Opposition Brief — SeaRiver Maritime, Inc. v. Exxon Seamen's Union

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No. 95-1637 k

CLERK

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1995

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SEARIVER MARITIME, INC.,

Petitioner,

EXXON SEAMEN’S UNION,

Respondent

SI

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Third Circuit

SJ

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

SI

SCHNEIDER, GOLDBERGER, COHEN,

FINN, SOLOMON, LEDER AND

MONTALBANO, P.C.

Attorneys for Respondent,

Exxon Seamen's Union

1700 Galloping Hill Road

Kenilworth, New Jersey 07033

(908) 298-8800

Davip GROSSMAN

Counsel of Record

and on the Brief

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 442-2831

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

COUNTER STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........... 1

Pia IE OC hans VaR AE 5440 bec kk «obi cd oats 1

a Se See OP IIS 6 5 un 0 0s in eaa's eke eed 2

C. The Arbitration Proceeding .................. 3

D. Post-Arbitration Proceedings................. 4

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

I. PUBLIC POLICY WAS NOT VIOLATED BY CON-

FIRMATION OF AN ARBITRATION AWARD

WHEREIN THE ARBITRATOR DETERMINED

THAT THE EMPLOYER DID NOT HAVE REA-

SONABLE CAUSE TO REQUIRE THE GRIEVANT

TO SUBMIT TO A DRUG TEST AND THE

EMPLOYER DID NOT HAVE JUST CAUSE TO

DISCHARGE THE GRIEVANT.................. 5

A. The Court below gave due deference to the

arbitrator’s determination .................. 6

aN Cae etRe nie eln Ges wcka bia Ck tba <i < 13

il

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASEs:

Arco-Polymers, Inc. v. Local 8-74, 671 F.2d 752 (3d

Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 28, 103 S. Ct. 63, 74 L.

Bd. 26 65 (4902). 045 ivcvsiscadwees cashes in

Bechtel Construction, Inc. v. Laborers’ District

Council, 130 LRRM (BNA) 2749 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd,

865 F.2d 249 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S.

1017, 109 S. Ct. 1133, 103 L. Ed. 2d 194 (1989)...

Exxon Shipping Company v. Exxon Seamen’s Union,

73 Koa 12B/ COG CAR, Sees oc ik cha cate cen

Exxon Shipping Company v. Exxon Seamen's Union,

993 B2d Sof (3G Cie, S09sp ns ves. ces een eee

General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers Local

Union 968 v. Sysco Food Services, Inc., 838 F.2d

794 (Oth Cis. 29GB) i ncc5.c5 sa caks uc ceases

General Teamsters Local 326 v.M & G Convoy, Inc.,

648 K. Supp. 513 (0. Del. TOO). civicccersn act

Graphic Communications International Union Local

121-C v. Southern Coupon, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 970

(ND. Aba. VORB) ia ia occa caus Cera iia eee

Interstate Brands Corp. v. Teamsters Local Union No.

135, 909 F.2d 885 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499

U.S. 885, 111 S. Ct. 1104, 113 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1991) ..

Iowa Electric Light and Power Company v. Local

Union 204, International Brotherhood of Electrical

Workers, 834 F.2d 1424 (9th Cir. 1987).........

Jeddo-Highland Coal Company v. District 2, United

Mine Workers of America, 884 F. Supp. 926 (M.D.

PM. 90D}... cia vai se eaenvaele ye eee

Page

eS Tee

ee ee

ili

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

Local 238 International Brotherhood of Teamsters,

Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers v. Cargill,

Inc., 66 F.3d 988 (8th Cir. 1995)........... 7, 9, 10, 12

Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 65 S. Ct. 42,

ee. SR ee eens eae 13

Super Tire Engineering Company v. Teamsters Local

Union No. 676, 721 F.2d 121 (3d Cir. 1983), cert.

