Opposition Brief — City of Portland v. Northwest Environmental Advocates

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No. 95-1732

I a -

IN THE

Supreme Court of the Hnited States

October Term, 1995

CITY OF PORTLAND

Petitioner,

v.

NORTHWEST ENVIRONMENTAL ADVOCATES,

a non-profit Oregon corporation, and NINA BELL,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN

OPPOSITION

Craig N. Johnston

Associate Professor of Law

Lewis & Clark Law School

10015 S.W. Terwilliger Blvd.

Portland, OR 97219

Counsel of Record for

Respondents

David A. Bledsoe

Perkins Coie

1211 SW Fifth Avenue

Portland, OR 97204-1002

(503) 727-2000

Co-Counsel for Respondents

May 23, 1996

QUESTION PRESENTED

Does the Clean Water Act ((CWA” or “Act’) authorize

citizens to enforce narrative (non-quantified) permit

conditions?

ll

LIST OF INTERESTED PARTIES

The parties are correctly identified in the caption. Craig

N. Johnston is counsel of record for both respondents. David

A. Bledsoe of Perkins Coie is also counsel for respondents.

ll

TABLE OF CONTENTS

QUESTION PRESENTED 0.0.0. ooooocccccssssseeee Poe. ra

LIST OF INTERESTED PARTIES ................... eee

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES |... | iV

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

L THE NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION IS

FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE CLEAN

WATER ACT AND THE DECISIONS OF

PRUE RIED csseccxncssoviesedcosaseovscesesns. 3

A. The Clean Water Act Authorizes

Both Numeric and Narrative

Effluent Limitations . 5

B. Congress Has Granted the

Federal Courts Jurisdiction to

Enforce Narrative, Water Quality-

Based Permit Conditions ........ g

te The Permit Shield Doctrine

Supports the Enforceability of All

Permit Conditions ............... , 14

I. JEFFERSON COUNTY SUPPORTS THE

NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION ................ 15

Iu CONCLUSION ...... 19

APPENDICES

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

American Paper Institute, Inc. v. Environmental

Protection Agency, 996 F.2d 346 (CADC

| SEVER eM oy A Rectan AMDOE BN Eke meno ok Me AE 6, 10-11

Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91, 105-107

Atlantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v.

Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d 353 (CA2 1993) ...00000..000000.... 9

Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural Resources

Defense Council, Inc., 467 US 837 (1984). .........0.000.00... 7, 10

Consumer Product Safety Commission v. GTE

Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 108 (1980) 00.0... 4

District of Columbia v. Schramm, 631 F.2d 854,

Bae) eR Sa RR go ue

E.]. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430

US. 112, UBB QE CISTI co ooccsssscceecsvsencecescnessnsese: ll

Municipal Authority of the Borough of St.

Mary’s v. U.S.E.P.A., 945 F.2d 67, 71 (CA3

Northwest Environmental Advocates v. City of

Portland, Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals No.

Vv

Oregon Natural Resources Council v. United

States Forest Service, 834 F.2d 842 (CA9

a. aaa 24 4 ,,

Public Interest Research Group of New Jersey v.

Powell Duffryn Terminals, 913 F.2d 64, 78

(CA3 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1018

(1991)... -

PUD No. | of Jefferson County v. Washington

Department of Ecology, US. __,114§

Ct. 1900 (1994)........

Shell Oil Co. v. Train, 585 F.2d 408 (CA9 1978)

Texas Municipal Power Agency v. Administrator

of the U.S.E.P.A., 836 F.2d 1482, 1484-85

(CAS 1988) ...

United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F 2d 822,

839-40 (CA7 1977)

United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics

Corp., 749 F.2d 968 (CA2 1984)

United States v. Louisiana-Pacific Corp., slip

opinion, Civ. Act. No. C 78-0567 (N.D. Cal

1990) .....

Statutes

33 U.S.C. § 1311

my

4, 15-18

vi

MUSE SION. cc 7

ATER CTI og ee 13

RT SA ec 15

WES 6 ee ee ee 3

MUA thee... ee 14

Bee A ao ee 3

Re 8 oe ee ea 10

33 U.S.C. § 1365) ..nccccccccccsseccesseescsscessssesessssessssseseessessesseeee 10

ORS 183.484(2). ..ccccccccccccsccosssesessveceseeeee irintannaam en

Regulations and Rules

54 Fed. Reg, 23868, 2387] ...cc..cccccscccscssssesseesssevesesseevvveeveveee V1

40 CER. § 122.4) ooccccccccccssssssssecssessssssseeseeseee Soadinnstuel 8

4O CER. § 122.44(d).oo0-o-ococcccccccccsssssssessesssssssssseeveeeseee oe

4O CER. § 131.11(0)(2) coccccccccccccccsececccsssecessee “nese 1

Other Authorities

Federal Water Pollution Control Act

Amendments of 1972, S.Rep. No. 414, 92nd

Cong., Ist Sess., reprinted in 1972

CFM PRG, Dy SIP waciide cickiserbccccsdetinessinnans seagstons ae

No. 95-1732

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1995

CITY OF PORTLAND

Petitioner,

v.

NORTHWEST ENVIRONMENTAL ADVOCATES,

a non-profit Oregon corporation, and NINA BELL,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN

OPPOSITION

Respondents Northwest Environmental Advocates and

Nina Bell (collectively “NWEA”) respectfully urge this Court

to deny the petition for writ of certiorari seeking review of the

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit’s opinion

in the case of Northwest Environmental Advocates v. City of

Portland, No. 92-35044. The Court of Appeals’ opinion is

reported at 56 F.3d 979 (1995) (“NWEA IT” ) and is reproduced

in the Appendix to the petition at App-34. For the convenience

of the Court, all citations to the opinion will be to the opinion

attached to the petition.

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioner City of Portland (‘Portland’) annually

discharges hundreds of millions of gallons of diluted raw

sewage from its combined sewage and stormwater collection

system into the Willamette River and the Columbia Slough;

these ‘combined sewer overflow” (“CSO”) discharges cause

severe violations of water quality standards.

The relevant permits in this case have at all times

prohibited discharges that violate water quality standards.

Specifically, Portland’s 1984 National Pollutant Discharge

Elirnination System (“NPDES”) Permit provided as follows:

Notwithstanding the effluent limitations

established by this permit, no wastes

shall be discharged and no activities

shall be conducted which will violate

water quality standards as adopted in

OAR 340-41-455 except in the

following defined mixing zone: The

mixing zone shall consist of a 100 foot

radius from the point of discharge.

Portland’s 1991 Permit contains two separate provisions

(one for each basin) regarding water quality standard

compliance for the CSO discharges. Both provisions provide

that:

No wastes shall be discharged and no

activities shall be conducted which

violate Water Quality Standards as

adopted in OAR 340-41-445.

ac aaa acai

3

The issue in this case involves the enforceability of these

permit conditions. Most NPDES permits, like Portland’s,

contain no other mechanism for ensuring compliance with

water quality standards. !

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

L THE NINTH CIRCUIT DECISION IS FULLY

CONSISTENT WITH THE CLEAN WATER ACT

AND THE DECISIONS OF OTHER CIRCUITS

This is a plain meaning case. As the Ninth Circuit noted,

‘{t]he plain language of [the Clean Water Act] CWA § 505

[33 U.S.C. § 1365] authorizes citizens to enforce all permit

conditions.” NWEA II, Petition at App-49. Section 505 does

this by authorizing citizens to bring suit against persons

alleged to be in violation of any ‘effluent standard or

limitation under this chapter.” The term “effluent standard or

limitation” is used as a term of art in § 505. The term is

defined in § 505(f), and includes “a permit or condition

thereof issued under section 1342 of this title...” 33 U.S.C.

§ 1365(f(6).2 Because § 402 cf the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342,

' The United States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”)

has indicated its belief that all permits issued in Oregon, Arizona and

California contain identical or similar prohibitions. Brief of the

Environmental Protection Agency Supporting [Respondents’] Petition

for Rehearing (“EPA Brief’), App-26. While EPA does not indicate

how many of these permits also contain numeric, water quality-based

permit conditions, most do not.

2 This definition distinguishes the term “effluent standard or

limitation” from the more limited term “effluent limitation,” which is

defined separately at 33 USC § 1362(11). See, infra, pp. 7-8

4

establishes the NPDES permit program, the clear language of

§ 505(£(6) provides that citizens may enforce NPDES permit

conditions in citizen suits under § 505.3

This plain meaning must control absent a clearly

expressed legislative intention to the contrary. Consumer

Product Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S.

