Petition for Writ of Certiorari — City of Albuquerque v. Church on the Rock
Supreme Court brief1996
Ask Donna
What actually matters in this document.
Text
(\) 98 2KLEG AUC 20 19%
No. 96-___
- Of THE CLERK
gehiel = —
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1995
+
CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, and TONI MARTORELLI,
in her official capacity as Director of Family and
Comraunity Services for the City of Albuquerque, and
MARK SANCHEZ, in his official capacity as Deputy
Director of Family and Community Services for the
City of Albuquerque, and KATHLEEN STARK, in her
official capacity as Supervisor, Bear Canyon
Senior Center, City of Albuquerque,
Petitioners,
versus
CHURCH ON THE ROCK and
PASTOR DON KIMBRO,
Respondents.
°
On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Tenth Circuit
.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
°
Rosert M. Wuite, Wiiuiam D. Winter,
City Attorney Assistant City Attorney
Ranpy M. Autio, City of Albuquerque
Assistant City Attorney Post Office Box 2248
City of Albuquerque Albuquerque, NM
Post Office Box 2248 87103-2248
Albuquerque, NM (505) 768-4500
87103-2248
(505) 768-4500
Counsel for Petitioner
Counsel of Record
COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 42-2831
QUESTION PRESENTED
Whether Congress has the power, consistent with this
Court’s view of the Establishment Clause, to condition its
grants of federal funds under the Older Americans Act
upon assurances by the States that “sectarian instruction”
or “religious worship” will not be allowed in senior cen-
ters that are constructed or renovated with federal
money?
il
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
Ousstion Presgmbeg «oss case sA Linianekes ete i
Tews OF AMINE as ok sa cist bebd eae iv
Opinions Dew 66606 SG ie wee ene 1
Fespbaetietions. : v.55. 450u cance shou eines Cleese eee 1
Statutes and Constitutional Provisions Involved.... 1
Statement of the Cael v.cccnckeuweceeupheneinaewees 2
Reasons for Granting the Writ ..............s.seees 6
I. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
RAISES AN IMPORTANT QUESTION OF FED-
ERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AS TO THE
POWER OF CONGRESS TO ENFORCE THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AS A CONDITION
UPON THE EXPENDITURE OF FEDERAL
PUES 2 sind aeseivcesne eden oe eeiane eee 8
A. The Tenth Circuit’s Decision Rejecting
Application of The Older Americans Act
Conflicts With This Court’s Decision in
Tilton v. RICMAPEGOR. 65 cusses soaavane seuss 8
B. The Older Americans Act Prohibition on Sec-
tarian Activity is Appropriate Legislation
Designed by Congress to Implement the
Establishment Clause Through Its Enforce-
ment Powers Under Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Asnernusnent 666 is ss ch ice a ka os *
C. The Older Americans Act Prohibition on Sec-
tarian Activity is a Valid Condition Upon the
Grant of Federal Funds Under Congress’
Spenaing POW. . 6ccscucdseipaetsane ses —
ill
TABLE OF CONTENTS - Continued
Page
Il. CONGRESS MAY PROHIBIT CORE RELIGIOUS
ACTIVITIES IN FEDERALLY-FUNDED SENIOR
CENTERS CONSISTENT WITH THIS COURT'S
CURRENT VIEW OF THE ESTABLISHMENT
AND FREE SPEECH CLAUSES. ................ 20
SESS a ee re eee ee REE Pee 26
INDEX TO APPENDICES
Appendix A United States Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals Opinion. ..........66 sees ees la
Appendix B_ The United States District Court for
the District of New Mexico (D.C.
No. 94-CV-1101) Order Granting
Summary Judgment...............+5: 15a
Appendix C The United States District Court for
the District of New Mexico Repor-
ter’s Transcript of Proceeding, Vol-
ume II, Oral Decision of December
3 | rere rrr eri reas Tere ck 17a
Appendix D 42 U.S.C. § 3027 (1988). ...........--. 21a
Appendix E Affidavit of Lorraine R. Nunez in
Opposition to Motion For Prelimi-
nary Injunction and Transcript ....... 67a
Appendix F Affidavit of Kim H. Perdue in
Opposition to Motion for Prelimi-
nary Injunction ............+-++sse555 72a
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases
Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492
Jc Se CROEE cc awh saiciun hense da pweneutcaueasenks 20
Board of Airport Commissioners v. Jews for Jesus, Inc.,
ele Big eer ere Ty Per eT pert ri 25
Bowen v. Kendrick, 487 U.S. 589 (1988)............... 11
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940).......... 13
Capital Square Review Board v. Pinette, 515 U.S. __,
S19 GAR BOM CRP oee iv ckacewas eb eaeinal scanned, 23
Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense & Educ. Fund,
G73 US. FOS ISR 6 cei ae CeCe eee eek 24
Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990) .... 16
Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947) ...13, 14
Fiest ow. Comen, S92 US. Go Tiseehe svc cccacvcisdsceset 14
Flores v. City of Boerne, Texas, 73 F.3d 1352 (5th Cir.
1996), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3017
(U.S. June 25, 1996) (No. 95-2074)............... FR
Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973)................. 11
Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978) ..............4.. 12
Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641 (1966)....12, 13, 14, 15
Lamb’s Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free School,
508 U.S. 384, 113 S.Ct. 2141 (1993)......... 22, 23, 24
Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668 (1984) ............... 20
McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316 (1819) ........... 13
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES - Continued
Page
Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987).......-....--54-- 15
Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators’
Ass’n, 460 U.S. 37 (1983)....... ccc ccccceenseccane 25
Regan v. Taxation With Representation of Washington,
G1 U.S. SOO CIGGS) occ occ a ic ee een a dens 15
Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S. __,
118 S.Ct. 2510 (1995) 2... ceesccesevane 6, 9, 23, 24, 25
Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991)....... 7, 445.400
Sasnett v. Sullivan, __ F.3d __, 1996 W.L. 432348
Be Be | eee wre rr ere eT rer rerre ere yrs ts 12
South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987) ...... 7; 2
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971) ......... passim
U.S. Postal Service v. Greenburgh Civic Associations,
453 U.S. 114 (1981) «200 cee c cc cese ts tscenenes 19
United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787 (1966)............ 13
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 (1985) .....--.. eee ee ee, 15
Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981).... 11, 15, 22, 24
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School District, 509 U.S.
1, 2123 S.Ct. BAGZ (ISDS)... ccc s ce vevewccnsesegeces 6, 9
STATUTES:
U.S. Constitution:
Article 1, & Sone cds iasisanses ctesavedtan 2; if
y Dt, RS ERE Se Naeger eng ED ax Pah Deere Wee y ye oe
Asmniel: ATV, OS. isis van eae cevienecatass a; tm 3S
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued
Page
Y Bik tome Be ph Perry ree ere ree es ee 1
BO Usha Oe oe chee ee cceckinivebin rere 1
Oe Bae te BPs web eva ered 2b vb ba eas a aeeee wean 5
The Older Americans Act:
BOS ae ek ee rs ee eee rie mare 18
C2 Vicia | Ds is Arc ekeus ees fExy dees he ka ee 2
42 U.S.C. § 3027(a)(14)(A)(iv)(1988)............ re
eR Se a ee or ry, eer 8
Federal Regulations:
ee Rr.) yo ps wes Cr 9, 18
SS LAR. & AAS 6 Fs Akh s weak oe Cee 8
>. 4.2. B LORE ee 55 & Os cbs cde scab ve eeecebears 9
MISCELLANEOUS:
SP Come. Rac. S9GGs CieOes 66 p.ckiee sen ta teers hens 10
Or Come. Ret. 260GR SSRs) inks cakevecseweses sat seuss 13
Are Comm, Beet, TING «sen. cic eben cee aes veeeer kes 14
Older Americans Act (P.L. 95-478 (1978))........ passim
124 Cong. Rec. 33483; 33486-87; 33488; 33491;
34421; 13600; 22369; and 22410 (1978)............. 18
OPINIONS BELOW
The Court of Appeals issued its judgment on May 23,
1996, which is reported at 84 F.3d 1273, and is reproduced
in the Appendix to this petition, Pet. App. la. The oral
decision of the United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of New Mexico is reproduced in Pet. App. 17a, and
the district court’s order granting summary judgment in
favor of the City, entered December 16, 1994, is repro-
duced in Pet. App. 15a.
JURISDICTION
The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals
for the Tenth Circuit, reversing the United States District
Court for the District of New Mexico, was issued on May
23, 1996. Pet. App. 1a. This Court's jurisdiction is invoked
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1). Because the constitu-
tionality of 42 U.S.C. § 3027(a)(14)(A)(iv), has been drawn
into question by the decision of the Tenth Circuit, and
because the United States is not a party, 28 U.S.C.
§ 2403(a) may apply and a copy of this petition is being
served on the Solicitor General of the United States.
+
STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL
PROVISIONS INVOLVED
This case involves the First Amendment to the
United States Constitution, which reads in relevant part
as follows:
Amendment I:
Congress shall make no law respecting an estab-
lishment of religion . . . or abridging the free-
dom of speech... .
This case involves the constitutionality of 42 U.S.C.
§ 3027, which is set forth in its entirety in the Pet. App.
21a.
This case also involves Sections 1 and 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment, which read in relevant part as fol-
lows:
Amendment XIV:
Section 1. . . . No State shall . . . deprive any
person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law... .
Section 5. The Congress shall have power to
enforce by appropriate legislation, the provi-
sions of this article.
This case also involves questions under Congress’
spending power pursuant to Article I, Section 8, Clause 1,
which reads in relevant part as follows:
The Congress shall have Power To lay and col-
lect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay
the Debts and provide for the common Defense
and general Welfare of the United States. .
¢
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Older Americans Act conditions federal grants
under the Act upon recipient agencies giving assurances
that senior citizen centers constructed or renovated with
federal funds are not used for sectarian instruction or
religious worship. 42 U.S.C. § 3027(a)(14)(A)(iv) (1988).
Pet. App. 30a-31a. It has never been disputed that this
provision of the Act applies to the petitioners: City of
Albuquerque (City) senior centers have received funding
under the Act from the federal government, through the
State of New Mexico Agency on Aging, for, among other
purposes, renovation of City senior centers.
On February 11, 1994, Respondent Don Kimbro, then
Minister of Discipleship for the Respondent Church on
the Rock, a non-denominational evangelical church,
requested that he be allowed to teach a 13-week class on
the New Testament at a City senior center as part of the
regular programming for seniors sponsored by the City.
On March 24, 1994, Kimbro altered his request by asking
to show a two-hour film entitled Jesus and to distribute
large print Bibles to the center's “clientele”.!
There has never been any dispute that the Jesus film
constitutes the core religious activity of proselytizing.’
1 The requests were initially directed only to the Bear
Canyon Senior Center; however, in proceedings before the
district court, the challenge was later broadened to include all of
the City’s six senior centers.
2 The respondents were forthright in admitting their
purpose is religious proselytizing. The respondents candidly
admitted that their aim in attempting to use the Bear Canyon
Senior Center to show the Jesus film was “to share and spread
the Gospel of Jesus Christ” and to thereby obtain religious
converts. The Jesus film devotes primary attention to the
miracles of Christ, especially in healing the sick. Episodes
include the curing of the blind and lame, stopping a storm on
the Sea of Galilee, relieving a madman of his demons, creating
Viewers are asked to adopt the religious beliefs espoused
in the film and accept Christ as their savior. At the
conclusion of the film, the following process of religious
conversion is prescribed:
[E]xperience His love and forgiveness and
receive eternal life, you must receive Him as
God's sacrifice for your sin and invite Him to
come into your life by faith. If this is the desire
of your heart, you can pray a prayer of faith and
Jesus Christ will come into your life. This is a
suggested prayer. I will say it first:
Lord, Jesus, I need you. Thank you for
dying on the cross for my sins. I open the
door of my life and receive you as my Sav-
ior and Lord. Take control of my life, make
me the kind of person you want me to be.
Amen.
If this prayer expresses the desire of your heart
pray this prayer right now where you are, pray
after me silently as I repeat it one phrase at a
time:
Lord, Jesus, I need you. -
Thank you for dying on the cross for my
sins. -
I open the door of my life and receive you
as my Savior and Lord. -
food for the hungry, and curing an epileptic and a hunchback.
The film also focuses on the crucifixion and resurrection of
Christ in patently Christian terms, as the district court correctly
found.
Take control of life, make me the kind of
person you want me to be. -
Amen.
The last five minutes of the film have been transcribed,
Pet. App. 67a, and the film itself has been lodged with the
Court.
Pastor Kimbro’s requests were denied by the peti-
tioners on grounds the messages sought to be conveyed
were “sectarian instruction” and “religious worship” in
violation of the Older Americans Act and a City policy
that is a verbatim reflection of that Act. Pet. App. 72a,
1 3. (The Church on the Rock had previously shown the
film at another City-owned facility, which undisputably
was a public forum, and was offered the opportunity to
do so again at the same type forum; the Church declined
that offer.)
The Church on the Rock and Pastor Kimbro brought
suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. On December 16, 1994, the
district court heard arguments on the Church’s motion
for a preliminary injunction. At the conclusion of the
hearing, the Court converted the matter into one for
summary judgment, and entered summary judgment for
the City.$
The key findings of the district court pertinent to this
petition were: that the purposes of senior centers were
delineated by the Older Americans Act; that such pur-
poses did not include sectarian instruction nor religious
* The district court did not enter findings of fact nor
conclusions of law, but rather issued its decision from the bench,
which is attached hereto at Pet. App. 17a.
worship; that the Jesus film was “patently religious in
nature and is intended to spread the word that Jesus is
savior”; that the film’s primary purpose was to prosely-
tize; and, that the film was, therefore, sectarian instruc-
tion and could be properly excluded.
The Church on the Rock brought an appeal to the
United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit,
which on May 23, 1996, reversed the district court on
grounds the City policy constituted viewpoint discrimi-
nation.
The Tenth Circuit rejected the City’s reliance upon
the Older Americans Act, holding that the statutory com-
mands were an insufficient justification to exclude the
Church on the Rock’s speech. In doing so, the Court of
Appeals has jeopardized federal funding under the Older
Americans Act for the City and other government agen-
cies with programs under the Act. This petition follows.
SI
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
Language almost precisely the same as at issue in the
Older Americans Act has been found by this Court to be
coextensive with the Establishment Clause. Zobrest v. Cat-
alina Foothills School District, 509 U.S. 1, 113 S. Ct. 2462,
2465 n.7 (1993). In Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971)
this Court upheld a condition placed on a Congressional
grant employing the same language as in the Older
Americans Act. Moreover, Congress uses the prohibition
against sectarian instruction and religious worship in a
host of grant statutes. See Rosenberger v. University of
Virginia, 515 U.S. __, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 2544 n.9 (1995)
(Souter, J., dissenting).
Against this background, the Tenth Circuit has boldly
declared that Congress lacks the power to condition its
appropriations upon state compliance with the Establish-
ment Clause. This Court has never directly addressed the
question of whether Congress possesses the power to
enforce the Establishment Clause by conditioning its dis-
bursal of federal funds, and should do so in this case.
This Court has held that incident to its power under
the spending clause, Congress is permitted to attach con-
ditions on the receipt of federal funds. South Dakota v.
Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). In Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173
(1991) this Court, more specifically, upheld a federal
funding program burdening speech against a viewpoint
discrimination challenge. The Tenth Circuit's invalidation
of Congress’ funding restriction in the Older Americans
Act is in conflict with these decisions.
By declaring that Congress may not attach such a
condition upon its appropriations, and thereby enforce
the Establishment Clause, the Tenth Circuit has also
brought itself into conflict with the Fifth Circuit's holding
in Flores v. City of Boerne, Texas, 73 F.3d 1352 (Sth Cir.
1996), petition for cert. filed, 65 U.S.L.W. 3017 (U.S. June 25,
1996) (No.95-2074), that Congress does have the power to
enforce the Free Exercise Clause under Section 5 of the
Fourteenth Amendment.
in short, this petition argues that the Tenth Circuit
erred in viewing this case through the lens of this Court's
public forum doctrine under the Free Speech Clause, and
should have properly analyzed it under the Establish-
ment Clause, as the latter Clause has been implemented
by Congress through the funding condition in the Older
Americans Act.
I. THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
RAISES AN IMPORTANT QUESTION OF FED-
ERAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW AS TO THE
POWER OF CONGRESS TO ENFORCE THE
ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE AS A CONDITION
UPON THE EXPENDITURE OF FEDERAL FUNDS.
A. The Tenth Circuit’s Decision Rejecting Applica-
tion of The Older Americans Act Conflicts With
This Court’s Decision in Tilton v. Richardson.
Title III, § 307(a)(14)(A)(iv), of the Older Americans
Act (42 U.S.C. § 3207(a)(14)(A)(iv) (1988)) provides that
agencies that receive federal money for senior centers
must assure the federal government that a senior center
“will not be used and is not intended to be used for
sectarian instruction or as a place for religious worship.”
Pet. App. at 30a-3la.
The Act creates a complex and detailed set of require-
ments for area agencies and state agencies to follow in
order to qualify for and receive grants; the Act does not
create a system incorporating an open-ended block grant
program, giving the states free reign to implement senior
programs. 42 U.S.C. §§ 3021-3030(r).*
* The Older Americans Act is implemented through federal
regulations at 45 C.F.R. §§ 1321.1-1321.83. The regulations
provide, among other things: that each area agency only engage
in activities which are consistent with its statutory mission (45
ft Ma
As this Court has recognized, the funding language
of the Older Americans Act is a standard requirement not
only of this Act but of a wide variety of federal grant
statutes. See Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S.