denied, 469 U.S. 817, 105 S. Ct. 83, 83 L. Ed. 2d 31

ae Gays Dy Seneca taney) 9 2 aie, ele SA ee ina 8

Trinity Industries v. United Steelworkers of America,

891 F. Supp. 342 (N.D. Tex. 1995)................. 12

United Food and Commercial Workers International

Union, Local 588 v. Foster Poultry Farms, 151

LRRM (BNA) 2013 (9th Cir. 1995).......... 13, 16, 17

United Industrial Workers v. Government of Virgin

metanas, 967 F.2d 162 (3d Cir. 1993).............3... 6

United Paperworkers International Union v. Misco,

Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 108 S. Ct. 364, 98 L. Ed. 2d 286

RS rea ore 6, 11, 13, 14

United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel &

Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 80 S. Ct. 1358, 4 L. Ed.

EEE PR a ee er ane ae

United Transportation Union Local 1589 v. Suburban

Transit Corp., 51 F.3d 376 (3d Cir. 1995)............ 7

W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 757,

103 S. Ct. 2177, 76 L. Ed. 2d 298 (1983)........ 13, 17

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued

Page

STATUTES:

OG CIA, Street. SE ok oes head reese. grees cis 16

6 CR, TE Tee 6 66 oe Sead. ca vceeea aus 16

46 CBR. Section: TGR) « «soe ie sd pesca sie sesecdet 16

Re eR eee rer eerres 16

M6 CPR: Sect Giles 5 5 een k eee et 14, 15, 16

06 SR. BOC BGG «6 84 5 sigs any ty phe sd 98 ain 16

MISCELLANEOUS:

Elkouri & Elkouri, How Arbitration Works, Fourth

Edition, page 662-663 (BNA 1985)................. 10

SS Bod. Tekm, SI Se bie eo Ae is o Sa ee eA 16

li

COUNTER STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Background

The Exxon Seamen’s Union (hereinafter referred to as

the “union”) is, and has been, the collective bargaining

representative of the unlicensed personnel employed in

the deck, engine and steward’s departments of the Exxon

Shipping Company (hereinafter referred to as the “com-

pany” or “Exxon”).

The company and the union were parties to a collec-

tive bargaining agreement covering the period of July 31,

1985 through August 31, 1987.

After eight months of unsuccessful negotiations,

effective April 1, 1988, the company implemented its final

proposal. The discipline clause of the 1985-1987 agree-

ment was continued in full force and effect. Pursuant

thereto, an employee could only be discharged for

“cause”, which was interpreted to mean “just cause”. The

parties’ grievance and arbitration agreement was also

continued in full force and effect.

On April 1, 1988, the company unilaterally imple-

mented a drug and alcohol testing policy. On April 1,

1988, the company issued a Policy Statement on

Employee Alcohol and Drug Use. That policy contained a

provision regarding “reasonable cause” testing. That pol-

icy provided in relevant part:

The company also has the right to require

employees to submit to medical evaluation or

alcohol or drug testing where cause exists to

suspect alcohol or drug misuse. A positive test

result or refusal to submit to a drug test is

grounds for disciplinary action, including dis-

missal.

(App. 66a).

By letter dated September 27, 1988, the company

notified the employees of its intent to strictly enforce the

above policy. The company, despite this letter, did not

change its policy statement which implied that discharge

was not mandatory for a refusal to submit to a drug test

and did not change the contractual requirement that any

discipline was subject to the “just cause” provision.

B. Alan Cash’s Grievance

The grievant in this case is Alan Cash, who was a

pumpman employed for thirteen (13) years with Exxon.

In early May of 1989, Mr. Cash was transferred from the

oil-tanker Exxon Benicia in Japan to the oil-tanker Exxon

Washington anchored in San Francisco Bay. From May 10,

1989 to May 15, 1989, Mr. Cash was quartered in the

second pumpman’s room - a small, poorly furnished

room. Mr. Cash was working around the clock to get the

ship fit for sea.

On May 15, 1989, the chief pumpman left the Exxon

Washington due to a family emergency. Mr. Cash moved

into that room. The chief pumpman’s room was not

cleaned before Mr. Cash moved in. Due to fire safety

rules, the room door was always left unlocked.

