Appendix — Kayser-Roth Corp. v. Sara Lee Corp.

Supreme Court brief1996

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Supreme Court of the Cited States

October Term 1995

KAYSER-ROTH CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

Vv.

SARA LEE CORPORATION,

Respondent.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

Appendix to Petition for Writ of Certiorari

Alan W. Duncan

Counsel of Record

Jonathan A. Berkelhammer

Matthew W. Sawchak

SMITH HELMS MULLISS & MOORE, L.L.P.

300 North Greene Street

Suite 1400

Post Office Box 21927

Greensboro, North Carolina 27420

(910) 378-5200

Counsel for Petitioner

THE LEX GROUP @ 1205 East Main Street @ Suite 2 East ¢ Richmond, VA 23219

(804) 644-4419 @ (800) 856-4419 @ Fax: (804) 644-3256

TABLE OF CONTENTS

APPENDIX TO PETITION

Appendix Page

Opinion,

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fourth Circuit,

entered April 17, 1996 ... 2.0000. A-1

Memorandum Opinion,

United States District Court

for the Middle District of North Carolina

Winston-Salem Division

entered October 13, 1995 ........ A-34

Order,

Denying Petition for Rehearing

and Suggestion for Rehearing In Banc

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fourth Circuit

entered May 24, 1996 ......... A-155

Statutes Involved:

ERE es or rer ere hie A-156

OY Ae ener en A-160

WSs 4 Ses a sna Lo ee A-162

UR cao cuas eos eer A-164

Go eee See y ates A-167

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PUBLISHED

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

SARA LEE CORPORATION,

Plaintiff-Appell

Vv.

KAYSER-ROTH CORPORATION,

Defendant-Appellee.

No. 94-2562

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Middle District of North Carolina, at Winston-Salem.

Frank W. Bullock Jr., Chief District Judge.

(CA-92-460-6)

Argued: May 4, 1995

Decided: April 17, 1996

Entered: April 17, 1996

Before WIDENER, HALL, and WILKINS, Circuit Judges.

Reversed and remanded with instructions by published

opinion. Judge Hall wrote the majority opinion, in which

Judge Wilkins concurred. Judge Widener wrote a separate

dissenting opinion.

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COUNSEL

ARGUED: George Lester Little, Jr., Rodrick John Enns,

PETREESTOCKTON, L.L.P., Winston-Salem, North

“Carolina, for Appellant. Alan William Duncan, SMITH,

HELMS, MULLISS & MOORE, L.L.P., Greensboro, North

Carolina, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Daniel R. Taylor, Jr., J.

David Mayberry, PETREE STOCKTON, L.LP.,

Winston-Salem, North Carolina, for Appellant. Jonathan A.

Berkelhammer, SMITH, HELMS, MULLISS & MOOKLE,

L.L.P., Greensboro, North Carolina, for Appellee.

OPINION

HALL, Circuit Judge:

Sara Lee Corporation appeals the district court's entry

of judgment for Kayser-Roth Corporation in Sara Lee's action

for trademark infringement. The district court found that

Kayser-Roth's use of the mark Leg Looks® on a line of its No

nonsense® hosiery products sold in food, drug, and mass

merchandising outlets did not infringe on Sara Lee's L'eggs®

trademark. Because the court's finding was clearly erroneous,

we reverse its judgment and remand the case with directions to

enter judgment for Sara Lee. We further instruct the district

court to grant Sara Lee's request that Kayser-Roth be

permanently enjoined from using its Leg Looks® trademark

in a manner that infringes on the L'eggs® mark.

I.

Sara Lee manufactures pantyhose and other hosiery

products for retail sale under the Hanes® and L'eggs®

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trademarks. Until L'eggs® penetrated the "FDM market"! in

the early 1970s, women's hosiery was sold only in department

stores. Sara Lee's most popular L'eggs® product is its Sheer

Energy® line of light support pantyhose, made from nylon and

spandex. Sara Lee also manufactures nylon-only products, but

its nylon-and-spandex brands account for the largest share of

its profits from hosiery sales. Sara Lee dominates the nylon-

and-spandex pantyhose market; about three of every four pairs

sold are Sheer Energy® products.

Kayser-Roth is Sara Lee's only nationwide competitor.

It followed Sara Lee into the FDM market in 1973, when it

introduced its No nonsense® line of pantyhose. In contrast to

Sara Lee's, Kayser-Roth's sales of nylon-only products far

exceed those of its nylon-and-spandex lines.

Over the last twenty-odd years, Kayser-Roth and Sara

Lee have spent hundreds of millions of dollars in advertising

their hosiery products. As a result, the companies have reaped

billions in sales, and both No nonsense® and L'eggs® have

become household names.

Sara Lee and Kayser-Roth are intense rivals and

frequent court opponents. In early 1992, Kayser-Roth learned

of Sara Lee's plan to introduce L'eggs Everyday®, a new line

of nylon-only hosiery. Kayser-Roth decided to respond by

simultaneously introducing its own new line of

nylon-and-spandex hosiery, designed to be priced lower than

Sheer Energy®.

The new line required a name. Kayser-Roth had,

during the previous summer, applied to the United States

Patent and Trademark Office to register the designations

"Sheer Vigor" and "Sheer Invigoration." Sara Lee learned of

the applications, and it filed the instant suit for declaratory and

injunctive relief on July 22, 1992, alleging that Kayser-Roth

The FDM market is comprised of food, drug, and mass

merchandising (Wal-Mart, K-mart, etc.) outlets.

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had violated Sections 32 and 43(a) of the Lanham Act, 15

U.S.C. § 1051 et seq”

, See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114 and 1125(a). Section 1114 provides that

the holder of a registered trademark can pursue certain civil remedies in the

district court against

(1) Any person who shall, without the consent

of the registrant--

(a) use in commerce any reproduction, counterfeit, copy,

or colorable imitation of a registered mark in connection

with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or

advertising of any goods or services on or in connection

with which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to

cause mistake, or to deceive; or

(b) reproduce, counterfeit, copy, or colorably imitate a

registered mark and apply such . . . to labels, signs,

prints, packages, wrappers, receptacles or advertisements

intended to be used in commerce upon or in connection

with the sale, offering for sale, distribution, or

advertising of goods or services on or in connection with

which such use is likely to cause confusion, or to cause

mistake, or to deceive.. . .

Akin to § 1114's protection of trademarks, § 1125(a) proscribes

encroachments on a product's “trade dress," which is, at the very least, "the

total look of a product and its packaging. .. ." 1 J. Thomas McCarthy,

McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition,§ 8.01[2] (3d ed. 1995).

The statute permits “any person who believes that he or she is likely to be

damaged" to file suit against

(1) Any person who, on or in connection with any goods

or services, or any container for goods, uses in

commerce any word, term, name, symbol, or device, or

any combination thereof, or any false designation of

origin, false or misleading description of fact, or false or

misleading representation of fact,which--

(A) is likely to cause confusion, or to cause

mistake, or to deceive as to the affiliation, connection, or

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ee

Kayser-Roth instead marketed its new product as "Leg

Looks®," a trademark that it already owned. Undaunted, Sara

Lee amended its complaint on September 9, 1992, to assert

that the name Leg Looks® infringed on its L'eggs® mark, and

that the product's packaging was confusingly similar to the

trade dress of its Sheer Energy® line. See note 2, supra. Sara

Lee also amended its prayer for relief to request money

damages. Kayser-Roth counterclaimed, alleging that Sara Lee

had engaged in numerous antitrust violations and in false

advertising.

The case was assigned to a magistrate, who

recommended that Kayser-Roth be preliminarily enjoined

from continuing to sell Leg Looks® as packaged. The district

court adopted the magistrate's recommendation; Kayser-Roth

thereafter recalled its Leg Looks® products and changed the

packaging.’ Kayser-Roth nevertheless continued to affix the

Leg Looks® mark to its new nylon-and-spandex product.

association of such person with another person, or as to

the origin, sponsorship, or approval of his or her goods,

services, or commercial activities by another person, or

(B) in commercial advertising or promotion,

misrepresents the nature, characteristics, qualities, or

geographic origin or his or her or another person's goods,

services, or commercial activities . .. .

Sara Lee's initial complaint, as well as the amended version it later filed,

See text infra, also alleged that Kayser-Roth's actions violated state laws

regarding unfair competition, deceptive trade practices, and trademark

dilution.

y The Leg Looks® packaging used during the latter portion of 1992

indeed bore a close resemblance to that of the Sheer Energy® line. The

foreground and background colors and the size, slant, and font of the

primary lettering were very similar. In addition, both packages were styled

with thin, slanted, widely spaced lines, giving an appearance reminiscent of

sunlight peeking through Venetian blinds that are not quite closed.

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On January 11, 1993, Sara Lee moved to supplement

its amended complaint to reassert all of its federal and state

claims as to the repackaged Leg Looks® product; in March, it

once again moved for a preliminary injunction. The magistrate

conducted a ten-day hearing on the motion in August 1993. At

the conclusion of the hearing, the parties and the district court

agreed, inter alia, that (1) Sara Lee would waive all claims for

money damages, (2) Sara Lee's remaining claims for equitable

relief would be bifurcated from Kayser-Roth's counterclaims,

and (3) the just-concluded hearing would be treated as a trial

on the merits of Sara Lee's equitable claims, with the matter

referred to the magistrate for decision, subject to de novo

review by the district court.”

On November 30, 1993, the magistrate issued a report

and recommendation; he advised the district court to enter

judgment for Sara Lee on all claims. The magistrate

recommended that Kayser-Roth be permanently enjoined from

using its Leg Looks® trademark in the FDM market.”

Kayser-Roth objected to the magistrate's report and

recommendation. The district court examined the record anew,

The redesigned packages, introduced in early 1993, have

eliminated the lettering and styling similarities. A white, shimmering

silhouette of a leg in the kneeling position, dissolving just above the knee,

has been emplaced against a black, rectangular field, which is itself

centered on a brightly colored background (it appears to be an industry

practice that the dominant package color varies within the line itself,

depending on the particular product). The No nonsense® trademark and

the words "invigorating pantyhose" appear more prominently on the new

packaging.

. Sara Lee's initial claims regarding Kayser-Roth's attempted

registration of the Sheer Vigor and Sheer Invigoration trademarks were

dismissed without prejudice by the consent of the parties on July 14, 1993.

; The magistrate recommended against enjoining Kayser-Roth from

using its Leg Looks® mark in department store outlets where it had been

used prior to June 1, 1992. See Section III-A, infra.

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EES ae LOI ee CPR RT EET eee ee ame

and, on October 13, 1994, filed an opinion that adopted many

of the magistrate's underlying findings, yet disagreed with his

conclusions.

The court found, as an initial matter, that Sara Lee's

federal trademark claim was foreclosed by the doctrines of

laches and acquiescence; it further determined that, even if

Sara Lee's trademark claim were not equitably barred,

Kayser-Roth's use of the Leg Looks® mark did not violate the

Lanham Act. The court likewise saw no merit in Sara Lee's

claim that Kayser-Roth's marketing of Leg Looks® in the

redesigned package infringed on the trade dress of Sara Lee's

Sheer Energy® products.° Consequently, the district court

entered judgment for Kayser-Roth on all of Sara Lee's claims.

Sara Lee appeals.

II.

Although trademark law is imbued with numerous

idiosyncracies, the standard governing our review of the

district court's findings of fact in a trademark case is familiar.

Generally speaking, we may set aside such findings only if

they are clearly erroneous, “ed. R. Civ. P. 52(a); Pizzeria Uno

Corp. v. Temple, 747 F.2d 1522, 1526 (4th Cir.1984).

However, we owe no deference to the district court's findings

if they are derived as a result of the court's misapplication of

the law. Pizzeria Uno at 1526.

. The district court concluded that its findings in favor of

Kayser-Roth on the federal trademark and trade dress claims were

dispositive of Sara Lee's unfair competition and deceptive trade practice

etims under state law. Lastly, the court held that North Carolina did rot

recognize the tort of trademark dilution.

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Il.

We must address at the threshold the district court's

findings that Sara Lee slept on its rights or, alternatively, that it

acquiesced to Kayser-Roth's current use of the Leg Looks®

mark.

A.

During the 1980s, Kayser-Roth used the Leg Looks®

mark on a line of "fashion" nylon-only hosiery products in

competition with Sara Lee's Hanes® line; after peaking in

1985, sales of Leg Looks® dropped precipitously throughout

the remainder of the decade. In their original incarnation, Leg

Looks® products were available only in upscale department

stores. No L'eggs® products have ever been sold in such

outlets.

From the outset, the Hanes® division kept its

corporate master fully apprised of Kayser-Roth's marketing of

Leg Looks®; nonetheless, Sara Lee has not challenged

Kayser-Roth's use of the Leg Looks® mark until now. The

question before us is whether, as Kayser-Roth asserts, "now"

is too late.

In a trademark case, courts may apply the doctrine of

estoppel by laches to deny relief to a plaintiff who, though

having knowledge of an infringement, has, to the detriment of

the defendant, unreasonably delayed in seeking redress. See 4

J.. Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair

Competition, § 31.02 (3d ed. 1995) [hereinafter McCarthy]

("Estoppel by laches [is] defined as that type of delay in filing

suit which causes prejudice to defendant and when weighed

with all other relevant equitable factors, results in a bar to

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relief, either injunctive or monetary, or both.") (citation and

internal quotation marks omitted).

However, the doctrine is sparingly applied where, as

here, a plaintiff seeks only equitable relief. See id. at§

31.03[3][b] (reviewing cases);®

Int'l, Inc., 674 F.2d 209, 212 (4th Cir.) ("While the availability

of laches as a defense to claims for injunctive relief may be

’

In determining whether laches may operate as a defense to an

infringement claim, a court should ordinarily consider (1) whether the

owner of the trademark knew of the infringing use, (2) whether the owner's

delay in challenging the infringement of the mark was inexcusable or

unreasonable, and (3) whether the infringing user has been unduly

rejudiced by the owner's delay. Brittingham_v, Jenkins, 914 F.2d 447, 456

(4th Cir. 1990).

According to Professor McCarthy, cases involving the denial of

injunctive relief usually present one or more aggravating factors, causing

the balance of the equities (which has, at that point, favored the defendant

by virtue of the delay-and-prejudice analysis) to shift even further to the

defendant's advantage. These factors include (1) delay during which the

mark passed into usage as a generic name, (2) a grossly long period of

delay, (3) dubious proof of likelihood of confusion, (4) doubt as to the

plaintiff's title to the mark, (5) prior business dealings between the parties

that result in the plaintiff impliedly consenting to the defendant's

infringement, and (6) the defendant's good-faith development of a specific

territorial area.

We encountered the fifth of the above factors in Ambrosia

165 F.2d 693 (4th Cir.

1947), cert. denied, 333 U.S. 882 (1948). In Ambrosia, the chocolate

company's sales representative tried to sell the bakery certain ingredients to

be used in the manufacture of the latter's cakes. Afterward, the chocolatier’s

vice-president sent a letter to the bakery, urging that the two companies

transact business and noting “that the name ‘Ambrosia’ of your company

was the same as ours increased our interest, you may be sure." Jd. at 694.

Eight years later, the chocolate company finally became interested enough

to file suit seeking to enjoin the bakery from further use of the "Ambrosia"

trademark. The district court dismissed the complaint, and we affirmed,

holding, inter alia, that the suit was barred by “laches, acquiescence, and

estoppel. . . ." Id.

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limited . . . laches will bar a claim for damages for bad faith

infringement.") (citations omitted), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 969

(1982). Moreover, in consideration of the public interest,

estoppel by laches may not be invoked to deny injunctive

relief if it is apparent that the infringing use is likely to cause

confusion. 4 McCarthy at § 31.04[1]; see University of

Pittsburgh v. Champion Products, Inc., 686 F.2d 1040, 1044

(3d Cir.) ("Because laches is an equitable doctrine, its

application is inextricably bound up with the nature and

quality of the plaintiff's claim on the merits relevant to a

prospective injunction."), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1087 (1982).

In finding that Sara Lee was estopped by laches from

asserting its infringement claim, the district court failed to

consider the relative unavailability of that defense to preclude

injunctive relief. In addition, the court did not consider the

public interest in avoiding confusion between the L'eggs® and

Leg Looks® trademarks, undoubtedly because, as discussed in

Section IV, infra, it miscalculated the likelihood of that

confusion. Because the district court either overlooked or

misapplied the law governing estoppel by laches, we are

constrained to set aside its finding that the doctrine operates to

bar the instant suit. See Section II, supra.

We also note that the district court considered, but

failed to fully appreciate, the conundrum with which Sara Lee

was presented when Kayser-Roth expanded the use of its Leg

Looks® mark to the FDM market. Because L'eggs® hosiery

was, then as now, sold exclusively in FDM outlets, it is

doubtful that Sara Lee could have proved that its product

would likely be confused with Kayser-Roth's. Of course, the

likelihood of confusion is the "keystone of infringement." 3

McCarthy § 23.01; see 15 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1125(a)(1), note

2 supra. Indeed, to the extent that a plaintiff's prior knowledge

may give rise to the defense of estoppel by laches, such

knowledge must be of a pre-existing, infringing use of a mark.

See note 7, supra (Brittingham analysis assumes the existence

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2 eal, ea ie elt ec Re a a Sa ie

of an infringement for an extended period prior to the

commencement of litigation).

The estoppel-by-laches defense arises only where the

plaintiff has unreasonably delayed its pursuit of a remedy. See

Brittingham, 914 F.2d at 456, and note 7, supra. From the time

that Kayser-Roth first introduced its Leg Looks® products,

Sara Lee has been on the horns of a dilemma:

If [the trademark owner] waits for substantial

injury and evidence of actual confusion, it may

be faced with a laches defense. If it rushes

immediately into litigation, it may have little or

no evidence of actual confusion and real

commercial damage, may appear at a

psychological disadvantage as "shooting from

the hip" and may even face a counterclaim for

overly aggressive use of litigation.

