Petition for Writ of Certiorari — CMC Heartland Partners v. Union Pacific Railroad, 117 S. Ct. 44 (1996) (No. 96-44)

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OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Supreme Court of the Huited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1995

CMC HEARTLAND PARTNERS,

Petitioner,

Vv.

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY,

Respondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Seventh Circuit

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

ROBERT H. WHEELER KENNETH W. STARR

OPPENHEIMER WOLFF & Counsel of Record

DONNELLY DONALD G. KEMPF, JR.

Two Prudential Plaza CHRISTOPHER LANDAU

180 North Stetson Avenue KIRKLAND & ELLIS

45th Floor 655 Fifteenth Street

Chicago, Illinois 60601 Washington, D.C. 20005

(202) 879-5000

Counsel for Petitioner CMC

Heartland Partners

ray 2, 1996

QUESTION PRESENTED

This case presents an important and recurring question of

federal bankruptcy law on which the circuits are sharply

divided: does a federal bankruptcy “claim” based on state law

arise at the time when the conduct underlying the claim occurs,

or at the time when state law creates a cause of action imposing

liability for that conduct?

(i)

scam ii ai

ii

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioner, CMC Heartland Partners, was appellant below.

Respondent, Union Pacific Railroad Company, was appellee

below.

Pursuant to this Court’s Rule 29.6, petitioner notes that it is

a Delaware general partnership with two general partners: (1)

Heartland Partners, L.P., which owns 99.99% of the

partnership, and (2) Milwaukee Land Company, which owns

01% of the partnership. Heartland Partners, L.P. is a publicly-

held Delaware limited partnership, whose general partner is

Milwaukee Land Company. Milwaukee Land Company is a

publicly-held Delaware corporation.

iil

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

CRRPEE RUT PUMMIUEEERD ce sicccesecsesesccvvcewus i

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING .... cece cence ii

TEER MED PRS EEMEEEED ces cccccccrcseusveceeses Vv

i ere Sa Sone sis chev akeensere trees ]

a SS hae ey oe TON Iwo we 0 6+ eb sha ]

PERTINENT STATUTORY PROVISIONS ...........-. ]

STATEMENT OF THECASE 2. w ccc ccc ccc ccc ccccess 2

A. Union Pacific Purchases the Tacoma Railyard..... 2

B. The Bankruptcy Reorganization Is Completed ..... 3

C. The First Round of Litigation.................. 4

D. The Second Round of Litigation ............... 6

REASON FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ............-- 7

THE CIRCUITS ARE DIVIDED AS TO THE POINT IN

TIME AT WHICH A FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY “CLAIM”

BASED ON STATE LAW ARISES .............-.--.- 7

A. The Federal Bankruptcy Laws Broadly Define

af BE i STRESS a PR en Pr Se anc One 7

B. A Federal Bankruptcy “Claim” Arises at the Time

the Relevant Conduct Occurs, Not at the Time State

Law Creates Liability Based On Such Conduct .... 8

C. The Circuits Are Divided As To The Point In Time

At Which A Federal Bankruptcy “Claim” Arises . . 13

EE nc Cswsscddinscvevitosciaunsb sons 15

si

iV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page:

Cases:

Acevedo v. Van Dorn Plastic Mach. Co.,

68 B.R. 495 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986) ...------+++++> 10

Grady v. 1 H. Robins Co.,

839 F.2d 198 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed,

487 U.S. 1260 (1988) ....----- eee eee eee 9,11, 13, 14

In re Amfesco Inds., Inc.,

81 B.R. 777 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988) ...---.---+-->- 15

In re Baldwin-United Corp.,

48 B.R. 901 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985) ....-----+---- 10

In re Black,

70 B.R. 645 (Bankr. D. Utah 1986) ....-------+---> 10

In re Chateaugay Corp.,

53 F.3d 478 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,

116 S. Ct. 298 (1995) .. 2... cece cece tree eeeeees 13

Inre Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co.,

974 F.2d 775 (7th Cir. 1992) .....--- eee ee eeee rece 8

In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co.,

3 F.3d 200 (1993) .....-- eee eee reece reece passim

In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co.,

78 F.3d 285 (1996) ....--- eee eee eee eee eeeee passim

In re Cybermech, Inc.,

13 F.3d 818 (4th Cir. 1994) ....... 02 eee errr reer 8

In re Edge,

60 B.R. 690 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986) ...-..-. 10, 11, 13

In re Fairchild Aircraft Corp.,

184 B.R. 910 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1995) ..-------+++> 14

In re Food Barn Stores, Inc.,

175 B.R. 723 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994) .......... 10, 14

In re Frenville Co.,

744 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied,

ee a SEE oo Wedd bids 0 beavckie saan 13,14

In re Grynberg,

143 B.R. 574 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990),

aff'd, 966 F.2d 570 (10th Cir. 1992) ............ 11,14

In re Jensen,

127 B.R. 27 (9th Cir. BAP 1991), aff'd,

Fw tg. Le E.R eres 9, 10, 13

In re Johns-Manville Corp.,

57 B.R. 680 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986) ............ 10, 11

In re Penn Central Transp. Co.,

944 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied,

A rere rer rr eS 13

In re Piper Aircraft Corp.,

Se ae BATE CAs BOTS tcc ccccntancessen 9, 13

In re Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corp.,

106 F.2d 22 (2d Cir. 1939), cert. denied,

Fe a RTD + hanks bale sewetansevadcesecs 8

In re Transp. Sys. Int'l, Inc.,

110 B.R. 888 (D. Minn. 1990),

aff'd, 930 F.2d 625 (8th Cir. 1991) ................ 11

In re Waterman S.S. Corp.,

141 B.R. 552 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992) ......... 8,10, 11

In re Yanks,

49 B.R. 56 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985) ................ 10

In re Zelis,

es AD od wh hades ene wenn 10

Johnson v. Home State Bank,

gk OB i) | err rrrr reer yyy ero Pees: 8

vi

Kokoszka v. Belford,

417 USS. 642 (1974) 20... . cece rece cece eee eens 7

Lemelle v. Universal Mfg. Corp.,

18 F.3d 1268 (Sth Cir. 1994) .......-- eee reece eee 11

New York v. Feiring,

313 U.S. 283 (1941) 2... 2. cece eee reece ee eeeee 11

Ohio v. Kovacs,

469 U.S. 274 (1985)... 0. . cece eee e ener renee 8

Pennsylvania Dep’t of Public Welfare v. Davenport,

495 U.S. 552 (1990) ......- eee eee reece eee tenes 8

Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp.,

758 F.2d 936 (3d Cir.), cert.denied,

474 US. 864 (1985) .. 0... cece ee eee tenes 11

Stellwagen v. Clum,

245 U.S. 605 (1918) ...... cece eee erect e neces 7

Williams v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co.,

236 U.S. 549 (1915)... cee cece eee tener eens 7

Statutes:

11 U.S.C. § 35 (repealed 1978) .....------eeeeeereeee 7

11 U.S.C. § 101(4{(A) .- 60 ee ee eee eee eee eee eeee 8

11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(B) ..-- eee eee eee eter rete 8

11 U.S.C. § 101(5) .....--- eee eee cr cceeeeneceeccees 1

11 U.S.C. § 205(b) (repealed 1978) ....--------+++++- 1,8

11 U.S.C. §§ 727(b), 11410)... eee eee ee eee eee 7

28 U.S.C. § 1254(1) ....-- eee e eer cece ecccceererees 1

42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 ef seg. .. 6-6. cree eee terete passim

U.S. Const. Art. 1, § 2, cl.4 2.2... eee eee cere eee: 11

Wash. Rev. Code § 7.48 (1985) ......-cccsseneveceess 6

iii ll

vii

Wash. Rev. Code § 90.48 (1985) .............20 ee eens 6

WHEEL, PET, GAGE © TUMOR EDOED ponccccneecrcnvsencs 6

Wash. Rev. Code §§ 70.105D et seg. ............. passim

Other:

Case Note, In Re Jensen: Demonstrating the Need

for Supreme Court Resolution of the Conflict

Between CERCLA and the Bankruptcy Code,

9 J. Land Use & Envil. L. 179 (1994) .............. 14

Comment, Through the Looking Glass: A Comparison

of Covered Persons, Defenses, and Lic bility under

CERCLA and the Washington State Model Toxic Control

Act of 1988 (Initiative 97, 1988 General Election),

ae a: Ec A EUS foe ccawesevnevesn xs’ 12

The Federalist No. 42 (James Madison) (Clinton

PED eos kot hacks dx Radagactvewsees 11

Harvey R. Miller et al., Representing the Secured

Creditor In Chapter 11 Cases, in Formulation

and Confirmation of Chapter 11 Plans Under the

Bankruptcy Code (PLI Com. Law & Practice

Course Handbook Series No. A4-4457, 1994) ........ 14

Arlene E. Mirsky et al., The Interface Between

Bankruptcy and Environmental Laws, 46 Bus.

SNE ash Gabon Cebaws ba teak essd bees 10

Pe ee Te eee Te

Viii

Karynne G. Popper & Alison N. Zim, The Bottomless

Pit: The Struggle to Achieve Judicial Consistency

In the Application of CERCLA In Bankruptcy Proceedings

(PLI Com. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No.

AA4AS3, 1994) 2. cc cccccccccccccvesescccvccses 14

Steven E. Sherman, Environmental Issues Facing

High-Tech Companies In Chapter 11 Proceedings,

in Computer Law (Sept. 1994) ......-2022+ee scenes 14

CMC Heartland Partners respectfully petitions for a writ of

certiorari to review the judgment of the United States Court of

Appeals for the Seventh Circuit.

OPINIONS BELOW

The two opinions of the Court of Appeals for the Seventh

Circuit are reported at 78 F.3d 285 (1996), and 3 F.3d 200

(1993), and are reprinted at Appendix (“App.”) la-18a and

19a-34a respectively.

The District Court’s unreported order consummating the

Milwaukee Road bankruptcy is reprinted at App. 65a-74a. The

District Court’s first order upholding respondent’s post-

discharge state-law claim against petitioner is reported at 1992

WL 316321, and reprinted at App. 37a-46a. The District

Court’s second order upholding that claim is reported at 1994

WL 722053, and reprinted at App. 47a-64a.

JURISDICTION

The most recent judgment of the Court of Appeals was

entered on February 28, 1996. CMC Heartland Partners filed

a timely Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing

En Banc, which was denied on April 3, 1996. App. 35a-36a.

This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

PERTINENT STATUTORY PROVISIONS

The Bankruptcy Act of 1898 defined a “claim” as, inter alia,

“debts, whether liquidated or unliquidated, securities (other

than stock and option warrants to subscribe to stock), liens, or

other interests of whatever character.” 11 U.S.C. § 205(b)

(repealed 1978).

The Bankruptcy Code of 1978 defines a “claim” as, inter

alia, a “right to payment, whether or not such right is reduced

to judgment, liquidated, unliquidated, fixed, contingent,

matured, unmatured, disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable,

secured, or unsecured.” 11 U.S.C. § 101(5).

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case involves a dispute over liability for an environ-

mental clean-up of a former railyard located in Tacoma, Wash-

ington. The property was owned from the early years of this

century by the Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific

Railroad Company (“Milwaukee Road”). App. at 24a. Like

many other railroads, the Milwaukee Road fell into financial

straits in the 1960s and 70s. The company filed a petition for

bankruptcy reorganization on December 19, 1977, in the

United States District Court for the Northern District of

Illinois. /d. at 23a.

A. Union Pacific Purchases the Tacoma Railyard

As part of the reorganization process, the bankruptcy trustee

placed the Milwaukee Road’s Tacoma railyard on the market.

On March 28, 1980, respondent Union Pacific Railroad Com-

pany agreed to purchase the property. The purchase agreement

included a clause by which the bankruptcy trustee and the

Milwaukee Road agreed to indemnify Union Pacific and its

subsidiaries “against any and all claims, damages, liabilities,

losses or demands whatsoever, and expenses in connection

therewith, including reasonable fees of outside counsel, regard-

less of the source or nature thereof, arising out of the operation

of the Properties prior to March 12, 1980.” App. at 23a. The

bankruptcy court authorized the purchase, and the trustee con-

veyed the property by quitclaim deed on December 19, 1980.

Id. at 24a.

Union Pacific was under no illusion that the Tacoma railyard

was in a pristine state. To the contrary, Union Pacific engin-

eers who inspected the property in April 1980 observed (among

other things): “[The d]iesel fueling area is oil saturated and will

probably require removal of surface oil as well as contaminated

dirt. Apparently, this covers quite a large area and may require

extensive clean-up.” Jd. at 25a. Thus, it came as no surprise

when the United States Environmental Protection Agency

(“EPA”) in October 1981 designated the entire Commencement

Bay and the Nearshore Tideflats area (including the Tacoma

ee ee

3

railyard) as a federal Superfund site. See id.' Finally, in

January 1982, an environmental study commissioned by the

Washington State Department of Ecology concluded (among

other things) that many hazardous materials had been spilled at

the railyard and that accordingly “the soils at this site are

possibly permeated with toxic compounds.” /d. at 26a.?

B. The Bankruptcy Reorganization Is Completed

By 1985, the District Court was winding up the Milwaukee

Road bankruptcy reorganization. On July 12, 1985, the Court

confirmed a comprehensive reorganization plan. The plan

required all post-petition claims (i.e., claims against the

Milwaukee Road arising after the bankruptcy petition was

filed) to be filed on or before the “claims bar date” of

September 10, 1985. After that date, all further post-petition

claims against the bankruptcy trustee, the Milwaukee Road,

and the latter’s successors and assigns would be barred in

perpetuity unless “based on facts that are unknown, undis-

closed and unasserted” as of that date. App. at 24a (emphasis

added).

Union Pacific actively participated in the Milwaukee Road

bankruptcy proceedings, filing several claims against the

bankruptcy estate and negotiating with the trustee. App. at

24a, 38a. Accordingly, Union Pacific and its legal counsel

were on the official service list for the reorganization, and

received notice of the claims bar dates, notice of the hearings

regarding the reorganization plan, and a copy of that plan.

However, notwithstanding the manifest environmental

contamination at the Tacoma railyard, Union Pacific filed no

' Indeed, the EPA characterized the Tacoma site as one of the ten most

hazardous in the country—a characterization widely reported in the local

and national media. See id. at 25a.

? Although Union Pacific officials later denied any knowledge of this

study, the District Court specifically found that “this information was

available had they sought it out.” App. at 43a.

4

claims against the bankruptcy estate relating to any such

contamination.

On November 12, 1985, the District Court entered an order

consummating the bankruptcy and discharging all further

claims against the bankruptcy trustee, the Milwaukee Road,

and the latter’s successors and assigns. See App. at 70a. The

order also enjoined all persons from asserting claims that had

been discharged. See id. at 73a-74a. The Court expressly

retained jurisdiction to enforce that injunction. See id. at 71a.

C. The First Round of Litigation

In April 1989, the EPA notified Union Pacific that it was

potentially liable for environmental cleanup costs at the

Tacoma railyard under the Comprehensive Environmental

Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C.

§§ 9601 et seg. (“CERCLA”). App. at 27a. In October 1990,

the Washington State Department of Ecology notified Union

Pacific that it was also potentially liable for such costs under a

state-law analogue to CERCLA, the Washington State Model

Toxics Control Act, Wash. Rev. Code §§ 70.105D ef seq.

(“MTCA”), which had been enacted the previous year. See id.

On September 9, 1991—nearly two and a half years after

receiving the EPA notification—Union Pacific served upon

petitioner CMC Heartland Partners (“CMC”), successor in

interest to the Milwaukee Road, a letter demanding settlement

negotiations regarding liability for the clean-up costs at the

Tacoma railyard. Notwithstanding the Milwaukee Road’s

1985 bankruptcy discharge, Union Pacific asserted that CMC

was liable for environmental clean-up costs at the Tacoma

railyard under both CERCLA and the MTCA.

On November 13, 1991, CMC invoked the District Court’s

retained jurisdiction over the Milwaukee Road bankruptcy by

filing a motion to enjoin Union Pacific’s claims. Those claims,

CMC noted, could and should have been asserted during the

5

bankruptcy proceeding.’ The District Court agreed with CMC

with respect to the federal CERCLA claims, but disagreed with

respect to the state-law MTCA claims. See App. at 37a-46a.

The Court first held that Union Pacific had at least constructive

knowledge of its CERCLA claims before the bar date, and thus

was barred thereafter from asserting those claims against CMC.

Sez id. at 43a-44a. But the Court then held tha: Union Pacific

had no similar knowledge with respect to its MTCA claims,

because the MTCA was not enacted until 1989, four years affer

the claims bar date. See id. at 44a-45a.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed in part, vacated in part, and

remanded. See App. at 19a -34a. The Court first affirmed the

District Court’s conclusion that Union Pacific’s CERCLA

claims were barred because Union Pacific had at least

constructive knowledge of those claims before the bar date but

had not filed a contingent claim against the bankruptcy estate.

See id. at 28a-33a.‘

The Seventh Circuit then vacated the District Court’s

conclusion that Union Pacific’s claims under the Washington

MTCA were not barred because the statute was not enacted

until after the claims bar date. See id. at 33a-34a. The relevant

inquiry, the Seventh Circuit asserted, was not when the statute

was enacted, but whether the type of liability it imposed

“existed under predecessor statutes prior to the bar dates, and

whether Union Pacific consequently had a contingent claim for

environmental cleanup costs under Washington statutes in

effect before the bar dates.” Jd at 34a. Accordingly, the

Seventh Circuit remanded for the District Court to determine

“what liabilities under the [MTCA] existed [at the time of

> Union Pacific subsequently filed a lawsuit in the district court for the

Western District of Washington, seeking a declaratory judgment and

contribution and asserting claims under the MTCA and CERCLA. See App.

at 27a-28a. That action has been stayed pending resolution of this case.

