Opposition Brief — SeaRiver Maritime, Inc. v. Exxon Seamen's Union
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No. 95-1637 k
CLERK
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1995
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SEARIVER MARITIME, INC.,
Petitioner,
EXXON SEAMEN’S UNION,
Respondent
SI
On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Third Circuit
SJ
RESPONDENT'S BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
SI
SCHNEIDER, GOLDBERGER, COHEN,
FINN, SOLOMON, LEDER AND
MONTALBANO, P.C.
Attorneys for Respondent,
Exxon Seamen's Union
1700 Galloping Hill Road
Kenilworth, New Jersey 07033
(908) 298-8800
Davip GROSSMAN
Counsel of Record
and on the Brief
COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 442-2831
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
COUNTER STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........... 1
Pia IE OC hans VaR AE 5440 bec kk «obi cd oats 1
a Se See OP IIS 6 5 un 0 0s in eaa's eke eed 2
C. The Arbitration Proceeding .................. 3
D. Post-Arbitration Proceedings................. 4
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT
I. PUBLIC POLICY WAS NOT VIOLATED BY CON-
FIRMATION OF AN ARBITRATION AWARD
WHEREIN THE ARBITRATOR DETERMINED
THAT THE EMPLOYER DID NOT HAVE REA-
SONABLE CAUSE TO REQUIRE THE GRIEVANT
TO SUBMIT TO A DRUG TEST AND THE
EMPLOYER DID NOT HAVE JUST CAUSE TO
DISCHARGE THE GRIEVANT.................. 5
A. The Court below gave due deference to the
arbitrator’s determination .................. 6
aN Cae etRe nie eln Ges wcka bia Ck tba <i < 13
il
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASEs:
Arco-Polymers, Inc. v. Local 8-74, 671 F.2d 752 (3d
Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 28, 103 S. Ct. 63, 74 L.
Bd. 26 65 (4902). 045 ivcvsiscadwees cashes in
Bechtel Construction, Inc. v. Laborers’ District
Council, 130 LRRM (BNA) 2749 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd,
865 F.2d 249 (3d Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S.
1017, 109 S. Ct. 1133, 103 L. Ed. 2d 194 (1989)...
Exxon Shipping Company v. Exxon Seamen’s Union,
73 Koa 12B/ COG CAR, Sees oc ik cha cate cen
Exxon Shipping Company v. Exxon Seamen's Union,
993 B2d Sof (3G Cie, S09sp ns ves. ces een eee
General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers Local
Union 968 v. Sysco Food Services, Inc., 838 F.2d
794 (Oth Cis. 29GB) i ncc5.c5 sa caks uc ceases
General Teamsters Local 326 v.M & G Convoy, Inc.,
648 K. Supp. 513 (0. Del. TOO). civicccersn act
Graphic Communications International Union Local
121-C v. Southern Coupon, Inc., 852 F. Supp. 970
(ND. Aba. VORB) ia ia occa caus Cera iia eee
Interstate Brands Corp. v. Teamsters Local Union No.
135, 909 F.2d 885 (6th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499
U.S. 885, 111 S. Ct. 1104, 113 L. Ed. 2d 214 (1991) ..
Iowa Electric Light and Power Company v. Local
Union 204, International Brotherhood of Electrical
Workers, 834 F.2d 1424 (9th Cir. 1987).........
Jeddo-Highland Coal Company v. District 2, United
Mine Workers of America, 884 F. Supp. 926 (M.D.
PM. 90D}... cia vai se eaenvaele ye eee
Page
eS Tee
ee ee
ili
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page
Local 238 International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers v. Cargill,
Inc., 66 F.3d 988 (8th Cir. 1995)........... 7, 9, 10, 12
Muschany v. United States, 324 U.S. 49, 65 S. Ct. 42,
ee. SR ee eens eae 13
Super Tire Engineering Company v. Teamsters Local
Union No. 676, 721 F.2d 121 (3d Cir. 1983), cert.