102, 108 (1980). In this case, the legislative history

underscores the plain meaning of § 50S(f)(6). Most

significantly, as noted by the Ninth Circuit, the Senate Report

accompanying the passage of the CWA in 1972 explained in

unmistakable terms that “in addition to violations of section

301 (a) [33 U.S.C. § 1311, Effluent Limitations], ciuzens are

granted authority to bring enforcement actions for violation of

...@ny condition of any permit issued under section 402.”

Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,

S.Rep. No. 414, 92nd Cong., Ist Sess., reprinted in 1972

U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668, 3747 (emphasis added); see also NWEA

IT, Petition at App-51.

Moreover, as also noted by the Ninth Circuit, the case law

provides ample support for the court’s interpretation of the

effect of § 505(f)(6). NWEA II, Petition at App-52. We will

address PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington

Department of Ecology, _US.__, 114 S. Ct. 1900 (1994)

(Jefferson County) below. At this point we note only that

numerous courts have held that § 505(f)(6) grants citizens an

unqualified power to enforce any and all NPDES permit

conditions. See NWEA II, Petition at App-52-56 (and cases

3 The Environmental Protection Agency agrees with the Ninth

Circutt’s view of the plain meaning of § 505(f)(6). EPA Brief, App-23.

Pe a i ade

5

cited therein); see also United States v. Louisiana-Pacific

Corp., slip opinion, Civ. Act. No. C 78-0567 (N.D. Cal. 1990)

(reproduced in the Appendix at App-28-34) (granting the

Environmental Protection Agency (‘EPA’) the right to

enforce the same type of permit condition at issue in this case).

Notwithstanding the clear statutory language, legislative

history and case law, Portland argues that the CWA excepts

from the realm of enforceable permit conditions narrative

conditions that require compliance with water quality

standards. Portland does not identify any textual basis for this

exception. Instead, it raises three arguments in urging the

Court to grant its petition in this case. First, Portland argues

that allowing for the enforcement of these narrative conditions

would be inconsistent with the Act’s differentiation between

effluent limitations and water quality standards. Petition at 9-

10. Second, Portland maintains that allowing for the

enforcement of these conditions would constitute an

unwarranted extension of federal jurisdiction. Petition at 11-

17. Finally, Portland contends that the Ninth Circuit’s decision

abrogates the permit shield doctrine. Petition at 17-20.

NWEA will address each of these arguments in tum. We

will then address the effect of Jefferson County.

A. The Clean Water Act Authorizes Both

Numeric and Narrative Effluent Limitations

Portland argues that the permit conditions at issue in this

case are not true “effluent limitations,” and that therefore they

should not be enforceable. This argument fails to consider two

threshold issues. First, as noted above, § 505(f)(6) specifically

defines enforceable effluent standards and limitations in

citizen suits to include all permit conditions. As noted by the

6

Ninth Circuit, in applying this language ‘Several courts have

held that citizens groups may seek to enforce many kinds of

permit conditions besides effluent limitations.” NWEA II,

Petition at App-56 and cases cited therein.

Second, citizen suits are not the proper forum for

determining the validity or appropriateness of permit

conditions. It is well established that only state courts may

review the validity of state-issued NPDES permits. See Shell

Oil Co. v. Train, 585 F.2d 408 (CA9 1978); District of

Columbia v. Schramm, 631 F.2d 854, 863 (CADC 1980);

American Paper Institute, Inc. v. U.S.E.P.A., 890 F.2d 869,

875 (CA7 1989); and Municipal Authority of the Borough of

St. Mary’s v. U.S.E.PA., 945 F.2d 67, 71 (CA3 1991).

Moreover, the time for such challenges is at the point of

permit issuance. Under Oregon law, permits must be

challenged, if at all, within 60 days of issuance. ORS

183.484(2).4 By failing to challenge the permit at the point of

issuance, Portland lost “forever the nght to do so.” Public

Interest Research Group of New Jersey v. Powell Duffryn

Terminals, 913 F.2d 64, 78 (CA3 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.

Ct. 1018 (1991) (involving a state-issued permit); see also

Texas Municipal Power Agency v. Administrator of the

U.S.E.P.A., 836 F.2d 1482, 1484-85 (CAS 1988) (EPA-issued

permit).

4 See also 33 USC § 1369(b)(1) and (2) (limiting challenges to

EPA-issued NPDES permits to those filed in the appropriate Federal

judicial district within 120 days of permit issuance, and specifically

precluding the review of such conditions in enforcement actions).

7

Even if one were to assume the appropriateness of this

inquiry, however, Portland misapprehends the concept of

“effluent limitations.” Section 502(11) of the CWA defines

the phrase ‘effluent limitation” to mean “ any restriction

established by a State or the Administrator on quantities, rates,

and concentrations of chemical, physical, biological, and other

constituents ... including schedules of compliance.” 33

U'S.C. § 1362(11) (emphasis added). This definition is broad

enough to include narrative limitations. EPA has long

construed it so, both in its permitting regulations and in the

issuance of permits containing conditions just like those at

issue in this case.’ EPA’s long-standing view is entitled to

deference from this Court. Chevron USA, Inc. v. Natural

Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 US 837 (1984).

The CWA contemplates two types of effluent limitations.

First, § 301 requires the establishment of effluent limitations

requiring compliance with specified technology-based

requirements. See, e.g., 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(A) and (2)(A).

Second, § 301(b)(1)(C) requires that all discharges meet more

stringent limitations where necessary to comply with water

quality standards.” It is the latter requirement that is at issue in

this case. EPA’s regulations confirm that limitations to assure

compliance with water quality standards are proper by

> See 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(k)(2) (1994): and United States Steel

Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 839-40 (CA7 1977) (upholding a similar

condition).

6 See also EPA Brief, App-23-24.

7 See also Section 402(b), 33 USC § 1342(b), which requires

the issuance of permits that ensure compliance with § 301.

8

precluding the issuance of any permit where its conditions

cannot ensure compliance with water quality standards. 40

C.F.R. § 122.4(d). Further, 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(d) expands on

this requirement by mandating that each permit control the

discharge of pollutants that would cause, have the reasonable

potential to cause, or contribute to the violation of any water

quality standard. Thus, both the CWA and EPA’s regulations

mandate that NPDES permits compel compliance with water

quality standards. See also Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S.

91, 105-107 (1992) (upholding EPA’s interpretation that

NPDES permits must ensure compliance with the water

quality standards of downstream states).

The permit conditions at issue in this case serve precisely

the purpose of assuring compliance with water quality

standards. The fact that they do so through a narrative

prohibition does not render them illegal or unenforceable. As

noted by EPA, ‘{nJothing in section 301 or elsewhere in the

Act requires that such effluent limitations or permit conditions

be expressed solely as end-of-pipe limitations.” Bnef of the

Environmental Protection Agency Supporting [NWEA’s]

Petition for Rehearing (EPA Bnef), pp. 10-11. To the

contrary, “any restriction” is permissible. 33 U.S.C.

§ 1362(11) (emphasis added).

In United States Steel Corp. v. Train, 556 F.2d 822, 839-

40 (CA7 1977) (U.S. Steel’), the Seventh Circuit addressed a

timely-filed challenge to a permit condition just like those at

issue in this case. In U.S. Steel, the relevant condition

precluded the discharger from causing the affected waters to

violate Indiana’s water quality standards for temperature.

Noting that it knew of no other way to implement

temperature-based standards, the Court of Appeals concluded

OS POM ALR RACES A te IIE a 2 Salt SAI BN AE sain

9

that “[b]ecause of the convenience of temperature limits,

thermal water quality standards do not need to be ‘translated’

in order to become applicable to an individual discharger as

effluent limitations.” Jd. at 840 fn. 27.

B. Congress Has Granted the Federal Courts

Jurisdiction to Enforce Narrative, Water

Quality-Based Permit Conditions

The CWA, its legislative history, and the relevant case

law all indicate that § 505 grants citizens the authority to

enforce any and all NPDES permit conditions, as noted above.

Portland would have the Court create an unexpressed

exception to § 505(f(6) precluding the enforcement of

narrative permit conditions. Portland relies chiefly on four

cases, all of which are inapposite.

First, Portland asserts that the Ninth Circuit’s opinion

conflicts with Aflantic States Legal Foundation, Inc. v.

Eastman Kodak Co., 12 F.3d 353 (CA2 1993), which held

that § 505 does not authorize citizens to enforce state-:mposed

permit conditions that are beyond the scope of the CWA.

Kodak is in no way inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit’s

opinion. There is no credible argument to be made that

conditions requiring compliance with water quality standards

are beyond the scope of the CWA. The CWA and EPA’s

regulations expressly require such conditions. See, supra at pp.

5-8. Indeed, EPA utilizes permit conditions just like those at

issue here. See U.S. Steel, 556 F.2d at 839-40. Further, EPA

filed an amicus brief before the Ninth Circuit in this case

supporting the establishment and enforceability of narrative,

water quality-based permit conditions. EPA Brief, App-18-19,

22-27.