4 McCarthy § 31.06[2][c]. We agree with Professor McCarthy

that the owner “has no obligation to sue until ‘the likelihood of

confusion looms large."" Id, at § 31.06[2]}[a] (quoting Johanna

Farms, Inc. v. Citrus Bowl, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 866, 881

(E.D.N.Y. 1978)). Sara Lee, by waiting for Kayser-Roth to

expand its use of the Leg Looks® mark to the FDM market,

chose to delay its pursuit of a remedy until its right to

protection had clearly ripened. Under the circumstances, we

adjudge its actions to have been entirely reasonable; the

district court clearly erred in finding otherwise.

B.

Likewise, the district court's finding that Sara Lee

acquiesced in Kayser-Roth's use of the Leg Looks® mark in

the FDM market is clearly erroneous. The basis for the court's

decision was a written agreement between the parties executed

on April 30, 1991, in settlement of a dispute over Sara Lee's

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application with the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office to

register "Lingerie Looks" as a trademark for pantyhose. In the

document's preface, the parties acknowledged _ that

Kayser-Roth already owned the registered trademarks Leg

Looks®, Career Looks®, Designer Looks®, and Silky

Looks®; the substance of the agreement addressed how Sara

Lee's Lingerie Looks products would be packaged and

advertised to minimize any infringement on Kayser-Roth's

rights.

An infringement action may be barred by the doctrine

of estoppel by acquiescence where the owner of the trademark,

by conveying to the defendant through affirmative word or

deed, expressly or impliedly consents to the infringement. See

4 McCarthy § 31.14[1]; Sweetheart Plastics, Inc. v. Detroit

Forming, Inc. , 743 F.2d 1039, 1046 (4th Cir. 1984). Although

the doctrines of acquiescence and laches, in the context of

trademark law, both connote consent by the owner to an

infringing use of his mark, acquiescence implies active

consent, while laches implies a merely passive consent. 4

McCarthy at § 31.14[1]; see Sweetheart Plastics at 1046.”

Sara Lee's entry into the 1991 settlement agreement

with Kavser-Roth was, no doubt, an affirmative act. However,

just as a preexisting infringement is a prerequisite to the

estoppel-by-laches defense, see Section III-A, supra, estoppel

by acquiescence requires that the trademark owner knowingly

consent -- albeit actively -- to the defendant's infringing use of

the mark. As we discussed in the preceding section, it was by

no means clear until 1992 that Sara Lee could adduce

persuasive evidence of a likelihood of confusion between its

L'eggs® trademark and Kayser-Roth's Leg Looks® mark.

9

Thus, as we implied in Sweetheart Plastics at 1046, our decision

in Ambrosia, see note 8, supra, is most accurately classified as an

illustration of the estoppel by acquiescence doctrine, even though the

Ambrosia court invoked the doctrine of estoppel by laches as an alternative

ground for its holding.

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In any event, it is obvious that the 1991 agreement was

intended only to govern Sara Lee's future actions in marketing

its Lingerie Looks brand; there is nothing in the agreement

that can reasonably be construed to immunize Kayser-Roth

from liability for all future uses -- especially infringing uses --

of any of its own marks. Moreover, even if Kayser-Roth's

estoppel-by-acquiescence defense were valid, public policy

dictates that -- like the doctrine of estoppel by laches -- it not

be rigidly applied in cases like this one, where the likelihood

of confusion is apparent. See Section III-A, supra; 4 McCarthy

§ 31.14[1] ("The defense of laches is trumped by a strong

showing of likely confusion of the public. Similarly, a strong

showing of a likelihood of confusion can trump even a proven

case of acquiescence by the senior user to the junior user's

usage... .").

Accordingly, we reject Kayser-Roth's equitable

defenses to the instant suit, and we move on to address the

merits of Sara Lee's claims.

IV.

We may grant injunctive relief to the owner of a

registered trademark whose rights to the mark have been

infringed on by another's use of a copy or colorable imitation

that is "likely to cause confusion, or to cause mistake, or to

deceive." 15 U.S.C.§ 1114(1); Pizzeria Uno, 747 F.2d at 1527:

see also Perini Corp. v. Perini Constr., Inc., 915 F.2d 121, 127

(4th Cir. 1990) ("The ultimate question, for purposes of

determining liability in trademark infringement actions, is

whether there exists a likelihood that an appreciable number of

ordinarily prudent purchasers will be misled, or indeed simply

confused, as to the source of the goods in question.") (citations

and internal quotation marks omitted). The test is likelihood

of confusion; evidence of actual confusion is unnecessary.

Pizzeria Uno at 1527.

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To ascertain the likelihood of confusion between two

trademarks, we consider a number of factors. These factors

include:

(1) the distinctiveness of the senior mark;

(2) the similarity of the two marks;

(3) the similarity of the goods or services

that the marks identify;

(4) the similarity of the facilities employed

by the parties to transact their business;

(5) the similarity of the advertising used by

the parties;

(6) the defendant's intent in adopting the

same or similar mark; and

(7) actual confusion.

Pizzeria Uno at 1527. Certain factors may not be

germane to every situation; moreover, though several factors

are simultaneously present, some factors may, depending on

the case, be more important than others. Id; see

Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. L & L Wings, Inc., 962 F.2d 316, 320

(4th Cir.) (the Pizzeria Uno factors are not meant to be a rigid

formula for infringement; they are "only a guide -- a catalog of

various considerations that may be relevant in determining the

ultimate statutory question of likelihood of confusion."), cert.

denied, 113 S. Ct. 206 (1992). Indeed, we have distilled other

factors that may be considered relevant to analyzing the

likelihood of confusion, such as (8) the quality of the

defendant's product, Perini at 127, and (9) the sophistication of

the consuming public. Id. ; see Dayton Progress Corp. v. Lane

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Punch Corp., 917 F.2d 836, 839-40 (4th Cir. 1990). We will

consider each factor in turn.

A. The Distinct ‘the Senior Mar

1. Legal Background

The protection accorded trademarks is directly related

to the mark's distinctiveness. "Fanciful," "arbitrary," and

"suggestive" marks are inherently distinctive, and thus receive

the greatest protection against infringement. 1 McCarthy §

11.01[{1]. Fanciful marks are, in essence, made-up words

expressly coined for serving as a trademark. Some examples

of fanciful marks are Clorox®, Kodak®, Polaroid®, and

Exxon® . Id, at § 11.03[4].

Arbitrary marks are comprised of words in common

usage, but, because they do not suggest or describe any

quality, ingredient, or characteristic of the goods they serve,

are said to have been arbitrarily assigned. Examples include

Tea Rose® flour, Camel® cigarettes, and Apple® computers.

Id. at§ 11.04[3]. Though tea rose, camel, and apple are --

unlike Clorox® and Kodak® -- words denoting "real" things,

they are similar to fanciful marks in that they neither suggest

any mental image of the associated product nor describe it in

any way.

Suggestive marks connote, without describing, some

quality, ingredient, or characteristic of the product.

Coppertone®, Orange Crush®, and Playboy® are good

examples of suggestive marks because they conjure images of

the associated products. Id. at § 11.23. These marks are

nevertheless not descriptive; although they are meant to

project a favorable or idealistic image with which a

prospective user might identify, a person without actual

knowledge would have difficulty in ascertaining the nature of

the products that the marks represent.

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In contrast to fanciful, arbitrary, or suggestive marks,

there are marks that are not inherently distinctive. For instance,

certain marks merely describe a function, use, characteristic,

size, or intended purpose of the product. Examples of such

"descriptive" marks include After Tan post-tanning lotion, 5

Minute glue, King Size men's clothing, and the Yellow Pages

telephone directory. Id. at § 11.08. Marks that are merely

descriptive are accorded protection only if they have acquired

a "secondary meaning, "that is, if" in the minds of the public,

the primary significance of a product feature or term is to

identify source of the product rather than the product itself."

Dayton Progress at 839 (quoting Inwood Laboratories v. Ives

Laboratories, 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.11 (1982)). Coca-Cola® is

probably the paradigm of a descriptive mark that has acquired

a secondary meaning.

"Generic" terms are the common name of a product or

service itself, and can never be trademarks. Perini at 124."°

Examples of brand names held to be generic terms are

Convenient Store retail stores, Dry Ice solid carbon dioxide,

Light Beer ale-type beverages, and, in a case where a

once-fanciful mark had, over time, been assimilated into the

language, Thermos vacuum-insulated bottles. 2 McCarthy §

12.03 (citation omitted).

2. The L'eggs® mark

6: A mark is generic if it "denominate[s] a type, kind, genus or

subcategory of goods." Dayton Progress at 839 (quoting G. Heileman

Brewing Co. v. Anheuser-Busch, Inc., 873 F.2d 985, 997 (7th Cir. 1989)).

In other words, a generic term “identifies the general nature of an article."

Dayton Progress at 839 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).

A term may also be generic if it names a "distinctive characteristic

of that genus of products." 2 McCarthy § 12.02[5]. For example, the term

"Matchbox" was held to be generic because that genus of toy vehicles were

sold in matchbox-sized boxes.

A-16

|

The L'eggs® mark was conceived in the midst of Sara

Lee's endeavor to discover new ways to manufacture, package,

and market women's hosiery. The company's efforts have paid

off; by developing a line of nylon-and-spandex hosiery,

packaging its products in the now-famous egg-shaped

containers,'' and cultivating a new market in which to sell its

goods, Sara Lee has amassed handsome profits.

But what, exactly, does L'eggs® mean? The district

court decided that L'eggs® was a contraction for "leg eggs." It

then focused on what it considered to be the "weaker" element

of the mark (leg), which, of course, is also an intrinsic part of

Kayser-Roth's Leg Looks® mark, and almost certainly the

source of any confusion between the two.

Citing the rule that a term may be generic if it names a

distinctive characteristic of the genus to which the product

belongs, see note 10, supra, the court concluded that, because

all pantyhose have legs, the word "leg" is generic insofar as it

pertains to pantyhose. The court alternatively found that "leg"

is generic because it is an abbreviation of "legwear" or

"leggings," terms that refer to the genus of apparel to which

pantyhose belong. According to the district court, because the

word "leg" is generic, it may legally be used as part of an

otherwise non-infringing pantyhose trademark.

We disagree. The district court failed to appreciate that

the mark at issue is neither "leg eggs" nor "legs," but L'eggs®,

a word that represents a singular concept associated with -- but

very different from -- pantyhose. Although the mark may not

be wholly fanciful (because it is phonetically identical to a

common word) or arbitrary (because it is not actually a "real"

word), it is unquestionably suggestive, and therefore a strong,

distinctive mark. L'eggs® conjures favorable images of

. Since 1991, Sara Lee has curtailed its packaging of L'eggs®

products in plastic eggs in favor of more “environmentally friendly"

cardboard boxes. Nonetheless, the new packaging retains the egg

silhouette.

attractive legs or legginess, and, by subtly reminding

consumers of its famous egg packaging design, reinforces the

association between the product and its source -- a sure sign of

a mark entitled to protection.’

? See, ¢.g., Metro Publishing, Ltd. v. San Jose Mercury News, 987

F.2d 637, 640 (9th Cir. 1993) (a likelihood of confusion exists when

consumers “are likely to assume that a product or service is associated with

a source other than its actual source because of similarities between the two

sources’ marks or marketing techniques.") (citations and internal quotation

marks omitted). It stands to reason that a mark which elucidates, to an

unusual degree, the source of a product serves the public interest and

should be preserved. That is precisely why merely descriptive marks are

accorded trademark protection upon acquiring a secondary meaning. See

discussion in Section IV-A(1), supra.

As for the district court's alternative finding, we note simply that

L'eggs® does not denominate a type or genus of goods, nor does it name a

distinctive characteristic of pantyhose in general. See note 10, supra. A

different case would be presented if the mark at issue were "Pantyhose" or

"Stockings" (type or genus), or "Nylons" (characteristic).

Our conclusion that the L'eggs® mark is distinctive is further

bolstered by the Patent and Trademark Office's registration of the L'eggs®

trademark without requiring any proof of the mark's having acquired a

secondary meaning. See Pizzeria Uno at 1529:

The significance of registration without proof of

secondary meaning .. . is that the Patent and Trademark

Office has “concluded” that the mark or figure was not

merely descriptive but suggestive[,] and this essential

fact . . . must be considered prima facie correct by a

court in considering the validity of a trademark. . .[.]

[R]egistration . . . constitutes not only a determination. . .

that the term or word is suggestive but also operates to

provide prima facie evidence of the registrant's right to

use the mark, endowing it with a strong presumption of

validity. (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).

Of course, if L'eggs® were indeed a generic term, it could not

legally be registered as a trademark. The inescapable conclusion is that

either the Patent and Trademark Office or the district court has made a

mistake; we are convinced that it was the latter.

A-18

Om An lide IO

Pie ho aR ay SR PERN be IG MIO CL i me ome 5 ten ting!

Meh ttiha DAMA nlc Id tice BPR RO BA ery OT se 0

istic sin senininistairaneivecinaion

B. The "Similarity" Factors

We now consider briefly the similarity of the two

marks, of the goods the marks identify, of the facilities

employed to transact the parties’ business,’*? and of the

advertising used by the parties.

L'eggs® and Leg Looks® , although not identical, are

perceived similarly by the eye and ear. Whether being written

or spoken, L'eggs® and the first syllable of Leg Looks® are

quite similar. Moreover, Leg Looks'® first syllable stands

alone, emphasizing its similarity to L'eggs®.

There can be little argument as to the similarity of the

goods that the two marks represent (both are associated with

women's hosiery), the facilities that the parties employ to

transact business (both L'eggs® and Leg Looks® are

distributed in the FDM market, often side-by-side), or the

advertising used by Sara Lee and Kayser-Roth (both employ

similar media and target the same consumers). Regarding

these three factors, there is no substantial difference between

the parties that would serve to ameliorate any confusion of

their marks.

C. The Defendant's Intent

As we stated in Pizzeria Uno:

The intent of the defendant is sometimes a

major factor in infringement cases. If there is

intent to confuse the buying public, this is

strong evidence establishing likelihood of

confusion, since one intending to profit from

another's reputation generally attempts to make

. This factor has also been expressed as the "proximity" of the

products. Perini at 127.

A-19

his signs, advertisements, etc., to resemble the

other's so as deliberately to induce confusion.

Id. at 1535. In other words, we presume that the person who

sets out to infringe on ancther's trademark has more brains

than scruples, and will likely succeed. Cf. Osem Food Indus.

Lid. v. Sherwood Foods, Inc., 917 F.2d 161, 165 (4th Cir.

1990):

When a newcomer to the market copies a

competitor's trade dress, its intent must be to

benefit from the goodwill of the competitor's

customers by getting them to believe that the

new product is either the same, or originates

from the same source as the product whose

trade dress was copied. Logic requires . . . that

from such intentional copying arises a

presumption that the newcomer is successful

and that there is a likelihood of confusion.

In his memorandum opinion, the magistrate concluded

that Kayser-Roth intended to infringe on Sara Lee's trademark,

pointing to considerable circumstantial evidence in the record

supporting a strong inference that, when Kayser-Roth

resuscitated its Leg Looks® line, it expressly intended to take

advantage of the mark's similarity to L'eggs® to siphon sales

of Sara Lee's products.’ The district court, however, found

i The magistrate cited testimony that one of Kayser-Roth's

vice-presidents directed the company's New Products Group to design

packaging for its new line that differed from its other No nonsense®

products. The resultant trade dress was so close to that of Sheer Energy®

products that the magistrate -- with the approval of the district court --

enjoined its use. See Section I, supra. The same vice-president rejected the

Group's recommendation that the new line be called “Active Sensations,”

insisting instead on the Leg Looks® name. The magistrate also noted that

Kayser-Roth initially spent relatively little money to promote Leg Looks®.

A-20

that Kayser-Roth had acted in good faith -- a finding that we

may disturb only if it is clearly erroneous. Because we would

reach the same result in this case regardless of Kayser-Roth's

intent, reviewing the district court's disposition of this complex

issue would serve no purpose; we thus decline to do so.

D. Actual Confusion

The record is replete with anecdotal evidence of

consumers throughout the nation confusing the L'eggs® and

Leg Looks® marks. Six women -- most of whom usually

bought L'eggs® pantyhose -- testified that they had purchased

(or, in one case, nearly purchased) a Leg Looks® product

under the mistaken impression that it was instead a L'eggs®

product. Sara Lee's service merchandisers told the magistrate

of many occasions where consumers had approached them in

stores, uncertain of the origin of Leg Looks®.

The service merchandisers also told of massive

confusion by store personnel. Included in the record are

photographs of in-store advertisements and _ circulars

promoting, variously, "L'eggs Looks," "Legg Looks," and

"L'eggs Look" pantyhose.

The anecdotal evidence, standing alone, is nearly

overwhelming; indeed, we can but wonder how often the

experiences related by the trial witnesses have been repeated --

but not reported -- in stores across the country. Nevertheless,

Sara Lee produced additional evidence in the form of surveys

that it had conducted, indicating that approximately thirty to

forty percent of the consuming public was confused by the

similarity of the L'eggs® and Leg Looks® marks. The district

In addition, Kayser-Roth evidently accelerated its marketing of

Leg Looks® to coincide with Sara Lee's introduction of L'eggs®

Everyday. Perhaps most tellingly, there is evidence in the record suggesting

that certain Kayser-Roth employees may have purged computer files

relating to the development of the Leg Looks® repackaging.

A-21

Ce

court discounted the survey evidence on the ground that its

reliability may have been in question, but even if the true

figure were only half of the survey estimate, actual confusion

would, in our view, nevertheless exist to a significant degree.”

E. The Quality of the Defendant's Product & _ the

Sophistication of the C ng Publi

The two remaining factors, announced in Perini,

probably apply with less frequency than the previous seven.

Consideration of the quality of the defendant's product is most

appropriate in situations involving the production of cheap

copies or knockoffs of a competitor's trademark-protected

goods. If a defendant markets a product under a mark similar

to that affixed by a competitor to a commodity of like nature

but superior manufacture, that the defendant's product is

markedly inferior is likely to be highly probative of its reliance

on the similarity of the two marks to generate undeserved

sales.