—__, 115 S.Ct. 2510, 2544 n. 9 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting).
The Tenth Circuit’s decision has potentially cataclysmic
consequences for the local and state programs that are
funded under these statutes.
This Court has also recognized that this type of fund-
ing restriction by the federal government was designed to
implement the Establishment Clause. In Zobrest v. Catalina
Foothills School District, 509 U.S. 1, 113 S.Ct. 2462, 2464 n.7
(1993), this Court indicated it was persuaded that regula-
tory language, similar to the Older Americans Act, was
coextensive with the commands of the Establishment
Clause.
In Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971), this Court
addressed the constitutionality of a Congressional grant
progam with the same conditioning language as to sec-
tarian instruction and religious worship. At issue was the
Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963, which authorized
grants for expansion of college facilities, but prohibited
monies for “any facility used or to be used for sectarian
instruction or as a place for religious worship. .. . ”
C.F.R. § 1321.17(f)(1)); that each area agency create one or more
visible “focal points” in the community where anyone can go to
obtain help or information on any aging issue, and where
possible these focal points will be senior centers (45 C.F.R.
§ 1321.53(c)); and that the area agency will insure that the
maximum number of services are provided at the focal points.
Id.
10
A plurality in Tilton agreed that the statute did not
violate the religion clauses by authorizing grants to
church-related colleges. However, in a portion of the
decision of relevance to this petition, eight members of
this Court agreed that the Establishment Clause was vio-
lated by the Act’s provisions limiting the government's
interest in covered facilities to a 20-year period, which
thereby allowed use of the facilities for sectarian pur-
poses after such period. This Court struck down that
restriction because it was “inadequate to ensure that the
impact of the federal aid will not advance religion.” 403
U.S. at 682.
As the legislative history examined in Tilton makes
clear, the prohibition on “sectarian instruction” and “reli-
gious worship” in federally-funded facilities reflected an
attempt by Congress to acknowledge the neutrality prin-
ciples that have reached full flower in this Court’s Estab-
lishment Clause jurisprudence. In debates before the
Senate on the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963,
Senator Sam Ervin pressed amendments that would have
removed from eligibility grants for colleges that were
owned or controlled by religious denominations. 109
Cong. Rec. 19492 (1963). That attempt failed. The lan-
guage that is reflected in the Older Americans Act, and
elsewhere in federal grant programs, prevailed as a Con-
gressional compromise to allow federal funds to help
construct facilities on a neutral basis so long as core
religious activities were not promoted in the process. The
Tenth Circuit has now jeopardized this long-standing
accommodation.
The Tenth Circuit distinguished Tilton on the theory
that limitations on sectarian instruction and religious
OS a a a
11
worship in senior centers are subject to challenge on free
speech grounds. Church on the Rock, 84 F.3d at 1281. That,
however, begs the question of whether Congress can
legitimately prohibit what are in this case, undisputably,
core religious activities, such as Christian evangelism and
proselytizing, when they are presented in federally-
funded facilities in the context of senior center programs
that are permeated with government regulations and con-
trol.>
However, the nature of the forum is not, and should
not be, the issue. The issue is the power of Congress to
enforce the Establishment Clause through its funding
statutes. This Court has repeatedly upheld the constitu-
tionality of funding statutes that aided religious institu-
tions, so long as there were assurances that core religious
activities were not being furthered. Thus, this Court has
continued to read Tilton as allowing examination of a
government grant program to determine whether “partic-
ular applications” of a program result in government
sponsorship of sectarian practices. Bowen v. Kendrick, 487
U.S. 589, 601-602 (1988). See also Hunt v. McNair, 413 U.S.
734 (1973).
The “particular application” in this case is clear and
undisputed. In fact, the Church on the Rock proudly
agrees that what it is proposing is sectarian instruction
and proselytizing. The question then is simple, and need
not be burdened with forum analysis: Does Congress
° Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981), relied upon by the
Tenth Circuit in distinguishing Tilton, did not involve an
attempt, as here, to insert core religious activities into the heart
of a federally regulated and funded program.
12
have the power to enforce the Establishment Clause to
restrict core religious activities at federally-funded facili-
ties?
B. The Older Americans Act Prohibition on Sec-
tarian Activity is Appropriate Legislation
Designed by Congress to Implement the Estab-
lishment Clause Through Its Enforcement
Powers Under Section 5 of the Fourteenth
Amendment.
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment states that
“(t]he Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropri-
ate legislation, the provisions of this article.” U.S. Const.
Amend XIV, § 5. The issue of whether Congress’ power
under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is the
same when it acts to enforce an incorporated right as
when it acts to remedy a violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment has not been expressly decided by this
Court. See Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678, 718 (1978) (Rehn-
quist, J., dissenting).
This Court has expressed that Congress’ Section 5
powers were included to confer “the same broad powers
expressed in the Necessary and Proper Clause.” Katzen-
bach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 650 (1966). Thus, in the
recent words of Judge Posner, the enforcement clause
empowers Congress to act to give “practical efficacy” to a
constitutional right. Sasnett v. Sullivan, __ F.3d __, 1996
W.L. 432348 (7th Cir. 1996). In upholding RFRA in Flores
the Fifth Circuit concluded: “Section 5 does not place
conditions on Congress’ authority to enforce the amend-
ment. Congress has the power to enforce ‘the provisions
of this article,’ not just the Equal Protection Clause.” 73
13
F.3d at 1358 (citing United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 789
(1966)).
The question for this Court must be whether Con-
gress’ enforcement of the Establishment Clause in the
funding provision of the Older Americans Act is valid
under the three-part test announced in Morgan, 384 U.S.
at 650, an inquiry that this Court has fashioned to assure
that Congressional acts are consonant with the principles
of legislative power announced in McCulloch v. Maryland,
17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819).
The first inquiry under Morgan is whether the fund-
ing restriction “may be regarded” as an enactment to
enforce the Fourteenth Amendment. This Court has seen
fit to incorporate the liberty interests protected by the
First Amendment into the fundamental concept of liberty
embodied in the Fourteenth Amendment. Cantwell v. Con-
necticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940). The Establishment
Clause was specifically incorporated in Everson v. Board of
Education, 330 U.S. 1 (1947).
Based upon the legislative history outlined in Tilton,
for the same Congressional language, there can be little
doubt that Congress enacted the funding restrictions in
the Older Americans Act in order to enforce the Estab-
lishment Clause violations that it saw lurking in unfet-
tered grants for construction or renovation of senior
centers. See 109 Cong. Rec. 14962 (1963) (comments of
Rep. Quie).
Incorporation of First Amendment guarantees into
the Fourteenth Amendment has resulted in a flood of
religion cases that, arguably, this Court should not have
been required to address. It is only reasonable, therefore,
ca
14
that Congress ought to have some role, in this area of
constitutional uncertainty.
Thus, under the second prong of the Morgan test,
funding restrictions under the Older Americans Act are
also “plainly adapted” to what Congress perceived as its
role in ensuring proper application of funds it has appro-
priated. Morgan, 384 U.S. at 652. This Court-has recog-
nized only one restriction on the power of Congress to
tax and spend, and that restriction is the Establishment
Clause. Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 105 (1968). Given this
limitation, it is only reasonable that Congress have
attached conditions upon monies spent by it so as to
prevent violations of the Establishment Clause.
When it enacted the funding condition in the Older
Americans Act in 1978, Congress clearly had fresh in its
mind the very debate that had generated the language in
the Higher Education Facilities Act of 1963 that was
enforced in Tilton. The Senate debate on that Act demon-
strates that in rejecting the absolutist approach of Senator
Ervin, in favor of a narrow ban on “sectarian instruction”
and “religious worship”, Congress was guided by neu-
trality principles underlying this Court’s opinion in, for
example, Everson v. Board of Education, 330 U.S. 1, 17
(1947) (“[W]e cannot say that the First Amendment pro-
hibits New jersey from spending tax-raised funds to pay
the bus fares of parochial school pupils as part of a
general program under which it pays the fares of pupils
attending public and other schools.”). See 109 Cong. Rec.
19494 (Remarks of Sen. Ribicoff) (“Without a doubt, we in
Congress are striving to achieve a secular purpose when
we seek to improve the educational opportunities for our
Se alin eats Sow Sak,
15
nation’s colleges. . . . Aid for the religious aspects of
church related colleges has been specifically excluded”).
This neutrality principle now informs the Court's
increasing reliance upon an endorsement standard for
adjudicating cases under the Establishment Clause. As
will be demonstrated below in Section II, the funding
restriction of the Older Americans Act is entirely consis-
tent with this Court’s current views. See, e.g., Wallace v.
Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 50-52 (1985) (O’Connor, J., concur-
ring).
The third inquiry under Morgan is whether the fund-
ing restriction is consistent “with the letter and spirit of
the constitution.” Under Morgan, Section 5 does not grant
Congress power to enact statutes that dilute the guaran-
tees of the Fourteenth Amendment. Morgan, 384 US. at
651 n.10.
The funding restriction of the Older Americans Act
burdens the exercise of free speech, but not in an imper-
missible manner. This Court has recognized that govern-
ment serves a compelling interest in enforcing the
Establishment Clause, and may thereby sometimes bur-
den free speech. Widmar v. Vincent, 454 US. 263, 271
(1981). See also Meese v. Keene, 481 U.S. 465 (1987) (foreign
film may be barred as “political propaganda” under For-
eign Agents Registration Act even though such action
restricts free speech); Regan v. Taxation With Representation
of Washington, 461 U.S. 540 (1983) (I.R.S. statute granting
tax exemption for non-profit organizations that do not
engage in substantial lobbying activities not a violation of
the First Amendment).
16
In implementing the Establishment Clause in the
Older Americans Act, Congress has not overturned this
Court’s precedent as done by Congress in RFRA. The
Older Americans Act does not tread upon this Court’s
long-recognized principle that “neutral laws of general
applicability”, with incidental religious benefits, should
be protected from attack under the Establishment Clause.
Rather, under the Older Americans Act, again using
the legislative history explicated in Tilton, Congress has
seen fit to create a neutral funding program of general
application, but has stated its limits as to core religious
activities in a manner that is consistent with this Court’s
Establishment Clause precedents. By analogy, this is pre-
cisely the result allowed by this Court in Employment
Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
In Smith, this Court held that a generally applicable,
neutral criminal law that has the effect of burdening
religious practices under the Free Exercise Clause need
not be justified by a compelling governmental interest. By
the same token, there is no question that Congress’ fund-
ing restriction under the Older Americans Act burdens
the exercise of free speech. Therefore, there is no reason
to judge the Older Americans Act by any higher standard
than this Court used to judge the act of the Oregon
legislature in Smith. This Court also was clear in Smith
that “[w]Je have never held that an individual’s religious
beliefs excuse him from compliance with an otherwise
valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to
regulate.” 494 U.S. at 878-879. This Court gave proselytiz-
ing as an example of the religious conduct that the gov-
ernment may regulate. 494 U.S. at 877.
17
Congress’ enforcement of the Establishment Clause
through the grant condition of the Older Americans Act
is, therefore, a necessary and proper exercise of its Sec-
tion 5 power.
C. The Older Americans Act Prohibition on Sec-
tarian Activity is A Valid Condition Upon the
Grant of Federal Funds Under Congress’ Spend-
ing Power.
The Tenth Circuit in this case has prohibited the
application of a federal statute that places conditions
upon the expenditure of federal funds. As such, the Tenth
Circuit’s decision must withstand scrutiny under this
Court’s recent pronouncements in South Dakota v. Dole,
483 U.S. 203 (1987), and Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173
(1991).
In Dole, this Court sustained a federal statute allow-
ing Congress to withhold a percentage of federal high-
way funds to states allowing persons under age 21 to
purchase or possess alcohol since Congress was acting
indirectly under its spending power even though it may
not directly regulate the drinking age. Such action is
permissible, this Court stated, so long as Congress acts
(1) in pursuit of “the general welfare”; (2) unambiguously
and in such a fashion to enable the states to exercise their
choice knowingly; (3) so that the conditions on federal
grants are related to the particular program; and (4) so
that the condition does not violate an independent consti-
tutional barrier.
18
In the present case there can be no doubt that condi-
tional funding under the Older Americans Act is in pur-
suance of the general welfare and is clearly related to the
federal program of providing services to elderly Ameri-
cans through a facility that is designed to be a focal point
for their needs. The legislative history at the time Con-
gress inserted the grant condition into the Older Ameri-
cans Act (P.L. 95-478 (1978)) makes clear that Congress
was creating senior centers as focal points for the provi-
sion of services under the Act and had the general wel-
fare of the elderly in mind. 124 Cong. Rec. 33483 (Rep.
Green); 33486-87 (Rep. Pepper); 33488 (Rep. Wampler);
33491 (Rep. Bonker); 34421 (Sen. Chafee); 13600 (Rep.
Hammerschmidt); 22369 (Sen. Chafee); and 22410 (Sen.
Biden) (1978). Moreover, the condition itself is directly
related to the appropriate Congressional goal of limiting
use of senior centers to the purposes legislatively
defined. See 42 U.S.C. § 3002(35); 45 C.F.R. § 1321.17(f)(1).
The independent constitutional bar relied upon by
the Tenth Circuit is the Free Speech Clause. However, in
Rust this Court rejected the viewpoint discrimination
argument lodged against a federal regulation that
restricted discussion of abortion under a federal statute
setting up grants for family planning. This Court stated:
“Within far broader limits than petitioners are willing to
concede, when the Government appropriates public
funds to establish a program it is entitled to define the
limits of that program.” 500 U.S. at 194. This Court, thus,
determined that the funding restriction was “designed to
ensure that the limits of the federal program are
observed” and to restrict “activities outside the project's
scope”. 500 U.S. at 193-194.
ee ee
atti te
This Court further stated:
To hold that the Government unconstitutionally
discriminates on the basis of viewpoint when it
chooses to fund a program dedicated to advance
certain permissible goals, because the program
in advancing those goals necessarily discour-
ages alternative goals, would render numerous
Government programs constitutionally suspect.
When Congress established a National Endow-
ment for Democracy to encourage other coun-
tries to adopt democratic principles, . . . it was
not constitutionally required to fund a program
to encourage competing lines of political philos-
ophy such as communism and fascism.
500 U.S. at 194.
Clearly, no less can be said of Congress’ implementa-
tion of the Establishment Clause. The petitioners are not
required to open senior centers for uses beyond those for
which they are lawfully dedicated. U.S. Postal Service v.
Greenburgh Civic Associations, 453 U.S. 114 (1981). In addi-
tion, the petitioners offered the Church on the Rock alter-
nate forums for their speech. As recognized in Dole, the
petitioners were not forcing the Church on the Rock to
give up their religious speech; they merely were requir-
ing that the Church “keep such activities separate and
distinct from [Older Americans Act] activities.” 500 U.S.
at 196.
In short, the Tenth Circuit’s decision cannot with-
stand scrutiny under this Court’s conditional funding
cases, and should be reversed.
20
Il. CONGRESS MAY PROHIBIT CORE RELIGIOUS
ACTIVITIES IN FEDERALLY-FUNDED SENIOR
CENTERS CONSISTENT WITH THIS COURT’S
CURRENT VIEW OF THE ESTABLISHMENT AND
FREE SPEECH CLAUSES.
This Section of the petition argues that within the
context of federally-funded and City-administered senior
center programs, the practice of patent sectarian pros-
elytizing and worship would be perceived by the reason-
able observer as carrying government support and
endorsement. Consequently, the funding restriction in the
Older Americans Act, as it is administered by the City, is
entirely consistent with this Court’s present view of the
limits of the Establishment Clause.
“Every government practice must be judged in its
unique circumstances to determine whether it constitutes
an endorsement or disapproval of religion.” Lynch v. Don-
nelly, 465 U.S. 668, 694 (1984) (O’Connor, J., concurring).
The Tenth Circuit has defaulted in not analyzing this case
as involving a violation of the Establishment Clause,
which is within Congress’ prerogative to enforce.
This Court has increasingly hinged its Establishment
Clause analysis upon the degree and extent of govern-
ment support and endorsement of religious speech. Thus,
in Allegheny County v. Greater Pittsburgh ACLU, 492 U.S.
573, 600 n.50 (1989), the central focus of this Court’s
endorsement analysis was that the Grand Staircase was
not a place “in which all were free to place their displays”
and that the presence of a creche there under those cir-
cumstances served to associate the government with the
display.
eae Ne AU Fs ney FeO RN een PORT 7
bp Cee, 4
LAR agit
Ne ee
'
;
¥
;
3
4
2
|
21
In the case of senior centers, petitioners have never
permitted sectarian proselytizing or worship. Allowance
of non-sectarian, non-proselytizing educational classes on
Tai Chi, meditation, counseling or metaphysics does not
amount to an “open door” sufficient to negate the impres-
sion of government endorsement. This is especially true
where the facts reflect that the Church on the Rock
attempted to first insinuate itself into the very senior
center programs to conduct a 13-week class on the New
Testament, and, then, to show its Jesus film. At no time
did the Church ever indicate that it wanted to exhibit the
film outside the regular senior center hours or programs,
which are all approved, sponsored and produced by the
City after being advertised in City-published catalogs.
Neither did the Church ever indicate that it wanted to
show the film to anyone other than senior center program
participants. There was no dispute that Church on the
Rock was an “outside” organization with no ties to the
senior centers, although Pastor Kimbro did join the Bear
Canyon Senior Center after his lawsuit was filed. The
Church never requested use of senior center space for
after-hours meetings for itself as an “outside” group.