10

Portland next argues that the Ninth Circuit’s opinion ;

conflicts with United States v. Hooker Chemicals & Plastics

Corp., 749 F.2d 968 (CA2 1984). Hooker involved the |

question whether citizens may intervene in actions brought by

EPA, pursuant to § 504(a) of the CWA, 33 U.S.C. § 1364(a),

to abate ‘imminent and substantial endangerment{s].” The

Court of Appeals began with the correct assumption that the

citizens could intervene only if they could have initiated the

action themselves under § 505. Hooker, 749 F.2d at 978; see

also 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b). In finding that the citizens could not

have initiated the action themselves, however, the Second

Circuit expressly relied on the fact that § 505(f) does not

mecorporate the “imminent and substantial endangerment”

authority within the definition of enforceable ‘effluent

standard[s] and limitation[s].” Hooker, 749 F.2d at 979.

Hooker is clearly distinguishable from this case; here NWEA

seeks to enforce permit conditions, which are expressly listed

in § 505(f)(6) as being enforceable through citizen suits.

pane Nee anh i Pa a te toes

Third, Portland cites American Paper Institute, Inc. v.

Environmental Protection Agency, 996 F.2d 346 (CADC

1993) (“API’’), as allegedly indicating “that the intent of the

Clean Water Act is to enforce water quality standards in

citizen suits only through the effluent limitations established in

each permit - not the wholesale incorporation of ‘generic

standards’ relating to water quality.” Petition at 15-16. This

characterization is inaccurate. APJ involved a challenge to an

EPA regulation requiring that NPDES permit writers translate

narrative criteria addressing chemical pollutants (e.g., “ho

toxics in toxic amounts’) into chemical-specific effluent

limits. 996 F.2d at 350. Applying Chevron USA, Inc. v.

Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837

(1984), the Court of Appeals upheld the rule as a reasonable

|

ee

1]

means of assuring that NPDES permits ensure compliance

with water quality standards. AP/, 996 F.2d at 351.

API at most stands for the proposition that EPA, as a

matter of regulatory discretion, may require that permit-issuers

translate certain narrative water quality criteria into chemical-

specific limits in the permit issuance process. To date, EPA

has chosen to assert this authority only with respect to

chemical pollutants to implement the national water quality-

based toxics control program. 54 Fed. Reg. 23868, 23871

(June 2, 1989). While both EPA and the Court of Appeals

may view chemical-specific limits, where feasible, as the best

means of implementing narrative criteria (and NWEA agrees),

neither EPA nor the Court of Appeals suggests that this is the

only lawful way through which water quality standards may be

implemented. EPA’s amicus curiae brief in this case

specifically supports the enforceability of narrative, water

quality-based permit conditions. EPA Brief, App-22-27

There is good reason why EPA has not established an

across-the-board requirement mandating numeric, end-of-pipe

limits in all cases. As noted by the Ninth Circuit, “certain

water quality standards cannot be expressed quantitatively,

such as those that apply in this case to bacterial pollution,

aesthetic conditions, and objectionable matter (scum, oily

sleek, foul odors, and floating solids)” NWEA II, Petition at

App-57 (citations omitted). EPA’s regulations explicitly

contemplate the establishment of narrative criteria. 40 C.F.R.

§ 131.11(6)(2). If narrative permit conditions were

unenforceable, many of these standards would be rendered

meaningless. There is simply no indication that Congress

intended such a result.

12

The need for narrative effluent limitations is particularly

strong in the CSO context, where the inability to control the

amount of flow that is discharged during storm events makes

it infeasible to establish numeric, end-of-pipe limitations to

implement even numeric water quality criteria. The Ninth

Circuit explained this dynamic in the following terms:

... Because the number and volume of

overflow events from CSO systems are

caused primarily by uncontrollable

events--i.e., the amount of stormwater

entering the system--regulators have no

ready way of determining what portion

of the flow in a given discharge event is

sewage and what portion is rainwater.

Without this information, it is

impossible to determine the level at

which to set a numeric concentration-

based permit limit in order to ensure

that the gross amount of pollution

discharged will not violate water

quality standards.

NWEA IL, Petition at App-59. As evidenced by the permit

conditions in this case, in these circumstances permit-issuers

rely on narrative permit conditions to ensure that the water

quality-based requirements of the statute are met.* These

conditions must be given meaning in the enforcement process.

8 See also US Steel, 556 F.2d at 839-40 (CA7 1977)

(recognizing that permit issuers may simply incorporate water quality

13

Finally, Portland cites Oregon Natural Resources Council

v. United States Forest Service, 834 F.2d 842 (CA9 1987), for

the proposition that it is not the water quality standards

themselves that are enforceable under § 301(b)(1)C) [33

U.S.C. § 1311(6(1(C)], but the permit conditions necessary

to meet those standards. Petition at 16. NWEA agrees. See

also NWEA II, Petition at App-56-57, n.11. However, in this

case, unlike Oregon, NWEA is seeking to enforce permit

conditions. As EPA has noted:

EPA concurs with the premise that the

Statute does not require permittees to

comply with water quality standards

“directly,” or in the absence of a permit

condition imposing such a requirement

However, the permit at issue here

contains such a condition. Thus, the

principle set forth in the Oregon case is

inapposite to the question of whether a

permit expressly prohibiting discharges

that violate state standards is valid and

enforceable by citizens

EPA Brief, App-24.

Thus, all four of the cases cited by Portland are simply red

herrings. There is no conflict among the circuits, or within the

Ninth Circuit, that pertains to this action

standards into permit conditions where end-of-pipe limits are

infeasible)

vo

a4

C. The Permit Shield Doctrine Supports the

Enforceability of All Permit Conditions

Section 402(k) of the CWA establishes the bedrock

principle that, with minor exceptions, permittees are to be

judged by the standards of the permits under which their

discharges are authorized. Specifically,

Compliance with a permit issued

pursuant to this section shall be deemed

compliance, for purposes of sections

1319 and 1365 of this title, with

sections 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317 and

1343 of this title, except any standard

imposed under section 1317 of this title

for a toxic pollutant injurious to human

health...

33 U.S.C. § 1342(k). The effect of this provision is simple:

the permit is the measuring stick against which a permittee’s

compliance status is to be determined. By contrast, permittees

are not to be judged according to requirements that were

omitted from their permits or were promulgated after their

permits were issued. E.J. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train,

430 U.S. 112, 138 n.28 (1977). In short, compliance with the

permit is what matters.

NWEA seeks only to have Portland judged by the

standards of its permits--nothing more and nothing less. This

notion is fully consistent with § 402(k). In this case, each of

the relevant permits contains a clear provision requiring that

all discharges conform with water quality standards. The 1991

permit contains two separate water quality-based conditions

(one for each basin) specifically relating to the CSO

15

discharges. Portland seeks to turn § 402(k) on its head,

however, by arguing that it somehow shields Portland from

complying with these conditions. Portland wants the permit

shield doctrine to make the permit mean less than what it says.

The Court should not condone this blatant rewriting of

§ 402(k) and the relevant permits.

Portland’s reliance on EPA’s “permit as a shield” policy

is misplaced. The provisions that Portland quotes state a

principle not applicable to this case: that the permit shield

applies where a permittee has identified pollutants present in

its discharge stream for which the permit-issuer ultimately

declines to establish limitations. Petition at 18-19. That

principle simply has no bearing where, as here, the

authorization of relevant discharges is expressly conditioned

on the requirement that they not cause water quality standard

violations.

IL JEFFERSON COUNTY SUPPORTS THE NINTH

CIRCUIT’S DECISION

The Ninth Circuit characterized PUD No. | of Jefferson

County v. Washington Department of Ecology, _— US.

, 114 S. Ct. 1900 (1994), as holding that the CWA

“allows States to enforce the broad narrative criteria contained

in water quality standards.” NWEA II, Petition at App-52.

Portland objects to the Ninth Circuit’s characterization,

arguing that Jefferson County stands only for the proposition

that States may condition water quality certifications under

§ 401 of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1341, on requirements relating

to the maintenance of stream flow where necessary to protect

“designated uses.” Petition at 20-21. Portland also stresses

Judge Kleinfeld’s language from his dissenting opinion in

NWEA II to the effect that Jefferson County “does not involve

a

16

a citizens’ suit, says nothing about citizens’ suits, and implied

nothing about citizens’ suits.” Jd at 20 (quoting from NWEA

II, Petition at App-62 (Kleinfeld dissenting)). NWEA agrees

that Jefferson County involved a state’s enforcement of

designated uses under § 401, and also that it did not directly

speak to citizen enforcement under § 505. Nonetheless, the

decision is relevant to the case at bar.