denied, 469 U.S. 817, 105 S. Ct. 83, 83 L. Ed. 2d 31
ae Gays Dy Seneca taney) 9 2 aie, ele SA ee ina 8
Trinity Industries v. United Steelworkers of America,
891 F. Supp. 342 (N.D. Tex. 1995)................. 12
United Food and Commercial Workers International
Union, Local 588 v. Foster Poultry Farms, 151
LRRM (BNA) 2013 (9th Cir. 1995).......... 13, 16, 17
United Industrial Workers v. Government of Virgin
metanas, 967 F.2d 162 (3d Cir. 1993).............3... 6
United Paperworkers International Union v. Misco,
Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 108 S. Ct. 364, 98 L. Ed. 2d 286
RS rea ore 6, 11, 13, 14
United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel &
Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 80 S. Ct. 1358, 4 L. Ed.
EEE PR a ee er ane ae
United Transportation Union Local 1589 v. Suburban
Transit Corp., 51 F.3d 376 (3d Cir. 1995)............ 7
W.R. Grace & Co. v. Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 757,
103 S. Ct. 2177, 76 L. Ed. 2d 298 (1983)........ 13, 17
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page
STATUTES:
OG CIA, Street. SE ok oes head reese. grees cis 16
6 CR, TE Tee 6 66 oe Sead. ca vceeea aus 16
46 CBR. Section: TGR) « «soe ie sd pesca sie sesecdet 16
Re eR eee rer eerres 16
M6 CPR: Sect Giles 5 5 een k eee et 14, 15, 16
06 SR. BOC BGG «6 84 5 sigs any ty phe sd 98 ain 16
MISCELLANEOUS:
Elkouri & Elkouri, How Arbitration Works, Fourth
Edition, page 662-663 (BNA 1985)................. 10
SS Bod. Tekm, SI Se bie eo Ae is o Sa ee eA 16
li
COUNTER STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Background
The Exxon Seamen’s Union (hereinafter referred to as
the “union”) is, and has been, the collective bargaining
representative of the unlicensed personnel employed in
the deck, engine and steward’s departments of the Exxon
Shipping Company (hereinafter referred to as the “com-
pany” or “Exxon”).
The company and the union were parties to a collec-
tive bargaining agreement covering the period of July 31,
1985 through August 31, 1987.
After eight months of unsuccessful negotiations,
effective April 1, 1988, the company implemented its final
proposal. The discipline clause of the 1985-1987 agree-
ment was continued in full force and effect. Pursuant
thereto, an employee could only be discharged for
“cause”, which was interpreted to mean “just cause”. The
parties’ grievance and arbitration agreement was also
continued in full force and effect.
On April 1, 1988, the company unilaterally imple-
mented a drug and alcohol testing policy. On April 1,
1988, the company issued a Policy Statement on
Employee Alcohol and Drug Use. That policy contained a
provision regarding “reasonable cause” testing. That pol-
icy provided in relevant part:
The company also has the right to require
employees to submit to medical evaluation or
alcohol or drug testing where cause exists to
suspect alcohol or drug misuse. A positive test
result or refusal to submit to a drug test is
grounds for disciplinary action, including dis-
missal.
(App. 66a).
By letter dated September 27, 1988, the company
notified the employees of its intent to strictly enforce the
above policy. The company, despite this letter, did not
change its policy statement which implied that discharge
was not mandatory for a refusal to submit to a drug test
and did not change the contractual requirement that any
discipline was subject to the “just cause” provision.
B. Alan Cash’s Grievance
The grievant in this case is Alan Cash, who was a
pumpman employed for thirteen (13) years with Exxon.
In early May of 1989, Mr. Cash was transferred from the
oil-tanker Exxon Benicia in Japan to the oil-tanker Exxon
Washington anchored in San Francisco Bay. From May 10,
1989 to May 15, 1989, Mr. Cash was quartered in the
second pumpman’s room - a small, poorly furnished
room. Mr. Cash was working around the clock to get the
ship fit for sea.
On May 15, 1989, the chief pumpman left the Exxon
Washington due to a family emergency. Mr. Cash moved
into that room. The chief pumpman’s room was not
cleaned before Mr. Cash moved in. Due to fire safety
rules, the room door was always left unlocked.