Each City senior center publishes an Activities Cata-
log and Calendar of events. In the normal course, the
Church’s proposed class or film would be placed in the
Catalogs and Calendars as part of the City center pro-
gram. The City Catalog welcomes seniors to the centers
and, for example, states at the top of the first page “Bear
Canyon Senior Center is operated by the City of Albu-
querque, Department of Community Services, Office of
Senior Affairs.” Each catalog identifies all the programs
22
as “City” programs and lists all of the services the City
provides.
The City has never allowed unrestricted access to
senior centers by outside groups or organizations, and
enforces a variety of general restrictions on use in addi-
tion to the funding guidelines of the Older Americans
Act.®
These facts remove this case from the “after-hours”,
religion-neutral, open forum situations that were evident
in Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 274 (1981) (“the forum
is available to a broad class of nonreligious as well as
religious speakers; there are over 100 recognized student
groups at UMKC”); Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union
Free School, 508 U.S. 384, 113 S.Ct. 2141, 2147 (1993) (“The
showing of this film would not have been during school
hours, would not have been sponsored by the school, and
6 Only seniors who become members of the centers can
participate in City programs. The City designs the senior
programs it offers, and receives input from advisory councils
comprised of seniors who are members of the centers as
required by the Older Americans Act. The only allowed non-
program uses of City senior centers are for after-hours use of
meeting rooms for senior support groups whose membership is
at least 75% seniors 55 years old or older to discuss only senior
issues, and, on occasion, City policymakers. Examples of groups
are the American Association of Retired Persons, a Recreational
Vehicle Club and Alzheimers Support Group. The Centers are
staffed at all times by city employees who operate programs
including meal services, frail elderly day care services,
recreation services and health services. No for-profit businesses
are allowed to use the facilities except for limited senior-related
advertising on bulletin boards. The City does not allow political
speeches by single candidates and restricts the distribution of
campaign literature. Pet. App. 74a-75a.
fase a atin tid eae aah
23
would have been open to the public, not just to church
members.”), Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 515 U.S.
— —~ 115 S.Ct. 2510, 2522, 2524 (1995) (“The object of
the SAF is to open a forum for speech and to support
various student enterprises”; “the student publication is
not a religious institution . . . and it is not a religious
organization as used in the University’s own regula-
tions”), and in Capital Square Review Board v. Pinette, 515
U.S. __, 115 S.Ct. 2440, 2448 (1995) (“Capital Square is a
genuinely public forum, and has been widely used as a
public forum for many, many years”), facts all of which
persuaded this Court that the speech in those cases was
not being endorsed by the government. In this case, a
reasonable observer would believe that a proselytizing
message inserted so directly into senior center program-
ming was being endorsed and sponsored by the City.
As the basis for its conclusion that the Church on the
Rock’s message was “sectarian instruction”, the district
court, found that the Jesus film was “patently religious in
nature and is intended to spread the word that Jesus is
the savior” and that “the film’s primary purpose is to
proselytize”. In doing so, the district court determined
that conduct which violated the Establishment Clause
was not within the legislatively defined purposes of
senior centers and could be validly excluded.
The film Jesus is a two-hour depiction of the life of
Jesus, which Pastor Kimbro characterized as “based on
the Gospel of Luke from the Bible.” This is, by admission,
a Christian evangelical film. It is not about family values
or child-rearing, albeit with a religious slant, as was the
case in Lamb's Chapel. (The description of the film series
24
in Lamb’s Chapel contained only one reference to “a loving
God.” 113 S.Ct. at 2145 n.3.)
Senior centers are not places where the City has
previously allowed in a “wide array of non-religious,
anti-religious and competing religious viewpoints” — let
alone blatant proselytizing — so as to obviate the image of
government endorsement. Rosenberger, 115 S.Ct. at 2527
(O’Connor, J., concurring). The district court found that
the City had never previously allowed core religious
speech at any of its senior centers. Thus, there is nothing
in this case that would indicate a “long-standing prac-
tice” that would dissuade the reasonable observer that
the Church on the Rock’s message was being endorsed by
the City; there are no indicators to counter the obvious
fact that the government is making an exception to
accommodate a patently Christian message in a place that
has never allowed such messages before.
Thus, Tilton retains its full force in this case. This was
not an “open-forum” case that would bring it within the
Widmar exception. The Tenth Circuit, in its de novo review
of the grant of summary judgment in this case, failed to
recognize the overwhelming evidence that this case was,
first and last, one that must be analyzed under the federal
statute as embodying the Establishment Clause.
The Tenth Circuit’s attempt to portray this case as a
violation of free speech and as viewpoint discrimination
collapses under the sheer weight of the Establishment
Clause violation. Under this Court's limited public forum
analysis, property remains a nonpublic forum as to all
unspecified uses, Cornelius v. NAACP Legal Defense &
aS anette
Avian
, . Ba a
PT Rs set A Las” OS Ee Peal gf Se
SO Ne ABE RNa ioe Aili Ba
25
Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 802 (1985); Perry Education Asso-
ciation v. Perry Local Educators’ Ass'n, 460 U.S. 37, 48
(1983), and exclusion of uses, even if based upon subject
matter of the speaker's identity, need only be reasonable
and viewpoint-neutral. See Board of Airport Commissioners
v. Jews for Jesus, Inc., 482 U.S. 569, 573 (1987).
This Court’s opinion in Rosenberger does not change
this analysis as it relates to the enforceability of the Older
Americans Act. The regulation of speech in Rosenberger
barred all “religious activity” that “primarily promotes or
manifests a particular belief in or about a deity or an
ultimate reality.” 115 S.Ct. at 2515. It was the breadth of
this regulation that persuaded this Court that it was an
unconstitutional suppression of free speech. 115 S.Ct. at
2515-2520.
The regulation in Rosenberger, however, was consid-
erably broader than the Older Americans Act, which
narrowly captures “sectarian instruction” and “religious
worship”. Pursuant to that statute, petitioners have never
allowed into its senior centers sectarian instruction, or, to
be more exact, Christian proselytizing, and the district
court so held. Therefore, the Tenth Circuit has misapplied
this Court’s precedent in believing that forum analysis
controlled an obvious violation of the Establishment
Clause that the City appropriately regulated through a
constitutional federal statute.
€
26
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, a writ of certiorari should
issue to review the judgment of the United States Court
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.
Respectfully Submitted,
Wituiam D. WinteR*
Assistant City Attorney
City of Albuquerque
Post Office Box 2248
Albuquerque, NM 87103-2248
Telephone: (505) 768-4500
Rosert M. Wuirte, City Attorney
City of Albuquerque
Post Office Box 2248
Albuquerque, NM 87103-2248
Telephone: (505) 768-4500
Ranpy M. Autio
Assistant City Attorney
City of Albuquerque
Post Office Box 2248
Albuquerque, NM 87103-2248
Telephone: (505) 768-4500
Counsel for Petitioner
*Counsel of Record
!
1 la
APPENDIX A
PUBLISH
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
TENTH CIRCUIT
CHURCH ON THE ROCK; DON
KIMBRO, Pastor,
Plaintiffs-Appellants, No. 95-2009
V.
)
)
)
)
)
CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE; TONI ?
MARTORELLI, in her official
capacity as Director of Family and
Community Services for the City )
of Albuquerque; MARK )
SANCHEZ, in his official capacity )
as Deputy Director of Family and
Community Services for the City )
of Albuquerque; KATHLEEN )
STARK, in her official capacity as
Supervisor, Bear Canyon Senior )
Center, City of Albuquerque,
)
Defendants-Appellees.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
(D. C. No. 94-CV-1101)
,
2a
Benjamin W. Bull, The American Center for Law and
Justice, Phoenix, Arizona (Jay Alan Sekulow, The Ameri-
can Center for Law and Justice, Washington, DC, Nikolas
T. Nikas, The American Center for Law and Justice, Phoe-
nix, Arizona, and Paul F. Becht, Becht Law Firm, Albu-
querque, NM, with him on the briefs) for the Appellants.
William D. Winter, Assistant City Attorney (Robert M.
White, City Attorney, with him on the brief) Albuquer-
que, NM, for the Appellees.
Before TACHA, LOGAN, and REAVLEY,* Circuit Judges.
TACHA, Circuit Judge.
Plaintiffs Church on the Rock and Pastor Don Kimbro
(“Church on the Rock”) brought suit under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 alleging that defendants the City of Albuquerque
and its agents (“the City”) denied Church on the Rock’s
First Amendment right to free expression at City Senior
Centers. The district court granted summary judgment in
favor of the City on all claims. Church on the Rock now
appeals, arguing that the City’s policy prohibiting “sec-
tarian instruction and religious worship” at City Senior
Centers violates the First Amendment. We exercise juris-
diction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and reverse.
* The Honorable Thomas M. Reavley, Senior Circuit Judge,
United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, sitting by
designation.
hg fot Ta it SPR ad 4 ALS he alana ei
FAI, are PHL t
PAP AP PARTITE ILS Ai is iste
tb Se LAD ch the ibe TG ts ae
4
\
}
3a
I. Background
The City owns and operates six Senior Centers. The
centers are multipurpose facilities that provide forums
for lectures, classes, movies, crafts, bingo, dancing, physi-
cal exercise, and other activities. To become a member of
a Senior Center, one need only fill out an application. The
sole requirement for membership is that a person be at
least fifty-five years old or be married to a member who
is at least fifty-five years old. People who use the Senior
Centers do not reside there, and all of the programs are
voluntary.
Many of the programs at the Senior Centers are orga-
nized and sponsored by private individuals or organiza-
tions. Senior center policies permit non-member groups
to use the centers for classes and other activities if the
subject matter is “of interest to senior citizens.” Alter-
natively, groups may use the Senior Centers without
regard to this subject matter requirement if they are com-
posed of seventy-five percent or more senior citizens.
Nonmembers or persons under fifty-five years of age
may conduct classes, and people who deliver lectures or
teach classes are also permitted to distribute literature.
The range of subjects that qualify as being “of inter-
est to senior citizens” is quite broad. The Senior Centers’
activities catalogs list many of the programs that meet
this requirement, such as Amateur Radio, Ceramics, Chi-
nese, Choral Group, Economics, El Abuelo - The Clown
of Spanish Culture, Fishing, Medicare/Health Insurance
Counseling, Myth of the Hanging Tree, and Plants and
People of New Mexico. The catalogs also include a
number of classes and presentations in which religion or
4a
religious matters are the primary focus: Bible as Litera-
ture, Myths and Stories About the Millennium, Theoso-
phy, and A Passover Commemoration (an oratorio). The
catalogs encourage “ideas for new classes and programs”
as well.
On March 24, 1994, Pastor Kimbro, a citizen over the
age of fifty-five, requested permission from Kathleen
Stark, the supervisor of the Bear Canyon Senior Center, to
show a two-hour film entitled Jesus. The film recounts the
life of Jesus Christ as described in the Gospel of Luke. At
the conclusion of the story, a voice-over narrator makes
affirming statements such as, “Jesus is exactly who he
claimed to be — the Son of the Lord, the Savior of all
mankind.” The narrator then invites viewers to adopt the
Christian religion and to join him in a short prayer.
Kimbro also requested permission to give away giant-
print New Testaments to persons attending the film.
On May 18, 1994, after reviewing the film, Mark
Sanchez, the City’s Deputy Director of Family and Com-
munity Services, denied Kimbro’s requests. Sanchez
stated that City policy prohibited the use of Senior Cen-
ters “for sectarian instruction or as a place for religious
worship.” The City adopted this policy to conform with
the terms of the Older Americans Act. The Older Ameri-
cans Act provides federal funding to the states for multi-
purpose senior centers, but requires, as a condition for
receiving such funding, that the “facility will not be used
and is not intended to be used for sectarian instruction or
as a place for religious worship.” 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 3027(a)(14)(A)(iv).
a
?
*
4
3
4
4
5
¢
5a
In keeping with this directive, Senior Center person-
nel screen programs for sectarian instruction or religious
worship before allowing them at the Senior Centers.
Senior Center employees also monitor presentations for
religious content by sitting in on classes and entertaining
objections from Senior Center members who call atten-
tion to expression falling into one of these forbidden
categories. When Senior Center employees determine that
presentations are too religious in nature, they intervene
to stop the presentations. There are no official criteria or
written standards to assist them in deciding whether or
not expression constitutes “sectarian instruction” or “reli-
gious worship.”
Church on the Rock filed this suit seeking declara-
tory and injunctive relief. The district court granted sum-
mary judgment in favor of the City. In its decision, the
court assumed without deciding that the Senior Center is
a designated limited public forum. The court stated that
the purpose of the Senior Center does not include sec-
tarian instruction, and that the primary purpose of the
film Jesus is to proselytize. The court concluded that the
film constitutes sectarian instruction and that the City
may therefore exclude the film on the ground that its
subject matter is not within the purpose of the Senior
Centers. The court also held that the City’s restriction is
not viewpoint-based because the City does not permit
sectarian instruction from any religious perspective. This
appeal followed.
6a
Il. The Degree of First Amendment Protection
Afforded to the Expression
We review the district court’s grant of summary judg-
ment de novo. Cannon v. City and County of Denver, 998
F.2d 867, 870 (10th Cir. 1993). We begin our analysis by
noting that the speech in question is entitled to First
Amendment protection. It is well established that reli-
gious worship and discussion are forms of speech and
association protected by the First Amendment. Widmar v.
Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 269 (1981); Heffron v. International
Soc. for Krishna Consciousness, 452 U.S. 640, 647 (1981). The
City argues that the proselytizing religious speech in the
film Jesus enjoys a lesser degree of First Amendment
protection than does religious speech that is not intended
to recruit new believers. The Supreme Court, however,
has rejected the notion that speech about religion, reli-
gious speech designed to win converts, and religious
worship by persons already converted should be treated
differently under the First Amendment. Widmar, 454 U.S.
at 269 n. 6; see also Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union
Free School District, 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2148 (1993) (describing
the fear that proselytizing by a “radical” church might
cause unrest as “difficult to defend as a reason to deny
the presentation of a religious point of view about a
subject the District otherwise makes open to discussion
on District property”). The City’s policy, then, restricts
speech that is entitled full protection under the First
Amendment.
ee
a a ee ee ee ee ee ee
AAO BO eel wil Zp.
7a
Ill. The Nature of the Forum
The government's ability to restrict protected speech
by private persons on government property depends, in
part, on the nature of the forum. Cornelius v. NAACP Legal
Defense & Educ. Fund, 473 U.S. 788, 797 (1985). The threc
types of forums that may exist on government property
are traditional public forums, designated public forums,
and nonpublic forums. Id. at 802. Traditional public
forums are places such as streets and parks that “by long
tradition . . . have been devoted to assernbly and debate.”
Perry Educ. Assn. v. Perry Local Educators’ Assn., 460 U.S.
37, 45 (1983). Designated public forums are those “created
by government designation of a place or channel of com-
munication for use by the public at large for assembly
and speech, for use by certain speakers, or for the discus-
sion of certain subjects.” Cornelius, 473 U.S. at 802. Thus,
designated public forums may be limited in terms of
participants and in terms of subject matter. University
facilities opened for meetings of registered student orga-
nizations qualify as a designated public forum, Widmar,
454 U.S. at 267-68, as do public school classrooms that are
available to the general public outside of school hours for
limited purposes, Lamb’s Chapel, 113 S. Ct. 2141, 2146-47.
In Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of Univ. of Va., 115 S. Ct.
2510 (1995), the Supreme Court treated a university's
student activities fund as a designated public forum,
albeit “more in a metaphysical than in a spatial or geo-
graphic sense.” Id. at 2517. A nonpublic forum is govern-
ment property that is not by tradition or designation a
forum for public communication. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
The Bear Canyon Senior Center is a designated pub-
lic forum. It may not be classified as a traditional public
8a
forum because it is not a traditional location of public
debate or assembly. It is, however, a place that has been
opened to the public for discussive purposes. The City
has permitted lectures and classes on a broad range of
subjects by both members and non-members at its Senior
Centers. The City limits this designated public forum in
two ways. First, the City imposes an age requirement for
participation, although this limitation is rather flexible
where groups or spouses are involved. Second, the City
limits the subject matter of presentations to topics “of
interest to senior citizens.” The subject matter limitation
has also been extremely flexible in practice, as evidenced
by the long list of diverse topics that have been presented
in the past.
IV. The Nature of the City’s Restriction
Having classified the type of forum involved, we
now turn to the type of restriction that the City has
imposed. The Senior Center Policies and Procedures
Manual from the City’s Office of Senior Affairs includes
the following directive: “It is prohibited to use any OSA
facility for sectarian instruction or as a place for religious
worship.” The City contends that this policy is a restric-
tion based upon content, not viewpoint, because it disal-
lows all sectarian instruction and religious worship in its
Senior Centers, regardless of the particular religion
involved. The Supreme Court, however, has rejected simi-
lar arguments. In Lamb’s Chapel, for example, the Court
noted that the mere fact that a regulation categorically
treats all religions alike does not answer the critical ques-
tion of whether viewpoint discrimination exists between
religious and nonreligious expression. 113 S. Ct. at 2147.
