Opposition Brief — Moore v. Ingebretsen

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No. 96-331 ,

riut Ur THE CLERK

ee a ree ae

In THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1996

MIKE Moore, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MISSISSIPPI,

¥ Petitioner,

DAVID INGEBRETSEN, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF and

His DAUGHTER, ANNA INGEBRETSEN, ef ai.,

: Respondents.

On Petition fora Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

ROBERT B. MCDUFF ELLIOT M. MINCBERG *

767 North Congress Street JUDITH E. SCHAEFFER

Jackson, Mississippi 39202 PEOPLE FoR THE AMERICAN WAY

(601) 969-0802 2000 M Street, N.W.

STEVEN R. SHAPIRO Suite 400

AMERICAN CIVIL LIBERTIES Washington, D.C, 20086

UNION FOUNDATION (202) 467-4999

132 West 43rd Street JOHN G. JONES

New York, New York 10086 P.O. Box 9622

(212) 944-9800 Jackson, Mississippi 39286

(601) 362-7555

Counsel for Respondents

* Counsel of Record

WILSON EPEes Printing Co., Inc. - 789-0096 - WasniNnGcron, D.C. 20001

@ ce co

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES .................... scnictatsaeblinpaien

STATEMENT OF THE CASE .............2..........0.--cccescceneees

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT ..................... :

ea IIT con: nentaieiindaatiidiesimenitiiadmcemiatacnes sisiceainaigstsith

Page

12

ii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES Page

ACLU v. Blackhorse Pike Regional Board of Edu-

cation, 84 F.3d 1471 (8d Cir. 1996) (en banc)... 10

Anderson v. City of Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564

IEE sais cte csesiccnhieeccckcannanbeacpl ts aaah ian Riddle ob ceth 7

Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988) ................ 9

Committee for Public Education and Religious

Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (19738) —............ 8,9

Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422 U.S. 922 (1975) ....... 7

Edwards v. Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578 (1987) ............. 7,8,9

Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347 (1976) ................-.....--. 5

Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) ...............0200022... 7

Gearon v. Loudoun County School Board, 844 F.

aa. TORT 1s Oak SO wrtaienstidinionnn 10

Harris v. Joint School District No. 241, 41 F.3d

447 (9th Cir. 1994), vacated as moot, 115 S. Ct.

DOGG CESS -onncisicetsctaanemnneambeeneiae 10

Ingebretsen, et al. v. Jackson Public School District,

et al., 88 F.3d 274 (5th Cir. 1996) 0.00000. passim

Ingebretsen, et al. v. Jackson Public School Dist.,

et al., 864 F. Supp. 1473 (S.D. Miss. 1994) ....... passim

Jones v. Clear Creek Independent School District,

977 F.2d 963 (5th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113

Th, GR, FB CIID. siisnscssceisinebiedcbocencusialinaniaenes 5, 10

Karen B. v. Treen, 653 F.2d 897 (5th Cir. 1981),

summarily aff'd, Treen v. Karen B., 455 US.

DED: LUD eccesssnncctadelceionsioncecd asec anand 7,8

School District of Abington Township v. Schempp,

Re Ee | EG. | RRR Ne ae eM AR im 7

Treen v. Karen B., 455 U.S. 918 (1982) .......000000002... 7,8,9

United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739 (1987) ....... 9

Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) ...0000 7,8,9

UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION

UE. PIN issn citcticcnanit each aati 5

The Establishment Clause ..............0.0....0.000...... passim

STATUTES

Mississippi School Prayer Law, Chapter No. 609,

Laws of 1994, Miss. Code §§ 37-13-4, 37-13-4.1..passim

Miss. Code § 37-18-4.1(2) ...............sce-scssececeeoeee 1

——

IN THE

Siuprene Cot of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1996

No. 96-331

MIKE Moore, ATTORNEY GENERAL OF MISSISSIPPI,

Petitioner,

DAVID INGEBRETSEN, ON BEHALF OF HIMSELF and

His DAUGHTER, ANNA INGEBRETSEN, ef ai.,

Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

| STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case concerns the issuance of a preliminary in-