On May 17, 1989, the company conducted an unan-
nounced search of the Exxon Washington. During that
search, in the chief pumpman’s cabin, the search team
found several marijuana seeds on and under the rug, an
ash by the bedpost, and two little balled up pieces of
paper which turned out to be marijuana cigarette ends
(“roaches”) in the pouch of a suitcase used by Mr. Cash.
Based upon these findings, the company ordered the
grievant to submit to a drug test. The union had consis-
tently contested the drug and alcohol policy, and on the
advice of the union representative, the grievant refused
to submit to a drug test. Mr. Cash was discharged. Mr.
Cash's discharge was grieved. The parties were unable to
resolve the grievance, thus the matter was submitted to
arbitration.
C. The Arbitration Proceeding
After three days of hearing, and the submission of
post-hearing briefs, the neutral arbitrator issued an Opin-
ion and Award dated November 27, 1992. (App. 35a). The
union-designated arbitrator concurred with the Opinion
and Award; the employer-designated arbitrator dissen-
ted. (App. 63a, 64a).
The arbitrator found that the discharge of Mr. Cash
was not for just cause. (App. 63a). The arbitrator found
that Mr. Cash did not have possession of the controlled
substance scattered in his room. (App. 60a, 61a). Thus,
the arbitrator concluded that there was no “cause”, “rea-
sonable cause”, “probable cause” or “just cause” to order
Mr. Cash to submit to a drug test. (App. 61a). In finding
that there was no cause to order Mr. Cash to submit to a
drug test, the arbitrator made note of certain material
facts such as: Mr. Cash was only in the room 1 1/2 days
prior to the search and only for a few hours daily (App.
59a); the cabin had not been cleaned before Mr. Cash
moved in (App. 59a); other persons had full access to the
room because the door was unlocked (App. 59a); the
room had been previously occupied (App. 59a); the mate-
rials discovered were scattered around the rocm which
would lead a reasonable person to the conclusion that the
materials belonged to someone else (App. 59a-60a); and
the arbitrator took note of a prior arbitration award
wherein an employee who was discharged for refusal to
submit to a drug test after a search disclosed a marijuana
roach and an alligator clip, was reinstated without pay
because there was doubt as to whether the grievant pos-
sessed the material found. (App. 41a, 42a). The arbitrator
ordered that Mr. Cash be reinstated with full seniority but
the period of his discharge was to be deemed a disciplin-
ary suspension without pay. (App. 63a).
D. Post-Arbitration Proceedings
Exxon moved to vacate the arbitration award and the
union moved to confirm same. By Opinion and Order
dated December 8, 1994, the District Court confirmed the
arbitration award. (App. 23a-34a).
Exxon filed an appeal. In an Opinion filed January
11, 1996, the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit
affirmed the decision of the District Court. (App. 1a).
+
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT
I. PUBLIC POLICY WAS NOT VIOLATED BY CON-
FIRMATION OF AN ARBITRATION AWARD
WHEREIN THE ARBITRATOR DETERMINED
THAT THE EMPLOYER DID NOT HAVE REASON-
ABLE CAUSE TO REQUIRE THE GRIEVANT TO
SUBMIT TO A DRUG TEST AND THE EMPLOYER
DID NOT HAVE JUST CAUSE TO DISCHARGE
THE GRIEVANT.
Pursuant to the collective bargaining agreement, and
the issue submitted to the arbitrator, the grievant, Alan
Cash, could only be discharged by Exxon for “just cause”.
The arbitrator determined that Exxon did not have
just cause to discharge Mr. Cash. As part of-the award,
the arbitrator found that the grievant did not have pos-
session of a controlled substance, thus the company did
not have reasonable cause to require Mr. Cash to submit
to a drug test. (App. 61a-63a). The District Court below
confirmed the arbitration award and the Court of
Appeals for the Third Circuit affirmed that decision. The
well-reasoned decision of the Third Circuit follows estab-
lished labor arbitration case precedent.
The Petitioner contends that this Court should grant
the writ of certiorari because the court below erred by not
vacating the arbitration award on public policy grounds.
