Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Power Engineering Co. v. United States

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ay, FILED

991179 DEC - 7 1999

aia OFFICE OF THE CLERK

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

POWER ENGINEERING COMPANY,

REDOUBT, LTD., and RICHARD J. LILIENTHAL,

Petitioners,

Vv.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Respondent.

On PETITION For Writ OF CERTIORARI

To Tue Unitep STATES CourRT OF APPEALS

For THe TENTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

VALERIE MCNAUGHTON *

JOHN J. ZODROW

ZODROW ET AL. P.C.

INDEPENDENCE PLAZA

Suite 1700

1050 SEVENTEENTH STREET

DeNnvER, CO 80265

(303) 572-0700

Counsel for Petitioners

* Counsel of Record

BECKER GALLAGHER LEGAL PUBLISHING, INC.,

CINCINNATI, OHIO 800-890-5001

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether §3008(a) of the Resource Conservation and

Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. §6928(a), allows a Court in a civil

enforcement action to enter a preliminary mandatory

injunction ordering that a defendant obtain financial

assurances from a non-party to guarantee payment for

performance of any final judgment directing a remediation of

environmental contamination.

PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDING

Petitioners

Petitioners Power Engineering Company and Redoubt,

Ltd. do not have any parent companies or non-wholly owned

subsidiaries.

Respondent

The United States of America.

Other Parties

Jack R. Lilienthal is named as a third-party defendant

in the District Court. He was not a party to the District

Court’s mandatory injunctive order that is the subject of this

Petition or the appeal of the District Court’s Order to the

United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

BS eet 8 os 4s EAI ee i

PAR SiG 0) TH PROCEEUING 2c ce es il

pe ee ey. yo. Ler ater rarer ill

BEE Ae PRUE eee eee ci vense V

I i cag oa oe i l

DIAP omen: OF JURISDICTION ........008.. l

STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS

eee Oe DOU OS os ka eo ek alee ww ee 2

RUS RUMEEETE GPE AUTRES GAAS ce ecw es +

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT ......... 6

A. The Order that PEC Obtain Financial

Assurances Violates Longstanding

Principles of Statutory Construction

Established by this Court Because the

District Court and Court of Appeals

Provided EPA with a Prejudgment

Remedy Not Authorized by Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 64 or by

OPTI nc eke ey ears 7

iil

B. The District Court’s Preliminary

Injunction for Financial Assurances is

an Order for Prejudgment Security

Relating to Costs Associated With

Preclosure Remediation of the

PRES CN neti ok is ae a ea es 10

ROUSING ga ss ah eens aig oe Ove Sete enn 12

APPENDIX

Appendix A

Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals Order

WE No ake koe Oa ee ee ae la

Appendix B

District Court Order - 9/24/98 ........... 23a

Appendix C

District Court Memorandum Opinion and

SR SR ib oe EA eee ek i 3la

Appendix D

District Court Memorandum Opinion and

PONE EI 68k ea el Pa eee are A era ge 75a

Appendix E

6 Code of Colorado Regulations 1007-3

PE Se Re Re 6 ok aw Pek ee 129a

iV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman,

GIF i OPE ECE RONDE OE

DeBeers Consolidated Mines, Ltd. v. United States,

See Sh ee A 8s ee ew

Harmon Industries, Inc. v. Browner,

19 F.Supp. 2d 988 (W.D. Mo. 1998),

aff'd. 191 F.3d 894 (8" Cir. 1999) .......

Karahalios v. National Federation of Federal

Employees Local 1263,

SEs ne REE 6 6 8 odie a

Middlesex County Sewage Authority v.

National Sea Clammers Assoc..,

Gon Stan RREOE <6 5b 6 oe ean

Seminole Tribe v. Florida,

Fk: ei OE 6 be KGS wee ee

Transamerica Mortgage Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis,

MUS: UNS. ceo oa

Statutes

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Te ee NE 6k 6 kA Se Fae eR 8

ee ees EE 4X4 4:5 oe a es ee i

Ee ee a are a acare are passim

Rules of Civil Procedure

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a RF 6 8 PY Bee rane crea rar rs ere passim

Rae gl: AR teresa per reere rat tare 10

ON A 2 Ae ers Aree ae tS 10

Regulations

i es See Pe ee ee bre eee passim

6 C.C.R. 1007-3 §100.41 (15) and (16) ........... 7

60 ee OF 6 i bec 5 ele hae 7

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Aas SO ee EEE a ek a As ke 10

V1

Petitioners Power Engineering Company, Redoubt,

Ltd., and Richard J. Lilienthal, respectfully request that a writ

of certiorari be issued to review the judgment of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit in this case.

OPINIONS BELOW

The opinion of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Tenth Circuit is reported at United States v. Power

Engineering Company, 191 F.3d 1224 (10" Cir. 1999).

Appendix “App.” A. The opinion of the United States

District Court for the District of Colorado is reported at 10

F.Supp. 2d 1145 (D.Colo. 1998). App. D. A related order

entered by the District Court on August 17, 1998 is reported

at 10 F.Supp. 1165 (D.Colo. 1998). App. C. A related order

of the District Court entered September 24, 1998 is not

published. App. B.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals

for the Tenth Circuit was entered on September 8, 1999.

Rehearing was not requested. An extension of time for filing

this petition for certiorari has not been requested.

The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §1254(1).

ee ee a ee ne ae

STATUTORY AND REGULATORY PROVISIONS

INVOLVED IN THIS CASE

This case involves the nature and extent of remedies

available under §3008(a) of the Resource Conservation and

Recovery Act (“RCRA”), 28 U.S.C. §6928(a):

Section 3008. Federal Enforcement

(a) Compliance Orders. (1) Except as

provided in paragraph (2), whenever on the

basis of any information the Administrator

determines that any person has violated or is in

violation of any requirement of this subtitle,

the Administrator may issue an order assessing

a civil penalty for any past or current

violation, requiring compliance immediately or

within a specified time period, or both, or the

Administrator may commence a civil action in

the United States district court in the district in

which the violation occurred for appropriate

relief, including a temporary or permanent

injunction.

(2) In the case of a violation of any

requirement of this subtitle where such

violation occurs in a State which is authorized

to carry Out a hazardous waste program under

section 3006, the Administrator shall give

notice to the State in which such violation has

occurred prior to issuing an order or

commencing a Civil action under this section.

(3) Any order issued pursuant to_ this

subsection may include a suspension or

revocation of any permit issued by the

Administrator or a State under this subtitle ang

2

Shall state with reasonable specificity the

nature of the violation. Any penaity assessed

in the order shall! not exceed $25,000 per day

of noncompliance for each violation of a

requirement of this subtitle. In assessing such

a penalty, the Administrator shall take into

account the seriousness of the violation and

any good faith efforts to comply with

applicable requirements.

This case involves whether ordering compliance with

the requirement for financial assurances, 6 Colorado Code of

Regulations (C.C.R.) 1007-3, Part 266, is a permissible

remedy under RCRA §3008(a), 28 U.S.C. §6928(a). 6

C.C.R. 1007-3, §§266.10 - 266.18 are reproduced in

Appendix E.

Rule 64 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure

applies to remedies relating to the seizure of person or

property for the purpose of securing satisfaction of a judgment

ultimately to be entered in an action.

Rule 64. Seizure of Person or Property

At the commencement of and during the course

of an action, all remedies providing for seizure

of person or property for the purpose of

securing satisfaction of the judgment ultimately

to be entered in the action are available under

the circumstances and in the manner provided

by the law of the state in which the district

court is held, existing at the time the remedy is

sought, subject to the following qualifications:

(1) any existing statute of the United States

governs to the extent to which it is applicable;

3

(2) the action in which any of the foregoing

remedies is used shall be commenced and

prosecuted or, if removed from a state court,

shall be prosecuted after removal, pursuant to

these rules. The remedies thus available

include arrest, attachment, garnishment,

replevin, sequestration, and other

corresponding or equivalent remedies,

however designated and regardless of whether

by state procedure the remedy is ancillary to

an action or must be obtained by an

independent action.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Power Engineering Company is a _ Colorado

corporation having its principal place of business in Denver,

Colorado. Power Engineering Company refinishes metal

crankshafts, connecting rods and rod journals for large diesel

engines used in heavy equipment. Redoubt Ltd. owns the

property and building used by Power Engineering Company

for its operations. Richard J. Lilienthal is an officer and

majority owner of both companies. Petitioners will be

collectively referred to as “PEC” in this petition.

As a result of operations, soils at and around PEC’s

place of business and groundwater that flows beneath and

away trom the property have become contaminated with

hexavalent chromium. As a result, the Colorado Department

of Public Health and Environment (“CDPHE”) issued a

Compliance Order to PEC directing that PEC characterize the

nature and extent of the contamination, then prepare and

implement plans for remediation of contaminated soils and

groundwater once the characterization was complete. PEC

4

has substantially completed the characterization required by

the Compliance Order, and is currently involved in the

remediation process.

The Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”),

through the United States, filed suit in the United States

District Court for the District of Colorado on August 1,

1997.' Jurisdiction was vested in the District Court pursuant

to §3008(a) of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §6928(a), and 28 U.S.C.

§§1331, 1345 and 1355. In its complaint, the United States

alleged that PEC had and was continuing to treat, store and

dispose of hazardous waste without a permit in violation of

§3005(a) of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §6925(a). The United States

requested the following relief:

(a) the imposition of civil penalties pursuant to RCRA

§3008(a), 42 U.S.C. §6928(a);

(b) an order enjoining defendants from future

violations of Subtitle C of RCRA; and

(c) mandatory injunctive relief directing that

defendants comply with Subtitle C of RCRA and close all

illegal hazardous waste units.

The United States filed a Motion for a Preliminary

Injunction requesting that the District Court enter mandatory

'The State of Colorado filed an action on the same day

seeking judicial enforcement of the Compliance Order. The State

Court subsequently entered judgment against PEC for enforcement

of the Compliance Order. PEC filed a motion in the District Court

seeking dismissal of the United States’ action based upon Harmon

Industries, Inc. v. Browner, 19 F Supp. 2d 988 (W.D. Mo. 1998),

aff'd., 191 F.3d 894 (8" Cir. 1999).