On May 17, 1989, the company conducted an unan-

nounced search of the Exxon Washington. During that

search, in the chief pumpman’s cabin, the search team

found several marijuana seeds on and under the rug, an

ash by the bedpost, and two little balled up pieces of

paper which turned out to be marijuana cigarette ends

(“roaches”) in the pouch of a suitcase used by Mr. Cash.

Based upon these findings, the company ordered the

grievant to submit to a drug test. The union had consis-

tently contested the drug and alcohol policy, and on the

advice of the union representative, the grievant refused

to submit to a drug test. Mr. Cash was discharged. Mr.

Cash's discharge was grieved. The parties were unable to

resolve the grievance, thus the matter was submitted to

arbitration.

C. The Arbitration Proceeding

After three days of hearing, and the submission of

post-hearing briefs, the neutral arbitrator issued an Opin-

ion and Award dated November 27, 1992. (App. 35a). The

union-designated arbitrator concurred with the Opinion

and Award; the employer-designated arbitrator dissen-

ted. (App. 63a, 64a).

The arbitrator found that the discharge of Mr. Cash

was not for just cause. (App. 63a). The arbitrator found

that Mr. Cash did not have possession of the controlled

substance scattered in his room. (App. 60a, 61a). Thus,

the arbitrator concluded that there was no “cause”, “rea-

sonable cause”, “probable cause” or “just cause” to order

Mr. Cash to submit to a drug test. (App. 61a). In finding

that there was no cause to order Mr. Cash to submit to a

drug test, the arbitrator made note of certain material

facts such as: Mr. Cash was only in the room 1 1/2 days

prior to the search and only for a few hours daily (App.

59a); the cabin had not been cleaned before Mr. Cash

moved in (App. 59a); other persons had full access to the

room because the door was unlocked (App. 59a); the

room had been previously occupied (App. 59a); the mate-

rials discovered were scattered around the rocm which

would lead a reasonable person to the conclusion that the

materials belonged to someone else (App. 59a-60a); and

the arbitrator took note of a prior arbitration award

wherein an employee who was discharged for refusal to

submit to a drug test after a search disclosed a marijuana

roach and an alligator clip, was reinstated without pay

because there was doubt as to whether the grievant pos-

sessed the material found. (App. 41a, 42a). The arbitrator

ordered that Mr. Cash be reinstated with full seniority but

the period of his discharge was to be deemed a disciplin-

ary suspension without pay. (App. 63a).

D. Post-Arbitration Proceedings

Exxon moved to vacate the arbitration award and the

union moved to confirm same. By Opinion and Order

dated December 8, 1994, the District Court confirmed the

arbitration award. (App. 23a-34a).

Exxon filed an appeal. In an Opinion filed January

11, 1996, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

affirmed the decision of the District Court. (App. 1a).

+

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

I. PUBLIC POLICY WAS NOT VIOLATED BY CON-

FIRMATION OF AN ARBITRATION AWARD

WHEREIN THE ARBITRATOR DETERMINED

THAT THE EMPLOYER DID NOT HAVE REASON-

ABLE CAUSE TO REQUIRE THE GRIEVANT TO

SUBMIT TO A DRUG TEST AND THE EMPLOYER

DID NOT HAVE JUST CAUSE TO DISCHARGE

THE GRIEVANT.

Pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, and

the issue submitted to the arbitrator, the grievant, Alan

Cash, could only be discharged by Exxon for “just cause”.

The arbitrator determined that Exxon did not have

just cause to discharge Mr. Cash. As part of-the award,

the arbitrator found that the grievant did not have pos-

session of a controlled substance, thus the company did

not have reasonable cause to require Mr. Cash to submit

to a drug test. (App. 61a-63a). The District Court below

confirmed the arbitration award and the Court of

Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed that decision. The

well-reasoned decision of the Third Circuit follows estab-

lished labor arbitration case precedent.

The Petitioner contends that this Court should grant

the writ of certiorari because the court below erred by not

vacating the arbitration award on public policy grounds.