* Indeed, the Seventh Circuit noted that “on the basis of the record before

it, the [District] [C]ourt could have found actual knowledge as well” as

constructive knowledge of the potential CERCLA claims. App. at 31a.

6

discharge] by virtue of Washington state statutes then in

effect.” Id.

D. The Second Round of Litigation

On remand, the District Court assigned the case to a

magistrate judge, who compared the MTCA to three

Washington statutes that had existed prior to the bar date: (1)

the Water Pollution Control Act, Wash. Rev. Code § 90.48

(1985), (2) the Hazardous Waste Management Act, Wash. Rev.

Code § 70.105 (1985), and (3) the nuisance statute, Wash. Rev.

Code § 7.48 (1985). The magistrate judge concluded that none

of these statutes imposed the same liability as that created by

the MTCA. The District Court considered the parties’

objections to the magistrate judge’s recommended order and,

after minor modifications, ratified that order. See App. at 47a-

64a.

The Seventh Circuit affirmed, holding that the District Court

had properly concluded that the liability created by the MTCA

was a “new” liability distinct from any liability that existed

under Washington law at the iume of the bar date in 1985. See

App. at 9a-17a.5

* The Seventh Circuit also noted that, while this litigation was pending,

Union Pacific sold the railyard to the Port of Tacoma. Union Pacific sought

to substitute the Port as the party prosecuting the case, but the Court of

Appeals refused to allow the substitution. See App. at 4a.

7

REASON FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

THE CIRCUITS ARE DIVIDED AS TO THE POINT

IN TIME AT WHICH A FEDERAL BANKRUPTCY

“CLAIM” BASED ON STATE LAW ARISES.

A. The Federal Bankruptcy Laws Broadly Define

“Claims”

As Judge Aldisert noted below, this case presents “the

important question” that arises “here and in other judicial

circuits” of “whether debtors in bankruptcy who are charged

with pollution in the past can be held liable for cleanup costs of

hazardous waste at their former business sites.” App. at 20a.

Resolution of that question implicates the most fundamental

principles underlying the federal bankruptcy laws.

Those laws serve two core purposes: (1) to ensure an

equitable settlement of debts among a bankrupt’s creditors, and

(2) thereafter to give the bankrupt a “fresh start” freed from

those debts. See, e.g., Kokoszka v. Belford, 417 U.S. 642, 645-

46 (1974); Stellwagen v. Clum, 245 U.S. 605, 617 (1918);

Williams v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-

55 (1915). The bankruptcy laws seek to achieve both these

purposes by providing for a comprehensive settlement of the

bankrupt’s debts followed by a binding discharge of those

debts. In order for this procedure to succeed, it is imperative

that all debts be settled during the bankruptcy proceeding.

Permitting creditors to pursue collection of those debts after

that proceeding would not only undermine the fairness of the

distribution but also jeopardize the bankrupt’s ability to make

a “fresh start.”

Accordingly, the bankruptcy laws require creditors to

present all “claims” against a bankrupt during the bankruptcy

proceeding or lose those claims forever. See 11 U.S.C.

§§ 727(b), 1141(d); see also former 11 U.S.C. § 35 (repealed

1978). In addition, the bankruptcy laws broadly define the

term “claim” to ensure that all conceivable liabilities are

presented for orderly resolution during a pending bankruptcy

-

8

proceeding. See, e.g., Johnson v. Home State Bank, 501 U.S.

78, 83 (1991); Pennsylvania Dep't of Public Welfare v.

Davenport, 495 U.S. 552, 558 (1990); Ohio v. Kovacs, 469

U.S. 274, 279 (1985). A “claim” includes all potential debts,

no matter how remote or contingent. See, e.g., In re Cyber-

mech, Inc., 13 F.3d 818, 821 (4th Cir. 1994); Jn re Radio-

Keith-Orpheum Corp., 106 F.2d 22, 22-27 (2d Cir. 1939), cert.

denied, 308 U.S. 622 (1940).° Indeed, the breadth of that term

can hardly be overstated. The courts have described it not only

as “broad” and “very broad,” but as “extremely broad,” “could

not be broader,” “broadest possible,” “all-encompassing,” and

“sufficiently broad to cover any possible obligation.” Jn re

Waterman S.S. Corp., 141 B.R. 552, 556 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

1992) (internal citations and quotations omitted) (collecting

definitions).

B. A Federal Bankruptcy “Claim” Arises at the Time

the Relevant Conduct Occurs, Not at the Time State

Law Creates Liability Based On Such Conduct.

The acknowledged breadth of the statutory term “claim”

informs, but does not directly answer, the question at issue

here: when does a state-law “claim” arise for purposes of the

federal bankruptcy laws? To the extent that Union Pacific’s

claims against CMC arose before the Milwaukee Road’s

bankruptcy discharge, those claims are barred.

* Because the Milwaukee Road filed for bankruptcy before the enactment

of the current Bankruptcy Code in 1978, this case is governed by the

Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Both statutes broadly define the term “claim” to

include wholly contingent obligations of the sort at issue here. The Seventh

Circuit’s resolution of this case, accordingly, in no way turned on any

perceived distinction between the 1898 and 1978 bankruptcy statutes. See

In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 974 F.2d 775, 781 (7th

Cir. 1992) (“Just as Section 77 of the 1898 Act broadly defines claims, the

new Bankruptcy Code also broadly defines claims. Compare 11 U.S.C.

§ 205(b) (repealed 1978) and 11 U.S.C. § 101(4)(A) and (B) (enacted

1978).”).

9

To determine the point in time at which Union Pacific’s

claim under the Washington MTCA arose, the Seventh Circuit

focused on the point in time at which state law created the

relevant legal liability. While rejecting the mechanical

suggestion that, for purposes of federal bankruptcy law, a

“claim” under the MTCA could not arise before the enactment

of that statute, see App. at 34a, the Court focused the inquiry

on the existence of other state statutes that imposed the same

liability, see id. Therefore, in the first round of this litigation,

the Seventh Circuit remanded the case for the District Court to

determine “what liabilities under the [MTCA] existed [at the

time of discharge] by virtue of Washington state statutes then

in effect.” Jd. The District Court subsequently concluded that

no other state statute had imposed that same liability, see id. at

56a-64a, and the Seventh Circuit affirmed that conclusion, see

id. at 9a-17a. Because Union Pacific’s MTCA claim did not

arise until the enactment of that statute in 1989, the Seventh

Circuit held, it could not have been discharged during the 1985

bankruptcy proceeding. See id. at 3a, 7a, 9a-10a, 17a.

The Seventh Circuit violated federal law and policy by

looking to state law to determine when a “claim” arose for

federal bankruptcy purposes. The Seventh Circuit’s underlying

premise—that a “claim” based on state law cannot arise until

state law officially creates the specific liability on which the

claim is based—is incorrect. The question of when a federal

bankruptcy “claim” arises is a federal question to be resolved

by reference to the text, structure, and purposes of the federal

bankruptcy laws. As at least three other circuits have held, the

determination of when a “claim” arises cannot be left to turn on

the vagaries of state law. See, e.g., In re Piper Aircraft Corp.,

58 F.3d 1573, 1576 & n.2 (11th Cir. 1995); Jn re Jensen, 995

F.2d 925, 929-30 & n.5 (9th Cir. 1993); Grady v. A.H. Robins

Co., 839 F.2d 198, 201-02 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 487 U.S.

10

1260 (1988).’ These circuits, unlike the Seventh Circuit,

accordingly recognize that “a claim can exist even though the

holder of that claim may have no present cause of action

against the debtor” under state law. Arlene E. Mirsky et al.,

The Interface Between Bankruptcy and Environmental Laws,

46 Bus. Law. 623, 652 (1991).

Thus, in determining when a “claim” arises for purposes of

the federal bankruptcy laws, “[m]ost courts have focused on the

time when the conduct giving rise to the claim occurred .. . .

With respect to claims under state and federal environmental

laws, this usually means the time at which the contamination

or violation occurred.” Id. at 651-52 (emphasis added). The

relevant inquiry, in other words, focuses on the underlying

conduct at issue rather than the legal consequences or label a

state attaches to that conduct. Because “[c]laims in bankruptcy

arise from the debtor’s conduct,” Jn re Zelis, 66 F.3d 205, 209

(9th Cir. 1995) (citing In re Jensen, 127 B.R. 27, 32-33 (9th

Cir. BAP 1991)), “[a] ‘claim’ arises at the moment when acts

giving rise to the alleged liability are performed.” Jn re

Waterman S.S. Corp., 141 B.R. 552, 556 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.

1992) (internal quotation marks added).* See also In re Johns-

” Many district courts sitting in bankruptcy have also held that “for federal

bankruptcy purposes, a prepetition ‘claim’ may well encompass a cause of

action that, under state law, was not cognizable until after the bankruptcy

petition was filed.” Jn re Johns-Manville Corp., 57 B.R. 680, 690 (Bankr.

S.D.N.Y. 1986); see also In re Food Barn Stores, Inc., 175 B.R. 723, 728-

31 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1994); In re Waterman S.S. Corp., 141 B.R. 552, 556

(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992); In re Black, 70 B.R. 645, 647-51 (Bankr. D. Utah

1986); Acevedo v. Van Dorn Plastic Mach. Co., 68 B.R. 495, 497-98

(Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1986); In re Edge, 60 B.R. 690, 704-05 (Bankr. M.D.

Tenn. 1986); Jn re Yanks, 49 B.R. 56, 57-59 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1985); Jn re

Baldwin-United Corp., 48 B.R. 901, 904 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1985).

* This focus on the underlying conduct is also reflected in the bankruptcy

reorganization plan in this case, which barred all post-discharge contribution

or indemnity claims “based on facts that are unknown, undisclosed and

unasserted” as of the bar date. App. at 24a (quoting Plan of Reorganization

§ 11.2) (emphasis added).

11

Manville Corp., 57 B.R. 680, 690 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1986); Jn

re Transp. Sys. Int’l, Inc., 110 B.R. 888, 394 (D. Minn. 1990),

aff'd, 930 F.2d 625 (8th Cir. 1991); In re Grynberg, 143 B.R.

574, 576 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990), aff'd, 966 F.2d 570 (10th Cir.

1992). The point at which state law recognizes a cause of

action imposing liability for that conduct is immaterial.”

That approach is consistent with the broad federal

bankruptcy definition of “claim.” By holding that a “claim”

cannot arise until state law creates the specific liability on

which it is based, the Seventh Circuit has opened the door for

state law to create “new” post-discharge liabilities based on

pre-discharge conduct. The power to impose such liabilities,

of course, is the power to undermine the “Uniform Laws on the

subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States” that

Congress has enacted pursuant to its express constitutional

power. See U.S. Const. Art. I, § 2, cl. 4. Cf New York v.

Feiring, 313 U.S. 283, 285 (1941) (federal bankrutpcy statute

“[iJntended to be nationwide in its application” and not

“controlled or varied by the particular characterization by local

law”). By allowing the States to create new “claims” after a

federal bankruptcy discharge, the Seventh Circuit has

jeopardized the fundamental predictability and stability of the

uniform federal bankruptcy laws.'®

® Indeed, some courts have held that a “claim” arises at the time the debtor

engages in the conduct on which the claim is based even where that conduct

does not result in any evident injury until later. See, e.g., Grady v. A.H.

Robins Co., 839 F.2d 198, 201 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 487 U.S. 1260

(1988): Jn re Waterman S.S. Corp., 141 B.R. 552 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1992);

In re Edge, 60 B.R. 690, 701-02 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1986). But see

Lemelle v. Universal Mfg. Corp., 18 F.3d 1268, 1275-77 (Sth Cir. 1994);

Schweitzer v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 758 F.2d 936, 943 (3d Cir.),

cert.denied, 474 U.S. 864 (1985).

'° See also The Federalist No. 42, at 271 (James Madison) (Clinton

Rossiter ed., 1961) (“The power of establishing uniform laws of bankruptcy

is SO intimately connected with the regulation of commerce, and will prevent

so many frauds where the parties or their property may lie or be removed

(continued...)

12

This case offers a compelling example of the danger.

Although the Milwaukee Road went into bankruptcy almost

twenty years ago, and had its debts discharged over ten years

ago, the Seventh Circuit has now allowed a creditor to file a

potentially enormous claim against its successor-in-interest,

petitioner CMC Heartland Partners, which has never been

involved in the railroad business at all. (Petitioner is in the

business of real estate management and development.) The

eight-year duration of the Milwaukee Road bankruptcy

proceedings (from 1977 to 1985) underscores the careful

attention given to discharging the Milwaukee Road’s debts in

an orderly, equitable, and comprehensive manner. Union

Pacific could easily have preserved any and all claims involv-

ing environmental contamination at the Tacoma railyard,

regardless of the legal basis of liability, by simply filing during

the Milwaukee Road bankruptcy proceeding a bare-bones proof

of claim parroting the contractual indemnification language in

the 1980 purchase agreement. Having failed to do so, Union

Pacific should not be allowed to frustrate the “fresh start”

provided by the 1985 discharge.

The Seventh Circuit’s conclusion that Union Pacific’s

MTCA claim is not barred, moreover, is especially peculiar in

light of the fact that the MTCA is closely modeled on

CERCLA. See App. at 7a, 10a-11a; see generally Comment,

Through the Looking Glass: A Comparison of Covered

Persons, Defenses, and Liability under CERCLA and the

Washington State Model Toxic Control Act of 1988 (Initiative

97, 1988 General Election), 25 Gonz. L. Rev. 253, 254 (1990).

What the Seventh Circuit gave with one hand, then, it took

away with the other: it allowed Union Pacific to bring under

state law the CERCLA claim that it was barred from bringing

under federal law. That result makes no sense. Union Pacific

clearly knew (or should have known) of the need to file a

'° (...continued)

into different States, that the expediency of it seems not likely to be drawn

into question.”’)

ee

AA Cn VUE te Wd Ot EE MS FOR

ee

13

contingent claim based on the contamination at the Tacoma

railyard during the Milwaukee Road bankruptcy proceedings.

A State cannot circumvent the federal bankruptcy laws by

simply purporting to attach new, cumulative, or duplicative

legal consequences to conduct that occurred before a federal

bankruptcy discharge."

C. The Circuits Are Divided As To The Point In Time

At Which A Federal Bankruptcy “Claim” Arises.

The Seventh Circuit is not the first circuit to fall into the

error of holding that the point at which a federal bankruptcy

“claim” arises is to be determined by reference to state law.

The Third Circuit has made the same mistake, holding that the

point at which a “claim” arises for purposes of the federal

bankruptcy laws turns on the point at which a cause of action

accrues under state law regardless of when the events

underlying the claim occurred. See In re Frenville Co., 744

F.2d 332, 335-36 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1160

(1985). That approach, like the Seventh Circuit’s approach in

this case, “confuse[s] the existence of a present right of action

or access to the courts with the existence of a ‘claim’ for

bankruptcy purposes.” Jn re Edge, 60 B.R. at 704. The

Frenville Court’s reliance on state law to determine the point

at which a federal bankruptcy claim arises has been expressly

rejected by three other circuits. See, e.g., In re Piper Aircraft

Corp., 58 F.3d 1573, 1576-77 (11th Cir. 1995); In re Jensen,

995 F.2d 925, 930 (9th Cir. 1993); Grady v. A.H. Robins Co.,

'' The same analysis does not necessarily apply where federal law

purports to impose a new post-discharge liability. Congress, unlike the

States, enjoys power to impose new liabilities inconsistent with the federal

bankruptcy laws—assuming that such liabilities are not unconstitutionally

retroactive. See, e.g., In re Chateaugay Corp., 53 F.3d 478, 497 (2d Cir.),

cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 298 (1995); In re Penn Central Transp. Co., 944

F.2d 164, 168 (3d Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 503 U.S. 906 (1992). Thus,

whereas the federal bankruptcy laws must be reconciled with inconsistent

federal enactments, those laws trump inconsistent state enactments outright.

14

839 F.2d 198, 201-02 (4th Cir.), cert. dismissed, 487 U.S. 1260

(1988).”

The confusion engendered by Frenville and exacerbated by

the opinions below creates substantial difficulties for the

companies considering reorganization and the courts that must

assist them. Determining, for example, when environmental

claims arise under the bankruptcy laws and thus whether such

“claims can be discharged or survive as a liability of the

reorganized company can be determinative of whether there

can be a successful reorganization.” Steven E. Sherman,

Environmental Issues Facing High-Tech Companies In

Chapter 11 Proceedings, in Computer Law (Sept. 1994).

“Given the importance of this issue and the emerging conflicts

among the circuits, it would be surprising if this issue is not

soon addressed by the Supreme Court.” Jd.”

Both the Third and Seventh Circuits, in sum, have

erroneously “replace[d] the federal definition of ‘claim’ .. .

'? Many courts have recognized the split in authority. See, e.g., In re

Fairchild Aircraft Corp., 184 B.R. 910, 923 (Bankr. W.D. Tex. 1995)

(“Frenville’s reliance upon state law has been rightly criticized by other

courts as being inconsistent with the intended breadth and scope of the

statute and seems to have been rejected in all circuits save its place of

origin.””); Jn re Food Barn Stores, Inc., 175 B.R. 723, 730 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.