The Petitioner postures that the confirmation of the arbi-
tration award and the reinstatement of the grievant will
cause an environmental catastrophe (Pet. 9). The Petition
is replete with misstatements of fact and law. The Petition
does not require this Court to resolve any unsettled ques-
tions of Federal law or conflicting decisions of this Court.
The Petition should therefore be denied.
a
A. The Court below gave due deference to the arbi-
trator’s determination.
Courts exercise very limited review of an arbitration
award issued pursuant to a collective bargaining agree-
ment. United Paperworkers International Union v. Misco,
Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36-38, 108 S. Ct. 364, 369-70, 98 L. Ed. 2d
286 (1987) (“Misco”); Exxon Shipping Company v. Exxon
Seamen's Union, 73 F.3d 1287, 1291 (3d Cir. 1996) (“Exxon
111”). As this Court has observed, “[t]he federal policy of
settling labor disputes by arbitration would be under-
mined if courts had the final say on the merits of the
awards”. United Steelworkers of America v. Enterprise Wheel
& Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 596, 80 S. Ct. 1358, 1360, 4 L. Ed.
2d 1424 (1960) (“Enterprise Wheel”), accord, Exxon Ill, 73
F.3d at 1291. Accordingly, courts are not authorized to
reconsider the merits of an arbitration award. Misco, 484
U.S. at 36, 108 S. Ct. at 370; Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at
596, 80 S. Ct. at 1360. A court may not reconsider the
merits of an award even when the parties allege that the
award rests on errors of fact and/or errors of law. See,
United Industrial Workers v. Government of Virgin Islands,
987 F.2d 162, 170 (3d Cir. 1993); Interstate Brands Corp. v.
Teamsters Local Union No. 135, 909 F.2d 885, 888 (6th Cir.
1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 885, 111 S. Ct. 1104, 113 L. Ed.
2d 214 (1991).
The parties have authorized the arbitrator to give
meaning to the language of the agreement. Jeddo-Highland
Coal Company v. District 2, United Mine Workers of America,
884 F. Supp. 926, 936 (M.D. Pa. 1995). It is the job of the
arbitrator to interpret and apply the terms of the parties’
collective bargaining agreement. Enterprise Wheel, 363
"7
/
U.S. at 597, 80 S. Ct. at 136. As long as the arbitrator’s
award “draws its essence from the collective bargaining
agreement and is not merely the arbitrator’s own brand
of industrial justice”, the court must enforce the award.
Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597, 80 S. Ct. at 1361.
Pursuant to the terms of the collective bargaining
agreement in effect, an employee could only be dis-
charged or disciplined for “cause”, which had been inter-
preted to mean “just cause”. The agreement does not
define that phrase. Thus, when the parties submit to the
arbitrator the question of whether the grievant was dis-
charged for “just cause”, the arbitrator is required to
decide what “just cause” means. United Transportation
Union Local 1589 v. Suburban Transit Corp., 51 F.3d 376, 380
(3d Cir. 1995). The arbitrator must apply all the surround-
ing facts and circumstances to his interpretation of the
agreement to determine whether or not the discharge was
proper. Arco-Polymers, Inc. v. Local 8-74, 671 F.2d 752, 756
(3d Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 28, 103 S. Ct. 63, 74 L. Ed.
2d 65 (1982). A highly deferential standard of review is
commonly extended to the substantive issue of what con-
stitutes sufficient and reasonable cause for discharge.
Interstate Brands, 909 F.2d at 889 (citations omitted).
Generally, in a discharge arbitration case, the
employer will assert that the employee has engaged in
conduct which is violative of a specific company rule or
policy, and that said conduct was cause to discharge the
employee. The operation of a company rule may be at
odds with the “just cause” provision. In such cases, har-
monizing discordant provisions is clearly a matter for the
arbitrator and is well within his authority. Local 238 Inter-
national Brotherhood of Teamsters, Chauffeurs, Warehousemen
and Helpers v. Cargill, Inc., 66 F.3d 988, 990 (8th Cir. 1995)
(citations omitted); Arco Polymers, 671 F.2d at 756.