Sa ee ee ne aN eee SO Re eee PT ee ee Or
tt
eS ee
fie PG ae yd caked ach
9a
Here, the City had already opened the doors of its Senior
Centers to presentations about religion, such as The Bible
as Literature and Myths and Stories About the Millen-
nium. The City allowed speakers at Senior Centers to
discuss the Bible from a “strictly historical” perspective
and to address religion as long as such presentations
could be characterized as “a literature discussion or ¢
philosophical discussion.” The film Jesus dealt with sub-
ject matter similar to that which would be included in a
class on the Bible as literature. The film ran afoul of City
policy, however, by advocating the adoption of the Chris-
tian faith. In contrast, a film about Jesus’s life that ended
on a skeptical note and urged agnosticism or atheism
would not have contravened the City’s policy. Because
“(t]he prohibited perspective, not the general subject mat-
ter” triggered the decision to bar the private expression,
Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2517, the City’s policy is prop-
erly analyzed as a viewpoint-based restriction on speech.
Moreover, even if the City had not previously opened
the Senior Centers to presentations on religious subjects,
its policy would still amount to viewpoint discrimination.
Any prohibition of sectarian instruction where other
instruction is permitted is inherently non-neutral with
respect to viewpoint. Instruction becomes “sectarian”
when it manifests a preference for a set of religious
beliefs. Because there is no nonreligious sectarian instruc-
tion (and indeed the concept is a contradiction in terms),
a restriction prohibiting sectarian instruction intrinsically
favors secularism at the expense of religion. Therefore,
we conclude that the City’s policy constitutes viewpoint
discrimination. |
10a
V. The Appropriate Level of Judicial Scrutiny
The government bears a particularly heavy burden in
justifying viewpoint-based restrictions in designated pub-
lic forums. Viewpoint discrimination is “an egregious
form of content discrimination.” Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at
2516. Content-based restrictions are subject to strict scru-
tiny. See United States v. Kokinda, 497 U.S. 720, 726-27
(1990); Perry, 460 U.S. at 46. Viewpoint-based restrictions
receive even more critical judicial treatment. As the
Supreme Court noted in Rosenberger:
The necessities of confining a forum to the lim-
ited and legitimate purposes for which it was
created may justify the State in reserving it for
certain groups or for the discussion of certain
topics. . . . [I]n determining whether the State is
acting to preserve the limits of the forum it has
created so that the exclusion of a class of speech
is legitimate, we have observed a distinction
between, on the one hand, content discrimina-
tion, which may be permissible if it preserves
the purposes of that limited forum, and, on the
other hand, viewpoint discrimination, which is
presumed impermissible when directed against
speech otherwise within the forum’s limitations.
115 S. Ct. at 2516-2517 (citations omitted). While the
Court did not explain what, precisely, the government
must show in order to overcome this heavy presumption,
it did indicate that the necessity of complying with
another clause of the Constitution - the Establishment
Clause — would excuse a viewpoint-based restriction on
speech. Id. at 2520. We understand Rosenberger to mean
that courts must examine viewpoint-based restrictions
with an especially critical review of the government's
lla
asserted justifications for those restrictions. At a mini-
mum, to survive strict scrutiny the City’s policy must be
“narrowly drawn to effectuate a compelling state inter-
est.” Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
VI. The City’s Justifications for its Policy
The City offers three justifications for its policy pro-
hibiting religious expression. First, the City asserts that
the policy ensures conformity with the First Amend-
ment’s prohibition against state establishment of religion.
While adherence to the Establishment Clause is a compel-
ling government interest that may justify restrictions on
speech in designated public forums, Rosenberger, 115 S.
Ct. at 2520; Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270-71, the City’s restric-
tion is not necessary to serve this interest. The Supreme
Court has made it abundantly clear that providing equal
access to a designated public forum for citizens engaging
in religious expression and citizens engaging in secular
expression does not violate the Establishment Clause.
Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at 2520-25; Lamb's Chapel, 113 S. Ct.
at 2148; Widmar, 454 U.S. at 270-75. The government need
only remain neutral, preferring neither religious nor sec-
ular expression over the other. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct.
at 2521-2522. Where the state does not sponsor the reli-
gious expression, the expression is made on government
property that has been opened to the public for speech
purposes, and permission is obtained through the same
application process and on the same terms as secular
groups, there is no violation of the Establishment Clause.
Capitol Square Review and Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 115 S. Ct.
2440, 2447 (1995). “[I]t is no violation for government to
enact neutral policies that happen to benefit religion.” Id.
12a
Clearly, the Establishment Clause does not compel the
City to bar sectarian instruction and religious worship
from its Senior Centers.
Second, the City asserts that its policy is necessary to
remain in compliance with the Older Americans Act. To
that end, the policy mirrors the language of the Older
Americans Act, which requires as a condition for receiv-
ing federal funding assurances that a “facility will not be
used and is not intended to be used for sectarian instruc-
tion or as a place for religious worship,” 42 U.S.C.
§ 3027(a)(14)(A)(iv). The fact that the City’s policy is
designed to conform with federal statutory requirements,
however, does not shelter it from constitutional scrutiny.
A city or state’s desire for federal funds is not a compel-
ling government interest. Thus, compliance with the
Older Americans Act does not justify this viewpoint-
based restriction on expression. In the context presented
here, no government entity may permissibly control the
viewpoint being expressed. See Rosenberger, 115 S. Ct. at
2518-19 (where the government expends public funds to
convey its own message, it may say what it wishes; where
private speech is concerned, the government may not
restrict expression on the basis of viewpoint).
Third, the City asserts that its policy is necessary to
protect the senior citizens who use its centers. The City
argues that the senior citizens who use the Senior Centers
are members of a “captive audience” who are “vulner-
able” to “religious proselytizing and coercion.” Br. Appel-
lees 27. This claim is at best tenuous, and at worst
insulting to senior citizens. People in this age group are
not in need of special insulation from invitations to adopt
a religious faith; nor are they, as a class, more likely than
l3a
other citizens to be intimidated by such invitations.
Moreover, the showing of the Jesus film and the distribu-
tion of giant-print New Testaments can hardly be con-
strued as intimidating or coercive. People who choose to
attend presentations at the Senior Centers do not become
part of a captive audience: attendance at such programs
is purely voluntary, and people are free to come and go as
they please. Nor is there any implicit coercion to attend.
This is not a situation akin to the school graduation
ceremony at issue in Lee v. Weisman, where those who
chose to absent themselves paid the price of missing “one
of life’s most significant occasions.” 112 S. Ct. 2649, 2659
(1992). Shielding senior citizens from religious speech,
then, is also an inadequate justification for the City’s
policy.
VII. Tilton v. Richardson
Finally, we address the City’s contention that Tilton v.
Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971), which primarily con-
cerned an Establishment Clause challenge to statutory
language similar to that in the Older Americans Act,
should be read to uphold the City’s policy against a free
speech challenge. We reject this reading of Tilton. In that
case, the Court considered a federal grant and loan pro-
gram for the construction of academic facilities at institu-
tions of higher learning. The terms of the act excluded
facilities used for sectarian instruction or religious wor-
ship. The Court held, however, that a provision in the act
that effectively allowed facilities to be converted entirely
to religious purposes after twenty years violated the
Establishment Clause. Id. at 682-684. At no point did the
Court address any free-speech challenge to the act, and
l4a
nothing in the opinion implied that its decision uphold-
ing the remainder of the act against an Establishment
Clause challenge could be extended to protect similar
statutory language against a free-speech challenge. Fur-
thermore, the Court revisited the Tilton case in Widmar
and warned against such an expansive reading:
“[N]jothing in Tilton suggested a limitation on the State’s
capacity to maintain forums equally open to religious and
other discussions. Cases before and after Tilton have
acknowledged the right of religious speakers to use pub-
lic forums on equal terms with others.” 454 U.S. at 272 n.
12.
VIII. Conclusion
The City of Albuquerque has failed to show a com-
pelling interest that justifies its policy prohibiting sec-
tarian instruction and religious worship at its Senior
Centers. For that reason, we hold that the policy is an
unconstitutional restriction on expression. We therefore
REVERSE the judgment of the district court and enjoin
the City from barring the showing of the film Jesus and
the distribution of New Testaments at its Senior Centers.
We also award reasonable attorney’s fees to the appel-
lants in the district court and on appeal, as provided
under 42 U.S.C. § 1988, and remand this matter to the
district court for the determination of appropriate fee
amounts.
15a
APPENDIX B
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
CHURCH ON THE ROCK and
PASTOR DON KIMBRO,
Plaintiffs,
VS. CIV 94-1101 JC/ WWD
CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, TONI MARTORELLI,
in her official capacity as Director of Family and
Community Services for the City of Albuquerque,
and MARK SANCHEZ, in his official capacity as
Deputy Director of Family and Community Services
for the City of Albuquerque, and KATHLEEN STARK,
in her official capacity as Supervisor, Bear Canyon Senior
Center, City of Albuquerque,
Defendants.
ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY JUDGMENT
THIS MATTER came on for consideration of the
Plaintiff’s Notice of Motion for Preliminary Injunction,
filed October 3, 1994. The Court received evidence and
testimony and heard the arguments of counsel on Decem-
ber 5, 1994 and again on this date. Having announced my
reasoning aid the ruling from the bench and the parties
agreeing to converting the motion to one for Summary
Judgment, the Court enters judgment.
Wherefore,
IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED that
Summary Judgment is hereby entered for the Defendants
on the Complaint.
16a
Dated December 16, 1994.
/s/ John E. Conway
CHIEF UNITED STATES
DISTRICT JUDGE
Date of Entry 12-16-94
17a
APPENDIX C
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
HONR. JOHN E. CONWAY, JUDGE PRESIDING
CHURCH ON THE ROCK and
PASTOR DON KIMBRO,
Plaintiffs, No. CIV 94-1101-JC
cee eae eee ee
CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE,
et al.,
)
)
)
)
VS. )
)
)
)
)
a Defendants.
REPORTER’S TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS
VOLUME II
December 16, 1994
APPEARANCES
FOR THE PLAINTIFF:
MR. BENJAMIN W. BULL
Attorney at Law
11811 N. Tatum Boulevard
# P155
Phoenix, Arizona 85028
MR. PAUL BECHT
Attorney at Law
1709 Moon Street, N.E.
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87112
18a
FOR THE DEFENDANT:
OFFICE OF THE CITY ATTORNEY
One Civic Plaza
11th Floor
Albuquerque, New Mexico 87102
BY: MR. WILLIAM D. WINTER
* * *
[p. 100] thing as the Establishment Clause, because in this
context, that’s the only way those words can pass consti-
tutional muster is if they’re interpreted or defined to
mean the Establishment Clause. Because if they mean
anything else, then they’re on a collision course with
Lamb’s Chapel, which I believe is controlling in this partic-
ular case.
Your Honor, unless the Court has any more questions
for me, that’s all I have.
THE COURT: All right. Appreciate the argu-
ments this morning, I'll give you a decision at 11:30.
MR. BULL: 11:30?
THE COURT: Yes.
(Recess held.)
THE COURT: All right. This is my decision in
the case of Church on the Rock and Pastor Don Kimbro v.
City of Albuquerque et al.
First, I find the plaintiffs have failed to show a likeli-
hood of success on the merits. To reach this decision, I do
not need to decide whether the senior center should be
characterized as a designated limited purpose public
forum or a nonpublic forum. Even if the senior center is a
=
:
a
‘
|
4
ron cae
Noisy Het hesitate aap Be ew 06 Hag 28 LOE EE EIEN Ht aE IE
OO eA NI eT
iad aa dee Reals Me aN RAKO TIO ws
19a
limited public forum which permits the City to impose
lesser restrictions on [p. 101] speech, I find that the
restrictions in this case are constitutional.
In the case of a limited purpose public forum, the
government may create a forum, even if not officially
required to do so, and limit that forum to particular
groups or subject matter. Bell v. Little Axe Independent
School District, 766 F.2d 1391, at page 1401, a 1985 deci-
sion; and also Cornelius and Perry Education Association
from the U. S. Supreme Court.
The evidence supports the City’s position that the
purpose of the senior centers, as defined by the Older
Americans Act, is to provide a variety of services, includ-
ing recreation, health, nutrition, referral to senior citizen
service providers and education. Mr. Perdue’s affidavit at
paragraph 8 and 42 United States Code Section 3002
subparagraph (35) from the West Supplement. By defini-
tion, this purpose does not include sect#:ian instruction
or religious worship. See 42 U. S. Code Section
3027(14)(a){iv).
Both parties agree that Jesus that the “Jesus” movie is
patently religious in nature and is intended to spread the
word that Jesus is the savior. In fact, plaintiffs’ counsel
concedes that the film’s primary purpose is to prosely-
tize. Therefore, I conclude that it is sectarian instruction
and not [p. 102] within the limited purpose of the senior
centers.
I also find the City is not restricting speech here on
the basis of viewpoint. In Lamb's Chapel, it was clear that
the school district had opened up the forum on family
values and child rearing, yet it excluded instruction from
20a
a Christian viewpoint. Here the City has not opened up
the senior center forum for sectarian instruction. There-
fore, no matter what viewpoint the speaker proposes,
Christian, Jewish, Muslim, Hindu or whatever, the
speaker may not offer sectarian instruction.
I'll put in my order that it’s a matter of “potentially
different” so you can take an immediate appeal.
MR. BULL: Thank you, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Or I'll convert it into summary
judgment now and enter a summary judgment in favor of
the City and you can take that up on appeal.
MR. BULL: We prefer that the whole thing be
converted into summary judgment. That way we can take
the whole thing up on that basis.
THE COURT: Everything that you've presented
by way of exhibits will be part of the record. So — and I'll
enter summary judgment, then, in favor of the City. Any-
thing further?
[p. 103] MR. BULL: Not from the plaintiffs.
MR. WINTER: No, thank you.
THE COURT: We'll be in recess.
(Proceedings concluded.)
2la
APPENDIX D
§ 3027. State plans
(a) Criteria for eligibility; contents
Except as provided in the succeeding sentence and
section 3029(a) of this title, each State, in order to be
eligible for grants from its allotment under this subchap-
ter for any fiscal year, shall submit to the Assistant Secre-
tary a State plan for a two-, three-, or four-year period
determined by the State agency, with such annual revi-
sions as are necessary, which meets such criteria as the
Assistant Secretary may by regulation prescribe. If the
Assistant Secretary determines, in the discretion of the
Assistant Secretary, that a State failed in 2 successive
years to comply with the requirements under this sub-
chapter, then the State shall submit to the Assistant Secre-
tary a State plan for a 1-year period that meets such
criteria, for subsequent years until the Assistant Secretary
determines that the State is in compliance with such
requirements. Each such plan shall comply with all of the
following requirements:
(1) The plan shall contain assurances that
the State plan will be based upon area plans
developed by area agencies on aging within the
State designated under section 3025(a)(2)(A) of
this title and that the State will prepare and
distribute a uniform format for use by area
agencies on aging in developing area plans
under section 3026 of this title.
(2) The plan shall provide that each area
agency on aging designated under section
3025(a)(2)(A) of this title will develop and sub-
mit to the State agency for approval an area plan
22a
which complies with the provisions of section
3026 of this title.
(3)(A) The plan shall provide that the State
agency will evaluate the need for supportive
services (including legal assistance and trans-
portation services), nutrition services, and mul-
tipurpose senior centers within the State and
determine the extent to which existing public or
private programs meet such need. To conduct
the evaluation, the State agency shall use the
procedures implemented under section
3012(a)(29) of this title.
(B) The plan shall provide assurances that
the State agency will spend in each fiscal year,
for services to older individuals residing in rural
areas in the State assisted under this subchapter,
an amount equal to not less than 105 percent of
the amount expended for such services (includ-
ing amounts expended under subchapter V and
subchapter VII of this chapter) in fiscal year
1978.
(4) The plan shall provide for the use of
such methods of administration (including
methods relating to the establishment and main-
tenance of personnel standards on a merit basis,
except that the Assistant Secretary shall exercise
no authority with respect to the selection, tenure
of office, or compensation of any individual
employed in accordance with such methods) as
are necessary for the proper and efficient
administration of the plan, and, where neces-
sary, provide for the reorganization and reas-
signment of functions to assure such efficient
administration.
(5) The plan shall provide that the State
agency will afford an opportunity for a hearing
Sn i tei ba S ES ES A Eb RNG E GI SR ill A Get * Silas iii ania 2a gees,
= Rea alla Cie eS a ils Sih,
pling ihe leaky! Ke te ate WE
ah et C0
2 ROAR Ente tit BRE mili. a> LP vides
23a
upon request to any area agency on aging sub-
mitting a plan under this subchapter, to any
provider of a service under such a plan, or to
any applicant to provide a service under such a
plan. The State agency shall establish and pub-
lish procedures for requesting and conducting
such hearing.
(6) The plan shall provide that the State
agency will make such reports, in such form,
and containing such information, as the Assis-
tant Secretary may require, and comply with
such requirements as the Assistant Secretary
may impose to insure the correctness of such
reports.
(7)(A) The plan shall provide satisfactory
assurance that such fiscal control and fund
accounting procedures will be adopted as may
be necessary to assure proper disbursement of,
and accounting for, Federal funds paid under
this subchapter to the State, including any such
funds paid to the recipients of a grant or con-
tract.
(B) The plan shall provide assurances that -
(i) no individual (appointed or other-
wise) involved in the designation of the
State agency or an area agency on aging, or
in the designation of the head of any subdi-
vision of the State agency or of an area
agency on aging, is subject to a conflict of
interest prohibited under this chapter;
(ii) no officer, ernployee, or other rep-
resentative of the State agency or an area
agency on aging is subject to a conflict of
interest prohibited under this chapter; and
24a
(iii) mechanisms are in place to iden-
tify and remove conflicts of interest prohib-
ited under this chapter.