1994) (“The Frenville decision has been criticized or rejected by many

courts.”); In re Grynberg, 143 B.R. 574, 577 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1990) (“[T}he

Frenville decision has been discredited and is generally not followed outside

of the Third Circuit.”).

> Other commentators and bankruptcy practictioners have also noted the

need for clarification of the confusion. See, e.g., Harvey R. Miller et ai.,

Representing the Secured Creditor In Chapter 11 Cases, in Formulation

and Confirmation of Chapter 11 Plans Under the Bankruptcy Code (PLI

Com. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. A4-4457, 1994);

Karynne G. Popper & Alison N. Zim, The Bottomless Pit: The Struggle to

Achieve Judicial Consistency In the Application of CERCLA In Bankruptcy

Proceedings (PLI Com. Law & Practice Course Handbook Series No. A4-

4453, 1994); Case Note, In Re Jensen: Demonstrating the Need for Supreme

Court Resolution of the Conflict Between CERCLA and the Bankruptcy

Code, 9 J. Land Use & Envil. L. 179, 190 (1994).

15

with the narrower state concept of ‘cause of action[.]’” Jn re

Amfesco Inds., inc., 81 B.R. 777, 782 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1988).

The significance of that error cannot be overstated. Those two

circuits now allow state law to circumvent federal bankruptcy

law at will by creating new liabilities based on pre-discharge

conduct.

The resulting parade of horribles is far from speculative: it

is manifest in this very case. The Seventh Circuit has allowed

the State of Washington, years after the discharge of the

Milwaukee Road’s debts, to impose on petitioner significant

new liability based wholly on pre-discharge events. The

federal bankruptcy laws neither authorize nor tolerate that

result.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for a writ of certiorari

should be granted.

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT H. WHEELER KENNETH W. STARR

OPPENHEIMER WOLFF & Counsel of Record

DONNELLY DONALD G. KEMPF , IR.

Two Prudential Plaza CHRISTOPHER LANDAU

180 North Stetson Avenue KIRKLAND & ELLIS

45th Floor 655 Fifteenth Street, N.W.

Chicago, Illinois 60601 Suite 1200

Washington, D.C. 20005

Counsel for Petitioner CMC

Heartland Partners

APPENDIX

la

APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

SEVENTH CIRCUIT

In the Matter of

CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE, ST. PAUL & PACIFIC RAIL-

ROAD COMPANY,

Debtor.

CMC HEARTLAND PARTNERS,

Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee,

v.

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD,

Defendant-Appellee, Cross-Appellant.

Nos. 95-1412, 95-2986

Argued Jan. 4, 1996.

Decided Feb. 28, 1996.

Rehearing and Suggestion for Rehearing En Banc

Denied April 3, 1996.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division, No. 77 B 8999;

George W. Lindberg, Judge.

Robert H. Wheeler (argued), Mark Leipold,

Oppenheimer, Wolff & Donnelly, Chicago, IL, for Appellant.

Raymond H. Groble, III (argued), Ross & Hardies,

Chicago, IL, for Appellee.

Jerold S. Solovy, Jenner & Block, Chicago, IL, for

Debtor.

2a

Before ROVNER, DIANE P. WOOD, and EVANS,

Circuit Judges.

TERENCE T. EVANS, Circuit Judge.

Like the Energizer Bunny, litigation growing out of the

Milwaukee Road’s bankruptcy proceedings keeps going and

going and going. Today, we issue another opinion—to be

added to more than a dozen others—in a case stemming from

the reorganization of the railroad which began in 1977.

The Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad

Company, better known as the Milwaukee Road, came to the

end of the line in 1977 when it petitioned for reorganization

pursuant to § 77 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, formerly 11

U.S.C. § 205 (1976) (repealed 1978). The United States

District Court for the Northern District of Illinois served as the

reorganization court.

In accordance with procedures under the Bankruptcy

Act, the reorganization court established deadlines, or bar

dates, for the filing of claims against Milwaukee Road, the

estate, and its trustee. The first bar date was September 10,

1985, which established the deadline for all post-petition

claims (claims arising against Milwaukee Road during the

period of reorganization). Notice of this bar date was sent to

all known creditors and published in The Wall Street Journal.

On November 12, 1985, the reorganization court

entered a consummation order. This order Secame effective on

November 25, 1985, the consummation date. The consumma-

tion order set forth a new bar date of December 26, 1985, for

claims that arose between the prior September 10 bar date and

the November 25 consummation date. This order bars and

forever discharges all untimely claims against the trustee, the

Milwaukee Road, and its successors and assigns.

The question we face, for the second time, is whether

certain claims of the Union Pacific Railroad are among those

properly barred by the reorganization court. The claims arise

eae al

hibae bai ibe ict aia Bile ata be teks

3a

out of an environmental cleanup of a railyard located within the

Commencement Bay/Nearshore Tideflats Superfund site in

Tacoma, Washington. Union Pacific purchased the land from

the Milwaukee Road in 1980 and, as the owner of the land (at

least the owner at the time the appeal was filed but more about

that later), faces liability for the cleanup. It filed claims for the

cleanup against CMC Heartland Partners, successor-in-interest

to the Milwaukee Road, under both the Comprehensive

Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act

(CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. § 9601 ef seg., and the Model Toxics

Control Act of the State of Washington, Wash.Rev.Code Ch.

70.105D.010 et seq.

We first encountered the question in 1993. A brief

review of our decision in Jn re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul

& Pacific RR., 3 F.3d 200 (7th Cir.1993), will set the stage for

our analysis of the present appeal.

We noted that the situation required us to attempt to

reconcile conflicting goals of laws that deal with environmental

cleanups and those of the bankruptcy code designed to give

debtors a “fresh start.” In that context we determined that

claims subject to the claims bar included “contingent claims.”

In the context of CERCLA, a contingent claim exists, we said,

when a party potentially liable for response costs under the Act

can tie a debtor to a “known release of a hazardous substance.”

At 202. Under that formulation we determined that Union

Pacific’s CERCLA claim was barred.

However, the Washington state Model Act became

effective in 1989, four years after the bar date. We joined other

courts, e.g., the Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit—Jn re

Penn Central Transp. Co., 944 F.2d 164 (1991), cert. den. 503

U.S. 906 (1992)—in concluding that claims based on a statute

enacted after the discharge date are not barred.

That was not the end of the issue. CMC argued that

two Washington statutes, the Water Pollution Control Act,

Wash.Rev.Code Ch. 90.48, and the Hazardous Waste Manage-

ment Act, Wash.Rev.Code Ch. 70.105, which existed prior to

4a

the bar date, provided the same or similar relief as the Model

Act and thus barred the claim. We remanded the case to the

reorganization court for a determination “as to what liabilities

under the Model Act existed in 1985 by virtue of Washington

state statutes then in effect.”

On remand, the district court did an admirably thorough

job. Judge George W. Lindberg referred the issue to

Magistrate Judge W. Thomas Rosemond, Jr., who compared

the Model Act to those two statutes and a third, which CMC

added to the mix after remand, the Washington nuisances

statute, Wash. Rev.Code Ch. 7.48.140. Judge Rosemond

issued a recommendation that the claim not be barred. Judge

Lindberg considered objections to the recommendation and,

with minor modifications, also concluded that the claim was

not barred—that Union Pacific was not subject to the same

liability for cleanup of the railyard under prior Washington

statutes as it was under the Model Act and, therefore, its claim

for contribution from CMC did not exist prior to the enactment

of the Model Act. CMC appeals that decision as well as a later

decision on its Rule 60 motion in the district court based on

newly discovered evidence.

In addition, because Union Pacific sold the land to the

Port of Tacoma during the pendency of the appeal, Union

Pacific seeks to substitute the Port as the party prosecuting this

case. We decline to substitute parties. This appeal will pro-

ceed with the original cast. Given the outcome of this appeal

and the agreement between Union Pacific and the Port, we find

that there is no reason to order substitution.

As to the appeal itself, our standard of review in the

many Milwaukee Road cases was set out some time ago:

Because the district court’s entry of an injunction in this case

was both a bankruptcy decision and an interpretation of its

prior consummation order, we review the court’s decision to

bar [the creditor’s] claims for abuse of discretion. Nonetheless,

in applying the abuse of discretion standard, we do not give

equal deference to every aspect of a court’s decision. The

‘. Pisa VRS a tisk, PARP Lacie

Sear io id seeing

Aelia eae

mnt MAC Bh ON Lo 0M

Sa

abuse of discretion standard is used to evaluate the reorganiza-

tion court’s application of the facts to the appropriate legal

standard, and the factual findings and legal conclusions under-

lying such decisions are evaluated under the clearly erroneous

and de novo standards, respectively. In re Chicago,

Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific R.R., 974 F.2d 775, 779-80 (7th

Cir., 1992). The decision on the Rule 60 motion is subject to

considerably more deference. It is reviewed for an abuse of

discretion.

The railyard in Tacoma was owned and used by the

Milwaukee Road from the early years of this century. In 1980,

Union Pacific, with the authorization of the reorganization

court, purchased the Tacoma site from the trustee and later

assigned it to a wholly owned subsidiary, the Oregon-

Washington Railroad and Navigation Co. The purchase agree-

ment contained an indemnification clause for claims arising out

of the operation of the property prior to March 12, 1980.

After purchasing the site, Union Pacific removed

existing structures and let the land stand vacant. In 1980,

Union Pacific’s own inspection of the property revealed that

the area of the site used for diesel fueling was saturated with oil

which, along with contaminated dirt, would probably have to

be removed.

The railyard is in a highly industrial area. In October

1981, the United States Environmental Protection Agency

placed the area on the Agency’s National Priority List. The

Superfund site was described as one of the ten most hazardous

sites in the country. In 1982 the State of Washington commis-

sioned an environmental study of the railyard, and the EPA

investigated the site in 1985.

Union Pacific also owned other property within the

Superfund site and had dealings with the EPA in connection

with two of them. One was an abandoned railway tunnel. The

EPA notified Union Pacific in 1982 that it was a potentially

responsible party for the cleanup of that site. Later, however,

6a

the EPA determined that the tunnel was not the source of

contamination and discontinued its investigation.

The other site was Union Pacific’s Tacoma fueling

facility. The Department of Ecology of the State of Washing-

ton investigated oil contamination in the City of Tacoma

waterway in 1982 and, under Washington’s Water Pollution

Control Act, directed Union Pacific to take remedial action.

Union Pacific commissioned a groundwater investigation.

Although the investigation revealed no groundwater contamin-

ation, Union Pacific, with state approval, removed the top foot

of soil at the facility.

Then in 1990, Union Pacific decided to sell the railyard

and, in preparation for the sale, commissioned an environ-

mental audit. The audit, completed in June 1990 by a company

called Applied Geotechnology, found subsurface contamina-

tion of the soil by petroleum hydrocarbons. The audit also

identified potential contamination from metals and solvents.

As required by law, Union Pacific notified both the EPA and

the State of Washington of these findings.

The State notified Union Pacific that it was potentially

liable for cleanup of the site under the Model Act. The EPA

notified the company that it was also a potentially responsible

party under CERCLA. Union Pacific and the State entered into

an agreement for remediation of contamination at the railyard.

It was then, on September 9, 1991, that Union Pacific

served CMC with a demand for settlement negotiations regard-

ing the cleanup. CMC filed a motion in the reorganization

court to enjoin Union Pacific, under the consummation order,

from asserting any claims arising out of the cleanup of the

railyard. Union Pacific filed a complaint in the Western Dis-

trict of Washington for contribution under CERCLA and the

Model Act.

This summary brings us to the issue at hand. Should

the claim under the Washington Model Act be barred? We

have previously noted that Union Pacific’s CERCLA claim is

> il rd ae CRN tae Late

j

4

|

3

7a

barred. In fact, in 1996, as we look back at the situation, it

seems surprising, if not shocking, that Union Pacific did not

file a contingent CERCLA claim. Also from our 1996 vantage

point, it is perhaps less surprising, but nevertheless worthy of

notice, that Union Pacific did not file a contingent claim under

any possibly relevant existing state statute.

But questions regarding whether the existence of claims

under prior statutes bars a claim now under the Model Act can

only be fairly answered by viewing the world from a 1985

perspective, not from our perspective in 1996. We must resist

the temptation to use 20-20 hindsight.

What was the 1985 perspective? It can best be under-

stood by a brief glance at the history of CERCLA, which is,

after all, the inspiration for Washington’s Model Toxics Con-

trol Act. CERCLA is the source of our current understanding

that owners as owners can be responsible for cleanup costs.

CERCLA became effective on December 11, 1980, ten

months after Union Pacific purchased the railyard. Tremen-

dous changes in environmental law have occurred in the 15

years since the passage of the Act. One commentator has said

that with one possible exception, CERCLA “stands alone as a

conspicuous example of legislative consequence outdistancing

even the boldest imagination of its sponsors.”' He points out

that looking back in 1985, Congress could believe that

CERCLA was aimed at a relatively limited problem and that

cleanup was a relatively inexpensive affair involving scraping

off some soil.’

And, in fact, CERCLA was a sleeper at first. It was

widely thought to be a short-range law; it had a self-destruct

provision of September 30, 1985. Prior to reauthorization in

1986, it had accomplished long-term total cleanup of only 14

' William H. Rodgers, Jr., Environmental Law, at 685 (2d ed. 1994).

? Id.

8a

sites.? Furthermore, the political climate was not conducive to

bold environmental initiatives. The EPA administrator

appointed in 1981 was reluctant to use the full authority

provided by the Act. She and other top administrators wanted

to limit the program to five years, and they minimized the

extent of hazardous waste problems.‘

With the full power of CERCLA not yet fully

understood or acknowledged, it was unlikely that states would

assume that their existing, traditional environmental statutes

could provide the kind of relief that CERCLA would

eventually be seen to provide. In fact, states were unsure of

what their powers were. On March 10, 1986, four months after

the bar date in this case, the Supreme Court struck down a New

Jersey state cleanup tax law on the grounds that CERCLA

preempted that particular type of state action. Exxon Corp. v.

Hunt, 475 U.S. 355 (1986). In 1986, Congress repealed the

section on which the Court relied, and it is now, as we stated in

our prior decision in this case, quite clear that CERCLA does

not preempt state action. See also Burlington Northern R.R. v.

Time Oil Co., 738 F.Supp. 1339 (W.D.Wash.1990).

The expansion of the influence of CERCLA came

primarily as a result of the 1986 reauthorization bill, the

Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986

(SARA). A look at a few things SARA added to the law will

show what was missing in the original bill. SARA expanded

the types of costs which could be recovered from responsible

parties. These now include virtually every conceivable

expense, including health assessments and health effects

studies, and interest from the date that payment is demanded.

See § 9607(a)(4)(D). It provided specifically for actions for

contribution. See § 9613(f). It dealt with the unanswered

> Superfund II: A New Mandate, Environment Reporter, Vol. 17, No. 42

(Feb. 13, 1987), at 3.

* Environment Reporter, at 10.

9a

question as to how clean is clean. It provided for explicit

cleanup standards, stating that remedial actions which

permanently reduce toxics are to be preferred over remedial

actions which do not involve permanent reduction. See

§ 9621(b). Significantly for the present case, SARA also gave

the states the right to substantial and meaningful involvement

in cleanup efforts. § 9621(f).

Early case law also shows the way courts were feeling

their way toward the strong CERCLA that now exists. In 1983,

courts were struggling with the causation issue. In United

States v. Wade, 577 F.Supp. 1326 (E.D.Pa.1983), the court

considered whether the Act required traditional proof that a

defendant caused the harm. Only after much discussion did the

court determine that the Act imposed liability on certain

persons, without proof that their specific waste caused the

necessity for a cleanup. As late as 1985, in State of New York

v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032 (2d Cir.1985), the court

was stiil considering arguments that CERCLA applied only to

the entity which was the owner of the property at the time of

the discharge and that there must be a showing of causation.

The court ultimately rejected both contentions, holding that

CERCLA “unequivocally imposes strict liability on the current

owner of a facility from which there is a release or threat of

release, without regard to causation.” At 1044. The court

stated a proposition used as a starting point today, but it was

not always so.

Given this historical context in 1985, did Union Pacific

have a contingent claim, based on the three existing

Washington statutes, which would bar its claim based on

Washington’s 1989 Model Act? Today, CMC asks us to inter-

pret the statutes creatively to say that Union Pacific would have

known in 1985 that it, as owner, might have been held

responsible for allowing seepage, identifiable as from the

railyard, that anyone would know must have gotten into the

ground water and that therefore it could be ordered to

remediate the site permanently. Was such an interpretation of

the Washington statutes within the realm of possibility in 1985,

10a

or would Union Pacific have been considered almost frivolous

for filing with the bankruptcy court a claim for contribution

based on such potential liability? For that matter, is such an

interpretation possible today?

We have reviewed de novo the conclusions of the

district court regarding these issues and conclude that the court

was correct. The Washington statutes did not provide the com-

prehensive liability or remedy found in the Model Act.

The Washington Model Act was the result of a

statewide initiative. The bill, which became effective on

March 1, 1989, as we said, is modeled after CERCLA/SARA

but in some ways seems even clearer. For instance, CERCLA

lists covered persons as the “owner and operator” of a

hazardous waste site. That phrase prompted litigation in which

arguments were made regarding whether to be a covered

person one had to be both an owner and an operator or whether

“and” actually meant “or” in that context. See, e.g., United

States v. Maryland Bank & Trust Co., 632 F.Supp. 573

(D.Md.1986). The Model Act stated clearly that covered per-

sons included the “owner or operator.” § 70.105D.040(1 (a).