junction against the implementation of part of a 1994

Mississippi school prayer statute, Miss. Code §§ 37-13-4

and 37-13-4.1 (hereafter “the School Prayer Law”). In

pertinent part, the School Prayer Law requires all public

schools in the state to authorize “invocations, benedic-

tions” and “nonsectarian, nonproselytizing student-initiated

voluntary prayer” at all school-related student events,

compulsory as well as non-compulsory. Miss. Code § 37-

| 13-4.1(2).’ As the court of appeals explained, the School

: Prayer Law thus “gives a preferential, exceptional bene-

| fit to religion that it does not extend to anything else.”

1 The full text of the School Prayer Law is set out in the appendix

to the petition (“Pet. App.) at 64a-66a.

| |

2

Ingebretsen v. Jackson Public School District, 88 F.3d

274, 279 (Sth Cir. 1996), Pet. App. at 6a.

As the district court found, the School Prayer Law was

enacted in response to a widely-publicized incident in

which a public high school principal in Jackson, Missis-

sippi authorized use of the school’s public address system

by students during the school day to recite prayers to all

students at the school, who were required to be in their

classrooms. The principal took this action despite having

been previously advised by counsel for the Jackson Public

School District that the practice was unconstitutional and

improper. Ingebretsen v. Jackson Public School District,

864 F. Supp. 1473, 1478-79 (S.D. Miss. 1994), Pet.

App. at 3la-34a. Following public expressions of sup-

port across the state for the actions of the principal, who

had been disciplined for ignoring the advice of the

school district’s counsel, the Mississippi Senate passed a

resolution in March 1994 commending the principal for

his actions as the “catalyst for a renewed effort all over

this state and nation to return prayer to our public

schools.” Pet. App. at 33a-34a, 864 F. Supp. at 1479.

Several days later, the state Senate and the House of

Representatives passed the School Prayer Law, which was

to take effect on July 1, 1994. Pet. App. at 34a, 864

F. Supp. at 1479.

This lawsuit was filed by the respondents on July 15,

1994, approximately one month prior to the start of the

1994-1995 school year. Respondents include students en-

rolled in the Jackson public schools, parents of those

students in their capacities as parents and taxpayers, and

the American Civil Liberties Union of Mississippi, suing

on its own behalf and on behalf of its members and their

minor children. Pet. App. at 30a, 864 F. Supp. at 1477.

The Complaint contends that the statute violates the Es-

tablishment Clause, and seeks permanent injunctive and

declaratory relief. Pet. App. at 70a-76a. A motion for

a preliminary injunction to preserve the status quo was

filed simultaneously with the Complaint.

3

The original defendants in this action were the Attor-

ney General of Mississippi (petitioner herein) and the

Jackson Public School District and its Board of Trustees.

The Attorney General opposed the motion for a preliminary

injunction and filed a motion to dismiss the Complaint.

The School District admitted the facts pleaded in the

Complaint and conceded that, absent an injunction, the

new law would be invoked once school began; otherwise,

it took no further position in the case. 1 R. at 25.° The

case was assigned to the Honorable Henry T. Wingate.

On August 4, 1994, Judge Wingate heard oral argu-

ment on the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction

and on the Attorney General’s motion to dismiss. On

August 11, 1994, Judge Wingate issued a Memorandum

Opinion and Order in which he concluded that the new

statute had serious constitutional problems and temporarily

enjoined the law pending a further hearing to consider,

inter alia, the possibility of severing those portions of the

law that were unconstitutional. 1 R. at 80, 87-88. On

August 16, 1994, Judge Wingate conducted an eviden-

tiary hearing and heard further argument. Respondents

submitted documentary evidence to the court and called

as witnesses the Interim Superintendent of the Jackson

Public School District, Dr. Dan Merritt, as well as Dr.

Emanuel Reeves, a high school principal in the Jackson

Public School District, each of whom has had more than

25 years of experience in the schools. (3 R. at 5-6, 39-

41). The Attorney General called no witnesess.