In Arco Polymers, supra, a company rule stated that an
employee would be subject to discharge if he/she were
absent for more than four days without good and suffi-
cient cause. 671 F.2d at 752. The collective bargaining
agreement between the union and Arco Polymers also
contained a “just cause” for discharge provision. The
grievant was discharged for being absent for 19 days
without good and sufficient cause. The arbitrator found
that the grievant was unjustly discharged. Id. at 752. The
District Court vacated the award. The Third Circuit
reversed.
Upon review, the Third Circuit noted that the rule
did not give the company unfettered discretion to dis-
charge without being subject to review under the “just
cause” provision. Id. at 756. Moreover, the language of
the rule — “shall be subject to discharge” - was inter-
preted by the arbitrator to mean that discharge was not
mandatory. Id; accord, Super Tire Engineering Company v.
Teamsters Local Union No. 676, 721 F.2d 121, 124-125 (3d
Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 817, 105 S. Ct. 83, 83 L. Ed.
2d 31 (1984).
In a discharge case involving the “just cause” provi-
sion and allegations of the violation of a company rule,
not only is the arbitrator interpreting the “just cause”
provision, but he/she is also required to interpret the
rule. See, General Drivers, Warehousemen and Helpers Local
Union 968 v. Sysco Food Services, Inc., 838 F.2d 794, 798 (5th
Cir. 1988). In Sysco Food Services, the grievant was accused
of insubordination. In analyzing whether the grievant
——
violated the company’s rule on insubordination, the arbi-
trator had to determine whether the disciplined employee
engaged in the specific conduct which resulted in the
disciplinary action. Id. at 798. In order for an arbitrator to
fin. ~ st cause” to discharge an employee, the employer
must prove that the grievant engaged in conduct viola-
tive of the elements of the offense charged. Once the
arbitrator finds that the grievant did not engage in con-
duct violative of the rule, and that there is no just cause
to discharge the grievant, then the arbitrator has the
authority to fashion the appropriate remedy. Id. at 799;
see, Cargill, Inc., 66 F.3d at 99. The judicial deference to an
arbitrator’s award extends to the remedy awarded. See,
Enterprise Wheel, 363 U.S. at 597, 80 S. Ct. at 1361; accord,
General Teamsters Local 326 v. M & G Convoy, Inc., 848 F.
Supp. 513, 517 (D. Del. 1994).
This case follows the above-cited established case
precedent. The bargaining unit employees could only be
discharged for “just cause”. The policy unilaterally imple-
mented by the company indicated that the company
could require an employee to submit to a drug or alcohol
test “where cause exists to suspect alcohol or drug mis-
use”. (App. 66a). The rule went on to indicate that a
“refusal to submit to a drug test was grounds for disci-
plinary action, including discharge”. (App. 66a). Thus,
discharge was not made mandatory.
On September 27, 1988, the company issued a letter
which reiterated the above policy. (App. 67a). The letter
indicated that a violation of the policy “will result in
immediate termination”. (App. 71a). However, the letter
also indicated that each incident would be reviewed on a
“case by case” basis. (App. 71a).
10
The above letter did not constitute an amendment to
the official promulgated policy. Instead, the letter was an
indication of how the company would interpret the pol-
icy.
It is reasonable to interpret the policy and the letter
to allow a penalty lesser than a discharge. Any discipline
under the policy remains subject to the just cause provi-
sion. The stipulated issue submitted to the arbitrator, i.e.,
was Mr. Cash discharged for just cause, shows that Exxon
did not think the discharge under the policy was “strictly
a function of management”. See, Cargill, Inc., 66 F.3d at
990.