With narrow exceptions, the Model Act imposes strict liability

on an owner of property based merely on ownership without

regard to what actions the owner took on the property to cause

pollution. The owner of the site is a person potentially

responsible for the cleanup, whether or not it caused the

pollution. The Act also recognizes the difficulty of identifying

with precision the parties responsible for hazardous waste sites,

and thus it permits joint and several liability. § 70.105D.010

(4).

The Washington statutes existing in 1985, which we

will soon discuss, often impose liability—sometimes strict

liability—on the owner of a property. However, strict liability

attaches based on an owner’s activities at the site. The statutes

are grounded in a traditional version of strict liability; that is,

strict liability as a theory of recovery based on the idea that a

defendant engaged in some kind of activity which exposed

2 ia ios

CS i DL Se BE OES cet ym ne Ne Nae Te SEK Sah, ht dO AL ahs pea ce

lla

others to a risk of harm and that the activity justified allocating

the risk to the defendant, even though he acted with reasonable

care—that is, it is not necessary to prove negligence. See

Prosser & Keeton, The Law of Torts 653 (1984).

Liability under the existing statutes would require

difficult matters of proof. Union Pacific took some actions at

the site—removing structures, etc. Looking back, CMC urges

us to say that the Department of Ecology could have attempted

to prove that Union Pacific’s actions—taken arguably to clean

up the site—actually disrupted the land and caused pollution.

Being realistic, we have to recognize how highly unlikely that

is. Furthermore, the proof of harm would involve showing that

the petroleum hydrocarbons from the railyard did, in fact, seep

into the waters of the state. It is easy to look back and say,

“Well, of course, they must have,” but such speculation does

not proof make. A remote possibility of liability under the

existing statutes should not bar a claim under the Model Act.

In addition, enforcement provisions of the Model Act

are like those in CERCLA, not those that traditionally existed.

The Model Act has as its purpose the protection of each

person’s “fundamental and inalienable right to a healthful

environment.” § 70.105D.010(1). To ensure that cleanup is

accomplished, it, like CERCLA, has strong enforcement

provisions. After determining that “remedial action is in the

public interest” the state can “issue orders requiring potentially

liable persons to provide the remedial action.” Refusal to

conduct the cleanup can result in draconian penalties. A

person who claims to have been improperly required to take

remedial action must take the action first and contest the order

with the department or in court later. See § 70.105D.050. The

Model Act is, like CERCLA, a statute under which—as we

pointed out in another Milwaukee Road case—persons

needlessly told to clean up may recover costs only after they

have done so: “In the meantime they must get the lead

out”—or the petroleum hydrocarbons. Jn re CMC Heartland

Partners, 966 F.2d 1143, 1148 (7th Cir.1992).

12a

Having made our generalizations, we tum to a

discussion of the individual Washington statutes.

The Water Pollution Control Act, Wash.Rev.Code

§ 90.48.080, provides: Discharge of polluting matter in

waters prohibited. It shall be unlawful for any person to

throw, drain, run, or otherwise discharge into any of the waters

of this state, or to cause, permit or suffer to be thrown, run,

drained, allowed to seep or otherwise discharged into such

waters any organic or inorganic matter that shall cause or tend

to cause pollution of such waters according to the

determination of the commission, as provided for in this

chapter. CMC argued in the district court, as it does here, that

the Water Pollution Control Act (WPCA) is a strict liability

statute which could apply in this case because the pollutants on

the railyard likely “seep” into the waters of the state. The

district court properly rejected the notion that this statute

provided a contingent claim which would bar a claim based on

the Model Act.

CMC seeks comfort in a 1992 decision of the

Washington Pollution Control Hearings Board which held that

the WPCA imposes strict liability and, in fact, that liability

may be imposed on the landowner. Nordevan v. State of

Washington, Dep’t of Ecology, 1992 WL 172977 (1992).

Unfortunately for CMC, a look at the facts in Nordevan shows

how different that situation is from that at the railyard.

Nordevan is a company which buys, clears, and

prepares land for sale to developers. The land in question was

on a steep slope with a creek running through it. Nordevan

obtained various permits and began clearing the land. And, of

course, as the board specifically found, it rains a lot in

Washington. There were clear, obvious, and serious erosion

problems which muddied the creek. The sophistication

required to establish this violation is far less than would be

necessary to establish the pollution of groundwater from the

Union Pacific site. In imposing liability on Nordevan, the -

board stated that the Water Pollution Control Act was a strict

PT eRe Re eS ITE ee Pe ee

.

¥

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\

.

l3a

liability statute. Nordevan had “drained, suffered or caused the

discharges into the waters of the state” and was therefore

strictly liable.

Further, Nordevan had allowed a utility company a

limited utility easement. In what CMC argues is an imposition

of liability on an owner as owner, the board said that

Nordevan, as the owner of the property, “remained responsible

for the discharge of potential pollution.” We disagree with

CMC’s interpretation.

The manner in which liability attached to the owner in

Nordevan is similar to the liability on the owner in Sea Farms,

Inc. v. Foster & Marshall Realty, Inc., 42 Wash.App. 308, 711

P.2d 1049 (1985). There the court considered oyster beds

“negligently damaged by the construction of a marina...” Sea

Farms sued both the developer and the project engineer of the

marina. The owner of the land attempted to pass off its liability

onto the general contractor. That it was not permitted to do.

The duty to comply with the permit which had been issued to

the owner to build the marina was nondelegable. The owner’s

motion for summary judgment was denied because it had a

duty not to pollute its own waters, as well as those of others:

“Thus the duty to refrain from acts which will pollute waters on

another’s land may not be delegated to an independent contrac-

tor.” At 312, 711 P.2d 1049.

In both Sea Farms and Nordevan, the owner is

responsible for pollution done on its land by those acting with

its knowledge and permission. It is a far cry from Union

Pacific being held liable for pollution caused by the Milwaukee

Road during a half century before Union Pacific bought the

land.

In addition, although the WPCA prohibits permitting

any polluting matter to seep into the waters, and although it

would perhaps be possible to show that the pollutants from the

railyard have seeped into the groundwater, the proof required

to sustain that claim as to the railyard could be formidable.

The statute would seem to require that one prove that the

l4a

pollutants which exist in the groundwater—or any other

water—came from the railyard. The railyard is located in an

area of bountiful sources of pollutants. The proof on this point

would be considerably more than what is required under the

Model Act.

Finally, after defying the orders of the Department of

Ecology to control the erosion, Nordevan was fined $15,000,

with $5,000 of that amount suspended on the condition that it

not violate the law for two years. In short, Union Pacific did

not face the same threat of liability and thus did not possess the

same claim for contribution under the WPCA as it did once the

Model Act went into effect.

The Washington Hazardous Waste Management Act,

Wash.Rev.Code § 70.105.050, is even less helpful to CMC. It

provides that: No person shall dispose of designated extremely

hazardous wastes at any disposal site in the state other than the

disposal site established and approved for such purpose under

provisions of this chapter, except when such wastes are going

to a processing facility which will result in the waste being

reclaimed, treated, detoxified, neutralized, or otherwise pro-

cessed to remove its harmful properties or characteristics. “Dis-

pose or disposal” is defined as “the discarding or abandoning

of hazardous wastes or the treatment, decontamination, or

recycling of such wastes once they have been discarded or

abandoned.” § 70.105.010(4). It is not necessary to say much

more about a potential Union Pacific claim under this statute

than that the district court was right to reject the argument that

one might have existed.

The statute refers clearly to those who dispose of waste

at disposal sites, not to those who own land on which wastes

were allowed to gather by a previous owner. Union Pacific

would not have had occasion to be concerned about a potential

claim under this statute. CMC does not provide us with any

cases in which liability has been established in similar circum-

stances.

lSa

Finally, we turn to Washington’s nuisance statute. The

Statute is not a model of efficiency. Several sections of the Act

could conceivably be argued to be applicable to this case.

Section 7.48.010 defines actionable nuisances: The obstruction

of any highway or the closing of the channel of any stream

used for boating or rafting logs, lumber or timber, or whatever

is injurious to health or indecent or offensive to the senses, or

an obstruction in the free use of property, so as to essentially

interfere with the comfortable enjoyment of the life and

property, is a nuisance and the subject of an action for damages

and other and further relief.

Section 7.48.120 defines nuisance: Nuisance consists in

unlawfully doing an act, or omitting to perform a duty, which

act or omission either annoys, injures or endangers the comfort,

repose, health or safety of others, offends decency, or unlaw-

fully interferes with, obstructs or tends to obstruct, or render

dangerous for passage, any lake or navigable river, bay, stream,

canal or basin, or any public park, Square, street or highway;

or in any way renders other persons insecure in life, or in the

use of property. Then § 7.48.130 defines public nuisance: A

public nuisance is one which affects equally the rights of an

entire community or neighborhood, although the extent of the

damage may be unequal. Section 7.48.150 says everything in

7.48.130 is a private nuisance. If all that was not enough,

§ 7.48.140 enumerates public nuisances. Subsection (2) is the

one argued to be relevant: To throw or deposit any offal or

other offensive matter, or the carcass of any dead animal, in

any watercourse, stream, lake, pond, spring, well, or common

sewer, street, or public highway, or in any manner to corrupt or

render unwholesome or impure the water of any such spring,

stream, pond, lake, or well, to the injury or prejudice of

others[.] The statute provides for abatement of the nuisance.

See § 7.48.250.

What seems clear from a simple reading of the statutes

is that parlaying a claim based on those statutes into something

approaching that arising from the Model Act would be more

than an uphill battle.

(a

l6a

In 1985, the Supreme Court of Washington discussed

a private nuisance action on certification from the District

Court for the Western District of Washington. The discussion

sheds light on the nature of a nuisance action. A nuisance

action required a “substantial and unreasonable interference

with [the] use and enjoyment of” one’s property. Bradley v.

American Smelting and Refining Co., 104 Wash.2d 677, 709

P.2d 782 (1985). We could not say with confidence that

Washington courts would interpret that requirement suffi-

ciently broadly to allow a claim regarding the railyard. It is, as

we have noted, located in a highly industrial area, identified as

a Superfund site. The railyard could hardly affect the rights of

the “neighborhood.” See § 7.48.130. Union Pacific could as

easily have a claim against other property owners within the

site. And while the entire site could be alleged to affect the

rights of the “entire community” (id.), it would be hard to

single out Union Pacific and would be a formidable challenge

to sue all of the property owners within the site.

CMC calls our attention to Miotke v. City of Spokane,

101 Wash.2d 307, 678 P.2d 803 (1984), which involved a

determination that a violation of the WPCA can support a claim

for nuisance. Of course, before there can be a nuisance under

this theory, there must be a finding of a violation of the WPCA,

which we have just discussed as it relates to this case. In

Miotke, the city, in violation of a waste discharge permit,

discharged 100 million gallons of raw sewage into a river,

which was at a relatively low flow. The sewage went down-

stream to a lake on which several persons had constructed lake

homes. The lake became a putrid mess. It is true—and not

surprising—that a claim for nuisance was found to exist on

these facts. Even so, the court noted that the litigation was

“protracted and complex.” 678 P.2d at 806. How much more

difficult would it be to show a violation in the present case?

Furthermore, because of the railyard’s location, there

are many other sources of pollution. In order to obtain relief

from Union Pacific under a nuisance theory, the state would be

required to identify pollution which could be traced to Union

eee eee ee Ne

17a

Pacific. See Maas v. Perkins, 42 Wash.2d 38, 253 P.2d 427

(1953); Smith v. Rodene, 69 Wash.2d 482, 418 P.2d 741

(1966). That is different in kind from a showing that there is

hazardous waste on property of which the defendant is the

owner.

CMC urges us to superimpose the Model Act on the

nuisance statute and find that the nuisance statute provides

some of the relief set out in the Model Act. As a practical

matter, it does not. For all these reasons, we conclude that the

district court correctly determined that Washington statutes

existing in 1985 did not form the basis for the filing, by Union

Pacific, of a contingent claim in the Milwaukee Road

bankruptcy proceeding.

CMC also has appealed the denial of its Rule 60 motion

in which it claimed that new evidence required relief from the

judgment.

CMC is entitled to relief from the district court’s final

judgment only if it can present “newly discovered evidence

which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time

to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b).” Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 60(b)(2). In order to prevail on its motion,

CMC must meet the following prerequisites: 1. The evidence

was discovered following trial; 2. Due diligence on the part of

the movant to discover the new evidence is shown or may be

inferred; 3. The evidence is not merely cumulative or impeach-

ing; 4. The evidence is material; and 5. The evidence is such

that a new trial would probably produce a new result. If any of

these prerequisites are not met, CMC cannot prevail on its

motion.

The denial of a Rule 60(b)(2) motion will not be

overturned unless the district court abused its discretion.

McKnight v. United States Steel Corp., 726 F.2d 333, 335 (7th

Cir.1984). To establish an abuse of discretion, CMC must

show that no reasonable person could agree with the court; if

reasonable persons could disagree as to the propriety of the

18a

court’s action there is no abuse of discretion. Lee v. Village of

River Forest, 936 F.2d 976 (7th Cir.1991).

The newly discovered evidence was a November 1994

feasibility study regarding environmental cleanup of the site;

a November 1994 letter from the Washington State Department

of Ecology to the Port allegedly indicating that the department

could direct a cleanup of the site under prior statutes; the sale

agreement between Union Pacific and the Port of Tacoma, in

which the Port agrees to indemnify Union Pacific from claims

under any environmental laws; and an excerpt from an April

1993 hydrogeologic characterization report prepared by a

Union Pacific subsidiary.

Conveniently, the newly discovered documents

allegedly showed that contrary to the district court’s ruling,

affirmative acts on Union Pacific’s part were not required

before cleanup liability attached, and even if they were, Union

Pacific had engaged in such acts. It was not an abuse of

discretion for the court to find that this evidence was not new

or, to the extent it was new, that it was not material and would

not have changed the underlying decision. We agree with the

district court and furthermore find that the newly discovered

evidence would not have changed the analysis in our de novo

review of the underlying decision.

The decisions of the district court are AFFIRMED.

19a

APPENDIX B

ised acciebaiaaeionls

} UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

SEVENTH CIRCUIT

In the Matter of

CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE, ST. PAUL & PACIFIC RAIL-

ROAD COMPANY,

Debtor.

CMC HEARTLAND PARTNERS,

sgn Read ge oe ee

Plaintiff-Appellant, Cross-Appellee,

| UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD,

Defendant-A ppellee, Cross-Appellant.

| Nos. 92-3713, 92-3790.

June 8, 1993.

Decided Aug. 18, 1993.

Raymond H. Groble, II (argued), Ross & Hardies,

Chicago, IL, for Union Pacific R. Co.

ha. nical Ne aes ht

20a

Michael D. Dabertin, Robert Wheeler (argued),

Oppenheimer, Wolff & Donnelly, Chicago, IL, for CMC

Heartland Partners.

James M. Amend, Kirkland & Ellis, Chicago, Michael

L. Gesas, Gesas, Pilati & Gesas, Chicago, IL, for Chicago,

Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific R. Co.

Before COFFEY and MANION, Circuit Judges, and

ALDISERT, Senior Circuit Judge.”

ALDISERT, Senior Circuit Judge.

We attempt again to reconcile the conflicting goals of

environmental cleanup and a “fresh start” for bankruptcy deb-

tors.

Presented in these cases, here and in other judicial

circuits, is the important question whether debtors in bank-

ruptcy who are charged with pollution in the past can be held

liable for cleanup costs of hazardous waste at their former

business sites.' Generally, demands for contribution and reim-

bursement are made after bankruptcy proceedings are either in

advanced stages or have been completed; in these cases the

debtors generally assert that the demands are too late because

they were made subsequent to bar dates for claims fixed by the

bankruptcy courts.

The interface of environmental cleanup laws and

federal bankruptcy statutes is never tidy; jurisprudentially, it

is somewhat grubby. The Comprehensive Environmental

Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, 42 U.S.C.

§§ 9601-9675 (“CERCLA”) and similar state laws, like

Washington's Model Toxics Control Act, Wash.Rev.Code ch.

” Ruggero J. Aldisert, of the Third Circuit, sitting by designation.

! See In re Jensen, 995 F.2d 925 (9th Cir.1993); In re Chateaugay Corp.,

944 F.2d 997 (2d Cir.1991); Jn re National Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. 397

(N.D.Tex.1992); United States v. Union Scrap & Metal, 123 B.R. 831

(D.Minn.1990); Jn re Edge, 60 B.R. 690 (Bankr.M.D.Tenn. 1986).

2la

70.105D (“the Model Act”), effective March 1, 1989, and

predecessor statutes seek to protect public health and the

environment by facilitating the cleanup of environmental con-

tamination and imposing costs on the parties responsible for the

pollution. The Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, 11 U.S.C.

§§ 101-1330, and its predecessors were designed to give a

debtor a fresh start by discharging as many of its debts as

possible. The tension between these fundamental aspects of

our national policy is profound.

The Supreme Court has indicated that, if possible, these

two conflicting objectives should be reconciled. Méidlantic

Nat'l Bank v. New Jersey Dep’t of Envtl. Protection, 474 U.S.

494, 505-06 (1986); see Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274, 280-82

(1985); see also In re National Gypsum Co., 139 B.R. 397, 404

(N.D.Tex.1992) (“It is not a question of which statute should

be accorded primacy over the other, but rather what interaction

between the two statutes serves most faithfully the policy

objectives embodied in the two separate enactments of Con-

gress”). The very difficult issue present in cases involving this

fundamental conflict—including the case before us—is: When

does a “claim” as defined by the Bankruptcy Act for recovery

of cleanup costs arise?

I.