(C) The plan shall provide assurances that
the State agency and each area agency on aging
will -
(i) maintain the integrity and public
purpose of services provided, and service
providers, under the State plan in all con-
tractual and commercial relationships;
(ii) disclose to the Assistant Secretary -
(I) the identity of each nongovern-
mental entity with which the State
agency or area agency on aging has a
contract or commercial relationship
relating to providing any service to
older individuals; and
(II) the nature of such contract or
such relationship;
(iii) demonstrate that a loss or diminu-
tion in the quantity or quality of the ser-
vices provided, or to be provided, under
this chapter by such agency has not resulted
and will not result from such contract or
such relationship;
(iv) demonstrate that the quantity or
quality of the services to be provided under
the State plan will be enhanced as a result of
such contract or such relationship; and
(v) on the request of the Assistant Sec-
retary, for the purpose of monitoring com-
pliance with this chapter (including
conducting an audit), disclose all sources
25a
and expenditures of funds the State agency
and area agency on aging receive or expend
to provide services to older individuals.
(8) The plan shall provide that the State
agency will conduct periodic evaluations of, and
public hearings on, activities and projects car-
ried out under the State plan, including an eval-
uation of the effectiveness of the State agency in
reaching older individuals with greatest eco-
nomic need and older individuals with greatest
social need, with particular attention to low-
income minority individuals. In conducting
such evaluations and public hearings, the State
agency shall solicit the views and experiences of
entities that are knowledgeable about the needs
and concerns of low-income minority older indi-
viduals.
(9) The plan shall provide for establishing
and maintaining information and assistance ser-
vices in sufficient numbers to assure that all
older individuals in the State who are not fur-
nished adequate information and assistance ser-
vices under section 30?4(a)(4) of this title will
have reasonably convenient access to such ser-
vices.
(10) The plan shall provide that no sup-
portive services, nutrition services, or in-home
services (as defined in section 3030i of this title)
will be directly provided by the State agency or
an area agency on aging, except where, in the
judgment of the State agency, provision of such
services by the State agency or an area agency
on aging is necessary to assure an adequate
supply of such services, or where such services
are directly related to such State or area agency
on aging’s administrative functions, or where
26a
such services of comparable quality can be pro-
vided more economically by such State or area
agency on aging.
(11) The plan shall provide that subject to
the requirements of merit employment systems
of State and local governments -
(A) preference shall be given to older
individuals; and
(B) special consideration shall be
given to individuals with formal training in
the field of aging (including an educational
specialty or emphasis in aging and a train-
ing degree or certificate in aging) or equiva-
lent professional experience in the field of
aging;
for any staff positions (full time or part time) in
State and area agencies for which such individ-
uals qualify.
(12) The plan shall provide assurances that
the State agency will carry out, through the
Office of the State Long-Term Care Ombuds-
man, a State Long-Term Care Ombudsman pro-
gram in accordance with section 3058g of this
title and this subchapter.
(13) The plan shall spioneomolts with respect to
nutrition services that —
(A) each project providing nutrition
services will be available to older individ-
uals and to their spouses, and may be made
available to handicapped or disabled indi-
viduals who have not attained 60 years of
age but who reside in housing facilities
occupied primarily by older individuals at
27a
which congregate nutrition services are pro-
vided;
(B) primary consideration shall be
given to the provision of meals in a congre-
gate setting, except that each area agency on
aging (i) may award funds made available
under this subchapter (other than under
section 3023(b)(3) of this title) to organiza-
tions for the provision of home delivered
meals to older individuals in accordance
with the provisions of subpart II of part C of
this subchapter, based upon a determination
of need made by the recipient of a grant or
contract entered into under this subchapter,
without requiring that such organizations
also provide meals to older individuals in a
congregate setting; and (ii) shall, in award-
ing such funds, select such organizations in
a manner which complies with the provi-
sions of subparagraph (H);
(C)(i) each project will permit recip-
ients of grants or contracts to solicit volun-
tary contributions for meals furnished in
accordance with guidelines established by
the Assistant Secretary, taking into consid-
eration the income ranges of eligible indi-
viduals in local communities and other
sources of income of the recipients of a
grant or contract; and
(ii) such voluntary contributions will
be used to increase the number of meals
served by the project involved, to facilitate
access to such meals, and to provide other
supportive services directly related to nutri-
tion services;
28a
(D) in the case of meals served in a
congregate setting, a site for such services
and for comprehensive supportive services
is furnished in as close proximity to the
majority of eligible individuals’ residences
as feasible, with particular attention upon a
multipurpose senior center, a school, a
church, or other appropriate community
facility, preferably within walking distance
where possible, and where appropriate,
transportation to such site is furnished;
(E) each project will establish outreach
activities which assure that the maximum
number of eligible individuals may have an
opportunity to participate;
(F) each project will establish and
administer the nutrition project with the
advice of dietitians (or individuals with
comparable expertise), persons competent
in the field of service in which the nutrition
project is being provided, older individuals
who will participate in the program, and of
persons who are knowledgeable with
regard to the needs of older individuals;
(G) each project will provide special
menus, where feasible and appropriate, to
meet the particular dietary needs arising
from the health requirements, religious
requirements, or ethnic backgrounds of eli-
gible individuals;
(H) each area agency on aging will
give consideration, where feasible, in the
furnishing of home delivered meals to the
use of organizations which (i) have demon-
strated an ability to provide home delivered
meals efficiently and reasonably; and (ii)
x See eee eee
29a
furnish assurances to the area agency on
aging that such an organization will main-
tain efforts to solicit voluntary support and
that funds made available under this sub-
chapter to the organization will not be used
to supplant funds from non-Federal sources;
(I) each area agency on aging shall
establish procedures that will allow nutri-
tion project administrators the option to
offer a meal, on the same basis as meals are
provided to participating older individuals,
to individuals providing volunteer services
during the meal hours, and to individuals
with disabilities who reside at home with
and accompany older individuals who are
eligible under this chapter;
(J) each nutrition project shall provide
nutrition education on at least a semiannual
basis to participants in programs described
in part C of this subchapter;
(K) each project shall comply with
applicable provisions of State or local laws
regarding the safe and sanitary handling of
food, equipment, and supplies used in the
storage, preparation, service, and delivery
of meals to an older individual;
(L) the State agency will monitor,
coordinate, and assist in the planning of
nutritional services, with the advice of a
dietitian or an individual with comparable
expertise; and
(M) the State agency will -
30a
(i) develop nonfinancial criteria
for eligibility to receive nutrition ser-
vices under section 3030f of this title;
and
(ii) periodically evaluate recip-
ients of such services to determine
whether they continue to meet such cri-
teria.
(14) The plan shall provide, with respect to
the acquisition (in fee simple or by lease for 10
years or more), alteration, or renovation of exis-
ting facilities (or the construction of new facili-
ties in any area in which there are no suitable
structures available, as determined by the State
agency, after full consideration of the recom-
mendations made by area agencies on aging, to
be a focal point for the delivery of services
assisted under this subchapter) to serve as mul-
tipurpose senior centers, that -
(A) the plan contains or is supported
by reasonable assurances that (i) for not less
than 10 years after acquisition, or not less
than 20 years after the completion of con-
struction, the facility will be used for the
purpose for which it is to be acquired or
constructed, unless for unusual circum-
stances the Assistant Secretary waives the
requirement of this division; (ii) sufficient
funds will be available to meet the non-
Federal share of the cost of acquisition or
construction of the facility; (iii) sufficient
funds will be available when acquisition or
construction is completed, for effective use
of the facility for the purpose for which it is
being acquired or constructed; and (iv) the
facility will not be used and is not intended
3la
to be used for sectarian instruction or as a
place for religious worship;
(B) the plan contains or is supported
by reasonable assurances that, in the case of
purchase or construction, there are no exis-
ting facilities in the community suitable for
leasing as a multipurpose senior center;
(C) the plans and specifications for the
facility are in accordance with regulations
relating to minimum standards of construc-
tion, promulgated with particular emphasis
on securing compliance with the require-
ments of the Act of August 12, 1968, com-
monly known as the Architectural Barriers
Act of 1968 [42 U.S.C. § 4151 et seq.];
(D) the plan contains or is supported
by adequate assurance that any laborer or
mechanic employed by any contractor or
subcontractor in the performance of work
on the facility will be paid wages at rates
not less than those prevailing for similar
work in the locality as determined by the
Secretary of Labor in accordance with
the Act of March 3, 1931 (40 U.S.C.
§§ 276a-276a-5; commonly known as the
Davis-Bacon Act), and the Secretary of
Labor shall have, with respect to the labor
standards specified in this subparagraph,
the authority and functions set forth in reor-
ganization plan numbered 14 of 1950 (15
F.R. 3176; 64 Stat. 1267), and section 276c of
Title 40; and
(E) the plan contains assurances that
the State agency will consult with the Secre-
tary of Housing and Urban Development
32a
with respect to the technical adequacy of
any proposed alteration or renovation.
(15) The plan shall provide that with
respect to legal assistance —
(A) the plan contains assurances that
area agencies on aging will (i) enter into
contracts with providers of legal assistance
which can demonstrate the experience or
capacity to deliver legal assistance; (ii)
include in any such contract provisions to
assure that any recipient of funds under
division (i) will be subject to specific restric-
tions and regulations promulgated under
the Legal Services Corporation Act [42
U.S.C. § 2996 et seq.] (other than restrictions
and regulations governing eligibility for
legal assistance under such Act and govern-
ing membership of local governing boards)
as determined appropriate by the Assistant
Secretary; and (iii) attempt to involve the
private bar in legal assistance activities
authorized under this subchapter, including
groups within the private bar furnishing
services to older individuals on a pro bono
and reduced fee basis;
(B) the plan contains assurances that
no legal assistance will be furnished unless
the grantee administers a program designed
to provide legal assistance to older individ-
uals with social or economic need and has
agreed, if the grantee is not a Legal Services
Corporation project grantee, to coordinate
its services with existing Legal Services Cor-
poration projects in the planning and ser-
vice area in order to concentrate the use of
funds provided under this subchapter on
33a
individuals with the greatest such need; and
the area agency on aging makes a finding,
after assessment, pursuant to standards for
service promulgated by the Assistant Secre-
tary, that any grantee selected is the entity
best able to provide the particular services;
(C) the State agency will provide for
the coordination of the furnishing of legal
services to older individuals within the
State, and provide advice and technical
assistance in the provision of legal assis-
tance to older individuals within the State
and support the furnishing of training and
technical assistance for legal assistance for
older individuals;
(D) the plan contains assurances, to
the extent practicable, that legal services
furnished under the plan will be in addition
to any legal services for older individuals
being furnished with funds from sources
other than this chapter and that reasonable
efforts will be made to maintain existing
levels of legal services for older individuals;
and
(E) the plan contains assurances that
area agencies on aging will give priority to
legal assistance related to income, health
care, long-term care, nutrition, housing,
utilities, protective services, defense of
guardianship, abuse, neglect, and age dis-
crimination.
3
2
4
3
$
3
.
:
:
3
i
4
a
a
:
4
s
‘
(16) The plan shall provide, whenever the
State desires to provide for a fiscal year for
services for the prevention of abuse of older
individuals -
34a
(A) the plan contains assurances that
any area agency on aging carrying out such
services will conduct a program consistent
with relevant State law and coordinated
with existing State adult protective service
activities for -
(i) public education to identify
and prevent abuse of older individuals;
(ii) receipt of reports of abuse of
older individuals;
(iii) active participation of older
individuals participating in programs
under this chapter through outreach,
conferences, and referral of such indi-
viduals to other social service agencies
or sources of assistance where appro-
priate and consented to by the parties
to be referred; and
(iv) referral of complaints to law
enforcement or public protective ser-
vice agencies where appropriate;
(B) the State will not permit involun-
tary or coerced participation in the program
of services described in this paragraph by
alleged victims, abusers, or their house-
holds; and
(C) all information gathered in the
course of receiving reports and making
referrals shall remain confidential unless all
parties to the complaint consent in writing
to the release of such information, except
that such information may be released to a
law enforcement or public protective ser-
vice agency.
35a
(17) The plan shall provide assurances that
each State will provide inservice training oppor-
tunities for personnel of agencies and programs
funded under this chapter.
(18) The plan shall provide assurances that
each State will assign personnel (one of whom
shall be known as a legal assistance developer)
to provide State leadership in developing legal
assistance programs for older individuals
throughout the State.
(19) The plan shall provide, with respect to
education and training services, assurances that
area agencies on aging may enter into grants
and contracts with providers of education and
training services which can demonstrate the
experience or capacity to provide such services
(except that such contract authority shall be
effective for any fiscal year only to such extent,
or in such amounts, as are provided in appro-
priations Acts).
(20) The plan shall provide assurances
that, if a substantial number of the older indi-
viduals residing in any planning and service
area in the State are of limited English-speaking
ability, then the State will require the area
agency on aging for each such planning and
service area —
(A) to utilize, in the delivery of out-
reach services under section 3026(a)(2)(A) of
this title, the services of workers who are
fluent in the language spoken by a predomi-
nant number of such older individuals who
are of limited English-speaking ability; and
(B) to designate an individual
employed by the area agency on aging, or
36a
available to such area agency on aging on a
full-time basis, whose responsibilities will
include -
(i) taking such action as may be
appropriate to assure that counseling
assistance is made available to such
older individuals who are of limited
English-speaking ability in order to as-
sist such older individuals in participat-
ing in programs and receiving
assistance under this chapter; and
(ii) providing guidance to individ-
uals engaged in the delivery of suppor-
tive services under the area plan
involved to enable such individuals to
be aware of cultural sensitivities and to
take into account effectively linguistic
and cultural differences.
(21) The plan shall provide assurances that
the State agency, in carrying out the State Long-
Term Care Ombudsman program under subsec-
tion (a)(12) of this section, will expend not less
than the total amount expended by the agency
in fiscal year 1991 in carrying out such a pro-
gram under this subchapter.
(22) The plan shall specify a minimum per-
centage of the funds received by each area
agency on aging for part B of this subchapter
that will be expended, in the absence of the
waiver granted under section 3026(b)(1) of this
title, by such area agency on aging to provide
each of the categories of services specified in
section 3026(a)(2) of this title.
a 37a
(23) The plan shall, with respect to the
fiscal year preceding the fiscal year for which
such plan is prepared -
(A) identify the number of low-
income minority older individuals in the
State; and
(B) describe the methods used to sat-
isfy the service needs of such minority older
individuals.
(24) The plan shall provide assurances that
the State agency will require outreach efforts
that will -
(A) identify individuals eligible for
assistance under this chapter, with special
emphasis on -
(i) older individuals residing in
rural areas;
(ii) older individuals with greatest
economic need (with particular atten-
tion to low-income minority individ-
uals);
(iii) older individuals with great-
est social need (with particular atten-
tion to low-income minority individ-
uals);
(iv) older individuals with severe
disabilities;
(v) older individuals with limited
English-speaking ability; and
(vi) older individuals with
Alzheimer’s disease or related disor-
ders with neurological and organic
38a
brain dysfunction (and the caretakers of
such individuals); and
(B) inform the older individuals
referred to in clauses (i) through (vi) of
subparagraph (A), and the caretakers of
such individuals, of the availability of such
assistance.
(25) The plan shall provide, with respect to
the needs of older individuals with severe dis-
abilities, assurances that the State will coordi-
nate planning, identification, assessment of
needs, and service for older individuals with
disabilities with particular attention to individ-
uals with severe disabilities with the State agen-
cies with primary responsibility for individuals
with disabilities, including severe disabilities,
and develop collaborative programs, where
appropriate, to meet the needs of older individ-
uals with disabilities.
(26) The plan shall provide assurances that
area agencies on aging will conduct efforts to
facilitate the coordination of community-based,
long-term care services, pursuant to section
3026(a)(6)(1) of this title, for older individuals
who -
(A) reside at home and are at risk of
institutionalization because of limitations
on their ability to function independently;
(B) are patients in hospitals and are at
risk of prolonged institutionalization; or
(C) are patients in long-term care
facilities, but who can return to their homes
if community-based services are provided
to them.
BI ac oie a i a tei as
39a
(27) The plan shall provide assurances of
consultation and coordination in planning and
provision of in-home services under section
3030h of this title with State and local agencies
and private nonprofit organizations which
administer and provide services relating to
health, social services, rehabilitation, and men-
tal health services.
(28) The plan shall provide assurances that
if the State receives funds appropriated under
section 3023(e) of this title, the State agency and
area agencies on aging will expend such funds
to carry out part E of this subchapter.
(29) The plan shall, with respect to the
fiscal year preceding the fiscal year for which
such plan is prepared, describe the methods
used to satisfy the service needs of older indi-
viduals who reside in rural areas.
(30) The plan shall include the assurances
and description required by section 3058d(a) of
this title.
(31)(A) If 50 percent or more of the area
plans in the State provide for an area volunteer
services coordinator, as described in section
3026(a)(12) of this title, the State plan shall pro-
vide for a State volunteer services coordinator,
who shall -
(i) encourage area agencies on
aging to provide for area volunteer ser-
vices coordinators;
(ii) coordinate the volunteer ser-
vices offered between the various area
agencies on aging;
40a
(iii) encourage, organize, and pro-
mote the use of older individuals as
volunteers to the State;
(iv) provide technical assistance,
which may include training, to area vol-
unteer services coordinators; and
(v) promote the recognition of the
contribution made by volunteers to the
programs administered under the State
plan.