The Petitioner postures that the confirmation of the arbi-

tration award and the reinstatement of the grievant will

cause an environmental catastrophe (Pet. 9). The Petition

is replete with misstatements of fact and law. The Petition

does not require this Court to resolve any unsettled ques-

tions of Federal law or conflicting decisions of this Court.

The Petition should therefore be denied.

a

A. The Court below gave due deference to the arbi-

trator’s determination.

Courts exercise very limited review of an arbitration

award issued pursuant to a collective bargaining agree-

ment. United Paperworkers International Union v. Misco,

Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36-38, 108 S. Ct. 364, 369-70, 98 L. Ed. 2d

286 (1987) (“Misco”); Exxon Shipping Company v. Exxon

Seamen's Union, 73 F.3d 1287, 1291 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Exxon

111”). As this Court has observed, “[t]he federal policy of

settling labor disputes by arbitration would be under-

mined if courts had the final say on the merits of the

awards”. United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel

& Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596, 80 S. Ct. 1358, 1360, 4 L. Ed.

2d 1424 (1960) (“Enterprise Wheel”), accord, Exxon Ill, 73

F.3d at 1291. Accordingly, courts are not authorized to

reconsider the merits of an arbitration award. Misco, 484

U.S. at 36, 108 S. Ct. at 370; Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at

596, 80 S. Ct. at 1360. A court may not reconsider the

merits of an award even when the parties allege that the

award rests on errors of fact and/or errors of law. See,

United Industrial Workers v. Government of Virgin Islands,

987 F.2d 162, 170 (3d Cir. 1993); Interstate Brands Corp. v.

Teamsters Local Union No. 135, 909 F.2d 885, 888 (6th Cir.

1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 885, 111 S. Ct. 1104, 113 L. Ed.

2d 214 (1991).

The parties have authorized the arbitrator to give

meaning to the language of the agreement. Jeddo-Highland

Coal Company v. District 2, United Mine Workers of America,

884 F. Supp. 926, 936 (M.D. Pa. 1995). It is the job of the

arbitrator to interpret and apply the terms of the parties’

collective bargaining agreement. Enterprise Wheel, 363

"7

/

U.S. at 597, 80 S. Ct. at 136. As long as the arbitrator’s

award “draws its essence from the collective bargaining

agreement and is not merely the arbitrator’s own brand

of industrial justice”, the court must enforce the award.

Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597, 80 S. Ct. at 1361.

Pursuant to the terms of the collective bargaining

agreement in effect, an employee could only be dis-

charged or disciplined for “cause”, which had been inter-

preted to mean “just cause”. The agreement does not

define that phrase. Thus, when the parties submit to the

arbitrator the question of whether the grievant was dis-

charged for “just cause”, the arbitrator is required to

decide what “just cause” means. United Transportation

Union Local 1589 v. Suburban Transit Corp., 51 F.3d 376, 380

(3d Cir. 1995). The arbitrator must apply all the surround-

ing facts and circumstances to his interpretation of the

agreement to determine whether or not the discharge was

proper. Arco-Polymers, Inc. v. Local 8-74, 671 F.2d 752, 756

(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 28, 103 S. Ct. 63, 74 L. Ed.

2d 65 (1982). A highly deferential standard of review is

commonly extended to the substantive issue of what con-

stitutes sufficient and reasonable cause for discharge.

Interstate Brands, 909 F.2d at 889 (citations omitted).

Generally, in a discharge arbitration case, the

employer will assert that the employee has engaged in

conduct which is violative of a specific company rule or

policy, and that said conduct was cause to discharge the

employee. The operation of a company rule may be at

odds with the “just cause” provision. In such cases, har-

monizing discordant provisions is clearly a matter for the

arbitrator and is well within his authority. Local 238 Inter-

national Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen

and Helpers v. Cargill, Inc., 66 F.3d 988, 990 (8th Cir. 1995)

(citations omitted); Arco Polymers, 671 F.2d at 756.