In Jefferson County, the petitioners argued that designated

uses are too vague to be enforceable under § 401 of the Act.

After first noting that “EPA has not interpreted § 303 to

require the States to protect designated uses exclusively

through enforcement of numerical criteria[],” this Court

addressed the vagueness argument in the following terms:

Petitioners also appear to argue that use

requirements are too open-ended, and

that the Act only contemplates

enforcement of the more specific and

objective “criteria” But this argument

is belied by the open-ended nature of

the criteria themselves. . . .

.. . We think petitioners’ attempt to

distinguish between uses and criteria

loses much of its force in light of the

fact that the Act permits enforcement of

broad, narrative criteria based on, for

example, “aesthetics.”

Jefferson County, 114 S. Ct. at 1911 (emphasis added). This

Court further noted the impact that the petitioners’

interpretation would have on the implementation of the Act:

17

Requiring the States to enforce only the

criteria component of their water

quality standards would in essence

require the States to study to a level of

great specificity each individual surface

water to ensure that the cmritena

applicable to that water are sufficiently

detailed and individualized to fully

protect the water’s designated uses.

Given that there is no textual support

for imposing this requirement, we are

loath to attribute to Congress an intent

to impose this heavy regulatory burden

on the States.

Jefferson County, 114 S. Ct. at 1912

The thrust of Portland’s argument in this case is very

similar to that advanced by the petitioners in Jefferson County

— i.e., that narrative permit conditions requiring compliance

with water quality standards are too vague to be enforceable

As the Ninth Circuit noted, however, “interpreting § 505 to

exclude citizen suit enforcement of water quality standards

that are not translated into quantitative limitations” would

“immunize the entire body of qualitative regulations from an

important enforcement tool.” NWEA ILI, Petition at App-58

Jn Jefferson County, this Court indicated its reluctance to

interpret the CWA in a manner that would frustrate the

achievement of its water quality-based requirements. 114 S

Ct. at 1912. The Ninth Circuit did not view itself as bound by

the Jefferson County decision; it expressly recognized that the

two cases involved different statutory dynamics. NWEA II,

Petition at App-55. Instead, the Ninth Circuit simply applied

18

the reasoning of Jefferson County to the similar issues

presented in this case. After noting the difficulties both of

establishing numeric, end-of-pipe limits to ensure compliance

with narrative criteria and even of implementing numeric

criteria where it is infeasible to control the amount of flow, the

Ninth Circuit properly concluded that the teaching of Jefferson

County counseled a similar result in the case before it. This

Court should support that decision.?

° To the extent that Portland seeks to distinguish Jefferson

County because it involved State and not citizen enforcement, it is

enough to point out that nothing in either the CWA or its legislative

history suggests that citizens are to be more limited than EPA or the

states with respect to the types of permit conditions they are entitled to

enforce. Compare § 309(d} (allowing EPA to seek civil penalties for

violation of permit conditions) and § 505(f)(6) (authorizing citizens to

enforce permit conditions); see also NWEA II, Petition at 55 (noting

that citizens may enforce the same permit conditions that States may

enforce).

19

Ii CONCLUSION

For these reasons, NWEA respectfully requests that the

Court deny Portland’s wnt of certiorari.

Respectfully submitted this 23rd day of May, 1996.

Respectfully submitted,

Craig N. Johnston

Associate Professor of Law

Lewis & Clark Law School

10015 S.W. Terwilliger Blvd.

Portland, OR 97219

Counsel of Record for NWEA

David A. Bledsoe

Perkins Coie

Suite 1500, Pacwest Center

1211 S.W. Fifth Avenue

Portland, OR 97204-1002

Counsel for NWEA

APPENDIX

TABLE OF CONTENTS

So SF ec asia steal cidonece Petitioner’s Appendix 93

So ries RU Se ela a aiistircnsseresacseesse Appendix 1

Sa Tia, Oe Rec scecncesaticesGeciiees Petitioner’s Appendix 151

Ft WF Ries AE ie cianessereessecoserseesse Appendix 6

Bd Reo Beate pisanee rs cctisccrsennssese esses Appendix 7

SF LS. Bks SB pease cssahckseoles lniniens Petitioner’s Appendix 170

SCPE, BS Ti Mass ats esarinscscsesees. Appendix 8

BO CER. © Er sl reerstespievicserness....... Appendix 9

gee AO Bo go Bae Appendix !0

CORE i er sessicesscncss.......... Appendix 11

Brief of the Environmental Protection Agency

Supporting the Petition for

Rehearing/Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc...... Appendix 12

United States of America v. Louisiana Pacific,

slip opinion, Civ. Act. No. C78-0567 (N.D.

APP-]

§ 1341. Certification

(a) | Compliance with applicable requirements;

application; procedures; license suspension

(1) Any applicant for a Federal license or permit to

conduct any activity including, but not limited to, the

construction or operation of facilities, which may result in any

discharge into the navigable waters, shall provide the licensing

or permitting agency a certification from the State in which the

discharge originates or will originate, or, if appropriate, from

the interstate water pollution control agency having

jurisdiction over the navigable waters at the point where the

discharge originates or will onginate, that any such discharge

will comply with the applicable provisions of sections 1311,

1312, 1313, 1316, and 1317 of this title. In the case of any

such activity for which there is not an applicable effluent

limitation or other limitation under sections 1311(b) and 1312

of this title, and there is not an applicable standard under

sections 1316 and 1317 of this title, the State shall so certify,

except that any such certification shall not be deemed to satisfy

section 1371(c) of this title. Such State or interstate agency

shall establish procedures for public notice in the case of all

applications for certification by it and, to the extent it deems

appropniate, procedures for public hearings in connection with

specific applications. In any case where a State or interstate

agency has no authority to give such a certification, such

certification shall be from the Administrator. If the State,

interstate agency, or Administrator, as the case may be, fails or

refuses to act on a request for certification, within a reasonable.

period of time (which shall not exceed one year) after receipt

of such request, the certification requirements of this

subsection shall be waived with respect to such Federal

application. No license or permit shall be granted until the

certification required by this section has been obtained or has

been waived as provided in the preceding sentence. No

APP-2

license or permit shall be granted if certification has been

denied by the State, interstate agency, or the Administrator, as

the case may be.

(2) Upon receipt of such application and certification the

licensing or permitting agency shall immediately notify the

Administrator of such application and certification. Whenever

such a discharge may affect, as determined by the

Administrator, the quality of the waters of any other State, the

Administrator within thirty days of the date of notice of

application for such Federal license or permit shall so notify

such other State, the licensing or permitting agency, and the

applicant. If, within sixty days after receipt of such

notification, such other State determines that such discharge

will affect the quality of its waters so as to violate any water

quality requirement in such State, and within such sixty-day

period notifies the Administrator and the licensing or

permitting agency in writing of its objection to the issuance of

such license or permit and requests a public hearing on such

objection, the licensing or permitting agency shall hold such a

hearing. The Administrator shall at such hearing submit his

evaluation and recommendations with respect to any such

objection to the licensing or permitting agency. Such agency,

based upon the recommendations of such State, the

Administrator, and upon any additional evidence, if any,

presented to the agency at the hearing, shall condition such

license or permit in such manner as may be necessary to insure

compliance with applicable water quality requirements. If the

imposition of conditions cannot insure such compliance such

agency shall not issue such license or permit.

(3) The certification obtained pursuant to paragraph (1) of

this subsection with respect to the construction of any facility

shall fulfill the requirements of this subsection with respect to

certification in connection with any other Federal license or

permit required for the operation of such facility unless, after

notice to the certifying State, agency, or Administrator, as the

APP-3

case may be, which shall be given by the Federal agency to

whom application is made for such operating license or

permit, the State, or if appropriate, the interstate agency or the

Administrator, notifies such agency within sixty days after

receipt of such notice that there is no longer reasonable

assurance that there will be compliance with the applicable

provisions of sections 1311, 1312, 1313, 1316, and 1317 of

this title because of changes since the construction license or

permit certification was issued in (A) the construction or

operation of the facility, (B) the characteristics of the waters

into which such discharge is made, (C) the water quality

criteria applicable to such waters or (D) applicable effluent

limitations or other requirements. This paragraph shall be

inapplicable in any case where the applicant for such operating

license or permit has failed to provide the certifying State, or,

if appropnate, the interstate agency or the Administrator, with

notice of any proposed changes in the construction or

operation of the facility with respect to which a construction

license or permit has been granted, which changes may result

in violation of section 1311, 1312, 1313, 1316, or 1317 of this

title.