5

injunctive relief directing defendants to obtain financial

assurances pursuant to 6 C.C.R. 1007-3, §§266.10 ef seq. as

security for payment of estimated costs necessary to remediate

soil and groundwater contamination at and around PEC’s

property. After a three day evidentiary hearing, the United

States District Court for the District of Colorado (Babcock,

J.) granted the United States’ motion and directed that

defendants “provide financial assurance in the amount of

$3,500,000 pursuant to 6 C.C.R. 1007-3, Part 266 and all

applicable subparts.” App. D, p.126a.

Defendants appealed the District Court’s grant of the

mandatory preliminary injunction to the United States Court

of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Jurisdiction over the appeal

was proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1292(a). A notice of

appeal was timely filed pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate

Procedure 4(a)(1). In an opinion issued September 8, 1999,

the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit

affirmed the District Court. App. A, p.22a.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

This case presents an issue of first impression

regarding the permissible scope of remedies available to the

United States Environmental Protection Agency pursuant to

RCRA §3008(a), 28 U.S.C. §6928(a).

A. The Order that PEC Obtain Financial Assurances

Violates Longstanding Principles of Statutory

Construction Established by this Court Because the

District Court and Court of Appeals Provided EPA

with a Prejudgment Remedy Not Authorized by

Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 64 or by RCRA

§3008(a).

The District Court’s Order proviues EPA with a

prejudgment right in all cases alleging past or present

unpermitted treatment, storage, and/or disposal of hazardous

waste to require a defendant to provide third party financial

assurances in an amount that will secure performance or

payment of any order or judgment ultimately to be entered in

the case. This prejudgment financial assurance remedy does

not flow from a specific statutory grant conferred on EPA (or

any other person) by Congress. Rather, this remedy resulted

from the District Court applying regulations applicable in the

context of RCRA’s permit requirements as an enforcement

remedy.”

RCRA §3008(a)(1) provides that EPA, upon notice of

a RCRA violation, may pursue an order requiring that a party

comply with the RCRA provision it is allegedly violating.

*The financial assurance requirements are inextricably

linked to the permitting regulations that incorporate parallel

operational and closure requirements. The regulations governing

the permit process require the submission of closure and post-

closure plans and documentation demonstrating compliance with the

financial assurance requirements. 6 C.C.R. 1007-3 §100.41(15)

and (16). A closure plan serves as the basis from which a closure

cost estimate is calculated. 6 C.C.R. 1007-3 §266.12(c). The

closure cost estimate determines the amount of financial assurances

required. 6 C.C.R. 1007-3 §266. 14.

7

The District Court premised its order on findings that PEC

illegally treated, stored and disposed of hazardous waste

without a permit or interim status required by RCRA

§3005(a), 42 U.S.C. §6925(a). App. D, p. 118a. The

District Court’s findings demonstrate that two alternatives

were available to EPA for directing PEC to comply with

RCRA §3005(a): (1) an order directing that the facility secure

a permit covering such treatment, storage, or disposal, or (2)

an order directing that the facility cease its illegal activities.

The District Court’s order directing that defendants comply

with only the financial assurance requirements of 6 C.C.R.

1007-3, Part 266 did neither. Financial assurances alone do

not secure PEC’s compliance with the permit requirements of

RCRA §3005(a), 42 U.S.C. §6925(a). Nor do financial

assurances bring PEC into compliance with the operational

standards of RCRA §3004(a), 42 U.S.C. §6924(a). In short,

the District Court ordered relief that could not remedy the

specific RCRA violations alleged by EPA and found by the

District Court.

“It is an elemental canon of statutory construction that

where a statute expressly provides a remedy, a court must be

chary of reading others into it.” Transamerica Mortgage

Advisors, Inc. v. Lewis, 444 U.S. 11, 19 (1979). The

District Court and Court of Appeals failed to heed this

elemental rule of statutory construction. Prejudgment

imposition of financial assurances as security for a future

order or judgment is not found within the remedies provided

EPA under RCRA’s enforcement provision. RCRA

3008(a)(1) provides that EPA may assess a civil penaity for

any past or current violation, or order compliance with the

RCRA requirements being violated, or both. These remedies

are available administratively, or EPA may commence a civil

action in the appropriate District Court for such relief,

including relief by way of a temporary or permanent

8

injunction. In the absence of strong indicia of contrary

congressional intent, it must be presumed that Congress

provided the remedies it deemed appropriate. Karahalios v.

National Federation of Federal Employees, Local 1263, 489

U.S. 527, 533 (1989). RCRA §3008(a)(1) does not provide

for prejudgment remedies to secure performance or payment

of a future order or judgment independent of Federal Rule of

Civil Procedure 64.

The District Court violated other principles of

Statutory construction established by this Court when it read

a prejudgment remedy into RCRA §3008(a), 42 U.S.C.

§6928(a), that is not there. When Congress crafts particular

remedies for particular wrongs, the presumption is that these

are the exclusive remedies and such limitations as they may

embody are not to be circumvented by extending a more

generally worded statute over the subject of the more specific

one. Seminole Tribe v. Florida, 571 U.S. 44, 74 (1996);

Middlesex County Sewage Authority yv. National Sea

Clammers Association, 451 U.S. 1, 14-15 (1981). Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 64 specifically provides the remedies

available to secure satisfaction of a judgment to be entered in

a case. RCRA §3008(a), 42 U.S.C. §6928(a), does not.

Upon finding a statutory violation, a federal court must tailor

the remedy to fit the nature and extent of the violation, and

give only such relief as is authorized by the applicable statute.

Dayton Board of Education v. Brinkman, 433 U.S. 406, 420

(1977). The remedy ordered by the District Court is simply

not cognizable under RCRA §3008(a).

The breadth and scope of a remedy requiring that a

defendant obtain financial assurances as prejudgment security

in a RCRA enforcement action far exceeds the scope of any

prejudgment remedy available under Rule 64. Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 64 specifies that remedies for prejudgment

9

security are available under the law of the state in which the

District Court is held, or to the extent any existing statute of

the United States governs. Colorado law limits remedies for

prejudgment security to attachments before judgment,

Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 102(a), or garnishment in

aid of attachment, Colorado Rule of Civil Procedure 103, §5.

Prejudgment remedies available to the United States are

limited under the Federal Debt Collection Act, 28 U.S.C.

§$§$3001 ef seq., to attachment, receivership, garnishment and

sequestration. 28 U.S.C. §§3101-3105. In contrast, the

financial assurance regulations of 6 C.C.R. 1007-3, §266.14

require that a defendant obtain the agreement of a non-party

requiring that non-party to pay closure and post-closure costs

through a trust, letter of credit, surety bond, insurance policy

or Other financial instrument issued by a third party financial

institution.’ Financial assurances as a prejudgment remedy

transcend the traditional prejudgment remedies because

compliance requires a third party, who is not subject to the

Court's jurisdiction, to provide the financial assurances on

behalf of a defendant. No such third party guarantee is

authorized by Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 64.

B. The District Court’s Preliminary Injunction for

Financial Assurances is an Order for Prejudgment

Security Relating to Costs Associated With

Preclosure Remediation of the Property.

The Court of Appeals did not address the significant

question of whether ordering that PEC obtain financial

assurances to secure compliance with a future order of the

‘It is undisputed that Petitioners do not meet the financial

lest and corporate guarantee requirement of 6 C.C.R. 1007-3,

§266. 14(1)

LO

ee tees 2 Ltn eens J

EAE SAR iat « Savon nw sty

District Court exceeded the powers granted to EPA under

RCRA §3008(a). The overall context of the District Court’s

order demonstrates that the remedy granted EPA was

prejudgment security for the satisfaction of any judgment that

may be ultimately entered in the action. In its order, the

District Court found that the irreparable harm consisted of

“the threat that the public will have to [financially] subsidize

remediation and proper closure of the facility.” App. D,

p. 135a. The District Court’s finding was based on evidence

of PEC’s limited financial resources, failure to pay a civil

penalty assessed by CDPHE, engaging in transactions

evidencing a pattern of debt reduction and asset forfeiture,

and statements regarding bankruptcy and abandonment of the

facility.“ App. D, p.122a. In short, the irreparable harm

found by the District Court consisted of the possibility that

PEC would be unable to satisfy the judgment or comply with

a future order directing remediation of the property.

This “irreparable harm”, the evasion of a future court

order, is the very type of harm that prejudgment remedies are

intended to address. A court must exactly determine the

substance of the relief sought in a proceeding because the

name given to the process is not determinative. DeBeers

Consolidated Mines, Ltd. v. United States, 325 U.S. 212,

219 (1945). The District Court failed to follow this rule

when it granted a prejudgment remedy securing PEC’s

“At present, PEC has substanually completed all of the

characterization work required by CDPHE’s Compliance Order,

has implemented measures for remediation of chromium

contaminated groundwater flowing away from the property and is

working with CDPHE on identifying viable remediation methods

for chromium contaminated soils.

compliance with a future order or judgment under the guise of

a preliminary injunction.

The Court of Appeals erred when it did not interpret

the District Court’s preliminary injunction as ordering

prejudgment security securing compliance with a future

judgment or order directing remediation of contaminated soils

and groundwater. App. A, 19a. While the Court of Appeals

acknowledged that the basis of the District Court’s mandatory

injunction was the threat that PEC could not or would not

comply with a future District Court Order directing

remediation of the property based upon financial

considerations, it ignored the legal significance of that

finding. The threat of irreparable harm created by the

perceived inability cf a defendant to satisfy a future order or

judgment is the very harm Rule 64 is intended to remedy.

The Court of Appeals affirmance of the District Court was

based on the erroneous legal conclusion that the irreparable

harm sought to be avoided was something other than the

threat that PEC would be unable to satisfy a future District

Court judgment or order. It was only by ignoring the basis

for the District Court’s finding of irreparable harm that the

Court of Appeals could avoid the issue presented by this

petition.

CONCLUSION

The petition for writ of certiorari should be granted.