Barring an unusual case, buyer sophistication will only

be a key factor when the relevant market is not the public

at-large. If the typical consumer in the relevant market is

sophisticated in the use of -- or possesses an expertise

regarding -- a particular product, such sophistication or

expertise may be pertinent in determining the likelihood of

if

We may infer from the case law that survey evidence clearly

favors the defendant when it demonstrates a level of confusion much below

ten percent. See Henri's Food Products Co.. Inc. v. Kraft. Inc., 717 F.2d

352, 358 (7th Cir. 1983). In that case, the court of appeals cited several

cases holding that survey evidence indicating ten to twelve percent

confusion was sufficient to demonstrate actual confusion. The court,

however, concluded that the 7.6% confusion level before it “weighs against

infringement.” See also Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co, v, Novak, 836 F.2d 397,

400 (8th Cir. 1987) (survey evidence showing confusion level of between

ten and eleven percent sufficient to demonstrate actual confusion), cert.

denied, 488 U.S. 933 (1988).

A-22

confusion. Perini at 127-28. The relative sophistication of the

market may trump the presence or absence of any other factor.

See id, at 128:

The plaintiff claims that lack of consideration

of consumer sophistication does not preclude a

finding of infringement when every other

factor indicates a likelihood of confusion. Yet,

we hold that in a market with extremely

sophisticated buyers, the likelihood of

consumer confusion cannot be presumed on the

basis of the similarity in trade name alone ....

We need not here concern ourselves, however, with

either of the two "Perini factors." There is no assertion in the

instant proceeding that Kayser-Roth's product is substantially

inferior to Sara Lee's, or that persons who buy pantyhose are

any more sophisticated about that product than those who

comprise the market for other ordinary retail goods.

We have previously acknowledged that the

distinctiveness of the senior user's mark is "the first and

paramount factor" in determining the likelihood of confusion.

Pizzeria Uno at 1527. If the strength of the senior mark is the

alpha of infringement analysis, then evidence of actual

confusion is surely the omega; where the defendant in an

infringement case has elected to use a mark similar to that of a

competitor's distinctive mark, and, as a result, has actually

confused the public, our inquiry ends almost as soon as it

begins.

Even if most of the other factors did not indicate-- as

they do in this case -- a strong likelihood of confusion, the

strength of the L'eggs® mark in conjunction with the solid

evidence of actual confusion compels us to conclude that

A-23

Sg ee a ee OL

Kayser-Roth's current use of its Leg Looks® mark is an

infringing one.'® Upon reviewing the district court's finding to

the contrary, we cannot help but be left with a "definite and

firm conviction that a mistake has been made." Pizzeria Uno at

1526. The court's finding is clearly erroneous; we are thus

constrained to overturn it.

V.

The judgment of the district court is reversed, and the

case is remanded for it to enter judgment for Sara Lee. We

further instruct the district court to enter an order permanently

enjoining Kayser-Roth from affixing the Leg Looks®

trademark to any of its products placed in the same channels of

distribution as those in which Sara Lee's L'eggs® products are

currently sold.

REVERSED AND REMANDED WITH INSTRUCTIONS

= Sara Lee has suggested that the use of an infringing mark on

product packaging, standing alone, also constitutes a trade dress violation.

We have scrutinized Professor McCarthy's treatise as it pertains to trade

dress, see note 2, supra, and can find no support for this argument. The

magistrate cited M. Kramer Mfg. Co.. Inc. v. Andrews, 783 F.2d 421, 427

(4th Cir 1986), as holding that "the brand name is part of the trade dress,"

Magis. Op. at 119, but we read the cited portion of that case to say only that

the plaintiff alleged that the defendant's copying of the brand name violated

Section 1 125(a).

In any event, because Sara Lee's trade dress claim remains alive

only insofar as it might serve as an alternative basis for enjoining

Kayser-Roth's further infringing use of the Leg Looks® mark, our grant of

injunctive relief on the ground of trademark infringement effectively moots

the trade dress issue. Moreover, our holding in Sara Lee's favor on its

primary federal claim renders it unnecessary for us to address its

supplemental state law claims; even were Sara Lee to also prevail on its

other theories, it would not be entitled to any further relief.

A-24

WIDENER, Circuit Judge, dissenting:

I respectfully dissent.

The district court denied Sara Lee's request to enjoin

Kayser-Roth from using the trademark LEG LOOKS

pantyhose in the food, drug, and mass merchandise market.

The judgment of the district court was supported by many

findings of fact, one of which was based on a contract of

settlement between Sara Lee and Kayser-Roth in 1991.

Because of that finding of fact, but also otherwise supported,

the district court found that Sara Lee had acquiesced in

Kayser-Roth's use of the LEG LOOKS mark.

The majority concludes that this finding is clearly

erroneous because "the 1991 agreement was intended only to

govern Sara Lee's future actions in marketing its LINGERIE

LOOKS brand." Slip op. at 11.

The agreement in question appears at A.2871 and grew

out of Sara Lee's attempt to register the trademark LINGERIE

LOOKS in International Class 25. Kayser-Roth objected on

the basis that that mark infringed on its registered mark LEG

LOOKS and other marks such as Career Looks, Designer

Looks and Silky Looks. Sara Lee agreed to comply with

specific marketing and advertising practices, in particular that

its LINGERIE LOOKS mark would always be used with and

have added to it the L'EGGS trademark so that L'EGGS

LINGERIE LOOKS would be the dominant trademark usage

of Sara Lee. The agreement contained no market restrictions.

The district court found that each party remained free to use its

respective mark, LEG LOOKS by Kayser-Roth, and L'EGGS

LINGERIE LOOKS, by Sara Lee. It found that in the

agreement Sara Lee expressly acknowledged Kayser-Roth's

ownership of the registration for the LEG LOOKS mark and

that such acknowledgement "supports the inference that [Sara

Lee] recognized and consented to Defendant's [Kayser-Roth's]

entitlement to the whole range of rights legally afforded by

A-25

such ownership.” The district court found that Sara Lee would

not have agreed to L'eggs LINGERIE LOOKS by Sara Lee if

it thought it would be confused with LEG LOOKS, despite the

sharing of the word leg.

The district court found the relevant market to be the

national retail pantyhose market and that food, drug, and mass

merchandise stores are some of the many outlets used by both

parties to distribute pantyhose products in the national market.

Sara Lee registered the L'eggs trademark in 1973 for use on

ladies’ hosiery and pantyhose in International Class 25.

Kayser-Roth registered the LEG LOOKS trademark in 1983

for use on ladies’ hosiery and pantyhose in International Class

25. The district court reviewed Kayser-Roth's registration of

LEG LOOKS and found no limitation to a particular

composition or style. It further found that registration of a

trademark bestows upon its owner a presumption that the

"goods or services will move through all channels of trade

suitable for goods or services of that type, and that they reach

all purchasers and potential purchasers of them," quoting

RE/MAX of America, Inc, v. Realty Mart, Inc. , 207 U.S.P.Q.

960, 965 (T.T.A.B. 1980). The district court concluded that

Kayser-Roth's registration of LEG LOOKS, which had

become incontestible to the extent provided by 15 U.S.C. §

1065, established the presumption that it could distribute

pantyhose under the LEG LOOKS mark through all channels

suitable for the registered classification. It then found that

department stores, mass merchandising stores, off-price

outlets, food stores, and drug stores were all such suitable

outlets and that both parties had marketed pantyhose in the

national pantyhose market, including the food, drug, and mass

merchandise market, since the 1970's.

The majority, by confining its reasoning to the food,

drug, and mass merchandising market, has not taken into

account many or even most of the findings of fact I have just

related. Especially, it has not taken into account the district

court's finding of fact that:

A-26

|

Given the functional interchangeability of

pantyhose, Plaintiff's successful marketing of

L'eggs pantyhose through FDM stores rather

than department stores, and defendant's current

success with its pricing strategy, it would be

unrealistic and flatly incorrect to find that

low-cost pantyhose and high-priced pantyhose

do not compete in the same market. Cf. Brown

Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 326 (refusal to divide

theshoe market according to "price/quality"

distinctions). The court, therefore, finds that the

relevant market in this case is, and has always

been, the national retail pantyhose market.

That error, and the incorrect finding as clearly

erroneous of the district court's finding of acquiescence, are

two essential weaknesses in the majority opinion.

I am of opinion that the district court's findings of fact

are plausible and supported by the evidence. "If the district

court's account of the evidence is plausible in light of the

record viewed in its entirety, the court of appeals may not

reverse it even though convinced that had it been sitting as the

trier of fact, it would have weighed the evidence differently.

Where there are two permissible views of the evidence, the

factfinder's choice between them cannot be clearly erroneous."

Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573-74 (1985).

I would affirm the district court's finding that Sara Lee

had acquiesced in the defendant's use of the mark LEG

LOOKS.

I would also affirm its finding of relevant market.

II

I also do not agree with the majority's view that

anecdotal evidence of confusion and likelihood of confusion in

this case is "massive" and "nearly overwhelming" and its

A-27

conclusion that the district court did not consider, or

miscalculated the likelihood of, consumer confusion

Confusion or likelihood of confusion is a question of fact no’

to be disturbed unless clearly erroneous. 3 J. Thomas

McCarthy, Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 23.22

(1995). The district court discussed the relevant evidence in

detail and gave specific reasons for crediting or discrediting

anecdotal evidence, market studies, and expert testimony

offered by both parties. This discussion, in fact, occupies 20

pages of the appendix (A.5331-5351).

The district court divided its discussion of the

likelihood of confusion into five categories and its conclusion.

The categories were (1) strength of the SHEER ENERGY

trade dress; (2) similarity of the packages; (3) defendant's

intent; (4) similarity of the goods, sales facilities, and

advertising; and (5) evidence of actual confusion. The majority

opinion takes little or no issue with any of the district court's

discussion or fact finding except that with respect to actual

confusion, as is illustrated on page 18-19 of the slip opinion, in

the part labeled "D. Actual Confusion." on which its holding is

based.

The district court, in its consideration of evidence of

actual confusion, listed as sub-categories: A. Consumers, B.

Store Personnel, C. Misshelving and Misspelling, and D. Mail

Intercept Surveys. The majority opinion discusses little or no

evidence relevant to these categories and considered by the

district court in detail, but bases its decision on the fact that it

disagrees with the district court on the weight to be given the

survey evidence and the effect to be given the anecdotal

evidence. Slip op. at 18-19.

For example, included in the evidence considered by

the district court, but not by the majority, is the following:

As of the August 1993 hearing, Kayser-Roth

had sold over 3.5 million 1993 packages, yet

only four consumers testified at the hearing to

A-28

|

having bought the 1993 package, believing it

contained L'eggs pantyhose, and only one of

those believed it contained SHEER ENERGY

pantyhose.

ate pesca

The largest proportion of anecdotal evidence of

confusion came from plaintiffs’ sales

merchandisers rather than store personnel, and

even with that, plaintiffs employees gave

evidence of only 25 encounters with store

personnel who asked plaintiffs’ employees

about the 1993 package.

+ anagem Fs bi

| Between the introduction of the 1993 package

is and the August 1993 hearing, Sara Lee's sales

| merchandisers had made at least 800,000 store

visits. Even if only 1/4 of those 800,000 visits

had coincided with a display of the 1993

package, those 25 encounters would have

occurred on barely more than 1/100 of 1% of

the visits.

The evidence about misshelving or misspelling

came from Sara Lee's employees and included

no explanation from those responsible for the

) errors. Since Kayser-Roth's pantyhose were

almost always shelved near Sara Lee's, the

district court did not consider a few clerical

errors by unidentified store personnel or

outside advertisers demonstrative of actual

. confusion.

With respect to the survey evidence of Sara

Lee, the district court did not "accord the

proffered results much weight" because of "the

selection of an inappropriate controller by Sara

A-29

Lee." The district court also discounted Sara

Lee's surveys because "they insufficiently

emulated market conditions." Rather than take

issue with that district court finding as to the

weight of the evidence, the majority merely cut

the result in half and used that arbitrary

half-figure in coming to its conclusion.

The majority opinion does not take into account that

the district court accorded more weight to Kayser-Roth's

survey evidence than it did to Sara Lee's because it had come

closer to emulating market conditions and controlling for the

effect of color on packages.

The district court in this case, for some 20 pages,

analyzed in detail the evidence of likelihood of confusion. The

majority dismisses that analysis in one page with little analysis

of the same evidence. Slip op. at 18-19. In my opinion, the

majority opinion does not state a sufficient basis for its

conclusion that the district court's findings were clearly

erroneous. Inwood Labs., Inc. v, Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S.

844, 857-58 (1982), stated that "[aJn appellate court cannot

substitute its interpretation of the evidence for that of the tal

court simply because the reviewing court might give the facts

another construction, resolve the ambiguities differently, and

find a more sinister cast to actions which the District Court

apparently deemed innocent." (Internal quotation omitted.)

Yet, I suggest that is just what the majority has done in this

case.

Il

Whether or not the findings of fact of the district court

I have referred to above are clearly erroneous, and even if the

findings of fact of the majority are not clearly erroneous, in my

opinion the majority erred when it sequestered the use of the

word "leg" in connection with the sale and advertising of

A-30

pantyhose in the food, drug, and mass merchandise market and

gave that exclusive use to Sara Lee.

On page 15 of the slip opinion, the holding of the

majority is disclosed.

According to the district court, because the

word"leg" is generic, it may legally be used as

part of an otherwise non-infringing pantyhose

trademark.

We disagree. The district court failed to

appreciate that the mark at issue is neither "leg

eggs" nor "legs" but L'eggs®, a word that

represents a singular concept associated

with--but very different from--pantyhose.

Although the mark may not be wholly fanciful

(because it is phonetically identical to a

common word) or arbitrary (because it is not

actually a "real" word), it is unquestionably

suggestive, and therefore a strong, distinctive

mark. L'eggs® conjures favorable images of

attractive legs or legginess, and, by subtly

reminding consumers of its famous egg

packaging design, reinforces the association

between the product and its source--a sure sign

of a mark entitled to protection. (Italics added.)

Thus the majority holds that the word "leg" may not

legally be used as part of an otherwise non-infringing

pantyhose trademark in connection with the advertising or sale

of pantyhose. I suggest that it is simply not possible to

advertise or sell pantyhose without the use of the word "leg"

and that the decision of the majority, that the use of the word

"leg" in connection with the advertising and sale of pantyhose,

is the exclusive right of Sara Lee, is error.

A-31

In remarkably similar circumstances, the Third Circuit

held, in A.J. Canfield Co. v. Honickman, 808 F.2d 291 (3d

Cir. 1986), that "chocolate fudge," as used in the name of a

drink called "Diet Chocolate Fudge Soda," was generic and

was "available to all potential competitors." 808 F.2d at 308.

The court reasoned that ". . . if a term is necessary to describe a

product characteristic that a competitor has a right to copy, a

producer may not effectively preempt competition by claiming

that term as its own." 808 F.2d at 305.

Along the same line, the Seventh Circuit, in Miller

Brewing Co, v. G. Heileman Brewing Co., 561 F.2d 75 (7th

Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1025 (1978), decided that

"Light" is a generic or common descriptive term when used

with beer. 561 F.2d at 80. In that case, Miller had the

registered mark of "LITE" and had sued Heileman, which had

incorporated the word "light" in its sales and advertising. Of

course, Miller's suit failed. And the court stated that "[a]

generic or common descriptive term is one which is

commonly used as the name or description of a kind of goods.

It canriot become a trademark under any circumstances." 561

F.2d at 79. The Heileman case was followed in Miller

Brewing Co, v. Falstaff Brewing Corp., 655 F.2d 5 (ist Cir.

1981), which held that Miller was estopped by Heileman from

prosecuting the same kind of a suit against Falstaff. The court

relied on the reasoning of Judge Friendly in two cases for the

rule which, in my opinion, should be followed here and is as

follows:

"No matter how much money and effort the

user of a generic term has poured into

promoting the sale of its merchandise and what

success it has achieved in securing public

identification, it cannot deprive competing

manufacturers of the product of the right to call

an article by its name." Abercrombie & Fitch

Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d

A-32

OI

Cir. 1976). "The reason is plain enough. To

allow trademark protection for generic terms,

i.e. terms which describe the genus of goods

being sold, even when these have been

identified with a first user, would grant the

owner of the mark a monopoly since a

competitor could not describe his goods as

what they are." ishi

Regis Publications, Inc., 531 F.2d 11, 13 (2d

Cir.1975).

655 F.2d at 8.

I would conclude that the word "leg" is no less generic

than the words "chocolate fudge," as used in connection with

diet soda, or the word "light," as used with beer. I suggest

again that this holding of the majority is error, regardless of

whether or not the facts as found by the district court are

clearly erroneous. Advertising and selling pantyhose without

using the word "leg" just seems to me to be impossible.

IV

In sum, I am of opinion that the majority erred when it

decided, either implicitly or expressly, that the holdings of the

district court were clearly erroneous with respect to

acquiescence, relevant market, and confusion. Absent the fact

findings of the majority, which were contrary to those of the

district court, the decision of the majority can not stand.

Even considering for argument, however, that the fact

findings of the majority were correct, its holding that the word

"leg" is not a generic term is erroneous, | think, and also for

that reason, the decision of the majority can not stand.

I would affirm.

A-33

SARA LEE CORPORATION,

Plaintiff,

V.

KAYSER-ROTH CORPORATION,

Defendant.

CIVIL NO. 6:92CV00460

UNITED STATES DiSTRICT COURT

FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

WINSTON - SALEM DIVISION

October 13, 1994, Decided

October 13, 1994, FILED,

October 13, 1994, ENTERED

MEMORANDUM OPINION

BULLOCK, District Judge

I. INTRODUCTION

II. FINDINGS OF FACT

A. History of the Case

l. The Parties, the Trademarks, the

Market

a. The Parties and the

Trademarks

b. The Market

y The Original Complaint

The Amended Complaint

4. The 1992 Preliminary Injunction

Ww

A-34

5. The 1993 Supplemental Complaint -

6. The 1993 Preliminary Injunction

Hearing and Recommendation

B. History of the Marks and Original Packaging

l. Plaintiffs L'eggs® SHEER

ENERGY® Line of Pantyhose

a. The Marks L'eggs® and

SHEER ENERGY®

b. Packaging and Marketing the

SHEER ENERGY® Line

i Defendant's No nonsense® Lines of

Pantyhose

8

H

3

r .