(4) Prior to the initial operation of any federally licensed

or permitted facility or activity which may result in any

discharge into the navigable waters and with respect to which

a certification has been obtained pursuant to paragraph (1) of

this subsection, which facility or activity is not subject to a

Federal operating license or permit, the licensee or permittee

shall provide an opportunity for such certifying State, or, if

appropnate, the interstate agency or the Administrator to

review the manner in which the facility or activity shall be

operated or conducted for the purposes of assuring that

applicable effluent limitations or other limitations or other

applicable water quality requirements will not be violated.

Upon notification by the certifying State, or if appropriate, the

interstate agency or the Administrator that the operation of any

such federally licensed or permitted facility or activity will

APP-4

violate applicable effluent limitations or other limitations or

other water quality requirements such Federal agency may,

after public hearing, suspend such license or permit. If such

license or permit is suspended, it shall remain suspended until

notification is received from the certifying State, agency, or

Administrator, as the case may be, that there is reasonable

assurance that such facility or activity will not violate the

applicable provisions of section 1311, 1312, 1313, 1316, or

1317 of this title.

(5) Any Federal license or permit with respect to which a

certification has been obtained under paragraph (1) of this

subsection may be suspended or revoked by the Federal

agency issuing such license or permit upon the entering of a

judgment under this chapter that such facility or activity has

been operated in violation of the applicable provisions of

section 1311, 1312, 1313, 1316, or 1317 of this title.

(6) Except with respect to a permit issued under section

1342 of this title, in any case where actual construction of a

facility has been lawfully commenced prior to April 3, 1970,

no certification shall be required under this subsection for a

license or permit issued after April 3, 1970, to operate such

facility, except that any such license or permit issued without

certification shall terminate April 3, 1973, unless prior to such

termination date the person having such license or permit

submits to the Federal agency which issued such license or

permit a certification and otherwise meets the requirements of

this section.

(b) Compliance with other provisions of law

setting applicable water quality requirements

Nothing in this section shall be construed to limit the

authority of any department or agency pursuant to any other

provision of law to require compliance with any applicable

water quality requirements. The Administrator shall, upon the

APP-5

request of any Federal department or agency, or State or

interstate agency, or applicant, provide, for the purpose of this

section, any relevant information on applicable effluent

limitations, or other limitations, standards, regulations, or

requirements, or water quality criteria, and shall, when

requested by any such department or agency or State or

interstate agency, or applicant, comment on any methods to

comply with such limitations, standards, regulations,

requirements, or criteria.

(c) Authority of Secretary of Army to permit use

of spoil disposal areas by Federal licensees or

permittees

In order to implement the provisions of this section, the

Secretary of the Army, acting through the Chief of Engineers,

is authorized, if he deems it to be in the public interest, to

permit the use of spoil disposal areas under his jurisdiction by

Federal licensees or permittees, and to make an appropriate

charge for such use. Moneys received from such licensees or

permittees shall be deposited in the Treasury as miscellaneous

receipts.

(d) Limitations and monitoring requirements of

certification

Any certification provided under this section shall set

forth any effluent limitations and other limitations, and

monitoring requirements necessary to assure that any applicant

for a Federal license or permit will comply with any applicable

effluent limitations and other limitations, under section 1311

or 1312 of this title, standard of performance under section

1316 of this title, or prohibition, effluent standard, or

pretreatment standard under section 1317 of this title, and with

any other appropriate requirement of State law set forth in

such certification, and shall become a condition on any

Federal license or permit subject to the provisions of this

section.

ee ee ae ee Pe eS oe

oe See ee eee ee

APP-6

UNITED STATES CODE

TITLE 33

SECTION 1362

Section 1362. Definitions

** *

(11) The term ‘effluent limitation” means any restriction

established by a State or the Administrator on quantities, rates,

and concentrations of chemical, physical, biological, and other

constituents which are discharged from point sources into

navigable waters, the waters of the contiguous zone, or the

ocean, including schedules of compliance

APP-7

UNITED STATES CODE

TITLE 33

SECTION 1364

Section 1364. Emergency powers

(a) Emergency powers

Notwithstanding any other provision of this chapter, the

Administrator upon receipt of evidence that a pollution source

or combination of sources is presenting an imminent and

substantial endangerment to the health of persons or to the

welfare of persons where such endangerment is to the

livelihood of such persons, such as inability to market

shellfish, may bring suit on behalf of the United States in the

appropriate district court to immediately restrain any person

causing or contributing to the alleged pollution to stop the

discharge of pollutants causing or contributing to such

pollution or to take such other action as may be necessary.

APP-8

40 CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS

SECTION 122.4(d)

Section 122.4. Prohibitions (applicable to State NPDES

programs, see § 123.25)

No permit may be issued

“* *

(d) When the imposition of conditions cannot ensure

compliance with the applicable water quality requirements of

all affected States;

APP-9

40 CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS

SECTION 122.44 (d)(1){i)

Section 122.44(d)(1)(i).

(d) Water quality standards and State requirements: any

requirements in addition to or more stringent than

promulgated effluent limitations guidelines or standards under

sections 301, 304, 306, 307, 318 and 405 of CWA necessary

to:

(1) Achieve water quality standards established under

section 303 of the CWA, including State narrative cnteria for

water quality.

(i) Limitations must control all pollutants or pollutant

parameters (either conventional, nonconventional, or toxic

pollutants) which the Director determines are or may be

discharged at a level which will cause, have the reasonable

potential to cause, or contribute to an excursion above any

State water quality standard, including State narrative criteria

for water quality.

APP-10

40 CODE OF FEDERAL REGULATIONS

SECTION 131.11(b)(2)

Section 131.11(b)(2) Cntena

(b) Form of criteria) In establishing criteria, States

should:

** *

(2) Establish narrative criteria or criteria based upon

biomonitoring methods where numerical criterial cannot be

established or to supplement numerical criteria.

APP-11

OREGON REVISED STATUTES

Section 183.484(2)

***

(2) Petitions for review shall be filed within 60 days only

following the date the order is served, or if a petition for

reconsideration or rehearing has been filed, then within 60

days only following the date the order denying such petition is

served. If the agency does not otherwise act, a petition for

rehearing or reconsideration shall be deemed denied the 60th

day following the date the petition was filed, and in such case

petition for judicial review shall be filed within 60 days only

following such date. Date of service shall be the date on

which the agency delivered or mailed its order in accordance

with ORS 183.470.

Docket No. 92-35044

——ESESEEEaEaEEEEEEEEEESSE=ESESESSSSS

In the

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NORTHWEST ENVIRONMENTAL ADVOCATES,

a Non-Profit Oregon corporation, and NINA BELL,

Appellants,

v.

CITY OF PORTLAND,

Appellee.

BRIEF OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

AGENCY SUPPORTING THE PETITION FOR

REHEARING/ SUGGESTION FOR REHEARING

EN BANC

a LT — a an 2

-— —— — ———— —— —-

LOIS J. SCHIFFER

Acting Assistant Attorney

General

alll

APP-13

PETER R. STEENLAND,

JR.

CATHERINE M.

FLANAGAN

eee Attorneys, Department of

Justice

Washington, D. C. 20530

(202) 514-1442

APP-14

Docket No. 92-35044

——$—$——— —

In the

IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR

THE NINTH CIRCUIT

NORTHWEST ENVIRONMENTAL ADVOCATES,

a Non-Profit Oregon corporation, and NINA BELL,

Appellants,

Vv.

CITY OF PORTLAND,

Appellee.

BRIEF OF THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION

AGENCY SUPPORTING THE PETITION FOR

REHEARING/ SUGGESTION FOR REHEARING

EN BANC

Pursuant to Rules 35 and 40 of the Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure and Rule 35 of this Court, the United

States of America submits this memorandum in support of

appellant's Petition For Rehearing With Suggestion For

Rehearing En Banc of the decision (Addendum I hereto),

issued on December 10, 1993 by a panel consisting of Circuit

Judges Kleinfeld and Pregerson and District Judge Ingram.

APP-15

We express a belief that this appeal involves a question of

exceptional importance: may citizens enforce a condition in a

National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System ("NPDES")

permit issued pursuant to the Clean Water Act ("the Act") that

requires the permittee to ensure that discharges do not cause

receiving waters to violate state water quality standards?

The United States has a direct interest in the development

of the law regarding citizen enforcement of the Act because

citizens play a crucial role in Clean Water Act enforcement.

The panel decision hinged upon the panel's conclusion that

permit conditions prohibiting discharges that violate water

quality standards can be enforced by citizens only if they are

expressed as end-of-the-pipe effluent limitations. EPA and

states commonly include permit conditions prohibiting

discharges that cause violations of state water quality

standards using language similar to that employed here,

particularly when regulating stormwater discharges or

combined sewer and stormwater overflows ("CSOs’).