The bankruptcy petition in this case was filed under the

Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Section 77(b) of that act, former 11

U.S.C. § 205(b) (repealed 1978), provided: “The term ‘claims’

includes debts, whether liquidated or unliquidated, securities

(other than stock and option warrants to subscribe to stock),

liens, or other interests of whatever character.” See City of

New York v. New York, N.H. & H. RR. 344 U.S. 293, 295 n.

4 (1953). The current version of the code sets out the broad

reach of the term in greater detail. “Claim” means:

(A) right to payment, whether or not such right

is reduced to judgment, liquidated, unliqui-

dated, fixed, contingent, matured, unmatured,

disputed, undisputed, legal, equitable, secured,

22a

or unsecured; or (B) right to an equitable reme-

dy for breach of performance if such breach

gives rise to a night to payment, whether or not

such right to an equitable remedy is reduced to

judgment, fixed, contingent, matured, un-

matured, disputed, undisputed, secured, or

unsecured.

11 U.S.C. § 101(5).

When a kindred contention was previously before us in

In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad, 974

F.2d 775 (7th Cir.1992) (hereinafter Chicago J), we announced

a possible formulation of when a contingent claim arose:

[W]hen a potential CERCLA claimant can tie

the bankruptcy debtor to a known release of a

hazardous substance which the potential claim-

ant knows will lead to CERCLA response costs,

and when this potential claimant has, in fact,

conducted tests with regard to this contamina-

tion problem, then this potential claimant has,

at least, a contingent CERCLA claim under

Section 77.

Id. at 786. Our formulation has been cited with approval by the

Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. Jn re Jensen, 995 F.2d

925 (9th Cir.1993).

We have cross appeals filed by Union Pacific Railroad

and by CMC Heartland Partners, the successor in interest to the

debtor, Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad

(hereinafter “the Milwaukee Road”). Our task is to determine

whether the district court properly applied our definition of a

contingent claim to that submitted by Union Pacific Railroad

for contribution and indemnity. Union Pacific purchased the

property at issue from the Milwaukee Road bankruptcy trustee

by agreement dated March 28, 1980. The agreement included

a clause by which the bankruptcy trustee and the Milwaukee

Road agreed to indemnify Union Pacific and its subsidiaries—

———————eeeeeeeeee———————————eeEeEeonor

Cee i ar Cae Bo temoe Cree SS eo oes ie) ieee Seema laren ar teat

23a

against any and all claims, damages, liabilities, losses or

demands whatsoever, and expenses in connection therewith,

including reasonable fees of outside counsel, regardless of the

source or nature thereof, arising out of the operation of the

Properties prior to March 12, 1980. App. at 49.

Union Pacific now faces liability under state and federal

law for cleanup of pollution on the property and seeks to

enforce the indemnification clause against CMC. CMC

responds that any claims for cleanup costs were discharged in

the bankruptcy proceedings.

In these cross appeals, we must consider (1) whether

the district court was correct in holding that Union Pacific’s

claim for indemnification of its liability under federal law arose

before the discharge and thus was barred; and (2) whether the

district court was correct in holding that Union Pacific’s claim

for indemnification of its liability under state law arose after

the discharge and thus was not barred.

Jurisdiction was proper in the trial court based on 28

U.S.C. § 1334. This court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.

§ 1291. The appeal was timely filed under Rule 4(a) of the

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure.

We hold that the district court properly held that Union’

Pacific’s claim under CERCLA was barred. To the extent that

the district court further held that Union Pacific’s claim under

the Washington Model Toxic Control Act was not barred, we

vacate that portion of the judgment and remand with a direction

that the district court first determine what liabilities under the

Model Act, if any, were imposed under previous Washington

statutes, and then decide what, if any, specific cleanup liabili-

ties under previous state statutes were discharged because no

claims were timely presented to the bankruptcy court.

IL.

The Milwaukee Road petitioned for reorganization on

December 19, 1977, under Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act of

24a

1898, which was then in effect. Union Pacific was a creditor

and participated in the bankruptcy proceedings.

On July 12, 1985, the district court entered Order No.

832, which confirmed the debtor’s reorganization plan. The

order set a bar date of September 10, 1985, for all post-petition

claims. Claims arising after September 10 but before the con-

summation date of November 25, 1985, were required to be

filed by December 26, 1985. Under Section 11.2 of the plan,

the bar dates apply to—all claims, including claims for

contribution and indemnity existing as of the Confirmation

Date [July 12, 1985] and Consummation Date [November 25,

1985], respectively. The bar dates provided in section 11.1,

however, do not apply to claims for contribution or indemnity

based on facts that are unknown, undisclosed and unasserted as

of the Confirmation Date and Consummation Date, respec-

tively. App. at 23. The court subsequently entered Order No.

866 on November 12, 1985 (“the consummation order”), which

discharged all claims against the Milwaukee Road and its

successors and assigns, including CMC, unless those claims

had been timely filed. The order also enjoined all persons from

asserting claims that had been discharged.

The property giving rise to Union Pacific’s claim is a

former railyard in Tacoma, Washington (“the railyard”), which

had been owned by the Milwaukee Road from the early years

of this century. The railyard is located within the Commence-

ment Bay/Nearshore Tideflats Superfund site in Tacoma,

Washington (“the Superfund site”), a site whose charac-

terization, remediation and funding were described in

numerous national and regional newspapers as early as 1981.

The bankruptcy trustee conveyed it to Union Pacific by quit-

claim deed, and it was subsequently assigned to the Oregon-

Washington Railroad and Navigation Co., a wholly owned

subsidiary of Union Pacific. The transfer was authorized by

the reorganization court and took place on December 19, 1980.

Union Pacific removed the existing structures on the

railyard, and it thereafter stood vacant. By April 1980, Union

SS a a ea Le Se »

25a

Pacific engineers had inspected the site and reported their

results in an internal memorandum to Roland Haacke, the

company’s district engineer. The memorandum included this

statement: Diesel fueling area is oil saturated and will probably

require removal of surface oil as well as contaminated dirt.

Apparently, this covers quite a large area and may require

extensive clean-up. Rec. 4, Ex. J-1. Haacke testified that he

made several personal inspections of the railyard and observed

oil or grease on the ground in the shop area, the roundhouse

area and the diesel fueling area. Union Pacific contends that

the inspections by Haacke and others gave no indication of any

subsurface contamination but revealed only surface contamina-

tion.

Meanwhile, hazardous wastes in the area around the

railyard came to the attention of the Environmental Protection

Agency. EPA placed Commencement Bay and the Nearshore

Tideflats on the Interim Priority List in October 1981. In this

same highly publicized announcement, EPA described the

Superfund site as one of the ten most hazardous sites in the

country. Local and national media reported these develop-

ments. Rec. 3, Ex. H; see also Wallace Turner, Tacoma Pollu-

tion on “10 Worst” List, N.Y. Times, Nov. 8, 1981, § 1, at 35.

The Union Pacific railyard is entirely within the Superfund site.

The proposed inclusion of the Commencement Bay/Nearshore

Tideflats area on the first National Priorities List (NPL) was

published in the Federal Register. Amendment to National Oil

and Hazardous Substance Contingency Plan; The Nation

Priorities List, 47 Fed.Reg. 58476 (1982) (proposed Dec. 30,

1982). The site eventually was included on the first NPL,

which was issued in September 1983.

The state of Washington commissioned an environ-

mental study of the railyard, focusing on its historical use. The

study, by Dames & Moore, was completed in January 1982 and

included these findings: During the history of the railyard,

many spills of compounds occurred on site, including oil and

other compounds transported by rail. Spills were not cleaned

up, and the materials were allowed to seep into the ground. The

26a

railroad also cleaned out their rail cars. It was reported that

during the late 1950s the material was dumped on site and

allowed to disperse into the soil and seep into the waterways.

In 1960, the railroad was required to collect copper sulfite and

other toxic materials dry and dispose of them on land. Runoff

from this site enters the Milwaukee Waterway. This evaluation

of the site indicates that the soils at this site are possibly

permeated with toxic compounds. Recently, there has been

some grading and the tracks were pulled up. This may have

resulted in covering the permeated soils with a thin layer of dirt

or exposing the contaminated soils to the environment. Rec. 4,

Ex. G, at 50. The Dames & Moore study was delivered to the

Washington Department of Ecology. Union Pacific states that

it did not receive a copy of the study and was not aware of its

contents.

Union Pacific owned other property within the Super-

fund site and had dealings with EPA and the st..te in connection

with two of these properties. EPA found contamination in the

vicinity of an abandoned railway tunnel owned by Union

Pacific and notified Union Pacific in early 1982 that it was a

potentially responsible party. However, EPA determined that

the tunnel was not the source of the contamination and discon-

tinued its investigations. Union Pacific interpreted this to mean

that it would not be required to participate in the cleanup of the

Superfund site.

The state’s ecology department also contacted Union

Pacific about oil contamination that occurred in the City of

Tacoma waterway on February 16, 1982. The source of the

spill was determined to be Union Pacific’s Tacoma fueling

facility, located several miles from the railyard with which the

present case is concerned. Under the state’s Water Pollution

Control Act, Union Pacific was required to take remedial

action and then commissioned a groundwater investigation.

Although the investigation revealed no groundwater contamin-

ation, Union Pacific proposed to remove the top one-foot of

soil at the facility to “eliminate the possibility of any diesel fuel

27a

in such soil reaching the storm drains or groundwater.” The

soil was removed, and the state approved this action.

Finally, in August 1985, several months before the bar

dates, EPA completed a Remedial Investigation of the Super-

fund site. This investigation contained a reference to environ-

mental contamination at the railyard: Milwaukee Railroad was

located on the south shore of Sitcum Waterway until 1980.

According to Dames & Moore (1982), numerous solid and

liquid spills have occurred in this area. The contents of these

spills are unknown and the associated potential for release of

contaminants to Sitcum Waterway from the spills and railway

operations cannot be evaluated. Union Pacific Br. at 10.

Union Pacific later decided to sell the railyard and com-

missioned an environmental audit that was completed by

Applied Geotechnology on June 29, 1990, and disclosed

subsurface contamination consisting primarily of petroleum

hydrocarbons. The audit also identified potential contamina-

tion from metals and solvents. Union Pacific notified both

EPA and the state of these findings but contends that it did not

know of any subsurface contamination prior to this environ-

mental audit.

The state ecology department notified Union Pacific on

October 16, 1990, that the railroad was potentially liable under

the Washington Model Act. Union Pacific and the state then

entered into an agreement on July 31, 1990, providing for

remediation of contamination at the railyard under the act.

CMC asserts also that on April 24, 1989, EPA notified Union

Pacific that it was a potentially responsible party under

CERCLA and thus could be liable for cleanup costs at the

railyard.

Union Pacific served CMC on September 9, 1991, with

a demand for settlement negotiations concerning cleanup of the

railyard. CMC filed a motion in the district court for the

Northern District of Illinois to enjoin Union Pacific, pursuant

to the consummation order, from asserting any claims arising

out of the purchase of the railyard. Union Pacific subsequently

28a

filed a complaint in the district court for the Western District

of Washington, seeking declaratory judgment and contribution

and asserting claims under the Model Act and CERCLA.

III.

After reviewing the facts, the district court for the

Northern District of Illinois considered whether Union Pacific

knew of its potential liability under CERCLA and the Model

Act before September 10, 1985, the bar date for post-petition

claims. Jn re Chicago, M., St. P. & Pac. R.R., No. 77 B 8999,

1992 WL 316321 (N.D.IIl. Oct. 21, 1992) (hereinafter

“D.Ct.Op.”). The court concluded that Union Pacific had

constructive knowledge of its CERCLA claim by the bar date

and identified several facts that supported its determination:

The Commencement Bay and Nearshore Tideflats area was

identified in 1981 as one of the most contaminated places in the

country. D.Ct.Op. at 7. The railyard is included in this area.

Union Pacific officials denied that they knew of the 1982

Dames & Moore report, but “this information was available

had they sought it out.” Jd. EPA’s notice to Union Pacific in

1982 concerning possible contamination from the railway

tunnel “was direct notice to Union Pacific that there were

environmental investigations occurring in the Commencement

Bay Area.” Jd. Union Pacific knew in 1982 of spills at its

Tacoma fueling facility, which made the railroad liable for

cleanup costs under state law. Jd. Union Pacific’s own engin-

eers had inspected the railyard in 1980 and noted that the site

“may require extensive cleanup.” Jd. at 8. The court stated:

While Union Pacific may not have had actual knowledge of

hazardous waste contamination at the railyard, the facts reveal

there was enough information present at the time that the bar

dates went into effect that Union Pacific should have been

aware of its potential liability. ... The presence of a number

of environmental investigations by state and federal authorities

in the Commencement Bay area should have reasonably alerted

Union Pacific to the possibility of environmental contamination

of an area that was already found to be oil saturated. Enough

factual information exists to give Union Pacific constructive

29a

knowledge of a CERCLA claim at the time of the bar dates. Jd.

at 7, 8.

The district court then tumed to Union Pacific’s claim

for indemnity of costs relating to the Model Act and held that

this claim was not barred. The court noted that the consumma-

tion order was filed in 1985, before the Model Act took effect

on March 1, 1989. The court concluded, “Union Pacific could

not possibly have known of its liability under a statute that was

not in existence until four years after the bar dates were estab-

lished for filing claims against the Milwaukee Road.” Jd. at 9

(citing Jn re Penn Central Transp. Co., 944 F.2d 164, 167-68

(3d Cir.1991) (CERCLA claim was not discharged in bank-

ruptcy when consummation order was entered before CERCLA

was enacted), cert. denied sub nom. Penn Central Corp. v.

United States, US. __, 112 S.Ct. 1262 (1992)). The court

also rejected CMC’s implicit argument that CERCLA pre-

empted state law remedies for hazardous waste contamination.

Id. at 8.

IV.

Union Pacific argues that the district court erred in

determining that Union Pacific had constructive knowledge of

its CERCLA liability before the consummation date. CMC

argues that the district court erred in determining that Union

Pacific could not have known of its state law liabilities until

after the consummation order was filed; it asserts that the

Model Act did not create new duties but merely recodified

existing duties under the state’s Water Pollution Control Act,

Wash.Rev.Code ch. 90.48, and Hazardous Waste Management

Act, Wash.Rev.Code ch. 70.105, and accompanying regula-

tions, Wash.Admin.Code ch. 173-303.

We described the standard of review in Chicago I:

Because the district court’s entry of an injunction in this case

was both a bankruptcy decision and an interpretation of its

prior consummation order, we review the court’s decision to

bar [the creditor’s] claims for abuse of discretion. Nonetheless,

in applying the abuse of discretion standard, we do not give

30a

equal deference to every aspect of a court’s decision. The

abuse of discretion standard is used to evaluate the reorganiza-

tion court’s application of the facts to the appropriate legal

standard, and the factual findings and legal conclusions under-

lying such decisions are evaluated under the clearly erroneous

and de novo standards, respectively. 974 F.2d at 779-80.

V.

Our analysis must begin with the definition of a “claim”

under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. We have recognized that

Section 77(b) of the Act “broadly defines claims to include

‘debts, whether liquidated or unliquidated ... or other interests

of whatever character.” Chicago I, 974 F.2d at 780 (quoting

former 11 U.S.C. § 205(b) (repealed 1978)).

Union Pacific argues that it did not have sufficient

knowledge of its CERCLA liability prior to the consummation

date to require it to file a proof of claim. In Chicago /, the

Washington State Department of Transportation (WSDOT)

purchased property from the bankruptcy trustee in 1984. The

state’s Department of Ecology determined by June or July 1985

that the site was contaminated as a result of a 1979 derailment

and spill of copper ore. In August 1985, the Department of

Ecology notified WSDOT of the problem and indicated that

some tests had been completed and further testing would be

necessary. Soil samples were taken in October 1985, and test

results were returned in November.

WSDOT did not file a proof of claim before the second

bar date of December 26, 1985. The state subsequently sought

to recover cleanup costs incurred under CERCLA. The district

court held that the claim was barred, and we affirmed.

As previously set forth in detail in Part III, the district

court in the present case listed five significant facts indicating

that Union Pacific had sufficient knowledge of its potential

liability under CERCLA to require it to file a proof of claim.

In summary, the court found that the railyard was included in

a Superfund site; the Dames & Moore report described contam-

3la

ination at the railyard, a report described by the district court

as information that was available to Union Pacific “had they

sought it out”; Union Pacific knew of EPA investigations in the

area; it knew of its liability under state law for contamination

at the Tacoma fueling facility; and its own engineers had noted

that the railyard might require extensive cleanup. The court

held that Union Pacific had constructive knowledge of its

CERCLA claim.

Union Pacific presents a number of counterarguments

that essentially challenge the district court’s factual finding of

constructive knowledge. It argues that it did not anticipate

CERCLA liability because petroleum is specifically exempted

from coverage. 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (“The term {‘hazardous

substance’] does not include petroleum, including crude oil or

any fraction thereof which is not otherwise specifically listed

or designated as a hazardous substance. ...”). But see 50 Fed.

Reg. 13,460 (April 4, 1985) (commentary to final rulemaking)

(“EPA does not consider materials such as waste oil to which

listed CERCLA substances have been added to be within the

petroleum exclusion.”).

Although the district court determined that “Union

Pacific may not have had actual knowledge of hazardous waste

containes at the railyard,” on the basis of the record before it,

the court could have found actual knowledge as well. The

April 1, 1980 in-house engineers’ memorandum, prepared

shortly after the purchase agreement was entered into, stated

that a portion of the railyard “will probably require removal of

surface oil as well as contaminated dirt. Apparently, this

covers quite a large area and may require extensive clean-up.”