. C

H .

.

p " "

l. Packaging and Marketing the LEG

LOOKS® Lines

2. Other "Leg" Marks

E. New Products for a Changing Market

l. Plaintiff's New Products

2. Defendant's Plans

a. Background: No nonsense®

Market Status in 1992

b. Pans to Redesign the No

nonsense® Line

| c. Plans to Introduce a New

Product

3. Defendant's New Product: LEG

LOOKS® INVIGORATING

PANTYHOSE and the 1992 Package

a. Choosing the Name

b. Designing the Package

(1) Ideas and Decisions

(2) The Box

(3) The Colors

ae See Ma 0.

.

A-35

(4) The Logo, Graphics,

and Size Designators

F. The 1993 LEG LOOKS® Package

l. Elements Retained: Name, Box,

Colors

2. Elements Changed: Font, Slant,

Graphics

3. Marketing the 1993 Package

G. Consumer Perceptions: Anecdotal Evidence

l. Consumer Testimony

a. About the 1992 Package

b. About the 1993 Package

2. Plaintiff's Employees’ Testimony

3. Defendant's Employees’ Testimony

H. Consumer Perceptions: Survey Evidence

4 Plaintiff's Survey Evidence

a. Designing the Surveys

b. Study #1

2. Study #2

2. Defendant's Survey Evidence

I, Expert wuness Testimony

l. Opinions of the Surveys

2. Opinions of the Likelihood of

Confusion

3. Opinions of Defendant's Intent

Il. DISCUSSION

A. The Issues Before the Court

l Jurisdiction and Venue

2. Issues Now Moot

3. Issues Remaining

B. Federal Trademark Claims

l. Threshold Defenses

a. Incontestability of the Mark

LEG LOOKS®

A-36

(3)

Limited

Incontestability

Plaintiff's Previously

Aquired State Law

Rights

Defendant's

Presumptive Rights

b. Equitable Defenses

(1) Estoppel by

Acquiescence

(2) Estoppel by Laches

(3) Defendant's Good Faith

2. Challenging the Mark LEG LOOKS®

a. Grounds for a Challenge

b. Likelihood of Confusion

(1) Strength of the Mark

L'eggs®

(2) Similarity of the Marks

(3) Similarity of the Goods

(4) Similarity of the Sales

Facilities and

Advertising

(5) Evidence of Actual

Confusion

(6) Defendant's Intent

(7) Conclusion

Federal Trade Dress Claim

l. The SHEER ENERGY® Trade Dress

and its Secondary Meaning

2. Unprotectable Features

3. Likelihood of Confusion

a. Defendant's Burden

b. Analysis

(1) Strength of the SHEER

ENERGY® Trade

Dress

A-37

(2) Similarity of the

Packages

(3) Defendant's Intent

(4) Similarity of the

Goods, Sales Facilities,

and Advertising

(5) Evidence of Actual

Confusion

(a) Consumers

(b) Store Personnel

(c) Misshelving or

Misspelling

(d) Mall-Intercept

Surveys

(6) Conclusion

D. = State Law Claims

1. Unfair Competition and Unfair Trade

Practices

2. Trademark Dilution

IV. CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

V. APPENDIX

I. INTRODUCTION

The recommendation of the United States Magistrate

Judge ganting injunctive elief to the Plaintiff in this complex

trademark/trade dress case following_a ten-day evidentiary

hearing is before the court for review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

636 and through agreement of the parties. Also before the

court are Defendant's comprehensive objections to the

recommendation. The objections merit thorough

consideration because it is the court's duty to make a de novo

determination of those portions of the recommendation to

which objection is made. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1). Such

A-38

we

determination includes a discussion of the factual and legal

bases for the court's action with regard to the

recommendation. Cf. Camby v. Davis, 718 F.2d 198 (4th

Cir. 1983) (absent objection, no explanation is necessary for

adoption of a magistrate's recommendation).

Both the magistrate judge and Plaintiff put great

emphasis on the findings recommended and the order entered

on December 1, 1992, regarding Defendant's LEG LOOKS®

INVIGORATING PANTYHOSE By No nonsense® package

on the market at that time ("1992 Package"). The sole issue

then before the court was whether a preliminary injunction

should be entered against that package. While the court was

satisfied that it should, the entry of the preliminary injunction

cannot be equated with a final finding of success. The court

issued an order "in accord with the overall substance" of the

magistrate judge's recommended findings of fact and

conclusions of law but considered those findings and

| conclusions for purposes of that order only. (Order and

Prelim. Inj., filed Dec.1, 1992.) They were not binding on the

| parties whose rights the injunction merely preserved pending

1 a final determination. See Wetzel v. Edwards, 635 F.2d 283,

| 286 (4th Cir. 1980); Meiselman v. Paramount Film Distrib.

Corp., 180 F.2d 94, 97 (4th Cir. 1950); Poe v. Charlotte

Memorial Hosp., Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1302, 1312 (W.D.N.C.

1974). Neither are those findings and conclusions binding on

the court as it decides Plaintiff's claims on their merits. See

University of Texas v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 394-95, 68

L. Ed. 2d 175, 101 S. Ct. 1830 (1980).

The court has painstakingly reviewed all of the

materials in the record, including thousands of pages of

testimony, dozens of packages, and hundreds of documents.

' Having made an independent assessment of the material

Oe ee oe ee

It is now apparent to the court that a final determination of the

issues in this case would have been reached more quickly had the matter

proceeded to a full trial before a district judge.

A-39

facts and legal arguments in this case, the court will issue its

own findings rather than setting forth with commentary the

various portions of the magistrate judge's recommendation.

Il. FINDINGS OF FACT

A. History of the Case

l. The Parties, the Trademarks, the Market

a. The rarties and the Trademarks

l. A major manfacturer of pantyhose

sold to consumers, Plaintiff’ is a Maryland corporation with

a principal place of business in Winston-Salem, North

Carolina.

2. Plaintiff owns federal trademark

registration No. 891,626, issued in 1970, for the trademark

L'EGGS for use on ladies’ hosiery and pantyhose. .

Hereafter, the mark will be referred to in the form in which it

appears on Plaintiff's products, with an upper-case "L" and

lower-case "e-g-g-s," i.e., "L'eggs®." See Fig. 1(a).

. "Plaintiff is used herein to refer collectively to Sara Lee

Corporation as well as its predecessors in interest with respect to the

L'eggs® line of products, which include Hanes Corporation.

: The use of a trademark as a house mark or a trade name does

not render inaccurate its designation as a trademark. Whether a registered

mark is used as a trademark, house mark, or trade name, the same

fundamental principles of law protect against its appropriation. See | J.

Thomas McCarthy, McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition §

9.01[1] (3d ed. 1992). The court will refer to a name or a phrase listed on

the Principal Register of the United States Patent and Trademark Office

as a “mark.”

A-40

reat!

etait Baked shel NAD Aint csc ON Aten A

. iat ad

3. Plaintiff also owns federal registration

No. 978,180, issued in 1974, for the trademark SHEER

ENERGY for use on ladies' hosiery and pantyhose.

Hereinafter, the mark will be referred to in the form in which

it appears on Plaintiff's products, with upper-case letters, i.e.,

"SHEER ENERGY®." See Fig. 4.

4. Both marks have become

incontestable to the extent provided by 15 U.S.C. § 1065, are

well recognized by consumers, and are substantially

associated with one source.

5. A major manufacturer of pantyhose

sold to consumers, Defendant* is a Delaware corporation

with a principal place of business in Greensboro, North

Carolina.

6. Defendant owns federal registration

No. 974,045, issued in 1973, for the trademark NO

NONSENSE for use on ladies’ hosiery and pantyhose.

Fiereafter, the mark will be referred to in the form in which it

aopears on Defendant's products, with an upper-case initial

"N” and lower-case letters thereafter, i.e., "No nonsense®."

See Figs. 5(a) & 5(b).

7 Defendant also owns federal

registration No. 1,247,116 for the trademark LEG LOOKS,

for use on hosiery and pantyhose, issued in 1983, with a

recorded first use of the mark in commerce in August 1977.

Hereafter, the mark will be referred to in the form in which it

appears on Defendant's products, with all upper-case letters,

i.e., "LEG LOOKS®." See Figs. 2(a) & 2(b).

8. Both marks have become incontestible

to the extent provided by 15 U.S.C. § 1065. The mark No

’ "Defendant" is used herein to refer collectively to Kayser-Roth

Corporation as well as its predecessors in interest with respect to its

pantyhose products, which include Burlington Hosiery, Inc.

A-41

nonsense® is well recognized by consumers and

substantially associated with one source.

b. The Market

9. Plaintiff and Defendant both make and

sell pantyhose nationally to members of the general

consuming public.

10. Pantyhose cover the legs with sheer

knitted fabric. They may be made of nylon or a combination

of nylon and spandex, but, regardless of their composition,

pantyhose are functionally interchangeable, competitive

products.

11. Both Plaintiff and Defendant advertise

their pantyhose nationally through a wide variety of media

including newspapers, magazines, radio, and television.

12. _ Both Plaintiff and Defendant distribute

pantyhose through a wide variety of retail outlets including

department stores, mass merchandising __ stores,

supermarkets, groceries, convenience stores, pharmacies and

drug chains.

13. In the hosiery and _ marketing

industries, mass merchandising stores, supermarkets,

groceries, convenience stores, pharmacies and drug chains

are sometimes referred to collectively as "food, drug, and

5

In the pleadings, pantyhose having 100 per cent nylon legs

have been referred to as "nylon" pantyhose, and pantyhose having some

percentage of spandex in the leg have been referred to as "spandex"

pantyhose. The legs of the so-called "spandex" pantyhose at the focus of

this case are actually seventy-nine, eighty, or eighty-one per cent nylon.

5 Stores commonly considered to be “mass merchandising stores"

are those large establishments selling a wide variety of goods at low

prices, for example, Wal-Mart.

A-42

mass merchandising"("FDM") outlets or colloquially as "the

FDM market."

14. FDM stores are, however, simply

some of the many outlets used to distribute goods in the

national retail pantyhose market, in which Plaintiff and

Defendant are major competitors.

2. The Original Complaint

15. In July 1992, Plaintiff filed a

complaint challenging Defendant's application for trademark

registration of the names "SHEER INVIGORATION" and

“SHEER VIGOR." That claim has been dismissed.

3. The Amended Complaint

16. In September 1992, Plaintiff amended

its complaint to include claims of trademark infringement,

false designation of origin and false description, unfair

competition, and unfair trade practices based on allegations

that the mark LEG LOOKS® affixed to women's hosiery

sold "to the same classes of consumers through the same

channels of trade" as L'eggs® pantyhose were also sold--i.e.,

FDM stores--infringed on the mark L'eggs®, and that

Defendant's 1992 Package infringed on Plaintiff's SHEER

ENERGY® trade dress. (Pl.'s Am. Compl. at 20, filed Sept.

9, 1992).

17. Plaintiff asked the court, inter alia, to

enjoin Defendant from "any and all further imitation and use

of the L'EGGS SHEER ENERGY trade dress or the

designation 'Leg Looks' as herein alleged." (Id. at 25).

4. The 1992 Preliminary Injunction

18. In October 1992 Plaintiff sought a

preliminary injunction against the 1992 Package but did not

A-43

bring the use of the mark LEG LOOKS® per se before the

court during the 1992 preliminary injunction proceedings.’

19. After hearings were held and a

recommendation made by the magistrate judge, the court

entered an order preliminarily enjoining Defendant from

marketing its LEG LOOKS® pantyhose in the 1992 package

or "in a package which would likely confuse consumers" as

to the origin of the product and from using specified

packaging elements "in a combination confusingly similar"

to Plaintiffs SHEER ENERGY® packaging. (Order and

Prelim. Inj., filed Dec. 1, 1992).

20. The order did not, however, prevent

Defendant "from using the name 'Leg Looks', or boxes of the

same size, weight and shape as the current ‘Leg Looks'

packaging, or the colors blue, green, and orange to denote the

style of pantyhose . . . , provided the packaging as a whole

[was] differentiated in general appearance from Plaintiff's

[SHEER ENERGY®] packaging and from [the 1992

Package]." (Id.).

> The 1993 Supplemental Complaint

21. Without conceding that the 1992

Package could properly be permanently enjoined, Defendant

withdrew the 1992 Packages from the market. Defendant has

informed the court that it will not use the 1992 Package

again under any circumstances.

22. After the withdrawal of the 1992

Package, which cost Defendant approximately $ 2.5 million,

Defendant reintroduced its pantyhose in a new package

("1993 Package").

?

Exhibits presented during the 1992 preliminary injunction

proceedings will be identified as exhibits from "Prelim. Inj. I."

Aas

23. In January 1993, Plaintiff moved to

supplement its complaint to assert that the 1993 Package,

featuring the mark LEG LOOKS®, infringes on the

trademark L'eggs®, imitates the SHEER ENERGY® trade

dress, and constitutes false designation of origin and false

description, and that Defendant's marketing of the package

constitutes unfair competition, unfair trade practices,

and trademark dilution.

24. In_ its supplemental complaint,

Plaintiff continued to seek an injunction against any further

use of the mark LEG LOOKS® and any further imitation

and use of the SHEER ENERGY® trade dress, damages, and

attorneys’ fees.

6. The 1993 Preliminary Injunction Hearing and

Recommendation

25. In March 1993, Plaintiff moved for a

preliminary injunction against the marketing in FDM stores

of any hosiery product under the name LEG LOOKS®, the

marketing of hosiery products in the 1993 Package, or any

other use of the name LEG LOOKS® or any LEG LOOKS®

package in a manner that would create a likelihood of

customer confusion with L'eggs® products.

26. In August 1993, the magistrate judge

conducted a ten-day hearing on the motion.*

27. At the conclusion of the hearing, the

parties agreed, and the court concurred, to the waiver of

Plaintiffs damage claims, the bifurcation of Plaintiff's

remaining equitable claims from Defendant's counterclaims,

the conversion of the hearing into a trial on the merits of all

Plaintiff's equitable claims, and the referral of the claims to

. Exhibits presented during the 1993 preliminary injunction

proceedings will be identified as exhibits from "Prelim. Inj. II."

A-45

the magistrate judge for a recommendation, with de novo

review by the court.”

28. On November 30, 1993, the magistrate

judge issued his recommendation that Plaintiff's request for a

permanent injunction be granted.

BO r the Marks and Original Packagi

l. Plaintiff's L'eggs® SHEER ENERGY® Line of

Pantyhose

a. The Marks L'eggs® and SHEER ENERGY®

29. On Plaintiffs SHEER ENERGY®

pantyhose packages the product name reads as "L'eggs®

SHEER ENERGY® Pantyhose."

30. The mark L'eggs® combines the

words "leg" and "egg."

31. ‘Plaintiffs promotion of the mark

L'eggs® has always emphasized the egg. The most recent

incarnation of the mark includes an egg outline rising above

the mark. See Fig. 1(c).

32. Definitions of the word "leg" include

"1: a limb of an animal used esp. for supporting the body and

for walking . . . 3a: the part of an article of clothing that

: The parties dispute whether Plaintiff's waiver of its claims for

damages included a waiver of its claim for attorney fees. Under the

Lanham Act, only the prevailing party in an "exceptional case[ }" may be

awarded attorney fees. 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a). Exceptional cases include

those in which an infringer's actions were “‘malicious, fraudulent,

deliberate and willful.‘ Scotch Whisky Ass'n v. Majestic Distilling Co.,

958 F.2d 594, 599 (4th Cir. 1992) (quoting S. Rep. No. 1400, 93rd

Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 7132, 7136). As

Plaintiff is not the prevailing party and this is not am exceptional case, the

court does not reach the issue of waiver.

A-46

covers the leg." Webster's Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary

682 (1989).

33. The word "leg," therefore, identifies

both the most significant parts of a pair of nantyhose and the

place where pantyhose are worn by all but a fraction of

pantyhose purchasers. °

34. The word "leg" is also the root of the

generic term "legwear," the class of apparel to which

pantyhose belong.

b. Packaging and Marketing the SHEER

ENERGY® Line

}. In the early 1970's, Plaintiff started

selling pantyhose under the mark L'eggs® in FDM stores.

According to Plaintiff, they were the first "high quality

branded" pantyhose to be sold in those stores rather than in

department stores. (Prelim. Inj. I Tr. Vol. I at 49, filed Nov.

5, 1992).

36. Plaintiff obtained national distribution

of L'eggs® pantyhose in 1974 and has since continued to

distribute L'eggs® pantyhose throughout each state in the

United States.

37. Plaintiff has affixed the mark L'eggs®

to pantyhose of a variety of colors, compositions, and

constructions or styles."

- Pantyhose purchasers who rob banks or undergo certain hair

treatments may wear their pantyhose on their heads, but the court is

confident that such purchasers are relatively rare and almost certainly

brand indifferent.

" The term "composition" as used here refers to the combination

of nylon or spandex in the yarn from which the pantyhose are made. The

terms “constructions” or "styles" as used here refers to the method of

reinforced weaving of a particular style of pantyhose, for example, in

Plaintiff's terminology, “all sheer,” “reinforced toe,” or “control top."

A-47

38. Plaintiff first packaged L'eggs®

pantyhose in a plastic egg resting in a paperboard cylinder 3

inches in diameter. That package is one of America's most

famous.

39. In 1973, Plaintiff introduced SHEER

ENERGY® pantyhose, which have legs that are twenty per

cent spandex and come in sizes designated "A," "B," and

"0."

40. From 1973 to 1991, the only one-pair

package of SHEER ENERGY® pantyhose available at retail

was the plastic egg. The egg motif remains prominent in

Plaintiffs SHEER ENERGY® packaging. Every SHEER

ENERGY® package in evidence displays an egg in some

form.