(B) If fewer than 50 percent of the area
plans in the State provide for an area volun-
teer services coordinator, the State plan may
provide for the State volunteer services
coordinator described in subparagraph (A).
(32) The plan shall provide assurances that
special efforts will be made to provide technical
assistance to minority providers of services.
(33) The plan -
(A) shall include the statement and
the demonstration required by paragraphs
(2) and (4) of section 3025(d) of this title;
and
(B) may not be approved unless the
Assistant Secretary approves such statement
and such demonstration.
(34) The plan shall provide an assurance
that the State agency will coordinate programs
under this subchapter and subchapter X of this
chapter, if applicable.
(35) The plan shall -
(A) provide an assurance that the
State agency will pursue activities to
4la
increase access by older individuals who are
Native Americans to all aging programs and
benefits provided by the agency, including
programs and benefits under this subchap-
ter, if applicable; and
(B) specify the ways in which the State
agency intends to implement the activities.
(36) If case management services are
offered to provide access to supportive services,
the plan shall provide that the State agency shall
ensure compliance with the requirements speci-
fied in section 3026(a)(20) of this title.
(37) The plan shall identify for each fiscal
year, the actual and projected additional costs of
providing services under this subchapter,
including the cost of providing access to such
services, to older individuals residing in rural
areas in the State (in accordance with a standard
definition of rural areas specified by the Assis-
tant Secretary).
(38) The plan shall provide assurances that
funds received under this subchapter will not be
used to pay any part of a cost (including an
administrative cost) incurred by the State or an
area agency on aging to carry out a contract or
commercial relationship that is not carried out
to implement this subchapter.
(39) The plan shall provide assurances that
preference in receiving services under this sub-
chapter will not be given by the area agency on
aging to particular older individuals as a result
of a contract or commercial relationship that is
not carried out to implement this subchapter.
(40) The plan shall provide assurances that
if the State receives funds appropriated under
42a
section 3023(g) of this title the State agency and
area agencies on aging will expend such funds
to carry out part G of this subchapter.
(41) The plan shall provide assurances that
demonstrable efforts will be made -
(A) to coordinate services provided
under this chapter with other State services
that benefit older individuals; and
(B) to provide multigenerational activ-
ities, such as opportunities for older indi-
viduals to serve as mentors or advisers in
child care, youth day care, educational
assistance, at-risk youth intervention, juve-
nile delinquency treatment, and family sup-
port programs.
(42) The plan shall provide assurances that
the State will coordinate public services within
the State to assist older individuals to obtain
transportation services associated with access to
services provided under this subchapter, to ser-
vices under subchapter X of this chapter, to
comprehensive counseling services, and to legal
assistance.
(43) The plan shall provide that the State
agency shall issue guidelines applicable to
grievance procedures required by section
3026(a)(6)(P) of this title.
(44) The plan shall include assurances that
the State has in effect a mechanism to provide
for quality in the provision of in-home services
under this subchapter.
a ee ee SP ON A! nie a
ee ee we et
Ai dtenkentvaate abit dk ripitdiniete
43a
(b) Approval by Assistant Secretary; waiver of require-
ments
(1) The Assistant Secretary shall approve any State
plan which the Assistant Secretary finds fulfills the
requirements of subsection (a) of this section, except the
Assistant Secretary may not approve such plan unless the
Assistant Secretary determines that the formula submit-
ted under section 3025(a)(2)(D) of this title complies with
the guidelines in effect under section 3025(a)(2)(C) of this
title.
(2) The Assistant Secretary, in approving any State
plan under this section, may waive the requirement
described in paragraph (3)(B) of subsection (a) of this
section if the State agency demonstrates to the Assistant
Secretary that the service needs of older individuals
residing in rural areas in the State are being met, or that
the number of older individuals residing in such rural
areas is not sufficient to require the State agency to com-
ply with such requirement.
(c) Notice and hearing prior to disapproval
(1) The Assistant Secretary shall not make a final
determination disapproving any State plan, or any mod-
ification thereof, or make a final determination that a
State is ineligible under section 3025 of this title, without
first affording the State reasonable notice and oppor-
tunity for a hearing.
(2) Not later than 30 days after such final deter-
mination, a State dissatisfied with such final determina-
tion may appeal such final determination to the Secretary
44a
for review. If the State timely appeals such final deter-
mination in accordance with subsection (e)(1) of this sec-
tion, the Secretary shall dismiss the appeal filed under
this paragraph.
(3) If the State is dissatisfied with the decision of
the Secretary after review under paragraph (2), the State
may appeal such decision not later than 30 days after
such decision and in the manner described in subsection
(e) of this section. For purposes of appellate review under
the preceding sentence, a reference in subsection (e) of
this section to the Assistant Secretary shall be deemed to
be a reference to the Secretary.
(d) Discontinuance of payments; disbursement of
withheld funds to agencies with approved plans;
matching funds ©
Whenever the Assistant Secretary, after reasonable
notice and opportunity for a hearing to the State agency,
finds that -
(1) the State is not eligible under section
3025 of this title,
(2) the State plan has been so changed that
it no longer complies substantially with the pro-
visions of subsection (a) of this section, or
(3) in the administration of the plan there
is a failure to comply substantially with any
such provision of subsection (a) of this section,
the Assistant Secretary shall notify such State agency that
no further payments from its allotments under section
3024 of this title and section 3028 of this title will be made
to the State (or, in the Assistant Secretary’s discretion,
45a
that further payments to the State will be limited to
projects under or portions of the State plan not affected
by such failure), until the Assistant Secretary is satisfied
that there will no longer be any failure to comply. Until
the Assistant Secretary is so satisfied, no further pay-
ments shall be made to such State from its allotments
under section 3024 of this title and section 3028 of this
title (or payments shall be limited to projects under or
portions of the State plan not affected by such failure).
The Assistant Secretary shall, in accordance with regula-
tions the Assistant Secretary shall prescribe, disburse the
funds so withheld directly to any public or nonprofit
private organization or agency or political subdivision of
such State submitting an approved plan in accordance
with the provisions of this section. Any such payment
shall be matched in the proportions specified in section
3024 of this title.
(e) Appeal
(1) A State which is dissatisfied with a final action
of the Assistant Secretary under subsection (b), (c), or (d)
of this section may appeal to the United States court of
appeals for the circuit in which the State is located, by
filing a petition with such court within 30 days after such
final action. A copy of the petition shall be forthwith
transmitted by the clerk of the court to the Assistant
Secretary, or any officer designated by the Assistant Sec-
retary for such purpose. The Assistant Secretary there-
upon shall file in the court the record of the proceedings
on which the Assistant Secretary’s action is based, as
provided in section 2112 of Title 28.
46a
(2) Upon the filing of such petition, the court shall
have jurisdiction to affirm the action of the Assistant
Secretary or to set it aside, in whole or in part, tempo-
rarily or permanently, but until the filing of the record,
the Assistant Secretary may modify or set aside the Assis-
tant Secretary’s order. The findings of the Assistant Secre-
tary as to the facts, if supported by substantial evidence,
shall be conclusive, but the court, for good cause shown,
may remand the case to the Assistant Secretary to take
further evidence, and the Assistant Secretary shall, within
30 days, file in the court the record of those further
proceedings. Such new or modified findings of fact shall
likewise be conclusive if supported by substantial evi-
dence. The judgment of the court affirming or setting
aside, in whole or in part, any action of the Assistant
Secretary shall be final, subject to review by the Supreme
Court of the United States upon certiorari or certification
as provided in section 1254 of Title 28.
(3) The commencement of proceedings under this
subsection shall not, unless so specifically ordered by the
court, operate as a stay of the Assistant Secretary’s action.
(f) Confidentiality of information relating to legal
assistance; protection of commercial information
(1) Neither a State, nor a State agency, may require
any provider of legal assistance under this subchapter to
reveal any information that is protected by the attorney-
client privilege.
(2) Information disclosed under section
3026(a)(14)(B)(i) of this title or subsection (a)(7)(C)(i1)(1)
of this section may be disclosed to the public by the State
‘ 47a
agency or the State only if such information could be
disclosed under section 552 of Title 5 by an agency of the
United States.
48a
(Pub. L. 89-73, Title III, § 307, as added Pub. L. 95-478,
Title L, § 103(b), Oct. 18, 1978, 92 Stat. 1524; amended Pub.
L. 97-115, §§ 3(d), 7, Dec. 29, 1981, 95 Stat. 1597, 1598;
Pub. L. 98-459, Title III, § 307, Oct. 9, 1984, 98 Stat. 1775;
Pub. L. 100-175, Title 1, §§ 128, 129(d), (e), 130(b), 131(b),
132(c), 136(c), 137(b), 138, 140(c), 141(c), 142, 144(d),
155(e)(2), 182(k), Nov. 29, 1987, 101 Stat. 934, 935, 938,
939, 940, 943, 944, 946, 947, 949, 953, 965; Pub. L. 100-628,
Title VII, § 705(6), Nov. 7, 1988, 102 Stat. 3247; Pub. L.
102-375, Title I, § 102(b)(4), (5), (10)(A), (C), (E), (F), Title
IIL, § 307, Title VII, § 708(c)(4), Title IX, § 904(a)(13), Sept.
30, 1992, 106 Stat. 1201, 1202, 1228, 1293, 1308; Pub. L.
103-171, §§ 2(9), 3(a)(5), Dec. 2, 1993, 107 Stat. 1988, 1990.)
REFERENCES IN TEXT
Subchapter V and subchapter VII of this chapter,
referred to in subsec. (a)(3)(B), were repealed by Pub. L.
95-478, Title V, § 501(a), Oct. 18, 1978, 92 Stat. 1558.
Act of August 12, 1968, commonly known as the
Architectural Barriers Act of 1968, referred to in subsec.
(a)(14)(C), is Pub. L. 90-480, Aug. 12, 1968, 82 Stat. 718, as
amended, which is classified generally to chapter 51 (sec-
tion 4151 et seq.) of this title. For complete classification
of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under
section 4151 of this title and Tables.
Act of March 3, 1931 (40 U.S.C. 276a-276a-5; com-
monly known as the Davis-Bacon Act), referred to in
subsec. (a)(14)(D), is Act Mar. 3, 1931, ch. 411, 46 Stat.
1494, as amended, which is classified generally to sec-
tions 276a to 276a-5 of Title 40, Public Buildings, Property,
and Works. For complete classification of this Act to the
49a
Code, see Short Title note set out under section 276a of
Title 40 and Tables.
Reorganization plan numbered 14 of 1950 (15 ER.
3176; 64 Stat. 1267), referred to in subsec. (a)(14)(D), is set
out in the Appendix to Title 5, Government Organization
and Employees.
The Legal Services Corporation Act, referred to in
subsec. (a){15)(A), is Title X of Pub. L. 88-452, as added by
Pub. L. 93-355, § 2, July 25, 1974, 88 Stat. 378, as amended,
which is classified generally to subchapter X (§ 2996 et
seq.) of chapter 34 of this title. For complete classification
of this Act to the Code, see Short Title note set out under
section 2996 of this title and Tables.
Prior PROvIsIONS
A prior section 3027, Pub. L. 89-73, title III, § 307, as
added Pub. L. 93-29, title III, § 301, May 3, 1973, 87 Stat.
44, related to payment of grants or contracts, prior to the
general amendment of this subchapter by Pub. L. 95-478.
See section 3029 of this title.
Provisions similar to those comprising this section
were contained in Pub. L. 89-73, title III, § 305, as added
Pub. L. 93-29, title III, § 301, May 3, 1973, 87 Stat. 41; Pub.
L. 94-135, title I, §§ 106(a), (b), 114(e), Nov. 28, 1975, 89
Stat. 715, 725, which was classified to section 3025 of this
title prior to repeal by Pub. L. 95-478.
50a
AMENDMENTS
1993 - Pub. L. 103-171, § 3(a)(5)(B), substituted
“Assistant Secretary” for “Commissioner” wherever
appearing.
Subsec. (a)(8). Pub. L. 103-171, § 2(9)(A)(i), substi-
tuted “knowledgeable” for “knowledgable”.
Subsec. (a)(24). Pub. L. 103-171, § 2(9)(A)(ii), substi-
tuted period for semicolon at end.
Subsec. (b)(2). Pub. L. 103-171, § 2(9)(B), substituted
“such requirement” for “the requirement described in
clause (3)(B) of subsection (a) of this section”.
Subsecs. (d), (e). Pub. L. 103-171, § 3(a)(5)(A), substi-
tuted “Assistant Secretary’s” for “Commissioner’s” wher-
ever appearing.
1992 — Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 102-375, § 307(a)(1), (2),
inserted “the succeeding sentence and” after “provided
in” in first sentence and inserted after first sentence “If
the Commissioner determines, in the discretion of the
Commissioner, that a State failed in 2 successive years to
comply with the requirements under this subchapter,
then the State shall submit to the Commissioner a State
plan for a 1-year period that meets such criteria, for
subsequent years until the Commissioner determines that
the State is in compliance with such requirements.”
before “Each such plan shall comply”.
Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 102-375, § 102(b)(10)(F), substi-
tuted “agencies on aging in” for “agencies in”.
Subsec. (a)(3)(A). Pub. L. 102-375, § 307(a)(3), inser-
ted “and transportation services” after “legal assistance”
5la
and inserted at end “To conduct the evaluation, the State
agency shall use the procedures implemented under sec-
tion 3012(a)(29) of this title.”
Subsec. (a)(5). Pub. L. 102-375, § 307(b), inserted at
end “The State agency shall establish and publish pro-
cedures for requesting and conducting such hearing.”
Subsec. (a)(7). Pub. L. 102-375, § 307(c), designated
existing provisions as subpar. (A) and added subpars. (B)
and (C).
Subsec. (a)(8). Pub. L. 102-375, § 904(a)(13)(A)(i), sub-
stituted “greatest economic need and older individuals
with greatest social need” for “the greatest economic or
social needs”.
Pub. L. 102-375, § 307(d), inserted at end “In conduct-
ing such evaluations and public hearings, the State
agency shall solicit the views and experiences of entities
that are knowledgeable about the needs and concerns of
low-income minority older individuals.”
Subsec. (a)(9). Pub. L. 102-375, § 102(b)(4), substi-
tuted “information and assistance” for “information and
referral” in two places.
Subsec. (a)(10). Pub. L. 102-375, 102(b)(5), substituted
“section 3030i of this title” for “section 3030i(1) of this
title”.
Subsec. (a)(11). Pub. L. 102-375, § 307(e), substituted
“governments —” for “governments, preference shall be
given to individuals aged 60 or older”, and added sub-
pars. (A) and (B).
52a
Subsec. (a)(12). Pub. L. 102-375, § 307(f), amended
par. (12) generally, substituting provisions requiring the
plan to provide assurances that a State Long-Term Care
Ombudsman program be carried out in accordance with
section 3058g of this title for provisions setting out, in
subpars. (A) to (K), the assurances required to be pro-
vided by the plan with respect to such a program.
Subsec. (a)(13)(A). Pub. L. 102-375,
§ 904(a)(13)(A)(ii)(D, (ID, substituted “ to older individ-
uals” for “to individuals aged 60 or older” and “by older
individuals” for “by the elderly”.
Subsec. (a)(13)(B). Pub. L. 102-375,
§ 904(a)(13)(A)(ii)(IID, substituted “subparagraph” for
“subclause”.
Pub. L. 102-375, § 307(g)(1), inserted “(other than
under section 3023(b)(3) of this title)” after “available
under this subchapter”.
Pub. L. 102-375, § 102(b)(10)(C), substituted “area
agency on aging” for “area agency”.
Subsec. (a)(13)(F). Pub. L. 102-375, § 307(g)(2), inser-
ted “dietitians (or individuals with comparable experi-
ence),” after “advice of” and substituted “project will” for
“project may”.
Subsec. (a)(13)(H). Pub. L. 102-375, § 307(g)(3), struck
out “and” at end.
Pub. L. 102-375, § 102(b)(10)(E), substituted “area
agency on aging” for “area agency” in two places.
53a
Subsec. (a)(13)(H). Pub. L. 102-375,
§ 904(a)(13)(A)(ii)(IV), substituted “participating older
individuals” for “elderly participants”.
Pub. L. 102-375, § 307(g)(4), substituted semicolon for
period at end.
Pub. L. 102-375, § 102(b)(10)(C), substituted “area
agency on aging” for “area agency”.
Subsec. (a)(13)(J) to (M). Pub. L. 102-375, § 307(g)(5),
added subpars. (J) to (M).
Subsec. (a)(14). Pub. L. 102-375, § 102(b)(10)(A), sub-
stituted “area agencies on aging” for “area agencies”.
Subsec. (a)(14)(D). Pub. L. 102-375,
§ 904(a)(13)(A)(iii), substituted “subparagraph” for
“clause”.
Subsec. (a)(15)(B). Pub. L. 102-375, § 102(b)(10)(C),
substituted “area agency on aging” for “area agency”.
Subsec. (a)(15)(E). Pub. L. 102-375, § 307(h), added
subpar. (E).
Subsec. (a)(16). Pub. L. 102-375, § 307(i), substituted
“shall provide,” for “shall provide that” and “provide for
a” for “, if funds are not appropriated under section
3023(g) of this title for a fiscal year, provide that for
such”,
Subsec. (a)(16)(B). Pub. L. 102-375,
§ 904(a)(13)(A)(iv), substituted “paragraph” for “clause”.
Subsec. (a)(18). Pub. L. 102-375, § 307(j), inserted
“(one of whom shall be known as a legal assistance
developer)” after “personnel”.