Although at oral argument, Union Pacific explained that this

memorandum “pertained solely to surface spills,” its district

engineer had testified to seeing “oil on the surface, grease or

oil, fuel” on the site. One does not need an engineering degree

to conclude that grease, oil and fuel left standing for a long

period of time have the capacity to seep into the subsurface of

soil. This was five years before the bar date.

32a

In any event, the district court did not err in finding

constructive knowledge. With EPA conducting a massive

investigation of one of the ten most hazardous sites in the

country, in which the railyard was located, Union Pacific

cannot now argue that it did not know of potential

environmental claims regarding the railyard. Our national

environmental policy does not permit a commercial landowner

in a tainted area to put on blinders or attempt an “ostrich

defense.”

We are satisfied that the district court’s determination

that Union Pacific had constructive knowledge of the facts

summarized above was not clearly erroneous. From this we

conclude that when such knowledge was imputed to Union

Pacific, it became “a potential CERCLA claimant [who could]

tie the bankruptcy debtor to a known release of a hazardous

substance.” Chicago I, 974 F.2d at 786. We also conclude that

on the basis of the Dames & Moore study, the April 1980

inspection of the railyard by Union Pacific engineers, the

personal inspections by district engineer Haacke, the public

characterization by the EPA of the Commencement Bay area

as one of the ten most hazardous sites in the country and other

evidence, it can be said, paraphrasing Chicago I, that Union

Pacific was a potential claimant that had, in fact, made

inspections of the site and observed contamination and had

available similar information from other sources, and therefore

Union Pacific had at least a contingent CERCLA claim under

Section 77. See id. We conclude further that Union Pacific

had this contingent CERCLA claim substantially in advance of

the bankruptcy court’s bar dates of September 10, 1985 and

December 26, 1985.

We hold, therefore, that the district court did not abuse

its discretion to bar Union Pacific’s CERCLA claims.

, |

33a

In so deciding, we are not pursuing “mechanical juris

prudence” in the sense condemned by Roscoe Pound? by

requiring fealty to bar dates set by bankruptcy judges. We are

not vaunting the national bankruptcy policy over environmental

concerns. If anything, we are acknowledging the importance

of facilitating the cleanup of environmental contamination by

placing upon property owners—whether longtime owners or

new purchasers—the obligation of performing an environ-

mental audit as early as possible. It is not too much to require

a timely examination under any circumstances, but where a

present Owner expects reimbursement from a predecessor in

interest, any delay may preclude relief, because of the interven-

tion of a statute of limitations, or as here, the interposition of

dates barring claims imposed by bankruptcy courts.

VI.

We now turn to CMC’s appeal challenging the district

court’s determination that Union Pacific’s claim under the

Model Toxics Control Act was not barred, because the Model

Act did not go into effect until after the 1985 bar dates. CMC

acknowledges that the Model Act went into effect after the bar

dates and that several courts have held that claims based on a

Statute enacted after discharge in bankruptcy are not barred.

E.g., Penn Central, 944 F.2d at 168. CMC distinguishes these

cases by asserting, “Union Pacific was aware of existing liabili-

ties to the United States and the State of Washington for

clean-up of the Railyard Site, under both CERCLA and

existing Washington State statutes.” CMC Br. at 24. CMC

relies on the state Water Pollution Control Act,

Wash.Rev.Code ch. 90.48, and on the Hazardous Waste

Management Act, Wash.Rev.Code ch. 70.105, with its

accompanying regulations, Wash.Admin.Code. ch. 173-303.

These enactments were in effect in 1985, prior to the adoption

of the Model Act. Union Pacific vigorously argues that it had

* Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 Colum.L.Rev. 605 (1908),

reprinted in part in Ruggero J. Aldisert, The Judicial Process 304 (1976).

34a

no liability under the laws existing in 1985 and that the Model

Act imposed an entirely new species of liability.

We will not meet the question at this time as to what

liabilities under the Model Act existed in 1985 by virtue of

Washington state statutes then in effect. The district court did

not make findings in this respect, and we will remand these

proceedings to that court to make this determination in the first

instance.

It is suggested that upon remand the parties assist the

court by preparing a section-by-section comparison of the

Model Act with previously enacted relevant state statutes.

Such an analysis could indicate whether a particular type of

liability under the Model Act existed under predecessor statutes

prior to the bar dates, and whether Union Pacific consequently

had a contingent claim for environmental cleanup costs under

Washington statutes in effect before the bar dates.

The judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED in part

and VACATED in part and the cause REMANDED for further

proceedings in accordance with the foregoing.

35a

APPENDIX C

ra eed anata ames GD

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

For The Seventh Circuit

Chicago, Illinois 60604

April 3, 1996

Before

Hon. Ilana Diamond Rovner, Circuit Judge

Hon. Diane P. Wood, Circuit Judge

Hon. Terence T. Evans, Circuit Judge

Nos. 95-1412 & 95-2986

In the Matter of:

CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE, ST. PAUL &

PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY,

Debtor.

CMC HEARTLAND PARTNERS,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

UNION PACIFIC RAILROAD,

Defendant-Appellee.

36a

ORDER

On March 13, 1996, CMC Heartland Partners filed a

petition for rehearing with suggestion for rehearing en banc.

All the judges on the original panel have voted to deny the

petition, and none of the active judges have requested a vote on

the suggestion for rehearing en banc. The petition is therefore

DENIED.

APPENDIX D

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

N. D. ILLINOIS, EASTERN DIVISION

In the Matter of

CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE, ST. PAUL &

PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY,

Debtor.

No. 77 B 8999.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

LINDBERG, District Judge.

This case arises out of the sale in bankruptcy of a

railyard in the State of Washington. The purchaser, Union

Pacific Railroad Co. (“Union Pacific” , commenced suit in the

U.S. District Court for the Western District of Washington

against the reorganized corporation, CMC Heartland Partners

(“CMC”), for clean-up and response costs incurred under the

Comprehensive Environmental Response Compensation and

Liability Act, 42 USC §§ 9601 et seq. (“CERCLA”) and the

Washington Model Toxic Control Act, RCW 70.105D.010

—70.105D.921 (“MTCA”), and for indemnification under the

terms of the sale agreement. CMC has moved to enjoin Union

Pacific from prosecuting its claims. The court determines that

Union Pacific is enjoined from bringing any CERCLA claim

38a

against CMC with respect to the railyard site. This court will

not enjoin Union Pacific from bringing any potential claims

under the MTCA.

FACTS

On December 19, 1977, the Chicago, Milwaukee, St.

Paul and Pacific Railroad Company (“Milwaukee Road”)

petitioned for reorganization pursuant to section 77 of the

Bankruptcy Act of 1898, formerly 11 USC § 205. This court

served as the reorganization court throughout the reorganiza-

tion proceedings. In accordance with section 77 of the Bank-

ruptcy Act and Bankruptcy Rule 8-401, the reorganization

court established bar dates for the filing of claims against

Milwaukee Road, the Estate and its trustee. Order No. 832

provided that all post-petition claims, that is, claims arising

against or obligations incurred by Milwaukee Road during the

reorganization proceedings, were to be filed on or before

September 10, 1985. Order No. 832 also confirmed the Trus-

tee's Modified 1985 Plan of Reorganization that defined the

kinds of claims to which the bar dates apply. Order No. 866,

the Consummation Order, which was entered by the reorgani-

zation court on November 12, 1985 and which became

effective on November 25, 1985, barred and discharged all

claims against the Trustee, the Debtor, and its assigns and

successors including CMC, except as provided for in the

bankruptcy plan. Order No. 866 also enjoined all persons from

attempting to prosecute or assert claims that had been dis-

charged in the bankruptcy proceeding. This court retained

jurisdiction to enforce that injunction.

Union Pacific actively participated in the Milwaukee

Road reorganization proceedings and had actual notice of the

bar dates. Several Union Pacific officers and legal counsel

were on the official service list for the reorganization. Counsel

for Union Pacific also participated in the reorganization

approval plan process.

In March 1980, Union Pacific purchased approximately

100 miles of railroad right-of-way and various railyard

a

39a

properties in Washington and Idaho from the Trustee in Bank-

ruptcy of Milwaukee Road. One of these railyards was the

former Milwaukee Road yard in Tacoma, Washington. As part

of the purchase agreement Union Pacific bargained for and

received indemnification from the trustee as follows:

The Trustee and the Milwaukee Road agree to

indemnify and save harmless Union Pacific, its

lessors subsidiaries and/or affiliates and their

respective officers, agents and employees,

against any and all claims, damages, liabilities,

lawsuits or demands whatsoever, and expenses

in connection therewith, including reasonable

fees of outside counsel, regardless of the source

or nature thereof, arising out of the operations

of the properties prior to March 12, 1980; or

arising out of the ownership of the properties at

anytime, or the operation or use thereof, by the

Milwaukee Road after March 12, 1980, and

prior to the date of Closing. . . .

This covenant of indemnity shall remain in full

force notwithstanding the consummation of the

transactions contemplated in this Agreement.

On October 21, 1981, the Environmental Protection

Agency (“EPA”) published its National Priorities List (“NPL”)

which indicated that the Commencement Bay/Nearshore

Tideflats (“Commencement Bay”) area, which encompassed

the railyard site, was one of the ten worst hazardous waste sites

in the country. This listing was published in the Federal

Register on December 30, 1982. The events surrounding the

listing and remediation of the site were subsequently discussed

in numerous national and regional newspapers. See “EPA

Names 115 Worst Toxic Waste Dump Sites in U.S.,” the

Washington Post § 1, pg. A4, October 24, 1981; “Tacoma

Pollution in Top 10,” Seattle Post-Intelligencer, October 24.

1981. The Department of Ecology (“DOE”) contracted with a

private company, Dames & Moore, to study aspects of the

40a

contamination of the Commencement Bay area. In January of

1982, Dames & Moore published its “Historic Land Use

Survey of the Tacoma Tide Flats,” in which it identified 117

historical sources of contamination in the Sitcum Waterway,

including the railyard site. The Dames & Moore study

describes the history of the railyard site:

During the history of the railyard, many spills

of compounds occurred on site, including oil

and other compounds transported by rail. Spills

were not cleaned up, and the materials were

allowed to seep into the ground.

The railroad also cleaned out their rail cars. It

was reported that during the late 1950’s the

material was dumped on site and allowed to

disperse into the soil and seep in the waterways.

In 1960, the railroad was required to collect

copper sulfite and other toxic materials dry and

dispose of them on land. Runoff from this site

enters the Milwaukee Waterway. This evalua-

tion of the site indicates that the soils at this site

are possibly permeated with toxic compounds.

Recently, there has been some grading and the

tracks were pulled up. This may have resulted

in covering the permeated soils with a thin layer

of dirt or exposing the contaminated soils to the

environment.

In September 1983, the EPA published its first official

National Priorities List (“NPL”) of 406 hazardous waste sites

throughout the country. Included on that list was the Com-

mencement Bay site. In October 1984, the DOE listed the

railyard site in its “Monthly Status Report, Commencement

Bay Cleanup Sites” for suspected soil and groundwater con-

tamination for past spills.

In August 1985, the DOE and EPA issued a Remedial

Investigation (RI). The RJ, which relied in part on the Dames

4la

& Moore information, noted that numerous solid and liquid

spills had occurred in the area.

Union Pacific’s own fueling facilities in Tacoma were

investigated by the DOE in 1982. As a result of this investi-

gation, Union Pacific agreed to remove the top level of

oil-contaminated soil at the facility to prevent groundwater

contamination. Union Pacific was also in direct contact with

the EPA concerning potential environmental contamination at

an abandoned railroad tunnel.

As the result of a title dispute with the Puyallup Native

American Tribe, the railyard stood vacant. Union Pacific's

only action with regard to the railyard was to remove the

existing structures and clean up the surface of the yard. During

the time that the railyard stood vacant, some of Union Pacific's

employees became aware of contamination of portions of the

railyard’s surface by petroleum wastes. In an internal memo-

randum, a Union Pacific division engineer noted that:

Diesel fueling area is oil saturated and will

probably require removal of surface oil as well

as contaminated dirt. Apparently, this covers

quite a large area and may require extensive

clean-up.

The Engineering Department at Union Pacific was responsible

for inspection and for environmental cleanup, either

performing the work in house or hiring a private contractor.

In preparation for the sale of the railyard, Union Pacific

commissioned an environmental audit of the site. The audit

was completed by Applied Geotechnology on June 29, 1990.

The audit discovered subsurface contamination consisting pri-

marily of petroleum hydrocarbons but also identified potential

contamination from metals and solvents as well. Union

Pacific, as required by law, notified the DOE and the EPA of

the results of this assessment.

Based on this information, the DOE notified Union

Pacific on October 16, 1990 that it was a Potentially Liable

42a

Party (“PLP’’) with respect to environmental contamination of

the railyard. On July 31, 1991, Union Pacific entered into an

agreement with the DOE for remediation of the railyard under

the provisions of the Washington Model Toxic Control Act

(“MTCA”).

In a letter dated September 9, 1991, Union Pacific

requested CMC, the reorganized Milwaukee Road corporation,

to enter into settlement negotiations with Union Pacific con-

cerning the clean-up and response costs to be incurred. CMC

responded to the letter by filing this action and requesting the

court to enforce the consummation order and enjoin Union

Pacific from prosecuting any claims against CMC arising out

of Union Pacific's purchase of the railyard. CMC asserts that

these claims were not brought before the bar date and were

therefore discharged in the reorganization. Not long after

CMC filed its motion in this court, Union Pacific filed a

complaint against CMC in the U.S. District Court for the

Western District of Washington asserting declaratory judg-

ment, CERCLA, MTCA and contribution claims.

DISCUSSION

Order No. 866 of the reorganization court includes a

provision which enjoins all “Entities” from prosecuting, pursu-

ing or attempting to institute any suit, action or proceeding

against CMC by reason of any obligations incurred by the

Debtor of the Trustee except the obligations imposed upon or

required to be assumed by CMC by the reorganization plan.

This court must now determine whether Union Pacific’s claims

were required to be assumed by CMC by the reorganization

plan. Section 11.2 of the reorganization plan bars all claims

“including claims for contribution or indemnity existing as of

the Confirmation Date and the Consummation Date, respec-

tively. The bar dates provided in section 11.1, however, do not

apply to claims for contribution or indemnity based on facts

that are unknown, undisclosed or unasserted as of the Confirm-

ation Date and Consummation Date respectively.”

43a

Union Pacific does not deny its involvement in the

reorganization proceedings, nor does it deny that it had actual

notice of the Confirmation and Consummation Dates. Union

Pacific contends, however, that its potential CERCLA claim

was unknown at the time of the reorganization proceedings and

that, because the MTCA was enacted in 1989, claims arising

from this statute were unknowable before the 1985 bar dates.

Union Pacific claims that it is entitled to indemnity and contri-

bution because its claims fall under the above-mentioned

exception to the bankruptcy bars in section 11.2 of the

reorganization plan.

While Union Pacific may not have had actual

knowledge of hazardous waste contamination at the railyard,

the facts reveal there was enough information present at the

time that the bar dates went into effect that Union Pacific

should have been aware of its potential liability. The Com-

mencement Bay area, which included the railyard, was listed

nationally in the Federal Register as one of the most contamin-

ated areas in America. In addition to this, numerous national

and regional newspapers ran stories about hazardous waste

contamination at the Commencement Bay area. The railyard

was listed as a potential source of environmental contamination

in the 1982 Dames & Moore study and in the 1985 DOE Reme-

dial Investigation. While Union Pacific denies that it was

aware of either the Dames & Moore study or the Remedial

Investigation, this information was available had they sought

it out.

In 1982, Union Pacific was informed by the EPA of its

potential CERCLA liability for contamination at an old railroad

tunnel that it owned in the Commencement Bay area. While

this investigation showed no hazardous release from the tunnel,

this was direct notice to Union Pacific that there were environ-

mental investigations occurring in the Commencement Bay

area.

Union Pacific also knew of an environmental investi ga-

tion for spills at its own nearby fueling facilities in Tacoma.

As a result of the investigation into their Tacoma railyard by

the DOE, Union Pacific agreed to remove the top layer of soil

on that facility. Union Pacific argues that because the investi-

gation at this facility did not show any groundwater contamina-

tion it may give rise to the inference that such would be the

case at the similar Milwaukee Road railyard site. This is a very

naive and dangerous inference.

At the railyard site itself, Union Pacific workers noticed

oil wastes present on the surface and concluded that because of

this contamination, the site “may require extensive clean-up.”

Union Pacific did, in fact, remove the existing structures on the

land and cleaned the surface of the site.

The presence of a number of environmental investiga-

tions by state and federal authorities in the Commencement

Bay area should have reasonably alerted Union Pacific to the

possibility of environmental contamination of an area that was

already found to be oil saturated. Enough factual information

exists to give Union Pacific constructive knowledge of a

CERCLA claim at the time of the bar dates. Knowledge of

CERCLA liability before the consummation date bars Union

Pacific from asserting any claims under CERCLA against

CMC. See Jn the Matter of: Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul &

Pacific Railroad Co., No. 91-2172 slip op. (7th Cir. Aug. 18,

1992).

Union Pacific’s MTCA claim, however, is not barred

by the bankruptcy reorganization. CMC argues that since

Union Pacific could have brought a CERCLA claim before the

bar dates and did not, it should be barred from bringing a

similar state law claim although the state statute was not in

effect at the time of the reorganization. CMC cites no law in

support of its argument. CMC seems to be implicitly arguing

CERCLA preemption of Union Pacific's state law claims.