41. Plaintiff used silver eggs with silver

cylinders and green lettering for "all sheer" SHEER

ENERGY® pantyhose, silver eggs with silver cylinders and

blue lettering for "reinforced toe" SHEER ENERGY®

pantyhose, and medium blue or "teal" eggs with teal

cylinders and white lettering for "control top" SHEER

ENERGY® pantyhose.

42. The SHEER ENERGY® logo on the

egg packages’ cylinders slants upward from left to right, as

do the thin lines that were added in the late 1980's.

43. On the bottom of the egg cylinders, a

one-size chart displays in two columns the heights and

corresponding weights for only the size of the pantyhose in

that package.

44. In 1991, Plaintiff introduced new one-

pair SHEER ENERGY® packages: paperboard boxes

approximately 3-1/2 inches high, 3 inches wide, and 2-3/8

inches deep, with elliptical or egg-shaped tops, s!anting logo,

and slanting stripes. The color-coding of styles on those

packages is the same as on the plastic egg packages.

45. According to Michael Wahl of the

Howard Marlboro Group, who has been a marketing

A-48

consultant to Plaintiff, the new one-pair packages were

designed to be more environmentally sound, to save money,

to facilitate automation, and, above all, to "make the

shopping experience easier." Michael Wahl, In_Store

Marketing 182 (1992) (Prelim. Inj. II Def.'s Ex. 96).

46. Since the late 1980's, Plaintiff has also

sold SHEER ENERGY® pantyhose in two-pair economy

boxes: rectangular paperboard boxes approximately 4 inches

high, 3 inches wide, and 3-1/2 inches deep.

47. Over the years, Plaintiff has used at

least twelve different two-pair SHEER ENERGY® economy

boxes. (Prelim. Inj. I. Pl.'s Exs. 4 & 8; Prelim. Inj. Il Pl.'s

Exs. 12-13, 15-20, 22, 24).

48. In focus in this case are two of those

twelve packages: the silver-grey and green "all sheer"

economy box (Prelim. Inj. I Pl.'s Ex. 8) and the silver-grey

and blue "reinforced toe" economy box (Prelim. Inj. I P1.'s

Ex. 4). See Fig. 4.

49. Those silver-grey economy boxes

share with the other economy boxes their name and logo,

their size, and some depiction of an egg-shaped or egg-

topped package that in turn incorporates the color silver,

slanted lettering, and thin slanting lines common to those

one-pair SHEER ENERGY® packages. On each end of

those two boxes is displayed a silhouette of an egg-shaped

package.

50. On both the silver-grey economy

boxes and the egg-topped boxes a three-size shaded grid with

multiple columns displays the height and weight

correspondences for all three sizes. This kind of three-size

shaded grid is common on pantyhose packaging.

51. According to Wahl, Plaintiff's senior

management, "the gatekeepers of the brand image that is so

strongly represented by the egg," established maximum

limits on the number of economy package facings that could

A-49

be displayed in conjunction with the "real egg" package.

Wahl, supra, at 181.

52. The photographs in evidence show

that the SHEER ENERGY® economy boxes generally

occupy space on only the top one or two shelves of Plaintiff's

racks.

53. Currently, at least in eastern states, the

plastic eggs, egg-topped boxes, and economy boxes may all

be found in stores where L'eggs® pantyhose are sold.

54. In addition to SHEER ENFRGY®,

Plaintiff sells in FDM stores a number of lines or sub-brands

of pantyhose under the mark L'eggs®. They include L'eggs®

Regular, L'eggs® Control Top, L'eggs® Sheer to Waist,

L'eggs® Knee Highs, L'eggs® CLASSICS®, L'eggs®

ACTIVE SUPPORT®, L'eggs® SheerElegance®, Sheer

Elegance® Silken Mist® Pantyhose by L'eggs®, Sheer

Elegance® Silky Support® Pantyhose by L'eggs®, Sheer

Elegance® Thigh Highs by L'eggs®, Winter L'eggs®, and

Summer L'eggs®.

55. According to Plaintiffs market

research, consumers identify the name "L'eggs" with the sub-

brand L'eggs® Regular, and consumers of SHEER

ENERGY® pantyhose usually refer to the product they buy

as “SHEER ENERGY®." (Prelim. Inj. II Def.'s Ex. 257 at

03318).

56. Plaintiff's sales of SHEER ENERGY®

pantyhose have been in excess of $2.5 billion. Over $ 100

million worth, or five per cent, of SHEER ENERGY®

pantyhose have been packaged in economy boxes.

57. Plaintiff has spent over $ 280 million

in advertising SHEER ENERGY® pantyhose. There is no

evidence, however, of any promotional expenditures

exclusively directed to or featuring any SHEER ENERGY®

economy box.

2. Defendant's No nonsense® Lines of Pantyhose

A-50

58. Defendant also began _ selling

pantyhose in FDM stores in the early 1970's, shortly after

Plaintiff, using the mark No nonsense®.

59. Defendant primarily sold products

called "No nonsense® Regular pantyhose,” ’” "No nonsense®

Sheer to waist pantyhose," and "No nonsense® Control top

pantyhose," all of which have 100% nylon legs.

60. Since the 1970's, Defendant's No

nonsense® Regular packages have been red, No nonsense®

Sheer to waist packages orange, and No nonsense® Control

top packages green. Both pouches and boxes have been

colored this way.

61. Since the 1970's, Defendant also has

sold other lines of pantyhose, including a line introduced as

"No nonsense® Comfort Stride®" and later called "No

nonsense® Light Support" that has some spandex in the legs.

62. Since the 1970's, Defendant's Comfort

Stride® or Light Support packages have been silver and

blue.

63. Defendant has always sold No

nonsense® brand pantyhose in one-pair plastic pouches 5

inches square.

64. Since 1985, two years before Plaintiff

introduced its first economy box, Defendant has also used

two-pair economy boxes approximately 4 inches high, 4-1/2

inches wide, and 2 inches deep that are colored like the

pouches.

55. Defendant has traditionally used the

size designations "petite to medium," “medium to tall," and

. "Regular" is the name Defendant uses for its nylon pantyhose

that have a waist of medium-weight construction, neither as sheer as

"Sheer to waist" nor as heavily reinforced as “Control top." The court has

before it an astounding variety of pantyhose, and will strive to refrain

from calling any “regular,” as in “common” or “usual.”

A-51

saan ite

"queen" on its No nonsense pantyhose packages and has

presented size information in a one-size, two-column chart.

Since 1990, Defendant has also sometimes used "A," "B,"

and "Q" size designations.

66. In addition to its No nonsense®

Regular, No nonsense® Control Top, No nonsense® Sheer

to waist, and No nonsense® Light Support pantyhose,

Defendant sells in FDM stores other lines or sub-brands of

pantyhose under the mark No nonsense®. Those «iher lines

or sub-brands include No nonsense® SHEER & SILKY, No

nonsense® DRESS SHEER & SILKY, No nonsense®

FASHION COLOR, and No nonsense® GREAT SHAPES

pantyhose.

67. According to Plaintiffs market

research, as it may seem to consumers that there are

"millions of eggs on a L'eggs display," the consistently

colored No nonsense® packages "really stand out in the

minds of . . . [No nonsense®] base brand buyers" and help

them find the pantyhose they are looking for. (Prelim. Inj. II

Def.'s Ex. 129 at 3.00849).

68. Defendant has spent over $ 855

million in advertising the mark No nonsense®.

C. Pantyhose Purchasing in FDM Stores

69. In FDM stores, both parties’ pantyhose

are displayed together in fixed “hosiery centers," unified

configurations of shelf or rack space. Originally designed for

Plaintiff's products, the centers are sometimes referred to in

the trade as the "L'eggs Category Management System." See

Wahl, supra, at App.

70. Nearly all of the pantyhose displayed

in any hosiery center are made by either Plaintiff or

Defendant. Of those that are not, none are as widely

distributed as Plaintiff's or Defendant's.

A-52

71. The racks have sloping shelves that

display pantyhose packages in neat lines. When a package at

the front of the rack is removed, gravity feeds the row of

packages down to fill the vacated space. Wahl, supra, at 180.

72. Signs on panels above the racks

indicate which section of the center is meant for which

brands or lines of pantyhose.

73. Both parties also deliver and display

their pantyhose packages in separate cardboard cases called

"shippers," which indicate on the front and sides whether

they contain L'eggs® or No nonsense® hosiery.

74. Both parties’ pantyhose also may be

stocked on spinners, free-standing units with two or more

sides of shelving that can be turned as customers look at the

products.

75. While some spinners are marked

exclusively for either Plaintiff's or Defendant's pantyhose, K-

Mart stores display spinners on the ends of which alternate

both "L'eggs®" and "No nonsense®." (See, e.g., Prelim. Inj.

II Def.'s Exs. 374-A-2 & 374-A-5).

76. According to sales merchandisers,

both parties’ pantyhose may properly be displayed on the

same K-Mart spinner but not on the same side of the same

spinner.

77. A consumer planning to buy

pantyhose she has bought before will go to the section of the

hosiery rack where those pantyhose are stocked, look for

packages of the color associated with her usual style of

pantyhose, and then read the color and size designators on

those packages to find the packages containing the pantyhose

she wants. Selecting a package in this way may take ten or

twenty seconds.

78. | While most pantyhose purchases are

made in this manner, many are not. Promotional sales, for

example, are often made to consumers who decide to buy

A-53

only after they catch sight of the product in a store and notice

its low cost.

79. Brand-name recognition is an

important factor in pantyhose purchasing, especially when a

new or low-cost product is introduced.

80. No matter how she chooses which

brand she will buy, when selecting pantyhose the average

pantyhose buyer must read the package to identify the style,

color, and size of the pantyhose in the package.

D. Defendant's LEG LOOKS® Lines of

" "

4 Packaging and Marketing the LEG LOOKS® Lines

81. Since at least 1980, and probably as

early as 1977, Defendant has sold pantyhose under the mark

LEG LOOKS®. Defendant has, for example, sold patterned

or textured nylon pantyhose in the lines LEG LOOKS® by

Burlington® and LEG LOOKS® Fashion. See Fig. 2(a).

Those pantyhose are sold in envelope-style packages with

three-size shaded grids.

82. Since 1983, Defendant has spent over

$ 12 million in advertising the mark LEG LOOKS®. By

1992, Defendant had sold nearly $ 75 million worth of

pantyhose in those LEG LOOKS® lines.

83. After peaking in the mid-1980's, sales

had dropped by December 1988 to a projected $ 5 to $ 6

million for that fiscal year. An internal memorandum noted

that revitalizing the brand would require a multi-million

dollar investment and would be difficult, partly because

consumer awareness of the mark was not "significant." (PI.'s

Br. Supp. Mot. for T.R.O. or Expedited Prelim. Inj. Ex. 29 at

A001753-1754, filed Oct. 5, 1992).

84. Until 1989, Defendant sold pantyhose

under the mark LEG LOOKS® only in department stores.

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That year, however, Defendant decided to withdraw them

from those stores and to sell them thereafter to a small

number of off-price or discount retailers, such as Ross Stores

and the Burlington Coat Factory.

85. Defendant considered those two

discount outlets and the FDM stores to be "very different

distribution channels." (Prelim. Inj. II Pl.'s Ex. 148).

86. In 1992, through those retailers,

Defendant was selling about $ 2 million worth of pantyhose

annually under the mark LEG LOOKS® and planned to

introduce special marketing programs in at least one area.

87. Occasionally, pantyhose sold under

the mark L'eggs® and pantyhose under the mark LEG

LOOKS® were sold by the same retailers.

88. By virtue of activities at the United

States Patent and Trademark Office and affirmative action by

Plaintiff to monitor activities in the hosiery market, Plaintiff

was well aware that Defendant sold pantyhose under the

mark LEG LOOKS®.

89. _ Until it amended its complaint in

September 1992, Plaintiff had raised no objection to

Defendant's use of the mark LEG LOOKS® on pantyhose.

90. On April 23, 1991, Plaintiff had in fact

acknowledged Defendant's ownership of Registration No.

1,247,116 of the mark LEG LOOKS® for hosiery and

pantyhose.

91. Plaintiff made this acknowledgment in

a settlement agreement after Defendant had opposed

Plaintiffs application for registration of the name

"LINGERIE LOOKS" as a new mark for pantyhose on the

grounds that LINGERIE LOOKS would be confused with,

among other marks, the mark LEG LOOKS®.

92. In that agreement, Plaintiff promised

always to use the mark L'eggs® prominently and "in direct

visual proximity to the words LINGERIE LOOKS" and only

in a particular stylized form in which the initial "L"s are in

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—

upper-case lettering and the other letters are in lower case.

(Prelim. Inj. II Def.'s Ex. 100 at P 1 & Ex. A). In other

words, Plaintiff agreed that its new mark would always

appear as "L'eggs® Lingerie Looks®." See Fig. 3.

93. For its part, Defendant agreed that

Plaintiff need not distribute L'eggs® Lingerie Looks®

pantyhose "in the egg-shaped containers now associated with

its L'EGGS brand." (Id. at P 3).

94. The conditions of use of the mark

Lingerie Looks® reflects the parties' understanding that

adding the mark L'eggs® would sufficiently indicate the

source of Lingerie Looks® pantyhose and would sufficiently

differentiate the mark Lingerie Looks® from the mark LEG

LOOKS®.

Other "Leg" Marks

95. | When the mark L'eggs® was first

registered for use on women's hosiery, it was challenged by

the owner of Mr. Leggs®, a mark used on men's trousers.

96. Plaintiff asserted that the two marks

were not likely to be confused because men's trousers and

women's pantyhose were different products sold in different

stores, the L'eggs® mark "is a contraction used in a

distinctive logo form," and the L'eggs® market theme,

packaging, and displays were "built around the egg." (Prelim.

Inj. II Def.'s Ex. 91 at 1).

97. Plaintiff pointed out that the close

relation of the "leg" portion of its mark to both "that

anatomical portion of a human being most susceptible to

both our products" and "to a pertinent characteristic of the

product itself" might make it difficult for use of the word to

be restricted. (Id. at 3).

98. _— Plaintiff also noted that the appearance

of the word "leg" in a number of other, prior trademarks in

use on clothing, particularly hosiery, gave Plaintiff "sound

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reason to believe that no possible confusion with any

registered mark was likely." (Id. at 2).

99. Over the years, Plaintiff has

challenged marks containing the word "leg" or "legs."

100. Defendant's mark LEG LOOKS® was

among over 100 registered "leg" marks interposed in defense

of Plaintiff's opposition to registration of the name "YOUR

LEGS."

101. Plaintiff admits that over forty third-

party trademarks registered for use on pantyhose contain the

word "leg" or "legs." Plaintiff has acknowledged others’

rights in or acquiesced to the use of a few of these composite

"leg" marks.

102. The registrations of at least eight of

the third-party marks include disclaimers of the exclusive

right to use "leg," "legs," or "legwear," apart from the mark

as shown." A registration owned by Plaintiff's predecessor

Hanes Corporation also contains such a disclaimer. (See

Prelim. Inj. II Def.'s Ex. 57).

103. Pantyhose bearing third-party "leg"

trademarks have been sold in FDM stores, but there is no

evidence that sales under any one of those "leg" marks

exceed one per cent of all pantyhose sales.

E. New Products for a Changing Market

a Plaintiff's New Products

104. In 1991, Plaintiff launched pantyhose

under the name "Back to Basics." They were made of nylon,

"s Disclaimers of “an unregistrable component of a mark otherwise

registrable" may be made voluntarily by an applicant or may be required

by the Commissioner of the Patent and Trademark Office. 15 U.S.C. §

1056. A mark that is “merely descriptive" is unregistrable. 15 U.S.C. §

1052(e)(1).

A-57

sold at a low price, and packaged in a plastic pouch that

could fit into No nonsense® racks. They were designed to

conform to Defendant's sizing and came in "tan," a

designation Defendant used, rather than "suntan," a

designation Plaintiff used.

105. By the fall of 1991, Plaintiff had

decided to discontinue Back to Basics and replace it with a

new line.

106. By the spring of 1992, Plaintiff had

developed L'eggs® Sheer To Waist pantyhose, intending the

nylon product to virtually replicate and directly compete with

No nonsense® Sheer to waist pantyhose. (See Prelim. Inj. II

Def.'s Ex. 131). |

107. In addition to Plaintiff's using the

common descriptive term "sheer to waist" for the first time,

the package displayed the term in a formation, typeface, and

angle below two stripes like those on Defendant's package.

Like Defendant's Sheer to waist package, Plaintiff's egg-

topped box was orange.

108. Plaintiff introduced its new product at

a significantly lower price than Defendant's and then

extended the low pricing strategy to all of Plaintiffs nylon

brands.

109. In the spring of 1992, Plaintiff

replaced Back to Basics with another nylon line, L'eggs®

Everyday®.

110. The Everyday® package was a

paperboard box approximately 4-1/2 inches wide, 4-1/2

inches high, and 1-1/2 inches deep. Plaintiff, noting it was

"shaped somewhat like the square pouch," designed it to fit

where pouches fit, i.e., on No nonsense® racks. (Prelim. Inj.

II Def.'s Ex. 149 at 3.04237). Everyday® pantyhose were

also designed to conform to No nonsense® sizing and came

in tan.

111. Plaintiffs packaging of knee-high

pantyhose in the Everyday® line also imitated an element

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Defendant had used since the 1970's for its knee-high

packaging: the color fuschia.

112. Furthermore, Plaintiff has marketed

nylon L'eggs® Knee Highs in-plastic-pouches virtually the

same size as Defendant's knee-high pouches. Although the

packages were peach-colored and not fuschia, they displayed

the phrase "Knee Highs" in a formation, typeface, and angle

below two stripes, as Defendant's packages did.