Because citizen enforcement provides a crucial supplement to

state and federal enforcement, the panel decision threatens to

undermine severely an important source for enforcement of a

proper, commonly used permit condition.

STATUTORY SCHEME

The Clean Water Act, also known as the Federal Water

Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 et seq., is a

comprehensive statute designed "to restore and maintain the

chemical, physical, and biological integnty of the Nation's

waters." 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a).

The Act prohibits the discharge of any pollutant from any

point source into the nation's waters unless the discharge

complies with the Act's requirements. 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311(a),

1362(12). For most dischargers, compliance is achieved by

obtaining and adhering to the terms of an NPDES permit

APP-16

pursuant to section 402 of the Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1342. See

EPA v. California ex rel. State Water Resources Control Bd,

426 U.S. 200, 205 (1976).

Because Congress intended that "states should play the

leading role in implementing the NPDES [program],"

American Paper Inst. v. EPA, 890 F.2d 869, 873 (7th Cir.

1989) (footnote omitted), EPA has granted 40 states, including

Oregon, authority to issue NPDES permits. See 33 U.S.C.

§ 1342(b). In authorized states, NPDES permits are issued by

the appropriate state agency, subject to EPA review. 33

U.S.C. § 1342(d). A final state-issued permit is subject to

judicial review in state court, with the state, not EPA,

defending the permit decision and terms. See American Paper

Inst. v. EPA, 890 F.2d at 874-75. Under Oregon law, NPDES

permits must be challenged within 60 days of issuance. Or.

Rev. Stat. § 183.484(2) (1991).

NPDES permits must include conditions ensuring that the

discharge complies with the substantive provisions of the Act.

33 U.S.C. § 1342(aX(2). In particular, all NPDES permits

must contain the more stringent of: (1) technology-based

effluent limitations which reflect the pollution reduction

achievable based on several levels of pollution control or

process changes, without reference to the effect on the

receiving water, or (2) effluent limitations representing that

level of control necessary to ensure that the receiving waters

attain and maintain state water quality standards. 33 U.S.C.

§ 1311(b), 1313(c).

Technology-based effluent limitations are usually based

upon guidelines promulgated by EPA, and are restrictions on

the quantities, rates, and concentrations of specified pollutants.

See 33 US.C. §1311, 1314. The guidelines, and the

corresponding effluent limitations, are based upon the leveis

of control that can be achieved by application of the best

a

APP-17

available technology economically achievabie, and define

permissible levels of discharges.!° 33 U.S.C. § 1311.

Water quality standards under the Act consist of two

principal elements: (1) a designated "use"! of waters

consistent with the goals of the Act as set forth in 33 U.S.C.

§ 1251(aX(2); see 40 CFR. § 130.3; and (2) "criteria"

specifying the amounts of various pollutants that may be

present in those waters without impairing the designated uses,

expressed in numerical concentration limits or in narrative

form. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2)(A). States are also required to

adopt an antidegradation policy which, among other things,

mandates that existing uses of waters be maintained, as well as

the level of water quality necessary to maintain those existing

uses. 40 C.F.R. § 131.6

States are required by section 303 to adopt water quality

standards, subject to EPA approval. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(3).

If a state does not adopt a water quality standard, EPA is

required to adopt such standards for the state. Id. In

accordance with this provision, Oregon has adopted water

quality standards applicable to the waters and pollutants that

are the subject of the citizen suit.

Water quality-based permit effluent limitations are unlike

technology-based effluent limitations in that they are

formulated without regard to technological capacity to restrict

harmful discharges. Water quality-based effluent limitations

10 While effluent limitation guidelines and corresponding effluent

limitations generally are expressed as numeric concentrations of specific

pollutants, such guidelines may also include narrative restrictions. See,

e.g. 40 C.F.R. § 435.13 note 4; amendment to § 435.13, 58 Fed. Reg.

12506 (March 4, 1993).

1! Designated uses of the water may include, for example, public |

water supply, recreation, propagation of fish, and agriculture.

APP-18

are designed to ensure that the discharge will not cause or

contribute to violations of state standards. 33 U.S.C.

§ 1311(b)(1(C). As with technology-based effluent

limitations, two types of water quality based limitations may

be written into permits. The first type contains numeric

limitations on the quantities, rates, and concentrations of

specified substances that are discharged, and is generally

expressed using end-of-the-pipe limitations.

The second type provides narrative limitations. One

common example of this type of limitation is a condition

prohibiting discharges that cause or contribute to violations of

state water quality standards.'2 The permit condition at issue

in this appeal falls within this latter category.

The Act authorizes citizen plaintiffs to enforce permit

conditions. The citizen suit provision, section 505, provides

that citizen plaintiffs may enforce "an effluent standard or

limitation." 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1). This section defines

"effluent standard or limitation" as, inter alia, "a permit or

condition thereof issued under section 1342." 33 U.SC.

§ 1365(a)(1) and (£6).

The enforcement section of the Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d),

authorizes imposition of civil penalties for violations of "any

permit condition or limitation" implementing the Act's

substantive provisions. The Act defines "effluent limitation"

12 EPA's NPDES permitting regulations recognize that effluent

limitations need not be either numeric or end-of-pipe limitations. See.

e.g. 40 CFR 122.44(k) (authorizing permit conditions relating to the

use of best management practices in addition to, or in lieu of, numeric

limitations); 40 CFR 440 (addressing best management practices for

mines). Best management practices include, for example, operating

procedures or practices to control plant site runoff, spillage or leaks that

would pollute surface waters. 40 CFR § 122.2.

m] ,

APP-19

as “any restriction established by a State or the Administrator"

on quantities, discharge rates and concentrations of a pollutant

discharged into a water of the United States. 33 U.S.C.

§ 1362(11).

STATEMENT

Nature of the Case, Course of Proceedings and

Summary.

From 1984 to August 1991, the City of Portland ("the

City") operated a sewage treatment plant under an Oregon

NPDES permit issued in 1984. Northwest Environmental

Advocates et al. v. City of Portland, No. 91-339-PA, slip op. at

4 (D. Or. Dec. 13, 3991) ("opinion below"). The City’s

antiquated sewage and stormwater systems were combined

and regularly discharged storm water and sewage from

approximately forty overflow outlets into the Willamette River

and Columbia Slough, a tributary of the Willamette River. Id.

at 2-3. In 1990, the City began to negotiate with the State

concerning the permit that would replace the expiring 1984

permit. Id. at 4. The State sought to include a schedule in the

new permit by which the City would eliminate the combined

sewer overflows, (CSOs), but the City complained that it

could not accomplish this in the five-year time period

contemplated by the permit. Id. In August 1991, the State and

the City finalized a stipulation under which the City would

have twenty years to eliminate the CSOs. Id. at 5.

In March 1991, while the negotiations were pending, the

citizens group, Northwest Environmental Advocates and its

executive director, Nina Bell ("the citizens"), brought this suit

under the Act's citizen suit provision, 33 U.S.C. § 1365. The

citizens’ complaint alleged that the 1984 permit covered only

discharges from the City's sewage treatment plant, not from

the CSOs, and the CSOs were thus unpermitted discharges.

Id. at 5. The citizens also alleged that even if the CSOs were

vX—ee SSeS. ae

eee

al ES i EO eigen ee A IE PRLS OE

APP-20

covered by the 1984 permit, that permit contained a condition

prohibiting the discharges from violating state water quality

standards, and this condition was violated. Id. at 12-13.!% The

citizens argued that the citizen suit provision, section 505(a),

authorizes citizen plaintiffs to enforce permits or conditions

thereof. Id. at 15. See 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) and (f)(6).

The district court interpreted the City's permit and held

that the City’s CSO discharges were authorized by the 1984

permit. Decision below at 12. The court also held that

although the 1984 permit referred to the Oregon water quality

standards, it did not incorporate an enforceable condition

because the "mere reference to water quality standards" in a

permit does constitute an effluent standard or limitation for

purposes of section 505. Id. at 15-16

The Ninth Circuit's panel decision upheld as "not clearly

erroneous" the district court's first holding that the permit

covered the CSOs. Panel Opinion ("Opinion") at 13915. The

panel also affirmed the district court's holding that the citizens

could not enforce the permit's requirement that discharges not

violate water quality standards, concluding that because the

citizens did not allege that the City violated end-of-pipe

limitations designed to achieve water quality standards, the

citizens lacked standing under section 505. Id. at 13920. The

panel stated that "it is the duty of the permit-issuing authority

to include in the permit end-of-pipe effluent limitations that

will ensure that water quality standards are met.” Id. at 13920

(emphasis in original). In making the statement that end-of-

pipe limitations are required, the panel did not rely upon

13 The 1984 permit stated “notwithstanding the effluent

limitations established by this permit, no wastes shall be discharged and

no activities shall be conducted which will violate Water Quality

Standards of Oregon. Id. at 14.