In Arco Polymers, supra, a company rule stated that an

employee would be subject to discharge if he/she were

absent for more than four days without good and suffi-

cient cause. 671 F.2d at 752. The collective bargaining

agreement between the union and Arco Polymers also

contained a “just cause” for discharge provision. The

grievant was discharged for being absent for 19 days

without good and sufficient cause. The arbitrator found

that the grievant was unjustly discharged. Id. at 752. The

District Court vacated the award. The Third Circuit

reversed.

Upon review, the Third Circuit noted that the rule

did not give the company unfettered discretion to dis-

charge without being subject to review under the “just

cause” provision. Id. at 756. Moreover, the language of

the rule — “shall be subject to discharge” - was inter-

preted by the arbitrator to mean that discharge was not

mandatory. Id; accord, Super Tire Engineering Company v.

Teamsters Local Union No. 676, 721 F.2d 121, 124-125 (3d

Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 817, 105 S. Ct. 83, 83 L. Ed.

2d 31 (1984).

In a discharge case involving the “just cause” provi-

sion and allegations of the violation of a company rule,

not only is the arbitrator interpreting the “just cause”

provision, but he/she is also required to interpret the

rule. See, General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers Local

Union 968 v. Sysco Food Services, Inc., 838 F.2d 794, 798 (5th

Cir. 1988). In Sysco Food Services, the grievant was accused

of insubordination. In analyzing whether the grievant

——

violated the company’s rule on insubordination, the arbi-

trator had to determine whether the disciplined employee

engaged in the specific conduct which resulted in the

disciplinary action. Id. at 798. In order for an arbitrator to

fin. ~ st cause” to discharge an employee, the employer

must prove that the grievant engaged in conduct viola-

tive of the elements of the offense charged. Once the

arbitrator finds that the grievant did not engage in con-

duct violative of the rule, and that there is no just cause

to discharge the grievant, then the arbitrator has the

authority to fashion the appropriate remedy. Id. at 799;

see, Cargill, Inc., 66 F.3d at 99. The judicial deference to an

arbitrator’s award extends to the remedy awarded. See,

Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597, 80 S. Ct. at 1361; accord,

General Teamsters Local 326 v. M & G Convoy, Inc., 848 F.

Supp. 513, 517 (D. Del. 1994).

This case follows the above-cited established case

precedent. The bargaining unit employees could only be

discharged for “just cause”. The policy unilaterally imple-

mented by the company indicated that the company

could require an employee to submit to a drug or alcohol

test “where cause exists to suspect alcohol or drug mis-

use”. (App. 66a). The rule went on to indicate that a

“refusal to submit to a drug test was grounds for disci-

plinary action, including discharge”. (App. 66a). Thus,

discharge was not made mandatory.

On September 27, 1988, the company issued a letter

which reiterated the above policy. (App. 67a). The letter

indicated that a violation of the policy “will result in

immediate termination”. (App. 71a). However, the letter

also indicated that each incident would be reviewed on a

“case by case” basis. (App. 71a).

10

The above letter did not constitute an amendment to

the official promulgated policy. Instead, the letter was an

indication of how the company would interpret the pol-

icy.

It is reasonable to interpret the policy and the letter

to allow a penalty lesser than a discharge. Any discipline

under the policy remains subject to the just cause provi-

sion. The stipulated issue submitted to the arbitrator, i.e.,

was Mr. Cash discharged for just cause, shows that Exxon

did not think the discharge under the policy was “strictly

a function of management”. See, Cargill, Inc., 66 F.3d at

990.

In order for the arbitrator to find “just cause” to

sustain the grievant's discharge, the company had to

prove that it had “reasonable cause” or “just cause” to

require the grievant to submit to a drug test. To prove

“reasonable cause”, the company had to present facts to

support a reasonable suspicion that the grievant had

either used or had possession of drugs. Since the charge

of use or possession of drugs is a criminal offense, arbi-

trators have required the employer to prove their case by

clear and convincing evidence, or beyond a reasonable

doubt. Elkouri & Elkouri, How Arbitration Works, Fourth

Edition, page 662-663 (BNA 1985); Graphic Communica-

tions International Union Local 121-C v. Southern Coupon,

Inc., 852 F. Supp. 970, 975 (N.D. Ala. 1993). Upon a review

of all of the facts and circumstances of this case, and in

light of a prior Exxon arbitration award wherein the

arbitrator found thet the company did have reasonable

cause to test the grievants, the arbitrator in this case

determined that the company did not carry its burden of

proof — that there was no reasonable cause to require the

—————————————er

CO

11

grievant to submit to a drug test — thus there was no just

cause to discharge him. Since the arbitrator’s award

draws its essence from the collective bargaining agree-

ment, the courts below confirmed the award.

