pothier’s discharge.

We think there was enough to show probable cause

and that the judgment of the District Court is correct.

Whether the locus of the alleged crime was within the

exclusive jurisdiction of the United States demands con-

sideration of many facts and seriously controverted ques-

tions of law. As heretofore often pointed out, these mat-

ters must be determined by the court where the indict-

ment was found. The regular course may not be antici-

pated by alleging want of jurisdiction and demanding a

ruling thereon in a habeas corpus proceeding. Barring

certain exceptional cases (unlike the present one), this

Court “has uniformly held that the hearing on habeas

corpus is not in the nature of a writ of error nor is it

intended as a substitute for the functions of the trial

court. Manifestly, this is true as to disputed questions

of fact, and it is equally so as to disputed matters of law,

whether they relate to the sufficiency of the indictment or

Se a eee

DAVIS v. PORTLAND SEED CO. 403

399 Syllabus.

the validity of the statute on which the charge is based.

These and all other controverted matters of law and fact

are for the determination of the trial court.” Henry v.

Henkel, 235 U. S. 219, 229: Louie v. United States, 254

U.S. 548.

Reversed.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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