54a
Subsec. (a)(20)(A). Pub. L. 102-375, § 708(c)(4), substi-
tuted “section 3026(a)(2)(A) of this title” for “sections
3026(a)(2)(A) and 3026(a)(6)(P) of this title”.
Subsec. (a)(21). Pub. L. 102-375, § 307(k), amended
par. (21) generaliy. Prior to amendment, par. (21) read as
follows: “The State plan shall provide that the State
agency, from funds allotted under section 3024(a) of this
title for part B of this subchapter and for paragraph (12)
(relating to the State long-term care ombudsman) shall
expend to carry out paragraph (12), for each fiscal year in
which the allotment for part B of this subchapter for the
State is not less than the allotment for fiscal year 1987 for
part B of this subchapter for such State, an amount which
is not less than the amount expended from funds received
under this chapter by such State in fiscal year 1987 to
carry out paragraph (12) as in effect before the effective
date of the Older Americans Act Amendments of 1987.
This paragraph shall not apply to American Samoa,
Guam, the Virgin Islands, the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands.”
Subsec. (a)(22). Pub. L. 102-375, § 102(b)(10)(E), sub-
stituted “area agency on aging” for “area agency” in two
places.
Subsec. (a)(24). Pub. L. 102-375, § 307(l), amended
par. (24) generally. Prior to amendment, par, (24) read as
follows: “The plan shall provide assurances that the State
agency will require outreach efforts that will -
“(A) identify older individuals who are eli-
gible for assistance under this chapter, with spe-
cial emphasis on older individuals with greatest
55a
economic need (with particular attention to low-
income minority individuals), older individuals
with greatest social need (with particular atten-
tion to low-income minority individuals), and
older individuals who reside in rural areas; and
“(B) inform such individuals of the avail-
ability of such assistance.”
Subsec. (a)(30). Pub. L. 102-375, § 307(m), amended
par. (30) generally. Prior to amendment, par. (30) read as
follows: “The plan shall provide assurances that if the
State receives funds appropriated under section 3023(g)
of this title, the State agency and area agencies on aging
will expend such funds to carry out part G of this sub-
chapter”.
Subsec. (a)(31). Pub. L. 102-375, § 307(n), amended
par. (31) generally, substituting provisions relating to an
area or State volunteer services coordinator for provi-
sions that State agency make funds available to eligible
area agencies on aging based on number of older individ-
uals with greatest economic need and inadequacy of out-
reach activities and applicat‘on assistance, that State
agency require area agency to submit application describ-
ing and evaluating activities for which funds were
sought, that State agency distribute to area agencies cer-
tain eligibility information, and that State agency submit
to Commissioner a report on evaluations required to be
submitted to it by area agencies.
Subsec. (a)(32) to (44). Pub. L. 102-375, § 307(n),
added pars. (32) to (44).
Subsec. (b)(1). Pub. L. 102-375, § 307(0), inserted
before period at end “, except the Commissioner may not
56a
approve such plan unless the Commissioner determines
that the formula submitted under section 3025(a)(2)(D) of
this title complies with the guidelines in effect under
section 3025(a)(2)(C) of this title”.
Subsec. (b)(2). Pub. L. 102-375, § 904(a)(13)(B), substi-
tuted “described in paragraph” for “described in clause”.
Subsec. (c). Pub. L. 102-375, § 307(p), designated exist-
ing provisions as par. (1) and added pars. (2) and (3).
Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 102-375, § 307(q), (r), redesignated
subsec. (g) as subsec. (f)(1), added subsec. (f)(2), and
struck out former subsec. (f), which related to demonstra-
tion projects for health and nutrition education.
Subsec. (g). Pub. L. 102-375, § 307(r)(1), redesignated
subsec. (g) as subsec. (f)(1).
1988 — Subsec. (a)(3)(A). Pub. L. 100-628 substituted a
period for “; and” at end.
1987 — Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 100-175, § 182(k)(1), substi-
tuted “Each such plan shall comply with all of the follow-
ing requirements:” for “Each such plan shall —”.
Subsec. (a)(1). Pub. L. 100-175, § 182(k)(2), (3), inser-
ted “The plan shall” and substituted a period for semi-
colon.
Subsec. (a)(3)(A). Pub. L. 100-175, § 182(k)(4)(A),
inserted “The plan shall”.
Subsec. (a)(3)(B), (4) to (7). Pub. L. 100-175,
§ 182(k)(4)(B), (5)-(8), inserted “The plan shall” and sub-
stituted a period for semicolon.
ey ee ee ee
57a
Subsec. (a)(3), Pub. L. 100-175, § 182(k)(9), inserted
“The plan shall” and substituted a period for semicolon.
Pub. L. 100-175, § 132(c)(1), inserted “, including an
evaluation of the effectiveness of the State agency in
reaching older individuals with the greatest economic or
social needs, with particular attention to low-income
minority individuals” before semicolon.
Pub. L. 100-175, § 128, inserted “, and public hearings
”
on,” after “evaluations of”.
Subsec. (a)(9). Pub. L. 100-175, § 182(k)(10), inserted
“The plan shall” and substituted a period for semicolon.
Subsec. (a)(10). Pub. L. 100-175, § 182(k)(11), inserted
“The plan shall” and substituted a period for semicolon.
Pub. L. 100-175, § 140(c)(1), which directed that par.
(10) be amended by substituting “nutrition services, or
in-home services (as defined in section 3030i(1) of this
title)” for “including nutrition services,”, was executed
by making the substitution for “or nutrition services,” to
reflect the probable intent of Congress and a previoiis’
amendment made by Pub. L. 98-459, § 307(a)(2).. See 1984
Amendment note below. :
Subsec. (a)(11). Pub. L. 100-175, § 182(k)(12), inserted
“The plan shall” and substituted a period for semicolon.
Subsec. (a)(12)(A). Pub. L. 100-175, § 129(d), amended
par. (12) generally, revising and restating as subpars. (A)
to (K) provisions of former subpars. (A) to (E).
Subsec. (a)(13). Pub. L. 100-175, § 182(k)(13), inserted
“The plan shall” and in subpar. (I) substituted a period
for semicolon.
58a
Subsec. (a)(13)(I). Pub. L. 100-175, § 136(c)(1), inser-
ted “, and to individuals with disabilities who reside at
home with and accompany older individuals who are
eligible under this chapter” before semicolon.
Subsec. (a)(14). Pub. L. 100-175, § 182(k)(14), inserted
“The plan shall” and in subpar. (E) substituted a period
for semicolon.
Subsec. (a)(15). Pub. L. 100-175, § 182(k)(15), inserted
“The plan shall” and in subpar. (D) substituted a period
for semicolon.
Subsec. (a)(16). Pub. L. 100-175, § 182(k)(16), inserted
“The plan shall” and in subpar. (C) substituted a period
for semicolon.
Pub. L. 100-175, § 144(d)(1), substituted “”, if funds
are not appropriated under section 3023(g) of this title for
a fiscal year, provide that for such fiscal year” for second
reference to “provide”.
Subsec. (a)(17) to (19). Pub. L. 100-175,
§ 182(k)(17)-(19), inserted “The plan shall” and substi-
tuted a period for semicolon.
Subsec. (a)(20). Pub. L. 100-175, § 182(k)(20), inserted
“The plan shall” and in subpar. (B)(ii) substituted a
period for “; and”.
Subsec. (a)(20)(A). Pub. L. 100-175, § 155(e)(2)(A),
substituted “sections 3026(a)(2)(A) and 3026(a)(6)(P) of
this title” for “section 3026(a)(2)(A) of this title”.
Subsec. (a)(21). Pub. L. 100-175, § 129(e), amended
par. (21) generally. Prior to amendment, par. (21) read as
noe ee
59a
follows: “provide that the State agency, from funds allot-
ted under section 3024(a) of this title for part B will use
an amount equal to an amount not less than 1 percent of
such allotment or $20,000, whichever is greater, for the
purpose of carrying out the provisions of clause (12),
except that (A) the requirement of this clause shall not
apply in any fiscal year in which a State spends from
State or local sources an amount equal to the amount
required to be spent by this clause; and (B) the provisions
of this clause shall not apply to American Samoa, Guam,
the Virgin Islands, the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands, and the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana
Islands.”
Subsec. (a)(22). Pub. L. 100-175, § 130(b), added par.
(22).
Subsec. (a)(23). Pub. L. 100-175, § 131(b), added par.
(23).
Subsec. (a)(24). Pub. L. 100-175, § 132(c)(2), added
par. (24).
Subsec. (a)(25). Pub. L. 100-175, § 136(c)(2), added
par. (25).
Subsec. (a)(26). Pub. L. 100-175, § 138, added par.
(26).
Subsec. (a)(27). Pub. L. 100-175, § 140(c)(2), added
par. (27).
Subsec. (a)(28). Pub. L. 100-175, § 141(c), added par.
(28).
Subsec. (a)(29). Pub. L. 100-175, § 142, added par.
(29).
60a
Subsec. (a)(30). Pub. L. 100-175, § 144(d)(2), added
par. (30).
Subsec. (a)(31). Pub. L. 100-175, § 155(e)(2)(B), added
par. (31).
Subsec. (g). Pub. L. 100-175, § 137(b), added subsec.
(g).
1984 — Subsec. (a)(3)(A). Pub. L. 98-459, § 307(a)(1),
substituted “legal assistance” for “legal services”.
Subsec. (a)(10). Pub. L. 98-459, § 307(a)(2), substituted
“supportive services or nutrition services” for “suppor-
tive services, including nutrition services”, and inserted
“, or where such services are directly related to such State
or area agency on aging’s administrative functions, or
where such services of comparable quality can be pro-
vided more economically by such State or area agency on
aging”.
Subsec. (a)(12)(A). Pub. L. 98-459, § 307(a)(3)(A)-(C),
substituted “, other than an agency or organization which
is responsible” for “which is not responsible”, “which is
an association” for “which is not an association”, and
“which provides an individual who will, on a full-time
basis —” for “which will —” in provisions preceding cl. (i).
Subsec. (a)(12)(A)(iv). Pub. L. 98-459, § 307(a)(3)(D),
substituted “training staff and volunteers” for “training
volunteers”.
Subsec. (a)(12)(E). Pub. L. 98-459, § 307(a)(3)(E)-(G),
added subpar. (E).
Subsec. (a)(13)(B). Pub. L. 98-459, § 307(a)(4)(A), sub-
stituted “subclause (H)” for “subparagraph (H)”.
Ditessey eee Se
6la
Subsec. (a)(13)(C)(i). Pub. L. 98-459, § 307(a)(4)(B),
substituted “solicit voluntary contributions” for “charge
participating individuals”.
Subsec. (a)(13)(C)(ii). Pub. L. 98-459, § 307(a)(4)(C),
substituted “voluntary contributions” for “charges”.
Subsec. (a)(15). Pub. L. 98-459, § 307(a)(5), substituted
“legal assistance” for “legal services” wherever appear-
ing.
Subsec. (a)(15)(A). Pub. L. 98-459, § 307(a)(5), substi-
tuted “legal assistance” for “legal services” wherever
appearing. 7
Subsec. (a)(15)(B). Pub. L. 98-459, § 307(a)(6), in
amended subpar. (B) generally, substituted provisions
requiring assurances regarding the furnishing of legal
assistance by grantees administering programs designed
to provide legal assistance to older individuals with
social or economic need for provisions requiring assur-
ances regarding the furnishing of legal services by
grantees who were either recipients of funds under the
Legal Services Corporation Act or who administered pro-
grams designed to provide legal services to all older
individuals with social or economic need.
Subsec. (a)(16) to (18). Pub. L. 98-459, § 307(a)(10),
added pars. (16) to (18). Former pars. (16) to (18) redesig-
nated (19) to (21), respectively.
Subsec. (a)(19), (20). Pub. L. 98-459, § 307(a)(9),
redesignated former pars. (16) and (17) as (19) and (20),
respectively.
Subsec. (a)(20){B)(ii). Pub. L. 98-459, § 307(a)(7), sub-
stituted “; and” for the period at the end.
62a
Subsec. (a)(21). Pub. L. 98-459, § 307(a)(9), redesig-
nated former par. (18) as (21).
Subsec. (a)(21)(B). Pub. L. 98-459, § 307(a)(8), substi-
tuted “Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands”
for “Northern Mariana Islands”.
Subsec. (b)(1). Pub. L. 98-459, § 307(b), substituted
“the Commissioner finds” for “he finds”.
Subsec. (d). Pub. L. 98-459, § 307(c), substituted “in
the Commissioner's discretion” for “in his discretion”,
“until the Commissioner is satisfied” for “until he is
satisfied”, “Until the Commissioner is so satisfied” for
“Until he is so satisfied”, “the Commissioner shall pre-
scribe” for “he shall prescribe”, and “the provisions of
this section” for “the provisions of section 307”.
Subsec. (e)(1). Pub. L. 98-459, § 307(d)(1), substituted
“designated by the Commissioner” for “designated by
him” and “the Commissioner's action is based” for “he
based his action”.
Subsec. (e)(2). Pub. L. 98-459, § 307(d)(2), substituted
“set aside the Commissioner’s order” for “set aside his
order”.
Subsec. (f). Pub. L. 98-459, § 307(e), added subsec. (f).
1981 - Subsec. (a). Pub. L. 97-115, § 7(a}, substituted
“for a two-, three-, or four-year period determined by the
State agency,” for “for a 3-year period,” in the provisions
preceding par. (1).
Subsec. (a)(3)(A), (10). Pub. L. 97-115, § 3(d), substi-
tuted “supportive services” for “social services”.
«
’
a
‘
63a
Subsec. (a)(13)(A). Pub. L. 97-115, § 7(b), substituted
“aged 60 or older and to their spouses, and may be made
available to handicapped or disabled individuals who
have not attained 60 years of age but who reside in
housing facilities occupied primarily by the elderly at
which congregate nutrition services are provided” for
“aged 60 or older, and to their spouses”.
Subsec. (a)(13)(B). Pub. L. 97-115, § 7(c), substituted
“primary consideration shall be given to the provision of
meals in a congregate setting, except that each area
agency (i) may award funds made available under this
subchapter to organizations for the provision of home
delivered meals to older individuals in accordance with
the provisions of subpart II of part C, based upon a
determination of need made by the recipient of a grant or
contract entered into under this subchapter, without
requiring that such organizations also provide meals to
older individuals in a congregate setting; and (ii) shall, in
awarding such funds, select such organizations in a man-
ner which complies with the provisions of subparagraph
(H)” for “each project will provide meals in a congregate
setting, except that each such project may provide home
delivered meals based upon determination of need made
by the recipient of a grant or contract entered into under
this subchapter”.
Subsec. (a)(13)(C)(ii). Pub. L. 97-115, § 7(d), inserted
“, to facilitate access to such meals, and to provide other
supportive services directly related to nutrition services”
after “the project involved”.
Subsec. (a)(13)(D). Pub. L. 97-115, §§ 3(d), 7(e), inser-
ted “in the case of meals served in a congregate setting,”
64a
before “a site for such services”, substituted “supportive
services” for “social services”, and struck out “or home
delivered meals are furnished to eligible individuals who
are homebound” after “transportation to such site is fur-
nished”.
Subsec. (a)(13)(I). Pub. L. 97-115, § 7(f), substituted
“each area agency shall establish procedures that will
allow nutrition project administrators the option to offer
a meal, on the same basis as meals are provided to elderly
participants, to individuals providing volunteer services
during the meal hours” for “each State agency may only
for fiscal years 1979 and 1980, use not to exceed 20
percent for the amounts allotted under part C to the State
for supportive services, including recreational activities,
informational services, heaith and welfare counseling,
and referral services, directly related to the delivery of
congregate or home delivered meals, except that the
Commissioner may approve an application from a State
to use not to exceed 50 percent of its amount allotted
under part C in areas with unusually high supportive
services costs”.
Subsec. (a)(16) to (18). Pub. L. 97-115, § 7(g), added
pars. (16) and (17) and redesignated former par. (16) as
(18).
Subsec. (b)(2). Pub. L. 97-115, § 7(h), redesignated
par. (3) as (2). Former par. (2), which related to the
authority of the Commissioner to waive particular
requirements of State plans for fiscal years 1979 and 1980,
was struck out.
65a
Errective Dare or 1992 AMENDMENT
Amendment by sections 307 and 708(c)(4) of Pub. L.
102-375 inapplicable with respect to fiscal year 1993, see
section 4(b) of Pub. L. 103-171, set out as a note under
section 3001 of this title.
Amendment by sections 307 and 708(c)(4) of Pub. L.
102-375 inapplicable with respect to fiscal year 1992, see
section 905(b)(2), (6) of Pub. L. 102-375, set out as a note
under section 3001 of this title.
Errective Date or 1987 AMENDMENT
Amendment by Pub. L. 100-175 effective Oct. 1, 1987,
except not applicable with respect to any area plan sub-
mitted under section 3026(a) of this title or any State plan
submitted under section 3027(a) of this title and
approved for any fiscal year beginning before Nov. 29,
1987, see section 701(a), (b) of Pub. L. 100-175, set out as a
note under section 3001 of this title.
Errective Dare or 1984 AMENDMENT
Amendment by Pub. L. 98-459 to take effect Oct. 9,
1984, see section 803(a) of Pub. L. 98-459, set out as a note
under section 3001 of this title.