In order for the arbitrator to find “just cause” to
sustain the grievant's discharge, the company had to
prove that it had “reasonable cause” or “just cause” to
require the grievant to submit to a drug test. To prove
“reasonable cause”, the company had to present facts to
support a reasonable suspicion that the grievant had
either used or had possession of drugs. Since the charge
of use or possession of drugs is a criminal offense, arbi-
trators have required the employer to prove their case by
clear and convincing evidence, or beyond a reasonable
doubt. Elkouri & Elkouri, How Arbitration Works, Fourth
Edition, page 662-663 (BNA 1985); Graphic Communica-
tions International Union Local 121-C v. Southern Coupon,
Inc., 852 F. Supp. 970, 975 (N.D. Ala. 1993). Upon a review
of all of the facts and circumstances of this case, and in
light of a prior Exxon arbitration award wherein the
arbitrator found thet the company did have reasonable
cause to test the grievants, the arbitrator in this case
determined that the company did not carry its burden of
proof — that there was no reasonable cause to require the
—————————————er
CO
11
grievant to submit to a drug test — thus there was no just
cause to discharge him. Since the arbitrator’s award
draws its essence from the collective bargaining agree-
ment, the courts below confirmed the award.
The decision of the court below is not an aberration.
There are several cases analogous to this case.
In Misco, the company promulgated a rule which
indicated that possession or use of a controlled substance
on company property was grounds for discharge. 484
U.S. at 32, 108 S. Ct. at 368. The grievant was appre-
hended by police sitting in the back seat of a car in the
company parking lot with marijuana smoke in the air and
a lighted marijuana cigarette in the frontseat ashtray. 484
U.S. at 33, 108 S. Ct. at 368. The employee was discharged
due to possession of drugs on company premises. Id.
The issue submitted to the arbitrator was whether
there was just cause to discharge under the company rule.
Id.
The arbitrator found that there was no just cause to
discharge the grievant. 484 U.S. at 34, 108 S. Ct. at 368.
The arbitrator found that the company failed to prove
that the grievant had possessed or used marijuana on
company property; finding the grievant in the backseat of
a car with a burning marijuana cigarette in the frontseat
ashtray was insufficient proof that the grievant had used
or possessed drugs on company property. Id.; also see,
Bechtel Construction, Inc. v. Laborers’ District Council, 130
LRRM (BNA) 2749 (E.D. Pa.), aff'd, 865 F.2d 249 (3d Cir.
1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1017, 109 S. Ct. 1133, 103 L. Ed.
2d 194 (1989).
ial
ee a a
12
In Cargill, Inc., supra, as in this case, the company
promulgated a drug and alcohol policy which included
reasonable suspicion testing. 66 F.3d at 989. The policy
indicated that an employee refusing a test would be
considered in violation of the policy and “will be termi-
nated”. Id. at 990. Disciplinary action taken pursuant to
the policy remained subject to the “just cause” provision.
Id.
The grievant was discharged because of his refusal to
submit to a drug and alcohol test. Jd. at 988. The arbitra-
tor found that the grievant had consumed alcohol on the
job, and knowingly and willfully refused to submit to the
test. Id. at 989. Nonetheless, the arbitrator found that the
company did not have sufficient cause to discharge the
grievant, and instead ordered a disciplinary suspension
as part of a “last chance offer of reemployment in lieu of
discharge”. Id. The court confirmed the arbitration award.
The court found that the arbitrator was within his author-
ity to harmonize the drug and alcohol testing policy and
the just cause provision. Id. at 990. Thus, upon finding
that there was no just cause for discharge, the arbitrator
was within his authority to order a last chance remedial
award.
In Trinity Industries v. United Steelworkers of America,
891 F. Supp. 342 (N.D. Tex. 1995), the company had a
drug and alcohol policy wherein the company could
require an employee to submit to a test. Id. at 345. A
supervisor caught two welders in a vacant building and
he detected the smell of marijuana smoke. Id. at 343. The
supervisor ordered the two employees to submit to a
drug test, but they refused and were discharged.
ee
13
The issue submitted to the arbitrator was whether
there was just cause for discharge. The court upheld the
arbitrator’s decision that the grievants were denied cer-
tain due process rights, and thus held there was no just
cause for discharge. The arbitrator converted the dis-
charge to a disciplinary suspension without pay which is
the same remedy the arbitrator ordered in this case. Also
see, United Food and Commercial Workers International
Union, Local 588 v. Foster Poultry Farms, 151 LRRM (BNA)
2013 (9th Cir. 1995) (The Ninth Circuit confirmed an
arbitration award wherein a driver who was discharged
for his refusal to take a random drug test required under
Department of Transportation regulations was ordered
reinstated).