113. Finally, Plaintiff, intending to

“emulate No Nonsense's structure," made a tabletop box

dispenser wider than but otherwise structurally identical to

Defendant's. (Prelim. Inj. II Def.'s Ex. 200).

y A Defendant's Plans

a. Background: No nonsense® Market Status in

1992

114. As 1992 began, market research

showed that due to a peaking of the rate of entry of women

into the work force and a growing tendency to wear casual

clothing, the hosiery market was stable or shrinking.

115. The research also showed _ that

consumers had greater awareness of the mark L'eggs® than

the mark No nonsense® and bought L'eggs® pantyhose

more often.

116. Considering only pantyhose sales

occurring FDM stores from 1988 to 1991, No nonsense®

lost 2-1/2 points of market share while L'eggs® gained more

than 3 points. By the end of 1991, No nonsense®'s market

share was at a five-year low.

117. According to a 1992 market research

report, pantyhose wearers consider that "(t]he most important

pantyhose attributes are comfort, fit and durability." (Pl.'s Br.

Supp. Mot. for T.R.O. or Expedited Prelim. Inj. Ex. 38 at

25.00570).

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118. In the report, which explored what

characteristics would make a new line of pantyhose

successful, Defendant analyzed the sales in FDM stores of

various types of pantyhose including "basic," "support," and

"premium." (Id.).

119. Noting that it is "extremely difficult to

convince consumers to try a new type of pantyhose," the

analysis included estimates of how many purchasers of

particular types of pantyhose would switch brands if the

price differences were irrelevant. (Id. at 25.00572).

120. Defendant's analysis showed | that,

while growth in the hosiery market as a whole was

stabilizing, since 1985 there had been growth in FDM store

sales of pantyhose made with spandex. Plaintiffs SHEER

ENERGY® had captured the largest share of this growth.

121. Of all pantyhose sold, over fifty per

cent are all nylon. Most of the pantyhose Defendant sells are

all nylon. Indeed, in 1991, over seventy-five per cent of No

nonsense® pantyhose sold were all nylon, and only twenty-

five per cent were made with spandex. The reverse was true

of L'eggs® sales.

122. The 1992 analysis recognized that the

hosiery market's stasis or contraction meant that growth in

No nonsense® sales would necessarily depend on gaining

market share from its competition, namely L'eggs® brands.

123. According to Robert Seelert,

Defendant's president and chief executive officer, Defendant

understood Plaintiff's copying of its nylon products and

package features to be a direct attempt to gain such market

share from No nonsense®.

b. Plans to Redesign the No nonsense® Line

124. Early in 1992, Defendant retained

Deskey Associates, Inc. ("Deskey"), a packaging design

consulting firm, to redesign the No nonsense® packages.

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el

125. Deskey revised the No nonsense®

logo.

126. Assuming that the mark No

nonsense® would be the "primary communication," followed

by sub-brand names and generic descriptors, Deskey also

suggested many possible names for different sub-brands and

narrowed the selection on the basis of market research. (P1.'s

Br. Supp. Mot. for T.R.O. or Expedited Prelim. Inj. Ex. 45 at

30.00034).

127. Among _ the criteria Deskey

acknowledged for sub-brand names were that they "should

be available and protectable legally." (Id.).

128. Defendant and Deskey wanted a

consistent color scheme for the No nonsense® package line.

After considering a number of different possibilities,

Defendant decided that it would be better to continue to use

its traditional colors rather than risk a loss of equity base by

trying new colors.

129. Defendant also discussed but decided

against alternatives to the pouch package.

130. The redesign of the No nonsense®

line is a long-term effort. As of the August 1993 hearing, its

results had not yet reached the market.

C. Plans to Introduce a New Product

131. As early as 1991, Defendant began to

consider developing a new line of pantyhose made with

spandex to introduce in response to Plaintiff's introduction of

new nylon pantyhose.

132. Defendant considered naming the new

line "Active Sensations."

133. By early 1992, Defendant believed

that Plaintiffs new nylon pantyhose and pricing strategy

would make Defendant's forthcoming promotion plan for the

predominantly nylon No nonsense® line "totally

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uncompetitive." (Prelim. Inj. II Tr. Vol. VIII at 120, filed

Feb. 28, 1994). While continuing to address the line

redesign, Defendant decided that development of a line of

pantyhose made with spandex would be its first priority.

134. Aiming to introduce its new pantyhose

concurrently with Plaintiff's introduction of Everyday®

pantyhose, Defendant undertook to launch its new pantyhose

by September 1, 1992.

135. Defendant wanted its new pantyhose

to compete with SHEER ENERGY® pantyhose. Defendant |

considered which colors to offer in which sizes and styles |

based on the best-selling SHEER ENERGY® combinations.

136. Defendant, however, chose a pricing

strategy markedly different from that Plaintiff used for

SHEER ENERGY®. Defendant decided to sell its new

pantyhose at a "value-price," that is, at a price very close to

the product's production cost. Defendant planned to

introduce its new pantyhose at a price forty per cent below

that of SHEER ENERGY® and to sustain sales at a price

twenty-five to thirty per cent below that of SHEER

ENERGY®. (See Prelim. Inj. II Def.'s Exs. 267 at A01358 &

266 at A001788).

137. Rather than investing heavily in media

advertising, Defendant planned to promote its new pantyhose

by making a broad-scale, rapid trial of pre-priced floor

displays. (Id. at 01791, 01793).

138. According to Defendant's advertising |

agency, it is unusual not to emphasize promotional

advertising when introducing new products. On the other

hand, saving money on advertising and promotion would

enable Defendant to pursue its low-cost pricing strategy.

139. Defendant's fiscal year runs from

February to January. In the advertising agency's experience,

Defendant typically cancelled a significant amount of fourth-

quarter advertising plans to improve their reported profits at

year end.

A-62

MN SIN eee ee

140. The new pantyhose were launched in

the fall of 1992. At that time, Defendant, circulating print

advertising, spent $ 340,000.00 on advertising.

141. One factor a company must take into

consideration when introducing a new product is the extent

to which consumers will buy the new product in place of the

company's existing products. A purchase of this kind is

known as "cannibalization." If too much cannibalization

occurs, an apparently successful new product may in fact not

be profitable to the company. Cannibalization dynamics may

be clarified once actual sales are made.

142. When drawing up budgets and

estimating profits and losses from new pantyhose, both

Plaintiff and Defendant have made projections based on

estimated cannibalization rates of both fifty per cent and

thirty per cent. Plaintiff has also made such projections based

on an estimated rate of zero per cent. (See Prelim. Inj. II

Def.'s Ex. 181 at 3.00471 ["assumes no cannibalization"]).

143. In the 1991 proposal requesting

permission to proceed with the development of "Active

Sensations," a $ 7.4 million media estimate was made based

on an assumption of fifty per cent cannibalization. This

proposal was not approved.

3. Defendant's New Product: LEG LOOKS®

INVIGORATING PANTYHOSE" and the 1992

Package

a. Choosing the Name

144. One way to name a new product is to

formulate a concept of the product, and then think of many

possible names and choose the one best encapsulating the

concept.

145. According to Plaintiff's expert, this is

the "usual way" of developing names. (Prelim. Inj. II Tr. Vol.

A-63

Hil at 72, filed Jan. 31, 1994). According to Defendant's

expert, in the general practice of marketing, deviations from

this ideal are “rampant.” (Prelim. Inj. II Tr. Vol. [IX at 71,

filed Mar. 1, 1994).

146. Seelert testified that launching a new

product with a name not already trademarked would be a

risky investment.

147. According to Defendant's advertising

agency, a name's status as a registered trademark could be a

practical reason for preferring it.

148. In the early 1990's, Defendant's library

of registered marks included LEG LOOKS®, LEG

SENSE\®, SILKY LOOKS®, COMFORT STRIDE®,

SHEER LEGACY®, SHEER INDULGENCE®, and

CAMEO.

149. Defendant's initial concept of its new

pantyhose was that they would feel invigorating.

150. In 1991, when development of this

new line was first contemplated, Defendant considered

names including “Active Sensations" and “Sheer

Invigoration."

151. Defendant filed applications for

trademark registration oof the names “SHEER

INVIGORATION" and "SHEER VIGOR" with the United

States Patent and Trademark Office, which published the

marks for opposition.

152. On April 15, 1992, Plaintiff notified

Defendant that it intended to oppose the registrations.

153. Evidence presented at the 1992

preliminary injunction hearing, at which the use of the mark

LEG LOOKS® per se was not at issue, led the magistrate

judge to conclude that Defendant turned to its library of

existing trademarks, and ultimately chose LEG LOOKS®,

only after and as a direct result of being notified of Plaintiff's

intent to oppose Defendant's trademark applications.

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154. Evidence presented at the 1993

hearing, however, shows that members of Defendant's

management had given substantial consideration to calling

its new line of pantyhose "LEG LOOKS® SENSATIONS

INVIGORATING PANTYHOSE By No nonsense®" well

before April 15.

155. George Holland, head of new product

development for Defendant since September of 1991, said in

a deposition that he did not remember hearing the names

"Sheer Vigor" or "Sheer Invigoration" before July 1992.

156. At least as early as April 10, 1992,

however, Holland had been told to use "LEG LOOKS

SENSATIONS INVIGORATING PANTYHOSE By No

nonsense®" as the working name for the new line of

pantyhose and had been sent color and size recommendations

for pantyhose referred to as "Leg Looks Sensations." (See

Pl.'s Br. Supp. Mot. for T.R.O. or Expedited Prelim. Inj. Ex.

52 at 72, 108, 115, 117-20; Prelim. Inj. II. Pl.'s Ex. 143). At

some point, the word "SENSATIONS," seen as unwieldy or

redundant, was dropped from the name.

157. Both Defendant's advertising agency

and focus group research indicated that names other than

LEG LOOKS® would more accurately convey to consumers

positive ideas about the feel as well as the look of the

product. Participants in the research found the name more

appealing, however, when it was read as "LEG LOOKS®

INVIGORATING PANTYHOSE." (Prelim. Inj. I] Def.'s Ex.

240 at A002321).

158. Holland, who previously worked with

Defendant's other LEG LOOKS® lines, testified that it never

occurred to him that selling pantyhose under the mark LEG

LOOKS® in FDM stores would cause confusion with the

mark L'eggs®.

b. Designing the Package

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(1) Ideas and Decisions

159. Defendant decided to use a May 1992

sales meeting as an opportunity to ask about a retailer's

interest in the new pantyhose. To that end, Defendant's

creative department drew possible package designs.

160. Deskey also made other drawings, but

Defendant decided to retain the basic design first created in-

house.

161. On July 17, 1992, Defendant met with

inside and outside counsel to discuss the launch of the new

pantyhose. John Pardo of Deskey, who was meeting with

Thomas Kuhn, Defendant's vice-president of marketing for

the sheer hosiery division, about redesigning the No

nonsense® line, joined the meeting, but Holland was on

vacation and did not attend.

162. At that meeting, after some changes

had been made, Seelert gave final approval to the LEG

LOOKS® INVIGORATING PANTYHOSE By No

Nonsense® name and packaging.

163. Notes made by one of Defendant's

product managers and by Deskey indicate that creative

information related to the new packaging was to be purged

once it had been decided upon.

164. As the volume of sealed documents

and the frequency with which the parties’ representatives

were excluded-from the courtroom during the hearing

demonstrate, both parties consider market research and

product design materials highly confidential. It is not

uncommon for employees to move from one company to the

other.

(2) The Box

A-66

165. Defendant decided to seli the new pantyhose

in a paperboard box with a tab by which the box may be

hung on a peg.

166. Defendant had several reasons for

choosing a box: it could be displayed in more ways than a

pouch; it maintained an association with Defendant's

economy boxes but was different enough from pouches to

minimize cannibalization; and it satisfied consumers’ belief

that paperboard is more environmentally sound than plastic.

167. According to Kuhn's instructions, the

box was to be the same height and width as the SHEER

ENERGY® economy box. Defendant, who keeps samples of

ali the products that compete with its own, had samples of

SHEER ENERGY® economy boxes available while it was

designing the new LEG LOOKS® package.

168. An expert testifying for the Defendant

pointed out that the size of a package is influenced by

concerns that the package "be big enough to hold the product

and not too big to make people believe there's more in the

package than [there] really is . . . [it is] really determined by

what you put in it." (Prelim. Inj. II Tr. Vol. [IX at 30-31, Aug.

27, 1993, filed Mar. 1, 1994).

169. The one-pair LEG LOOKS® box is of

nearly the same height and depth and only slightly more than

half the width of the two-pair No nonsense® economy box.

Its dimensions are closely comparable to those of the

paperboard box that holds one pair of Sears Legtricity®

pantyhose. (See Prelim. Inj. II Def.'s Ex. 337A).

170. The box would not fit the No

nonsense® racks already existing in FDM store hosiery

centers, but would fit L'eggs® racks.

171. Defendant planned to develop fixtures

for the package according to “'standard’ industry footage

allotments." (Prelim. Inj. II Def.'s Ex. 266 at A001790).

(3) The Colors

A-67

172. In its first drawings, which consumers

never saw, Defendant used color coding similar to the coding

Plaintiff used on its SHEER ENERGY® packaging: blue on

silver-grey for regular, green on silver-grey for sheer to

waist, and white on teal for control top.

173. Color is sometimes used by market

competitors to indicate common characteristics of their

products. For example, soups often come in red and white

cans and various brands of decaffeinated coffee and tea are

packaged in green.

174. Holland believed that using the

SHEER ENERGY® color schemes would help a consumer

pick pantyhose of the type and style she sought from all

those displayed on hosiery racks.

175. Deskey's drawings experimented with,

among other elements, different color schemes, but

Defendant chose not to adopt them.

176. Those at the June 17 meeting had "a

preliminary opinion that perhaps [Defendant's initial

drawings] were infringing on a L'eggs package." (Pardo Dep.

at 192, filed Aug. 31, 1993). The preliminary color schemes

were identified as one concern.

177. Pardo suggested Defendant build on

its existing equities and use No nonsense®'s traditional

colors of orange for sheer to waist, green for control top, and

blue for spandex. He thought red should not be used for the

regular style of the new pantyhose because red was so

closely associated with Defendant's best-selling No

nonsense® Regular nylon pantyhose.

178. Defendant decided to use orange,

green, and blue and to retain the silver-grey background,

which was considered a link to the No nonsense® Comfort

Stride® or Light Support silver pouch.

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(4) The Logo, Graphics, and Size

Designators

179. In early May 1992, Kuhn asked Pardo

to work with the graphics from Defendant's initial drawings

and to enlarge the product's name on the box.

180. Deskey's drawings incorporated the

new No nonsense® logo. That logo appears on the front,

sides, and top of both the 1992 and 1993 Packages.

181. Some drawings also included a line

drawing of a leg, but the 1992 package did not incorporate

that element.

182. Those at the June 17 meeting also

expressed concern about the typeface, angles, and lines used

in Defendant's initial concept drawings.

183. Pardo suggested considering other

typefaces and eliminating the angle. Nevertheless, he

considered neither of these features to pose significant

problems because typefaces are in the public domain and

angles and lines are common to many packages.

184. Holland later spoke to Pardo about

Pardo's impressions from the June 17 meeting. Each made

notes about the typeface being changed because it was "too

close to L'eggs." (Prelim. Inj. II Pl.'s Ex. 121 at C007457; see

also Pl.'s Br. Supp. Mot. for T.R.O. or Expedited Prelim. Inj.

Ex. 66).

185. The size designators on the 1992

Package were "A," "B," and "Q." A three-size shaded grid

appeared on the back of the 1992 Package, as it had on

Defendant's LEG LOOKS® envelopes.

F. The 1993 LEG LOOKS® Package

s Elements Retained: Name, Box, Colors

A-69

186. After the magistrate judge made his

recommendation of November 3, 1992, and before the court

rendered its order of December 1, 1992, Defendant could

only speculate as to the ultimate outcome of the 1992

hearing. Defendant therefore explored several possible

package designs.

187. Defendant considered other names it

had previously trademarked, and different color schemes,

typefaces, and graphics for use in the event the court

enjoined Defendant from using either the name, colors,

typeface, or graphics that had appeared on the 1992 Package.

188. The court's order of December 1,

1992, clarified the parameters of the injunction against the

1992 Package and any subsequent packaging Defendant

might develop.

189. Believing that its right to use the name

LEG LOOKS® had been at issue during the 1992

proceedings and had been resolved in its favor by the court,

Defendant decided to continue to call its pantyhose "LEG

LOOKS® INVIGORATING PANTYHOSE By No

nonsense®.

190. Defendant also decided to continue to

use the box and colors that the court's order permitted it to

use, the "A-B-Q" sizing, and the grid.

2. Elements Changed: Font, Slant, Graphics

191. Defendant eliminated each element the

order prohibited.

192. The 1993 Package presents, on the

horizontal against a solid blue, green, or orange background,

a black shield with "LEG LOOKS® INVIGORATING

PANTYHOSE By No nonsense®" in white and the leg

design created by Deskey.

193. The name LEG LOOKS® and the

logo By No nonsense® on the front are both larger than on

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Sim Pt Mp ty © Ot mts WS

——— a

the 1992 Package. The No nonsense® logos on the front, top,

and sides of the 1993 Package are larger than there were on

the 1992 Package.

3. Marketing the 1993 Package

194. The 1992 Package reached the market

in the fall of 1992, and the 1993 Package arrived by early

1993. As of the August 1993 hearing, Defendant had sold

over 3.5 million pairs of LEG LOOKS® INVIGORATING

PANTYHOSE in the 1993 Package.

195. In 1992 and 1993, SHEER

ENERGY® pantyhose were sold for as much as $4.00 per

pair, while pantyhose in the new LEG LOOKS® line were

sold for less than $ 3.00 and sometimes less than $ 2.00 per

pair.

196. Beginning in the fall of 1992, Plaintiff

arranged for SHEER ENERGY® coupons to be printed on

the back of cash register receipts when customers bought No

nonsense® Light Support or LEG LOOKS®

INVIGORATING PANTYHOSE. Plaintiff assumed as many

as 100 million coupons would be distributed in this manner

in the fall of 1992 alone.