The legally sanctioned imposition of financial assurances as

a prejudgment remedy to secure satisfaction of a future

judgment far exceeds the scope of permissible remedies under

RCRA §3008(a). This judicial expansion of the remedies

available under RCRA §3008(a), under the guise of

preliminary injunctive relief, cannot exist side-by-side with

the principles of statutory construction established by this

12

oe

Court. Supreme Court guidance is critical to prevent the

wholesale substitution of preliminary injunctive relief

ordering financial assurances in place of the standards

applicable to prejudgment remedies governed by Federal Rule

of Civil Procedure 64.

Respectfully submitted,

/s/

Valerie McNaughton

(Counsel of Record)

John J. Zodrow

Zodrow et al. P.C.

Independence Plaza, Suite 1700

1050 Seventeenth Street

Denver, CO 80265

Counsel of Record

13

APPENDIX A

PUBLISH

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

TENTH CIRCUIT

[Filed September 8, 1999]

No. 98-1273

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

)

Plaintiff-Appellee, )

)

Vv. )

)

POWER ENGINEERING )

COMPANY; REDOUBT, LTD.; _ )

and RICHARD J. LILIENTHAL, |)

Defendants-Third-Party )

Plaintiffs-Appellants, )

)

Vv )

)

JACK LILIENTHAL, )

Third-Party-Defendant. )

)

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the District of Colorado

(D.C. No, 97-B-1654)

Order - 9/8/99

John F. McBride (John J. Zodrow with him on the briefs),

Zodrow et al. P.C., Denver, Colorado, for Defendants-

Appellants.

Greer Goldman, Department of Justice, Washington, D.C.

(Lois J. Schiffer, Assistant Attorney General, Henry L.

Solano, United States Attorney, Stephen D. Taylor, Assistant

United States Attorney, Denver, Colorado; John A. Bryson,

John N. Moscato, Lisa E. Jones, Attorneys, Department of

Justice, Washington. D.C.; and Thomas Sitz, General

Counsel for Office of Enforcement, Compliance and

Environmental Justice, Environmental Protection Agency,

Denver, Colorado, with him on the briefs), for Plaintiff-

Appellee.

Before EBEL, MAGILL” and LUCERO, Circuit Judges.

EBEL, Circuit Judge.

Plaintiff-Appellee United States, acting on behalf of

the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA"), sought a

mandatory preliminary’ injunction directing Defendant-

Appellants Power Engineering Company ("PEC"), Redoubt,

Ltd., and Richard J. Lilienthal (collectively, "Defendants"),

to comply with the financial assurance regulations adopted by

the Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment

("CDPHE") under authority delegated to Colorado by the

EPA pursuant to the Resource Conservation and Recovery

Act of 1976 (“RCRA”) The district court granted the

eeeee

Honorable Frank Magill, Senior United States Circuit

Judge for the Fighth Circuit, sitting by designation

y

ee ee

Order - 9/8/99

mandatory preliminary injunction, requiring Defendants to

provide financial assurances in the amount of $3,500,000 to

ensure remediation of ground and water contamination caused

by chromium and other by-products of PEC's metal

refinishing business. Defendants appeal the grant of the

preliminary injunction. We affirm.

I. BACKGROUND!

Statutory and Regulatory Background

In 1976, Congress enacted RCRA, a comprehensive

statutory scheme providing cradle-to-grave oversight of solid

and hazardous waste. See 42 U.S.C. § 6902; United States v.

Colorado, 990 F.2d 1565, 1570 (10th Cir. 1993); United

States v. Power Engineering Co., 10 F. Supp.2d 1145, 1147

(D. Colo. 1998) ("PEC"). RCRA's Subtitle C, 42 U.S.C. §§

6921-39, governs the generation, transportation, storage,

disposal, and treatment of hazardous wastes to minimize

present and future threats to human health and_ the

environment. See 42 U.S.C. § 6924(a); United Technologies

Corp. v. EPA, 821 F.2d 714, 716 (D.C. Cir. 1987). To that

end, section 3004 of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6924, directs the

EPA to promulgate regulations establishing standards for

owners and operators of hazardous waste facilities, such as

standards for "financial responsibility (including financial

responsibility for corrective action) as may be necessary or

A more detailed background of RCRA and the facts can

be found in the district court's memorandum order and opinion,

United States v. Power Engineering Co., 10 F. Supp.2d 1145 (D.

Colo. 1998),

3a

g

3

5

2

J

Order - 9/8/99

desirable." 42 U.S.C. § 6924(a)(6). Section 3004 also permits

the EPA to promulgate regulations establishing standards for

compliance with section 3005 of RCRA. See 42 U.S.C. §

6924(a)(7). Section 3005 of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6925,

prohibits any person from treating, storing, or disposing of

hazardous waste or constructing any hazardous waste facility

for such treatment, storage, or disposal without (1) a permit

issued pursuant to Section 3005; or (2) designation of" interim

status," obtained by notifying the EPA of the person's

hazardous waste activities and submitting an application for a

permit. 42 U.S.C. § 6925(a) & (e).

If authorized by the EPA, a state may "carry out [its

own hazardous waste] program in lieu of the Federal

program” under Subtitle C and “issue and enforce permits for

the storage, treatment, or disposal of hazardous waste." 42

U.S.C. § 6926(b); see Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1569. Action

taken by a state pursuant to its federally authorized program

has "the same force and effect as action taken by the [EPA]."

42 U.S.C. § 6926(d); see Colorado, 990 F.2d at 1569.

Pursuant to EPA authorization, Colorado implemented

its own hazardous waste program, and promulgated

regulations governing generators of hazardous waste and the

operation and maintenance of hazardous waste treatment,

storage, and disposal facilities. See generally, 6 Colo. Code

Regs. 1007-3 ("C.C.R.") §§ 262, 264-68; Colorado, 990

F.2d at 1571; PEC, 10 F. Supp.2d at 1148. Colorado's

regulations are substantially identical to the EPA's

regulations, such that analysis of the federal scheme can

"overlay[{] and define[] that of Colorado." See Sierra Club v.

United States Dept. of Energy, 734 F. Supp. 946, 947 (D.

Colo. 1990). Among the state's regulations are the so-called

4a

Order - 9/8/99

financial assurance requirements, located in C.C.R. § 266,

which require Owners and operators of all hazardous waste

facilities to document that they have secured the financial

resources required for closure and, if necessary, post-closure

of their facilities in an appropriate and safe manner, and to

pay third-party claims that may arise from their operations.

See C.C.R. §§ 266.14 & 266.16; PEC, 10 F. Supp.2d at

1146.* The specifics of Colorado's regulatory scheme will be

discussed further in the relevant context.

For present purposes, however, it is useful to identify

two propositions which the district court stated, and which

neither party challenges on appeal. First, according to the

district court, the EPA "retains the right to bring enforcement

actions compelling compliance with Colorado's hazardous

waste regulations." PEC, 10 F. Supp.2d at 1148 (citing 42

U.S.C. §§ 6928, 6934, & 6973; 49 Fed. Reg. 41036 (1984);

51 Fed. Reg. 37729 (1986); 54 Fed. Reg. 20847 (1989); 56

According to the C.C.R. § 265.111,

The owner or operator jof a hazardous waste facility] must close

the facility in a manner that:

(a) Minimizes the need for further maintenance, and

(b) Controls, minimizes or eliminates, to the extent necessary to

protect human health and the environment, post-closure escape of

hazardous waste, hazardous constituents, leachate, contaminated

runoff, or hazardous waste decomposition products to the ground

or surface waters or to the atmosphere... .

Sa

Order - 9/8/99

Fed. Reg. 21601 (1991); 59 Fed. Reg. 16568 (1994)).’

Second, even though the state resolved its enforcement

> 42 U.S.C. § 6928 provides that the EPA may issue an

order assessing a Civil penalty, bring suit in federal court "for

appropriate relief, including a temporary or permanent injunction, "

or both, when it determines that a violation of"any requirement" of

Subtitle C has occurred. Id. at § 6928(a)(1). It further provides that

when a violation of Subtitle C occurs in a state which is authorized

to Carry Out a hazardous waste program, the EPA shall give notice

to the state prior to issuing an order or commencing an action, See

id. at § 6928 (a)(2).

42 U.S.C. § 6934 provides that the EPA may order an

owner or operator of a hazardous waste facility to conduct

monitoring, testing, analysis, and reporting under certain

conditions. See id. at § 6934(a).

42 U.S.C. § 6973 provides that the EPA may bring suit

against a person who has contributed or is contributing to the past

or present handling, storage, treatment, transportation, or disposal

of hazardous waste that presents an imminent and substantial

endangerment to health or the environment. See id. at § 6973(a).

The Federal Registers cited contain the EPA's approval of

Colorado's hazardous waste program or revisions thereto. In them,

the EPA states that "Colorado also has primary enforcement

responsibility, although EPA retains the right to conduct inspections

under Section 3007 of RCRA and to take enforcement actions"

under 42 U.S.C. §5 6928, 6934, & 6973. 49 Fed. Reg. 41036,

41037 (1984); see 51 Fed. Reg. 37729, 37730:(1986); 54 Fed.

Reg. 20847, 20848 (1989); 56 Fed. Reg. 21601, 21602 (1991); 59

Fed. Reg. 16568, 16569 (1994).

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Order - 9/8/99

proceedings against Defendants in this case through an

administrative order, the district court assumed the EPA had

"overfile” power under RCRA to bring its own subsequent

enforcement action. See PEC, 10 F. Supp.2d at 1146; see

also Bryan S. Miller, Harmonizing RCRA's Enforcement

Provisions: RCRA Overfiling in Light of Harmon Industries

v.

Browner, 5 Envtl. Law. 585,586 (1999) ("Overfiling occurs

when EPA initiates an enforcement action after a state begins

an action on the same matter.").

On appeal, the parties focus their argument only on

whether the EPA may enforce the financial assurance

provisions of the state regulations independently of

compelling compliance with the entire permitting scheme.

Therefore, because the propositions set forth above are not in

dispute in this appeal, we assume without deciding for

purposes of this appeal (1) that the EPA may enforce the

state's hazardous waste regulations, see United States v.