B. The Arbitration Award does not violate public
policy.
It is well settled that a court may not enforce a
collective bargaining agreement or an arbitration award
that is contrary to public policy. See, W.R. Grace & Co. v.
Local Union 759, 461 U.S. 757, 765-66, 103 S. Ct. 2177, 2183,
76 L. Ed. 2d 298 (1983). Such public policy must be an
explicit, well-defined and dominant public policy, which
is to be ascertained by reference to the laws and legal
precedents. Id., quoting, Muschany v. United States, 324
U.S. 49, 66, 65 S. Ct. 442, 451, 89 L. Ed. 744 (1945); accord,
Misco, 484 U.S. at 43, 108 S. Ct. at 373-74. General consid-
erations of supposed public policy do not trigger the
public policy exception. Foster Poultry Farms, 151 LRRM
at 2016 (citations omitted). The party seeking to vacate an
arbitration award bears the burden of showing that the
award violates an explicit well-defined and dominant
aia
14
public policy, and it must demonstrate that the policy is
one that specifically militates against the relief ordered by
the arbitrator. Id. (citations omitted). The courts have
been and should be reluctant to vacate an arbitral award
on public policy grounds - there is no broad judicial
power to set aside arbitration awards as against public
policy. Id., citing, Arizona Electric Power Cooperative, Inc. v.
Berkeley, 59 F.3d 990, 992 (9th Cir. 1995), citing, Misco, 484
U.S. at 43, 108 S. Ct. at 373.
Throughout all of the proceedings below, Exxon has
argued that Mr. Cash’s refusal to submit to a drug test
constitutes a violation of the Coast Guard Regulations,
specifically 46 C.F.R. 16.250. (App. 77a). Exxon continues
to argue that the arbitrator’s award reinstating Mr. Cash
violates public policy because said award is violative of
the above-cited Coast Guard regulation and also the pol-
icy underlying the regulation and several other statutes.
Exxon’s public policy argument is erroneous for a
number of reasons which will be discussed in turn.
When the public policy exception is raised, the Court
must accept the arbitrator’s findings of fact. Misco, 484
U.S. at 45, 108 S. Ct. at 374; Exxon Shipping Company v.
Exxon Seamen's Union, 993 F.2d 357, 360 (3d Cir. 1993);
Iowa Electric Light and Power Company v. Local Union 204,
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, 834 F.2d
1424, 1427 (9th Cir. 1987). The arbitrator in the case at bar |
specifically found that Mr. Cash did not use nor had
possession of the marijuana gleanings discovered in the
chief pumpman’s cabin. The arbitrator also determined
that Exxon did not have reasonable cause to require Mr.
Cash to submit to a drug test. In light of the above
Oe i i ei ait
|
15
findings of fact, the Coast Guard’s reasonable cause test-
ing provision is not implicated. Exxon did not have rea-
sonable cause to require Mr. Cash to submit to a drug test
under 46 C.F.R. 16.250.
As part of its presentation, Exxon submitted to the
arbitrator the Coast Guard drug testing regulations.
Exxon argued that it had reasonable cause to test and
discharge Mr. Cash pursuant to the Coast Guard regula-
tions. The arbitrator stated:
If there was no reasonable cause to conclude
that the grievant brought the drug into his cabin
~ and the above analysis finds that there was not
- then the Coast Guard regulations would not
call for a drug test, and no violation of the
regulations could be said to exist.
(App. 60a). Although this finding is beyond the scope of
the parties’ agreement, since Exxon argued the statutory
effect, Exxon should be held bound by the arbitrator’s
findings.
Regardless of the arbitrator’s decision, the Coast
Guard’s reasonable cause testing regulation does not
specifically militate against the arbitrator’s reinstatement
order for Mr. Cash.
The Coast Guard regulation regarding reasonable
cause testing, indicates that an employee may be required
to submit to a test when the employer has a reasonable
belief that the grievant had used drugs. In this case, there
was no indication of use or probable use of drugs by Mr.
Cash so there was no reasonable cause to require him to
submit to a drug test.