~~ ai

APP-21

explicit statutory language.'4 Indeed, the panel noted that

section 505, 33 U.S.C. § 1365, the citizen suit provision,

provides that citizens may enforce "an effluent standard or

limitation," and that the section broadly defines "effluent

standard or limitation" as, inter alia, "a permit or condition

thereof issued under section 1342." Opinion at 13919-20,

(citing 33 U.S.C. § 1365(a)(1) and (f)(6)). However, the panel

relied upon legislative history to disregard this statutory

language, claiming that Congress did not intend the "limitless

grant of jurisdiction" connoted by section 1365. Opinion at

13921-24.

As the panel noted, legislative history reveals that before

the 1972 amendments to the Act, the statute did not require

permits or mandate any effluent limitations, end-of-pipe or

otherwise, but rather relied solely upon enforcement of state

water quality standards. Id. Because enforcement of water

quality standards was "almost non-existent," Congress

developed the current approach whereby technology-based

effluent limitations are written into easily enforced permits.

Id. The panel emphasized that because Congress viewed

effluent limitations in permits as superior to the pre-1972

enforcement scheme, it must not have intended to allow

citizen enforcement of permit conditions prohibiting

discharges in violation of state standards in the absence of

end-of-pipe limitations. Id. at 13921-25.

14 As the panel noted, its opinion was the first court of appeals

decision addressing the enforceability of a permit condition requiring

that the permittee's discharges not violate state standards. Opinion at

13917.

ARGUMENT

A. Permit Conditions Based Upon the Effect Discharges

May Have Upon Receiving Waters Are Valid and

Enforceable by Citizens.

a Underlying the panel's holding that the permit

condition is unenforceable by citizens was the conclusion that

permit writers must incorporate end-of-pipe limitations. Id. at

13920. The plain language of the Act demonstrates that the

Portland permit condition, expressed in terms of the effect that

discharges may have upon receiving water, is a legal,

enforceable effluent limitation.

Section 301(b)(1)(C) mandates that point sources be

subject to effluent limitations necessary to ensure that state

water quality standards are not violated. 33 USC.

§ 1311(b)(1)(C); See Trustees of Alaska v. EPA, 749 F.2d

549, 557 (9th Cir. 1984). Section 402 authorizes states and

EPA to issue permits insuring compliance with section 301,

33 U.S.C. § 1311. 33 U.S.C. § 1342.!5 Nothing in section

301 or elsewhere in the Act requires that such effluent

limitations or permit conditions be expressed solely as end-of-

pipe limitations.

15 As the panel noted, section 402 authorizes permits ensuring

compliance with 33 U.S.C. §§ 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317, 1318 and

1343. Slip op. at 13920. However, the panel inaccurately cited section

402(b\(1((C) and 402(b)(2)(A) for this proposition; it is section

402(b)(1)(A) that requires that state permits ensure compliance with

sections 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317 and 1343. 33 U.S.C.

§ 1342(b)(1)(A). Section 402(b)(2)(A) requires that state permits

ensure compliance with section 1318. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b)(2)A).

Section 402(a)(1) sets forth this requirement for permits that EPA

issues. 33 U.S.C. § 1342(a)(1).

APP-23

Moreover, the citizen suit provision, section 505,

authorizes citizens to enforce “effluent limitations" and

provides a definition for that term as it is used within that

section. This definition provides that "effluent limitation" is a

"permit or condition thereof issued under section 1342 of this

title, which is in effect under this chapter." 33 U.S.C.

1365(f(6). Because this section unequivocally authorizes

citizens to enforce conditions in permits issued by states or

EPA pursuant to section 402, the panel was incorrect in

holding that the citizens could not enforce the condition.

The conclusion that Congress did not intend to restrict

effluent limitations to end-of-pipe limitations is confirmed by

the definition of "effluent limitation" found in section 502(1 1),

33 U.S.C. §§ 1362(11). This definition governs the use of the

term "effluent limitation" as generally used in the Act. The

definition states that "effluent limitation" means:

any restriction established by a State or

the Administrator on quantities, rates,

and concentrations of chemical,

physical, biological, and _ other

constituents which are discharged from

point sources into navigable waters, the

waters of the contiguous zone, or the

ocean, including schedules of

compliance.

33 US.C. § 1362(11). This definition encompasses any

restriction upon the nature of permitted discharges, and

therefore encompasses conditions based upon the discharge's

effect upon receiving waters. The requirement in Portland's

permit that discharges not violate state standards restricts whet

the City may discharge, and expresses that restriction in term

of the effect the discharges have upon receiving waters. Thus,

the permit condition constitutes a restriction under section

502(11).

APP-24

The panel opinion failed to address this clear statutory

evidence. Rather, the opinion summarized these statutory

provisions, and then set forth the whole of the panel's analysis

of these provisions:

None of these sections, however,

require [sic] that a permittee directly

comply with water quality standards.

Rather, it is the duty of the permit-

issuing authority to include in the

permit end-of-pipe effluent limitations

that will ensure that water quality

standards are met. See Oregon Natural

Resources Council v. United States

Forest Service, 834 F.2d 842, 850 (9th

Cir. 1987).

Opinion at 13920 (emphasis in original). The Oregon case

cited by the panel held that water quality standards are not

imposed in the absence of a permit condition. Oregon Natural

Resources Council v. United States Forest Service, 834 F.2d

at 850. EPA concurs with the premise that the statute does not

require permittees to comply with water quality standards

"directly," or in the absence of a permit condition imposing

such a requirement. However, the permit at issue here contains

such a condition. Thus, the principle set forth in the Oregon

case is inapposite to the question of whether a permit

expressly prohibiting discharges that violate state standards 1s

valid and enforceable by citizens. None of the statutory

provisions considered by the panel support the conclusion that

a permit is not enforceable by ‘citizens unless it incorporates

end-of-pipe limitations.

Moreover, the last time the Act was amended, Congress

gave increasing prominence to state water quality standards

In 1987 Congress amended section 303(cK2¥") to require

states to adopt numeric criteria for certain toxic pollutants that

APP-25

are expected to impede attainment of state standards. Water

Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 308(d), 101 Stat.

39. See also page 3, supra. Congress also amended section

304 to require that states (1) identify water bodies that are not

expected to attain state water quality standards due to

discharges of toxic pollutants and (2) develop strategies for

reducing the discharge of the relevant toxic pollutants. Pub. L.

No. 100-4, 308(a), 101 Stat. 39; see 33 U.S.C. 1314(1). The

Act thus casts state standards in a central role, and provides

broad authority for states to impose and citizens to enforce

permit conditions that implement those standards. !¢

b. In light of clear statutory language, the panel need not

have considered legislative history. In re Perroton, 958 F.2d

889, 893 (9th Cir. 1992) ("If the language of the statute is

clear and unambiguous, judicial inquiry is complete and that

language controls absent rare and _ exceptional

circumstances."). However, the panel also erred in its

assessment of the legislative history; the panel read into the

history an ambiguity which cannot fairly be found, and then

relied upon that ambiguity to disregard clear statutory

language.

The panel opinion recognized that when amending the

Act Congress sought to employ end-of-pipe limitations in

order to\enhance the pre-1972 system of enforcement of water

16 Additionally, it was improper for the district court to have

reviewed the validity of the permit condition because there is no federal

judicial review of any aspect of state-issued permits. See American

Paper Institute, Inc. v. EPA, 890 F.2d 869, 874 (7th Cir. 1989);

District of Columbia v. Schramm, 631 F.2d 854, 862-63 (D.C. Cir.

1980); Natural Resources Defense Council v. Outboard Marine, 702 F.

Supp. 690, 694 (N.D. Ill. 1988); Under state law governing issuance of

the state permit, NPDES permittees must challenge permits within 60

days of issuance. Or. Rev. Stat. § 183.484(2) (1991).

yn ainsi

APP-26

quality standards. Opinion at 13921-22. The panel stated that

the legislative history is ambiguous, and supports both sides of

the argument conceming whether citizens may enforce the

permit condition at issue. Id. However, the panel concluded

that because Congress viewed end-of-pipe limitations as

superior, it intended to preclude citizen enforcement of state

standards in the absence of such limitations. Id. at 13921-24.

Yet it cannot be assumed absent express congressional

direction that Congress intended that end-of-pipe limitations

become the exclusive means by which water quality standards

may be achieved. As Judge Pregerson noted in his dissenting

opinion, legislative history does not support the interpretation

that Congress intended to restrict citizen enforcement to end-

of-pipe limitations. Opinion at 13927 (emphasis in original).