G. Consumer Perceptions: Anecdotal Evidence“

i4

Defendant disputes many of the magistrate judge's credibility

determinations and objects to recommended findings based on those

determinations, particularly the findings relevant to consumer confusion.

The court has reviewed each of the Defendant's objections independently

and finds them without merit. The court could, but need not, conduct a

hearing to make a de novo determination of the credibility of witnesses.

United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676, 65 L. Ed. 2d 424, 100 S. Ct.

2406, reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 916, 65 L. Ed. 2d 1179, 101 S. Ct. 36

(1980). If the court had doubts about the magistrate judge's credibility

determinations such that the court might reject those determinations, the

court would conduct a hearing. See id. at 681 n.7. The determinations,

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i Consumer Testimony

a. About the 1992 Package

197. Two consumers wrote that they had

seen 1992 Packages and, due to the name, had thought that

the pantyhose "were a less expensive kind of 'L'eggs Sheer

Energy’ pantyhose," (Pl.'s Br. Supp. Mot. for T.R.O. or

Expedited Prelim. Inj. Ex. 13 Pryor Aff. P 3), or that "L'eggs

had come out with a new brand that was on sale," (PI.'s

Reply Br. Supp. Mot. for Prelim. Inj. App. Ex. 1 Pope Decl.

P 3). Both saw the packages at K-Mart; at least one saw them

on a K-Mart spinner.

198. At the hearing, another consumer

testified to buying pantyhose in the 1992 Package believing

them to be low-priced L'eggs® pantyhose. She said that the

name LEG LOOKS®, the designation "Sheer to the

Waist,"'°and "the silver color" led her to believe the 1992

Packages contained L'eggs® pantyhose. (Prelim. Inj. II Tr.

Vol. V at 145, filed Feb. 9, 1994).

b. About the 1993 Package

199. The same consumer said that, after

sending a pair of the 1992 pantyhose to Defendant for

replacement, she received a 1993 Package. She said due to

however, are based upon the direct observation of the witnesses by an

experienced magistrate judge with first-hand knowledge of the intricacies

of this dispute. See United States ex rel. Sullivan v. Cuyler, 553 F. Supp.

1236, 1238 (E.D. Pa. 1982), affd, 723 F.2d 1077 (3d Cir. 1983). The

court therefore accepts the magistrate judge's credibility determinations

while reserving its privilege to make its own determination of the weight

to be accorded any individual piece of evidence.

7 The style designations on SHEER ENERGY® packages are

“reinforced toe," "control top," and “all sheer," not "sheer to waist."

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the name she continued to believe the pantyhose were made

by Plaintiff.

200. Three other customers testified at the

hearing to having bought pantyhose in the 1993 Package

believing them to be L'eggs® pantyhose. Each said that the

name LEG LOOKS® prompted her to think the pantyhose

were L'eggs® pantyhose. Two of the consumers said they

thought that LEG LOOKS® were new pantyhose from

L'eggs®.

201. One said that, attracted by the low

price, she bought an orange 1993 Package thinking the new

pantyhose were from a new division of L'eggs® or were

"L'eggs Classic, or L'eggs Summertime Look." (Prelim. Inj.

II Tr. Vol. I at 114 & 102, filed Jan. 31, 1994). At the same

time she bought a pair of her usual pantyhose, all-sheer

SHEER ENERGY® pantyhose in the silver-and-green, egg-

topped box.

202. She opened both boxes and discarded

them. Later she mistakenly returned the pair of SHEER

ENERGY® pantyhose to Defendant and the pair of LEG

LOOKS® pantyhose to Plaintiff.

203. The other consumer who said she

thought LEG LOOKS® were new pantyhose from L'eggs®

said that she does not and cannot wear SHEER ENERGY®

or any other pantyhose made with spandex. She usually buys

all-nylon control-top pantyhose in a blue box.

204. She said she bought the green control-

top 1993 Package because she thought "that it was a new

type of pantyhose that L'eggs had come out with at a more

reasonable price." (Prelim. Inj. II Tr. Vol. II at 9, filed Jan.

31, 1994). She did not examine the package to see whether

the pantyhose inside were made with spandex.

205. She said, however, that she knew it

was not a SHEER ENERGY® package because "it did not

say Sheer Energy.” (Id. at 15).

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206. The only consumer to buy a 1993

Package believing it to be a SHEER ENERGY® package

bought a green control-top 1993 Package when she intended

to buy a silver-and-green all-sheer SHEER ENERGY® egg-

topped box.

207. Admitting she had not been wearing

her glasses at the time, she said because "all [she] saw was

the big print and the 'B’ and its says Leg Looks," she

assumed she was buying her normal product. (Prelim. Inj. II

Tr. Vol. I at 131-32, filed Jan. 31, 1994).

2. Plaintiffs Employees’ Testimony

208. Plaintiff sends approximately 840

sales merchandisers to at least 70,000 stores around the

country to handle stock and maintain displays.

209. A single sales merchandiser may visit

thirty stores a week. Between the introduction of the 1993

Package and the August hearing, Plaintiff's sales

merchandisers together therefore made over 800,000 store

visits. During that time the 1993 Package was stocked

intermittently in less than half the stores visited.

210. When they make their rounds,

Plaintiff's sales merchandisers routinely look for information

on competitors’ products and record it in a hand-held

computer. In January 1993 the computers were specifically

programmed to receive information pertaining to the new

LEG LOOKS® pantyhose. Sales merchandisers were also

provided with "LEG LOOKS FIELD INPUT" forms for

detailed reports. (See, e.g., Prelim. Inj. II Def.'s Ex. 219).

211. Sales merchandisers wear L'eggs®

name badges.

212 Three of Plaintiff's sales

merchandisers testified about witnessing consumers'

encounters with the 1993 Package and others provided

affidavits.

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ii a etn th Ei a

213. The court notes that the merchandisers

cannot know from hearing the consumers’ statements

whether they said, "It says 'Legs'" or "It says 'L'eggs.""

214. One merchandiser said that she had

encountered one consumer who said of a 1993 Package, "It is

made by L'eggs. It says 'Legs' right there." (Prelim. Inj. Tr.

Vol. I at 139, filed Jan. 31, 1994). Another consumer, when

she was told that a 1993 Package was not Plaintiff's, told the

merchandiser "it said 'Legs." (Id. at 141).

215. Another sales merchandiser testified

that a consumer said "Well, it says Legs," when she was told

that the 1993 Package she had asked about was not

Plaintiff's. (Id. at 198).

216. The third said that a customer asked

her about the 1993 Package, first indicating she thought it

contained pantyhose made by Plaintiff because L'eggs®

pantyhose "come in a box and No nonsense comes in a bag."

(Prelim. Inj. II Tr. Vol. II at 52, filed Jan. 31, 1994). When

the merchandiser and the customer then looked together at

the package, the customer said, "Legs right there; that's

yours." (Id. at 53).

217. The same sales merchandiser testified

that one store clerk asked her what she was going to do with

a LEG LOOKS® shipper and another thought the 1993

Packages on a K-Mart spinner were hers.

218. In affidavits, other employees attested

the following: a consumer who asked, "Are these L'eggs? . ..

I want L'eggs." (Pl.'s Br. Supp. Mot. for T.R.O. or Expedited

Prelim. Inj. Ex. 11 Cheatham Aff. P 3); a consumer who

asked of the 1993 Package, "Is this new?" (Id. Ex. 7 Revo

Aff. P 4); a consumer who said, while looking at a K-Mart

spinner containing 1993 Packages, "I thought this was

L'eggs." (Camplair Decl. P 3, filed Aug. 9, 1993); a

consumer who said of the 1993 Package, "The package

confuses me and it made me think that 'Leg Looks’ is made

by L'eggs." (Pl.'s Br. Supp. Mot. for T.R.O. or Expedited

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Prelim. Inj. Ex. 5 Chouinard Decl. P 5); and a store manager

who said in February 1993, "Many of my customers are

confused over who makes 'Leg Looks." (Id. Ex. 17 Thomas

Aff. P 3). It was generally the affiants' impression that the

consumers’ confusion arose from the name LEG LOOKS®.

219. The affidavits attested to

approximately two dozen encounters with store personnel

who asked Plaintiff's merchandisers to handle shippers or

excess store stock of 1993 Packages or appeared confused

about which products belonged on which shelves. Affiants

said store employees had not been confused before about

Plaintiff's and Defendant's pantyhose and had identified the

name LEG LOOKS® as the source of confusion.

220. The employee affidavits recounted a

dozen instances of LEG LOOKS® packages being shelved

on or, more often, near shelf space typically reserved for

Plaintiffs packages. Five of the incidents involved the 1992

Package and three others occurred in K-Mart.

221. There is also evidence of about a

dozen misspellings or misplacements of signs, half of which

were displayed in association with the 1993 Package.

x Defendant's Employees' Testimony

222. Defendant's sales merchandisers visit

about a third of Defendant's FDM retailers, virtually all of

whom carry Plaintiff's products.

223. There is no evidence that Defendant's

sales merchandisers wear anything identifying them as No

nonsense® representatives.

224. Three of Defendant's sales

merchandisers testified at the hearing to frequently being

asked by store personnel to service Plaintiff's display racks

or remove Plaintiff's stock from the store. Citing two

particular instances, one of Defendant's sales merchandisers

testified that she often has to explain to store personnel who

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ena G ae

believe that Defendant's sales merchandisers can "come out

and service ...the whole hosiery center" that Plaintiff and

Defendant are "two separate companies." (Prelim. Inj. II Tr.

Vol. VI at 195, filed Feb. 9, 1994).

225. The sales merchandisers said that they

routinely find Plaintiff's packages on K-Mart spinner shelves

meant for Defendant's products or in cartons designated for

No nonsense® returns.

226. They also said that they are constantly

mistaken for L'eggs® sales merchandisers or store personnel

and asked about a variety of products.

227. Also testifying for Defendant was

Timothy Flavin, Defendant's director of sales planning and

training, who had previously worked with L'eggs® sales for

ten years. He said that as early as 1979 he became aware of

confusion on the part of store personnel and consumers as to

which manufacturer made which pantyhose.

228. According to Flavin, as he stood at

L'eggs® racks, consumers would frequently ask him about

either Plaintiff's, Defendant's, or another manufacturer's

pantyhose. It was his impression that "they would just

assume that you were working pantyhose and that was your

product." (Prelim. Inj. II Tr. Vol. VII at 126, filed Feb. 28,

1994).

229. He, too, testified that store personnel

regularly made mistakes about Plaintiff's sales

representatives’ responsibilities. He said that while he was a

district operations manager for plaintiff store personnel

called Plaintiff so frequently to request removal of what

turned out to be Defendant's pantyhose that he had to

institute special procedures to handle the problem.

230. He also said that mistakes were often

made with regard to the shelving of pantyhose and on signs

and advertising.

231. Flavin said that his experience with

confusion and mistakes like these continued once he joined

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Defendant in 1989 and the general level of such confusion

became no greater than usual after the introduction of the

new line of LEG LOOKS® pantyhose.

232. As early as 1989, Plaintiff's consumer

relations department had devised procedures and form letters

to use for responding when a “consumer returns hosiery

product of another manufacturer." (Prelim. Inj. IT Def.'s Ex.

222 at 20.10491).

233. The department compiles year-end

reports of consumer correspondence and returns. According

to those reports, Plaintiff's L'eggs Products division received

fewer complaints about pantyhose in the primary L'eggs®

line or theL'eggs® Everyday® line in fiscal year 1993,

during which both LEG LOOKS® boxes were on sale, than

it had in fiscal year 1992, before they had been introduced.

234. According to the reports in both fiscal

year 1992 and in fiscal year 1993, of all the pairs of

pantyhose customers returned to the L'eggs Products

division, less than three-fourths of one per cent were not

made by Plaintiff. The reports do not indicate how many of

the pairs not made by Plaintiff were made by Defendant

rather than another manufacturer.

H. Consumer Perceptions: Survey Evidence

a Plaintiff's Survey Evidence

a. Designing the Surveys

235. As evidence of confusion, Plaintiff

also introduced two mall-intercept surveys and the testimony

of James Fouss of Response Analysis Corporation, a market

researcher. He conducted the surveys at the recommendation

of Virginia Miles, a marketing consultant.

236. Fouss conducted the surveys using the

silver-grey-and-green ll-sheer SHEER ENERGY®

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ia Biter. rte

economy box and the green control-top 1993 Package, as he

has been instructed to do by Plaintiff's counsel.

237. In designing the surveys, Fouss

worked with Miles. At the time, neither knew about

Defendant's historical use of colors in its No nonsense® line.

Nor did Fouss know what styles of pantyhose the silver-

grey-and-green SHEER ENERGY® box and the green 1993

Package contained.

238. In both surveys, a grey-violet control-

top "Jaclyn Smith® Silky Support" paperboard envelope was

used as a control in an effort to determine to what extent

participants’ responses were due to the characteristics of the

1993 package rather than other factors like prior familiarity

with the mark L'eggs® or the belief that the company that

makes L'eggs® also makes all other pantyhose.

239. According to Fouss, it was very

difficult to find nationally distributed pantyhose having no

relation to either party.

240. The mark Jaclyn Smith®, the name of

a well-known actress whose photograph appears on the

pantyhose package, is used on a complete line of women's

hosiery and clothing heavily advertised by its exclusive

distributor, K-Mart. Over thirty million women wear Jaclyn

Smith® clothing. The mark has high brand awareness

nationally.

241. Both J. C. Penney and Sears also

distribute pantyhose nationally and may be considered mass

merchandisers. Sears carries "Legtricity®" pantyhose, which

are packaged in a one-pair box of dimensions similar to the

1993 package. Fouss testified, however, that he avoided

selecting a control from J. C. Penney or Sears because of

their overall brand awareness.

242. Miles thought the Jaclyn Smith®

package an excellent choice of control because the package

is as unlike the silver-grey SHEER ENERGY® economy

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box as possible and because the pantyhose are distributed

nationally in a mass merchandising chain.

243. Neither of the two surveys designed

by Fouss tested consumer perceptions of the marks L'eggs®

or LEG LOOKS® per se. They only tested consumer's

impressions of green boxes featuring those marks.

244. In both surveys, participants were

instructed to look at the package as if they were considering

purchasing it and to assume the pantyhose it contained were

available in their size, color, and style. After they returned

the package and it was put out of sight, the interviewer

questioned them.

b. Study #1

245. In the first survey ("Study #1"),

pantyhose purchasers were shown either the SHEER

ENERGY® economy box and the 1993 Package or the

SHEER ENERGY® economy box and the Jaclyn Smith®

envelope. Participants were shown two boxes, one at a time,

and did not have the opportunity to compare them directly.

246. The participants were first asked

whether they thought the two brands of pantyhose were

manufactured by the same company or different companies

and then asked why. They were not, however, asked to name

the company or identify it in any other manner.

247. Once a respondent gave a reason for

thinking the products were made by the same company, an

interviewer would, according to instruction, "probe" for "any

other reasons." (P1.'s Br. Supp. Mot. for T.R.O. or Expedited

Prelim. Inj. Ex. 26 Fouss 2d Aff. Ex. 2 at App. Questionnaire

A at 1).

248. Each reason was later coded into one

of several categories. The survey results indicate what

percentage of the participants included a particular answer

among all those they gave. Because any single participant

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may have given several answers, the percentages assigned to

each category of answers do not represent discrete groups of

participants. Especially because answers recorded in one

category may have been an explanation for or embellishment

of answers recorded in another, the percentages from each

answer category cannot simply be added together to show

what percentage of participants were confused for specified

reasons.

249. Of all the participants who saw the

SHEER ENERGY® box and the 1993 Package, forty-three

per cent said that they thought the pantyhose were made by

the same company.

250. Twenty per cent attributed this, at least

in part, to similar packaging, colors, labels, or logos.'® Ten

per cent attributed it specifically to the appearance of either

"L'eggs®," "legs," or "leg" on both packages. Three percent

attributed it to the pantyhose having the same name or same

brand name.”””

ye The results Plaintiff lists in its survey report might at first glance

appear to differ from those here found. For instance, Plaintiff reports

"46%" as having said that the packages have “similar packaging, colors,

labels, [or] logos." (Pl.'s Br. Supp. Mot. for T.R.O. or Expedited Prelim.

Inj. Ex. 26 Fouss 2d Aff. Ex. 2 at 5). Caution must be taken to remember

that the figures reported by Plaintiff reflect what percentages of those

who saw both packages and said they were made by the same company

(a population of 126 consumers) then gave a specific reason for saying

so. The court's figures reflect what percentage of those who saw both (a

population of 290) then said they were made by the same company for a

specific reason. The court's figures, in other words, reflect percentages of

all those who saw both packages rather than percentages of a sub-set of

that group.

Bs At least one response coded as “same company [because] same

name" should not have been: the respor“ent actually said she thought the

pantyhose were made by the same company “because | think all

pantyhose are made by the same company." (Prelim. Inj. II Tr. Vol. II at

261; see also id. at 259-61).

A-81

251. More than twenty other reasons were

also given for participants’ perception that the pantyhose

were made by the same company. (Id. at 5).

252. Of the participants shown the SHEER

ENERGY® box and the Jaclyn Smith® envelope, twelve per

cent said they thought those pantyhose were made by the

same company. (Id.).

253. According to Plaintiff's experts, the

results of Study #1 showed that the net percentage of

consumers surveyed who thought, for trademark or trade

relevant reasons, that the pantyhose in the 1993 Package and

the pantyhose in the SHEER ENERGY® economy box were

made by the same company was between thirty-one and

forty-three per cent. Miles said it was likely to be at the mid-

point or approximately thirty-seven per cent.

S. Study #2

254. In the second survey ("Study #2"),

pantyhose purchasers were shown only one package, either

the 1993 Package or the Jaclyn Smith® envelope.

255. After they returned the package and it

was put out of sight, they were first asked what company

they thought made that brand of pantyhose and then asked

what other brands of pantyhose they thought that company

made. They were not asked why they thought the company

they named made the pantyhose, nor were they asked why

they thought that company also made the other brands of

pantyhose they named.