The decision of the court below is not an aberration.

There are several cases analogous to this case.

In Misco, the company promulgated a rule which

indicated that possession or use of a controlled substance

on company property was grounds for discharge. 484

U.S. at 32, 108 S. Ct. at 368. The grievant was appre-

hended by police sitting in the back seat of a car in the

company parking lot with marijuana smoke in the air and

a lighted marijuana cigarette in the frontseat ashtray. 484

U.S. at 33, 108 S. Ct. at 368. The employee was discharged

due to possession of drugs on company premises. Id.

The issue submitted to the arbitrator was whether

there was just cause to discharge under the company rule.

Id.

The arbitrator found that there was no just cause to

discharge the grievant. 484 U.S. at 34, 108 S. Ct. at 368.

The arbitrator found that the company failed to prove

that the grievant had possessed or used marijuana on

company property; finding the grievant in the backseat of

a car with a burning marijuana cigarette in the frontseat

ashtray was insufficient proof that the grievant had used

or possessed drugs on company property. Id.; also see,

Bechtel Construction, Inc. v. Laborers’ District Council, 130

LRRM (BNA) 2749 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 865 F.2d 249 (3d Cir.

1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1017, 109 S. Ct. 1133, 103 L. Ed.

2d 194 (1989).

ial

ee a a

12

In Cargill, Inc., supra, as in this case, the company

promulgated a drug and alcohol policy which included

reasonable suspicion testing. 66 F.3d at 989. The policy

indicated that an employee refusing a test would be

considered in violation of the policy and “will be termi-

nated”. Id. at 990. Disciplinary action taken pursuant to

the policy remained subject to the “just cause” provision.

Id.

The grievant was discharged because of his refusal to

submit to a drug and alcohol test. Jd. at 988. The arbitra-

tor found that the grievant had consumed alcohol on the

job, and knowingly and willfully refused to submit to the

test. Id. at 989. Nonetheless, the arbitrator found that the

company did not have sufficient cause to discharge the

grievant, and instead ordered a disciplinary suspension

as part of a “last chance offer of reemployment in lieu of

discharge”. Id. The court confirmed the arbitration award.

The court found that the arbitrator was within his author-

ity to harmonize the drug and alcohol testing policy and

the just cause provision. Id. at 990. Thus, upon finding

that there was no just cause for discharge, the arbitrator

was within his authority to order a last chance remedial

award.

In Trinity Industries v. United Steelworkers of America,

891 F. Supp. 342 (N.D. Tex. 1995), the company had a

drug and alcohol policy wherein the company could

require an employee to submit to a test. Id. at 345. A

supervisor caught two welders in a vacant building and

he detected the smell of marijuana smoke. Id. at 343. The

supervisor ordered the two employees to submit to a

drug test, but they refused and were discharged.

ee

13

The issue submitted to the arbitrator was whether

there was just cause for discharge. The court upheld the

arbitrator’s decision that the grievants were denied cer-

tain due process rights, and thus held there was no just

cause for discharge. The arbitrator converted the dis-

charge to a disciplinary suspension without pay which is

the same remedy the arbitrator ordered in this case. Also

see, United Food and Commercial Workers International

Union, Local 588 v. Foster Poultry Farms, 151 LRRM (BNA)

2013 (9th Cir. 1995) (The Ninth Circuit confirmed an

arbitration award wherein a driver who was discharged

for his refusal to take a random drug test required under

Department of Transportation regulations was ordered

reinstated).