On September 2, 1994, the court denied the Attorney

General’s motion to dismiss and granted, in part, the

plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. In granting

partial preliminary relief, the district court found a sub-

2 The motion to dismiss asserted a host of alleged bars to the

consideration of this case, including abstention, an alleged lack of

state action, a challenge to the respondents’ standing, and the

assertion that no case or controversy existed. Pet. App. at 36a-

37a, 864 F. Supp. at 1480.

8“R.” refers to the three-volume record below.

iii a

4

stantial threat that, absent such relief, the statute would

be invoked once school began:

The testimony of Dr. Merritt and Dr. Reeves that

they constantly have been besieged by student re-

quests to have public, classroom prayer and that they

reasonably expect many students to act under the

school-prayer statute at issue here amply demon-

strates that the risk of injury is neither remote nor

speculative.

Pet. App. at 42a, 864 F. Supp. at 1482 (transcript cita-

tions omitted).* The court explained that its conclusion

was further supported by evidence regarding the events

in Jackson that led to passage of the School Prayer Law,

including the public support by students and adults of the

intercom prayers. Pet. App. at 42a, 864 F. Supp. at

1482-83. Indeed, the defendant Jackson Public School

District conceded in its response to the plaintiffs’ motion

for a preliminary injunction that “[t]here can be no doubt

that the state law challenged here will be invoked by

administrators, teachers or students when school starts.”

1 R. at 25.

*Dr. Reeves and Dr. Merritt also testified that “the statute as

written would disrupt instructional and educational activities

throughout the District.” Pet. App. at 5la-52a, 864 F. Supp. at

1487. Based on their testimony, the district court found that

“these eminent educators reasonably apprehend that the effect of

this far-sweeping statute would cause disharmony, confusion, and

upset.” Pet. App. at 52a, 864 F. Supp. at 1487. As he did unsuc-

cessfully in the court of appeals, petitioner attempts to invite

this Court to second-guess the district court’s findings by relying

on a small portion of the testimony, taken out of context and

selectively reprinted in the Appendix, which allegedly shows that

Dr. Reeves and Dr. Merritt lacked “personal knowledge” of the

likelihood that the statute would be invoked once school began.

Pet. at 4 n.3. In fact, these transcript excerpts reveal merely

that at the time of the hearing, August 16, 1994, three days after

the end of summer recess, no specific student had come to either

witness and expressly stated that he or she would have invoked

the School Prayer Law had it not been enjoined on August 4.

Pet. App. at 77a-78a.

2

In ruling on respondents’ preliminary injunction mo-

tion, the district court specifically analyzed each part of

the statute that respondents contended violates the Es-

tablishment Clause and sought, as requested by petitioner.

to avoid a construction that would invalidate the law. Pet.

App. at 38a, 50a-60a, 864 F. Supp. at 1481, 1486-1491.

After applying the familiar four-part test for determining

whether to grant preliminary relief, the court preliminarily

enjoined the School Prayer Law, except for the portion

of the law authorizing “nonsectarian, nonproselytizing

student-initiated voluntary prayer at high school com-

miencement.” Pet. App. at 63a, 864 F. Supp. at 1492.

That portion of the law, the court explained, appeared

to be constitutional based on the prior decision of the

court of appeals in Jones v. Clear Creek Independent

School District, 977 F.2d 963 (Sth Cir. 1992), cert.

denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993). Id.

With respect to the remainder of the School Prayer

Law, the court found that respondents had demonstrated

a substantial likelihood of success on their First Amend-

ment claims based on all five of the criteria used by the

court of appeals and by the members of this Court in

evaluating Establishment Clause claims.° The court fur-

ther found that respondents had “adequately demonstrated

that they would suffer irreparable injury” if the statute

were not enjoined, specifically citing this Court’s admoni-

tion in Elrod v. Burns, 427 U.S. 347, 373 (1976), that

the “loss of First Amendment freedoms, for even minimal

periods of time, unquestionably constitutes irreparable in-

jury.” Pet. App. at 60a, 864 F. Supp. at 1491.