ASSESSMENT OF UNsatisFiep DEMAND POR SUPPORTIVE SERVICES
PROVIDED AT SENIOR CENTERS AND OTHER SiTEs
Section 111 of Pub. L. 100-175 directed Commissioner
on Aging, not later than Sept. 30, 1989, to submit to
66a
Congress a report assessing national unmet need for sup-
portive services, nutrition services, and multipurpose
senior centers by summarizing in detail for each State the
results of the most recent evaluation conducted by the
State agency under the then current plan submitted
under section 307(a)(3)(A) and containing recommenda-
tions of the Secretary with respect to the for ad:zninistra-
tive action and legislation relating to satisfying the
demand for supportive services provided at senior cen-
ters and other sites.
SruDpY OF OMBUDSMAN PROGRAM
Section 129(b) of Pub. L. 100-175 directed Commis-
sioner on Aging, not later than Dec. 31, 1989, to conduct a
study and submit a report to Congress concerning
involvement in the ombudsman program established
under 42 U.S.C. 3027(a)(12) and its impact upon issues
and problems affecting residents of board and care facili-
ties and other similar adult care homes who are older
individuals as defined in 42 U.S.C. 3022(10), and the
effectiveness of recruiting, supervising, and retaining vol-
unteer ombudsmen.
SecTION REFERRED TO IN OTHER SECTIONS
This section is referred to in sections 1395i-3, 1396r,
3002, 3011, 3012, 3017, 3020e, 3021, 3024, 3025, 3026, 3028,
3029, 3030d, 3030e, 3030f, 3030g-11, 3030h, 3030i, 30301,
3030m, 3030p, 3035a, 3035c, 30350, 3057e, 3058d of this
title.
67a
APPENDIX E
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
CHURCH ON THE ROCK and
PASTOR DON KIMBRO,
Plaintiffs,
v. No. CIV 94-1101-JC/WWD
CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, and
TONI MARTORELLI, in her official
capacity as Director of Family
and Community Services for the
City of Albuquerque, and MARK
SANCHEZ, in his official
capacity as Deputy Director of
Family and Community Services
for the City of Albuquerque,
and KATHLEEN STARK, in her
official capacity as Supervisor,
Bear Canyon Senior Center,
City of Albuquerque,
Defendants.
AFFIDAVIT OF LORRAINE R. NUNEZ
IN OPPOSITION TO MOTION
FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
COUNTY OF BERNALILLO )
) ss.
STATE OF NEW MEXICO )
COMES NOW the affiant, LORRAINE R. NUNEZ,
being first duly sworn upon her oath, deposes and states:
68a
1. I am employed by the City of Albuquerque (the
“City”) in the position of Legal Secretary for the Legal
Department.
2. I personally audio recorded and then transcribed
the last approximately 5 minutes of the JESUS tape, a true
and correct copy of which transcript is attached hereto
and made a part hereof as Exhibit “A”.
/s/ Lorraine R. Nufiez
LORRAINE R. NUNEZ
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 18th
day of October, 1994, by LORRAINE R. NUNEZ.
/s/ Janet L McCallister
Notary Public
My Commission Expires:
August 15, 1995
EXHIBIT “A”
TRANSCRIPT — LAST 5 MINUTES
The place where the body of the Lord Jesus was placed is
empty. Three days after His crucifixion He rose from the
dead. He is alive. He wants to come into your life. Jesus
himself said “I am the resurrection and the life. He that
believes in me though he were dead yet shall he live.”
Almost 2,000 years have past since Jesus rose from the
dead and He still lives today as the greatest and most
powerful influence in the world. The proud statesmen of
the past centuries have come and gone. Rulers, scholars,
re
<b, lie bitte
69a
scientists, philosophers and theologians have come and
gone, but Jesus still lives today.
He is the most unique person who has ever lived. His
birth was unique. The Bible tells us He was born of the
Virgin Mary. His life was unique. His life was charac-
terized by the supernatural. He lived a holy life without
sin and performed greater miracles than anyone who ever
lived. His message was unique. He offers love, forgive-
ness, and a new way of life to all who receive Him as
Savior and Lord. Wherever His message has gone, new
life, new hope, and new purpose for living have resulted.
His death on the cross was unique. Two thousand years
ago, the God of the universe sent His only Son, Jesus
Christ, to be the sacrifice for the sin of all men. He died
for you. His resurrection was unique. Three days after
His death the most amazing event in history took place,
Jesus rose from the dead. His birth, His life, His death,
and His resurrection, all prove that Jesus is exactly who
He claimed to be, the Son of God, the Savior of all
mankind.
This same Jesus Christ is alive today. He wants to come
into your life, forgive your sins, and give you the power
to live an abundant life. Listen to His words: “Come unto
me all you that labor and are heavy laden and I will give
you rest. I am the way, the truth and the life. No man
cometh unto the Father but by Me.” The Bible says, “for
all have sinned and come short of the glory of God.” It
also says “for the wages of sin is death but the gift of God
is eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord.”
When Jesus died He paid the penalty for your sin. Right
now He stands ready to come into your life. “Behold, I
70a
stand at the door and knock. If any man hear my voice
and open the door, I will come into him.” To experience
His love and forgiveness and receive eternal life, you
must receive Him as God’s sacrifice for your sin and
invite Him to come into your life by faith. If this is the
desire of your heart you can pray a prayer of faith and
Jesus Christ will come into your life. This is a suggested
prayer, I will say it first:
Lord, Jesus, I need you. Thank you for dying on
the cross for my sins. I open the door of my life
and receive you as my Savior and Lord. Take
control of my life, make me the kind of person
you want me to be. Amen.
If this prayer expresses the desire of your heart pray this
prayer right now where you are, pray after me silently as
I repeat it one phrase at a time:
Lord, Jesus, I need you. -
Thank you for dying on the cross for my sins. -
I open the door of my life and receive you as my
Savior and Lord. -
Take control of life, make me the kind of person
you want me to be. -
Amen.
Now that you have prayed this prayer of faith and
invited Jesus Christ to come into your life, you can be
sure that He came in because He promised He would if
only you would ask Him. You can also be sure that your
sins are forgiven, that you are a child of God and have
eternal life. If you want to experience the full and abun-
dant life which Jesus promised, talk with Him every day
in prayer. Discover His wonderful plan for your life by
7la
reading the scriptures and meet with others who love and
follow Him. Finally, remember always, His wonderful
promises. “I will never leave you or forsake you. Lo, I am
with you always even unto the end of the world.”
72a
APPENDIX F
IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW MEXICO
CHURCH ON THE ROCK and
PASTOR DON KIMBRO,
Plaintiffs,
v. No. CIV 94-1101-JC/WWD
CITY OF ALBUQUERQUE, and
TONI MARTORELLI, in her official
capacity as Director of Family
and Community Services for the
City of Albuquerque, and MARK
SANCHEZ, in his official
capacity as Deputy Director of
Family and Community Services
for the City of Albuquerque,
and KATHLEEN STARK, in her
official capacity as Supervisor,
Bear Canyon Senior Center,
City of Albuquerque,
Defendants.
AFFIDAVIT OF KIM H. PERDUE IN OPPOSITION
TO MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION
COUNTY OF BERNALLILO )
) ss.
STATE OF NEW MEXICO )
COMES NOW the affiant, KIM H. PERDUE, being
first duly sworn upon his oath, deposes and states:
73a
1. I am employed by the City of Albuquerque (the
“City”) in the position of Senior Center Network Man-
ager in the Department of Senior Affairs. I have held this
position for about 15 years, and my general duties
encompass the management and control of the City’s six
senior centers and the programs that are run from those
facilities, among them being the Bear Canyon Senior Cen-
ter.
2. Contrary to the facts stated in Paragraph 4 of the
Affidavit of Pastor Don Kimbro in Support of Motion for
Preliminary Injunction, the City does not on a “space
available basis” allow the Bear Canyon Senior Center —- or
any senior center — “to be used by members of the general
public for the showing of films, lectures, various pro-
grams, and discussions on an unfettered range of sub-
jects.” The City, as demonstrated hereinbelow, has
numerous restrictions on use of senior centers that are
designed to ensure that the centers are kept for the bene-
fit of and be appropriate for senior citizens.
3. The City prohibits use of any of the senior centers
“for sectarian instruction or as a place of religious wor-
ship”. (See Section 6, Paragraph 1.G. - “Facilities” — of
Senior Center Policy and Procedures Manual, a true and
correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit “A”
and incorporated herein by reference). This policy was
prepared and implemented in accordance with, and as a
reflection of, the Older Americans Act, 42 U.S.C.A.
3027(a) (14) (A) (iv), which provides in pertinent part that
as a condition of receiving federal grant monies for senior
centers each State must give assurances that a senior
center “will not be used and is not intended to be used
74a
for sectarian instruction or as a place for religious wor-
ship.” The City has received federal monies in the acqui-
sition, alteration or renovation of a number of its senior
centers.
4. Moreover, City policy requires that use of senior
centers be restricted to “usage by center members, senior
citizen organizations, or organizations composed of at
least 75% senior citizen membership (55 years or older).”
(Exhibit “A”, Section 6, Paragraph 1.B.) The City does not
allow use of any senior center by members of the general
public who do not meet these restriction, except for occa-
sional meetings by City departments or groups meeting
to discuss issues specific to senior citizens (See Para. 7
hereinbelow).
5. Moreover, in addition to the prohibition against
use for sectarian or religious purposes, and the rule that
users meet the 75% senior citizen requirement, the City
prohibits use of senior centers by for-profit businesses,
except for limited and controlled advertising practices.
(See Exhibit “A”, Section 6, “Facilities”, Paragraph 1.E.)
6. Moreover, in addition to the other restrictions on
use of senior centers identified above, the City restricts
the use of such facilities for political purposes. In particu-
lar, City policy prohibits speeches by single candidates,
and restricts the distribution of campaign literature. (See
Section I, Paragraph 6 — “General Guidelines” — Office of
Senior Affairs Policy and Procedure Manual, a true and
correct copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit “B”
and incorporated herein by reference.)
7. The City further restricts use of senior centers by
outside groups by requiring that such groups be
75a
approved by the center director, and that groups be com-_
prised of 75 percent senior citizens or be “for the express
purpose of studying or discussing senior citizen issues”.
(Exhibit “C”, Section XI, “General Guidelines for Facili-
ties”) In addition, the Older Americans Act requires that
members be involved in determining the programs that
are offered at each facility, and the City implements this
policy.
8. The purpose of senior centers, including the Bear
Canyon Senior Center, is not to promote expression, but
rather, as stated at 42 U.S.C.A. Section 3002(35), to pro-
vide a variety of “services” to senior citizens, including
recreation, health and fitness, nutritional needs, referral
to senior citizen service providers, health assessment and
screening, education, shopping assistance, and tax prepa-
ration assistance.
9. The City has never had a policy or practice of
opening its senior centers, including the Bear Canyon
Senior Center, for discourse by the public at large on an
unrestricted basis.
10. Senior centers, including the Bear Canyon
Senior Center, are not intended for the purpose of solic-
itation or religious proselytizing. In fact, the practices of
selling products or recruiting members, including reli-
gious proselytizing, are inconsistent with the intended
use of such centers — and are prohibited — because such
practices tend to target an often frail and vulnerable
audience and because they are contrary to the intended
purpose of senior centers, which is to provide a largely
self-governing haven for recreation, services and socializ-
ing by senior citizens.
76a
11. The City policy against use of the Bear Canyon
Senior Center by religious groups is consistently enforced
through programmatic oversight against all persons,
regardless of religious denomination, belief or creed.
12. In addition to the reasons stated hereinabove,
the City has denied use of the Bear Canyon Senior Center
to show the Jesus film and to distribute Bibles because it
would constitute a violation of 42 U.S.C.A. Section 3027,
and because it would result in opening the door to unre-
stricted religious and nonreligious solicitation at senior
centers, and cause unmanageable competition and clamor
among religious, political and for-profit business for lim-
ited senior center space in order to gain the captive ear of
senior citizens. The result would be to alter the character
of such facilities.
13. On May 18, 1994, the City offered to permit the
Church on the Rock to use of one of its multi-service
centers, which are open to the general public, to show the
Jesus film. (See Exhibit “8” to Affidavit of Pastor Don
Kimbro). The Church on the Rock did not respond to that
offer.
/s/ Kim H. Perdue
KIM H. PERDUE
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me this 18th
day of October, 1994, by KIM H. PERDUE.
/s/ Janet L. McCallister
Notary Public
My Commission Expires:
August 15, 1995
77a
Exhibit “A”
SECTION 6
FACILITIES
All facilities are to be maintained so as to provide for
health, safety, and comfort of senior citizen participants
during conduction of programs. Responsible for the facil-
ity is the Senior Center Director or his/her designated
representative. The facility includes the building
designed for senior center activities, the grounds it is
situated on, the equipment used for programming, and
for maintenance and upkeep.
Building
1. Operation and Usage
A. The facility will be made available for pro-
grams based on budgetary limitations.
B. The facility will be made available for usage by
center members, senior citizen organizations,
or organizations composed of at least 75%
senior citizen membership (55 years or older).
1. During the off hours of the center pro-
grams, the facility is available for usage
provided an amount offsetting the cost of
staffing the event is paid.
2. Rental written agreements with relevant
parties will state hours to be used, respon-
sibility for maintenance and repairs, equip-
ment usage, cost of event, security of
building, liability, and insurance.
C. Smoking permitted in designated smoking
rooms only.
78a
D. No gambling is allowed in the facilities as per
city ordinance and state statutes.
E. Advertising for profit of a private company or
business can be conducted in the following
manner:
1. Through the senior centers newsletter
where cash is handled by Advisory Council
members and all proceeds go to the council
or,
2. Sponsoring a function by purchasing food
items, supplies, and/or entertainment for
an event. The company can then post a sign
with their name and phone number and
have literature or trinkets available (during
the event) for people to pick up.
F. It is prohibited to use any Office of Senior
Affairs staff, equipment, food, facilities, or
vans to cater private parties and non-OSA
functions.
G. It is prohibited to use any OSA facility for
sectarian instruction or as a place for religious
workship [sic].
2. Maintenance
A. Interior
1. A daily check of all tables and chairs will
be made by staff personnel as they are
used, and needed repairs be immediately
referred to the facility director.
2. Furnishings will be attractive, comfortable,
safe and suitable for participants with
mobility and visual limitations.
79a
The city’s Building Maintenance Division
will be contacted before season use of heat-
ing or cooling units.
a) Inspection of units should be made
periodically for adequate quiet heating,
cooling, and ventilation systems.
Provisions for past control shall be made a
minimum of once a month.
Floors and carpets shall be cleaned imme-
diately upon report of spillage for health
and safety reasons.
In order to provide adequate lighting, fix-
tures will be checked periodically.
Restrooms will be cleaned, checked for
repairs, and maintained with proper sup-
plies daily.
The facilities will be closed one week every
six months for renovations, painting, and
cleaning.
Ingress and Egress for handicapped shall
always be accessible and movement within
the facility will be barrier free in confor-
mance with a city ordinance.
Exterior
1.
The building shall be constantly main-
tained to provide an attractive appearance.
Identification signs and iettering on build-
ing shall be in good repair to make clear
the purpose of the facility.
Roof leakage shall be repaired immediately
in order to prevent damage in the interior.
80a
4. Lighting shall be constantly maintained for
visual protection of the building.
3. Safety
A. Fire Safety
1. Periodic firedrills will be conducted on a
quarterly basis.
2. Smoke detectors will be checked for proper
functioning semi-annually.
3. Fire extinguishers will be provided as
required by City fire code.
4. Arrangements will be made with the Fire
Dept. for required inspections.
5. Fire Department regulations will be posted
and complied regarding maximum number
of people allowed at a function.
6. Combustible materials will be stored
according to Fire Dept. regulations.
B. Participant Safety
1. First Aid Kits will be kept in the staff office
and restocked as necessary.
2. Handrails will be provided in all lavatories.
3. Floors will be maintained with non-skid
supplies.
4. Handles and latches will be checked fo
proper functioning and replaced as neces-
sary.
5. Hallways will be barrier free and well
lighted.
8la
Grounds
1. Maintenance
A. It is the responsibility of the facility director to
see that the grounds, parking lots and irriga-
tion systems shall be maintained according to
the contract between OSA and the Parks and
Recreation Department.
B. Handicapped parking will be provided accord-
ing to City Ordinance R-40 Sec. 40.E. (2%).
C. Ingress and egress will always be accessible for
emergency vehicles.
D. All roads, paths, sidewalks, etc. will be
repaired immediately as needed.
E. The facility director is responsible for arrang-
ing for refuse containers and for refuse
removal.
F. Air conditioning and heating units will be
checked by Building Maintenance before the
season starts.
2. Safety
A. Snow and/or ice removal from all roads, paths,
sidewalks and parking lots shall be done
immediately.
B. The parking lot will be sufficiently illuminated.
Arrangement for police surveillance will be on
a daily basis.
Equipment
All equipment will be described and serial numbers
noted on Inventory cards. One copy to go to fiscal
accounting and one retained at the center where the
equipment is located.
82a
Building
1. Kitchen
A. Ovens will be cleaned daily so that they may
always be sanitary for cooking.
B. Freezers and refrigerators will be checked
daily for proper functioning so there will not
be any food loss.
C. Icemakers will be checked daily so that seniors
will be assured of having cool drinks.
D. All coffeepots, urns, pans, dishes, glasses, meat
cutters, grinders, cups, utensils, knives, etc.,
will be cleaned immediately
This text is long and has been trimmed here. Open the source document for the complete record.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.