B. The Arbitration Award does not violate public

policy.

It is well settled that a court may not enforce a

collective bargaining agreement or an arbitration award

that is contrary to public policy. See, W.R. Grace & Co. v.

Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 757, 765-66, 103 S. Ct. 2177, 2183,

76 L. Ed. 2d 298 (1983). Such public policy must be an

explicit, well-defined and dominant public policy, which

is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal

precedents. Id., quoting, Muschany v. United States, 324

U.S. 49, 66, 65 S. Ct. 442, 451, 89 L. Ed. 744 (1945); accord,

Misco, 484 U.S. at 43, 108 S. Ct. at 373-74. General consid-

erations of supposed public policy do not trigger the

public policy exception. Foster Poultry Farms, 151 LRRM

at 2016 (citations omitted). The party seeking to vacate an

arbitration award bears the burden of showing that the

award violates an explicit well-defined and dominant

aia

14

public policy, and it must demonstrate that the policy is

one that specifically militates against the relief ordered by

the arbitrator. Id. (citations omitted). The courts have

been and should be reluctant to vacate an arbitral award

on public policy grounds - there is no broad judicial

power to set aside arbitration awards as against public

policy. Id., citing, Arizona Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. v.

Berkeley, 59 F.3d 990, 992 (9th Cir. 1995), citing, Misco, 484

U.S. at 43, 108 S. Ct. at 373.

Throughout all of the proceedings below, Exxon has

argued that Mr. Cash’s refusal to submit to a drug test

constitutes a violation of the Coast Guard Regulations,

specifically 46 C.F.R. 16.250. (App. 77a). Exxon continues

to argue that the arbitrator’s award reinstating Mr. Cash

violates public policy because said award is violative of

the above-cited Coast Guard regulation and also the pol-

icy underlying the regulation and several other statutes.

Exxon’s public policy argument is erroneous for a

number of reasons which will be discussed in turn.

When the public policy exception is raised, the Court

must accept the arbitrator’s findings of fact. Misco, 484

U.S. at 45, 108 S. Ct. at 374; Exxon Shipping Company v.

Exxon Seamen's Union, 993 F.2d 357, 360 (3d Cir. 1993);

Iowa Electric Light and Power Company v. Local Union 204,

International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 834 F.2d

1424, 1427 (9th Cir. 1987). The arbitrator in the case at bar |

specifically found that Mr. Cash did not use nor had

possession of the marijuana gleanings discovered in the

chief pumpman’s cabin. The arbitrator also determined

that Exxon did not have reasonable cause to require Mr.

Cash to submit to a drug test. In light of the above

Oe i i ei ait

|

15

findings of fact, the Coast Guard’s reasonable cause test-

ing provision is not implicated. Exxon did not have rea-

sonable cause to require Mr. Cash to submit to a drug test

under 46 C.F.R. 16.250.

As part of its presentation, Exxon submitted to the

arbitrator the Coast Guard drug testing regulations.

Exxon argued that it had reasonable cause to test and

discharge Mr. Cash pursuant to the Coast Guard regula-

tions. The arbitrator stated:

If there was no reasonable cause to conclude

that the grievant brought the drug into his cabin

~ and the above analysis finds that there was not

- then the Coast Guard regulations would not

call for a drug test, and no violation of the

regulations could be said to exist.

(App. 60a). Although this finding is beyond the scope of

the parties’ agreement, since Exxon argued the statutory

effect, Exxon should be held bound by the arbitrator’s

findings.

Regardless of the arbitrator’s decision, the Coast

Guard’s reasonable cause testing regulation does not

specifically militate against the arbitrator’s reinstatement

order for Mr. Cash.

The Coast Guard regulation regarding reasonable

cause testing, indicates that an employee may be required

to submit to a test when the employer has a reasonable

belief that the grievant had used drugs. In this case, there

was no indication of use or probable use of drugs by Mr.

Cash so there was no reasonable cause to require him to

submit to a drug test.