5 As recited by the district court, those five tests involve a deter-

mination of whether the purpose of the statute or practice at

issue is predominantly secular; whether the statute or practice

would have a primary effect that advances or inhibits religion;

whether it would result in excessive government entanglement with

religion; whether it constitutes government endorsement of re-

ligion; and whether it would have a coercive effect on students in

terms of religious exercise. Pet. App. at 49a-50a, 864 F. Supp.

at 1486.

ae CE NT TT

6

Petitioner appealed from the September 2, 1994 Order

partially granting the preliminary injunction and denying

his motion to dismiss, and respondents cross-appealed

from that portion of the Order denying the preliminary

injunction with respect to high school graduations. On

January 10, 1996, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district

court’s ruling in full. The court’s opinion specifically

noted that the preliminary injunction “affected only the

School Prayer Statute and would not affect students’ ex-

isting rights to the free exercise of religion and free

speech.” Pet. App. at 8a, 88 F.3d at 280. On May 31,

1996, the court denied the petitioner’s Suggestion for

Rehearing En Banc. The Petition for a Writ of Cer-

tiorari was filed on August 29, 1996.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

Petitioner has failed to advance a sound reason why

this Court should consider the questions that he contends

are raised by the decision of the court of appeals. He

alleges no conflict among the circuits on these questions.

He shows no departure from this Court’s decisions in the

lower courts’ resolution of the asserted questions, nor any

justification for this Court to overrule the precedents that

control those questions. In addition, the procedural pos-

ture of this case, involving a partial grant of a preliminary

injunction based on an evidentiary hearing, factual find-

ings by the district court, and statutory analysis by the

courts below of separable portions of the School Prayer

Law, makes it particularly inappropriate for review by

this Court.

1. Stripped of its hyperbole and its florid rhetoric, the

petitioner’s brief first asserts that the respondents lacked

standing to bring this action, and that no “ripe” case or

controversy exists. After conducting an evidentiary hear-

ing, however, the district court found as a matter of fact

that the School Prayer Law was likely to be invoked

absent preliminary injunctive relief, that respondents

would “suffer irreparable injury,” and that this risk of

7

injury was “neither remote nor speculative.” Pet. App.

at 60a, 42a, 864 F. Supp. at 1491, 1482. The court

of appeals agreed. Pet. App. at 4a, 88 F.3d at 278.

The district court’s factual findings are of course entitled

to deference. See, e.g., Anderson v. City of Bessemer

City, 470 U.S. 564, 574 (1985). In addition, the issu-

ance of a preliminary injunction itself is reviewed only for

an abuse of discretion. Doran v. Salem Inn, Inc., 422

U.S. 922, 931-32 (1975). Thus, petitioner’s assertions

regarding standing and ripeness, which the lower courts

found to be meritless, raise no important question for

this Court.

2. With respect to the respondents’ standing, the courts

below followed the well-established precedents of this

Court and the lower federal coutrs recognizing that par-

ents and students have the requisite stake in the outcome

of challenges to public school prayer and similar statutes

and practices under the Establishment Ciause to satisfy

standing requirements. See, e.g., Edwards v. Aguillard,

482 U.S. 578 (1987) (challenge by parents to law au-

thorizing “equal time” for teaching creationism); Wallace

v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) (challenge by parent to

“moment of silence”-for-school-prayer statute); Treen v.

Karen B., 455 U.S. 913 (1982), summarily affirming

Karen B. v. Treen, 653 F.2d 897 (Sth Cir. 1981) (chal-

lenge by parents to school prayer statute and regulation);

School District of Abington Township v. Schemmp, 374

U.S. 203 (1963) (challenge by parents and students to

government-endorsed school prayer and Bible reading);

Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962) (challenge by

parents to government-sponsored school prayer). Indeed,

it would be difficult to imagine plaintiffs with a greater

stake in the outcome of such cases than the parents and

students of the local public schools affected by the statute

or practice at issue.