Marine Shale Processors, 81 F.3d 1361, 1367 (Sth Cir. 1996)

("42 U.S.C. § 6928(a) gave EPA the power to enforce the

substance of an approved state's program against private

parties in that state."); and (2) that the EPA may do so even

after the state has taken its own enforcement actions, but see

Harmon Indus., Inc. v. Browner, 19 F. Supp.2d 988, 994,

996 (W.D. Mo. 1998) (recognizing that EPA could withdraw

state authority or enforce a violation of RCRA "when the state

remains inactive, after giving notice” pursuant to 42 U.S.C.

§ 6928(a)(2), but holding that EPA may not overfile under

RCRA after state concludes enforcement action on same

matter); see also Miller, supra, at 593 ("Harmon Industries,

Inc. v. Browner is the first federal court decision that directly

So NEA Rita Se eo hin a Sis alee

Order - 9/8/99

addresses the issue of whether EPA may overfile under

RCRA after a state concludes an enforcement action.").‘

Parties

The United States is the plaintiff acting on behalf of

the EPA. PEC is a Colorado corporation located in Denver.

From approximately 1968, PEC has operated a business of

refinishing metal crankshafts, connecting rods, and rod

journals for large diesel engines used in heavy equipment.

Redoubt owns the land and buildings leased to PEC, and thus

is the owner of PEC's facility under Colorado regulations.

Lilienthal is the president of PEC and owns 51% of the

outstanding stock of both PEC and Redoubt. For purposes of

the preliminary injunction motion, Lilienthal agreed that he is

an "owner" and "operator" of PEC and as such subject to any

order entered by the district court directing Defendants to

secure financial assurances.

4 . . . ‘ . .

Unlike Harmon, Marine Shale did not arise in an

overfile context. That is, while the EPA attempted to override a

state enforcement action in Harmon, the EPA proceeded in Marine

Shale in the absence of any clear state enforcement proceedings.

Thus, while Marine Shale spoke to whether the EPA can enforce

State regulations promulgated pursuant to RCRA, it did not address

the issue of whether the EPA can do so once a state has initiated its

own enforcement action. Harmon, on the other hand, spoke to

whether the EPA can overfile extant state enforcement proceedings,

but Harmon does not address whether the EPA may enforce state

implementing regulations in the absence of any state enforcement

effort. In fact, the EPA brought its complaint in Harmon under

federal regulations. See Harmon, 19 F. Supp.2d at 992 n.4.

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Nature of the Case

PEC’'s refurbishing operations produce more than

1,000 kilograms of hazardous waste per month, and the

facility stores more than 6,000 kilograms per month. The

facility generates approximately thirteen different waste

Streams, including arsenic, lead, mercury, and hexavalent

chromium contaminated media. In 1992, Denver Health and

Hospitals ("DHH") contacted the CDPHE concerning a

discharge into the Platte River of high levels of hexavalent

chromium. After investigation, DHH determined that PEC

was the likely sources of the discharge. The CDPHE then

conducted compliance review inspections at PEC in August

and September of 1992, and reported numerous violations of

federal and state regulations governing the treatment, storage,

and disposal of hazardous waste, which the district court set

out at length. In addition, PEC never applied for a permit or

obtained interim status.

Although PEC notified the CDPHE in 1986 that it was

a generator of certain hazardous waste, PEC failed to assess

adequately its generation, treatment, storage, and disposal of

hazardous waste, and the CDPHE did not know the severity

and extent of PEC's noncompliance with the state hazardous

waste program until the August 1992 inspection. As a result

of PEC's illegal storage and disposal of hazardous waste,

groundwater at and under the facility, as well as groundwater

under areas outside the facility, is contaminated with levels of

hexavalent chromium greatly exceeding established toxicity

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Order - 9/8/99

levels.° A plume of chrome contamination extends from the

facility approximately 3,310 feet into the South Platte Valley

Fill Aquifer, which is connected to the South Platte River.

After inspecting PEC's facility again in 1993 and

1994, the CDPHE issued an Initial Compliance Order on June

28, 1994. That order was stayed at PEC's request, while PEC

and the CDPHE held conferences between 1994 and 1996.

The CDPHE then issued a Final Administrative Compliance

Order on June 13, 1996 ("Order"). While complying with

certain requirements of the Order, PEC failed to meet others.

Accordingly, on December 26, 1996, the CDPHE issued an

Administrative Penalty Order assessing civil penalties of

approximately $1,875,000. Defendants did not appeal the

penalty, but neither have they paid any portion of it.

The EPA was displeased with the manner in which the

CDPHE sought to enforce the RCRA regulations. At the

EPA's request, the United States exercised its authority to

seek Defendant's compliance with the state regulations. As

part of its suit, the United States sought a mandatory

preliminary injunction directing Defendants to comply with

the regulations for financial assurances. After a hearing, the

district court granted the preliminary injunction pursuant to

§3008(a) of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. §6928(a), and Fed. R. Civ. P.

65. Defendants now appeal.

The district court noted that PEC currently is managing

hazardous wastes in compliance with applicable storage regulations.

See PEC, 10 F. Supp.2d at 1151.

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Il. DISCUSSION

Standard of Review

We review the grant of a preliminary injunction for

abuse of discretion. See Elam Constr., Inc. v. Regional

Trans. Disi., 129 F.3d 1343, 1346 (10th Cir. 1997), cert.

denied, 118 S. Ct. 1363 (1998). Granting a preliminary

injunction is proper where the moving party shows: (1) a

substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) irreparable

harm in the absence of an injunction; (3) the threatened harm

outweighs injury, which the injunction may cause the

opposing party; and (4) the injunction will not be adverse to

the public interest. See Kansas Health Care Assoc., Inc. v.

Kansas Dep't ot Soc. & Rehab. Servs., 31 F.3d 1536, 1542

(10th Cir. 1994). A mandatory preliminary injunction (1.e.,

one that directs a party to act) imposes “an even heavier

burden on [the movant] of showing that the four factors listed

above weigh heavily and compellingly in movant's favor.” Id.

at 1543. We review the underlying issues of law decided by

the district court de novo. See Equifax Servs., Inc. v_ Hitz,

905 F.2d 1355, 1357 (10th Cir. 1990); Tefel v. Reno, No.

98-4616, 1999 WL 496227, at *8 (1th Cir. July 14, 1999)

The district court found all four factors supporting a

preliminary injunction. See PEC, 10 F. Supp.2d at 1162-65.

As the government notes, Defendants on appeal do not appear

to challenye the finding of the latter three factors. Rather,

Defendants challenge the applicability of RCRA and state

unplementing regulations, an attack that goes to. the

government's likelihood of success on the merits

Additionally, Defendants raise questions about — the

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Order - 9/8/99

appropriateness of a preliminary injunction ordering financial

assurances. We address Defendant's arguments in turn.

A.

Defendants challenge the district court's holding that

PEC currently disposes of hazardous waste, an activity which

would subject it to Colorado's regulations for facilities

treating, storing, or disposing of hazardous waste ("TSD

facilities"). We agree with the district court

Colorado regulations define a TSD facility as “a

location at which hazardous waste is subjected to treatment,

Storage, or disposal and may include a facility where

hazardous waste is generated.” C_.C_R. § 260.10. Under the

[a] generator [of hazardous waste] who treats,

regulations,

Stores, or disposes of hazardous waste on-site must comply

with the applicable standards and permit requirements set

forth in Parts 264, 265, 266, and Part 100 of these

regulations.” C.C.R. § 262.10 n.2.° C.C.R. § 266 further

provides that its financial assurance requirements “apply to

C.C.R. § 264 sets out the standards for owners and

operators of hazardous waste treatment, storage, and disposal

facilities with permits. C.C.R. § 265 sets out interim status

standards applicable to owners and operators of hazardous waste

treatment, storage, and disposal taciliues who have obtained interim

See C CR

fan ra pall thy uh hy eo ¢ gant ft ;

SULLUS GS Weil 42S UlOSe WHO Have idlieG WO GUO SHO

265.1(b), United States v. Ekco Housewares. Inc., 62 F 3d 806

809 (6th Cir. 1995); PEC, 10 F. Supp.2d at L150. CCR. § 266

. } ’ ’ ’ y ’ rise

Sets Out financial assurance requirements. C.C_R. § 100 sets out the

regulations tor permit applicauons

tt

|

Order - 9/8/99

owners and operators of all hazardous waste facilities.’

C.C.R. § 266.10(a). RCRA and the state regulations define

"disposal" as

the discharge, deposit, injection, dumping,

spiliing, leaking, or placing of any solid or

hazardous waste into or on any land or water

so that such solid waste or hazardous waste or

any constituent thereof may enter the

environment or be emitted into the air or

discharged into any waters, including ground

waters.

42 U.S.C. § 6903(3); C.C.R. § 260.10.

For substantially the same reasons discussed

thoroughly in the district court's opinion, we find that

Defendants currently are disposing of hazardous wastes

illegally in three ways:

(1) the Facility's air scrubbers dispose a mist

of hexavalent chromium onto Facility soil; (2)

the Facility failed to remediate the soil

contaminated by a yellow/orange liquid that

leaked from air scrubbers down the west side

of the Facility's main building; and (3) the

Facility failed to remediate the three open

waste piles of contaminated soil excavated

from beneath the chrome-plating tanks and the

remaining contaminated soil located beneath

the chrome-plating tanks.

PEC, 10 F. Supp.2d at 1157, 1157-60.

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Order - 9/8/99

Furthermore, we conclude that PEC is subject to

Colorado's financial assurance requirements. By stipulation

before the district court for purposes of the preliminary

injunction motion, the parties agreed that PEC "is and was a

‘generator'" of hazardous waste as defined by RCRA and

Colorado regulations. Thus, PEC "must comply with the

applicable standards and permit requirements" of the

Colorado regulations for generators of hazardous waste who

are TSD facilities, including the financial assurance

requirements of § 266. C.C.R. § 262.10 n.2. Additionally,

those financial assurance requirements “apply to" Redoubt and

Lilienthal as "owners and operators of [al hazardous waste

facilit{y]." C.C.R. § 266.10(a).

We do not find Defendants’ argument to the contrary

persuasive. Defendants contend that, even if they are

disposers of hazardous waste, they are not a disposal facility

and therefore not a TSD facility. Defendants rely on C.C.R.