More precisely, CMC wants this court to rule that a contingent

CERCLA claim preempts a state law claim that has yet to come

into existence. CERCLA, however, is very clear that States

can enact and enforce statutes that provide additional liability

45a

or requirements with respect to the release of hazardous

substances within such state, and that these laws are

independent of CERCLA to the extent that they do not allow

for double compensation for removal costs or damages. 42

USC §§ 9614(a), 9614(b).

The MTCA had not been enacted by the State of

Washington at the time the consummation order was entered.

Union Pacific could not possibly have known of its liability

under a statute that was not in existence until four years after

the bar dates were established for filing claims against the

Milwaukee Road. See Jn the Matter of Penn Central Transpor-

tation Co., 944 F.2d 164 (3d Cir. 1991) (CERCLA claim was

not discharged in bankruptcy when the consummation order

was entered before CERCLA was enacted). Even though the

MTCA claim may be similar to the barred CERCLA claim,

CMC cites no authority to support barring Union Pacific from

prosecuting this claim.

CMC also asserts that a settlement agreement entered

into by both Union Pacific and CMC in 1991 releases it from

its liability to Union Pacific. The settlement agreement deals

primarily with the partitioning of land involved in a claim filed

by Union Pacific. The agreement contains the following broad

language which is the basis for CMC's argument:

CMC and UP release and discharge each other

from any and all claims raised, or which could

have been raised, against each other arising out

of the matters, transactions, occurrences or

events involved in the Litigation or in the

Reorganization Proceedings;

It does not appear that either party had any intention of includ-

ing potential but unasserted environmental claims when it

negotiated this settlement. By its own terms, the settlement

agreement is governed by Washington law, which provides that

the intent of the contracting parties should be determined by

looking at the contract as a whole. Stender v. Twin City Foods,

Inc., 510 P.2d 221 (1973). The agreement provides that the

46a

parties intended to settle only claims and counter-claims that

had been asserted in litigation in the State of Washington and

in the reorganization proceedings in this court. Union Pacific’s

MTCA claims, which were unasserted at the time of the settle-

ment and had nothing to do with the partitioning of the land,

are not released by that agreement.

ORDERED: Pursuant to Order No. 866 of this court,

Union Pacific is enjoined from asserting or attempting to

prosecute any claims under 42 USC §§ 9601- 9675, (CERCLA)

for indemnity or contribution against CMC. Union Pacific is

not enjoined from pursuing its claims for indemnity or contri-

bution under the Washington Model Toxic Control Act, RCW

70.105D.010—70.105D.921 (MTCA).

George W. Lindberg

United States District Judge

Date: October 21, 1992

47a

APPENDIX E

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

N. D. ILLINOIS, EASTERN DIVISION

In the Matter of

CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE, ST. PAUL &

PACIFIC RAILROAD COMPANY,

Debtor.

No. 77 B 8999,

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Before the court is the magistrate judge’s Report and

Recommendation (“R & R”) on CMC Heartland Partners’

(“CMC”) “Renewed Motion to Enjoin Union Pacific’s State

Law Claims for Remediation.”' In the R & R, Magistrate

Judge Rosemond recommends that the court deny CMC’s

renewed motion. CMC has filed objections to the R & R:

Union Pacific has filed a reply to CMC’s objections.

CMC’s objections to the R & R can be grouped into

three categories. First, CMC argues that, in reaching the

conclusions in the R & R, the magistrate judge mistakenly

assumed facts not in the record. Second, CMC maintains that

the magistrate judge misapplied the Seventh Circuit’s

standard pertaining to the definition of a “claim” for the

purposes of section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.

Finally, CMC contends that the magistrate judge improperly

interpreted Washington state law.

For a summary of the facts and procedural history of this case leading up

to this motion, see /n the Matter of Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific

Railroad Co., 3 F.3d 200 (7th Cir. 1993) (“Chicago IIT’).

48a

For the reasons that follow, the court overrules

CMC’s objections to the R & R, and with minor exceptions,

adopts the R & R. CMC’s renewed motion is denied.

I.

CMC first objects that “[iJn several critical areas, the

Magistrate has assumed facts not in the record and then relied

upon those facts and inferences therefrom in making his

recommendations.” CMC Objections (“Objections”) at 3.

The first error in this regard, according to CMC, is

the magistrate judge’s statement that CMC had been charged

with pollution in the past. Specifically, the magistrate judge

Stated:

Involved in this case was the important

question of whether debtors in bankruptcy

who were charged with pollution in the past

could be liable for clean-up costs of hazardous

waste at their former business sites.

R & R at 1. CMC maintains that neither it nor its

predecessor, the Milwaukee Road, was ever charged with any

pollution activity at the railyard in the past. On the contrary,

according to CMC, “fajll of the enforcement activity

referenced in the record occurred after Union Pacific

acquired ownership” of the railyard. Objections at 4 (CMC’s

emphasis). Thus, CMC argues, the magistrate judge

incorrectly assumed that this was a case in which CMC had

been charged with pollution and was trying to beat those

charges by relying on the bar dates.

Union Pacific maintains that CMC takes the

magistrate judge’s words out of context and ascribes to them

a meaning that the magistrate judge never intended.

According to Union Pacific, the “charge” to which the

magistrate judge referred was not any regulatory action;

rather CMC was “charged” with pollution by Union Pacific

in its claim for indemnity on the basis that CMC’s predeces-

sor contaminated the railyard. Reply at 4-5.

49a

The court agrees with Union Pacific. Aside from the

above-quoted passage, there is nothing in the R & R that

Suggests that the magistrate judge believed that CMC had

been charged by an official agency with pollution in the past

at the railyard. Indeed, it appears that the magistrate judge

was simply framing the issue in much the same way as the

Seventh Circuit had done in a prior appeal of this case. See

Chicago III, 3 F.3d at 201 (“Presented in these cases, here

and in other judicial circuits, is the important question

whether debtors in bankruptcy who are charged with

pollution in the past can be held liable for cleanup costs of

hazardous waste at their former business sites.”’).

Second, CMC argues that the magistrate judge

confused the railyard with Union Pacific’s fueling facility in

Tacoma. CMC bases this argument on the magistrate judge’s

statement that in 1982 Union Pacific “removed some surface

soil from the property.” R & R at 3. CMC claims there is

no evidence that Union Pacific ever removed any soil from

the railyard. Objections at 5. Union Pacific argues that the

magistrate judge’s statement is supported by the record, citing

the deposition -of Roland Haacke at pages 41-42 and 49-51,

and the report of Applied Geotechnology, Inc. Reply at 4-5.

The court’s review of these parts of the record reveals

no support for the magistrate judge’s statement.2 CMC

argues that the magistrate judge made this misstatement

because he confused the railyard with Union Pacific’s fueling

facility, where soil was indeed removed in 1983. A more

plausible explanation is that the magistrate judge relied on

Union Pacific’s representation in its brief that it removed

some soil from the railyard. See Reply Br. at 4. Although

Union Pacific has failed to provide any record support for the

In his deposition, Mr. Haacke specifically denied knowing whether any

soil was removed from the railyard. As for~the report of Applied

Geotechnology, Inc., Union Pacific fails to cite to a particular place in the

report which supports the magistrate judge’s statement. Moreover, the

court's review of the sixty plus page report revealed no such support.

50a

proposition that it removed soil from the railyard in 1982, the

court does not believe that the magistrate judge confused the

railyard with the fueling facility. Nor does the court believe

that CMC has adequately explained why this one unsupported

statement of fact dooms the entire R & R. Except as to that

statement, the court overrules CMC’s objections to the factual

recitation in the R & R.

II.

CMC’s second objection to the R & R concerns the

standard for determining whether a party has a “claim” within

the meaning of section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.

The fundamental issue facing the magistrate judge was

whether Union Pacific had a “claim” for indemnification

(within the meaning of section 77) that should have been

brought before the bar dates. The magistrate judge decided

that Union Pacific did not have such a claim and hence

should not be enjoined from bringing such a claim now.

According to CMC, the magistrate judge used too

stringent a test for determining what a “claim” is under

section 77. CMC maintains that the magistrate judge erred

in assuming that such a claim had to be established with a

high degree of certainty. CMC contends that “[t]he proper

section 77 test is whether Union Pacific had a contingent

claim for contribution, based on the possible liability that

Union Pacific could have faced under state law.” Objections

at 7.

Union Pacific takes the position that the magistrate

judge correctly applied section 77. Union Pacific points to

the following language in Chicago III where the Seventh

Circuit discusses when a CERCLA claim arises: When a

potential CERCLA claimant can tie the bankruptcy debtor to

a known release of a hazardous substance which the potential

claimant knows will lead to CERCLA response costs, and

when this potential claimant has, in fact, conducted tests with

regard to this contamination problem, then this potential

claimant has, at least, a contingent CERCLA claim under

Sla

Section 77. Chicago III, 3 F.3d at 202. Adapting this form-

ulation to the issue before the court, Union Pacific suggests

that the court should deem a claim to arise under a State

environmental statute when the claimant has knowledge of

the release of a hazardous substance which the claimant

knows will lead to response costs under that statute. Reply

at 6.

The proper test for determining whether a claim has

arisen under section 77 is a crucial issue on which the parties

have offered little helpful authority.’ The court does not

believe that the passage from Chicago III relied on by Union

Pacific is a proper source from which to cull a standard in

this case. As this court interprets that passage, the Seventh

Circuit was stating that, under circumstances such as those

prevailing in Chicago III, a claim arises under section 77

without question. The court did not appear to be saying that

only under similarly compelling circumstances would a claim

arise.

CMC relies on Chicago III and In re Chicago,

Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific Railroad Co., 974 F.2d 775

(7th Cir.1992) (“Chicago I’) as support for its view that

Union Pacific had to file a proof of claim before the bar

dates as long as it had a “contingent claim” for

indemnification. CMC does not elaborate on the meaning of

the term “contingent claim.” It is “usually said to refer to

obligations that will become due upon the happening of a

future event that was ‘within the actual or presumed

contemplation of the parties at the time the original

relationship between the parties was created.” Jn re

Chateaugay Corp., 944 F.2d 997, 1004 (2d Cir.1991) (discus-

sing meaning of the term in context of the new Bankruptcy

> Even the Statutory definition of the term “claims” offers no real assistance

due to its highly general nature. Section 77 provides that “[t]he term claims

includes debts, whether liquidated or unliquidated, securities (other than

stock and option warrants to subscribe to stock), liens, or other interests of

whatever character.”

52a

Code). For the purposes of this case, the “original relation-

ship between the parties” was created when Union Pacific

bought the railyard from CMC’s predecessor. Therefore, the

question is presumably whether, at the time of the purchase,

an obligation to clean up the contamination at the railyard

would arise on the happening of some future event that was

within the actual or presumed contemplation of the parties.

The difficulty in attempting to answer this question is that the

statute upon which Union Pacific bases its indemnification

claim was not in effect until after the bar dates.

As the Seventh Circuit has noted, “the determination

of when a party has a claim or contingent claim seems to

hinge on the nature of the claim and the posture of the case.”

Chicago I, 974 F.2d at 781. This observation is especially

appropriate in this case, given that Union Pacific’s claim is

based on a statute enacted after the bar dates and that the

Seventh Circuit has given a general indication of how to

proceed on remand. Therefvre, it is appropriate to review

certain facts of this case as well as the procedural history

leading up to CMC’s renewed motion.

Union Pacific purchased the railyard from the

Milwaukee Road in 1980. Included in the purchase agree-

ment was the indemnity clause under which Union Pacific

now seeks to collect contribution from CMC for remediation

costs at the railyard. In 1985, this court entered orders bar-

ring all claims against the Milwaukee Road and its successor

and assigns, including CMC, that had not been timely filed.

In 1989, the State of Washington’s Model Toxics Control

Act, Wash. Rev.Code ch. 70.105D (“the Model Act”), took

effect. Union Pacific decided to sell the railyard and com-

missioned an audit. The audit was completed in June 1990,

and revealed that the railyard was contaminated with hazard-

ous substances. Union Pacific duly notified the State of

Washington of those findings. In October 1990, the

Washington Department of Ecology (“DOE”) notified Union

Pacific that it was potentially liable under the Model Act. In

July 1991, Union Pacific agreed to clean up the contamina-

53a

tion at the railyard. Union Pacific then filed suit in the

Western District of Washington seeking contribution from

CMC for clean-up costs pursuant to the indemnity provision

in the purchase agreement for the railyard.

CMC filed a motion with this court (which had

retained jurisdiction to enforce the discharge order) to enjoin

Union Pacific from prosecuting its claims under both

CERCLA and the Model Act. This court enjoined Union

Pacific from seeking contribution for any claims arising out

of CERCLA, but declined to enjoin Union Pacific from

seeking contribution for any claims arising out of the Model

Act. On appeal, the Seventh Circuit affirmed this court’s rul-

ing with respect to CERCLA, but it vacated and remanded

this court’s ruling with respect to the Model Act. With re-

spect to the latter, the court of appeals stated:

We now turn to CMC’s appeal challenging the

district court’s determination that Union Paci-

fic’s claim under [the Model Act] was not

barred because the Model Act did not go into

effect until after the 1985 bar dates. CMC

acknowledges that the Model Act went into

effect after the bar dates and that several

courts have held that claims based on a statute

enacted after the discharge in bankruptcy are

not barred. E.g., Penn Central, 944 F.2d at

168. CMC distinguishes these cases by assert-

ing, “Union Pacific was aware of existing

liabilities to the United States and the State of

Washington for clean-up of the Railyard Site,

under both CERCLA and existing Washington

State statutes.” CMC Br. at 24. CMC relies

on the state Water Pollution Control Act,

Wash.Rev. Code ch. 98.48, and on the

Hazardous Waste Management Act, Wash.

Rev.Code ch. 70.105, with its accompanying

regulations, Wash. Admin.Code ch. 173-303.

These enactments were in effect prior to the

54a

adoption of the Model Act. Union Pacific

vigorously argues that it had no liability under

the laws existing in 1985 and that the Model

Act imposed an entirely new species of lia-

bility.

We will not meet the question at this

time as to what liabilities under the Model Act

existed in 1985 by virtue of Washington state

statutes then in effect. The district court did

not make findings in this respect, and we will

remand these proceedings to that court to

make this determination in the first instance.

It is suggested that upon remand the

parties assist the court by preparing a section-

by-section comparison of the Model Act with

previously enacted relevant state statutes.

Such an analysis could indicate whether a par-

ticular type of liability under the Model Act

existed under predecessor statutes prior to the

bar dates, and whether Union Pacific conse-

quently had a contingent claim for environ-

mental cleanup costs under Washington

statutes in effect before the bar dates. Chicago

III, 3 F.3d at 207-08.

On remand, the magistrate judge compared Union

Pacific’s liability under the Model Act with its liability under

three arguably relevant Washington statutes in effect in 1985:

The Water Pollution Control Act (“Water Act”), Wash.

Rev.Code ch. 90.48; the Hazardous Waste Management Act

(“Hazardous Waste Act”), Wash.Rev.Code ch. 70.105; and

the state nuisance statute, Wash.Rev.Code ch. 7.48

(hereinafter referred to collectively as “the prior existing

statutes”). The magistrate judge found that liability under the

Model Act is premised on the mere ownership of a contamin-

ated site. In other words, the owner of the site need not be

responsible for the contamination; mere ownership is

55a

sufficient to create liability under the Model Act. R & R at

6. The magistrate judge then compared this strict liability

scheme with the liability schemes of the prior existing

statutes. The magistrate judge concluded that no similar type

of strict liability could be imposed under either the Water Act

or the Hazardous Waste Act. As for the state’s nuisance

Statute, the magistrate judge concluded that, even if Union

Pacific could be held liabie for merely failing to remedy the

existing contamination at the railyard, its liability would still

be far less certain than under the Model Act; moreover, any

damages for which Union Pacific might have been held

responsible would have been much less.

In light of the Seventh Circuit’s directions on how to

proceed on remand, this court concludes that the magistrate

judge employed the correct methodology in this case for

determining whether, prior to the bar dates, Union Pacific

had a “claim” for indemnification for the purposes of section

77. The Seventh Circuit refused to address, and instead

directed this court to address, the question of “what liabilities

under the Model Act existed in 1985 by virtue of Washington

State statutes then in effect.” Chicago III, 3 F.3d at 208.

The court also suggested that a section-by-section comparison

of the Model Act with the prior existing statutes

could indicate whether a particular type of

liability under the Model Act existed under

predecessor statutes prior to the bar dates, and

whether Union Pacific consequently had a

contingent claim for environmental cleanup

costs under Washington statutes in effect

before the bar dates.

Id. In this court’s view, the most straightforward reading of

these quoted passages indicates that the Seventh Circuit

directed this court to ascertain whether Union Pacific faced

the same type of liability under the Model Act as Union

56a

Pacific faced under the prior existing statutes.‘ This is

exactly what the magistrate judge did. In doing so, he

considered the basis of the potential liability under the

various statutes, the relative likelihood of liability under

them, as well as the possible damages faced under them. The

court concludes that the magistrate judge correctly followed

the mandate of the court of appeals. CMC’s objection to the

R & R based on the appropriate section 77 standard is

overruled.

III.

CMC’s third objection is that, in comparing the Model

Act with other Washington statutes, the magistrate judge

misinterpreted those other statutes. As discussed above, the

magistrate judge compared Union Pacific’s liability under the

Model Act with its potential liability under the prior existing

statutes, namely, the Water Act, the Hazardous Waste Act,

and the state nuisance statute. The magistrate judge began by

ascertaining the basis of liability under the Model Act. The

magistrate judge correctly noted that liability under the Model

Act can be premised on the mere ownership of a

contaminated site. See Wash.Rev.Code § 70.105D.040.