Likewise, in rejecting petitioner’s contention that no

“ripe” case or controversy existed, the lower courts prop-

erly followed the clear precedents of this Court permitting

8

the adjudication of facial challenges to statutes or prac-

tices as violative of the Establishment Clause, including

challenges brought prior to implementation. See, e.g.,

Edwards v. Aguillard, supra (successful pre-implementation

facial challenge to state statute mandating “equal time”

for creationism if evolution is taught); Wallace v. Jaffree,

supra (successful facial challenge to state statute au-

thorizing a moment of silence specifically for prayer in

school); Treen v. Karen B., supra (successful facial chal-

lenge to school prayer practice that had “yet to be put

into effect,” Karen B. v. Treen, 653 F.2d at 902); Com-

mittee for Public Education and Religious Liberty v.

Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756 (1973) (successful pre-implemen-

tation facial challenge to statute providing tuition reim-

bursement and tax benefits to parents of children attend-

ing religious schools). Petitioner has offered no reason

to review this case in light of the consistent decisions by

this Court.°

3. Petitioner's complaint about the manner in which

the courts below reviewed the School Prayer Law ou its

face similarly raises no important issue for this Court.

Both courts properly evaluated respondents’ Establishment

Clause challenge to the statute exactly as this Court has

instructed, using precisely those tests set out by the Court

* Although petitioner complains that the School Prayer Law had

not and in theory might not be implemented, this Court has struck

down statutes under the Establishment Clause in similar circum-

stances. For example, the statute held to be facially unconstitu-

tional in Edwards v. Aguillard did not mandate the teaching of

either evolution or creationism, but provided only for “equa! time”

for creationism if evolution were taught. 482 U.S. at 581. Thus,

the statute might theoretically never have been implemented. Peti-

tioner’s argument implies not only that Edwards and numerous

other decisions were incorrect, but also that there could never be

a preliminary injunction in an Establishment Clause challenge

to a statute. Particularly where, as here, the lower courts found

a substantial likelihood that the School Prayer Law would be im-

plemented absent preliminary relief and that irreparable injury

would occur absent such relief, there is no justification for this

Court to review the decisions below.

9

for reviewing similar facial challenges to a law under the

Establishment Clause. See, e.g., Bowen v. Kendrick, 487

U.S. 589, 602 (1988); Edwards v. Aguillard, supra, 482

U.S. at 582-85; Wallace v. Jaffree, supra, 472 US. at

55-56; Treen v. Karen B., supra; Committee for Public

Education and Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, supra, 413

U.S. at 772-74. The decision below is therefore con-

sistent with a long line of decisions by this Court.

4. Petitioner fails to adduce even a single decision

by this Court or any court of appeals holding that the

methodology employed in United States v. Salerno, 481

U.S. 739 (1987), should be applied instead in Establish-

ment Clause cases or that the established method of

analysis utilized below was erroneous.’ Even assuming,

arguendo, that petitioner’s question regarding Salerno

merited consideration by this Court in an appropriate

case, that question is not squarely presented here. Be-

cause the School Prayer Law contains a_severability

clause, the courts below in fact effectively performed a

Salerno-type analysis by considering in what circum-

stances, if any, the statute could constitutionally be ap-

plied and then severed those portions.“

‘ Petitioner’s effort to reconcile Bowen with Salerno (Pet. at 15-

16 n.14) cannot withstand scrutiny. The opinion of the Court in

Bowen, written by Chief Justice Rehnquist, who was also the

author of Salerno, never even mentions Salerno. Instead, it articu-

lates the various tests used to adjudicate a facial challenge to a

statute under the Establishment Clause, 487 U.S. at 602, tests

(such as examining the purpose of a statute) that bear no rela-

tionship to Salerno, which evaluates the facial validity of a statute

by considering only whether the statute may be constitutionally

applied. Moreover, as explained in Justice Blackmun’s dissent in

Bowen, the defendant in that case had argued to this Court that

the court of appeals had erred by not utilizing the methodology

of Salerno. 487 U.S. at 627 n.1. Justice Blackmun expressly

agreed with the implicit holding of the majority that Salerno was

inapplicable, finding it to be “wholly incongruous” with the Court's

Establishment Clause jurisprudence. /d.