§ 260.10, which defines a "disposal facility" as a facility "at

which hazardous waste is intentionally placed into or on any

land or water, and at which waste will remain after closure."

Defendants argue that because they intend "to remedy the

contamination of the site while PEC is still a going concern,”

no waste will remain after closure, thereby precluding them

from being a disposal facility by definition.

We find no merit to this argument. Defendants

essentially contend that any generator currently disposing of

hazardous waste on their facility does not have to comply with

regulations for TSD facilities so long as they intend to clean

up the waste before closure. There is no basis in the provision

cited for such a sweeping subjective loophole. As an initial

matter, the intent element in the definition of “disposal

l4a

Order - 9/8/99

facility” pertains to whether hazardous waste was

"intentionally placed" on land or water, not whether the

polluter intends the hazardous waste to remain. Cf. United

States v. Allegan Metal Finishing Co., 696 F. Supp. 275, 287

(W.D. Mich. 1988) (refusing to read into 42 U.S.C. §

6925(e), interim status provision for "land disposal facility,"

"a state of mind requirement,” based on the regulatory

definition of "disposal facility,” as to "whether the defendant

intended the waste to remain [after closure]" (quotations

omitted)). As the EPA has indicated, the purpose of the intent

element in the definition of "disposal facility” is "to indicate

the [EPA's] intent that the term does not apply to activities

involving truly accidental discharge of hazardous waste,”

because the EPA posits that "permits logically can only be

required for intentional disposal of hazardous waste.” 45 Fed.

Reg. 33066, 33068 (1980).

Moreover, we need not decide whether PEC is a

"disposal facility.” Unlike "disposal facility,” the definition of

"disposal" does not limit its reference only to those facilities

at Which hazardous waste will remain after closure. Rather,

as noted, "disposal" encompasses "the discharge, deposit,

injection, dumping, spilling, leaking, or placing of any solid

or hazardous waste into or on any land or water so tat such

solid waste or hazardous waste or any constituent thereof may

enter the environment or be emitted into the air or discharged

into any waters.” C.C.R. § 260.10. As a generator of

hazardous waste that engages in its disposal, PEC is a TSD

facility. See C.C.R. § 260.10. Furthermore, as a TSD

facility, PEC must comply with the requirements of C.C.R.

§§ 264, 265, 266, and 100; and as PEC's owner and operator,

Redoubt and Lilienthal must meet the financial assurance

requirements of C.C.R. § 266. See C.C.R. § 260.10 (defining

15a

PEAS wah pe UT IR RE

ite autiaan olathe we Hewes

Order - 9/8/99

TSD facility to include generators of hazardous waste "at

which hazardous waste is subjected to treatment, storage, or

disposal"); C.C.R. § 262.10 n.2 (generator disposing of

hazardous waste is subject to C.C.R. §§ 264-66 & 100):

C.C.R. § 266. 10(a) (financial assurance provisions of C.C.R.

§ 266 apply to owners and operators of all hazardous waste

facilities). The definition of "disposal facility" on its face does

not negate these regulatory mandates, and Defendants’

argument does not convince us otherwise.

B.

Defendants argue that "financial assurances are part

and parcel of an integrated regulatory scheme governing pre-

operational permitting of a TSD{ facility] which cannot be

severed and applied separately from the balance of the

regulatory scheme." Since the amount of financial assurances

depends on the cost estimates of closure and post-closure of

the TSD facility, and since closure and post-closure plans are

required for a person to obtain a permit, Defendants argue

that the financial assurance requirements come into play only

at the tail end of the regulatory, scheme for permitting. Thus,

Defendants assert that the district court at most could only

require Defendants to (1) secure a permit covering treatment,

storage, or disposal of hazardous waste; or (2) cease its illegal

activities. Defendants conclude that the district court therefore

erred in enjoining compliance with the financial assurance

provisions.

We find Defendants’ argument unsupportable. As an

initial matter, § 3008 of RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6928, authorizes

the EPA to commence an action “for appropriate relief,

including a temporary or permanent injunction," for "any

16a

Order - 9/8/99

requirement" of Subtitle C, and to do so in states that have

authorized hazardous waste programs as long as the EPA

gives prior notice to the state. See 42 U.S.C. § 6928(a)(1)-(2).

As noted, the district court stated, and neither party

challenges, that the EPA may bring an overfile action under

RCRA to enforce state implementing regulations. Thus, we

turn to whether the EPA may require Defendants to comply

only with Colorado's financial assurance requirements

independent of requiring compliance with the entire

permitting scheme.

Colorado's financial assurance requirements "apply to

owners and operators of all hazardous waste facilities," and

inter alia require "[aJn owner or operator of each facility . .

. [to] establish financial assurances for closure, and if

applicable, post-closure of the facility.” C.C.R. §§ 266. 10(a)

& 266.14 (emphasis added). By their terms, these regulations

apply to all owners and operators of hazardous waste

facilities; they are not limited to permit holders or applicants.

In light of these clear provisions, we do not believe that the

mere fact that the permit application requires a showing of

compliance with the financial assurance provisions somehow

renders these provisions applicable only in the context of

permittine. See C.C.R. § 100.41. Based on the plain language

of the Colorado financial assurance requirements, we

conclude that the EPA's power to enforce Colorado's

regulations includes the power to enforce the financial

assurance requirements independent of requiring a permit. See

United States v. Ekco Housewares. inc., 62 F.2d 806, 809,

812 (6th Cir. 1995) (finding defendant subject to EPA

regulations for financial assurance until final closure is

certified even though defendant never obtained interim status

by applying for permit).

17a

eee eC uae t

GRADS ina ia

Order - 9/8/99

Defendants’ remaining arguments on this issue do not

dissuade us from our conclusion. Defendants attempt to

buttress their position by arguing that the CDPHE shares their

view that the financial assurance requirements cannot be

enforced separately from the entire permitting scheme. As

support, Defendants state that the "CDPHE has never

required a generator of hazardous waste, such as PEC , who

is illegally treating, storing or disposing of hazardous waste

to provide financial assurances." In a_ related point,

Defendants contend that the CDPHE has only considered PEC

to be a generator of hazardous waste, and has never

considered it also to be a TSD facility "subject to the permit

regulations, including the financial assurance requirements. "

The record belies Defendants’ argument, because

PEC's own environmental manager testified that the CDPHE

told PEC that it was a storage and disposal facility that needed

to obtain a permit pursuant to state regulations. Additionally,

while the CDPHE did not choose to require Defendants to

comply with the financial assurance requirements in its Final

Compliance Order, it believed it "[had] that option."

Rejecting Defendants’ arguments, we hold that the

EPA can enforce the state financial assurance requirements

independent of requiring compliance with permitting.

a

Defendants assert that the district court's grant of a

preliminary injunction directing them to provide financial

assurances in the amount of $3,500,000 was “not directed

towards requiring Defendants to obtain financial assurances

for the operation of a TSD[ facility], but was a thinly

18a

Order - 9/8/99

disguised attempt to obtain prejudgment security to enforce

any future judgment of the District Court." In particular,

Defendants assert that the preliminary injunction was "for

costs associated with remediation of existing contamination,

not for remediation of any contamination that may exist if and

when PEC closes its business." Defendants argue that the

preliminary injunction was actually prejudgment security, and

therefore it should be governed by Fed. R. Civ. P. 64.

Defendants conclude that the preliminary injunction exceeds

the scope of Rule 64 because "the prejudgment remedies

available to the United States [under Rule 64] are limited to

attachment, receivership, garnishment and sequestration."

Additionally, Defendants contend that the district court erred

in granting the preliminary injunction because "RCRA does

not have a provision providing prejudgment remedies to

secure a future judgment in an enforcement action under §

3008."’

We reject Defencants' arguments at the outset, because

we do not interpret the district court's preliminary injunction

for financial assurances to be an order for prejudgment

security for pre-closure remediation. We recognize that the

district court ordered financial assurances based upon the

costs of remediating the present contamination around the

PEC facility. However, we believe the district court

associated these remediation costs with closure and post-

closure of the facility. First, as a legal matter, the district

’ The United States contends that Defendants did not

properly raise this objection before the district court. We have

examined the record and conclude that Defendants sufficiently

raised the issue below.

19a

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Order - 9/8/99

court directed Defendants "to provide financial assurances in

accordance with 6 COLO. CODE REGS. 1007-3 § 266." See

PEC, 10 F. Supp.2d at 1165. That the court ordered financial

assurances "in accordance with" C.C.R. § 266 indicates that

the requested assurances will be used for closure and post-

closure costs. Second, as a factual matter, the district court

appeared to assume that closure and post-closure costs for the

facility would include costs for remediating the site in its

Current condition because Defendants have (1) violated

hazardous waste regulations for decades: (2) failed to comply

with the Final Compliance Order of the CDPHE respecting

remediation of its open piles of hazardous waste; (3) failed to

pay the civil penalty assessed by the CDPHE; (4) recently

engaged in a pattern of debt reduction and asset forfeiture;

and (5) threatened bankruptcy or abandonment of the facility

if the federal or state government continues seeking the

facility's compliance with applicable hazardous waste

regulations. See PEC, 10 F. Supp.2d at 1157, 1163, 1165.

Therefore, given Defendants’ history of unwillingness to

comply with RCRA and state implementing regulations, we

believe that the district court properly considered remediation

costs for the present contamination in calculating costs

associated with financial assurances necessary, for the

facility's closure or post-closure. Accordingly, we hold that

the district court properly ordered financial assurances for

closure and post-closure of the facility.

D.

Finally, Defendants contend that the district court's

calculation of the $3,500,000 figure for financial assurances

was based on "nothing more than gross and speculative

approximation." Because Defendants never have complied

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Order - 9/8/99

with applicable RCRA regulations by providing closure and

post-closure plans, Defendants contend that the absence of

those plans "is fatal to the United States' request for financial

assurances," as such financial assurances "cannut be

calculated without the detailed closure cost estimates required

by the regulations."