What CMC objects to are the magistrate judge’s conclusions

regarding the nature of liability under the prior existing

statutes. The court will address CMC’s objections to the

magistrate judge’s conclusions regarding each of these

statutes in turn.

4

This interpretation is supported by the Seventh Circuit’s description of

CMC’s arguments on appeal: CMC argues that the district court erred in

determining that Union Pacific could not have known of its state law

liabilities until after the consummation order was filed; it asserts that the

Model Act did not create new duties but merely recodified existing duties

under the [Water Act, the Hazardous Waste Act], and accompanying

regulations. Id. at 206 (emphasis added). CMC’s argument to the court of

appeals implied that, on remand, the task was simply to determine whether

the liabilities arising under the Model Act were the same as ‘nose arising

under the prior existing statutes.

57a

A. The Water Act

The prohibitory section of the Water Act provides:

It shall be unlawful for any person to throw,

drain, run, or otherwise discharge into any of

the waters of this state, or to cause, permit or

suffer to be thrown, run, drained, allowed to

seep or otherwise discharged into such waters

any Organic or inorganic matter that shall

cause or tend to cause pollution of such waters

according to the determination of the commis-

sion, as provided for in this chapter.

Wash.Rev.Code § 90.48.080. The magistrate judge rejected

CMC’s argument that this section imposed liability against

Union Pacific similar to that imposed under the Model Act.

R & R at 8-11. An examination of the plain language of the

Model Act and the Water Act corroborates the magistrate

judge’s conclusion.

The Model Act sets forth a list of persons who “are

liable with respect to a [contaminated] facility.” Wash.

Rev.Code § 70.105D.040(1). Among those persons listed is

the “owner or operator of the facility.” Jd. In contrast,

before liability attaches under the Water Act, the party must

have, at a minimum, “allowed to seep or otherwise

discharged into [any of the waters of the state] any organic

or inorganic matter that shall cause or tend to cause pollution

of such waters.” Wash. Rev.Code § 90.48.080. In short, the

Model Act targets those who own contaminated sites (regard-

less of whether those sites are the source of pollution to state

waters), whereas the Water Act targets only those who allow

contamination from a site to pollute the waters of the state.

CMC contends that the magistrate judge erred because

Washington case law supports the view that the Water Act

imposes strict liability on landowners for failing to prevent

pollution to state waters, regardless of source. The court

finds CMC’s argument unpersuasive for several reasons.

58a

First, CMC concedes that liability under the Water Act

attaches only in cases of pollution to state waters. It is clear

that liability under the Model Act is not limited in this way.

Second, the cases relied on by CMC all involve an affirma-

tive act on the part of the landowner (or his agent) that

caused the pollution to state waters. See Sea Farms, Inc. v.

Foster & Marshall Realty, 42 Wash.App. 308, 711 P.2d 1049

(1985) (defendants’ dredging for construction of marina

alleged to have caused silt to deposit on and damage

plaintiff's oyster beds), review denied, 105 Wash.2d 1010

(1986); Clark v. United States, 660 F.Supp. 1164 (W.D.

Wash.1987) (defendant’s disposal of waste materials in

landfills and burn pits alleged to have resulted in contamina-

tion of plaintiffs’ water supply); Nordevin, Inc. v. State of

Washington, Department of Ecology, 1992 WL 172977

(Washington Pollution Control Board) (defendant’s improper

regrading alleged to have caused significant sediment-laden

run-off in adjacent waterway).°

CMC also objects to another aspect of the magistrate

judge’s decision concerning the Water Act. According to

CMC, the magistrate judge erred in inferring that the DOE

lacked authority to institute remediation proceedings against

Union Pacific under the prior existing statutes based on the

fact that the DOE delayed instituting such proceedings until

after the passage of the Model Act. As CMC points out, the

EPA delayed instituting remediation proceedings at the rail-

yard under CERCLA even though the EPA had similar

information as the DOE about contamination there. This

delay, however, does not lead to the conclusion that the EPA

lacked authority to order a clean-up. See Objections at 13.

> CMC also relies on In re Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pacific

Railroad Co., 6 F.3d 1184, 1192 (7th Cir.1993) (“Chicago IV)”). A

thorough review of that case reveals that it does not even discuss the Water

Act or any other Washington environmental statute. The court assumes that

CMC’s citation to Chicago IV was the result of carelessness rather than a

deliberate attempt to mislead.

59a

CMC has a valid argument on this point, but it avails

CMC little. For as Union Pacific notes, the magistrate

judge’s conclusion regarding the inference to be drawn from

DOE’s delay in instituting clean-up proceedings was simply

a response to CMC’s argument in support of its renewed

motion. CMC had argued that because DOE exercised exten-

sive regulatory jurisdiction over environmental conditions in

the area, it necessarily had authority to order a clean-up or to

assert a cognizable claim for damages. However, the mere

fact that DOE spent considerable time identifying and asses-

sing the pollution in the Commencement Bay area does not

necessarily mean that the prior existing statutes authorized

DOE to order a clean-up. Although the court does not agree

with the inference drawn by the magistrate judge from

DOE’s delay, the court does not believe that that one faulty

aspect of the magistrate judge’s reasoning undermines the

magistrate judge’s ultimate conclusion that the liability under

the Water Act was not the same as that under the Model Act.

CMC’s objection to the magistrate judge’s conclusion

with respect to the Water Act is overruled.

B. The Hazardous Waste Act

The Hazardous Waste Act includes the following

prohibitory provision:

No person shall dispose of designated

extremely hazardous wastes at any disposal

site in the state other than the disposal site

established and approved for such purpose

under provisions of this chapter.

Wash.Rev.Code § 70.105.050. The magistrate judge noted

that the Hazardous Waste Act makes liable any party who

violates this provision and thereby injures another.

Wash.Rev.Code § 70.105.097. The Hazardous Waste Act

defines “dispose or disposal” as “the discarding or

abandoning of hazardous wastes or the treatment,

decontamination, or recycling of such wastes once they have

60a

been abandoned.” Wash.Rev.Code § 70.105.010(4). Given

these provisions, the magistrate judge concluded that DOE

certainly “had the authority to clean the site up and assert a

valid cause of action against the party responsible for the

disposal of oil at the railyard.” R & R at 12-13. The magis-

trate judge proceeded to observe that “i]t is far less clear...

whether [DOE] could have asserted a cause of action against

Union Pacific” because “[b]oth the text of the Hazardous

Waste Act and the regulations promulgated thereunder refer

to liability and responsibility only with regard to the party

responsible for the violation.” Id. at 13. As support, the

magistrate judge cites the regulations implementing the

Hazardous Waste Act. They provide in relevant part that the

DOE “may require the person responsible for the spill or

discharge to . . . [c]lean up all released dangerous wastes or

hazardous substances.” Wash. Admin.Code § 173-303-145(3)

(a)(i).

CMC argues that the magistrate judge ignored the

definition of “discharge,” which the applicable regulations

uefine as “the accidental or intentional release of hazardous

substances . . . such that [they] may enter or be permitted to

enter into the environment.” Wash.Admin.Code § 173- 303-

040(24). “Release” is defined so as to “include[] . . . the

actions of: Spilling, leaking, pumping, pouring, emitting,

dumping, emptying, depositing, placing, or injecting.” Jd.

CMC implies that Union Pacific somehow “leaked” the

hazardous substances at the railyard and therefore was liable

for clean-up, presumably under Wash.Admin.Code § 173-

303-145(3)(a)(i). Objections at 14-15.

CMC cites no evidence to support the proposition that

Union Pacific “leaked” hazardous substances at the railyard.

Indeed, this court previously found that, after the purchase,

“Union Pacific’s only action with regard to the railyard was

to remove existing structures and clean up the surface of the

yard.” Memorandum and Order of October 21, 1992, at 4.

Absent evidence that Union Pacific leaked or otherwise

released any of the contaminants, Union Pacific was not a

6la

party responsible for the discharge of the contaminants.

Union Pacific could not be held liable under the Hazardous

Waste Act for clean-up costs merely by virtue of its owner-

ship of the railyard. Hence, Union Pacific did not face the

same liability under the Model Act as it faced under the

Hazardous Waste Act. The magistrate judge did not err in so

finding.°

CMC’s objection to the magistrate judge’s conclusion

with respect to Hazardous Waste Act is overruled.

C. Washington State Nuisance Statute

Under Washington law, it is a public nuisance [t]o

throw or deposit any offal or other offensive matter, or the

carcass of any dead animal, in any watercourse, stream, lake,

pond, spring, well, or common sewer, street, or public high-

way, Or in any manner to corrupt or render unwholesome or

impure the water of any stream, pond, lake, or well, to the

injury or prejudice of others.

Wash.Rev.Code § 7.48.140(2). The magistrate judge noted

that, “[bJased on the above definition, it could reasonably be

argued that Union Pacific’s failure to remedy the existing

contamination on the site constituted an actionable public nui-

sance.” R & R at 14-15. Nevertheless, the magistrate judge

concluded that two fundamental differences existed between

the nuisance statute and the Model Act: (1) the relative

uncertainty of liability under the nuisance statute as compared

to the Model Act, and (2) the lesser likelihood that liability

under the nuisance statute would result in clean-up costs,

given that the area around the railyard is extensively polluted.

R & R at 15-16.

° CMC also argues that the magistrate judge “wrongly ignored the

definition of persons ‘having control over oil’ as to who [DOE] could take

enforcement action.” Objections at 15. As Union Pacific points out, CMC

cites no authority for its proposed definition. Nor does CMC indicate how

this definition fits into the statutory or regulatory scheme of the Hazardous

Waste Act. Therefore, the court finds that this argument is waived.

62a

CMC argues that, under Washington law, the “[v]iola-

tion of pollution laws, including specifically the violation of

the Water Act, is a nuisance.” Objections at 16-17. CMC

cites Miotke v. City of Spokane, 101 Wash.2d 307, 678 P.2d

803 (Wash.1984) as support. Miotke does not stand for the

proposition that a violation of the Water Act is a public

nuisance per se. Rather, the court in Miotke analyzed the

nuisance laws and concluded that the pollution in that

particular case (which was caused by an act that violated the

Water Act permit scheme) met the definition of a public

nuisance. Miotke, 101 Wash. at 330-31, 678 P.2d at 816-17.

CMC maintains that the magistrate judge erred in

concluding that liability under the nuisance laws “is far less

certain than it is under the Model Act, which provides for

strict liability on the basis of ownership.” R & R at 15-16.

CMC notes that under Washington law, “[e]very successive

owner of property who neglects to abate a continuing

nuisance upon, or in the use of such property caused by a

former owner, is liable therefor in the same manner as the

one who first created it.” Wash.Rev.Code § 7.48.170.

Nevertheless, this fails to address the magistrate judge’s

point, which was that to establish a nuisance, a party must

demonstrate that the defendant committed a wrongful act or

omission and that the party suffered tangible harm in its

ability to enjoy its property. In contrast, liability under the

Model Act is relatively certain, based as it is on mere

ownership of a contaminated site. R & R at 15-16.

Finally, CMC takes issue with the magistrate judge’s

distinction between the Model Act and the nuisance statute

regarding the calculation of damages. The magistrate

observed that nuisance damages are limited to personal

injuries and property damage flowing from the nuisance. The

magistrate then reasoned that because

the railyard is located in a section of Tacoma

characterized by heavy industry and which is

extensively contaminated[,] it seems unlikely

63a

that the polluted nature of the railyard makes

it any more bothersome to adjoining land-

owners than it would be in a pristine condi-

tion. Therefore, even if a successful nuisance

claim could have been brought against Union

Pacific for the pollution [of] the yard, the

resultant damages would have been far less

substantial than those faced by Union Pacific

under the Model Act, and would likely have

not involved clean-up damages.

R & R at 16. As CMC notes, however, a damages remedy

is not the only remedy available for a nuisance. Abatement

is a possible remedy under Washington State law. See Wash.

Rev. Code § 7.48.180, -.200, -.230, -.260. If Union Pacific

were liable under the nuisance statute, it could bear the cost

of abating the nuisance, i.e., cleaning up the contamination.

Therefore, the court does not agree that the distinction based

on the calculation of damages is relevant to the comparison

of the Model Act and the nuisance statute.

Nevertheless, as noted above, nuisance liability is far

less certain than liability under the Model Act. In addition,

the nature of the liability differs between the Model Act and

the nuisance statute: Liability under the Model Aci is pre-

mised on mere ownership of a contaminated facility, whereas

liability under the nuisance statute is based on “corrupt[ing]

or render[ing] unwholesome or impure the water of any...

spring, stream, pond, lake, or well, to the injury or prejudice

of others.” Wash.Rev.Code § 7.48.140(2). Although a con-

taminated site can be the source of such corruption, it need

not be. For these reasons, the court concludes that Union

Pacific’s potential liability under the Model Act was of an

entirely different nature than its potential liability under state

nuisance law.

CMC’s objections to the magistrate judge’s conclu-

sions with regard to the state nuisance statute are overruled,

64a

except to the extent the magistrate judge relies on the distinc-

tion based on the calculation of damages.

ORDERED: Except as specifically noted in the body

of this Memorandum Opinion and Order, CMC’s objections

to the Report and Recommendation are overruled, and the

court adopts the Report and Recommendation of the magis-

trate judge. CMC’s renewed motion to enjoin Union Paci-

fic’s state law claims for remediation is denied.

George W. Lindberg

District Judge

Date: December 28, 1994

65a

aon APPENIDX F

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF ILLINOIS

EASTERN DIVISION

IN THE MATTER OF ) In Proceedings for the

) Reorganization of a Railroad

CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE, )

ST. PAUL and PACIFIC )

RAILROAD COMPANY _)

) No. 77 B 8999

Debtor. ) Prentice H. Marshall, Judge

ORDER NO. 866

FINAL DECREE

Upon consideration of the Trustee’s Motion for Entry

of a Final Decree, filed pursuant to the Trustee’s Modified

1985 Plan of Reorganization (the “Plan”), due notice having

been given to creditors, stockholders and other parties in

interest, the Court, acting as a Court of Reorganization for the

Debtor pursuant to Section 77 of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898,

as amended (“Section 77”), finds and concludes as follows:

The Chicago, Milwaukee, St. Paul and Pacific

Railroad Company, the Debtor in this proceeding, a Wisconsin

corporation, filed on December 19, 1977 its petition to this

Court to effect a plan of reorganization under Section 77. A

copy of that petition was filed at the same time with the

Interstate Commerce Commission (the “Commission”). This

Court has jurisdiction over the proceedings pursuant to Section

77.

y The Court approved the petition as properly

filed on December 20, 1977. Stanley E.G. Hillman was

appointed trustee of the property of the Debtor on February 13,

66a

1978. Mr. Hillman was succeeded as Trustee by Richard B.

Ogilvie on August 29, 1979. Mr. Hillman from the date of his

appointment until August 20, 1979, and Mr. Ogilvie from that

date until the present time, have continued in the possession

and control of the property and assets of the Debtor and their

operation.

3. On March 31, 1983, the Trustee filed with the

Court an Amended Plan of Reorganization for the Debtor,

which was referred to the Commission by order of this Court.

After due notice and hearings, the Commission, in orders

served September 26, 1984, and January 11, 1985, approved a

modified version of the Trustee’s plan.

4. On February 19, 1985, this Court, in Order No.

809, approved the sale of the Debtor’s operating rail assets to

the Soo Line Railroad Company and its affiliate The

Milwaukee Road, Inc., formerly SLRCO, Inc. (collectively

“Soo”) pursuant to the terms of an Asset Purchase Agreement

(“APA”) between the Trustee and Soo.

5. On April 10, 1985, the Commission, upon

petition of the Trustee, issued a decision in which it ruled that

further modifications to the Trustee’s Amended Plan need not

be considered by the Commission.

6. On May 1, 1985, the Trustee filed with this

Court his 1985 Plan of Reorganization for the Debtor (the

“Plan”). The Plan recognized the sale of the operating assets

to Soo but otherwise incorporated the essential provisions of

the plan approved by the Commission. After due notice to

creditors, stockholders and other parties in interest was given

in accordance with Order No. 811, this Court held hearings,

received evidence, and heard the arguments of counsel on June

24, 25 and 27, 1985 and on July 12, 1985 for the purpose of

considering approval and confirmation of the Plan.

3 On July 12, 1985, this Court entered its Order

No. 832 modifying the Plan in certain respects and confirming

and approving the Plan as modified.

67a

8. The Plan authorizes and directs the Trustee to

proceed with the consummation of the Plan, but provides for

the retention of jurisdiction by this Court with respect to the

consummation of the Plan, including the entry of a final decree

pursuant to Section 77(f) discharging the Trustee and closing

the case, except as provided below.

9. The Trustee has substantially completed the

consummation of the Plan and it is now appropriate for this

Court to enter a Final Decree with respect to certain matters

involved in the consummation of the Plan and on the discharge

of the Trustee.

NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED, ADJUDGED

AND DECREED AS FOLLOWS:

1. The “Consummation Date” for purposes of the

Plan shall be November 25, 1985.

y 3 The APA and the Plan require the amendment

of the Debtor’s articles of incorporation to change its corporate

name. The form of amendment to the Debtor’s articles of

incorporation attached as Exhibit A is approved in all respects.

The Trustee is authorized and directed to file that amendment

with the appropriate officials in order to effect the change of

the Debtor’s name. The filing officer in the Stat

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