16

When the Coast Guard promulgated its regulations,

it was very specific about penalties. If an employee

refuses to take a drug test after a serious marine accident,

or if an employee tests positive for drugs, according to

the regulations, the employee must be immediately

relieved of all duties on the ship and he/she is subject to

having his/her license suspended or revoked. 46 C.ER.

Sections 4.06-5(c) and 16.201(c) and (d), and 53 Fed. Reg.

47072. If an employee refuses a random drug test, he/she

may not be employed. 46 C.F.R. Section 16.230(f).

Pursuant to the Coast Guard’s reasonable cause test-

ing provision, 46 C.F.R. Section 16.250, an employee who

refuses to take a reasonable cause test is not discharged

from employment nor removed from his/her duties on

the ship. Other Federal regulatory agencies have adopted

provisions that indicate that a refusal to take a test is to

be treated the same as a positive test. (Pet. 11-12). The

Coast Guard has not promulgated such a regulation. The

only penalty an employee will receive under the Coast

Guard’s regulations for refusing to take a reasonable

cause drug test is that he/she will have his/her name

placed in the vessel's official log book, if such a book is

required. 46 C.F.R. 16.250(c). (App. 77a, 80a). Thus, the

arbitrator’s reinstatement order of Mr. Cash is not viola-

tive of the Coast Guard’s regulations. See, Foster Poultry

Farms, 151 LRRM at 2016-17.

Exxon argues that the decision of the court below is

contrary to recent public policy case precedent involving

the reinstatement of employees in safety sensitive posi-

tions. (Pet. 10-11). In each of the cases cited, the employee

was in a safety sensitive position. In each of the cases

cited, evidence showed that the employee was under the

17 :

influence of drugs or alcohol while at work, but based

upon other considerations, the arbitrator found no just

cause for discharge. In all of the cases, the employees’

conduct violated a company policy, and in most a specific

positive law.

This case is clearly distinguishable. In this case, the

grievant was admittedly not under the influence of drugs

or alcohol at work. Second, the arbitrator did not find the

grievant guilty of a violation of the company policy.

There is no violation of a positive law or policy underly-

ing same.

Exxon argues that the effect of the decision of the

court below is contrary to the public policy of a drug-free

workplace. (Pet. 10). Exxon further contends that the

decision below will “measurably increase the likelihood

of tanker accidents and decrease tanker safety” (Pet. 9).

While it is admitted that avoiding an environmental acci-

dent is of utmost importance, an arbitration award (this

arbitration award) should not be vacated on public policy

grounds based on “general considerations of supposed

public interest”. W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766, 103 S. Ct. at

2183; Foster Poultry Farms, supra.

Exxon has expressed a concern about the negative

precedent established by the decision below. That deci-

sion need not be reversed to address that concern.

Instead, Exxon can and has addressed its concerns about

drug testing through the collective bargaining process.

Exxon Shipping Company, 993 F.2d at 360, n.3.

Exxon has filed its Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to -

reverse the decision of the Third Circuit and vacate the

arbitration award dated November 27, 1992. Exxon’s

18

argument is premised on an alleged violation of public

policy. However, in light of the Arbitrator’s finding that

Mr. Cash did not use or possess a controlled substance,

and there was no reasonable cause to require Mr. Cash to

submit to a drug test, Exxon has failed to show that the

arbitrator’s reinstatement order violates any positive law,

or any explicit, well-defined, dominant public policy. This

case is specific on its facts, so there is no likelihood of a

repeat case. The perceived tarnish to Exxon’s image from

the decision should not be grounds for a grant of Exxon’s

Petition for Writ of Certiorari.

e

CONCLUSION

For all of the foregoing reasons, the Petition for a

Writ of Certiorari should be denied.

Dated: May 10, 1996

Respectfully submitted,

SCHNEIDER, GOLDBERGER, COHEN,

FINN, SOLOMON, LEDER &

MOoNnrTALBANO, P.C.

Attorneys for Respondent,

Exxon Seamen’s Union

1700 Galloping Hill Road

Kenilworth, New Jersey 07033

(908) 298-8800

Davip GROSSMAN

(Counsel of Record

for Respondent)

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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