We disagree with Defendants’ argument. Even though

PEC does not have closure and post-closure plans pursuant to

C.C.R. § 265, the district court properly based its estimate of

financial assurances on the costs of remediating present

contamination at the site, under the assumption that the

contamination will remain at closure. See supra Part II.C.

Furthermore, the district court based its figure on estimates

from the CDPHE and PEC itself. The CDPHE estimated the

cost to remediate the contaminated soil and groundwater at

between $3,000,000 and $6,000,000. PEC's counsel

estimated that remediation of the site for contaminated soil

would cost $2,300,000, and PEC's hydrologist estimated that

remediation of the groundwater would cost $1,200,000. From

these figures, the district court concluded that the

government's request for financial assurances in the amount

$3,500,000 was a "fair estimate of the costs of remediation,"

and ordered financial assurances in that amount. PEC, 10 F.

Supp.2d at 1154.

We believe the district court's figure was supported by

the evidence, given that the amount of financial assurances

equaled the sum of PEC'’s own remediation estimates

($2,300,000 for site remediation and $1,200,000 for

groundwater remediation), and was within the remediation

estimated provided by the CDPHE ($3,000,000 to

$6,000,000). While Defendants and the government both

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Order - 9/8/99

admit that the estimates were rough rather than exacting,

Defendants in large part were responsible for the inexact

nature of the estimates because of their failure to develop

closure and post-closure cost estimates pursuant to state

regulations. The district court did its best to estimate fairly

closure costs under non-ideal circumstances of Defendants’

creation, and we find the evidence supported the estimate.

CONCLUSION

The district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing

the mandatory preliminary injunction ordering Defendants to

provide financial assurances in the amount of $3,500,000

pursuant to C.C.R. § 266. The district court's order js

AFFIRMED.

22a

APPENDIX B

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Lewis T. Babcock, Judge

[Filed September 24, 1998]

Civil Action No. 97-R-1654

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

)

)

)

)

)

POWER ENGINEERING COMPANY, _ )

REDOUBT, LTD., and RICHARD J. )

LILIENTHAL, )

Defendants/Third Party Plaintiffs, )

)

)

)

)

)

)

JACK LILIENTHAL,

Third Party Defendant.

ORDER

Defendants, Power Engineering Company ("Power

Engineering"), Redoubt, Ltd. ("Redoubt"), and Richard J.

Lilienthal (collectively, "defendants"), move for vacatur or

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A OR Ls TN

Order 9/24/98

reconsideration of the Memorandum Opinion and Order

entered August 17, 1998. Plaintiff, United States of America

("the United States"), acting on behalf of the Environmental

Protection Agency, object to defendants motion. The motion

is adequately’ briefed and oral argument will not materially

aid its resolution. For the reasons set forth below, I deny, in

part, and grant as confessed, in part, defendants' motion for

vacatur and reconsideration.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

By written order entered June 10. 1998 ("the June 10

order"), I directed defendants to “provide financial assurances

in the amount of $3,500.000 pursuant to 6 COLO. CODE

REGS. 1007-3 § 266 and all applicable subparts." Defendants

filed a show cause submission on July 10, 1998, explaining

why they had not yet provided financial assurances within the

time afforded by the June 10 order. Defendants appealed the

June 10 order on July 22, 1998. Plaintiff filed an objection to

defendants show cause submission on July 24, 1998. A

hearing was held on August 6, 1998, during which the issue

of this court's continuing jurisdiction was discussed but not

resolved. Accordingly, I directed the Parties to brief the

jurisdictional issue.

On August 7, 1998, the very next day, the United

States moved to vacate the briefing schedule and also moved

for the issuance of an order imposing specific financial

assurance requirements on defendants. In its motion, the

United States argued that this court had jurisdiction to enforce

the June 10 order despite defendants’ appeal of that order. On

August 17, 1998, ten days later. I entered a Memorandum

Opinion and Order ("the August 17 order") vacating the

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Order 9/24/98

briefing schedule and directing defendants to provide financial

assurances in the amount of $3,500.000 in the form of a

surety bond guaranteeing payment into a ciosure and/or post-

closure trust fund pursuant to6 COLO. CODE REGS. 1007-3

§ 266.14(f). Defendants did not respond to the United States’

August 7 motion before the August 17 order entered.

On August 31, 1998, defendants moved for vacatur or

reconsideration of the August 17 order. They argued, inter

alia, that vacatur of the briefing schedule and their inability

to file a response to the United States' August 7 motion

deprived them of due process of law guaranteed by the Fifth

Amendment of the United States Constitution. Out of an

abundance of caution. I entered an order on September 1,

1998, which order: (1) afforded defendants the opportunity to

file a response to the United States’ August 7 motion: (2) held

in abeyance defendants’ August 31 motion for vacatur or

reconsideration: and (3) stayed the August 17 order until

further order. Defendants filed their response to the United

States’ August 7 motion on September 10, 1998 and the

United States filed a reply on September 17, 1998. The issues

of jurisdiction and vacatur are now fully briefed. I remove the

stay of the August 17 order, subject to the modification set

forth below. An extensive procedural history of this case

appears in the August 17 order.

II. ANALYSIS OF DEFENDANTS’ MOTION FOR

VACATUR AND RECONSIDERATION

Defendants filed their response to the United States’

August 7 motion on September 10, 1998. Defendants argue

that, in light of their appeal of the June 10 order, this court

does not have jurisdiction to impose specific financial

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Order 9/24/98

assurance requirements on them. Defendants also contend that

they are unable to provide the specific form of financial

assurance requirement sought by the United States, a surety

bond guaranteeing payment into a closure and/or post-closure

trust fund. I address each argument in turn.

a. Jurisdiction

Defendants contend that the relief sought by the United

States will impermissibly modify the status quo pending

appeal. For the reasons set forth with more particularly inthe

August 17 order. I disagree. Granting the relief requested by

the United States does not materially alter the status of the

case on appeal. The June 10 order from which defendants

appeal directs defendants to "provide financial assurances in

the amount of $3,500.000 pursuant to 6 COLO. CODE

REGS. 1007-3 § 266 and all applicable subparts." The August

17 order merely requires defendants to provide financial

assurances in accordance with a specific subpart of §266.

Thus, the August 17 266. Thus, the August 17 order does not

expand the scope of injunctive relief granted in the June 10

order. It is important to note that the status quo pending

appeal derives from the June 10 order, which order requires

defendants to provide financial assurances. The status quo

pending appeal, therefore, is achieved by defendants

providing financial assurances.

Defendants could have complied with the June 10

order by providing any type of financial assurance allowed by

§ 266, including a bond, trust, insurance, or any combination

thereof. Defendants, however, failed to provide any type of

financial assurance. Defendants' show cause submission,

premised on draft trust agreements that proved to be

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Order 9/24/98

insufficient, did not bring defendants into compliance with the

June 10 order. This court necessarily retains jurisdiction over

the parties until they comply with the terms of the June 10

order even though defendants appeal from that order. 7yler v.

City of Manhattan, 118 F.3d 1400, 1402 n. 1 (10th Cir.

1997). Accordingly, I reject defendants’ jurisdiction

arguments.

The August 17 order is an appropriate means to

encourage compliance with the June 10 order. See Fed.

R.Civ. P. 62(c) ("When an appeal is taken from an

interlocutory or final judgment granting . . . an injunction, the

court in its discretion may suspend, modify, restore, or grant

an injunction during the pendency of the appeal upon such

terms as to bond or otherwise as it considers proper for the

security, of the rights of the adverse party."). As with all

litigants that appeal an injunctive order, defendants must

either comply with the injunctive order or seek a stay of the

injunctive order. Stay will occur only if defendants post a

supersedeas bond. See, e.g., Fed. R.Civ. P. 62(a), (d). I

deny, therefore, defendants' motion for vacatur or

reconsideration as to the issue of jurisdiction.

b. Defendants' Ability to Post a Surety Bond

As noted above, the August 17 order requires

defendants to obtain financial assurances in the form of a

surety bond in the amount of $3,500.000 that complies with

the provisions of 6 COLO. CODE REGS. 1007-3 § 266.14(f)

("Surety Bond Guaranteeing Payment into a Closure and/or

Post Closure Trust Fund"). Defendants contend that the

evidence admitted during the preliminary, injunction hearing

proves they are unable to obtain a surety, bond that complies

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Order 9/24/98

with § 266.14(f). Although I disagree with defendants’

argument, I need not address the issue because the United

States, softening its stance, makes the following concession in

its reply brief:

. the United States is concerned that

enforcement of the August 17, 1998

Memorandum Opinion and Order in its present

form will only provide Defendants with a basis

for further delay. Defendants allege that while

they could provide a form of assurance

acceptable under 6 Colo. Code Regs. 1007-3 §

266, it is impossible for Defendants to do so

by providing a surety bond and standby trust.

* * x

Rather than facilitating further delay by

insisting that the Order be enforced in its

present form, the United States respectfully

Suggests that the August 17 Memorandum

Opinion and Order be amended in part...

(PIf.'s Reply to Defs.' Mot. for Reconsideration at 5.) The

United States then Suggests that I amend the August 17 order

to allow defendants to provide an alternative form of financial

assurance if defendants proposed alternative satisfies all

requirements of § 266 and has been agreed to by the United

States. Supplementation of the August 17 order as suggested

by the United States vitiates al] of defendants’ stated concerns

except their jurisdictional argument. Accordingly,

supplement the August 17 order as Suggested by the United

States. Thus, I grant as confessed defendants’ motion for

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Order 9/24/98

vacatur or reconsideration as to the issue of their ability to

post a surety bond.

It is important to note at this juncture that, after much

time and expenditure of resources, the parties are left in a

status quo that does not materially differ from the status quo

immediately after entry of the June 10 order. The June 10

order required defendants to provide financial assurances in

accordance with § 266. The August 17 order, as

supplemented by this order, requires defendants to provide

financial assurances in accordance with § 266.14(f) or, if

agreed to by the United States, any subpart of § 266. Thus,

we have taken two steps forward and almost two steps

backward.