256. As in Study #1, interviewers were

instructed to "probe" whether there were "any other" brands

the participant thought were also made by the same

company. (Pl.'s Br. Supp. Mot. for T.R.O. or Expedited

Prelim. Inj. Ex. 26 Fouss 2d Aff. Ex. 1 at App. Questionnaire

2 at 1).

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257. Of the participants shown the 1993

Package and asked what company made them, thirty-eight

per cent said No nonsense®, thirty-four per cent said

L'eggs®, four per cent said Hanes®, three per cent said

L'eggs® or Hanes® and No nonsense®, and one per cent

said SHEER ENERGY®. (Id. at 3, 5).

258. Of the participants shown the Jaclyn

Smith® package, forty per cent said they were made by

Jaclyn Smith or K-Mart, twenty-four per cent said they were

made by L'eggs®, SHEER ENERGY®, or Hanes®, three

per cent said they wer. made by No nonsense®, and one per

cent said L'eggs® or Hanes® and No nonsense®. (Id. at 3,

6).

259. Of the participants shown the 1993

Package and asked to name other brands made by the

company they had identified, nine per cent named only No

nonsense® or Burlington® products, six per cent named only

SHEER ENERGY® products, thirteen per cent named only

L'eggs® products, thirteen per cent named Hanes® or other

L'eggs® or Hanes® products, and two per cent named both

L'eggs® and No nonsense® products. (Id. at 3, 7).

260. Of the participants shown the Jaclyn

Smith® package and asked to name other brands made by

the company they identified, three or four per cent named

only Jaclyn Smith® or K-Mart products, four per cent named

only No nonsense® or Burlington® products, four per cent

named only SHEER ENERGY® products, and nineteen per

cent named only L'eggs® or Hanes® products. (Id.).

261. Combining the responses to the two

questions and eliminating double counting, of those shown

the 1993 Package, thirty-five per cent associated it only with

Plaintiff's companies and products; twenty-seven percent

associated it only with Defendant's companies and products;

and twenty-four per cent associated it with both Plaintiff's

and Defendant's companies or products. (Id. at 8).

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262. Combining the responses to the two

questions and eliminating double counting, of those shown

the Jaclyn Smith® package, twenty-five per cent associated

it only with Plaintiff's Companies and products; seven per

cent associated it with both Plaintiff's and Jaclyn Smith's

companies or product:: and five per cent associated it with

both Plaintiff's and Defendant's companies or products. (Id.

at 9).

263. Of all the participants shown the 1993

package, fifty-nine per cent made some association between

it and Plaintiff's companies or products, and fifty-one per

cent made some association between it and Defendant's

company or products (some participants made some

association between the 1993 package and both Plaintiff's

and Defendant's companies and products).

264. By comparison, of the participants

shown the Jaclyn Smith® package, thirty-seven per cent

made some association between it and Plaintiff's companies

or products, and eight per cent made some association

between it and Defendant's company or products.

265. According to Plaintiff's experts, the

results of Study #2 showed that the net percentage of

consumers surveyed who thought, for trademark or trade

dress relevant reasons, that the pantyhose in the 1993

Package were made by one cr the other of Plaintiff's

divisions was somewhere between twenty-two and fifty-nine

per cent, and most likely to be at the mid-point, or

approximately forty per cent.

266. According to Plaintiff, the responses

given by participants who saw the Jaclyn Smith® package

and associated it with L'eggs® indicate that thirty-seven per

cent of consumers are likely to think all pantyhose are made

by or affiliated with Plaintiff. Thus, according to Plaintiff,

the rate of association made between the 1993 Package and

Plaintiff's companies or products may be as much as twenty-

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Cee tetepianipndiatttacattl

two percent higher than is normal between unrelated brands

of pantyhose.

267. Plaintiff attributes this twenty-two per

cent rate of association to the name and appearance of the

1993 Package.

268. The court notes, however, that twenty-

four per cent of those making an association between the

1993 package and L'eggs® named both L'eggs® and No

nonsense® as the company of origin, named No nonsense®

products as being made by L'eggs®, or named L'eggs®

products as being made by No nonsense®. Of those who

made an association between the Jaclyn Smith® package and

L'eggs®, five per cent gave similar responses.

269. These responses would be logically

inconsistent if those who gave them knew that pantyhose

sold under the mark L'eggs® and pantyhose sold under the

mark No nonsense® are products from different sources. In

other words, the responses of as many as twenty-four per

cent of the participants shown the 1993 Package indicate that

they did not distinguish L'eggs® and No nonsense® as being

separate companies or L'eggs® and No nonsense®

pantyhose as coming from separate sources.

270. While they might realize that not all

pantyhose are made by the company that makes L'eggs®

pantyhose, as many as twenty-four per cent of consumers

may well think that both No nonsense® pantyhose and

L'eggs® pantyhose are made by the same company, whether

it be Plaintiff or Defendant.

2. Defendant's Survey Evidence

271. Defendant submitted a _ survey

conducted in December 1992 by Michael Rappeport, a

market research expert with a background in statistics, to test

consumers' perceptions of the trade dress of the 1993

Package and the SHEER ENERGY® trade dress.

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272. As requested by Defendant's counsel,

Rappeport reviewed the December 1992 court order and

conducted a survey to determine whether the new packaging

was sufficiently differentiated from Plaintiffs SHEER

ENERGY® packaging.

273. Rappeport understood the focus to be

the trade dress of the 1993 Package. He differentiated "trade

dress" from "trade words" and believes it to be appropriate in

trade dress surveys "to distinguish all the elements that aren't

words and the elements that are words." (Prelim. Inj. II Tr.

Vol. VII at 11, filed Feb. 28, 1994). Rappeport therefore

designed a survey to determine whether "the trade dress--that

is, all the elements that weren't words, had been

distinguished from the SHEER ENERGY® package." (Id.).

274. Participants in the survey were shown

one of two arrays of six different pantyhose packages.

275. Featured in the survey was a box

virtually identical to the 1993 Package, except in place of the

words "LEG LOOKS" were the words "GOOD TIMES."

Half of the participants in the study saw an array containing

an egg-topped SHEER ENERGY® box and half saw an

array containing a SHEER ENERGY® economy box. In

every array the 1993 Package and the SHEER ENERGY®

package were of a different color.

276. With the packages in view, consumers

were asked, "How many different companies or makers are

represented by these six items, or don't you know?" Those

who said either two, three, four, or five were then asked,

"Which, if any, come from the same company or maker or

don't you know?" Then the participants were asked why they

had grouped certain products together.

277. These responses to the second

question were tabulated to show the percentage of consumers

who made each of the fifteen possible pairings of products in

the array.

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278. If the pairings were made randomly,

any one pairing of two particular packages would have a five

per cent change of occurrence. According to Rappeport, one

accounts for such "noise" or irrelevant associations, by

subtracting that five per cent from the rate of occurrence

actually found by the survey.

279. Approximately sixty per cent of the

participants answered, "one," "six," or "don't know" to the

first question and were not asked to make any groupings of

packages.

280. Of those who made groupings, a

substantial portion made a number of groupings inconsistent

with the number of companies the participant had identified

as being represented in the array.

281. Of all the pairings made by the forty

per cent of participants who made package groupings, ten per

cent matched the modified 1993 Package with either the

SHEER ENERGY® egg-topped box or the SHEER

ENERGY® economy box. Adjusting for randomness or

noise thus results in a rate of occurrence of the pairing of five

per cent.

282. According to the data collected,

similarities in packaging did not account for all the pairings

of the modified 1993 Package and the SHEER ENERGY®

packages. Participants’ reasons for pairing the packages also

included thinking that "L'eggs and No nonsense are the same

company" or "No nonsense is made by L'eggs," seeing them

both sold "at the same place" or "next to each other in the

store," and associating the "best known brands" or "the only

ones I know." (Prelim. Inj. II Def.'s Ex. 356 at App. II at II-1,

I]-2).

283. Rappeport attributed pairing for

reasons such as these to the effect of the L'eggs® mark's

market dominance.

284. In the survey, over one-third of the

1993 Package and SHEER ENERGY® pairings, or four per

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cent of all the pairings made, were attributed to such "market

dominance."

285. According to Rappeport, adjusting the

initial ten per cent pairing rate for both randomness and

market dominance leaves a one per cent chance of either

SHEER ENERGY® package being paired with the modified

1993 Package for reasons related to similarities in packaging.

286. Of pairings made by participants who

saw an array that included the SHEER ENERGY® economy

box, thirteen per cent matched that box with the modified

1993 package.

287. According to Rappeport, adjusting for

randomness and market dominance leaves a four per cent

chance of the modified 1993 Package and the SHEER

ENERGY® economy box being paired together for reasons

related to similarities in packaging.

288. In comparison, pairings of two

pantyhose packages that are both made by Sears and

appeared in all the arrays--a Legtricity® box and a Nice

Touch® Silken Sheers with Lycra® paperboard envelope--

accounted for nine per cent of all the pairings made.

According to Rappeport, adjusting for randomness or other

noise leaves the pairing of the two Sears’ packages with a

four per cent chance of occurrence.

289. According to Rappeport, given the

400-participant size of the sample used in this survey, the

normal fluctuation in the results overall would be plus or

minus three per cent.

290. The normal fluctuation in the results

of a survey employing a smaller sample would be even

greater. Given that sixty per cent of the participants surveyed

were not asked to make package groupings, the statistical

difference between thirteen per cent of pairings made by

some forty per cent of the 200 who saw an array including

the SHEER ENERGY® economy box and nine per cent of

pairings made by some forty per cent of the 400 who saw

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arrays including either that box or the egg-topped box is

insignificant.

291. According to Rappeport, his survey

did not reveal any meaningful evidence of consumer

confusion between the new packaging and the SHEER

ENERGY® packaging.

292. The survey did not test for consumers'

associations arising from use of the mark LEG LOOKS®.

I. Expert Witness Testimony

a Opinions of the Surveys

293. Virginia Miles and Thomas DuPont, a

market research expert, testified as expert witnesses for

Plaintiff.

294. Both thought that the Fouss surveys

were sound and well-designed, although DuPont added that

the surveys would have been even more sound if two

controls had been used.

295. DuPont agreed that it was important to

eliminate from consideration "any errors" other than the

1993 Package itself "there might be that cause somebody to

say that Leg Looks is made by L'eggs." (Prelim. Inj. II Tr. of

Extract from Hrg. at 48-49, filed Nov. 30, 1993).

296. He noted that the results of Study #1

do not show what portion of the associations made between

the 1993 Package and the SHEER ENERGY® economy box

was due to the name LEG LOOKS® and what portion was

due to anything else. (Id. at 59-60).

297. Plaintiff's experts said that the thirty-

seven per cent rate of association made between the Jaclyn

Smith® envelope and Plaintiff's companies or products in

Study #2 was high.

298. It was DuPont's opinion that if a brand

less widely known than Jaclyn Smith® had been used the

A-89

rate of association between it and Plaintiff's brands would

have been even higher than the association rates reported for

the Jaclyn Smith® envelope.

299. According to Plaintiffs experts,

Rappeport's survey was irrelevant because it neither tested

the actual 1993 Package nor measured the likelihood of

confusion between the marks L'eggs® and LEG LOOKS®.

300. At the hearing, Defendant called as an

expert witness Alvin Achenbaum, a marketing consultant.

301. Achenbaum characterized the Fouss

studies as "fallacious," largely because he thought they did

not sufficiently take into consideration the store

environment. (Prelim. Inj. II Tr. Vol. IX at 41, 40, filed Mar.

1, 1994). He also said that they did not sufficiently

distinguish the effects on consumer perception of various

features of the packages.

302. Plaintiffs experts testified that it is

difficult, if not impossible, to parse out consumer perceptions

of a package or to test the effect of one package feature apart

from others.

2. Opinions of the Likelihood of Confusion

303. According to Miles, "from five to ten

percent of the people would be confused about practically

anything,” but percentages higher than that would be cause

for concern. (Prelim. Inj. Tr. Vol. Ili at 79, filed Jan. 31,

1994).

304. To Miles, the Fouss surveys

demonstrated conclusively that the 1993 Package is

confusingly similar to the SHEER ENERGY® economy

box. To DuPont, they showed that there was a substantial

likelihood of confusion between the 1993 Package and any

L'eggs® package based on the word "leg."

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305. In Miles' opinion, the 1993 Package

appears to consumers "to be a value brand of L'eggs."

(Prelim. Inj. II Tr. Vol. IV at 6, 20, filed Jan. 31, 1994).

306. According to Miles, combining

several features of one package in a second package may

result in the second package being confused with the first,

even if any one feature might not cause confusion.

307. She admitted, however, that products

like health and beauty care products, condiments, soup, or

sodas may be sold in packages with "product category

established similarities." (Prelim. Inj. II Tr. Vol. III at 131,

filed Jan. 31, 1994).

308. Having noted that the mark No

nonsense® is clearly indicated on the 1993 Packages,

Achenbaum pointed out that in other product areas color

coding and same-sized boxes do not engender confusion.

309. Miles said that the dimensions and

color of the 1993 Package are "auxiliary" aids to the

confusion that is primarily caused by the name LEG

LOOKSS®. (Prelim. Inj. II Tr. Vol. IV at 66-67, filed Jan. 31,

1994). Miles and DuPont both stated their belief that if the

name on the 1993 package had been different a lawsuit

would have been far less likely.

310. Miles stated that consumers looking at

a SHEER ENERGY® package would know it not simply as

"SHEER ENERGY," but as a L'eggs® product.

311. It is Miles' firm opinion that the word

"leg" in the name LEG LOOKS®. evokes L'eggs®. Having

cited the widespread fame of the mark L'eggs®, Miles said

that "any use" of the word "leg" as a mark on pantyhose

would evoke it. (Prelim. Inj. Tr. Vol. III at 104, filed Jan. 31,

1994).

312. Scanning other "leg" marks and

imagining their use on the 1993 Package, Miles stated that

the two-word "leg" marks "that start with the free standing

word ‘leg’. . . [are] bound to cause consumer confusion by

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invoking the famous trademark L'eggs." (Prelim. Inj. Tr. Vol.

V at 92, filed Feb. 9, 1994). Those marks ending with "leg"

or “legs” would, she thought, also be problematic.

313. Miles said that consumers would not

necessarily read further than the name LEG LOOKS® to see

"By No Nonsense®" below it on the front, top, or sides of

the package.

314. In Miles’ opinion, even if a consumer

did read the No nonsense® logo, the prominence of the name

"LEG LOOKS" could lead her to misinterpret it.

315. During her testimony, Miles

acknowledged that the distinguishing feature of the L'eggs®

packaging is, and has always been, the egg. She said,

however, that the silhouette of the leg on the 1993 Package

did and was intended to invoke the "idea of L'eggs." (Prelim.

Inj. II Tr. Vol. III at 59, filed Jan. 31, 1994).

316. Miles agreed, nevertheless, that if the

No nonsense® logo were placed clearly on the package

"[but] the consumer doesn't know who they are, that's not the

fault of No Nonsense." (Id. at 142).

317. Ina similar vein, DuPont testified that

“if there are people walking around outside who just believe

that L'eggs and No Nonsense are the same company, then

any confusion by those people would be, as I said, .. .

legitimate or unavoidable confusion . . . if they exist, then

that's unavoidable." (Prelim. Inj. II Tr. of Extract from Hrg.

at 67, filed Nov. 30, 1993).

318. Defining confusion as occurring when

a customer intending to buy one brand mistakenly buys

another, and comparing the mark LEG LOOKS® with the

mark SHEER ENERGY®, Achenbaum testified that the

1993 Packages would not be confused with SHEER

ENERGY® packages and were clearly differentiated from

the 1992 Package and the SHEER ENERGY® economy box.

319. In Achenbaum's opinion, the green,

blue, and orange 1993 Packages are very different from

A-92

a a a

L'eggs® packages. Noting that both the egg and the color

silver were absent from the 1993 Package, he said that the

particularly distinguishing features of the 1993 Package are

the Defendant's consistent color-coding, the size and

frequency of the No nonsense® logo, and the leg silhouette.

3. Opinions of Defendant's Intent

320. Miles faulted Defendant for spending

so little on advertising the new LEG LOOKS® in the fall of

1992, for choosing a name neither well-recognized by

consumers nor well-connected to the new product's emphasis

on feel, and for "imposing the Leg Looks name from above."

(Prelim. Inj. II Tr. Vol. III at 72, filed Jan. 31, 1994). She

said that "the only logical explanation for the Leg Looks

name" is that Defendant intended to confuse consumers and

trade off L'eggs® brand equity. (Id. at 71).

321. When Miles first reached this

conclusion, she had seriously misinterpreted Defendant's

financial condition. She was, and until the 1993 hearing

remained, ignorant of Defendant's historical use of colors.

Furthermore, she had relied on assumptions about the

similarities between the pantyhose themselves to draw

conclusions as to Defendant's intent with regard to the

packages.

322. At the hearing, Miles conceded that

companies constantly, and legitimately, copy each other's

products and that "if [Defendant] had used all those colors

[on its packages] for 20 years, it . . . might be a different

situation." (Prelim. Inj. II Tr. Vol. I'V at 66, filed Jan. 31,

1994).

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Il. DISCUSSION

A. The Issues Before the Court

l. Jurisdiction and Venue

This court has subject matter jurisdiction over this

case pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 1121(a) and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331,

1338, and 1367(a). The court has personal jurisdiction over

the parties. Venue lies in this district pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§1391(b) and (c).

2. Issues Now Moot

Voluntary cessation of allegedly illegal conduct

makes an issue moot when the defendant can demonstrate

that there is no reasonable expectation that the wrong will be

repeated, United States v. W. T. Grant Co., 345 U.S. 629,

632-33, 97 L. Ed. 1303, 73 S. Ct. 894 (1953); see also

Virginia ex rel. Coleman v. Califano, 631 F.2d 324, 326 (4th

Cir. 1980). Defendant's withdrawal of the 1992 Package was

not voluntary, and Defendant continues to assert that its use

of the package violated no right of Plaintiff. Defendant has,

however, made substantial expenditures and investments in

reca

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