16
When the Coast Guard promulgated its regulations,
it was very specific about penalties. If an employee
refuses to take a drug test after a serious marine accident,
or if an employee tests positive for drugs, according to
the regulations, the employee must be immediately
relieved of all duties on the ship and he/she is subject to
having his/her license suspended or revoked. 46 C.ER.
Sections 4.06-5(c) and 16.201(c) and (d), and 53 Fed. Reg.
47072. If an employee refuses a random drug test, he/she
may not be employed. 46 C.F.R. Section 16.230(f).
Pursuant to the Coast Guard’s reasonable cause test-
ing provision, 46 C.F.R. Section 16.250, an employee who
refuses to take a reasonable cause test is not discharged
from employment nor removed from his/her duties on
the ship. Other Federal regulatory agencies have adopted
provisions that indicate that a refusal to take a test is to
be treated the same as a positive test. (Pet. 11-12). The
Coast Guard has not promulgated such a regulation. The
only penalty an employee will receive under the Coast
Guard’s regulations for refusing to take a reasonable
cause drug test is that he/she will have his/her name
placed in the vessel's official log book, if such a book is
required. 46 C.F.R. 16.250(c). (App. 77a, 80a). Thus, the
arbitrator’s reinstatement order of Mr. Cash is not viola-
tive of the Coast Guard’s regulations. See, Foster Poultry
Farms, 151 LRRM at 2016-17.
Exxon argues that the decision of the court below is
contrary to recent public policy case precedent involving
the reinstatement of employees in safety sensitive posi-
tions. (Pet. 10-11). In each of the cases cited, the employee
was in a safety sensitive position. In each of the cases
cited, evidence showed that the employee was under the
17 :
influence of drugs or alcohol while at work, but based
upon other considerations, the arbitrator found no just
cause for discharge. In all of the cases, the employees’
conduct violated a company policy, and in most a specific
positive law.
This case is clearly distinguishable. In this case, the
grievant was admittedly not under the influence of drugs
or alcohol at work. Second, the arbitrator did not find the
grievant guilty of a violation of the company policy.
There is no violation of a positive law or policy underly-
ing same.
Exxon argues that the effect of the decision of the
court below is contrary to the public policy of a drug-free
workplace. (Pet. 10). Exxon further contends that the
decision below will “measurably increase the likelihood
of tanker accidents and decrease tanker safety” (Pet. 9).
While it is admitted that avoiding an environmental acci-
dent is of utmost importance, an arbitration award (this
arbitration award) should not be vacated on public policy
grounds based on “general considerations of supposed
public interest”. W.R. Grace, 461 U.S. at 766, 103 S. Ct. at
2183; Foster Poultry Farms, supra.
Exxon has expressed a concern about the negative
precedent established by the decision below. That deci-
sion need not be reversed to address that concern.
Instead, Exxon can and has addressed its concerns about
drug testing through the collective bargaining process.
Exxon Shipping Company, 993 F.2d at 360, n.3.
Exxon has filed its Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to -
reverse the decision of the Third Circuit and vacate the
arbitration award dated November 27, 1992. Exxon’s
18
argument is premised on an alleged violation of public
policy. However, in light of the Arbitrator’s finding that
Mr. Cash did not use or possess a controlled substance,
and there was no reasonable cause to require Mr. Cash to
submit to a drug test, Exxon has failed to show that the
arbitrator’s reinstatement order violates any positive law,
or any explicit, well-defined, dominant public policy. This
case is specific on its facts, so there is no likelihood of a
repeat case. The perceived tarnish to Exxon’s image from
the decision should not be grounds for a grant of Exxon’s
Petition for Writ of Certiorari.
e
CONCLUSION
For all of the foregoing reasons, the Petition for a
Writ of Certiorari should be denied.
Dated: May 10, 1996
Respectfully submitted,
SCHNEIDER, GOLDBERGER, COHEN,
FINN, SOLOMON, LEDER &
MOoNnrTALBANO, P.C.
Attorneys for Respondent,
Exxon Seamen’s Union
1700 Galloping Hill Road
Kenilworth, New Jersey 07033
(908) 298-8800
Davip GROSSMAN
(Counsel of Record
for Respondent)
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.