Accordingly, I ORDER that:

(1) defendants’ motion for vacatur- or

reconsideration is DENIED, in part, and

GRANTED as confessed, in part;

(2) the stay of the Memorandum Opinion and

Order entered August 17, 1998 is LIFTED;

(3) the Memorandum Opinion and Order entered

August 17, 1998, which order requires

defendants to provide financial assurances in

the amount of $3,500.000 in the form of a

surety, bond guaranteeing payment into a

closure and/or post-closure trust find pursuant

to 6 COLO. CODE REGS. 1007-3 §

266.14(f), is SUPPLEMENTED as follows:

defendants MAY PROVIDE an alternative

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ee

(4)

Order 9/24/98

form of financial assurance if: (i) their

proposed alternative satisfies all requirements

of 6 COLO. CODE REGS. 1007-3 § 266: (ii)

their proposed alternative has been agreed to

by the United States: and (ili) the defendants

provide to the United States a letter, signed by

an authorized representative of defendants,

indicating why it is impossible for defendants

to comply with the August 17 order and/or

why compliance with the August 17 order

would materially disadvantage defendants

relative to other available financial assurance

requirements; and

defendants SHALL COMPLY with the August

17 order, as supplemented by this order,

within twenty days or show good cause as to

why they have not achieved such compliance.

Dated: September 24, 1998 in Denver, Colorado.

BY THE COURT:

/s/

LEWIS T. BABCOCK, JUDGE

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APPENDIX C

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Lewis T. Babcock, Judge

[Filed August 17, 1998]

Civil Action No. 97-B-1654

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

.

)

)

)

)

)

POWER ENGINEERING COMPANY, _ )

REDOUBT, LTD., and RICHARD J. )

LILIENTHAL, )

Defendants/Third Party Plaintiffs, — )

)

)

)

)

)

)

ws

JACK LILIENTHAL,

Third Party Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Babcock, J.

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/ 17/98

Plaintiff, United States of America ("the United

States"), acting on behalf of the Environmental Protection

Agency, moves for the issuance of an order requiring

defendants, Power Engineering Company ("Power

Engineering"), Redoubt, Ltd. ("Redoubt"), and Richard J.

Lilienthal (collectively, "defendants"), to obtain financial

assurances in the form of a surety, bond that satisfies state

regulations adopted by the Colorado Department of Public

Health and Environment, found at 6 COLO. CODE REGS.

1007-3 § 266.14(f). The United States also moves to vacate

the established briefing schedule regarding the jurisdictional

issue raised at the August 6, 1998 hearing. The United States’

motion is adequately briefed and oral argument will not

materially aid its resolution. For the reasons set forth below,

I grant the United States' motion.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

The United States commenced this action on August 1,

1997, alleging eight claims: (1) treatment of hazardous waste

without a permit or interim Status, (2) disposal of hazardous

waste without a permit or interim Status; (3) shipment of

hazardous waste to an un-permitted facility; (4) improper

container management; (5) storage of hazardous waste without

a permit or interim status; (6) failure to provide employee

training; (7) failure to have a hazardous waste contingency

plan; and (8) illegal operations (failure to have a groundwater

monitoring program, failure to have a closure plan, failure to

minimize releases of hazardous waste, and failure to obtain

and provide financial assurances for closure and post-closure).

The United States also alleges that Power Engineering has

failed to comply with a CDPHE Administrative Compliance

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

Order. Subject matter jurisdiction exists pursuant to 28

U.S.C. § 1331 (1997).

The United States filed a motion for preliminary

injunction on January 16, 1998, requesting issuance of an

order requiring defendants to comply with Colorado

hazardous waste regulations. These regulations require

owners and operators of all hazardous waste facilities to

document that they have secured the resources required to

close their facilities in an appropriate and safe manner, and to

pay third-party claims that mav arise from facility, operations.

A preliminary injunction hearing was held beginning May 11,

1998. On June 10, 1998, I issued a Memorandum Opinion

and Order ("the June 10 order") granting the United States'

motion for preliminary, injunction. The June 10 order directs

defendants to provide financial assurances in the amount of

$3,500,000 or show cause why they have not provided such

financial assurances within thirty days.

Defendants filed a "Show Cause Submission" on July

10, 1998 that states defendants were in the process of

finalizing trust arrangements and that the trust would be

finalized within ten business days. Three draft trust

agreements were attached to defendants' Show Cause

Submission. These three draft trust agreements indicated that

defendants intended the following properties to constitute the

res of the trust: (1) Richard Lilienthal's undivided one-half

interest in real property located in Eagle County, Colorado

(current estimated value of $1,200,000.00); (2) real property

owned by Redoubt, Ltd. on which the Power Engineering

facility operates (current estimated value $0.00; stated value

in draft trust agreement of $2,000,000.00); and (3) 9,340

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

Shares of UNUM stock owned by Power Engineering (current

estimated value $520,000.00).

The United States filed a response to defendants’ Show

Cause Submission on July 24, 1998, objecting on four

grounds. First, the United States argued that defendants’

Proposed trusts do not provide for joint and several liability

because each trust has a separate grantor. The United States

contended that one trust, rather than three separate trusts,

Should exist. Second, the United States argued that defendants

impermissibly altered the trust agreement language required

by Colorado regulations. Colorado regulations state:

"Payments made to the Trustee shall consist of cash or

securities acceptable to the Trustee." 6 COLO. CODS REGS.

1007-3 §§ 266.14(a) and 266. 18(a)(1). The draft trust

agreements impermissibly state:

Contributions of Property. made to the Trustee

for the Fund may consist of the property set

forth in the District Court's Order and other

preperty, acceptable to the Trustee.

(Ex. A to Def.'s Show Cause Submission at 2.) The United

States contends that, because the June 10 order requires

defendants to "provide financial assurance in the amount of

$3,500,000 pursuant to 6 COLO. CODE REGS. 1007-3 §

266 and all applicable subparts," any trust must consist of

cash or securities and not real property, to ensure liquidity,

and | revent the diminishment of the trust res by subsequent

impairment, such as tax liens. A letter from one of the

bankers contacted by defendants also indicates that Norwest

Bank would only establish a trust or escrow fund to hold

assets "in liquid form." (Ltr. from Martinez of Norwest Bank

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

of 7/20/98, Ex. A to Plf.'s Resp. to Def.'s Show Cause

Submission. )

Third, the United States argued that two of the three

properties proposed as trust res are inadequate. The United

States contended that Richard Lilienthal's undivided one-half

interest in real property located in Eagle County, Colorado

(current estimated value of $1,200,000), is subject to a

restrictive covenant regarding conveyance and has already

been quitclaimed to Richard Lilienthal's wife. Defendants

disputed this contention. The United States also contended

that the property owned by Redoubt on which the Power

Engineering facility operates is worthless until remediated.

Thus, the only proposed res acceptable to the United States is

the stock owned by Power Engineering.

Fourth, the United States objected to other language of

the draft trust agreements. Defendants modified the trust

language, mandated by 6 COLO. CODE REGS. 1007-3 § §

266. 14(a) and 266. 18(a)(1), regarding payment of remediation

costs out of trust assets. The proposed trust agreements give

defendants more power over trust assets than envisioned by

Colorado regulations. In summary., the United States objects

to defendants’ failure to comply with the June 10 order,

attempt to fund the proposed trusts with real property, instead

of cash or securities, attempt to provide real property that has

an impaired value, and proposal to modify, the trust

agreement in a manner that allows defendants to authorize or

prohibit payments from the trust assets. The United States did

not move for contempt, but averred that the question of

contempt "is one for the Court to determine." (PIf.'s Resp. to

Def.'s Show Cause Submission at 9.)

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

Defendants filed a supplement to their show cause

submission on July 27, 1998. Defendants contended that

Norwest Bank did not disclose its objection to acting as

Trustee of a trust funded by real property until July 20, 1998.

Since receipt of the letter from Norwest Bank, Defendants

allege that they have contacted eleven "companies" regarding

the trust arrangement "previously . . . discussed with Norwest

Bank." (Def.'s Supp. at 2.)

A siatus conference was held on August 6, 1998 to

address defendants’ compliance with the June 10 order. At the

commencement of the hearing, I raised the issue of whether

defendants’ Notice of Appeal, filed July 22, 1998, divested

this court of jurisdiction to enforce the June 10 order. Neither

the United States nor defendants were prepared to argue this

issue. Thus, I established a briefing schedule that would have

concluded on September 11, 1998.

Also during the status conference, the issues raised by

defendants' Show Cause Submission and the United States'

objections were addressed. | indicated that the United States’

objections to the form of (rusts proposed by defendants were

valid. The June 10 order requires compliance with Colorado

regulations and defendants' Proposed trusts ignore many of

important trust features mandated by these regulations, such

as the type of res and powers of the grantor. I also noted that

the United States’ concerns regarding the property used to

fund the trusts had merit. Clearly, Redoubt's land is not worth

$2,000,000. The very. purpose of financial assurances is to

ensure that liquid assets exist to pay for remediation if

defendants ignore their remediation responsibility. Although

Redoubt's contaminated land may be valuable if remediated,

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

the land surely does not constitute a valid financial assurance

in its unremediated state.

Lastly, I noted at the August 6 status conference that

the June 10 order is broadly worded. Nowhere does the June

10 order require defendants to provide financial assurances in

the form of a trust funded by property discussed in that order.

Rather, the June 10 order requires defendants to "provide

financial assurance in the amount of $3,500,000 pursuant to

6 COLO. CODE REGS. 1007-3 § 266 and all applicable

subparts." (Ord. of 6/10/98 at 46.) While I necessarily

discussed defendants’ personal and real property in the June

10 order, I did so only in assessing whether defendants had

the ability to provide financial assurances. The order merely

States:

[Power Engineering's] readily available cash

of $800,000, when combined with Lilienthal's

directly owned assets of $1,400,000, could be

placed in a trust fund with a present value of

$2,200,000. Defendants could borrow the

remaining $1,300,000, obtaining an insurance

policy for that fixed amount.

(Ord. of 6/10/98 at 25-26 (emphasis added)). I found that the

evidence presented at the injunction hearing illustrated

defendants’ ability to provide financial assurances, but the

June 10 order neither requires nor precludes defendants from

funding a trust or other form of financial assurance with the

property discussed in that order. Thus, defendants could have

complied with the mandatory injunction by providing financial

assurance comprised of insurance, bonds, trusts, or any

combination thereof.