8 Indeed, petitioner expressly urged the district court to adopt

a severability approach to the statute if it found any portion of

the statute to be unconstitutional. Pet. App. at 68a.

10

Specifically, the district court held an initial hearing

on plaintiffs’ preliminary injunction motion just prior to

the start of the 1994-95 school year, and concluded that

while the statute had “a constitutional defect” in some re-

spects, it could also be applied constitutionally to high

school graduation ceremonies in light of Jones vy. Clear

Creek Independent School District, 977 F.2d 963 (Sth

Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2950 (1993), which

upheld a school district policy permitting “student-

initated” prayer at high school graduations. | R. at 80,

86-87 (Memorandum Opinion and Order of Aug. 11,

1994). The court then held “a supplemental hearing to

determine what portion of the statute, if any, could escape

the injunction by its severability clause.” Pet. App. at 4a,

88 F.3d at 278. Following the hearing, the court held

that the School Prayer Law was constitutional insofar

as it applied to high school graduation ceremonies, and

refused to enjoin the statute in that respect. The Fifth

Circuit affirmed.” The lower courts thus conducted pre-

cisely the type of “narrow, case-by-case adjudication”

that petitioner claims is appropriate in a case such as this

(Pet. at 16). For this reason as well, review clearly is

not warranted.

5. Petitioner concludes with an improper effort to dis-

cuss the merits of the Establishment Clause in this case,

which petitioner has chosen not to raise as a question for

review, in an attempt to mischaracterize what this case

is and is not about. Pet. at 18-19. This lawsuit chal-

lenges the constitutionality of the enactment of a statute

by the state of Mississippi, nothing more and nothing

less. It does not, as petitioner erroneously suggests, seek

* For the record, respondents do not agree that Jones properly

interprets the Establishment Clause. See ACLU v. Blackhorse

Pike Regional Board of Education, 84 F.3d 1471 (3d Cir. 1996)

(en banc); Harris v. Joint School District No. 241, 41 F.8d 447

(9th Cir. 1994), vacated as moot, 115 S. Ct. 2604 (1995); Gearon

v. Loudoun County School Board, 844 F. Supp. 1097 (E.D. Va.

1993). However, this issue is not presently before the Court.

a hi

1]

to bar the private speech of private actors, nor to de-

i prive any students of any independently existing constitu-

| tional right to pray in public schools. As the court of

appeals recognized, the preliminary injunction affects only

the School Prayer Law and not “students’ existing rights

to the free exercise of religion and free speech. There-

fore, students continue to have exactly the same constitu-

tional right to pray as they had before the statute was

enjoined.” Pet. App. at 8a, 88 F.3d at 280. The district

court likewise explained:

as acknowledged by the Attorney General, the stu-

dents’ rights of Free Speech and Free Exercise are

pre-existing and, as such, the granting of an injunc-

tion would have no bearing on the students’ ability

to freely exercise their pre-existing rights. An injunc-

tion would not prevent students from praying silently

alone or assembling together to pray before or after

school. In fact, Dr. Reeves testified that Provine

High School, across town from Wingfield High, pres-

ently allows a student prayer group to meet on the

school grounds for the purpose of having morning

prayers.

Pet. App. at 45a, 864 F. Supp. at 1484. Petitioner has

simply failed to justify review of the decisions below by

this Court.

12

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Petition for a Writ of

Certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted, |

ROBERT B. MCDUFF ELLIOT M. MINCBERG *

767 North Congress Street JUDITH E. SCHAEFFER

Jackson, Mississippi 39202 PEOPLE FoR THE AMERICAN WAY

(601) 969-0802 2000 M Street, N.W.

STEVEN R. SHAPIRO Suite 400

AMERICAN CiviL Linerties Washington, D.C. 20036

UNION FOUNDATION (202) 467-4999

132 West 48rd Street JOHN G. JONES

New York, New York 10036 P.O. Box 9622

(212) 944-9800 Jackson, Mississippi 39286

(601) 362-7555

Counsel for Respondents

September 30, 1996 * Counsel of Record