Indeed, the panel does not point to any legislative history so

indicating. The history upon which the majority relies reflects

Congress’ intent to, in Judge Pregerson words, ‘improve

enforcement, not to supplant the old system.” Id.

Legislative history is consistent with the broad language

in sections 402 and 502 concerning permit limitations that

may be used to achieve state standards. See pages 10-12,

supra. Similarly, the desire to enhance enforcement revealed in

legislative history is reflected in the section 1365(f)(6)

mandate that citizens may enforce any such permit condition.

Id. The panel improperly failed to give effect to the Act's clear

language.

The practical implications of the panel opinion are severe.

It is EPA's understanding that all NPDES permits in the state

of Oregon contain the condition at issue here, and all permits

issued by Anzona and California contain similar prohibitions

against exceeding water quality standards. Because citizen

enforcement of NPDES permits provides an_ essential

supplement to governmental enforcement, the panel opinion

APP-27

threatens to greatly hinder Clean Water Act regulation in those

three states.

For the foregoing reasons, Appellants’ Petition for

Rehearing with Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc should be

granted.

Respectfully Submitted,

Lois Schiffer

Acting Assistant Attorney

General

Environment and Natural

Resources Division

/s/

Peter J. Steenland,

Catherine M. Flanagan

Attorneys, Department of

Justice

APP-28

Nos. C 78-0567 MHP and C 89-1738 MHP

In the

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

Vv.

LOUISIANA-PACIFIC CORPORATION,

Defendant

SURFRIDER FOUNDATION,

Plaintiff,

Vv.

LOUISIANA-PACIFIC CORPORATION and

SIMPSON PAPER COMPANY,

Defendants.

OPINION

APP-29

Defendants, Simpson Paper Company ("Simpson") and

Louisiana-Pacific Corporation ("“L-P") (collectively, "the

Mills" or "the Companies"), discharge effluent into the Pacific

Ocean under National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System

("NPDES") permits issued on July13, 1987 by the

Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") Regional

Administrator pursuant to section 301(m) of the Clean Water

Act. 33 U.S.C. § 1311(m)(1)(F). Plaintiffs, the United States

and the Surfrider Foundation, allege that defendants have

consistently violated the limits for chronic toxicity set under

those permits and seek, inter alia, injunctive relief and

penalties for the violations. The parties are now before the

court on defendants’ motion to dismiss certain claims in the

Amended Complaint in Intervention and the Amended

Supplemental Complaint. Having considered the papers

submitted and the arguments of the parties, for the following

reasons, the court grants in part and denies in part defendants’

motion.

BACKGROUND

The background of the underlying action is set out fully in

this court's order of June 14, 1990 and will not be repeated

here. The parties have now come to the court on defendants'

motion to dismiss claims of the amended complaints which

were filed earlier this year.

Defendants present three issues for the court's

consideration: (1) whether plaintiffs can seek enforcement of

certain permit conditions based on alleged violations of

receiving water limitations; (2) whether plaintiffs can be

redressed for violations of an administrative order prior to the

time the order was issued; and (3) whether plaintiffs can

APP-30

compel compliance with a discharge limitation whose status 1s

unclear at present.!7

DISCUSSION

A. Violations of Water Quality Standards

Defendants argue that the penalties sought by plaintiffs

for violations of effluent limitations exceed the scope of

section 309(d) of the Clean Water Act. Plaintiffs argue that

defendants’ resistance is in fact a protest of a permit condition

and, as such, defendants are barred from raising the issue in

this court because they have not exhausted their administrative

remedies. Defendants counter that, whether or not they

exhausted their administrative remedies, the penalties sought

by the government are outside the purview of the statute,

therefore depriving this court of jurisdiction to hear those

claims.

The court would only be deprived of jurisdiction if

section 309 did not provide for imposition of penalties for

violations of water quality standards. On its face, section 309

states that civil penalties may be imposed for violations of "any

permit condition or limitation....". 33 USC. 1319(d)

(emphasis added). As the water quality standards at issue have

been explicitly stated in defendants!’ NPDES permit, there is

nothing to suggest that they are not exactly the type of

conditions to which section 309 refers.

17 Specifically, defendants want the court to dismiss the seventh,

eighth, ninth and tenth claims for relief in the Amended Complaint in

Intervention against Simpson Paper Company and paragraph 25 of the

second claim, as well as the eighth, ninth, tenth and eleventh claims for

relief in the Amended Supplemental Complaint against Louisiana-

Pacific Corporation.

APP-3]

Defendants' attempt to create a distinction between

contesting permit conditions and contesting the enforcement

of conditions in their permit is unavailing. If defendants

believed that these standards were impermissibly vague and

therefore unenforceable, they could have appealed them to the

EPA.

Nor is defendants’ citation to 40 C.F.R. § 122.45(d)

persuasive. Although this section does suggest that permit

water quality standards for continuous discharges should be

reduced to numerical limitations if practicable, a determination

of whether said standards should have been reduced rather

than stated in narrative terms is properly addressed to the

agency during the permit stage. The sole question now before

the court on the narrative conditions is whether plaintiff can

establish with sufficient scientific accuracy that the conditions

have been violated. This is a matter of proof and the subject of

expert testimony.

Finally, the cases and statutes cited by defendants do not

support their proposition that narrative standards cannot be

enforced in addition to numerical limitations. See, e.g., EPA

v. Water Resources Control Bd., 426 U.S. 200, 205 n.12

("Water quality standards are retained as a supplementary

basis for effluent limitations"); Sierra Club v. Union Oil of

California, 813 F.2d 1480, 1483 (9th Cir. 1987) (same),

vacated on other grounds, 485 U.S. 931 (1988); Trustees for

Alaska v. EPA, 749 F.2d 549, 557 (9th Cir. 1984) (numerical

limitations needed in addition to water quality standards where

water quality standards must be translated); Oregon Natural

Resource Council v. U.S. Forest Service, 834 F.2d 842, 849

(9th Cir. 1987) (no NPDES permit). Accordingly, defendants’

motion to dismiss these claims 1s denied.

APP-32

B. Violations of EPA Order

The United States has asserted that during the period

October 1987 to November 19, 1988, defendants violated an

EPA order requiring defendants to monitor the chronic toxicity

of their discharges using a certain sea urchin protocol.

However, plaintiffs have now conceded that because the EPA

order was not entered until September 20, 1988, they are not

entitled to relief for alleged violations which occurred prior to

the entry of the order. Therefore, the United States has

stipulated that its tenth claim for relief in the Amended

Complaint in Intervention against Simpson and its eleventh

claim for relief in the Amended Supplemental Complaint

against L-P may be dismissed to the extent that plaintiffs seek

penalties for the period from October 1987 to September 20,

1988. Accordingly, those claims are DISMISSED except as

to the period beginning September 20, 1988

a Water Treatment Plant Limitations

The Amended Supplemental Complaint against L-P

charges the company with violating "the limit on total

suspended solids applicable to its water treatment works." See

Amended Supp. Cmplt. at par.25. L-P's NPDES permit

required L-P to remove seventy five percent of the total

suspended solids taken into its water treatment plant before

discharging the wastewater into the Pacific Ocean. However,

the permit also provided that if L-P's request for an exception

then pending in front of the State Water Resources Control

Board's were granted, the alternative limit chosen would

automatically apply.

On November 17, 1987 L-P's request for an exception

was approved. The State Water Resources Control Board's

resolution deleted the removal requirement without imposing

an alternative limit. Defendant argues, therefore, that there 1s

APP-33

currently no requirement to be enforced and that the

Government's second claim for relief should be dismissed. !*

As both parties note, however, in response to citizen

group challenges of the exemption provision, the EPA Chief

Judicial Officer found the automatic exemption provision to

be "a troublesome feature of the permits that allows

circumvention of applicable public participation procedures"

legislated in 40 C.F.R. part 124. See Ex. F. to Smith Dec.

Furthermore, L-P has filed a request for clarification of

the Chief Judicial Officer's ruling and, in response to the

ruling, EPA Region 9 has initiated permit modification

proceedings. L-P's request questions whether the intent of the

Chief Judicial Officer's Order was to invalidate the automatic

modification provision from the date it was issued, hence

prohibiting it from coming into effect.

The Chief Judicial Officer's response should clanfy for

which periods of time the removal requirement has been in

effect. Accordingly, the court denies defendants’ motion to

dismiss the second claim without prejudice to renew it after

the Chief Judicial Officer responds to the request for

clarification.

CONCLUSION

As set out above, the court GRANTS IN PART and

DENIES IN PART defendants’ motion to dismiss.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated: [SEP 26, 1990] /s/

18 Defendants’ severability argument raised in their reply brief is

completely unpersuasive.

;

2

APP-34

MARILYN HALL PATEL

United States District Judge

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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