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

On August 7, 1998, one day after the status conference

and outside the established briefing schedule, the United

States filed a "Motion to Vacate the Briefing Schedule and

Impose Financial Assurance Requirements." In its motion, the

United States addresses the jurisdictional issue at length and

concludes that this court has continuing jurisdiction to enforce

the June 10 order notwithstanding defendant's notice of

appeal. In light of defendants' insufficient trust proposal, the

United States also moves for issuance of an order requiring

defendants to obtain financial assurances in the form of a bond

that complies with 6 COLO. CODE REGS. 1007-3 §

266. 14(f) (Surety Bond Guaranteeing Payment into a Closure

and/or Post Closure Trust Fund). As of today's date,

defendants have not filed a response to the United States'

August 7, 1998 motion.

II. CONTINUING JURISDICTION

Generally, a party's filing of a notice of appeal divests

the district court of jurisdiction. Stewart y. Donges, 915 F.2d

572, 574-576 (10th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted). "[T]he

filing of a notice of appeal, whether from a true final

judgment or from a decision within the collateral Order

exception, ‘is an event of jurisdictional significance--it confers

jurisdiction on the court of appeals and divests the district

court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in

the appeal." Stewart, 915 F.2d at 575 (quoting Griggs y.

Provident Consumer Discount Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982)).

The principle of jurisdictional transfer is not, however,

absolute. No transfer occurs if the appeal is taken from a non-

appealable order, Riggs v. Scrivner, Inc., 927 F.2d 1146.

1148 (10th Cir. 1991), or if the district court certifies that the

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

appeal is frivolous, forfeited, or dilatory. Stewart, 915 F.2d

at 577.

Further, appeals from interlocutory, orders granting or

denying injunctive relief present special considerations.

Interlocutory, appellate review of a preliminary, injunction

order pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1) will not divest the

district court of its jurisdiction to act on the merits of the case

pending appeal. State of Colorado v. Idarado Mining Co.,

916 F.2d 1486, 1490 (10th Cir. 1990) (citations omitted);

Wright, Miller & Kane. Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil

2d § 3921.2. Rule 62 provides, in relevant part:

Stay of Proceedings to Enforce a Judgment.

(a) Automatic Stay; Exceptions--Injunctions,

Receiverships, and Patent Accountings. Except

as Stated herein, no execution shall issue upon

a judgment nor shall proceedings be taken for

its enforcement until the expiration of 10 days

after its entry. Unless otherwise ordered by the

action for an injunction or in a receivership

action, Or a judgment or order directing an

accounting in an action for infringement of

letters patent, shall not_be stayed during the

period after its entry and until an appeal is

taken or during the pendency of an appeal. The

pendency of an appeal.

Fed. R. Civ. P

Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

* a

(c) Injunction Pending Appeal. When an

appeal is taken from an interlocutory or final

judgment granting, dissolving, or denying an

injunction, the court in its discretion may

Suspend, modify, restore, or grant an

injunction during the pendency of the appeal

upon such terms as to bond or otherwise as it

considers proper for the security of the rights

of the adverse Party.

(d) Stay Upon Appeal. When an appeal is

taken the appellant by giving a supersedeas

bond may _ obtain a4 Stay subject to the

exceptions contained in subdivision (a) of this

rule. The bond may be given at or after the

time of filing the notice of appeal or of

procuring the order allowing the appeal, as the

case may be. The stay is effective when the

Supersedeas bond is approved by the court.

Application for a stay of the judgment or order

Of a district court pending appeal, or for

approval of a supersedeas bond, or for an

order suspending, modifying, restoring or

granting an injunction during the pendency of

an appeal must ordinarily be made in the first

instance in the district court. A motion for

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. 62 (emphasis added). Rule 8 further provides:

Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

such relief may be made to the court of appeals

or to a judge thereof, but the motion shall

show that application to the district court for

the relief sought is not practicable, or that the

district court has denied an application, or has

failed to afford the relief which the applicant

requested, with the reasons given by the

district court for its action.

F.R.A.P. 8(a).

Although the language of Rule 62(c) appears to afford

district courts extensive authority to grant injunctive relief

pending appeal, courts addressing the issue have construed the

rule more narrowly. Several circuits have held that the district

court may not alter the injunction once an appeal has been

filed except to maintain the status quo of the parties pending

the appeal. See, e.g., Coastal Corp. v. Texas Eastern Corp.,

869 F.2d 817, 820 (Sth Cir. 1989); Flynt Distributing Co.,

Inc. v. Harvey, 734 F.2d 1389, 1392 n. 1 (9th Cir. 1984);

Lewis v. Tobacco Workers’ Int'l Union, 577 F.2d 1135 (4th

Cir. 1978); State of New York v. Nuclear Regulatory Comm

'n, 550 F.2d 745, 758-759 (2d Cir. 1977); Ideal Toy Corp. v.

Sayco Doll Corp., 302 F.2d 623,625 (2d Cir. 1962). This

narrow interpretation of Rule 62(c) derives from Sayco Doll,

which involved a motion to vacate an injunction based on new

evidence brought before the district court while the validity of

the injunction was on appeal to the Second Circuit, which

held:

Once the appeal is taken, . . . jurisdiction

passes to the appellate court. Thereafter the

appellant is not usually entitled as of right to

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

present new evidence or argument to the trial

court, which in the exercise of a sound

discretion will exercise jurisdiction only to

preserve the status quo as of the time of

appeal. Appellant's proper procedure is then to

request leave of the court of appeals to proceed

in the lower court. He need not even dismiss

his appeal, for we have always been ready to

suspend proceedings while new matter was

introduced below. But absent permission of the

appellate court to reopen, sound judicial

administration demands that unless the judge is

Satisfied that his order was erroneous he shall

use his power under Rule 62(c) only to

preserve the status of the case as it sits before

the court of appeals.

Sayco Doll, 302 F.2d at 625 (citation omitted).

More recently, in Coastal Corp. v. Texas Eastern

Corporation, supra, the district court granted the plaintiffs’

motion for a preliminary injunction, prohibiting the

defendants from filing lawsuits challenging a tender offer in

other jurisdictions. After the defendants appealed the

preliminary injunction order, the trial court dissolved the

injunction based on newly discovered evidence. The Fifth

Circuit reversed, concluding that Rule 62(c) did not allow- the

district court to dissolve the injunction and eliminate the

appeal. Coastal, 869 F.2d at 820. According to the Fifth

Circuit, "the powers of the district court Over an injunction

pending appeal should be limited to maintaining the status quo

and ought not to extend to the point that the district court can

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

divest the court of appeals from jurisdiction while the issue is

before us on appeal.” /d.

Two circuits have concluded that, in some

circumstances, the district court may alter the status quo by

modifying an injunction during the pendency of an appeal. See

Board of Educ. of St. Louis v. State of Missouri, 936 F.2d

993, 996 (8th Cir. 1991) (district court's ongoing supervision

of integration of vocational educational programs requires it

to retain the broadest discretion possible); Ortho

Pharmaceutical Corp. v. Amgen, Inc., 887 F.2d 460, 464 (3d

Cir. 1989) (district court may alter status quo pursuant to

Rule 62(c) if alteration "preserves the integrity" of the

appeal). See also Basicomputer Corp. v. Scott, 973 F.2d 507,

513 (6th Cir. 1992) (declining to rule on issue). In Ortho, the

plaintiff sought a modification of an injunction while an

appeal was pending. The Third Circuit, like the Second and

Fifth Circuits, held that Rule 62(c), though purporting to

convey extensive authority to the district courts, did not

permit a district court unlimited authority to modify a

preliminary injunction. The Third Circuit, however, adopted

a less narrow construction, holding that Rule 62(c) authorized

the district court to take any of the listed actions as long as

such action "preserv[ed] the integrity of the proceedings in-the

court of appeals." Ortho, 887 F.2d at 464. Since the

modification requested by the plaintiff would impose

additional requirements on the defendant, the district court

concluded that the motion to modify transgressed the "status

quo” limitation. On appeal, the Third Circuit implicitly agreed

that the modification would alter the status quo, but concluded

that the modification would preserve the integrity of the

appeal by protecting the rights of the plaintiff, which rights

were jeopardized in a manner not anticipated by the original

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

injunction. Thus, the Third Circuit concluded that the

modification was within the authority provided by Rule 62(c)

even though it altered the status quo.

The Tenth Circuit came closest to addressing this issue

in Chief Freight Lines Co. y. Local Union No. 886, 514 F.2d

572 (10th Cir. 1975), in which an employer commenced an

action in district court to enjoin a union from striking. On

February 27, 1974, the district court judge announced orally

in Open court that he would enter an order granting the

preliminary injunction; the union filed a notice of appeal on

March 29, 1974. Id. at 578. On April 9 and 10, 1974, the

district court heard further evidence and oral argument. The

district court judge then entered detailed written findings and

conclusions together with an injunctive order on April 10,

1974. Id. The union filed a second notice of appeal on April

17, 1994. Id. The Tenth Circuit concluded that the district

court judge "intended to, and did on Februar

announce orally his conclusion to grant the preliminary

injunction, but that he did not enter the preliminary injunction

until April 10." /d. Thus. the Tenth Circuit deemed the

written injunctive order of April 10 as the order from which

an appeal was taken. Chief Freight Lines, however, does not

mention Rule 62(c) or Sayco Doll. While one commentator

suggests that Chief Freight Lines implies the Tenth Circuit

would follow the majority rule, see, e.g., Wright, Miller &

Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure: Civil 2d § 3921.2 pn.

28, I am not convinced that Chief Freight Lines provides

guidance for the particular issue presented here

conclude that the

Circuit.

y 27, merely

. Thus, |

issue is one of first impression in this

Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

The two predominant formulas are articulated by

Coastal and Ortho. Coastal requires maintenance of the status

quo as of the time of appeal, and Ortho speaks of preserving

the integrity, of the appeal. The difference is subtle. Ortho

recognizes, and Coastal fails to recognize, that the status quo

itself may cause one of the parties irreparable injury and

thereby threaten the appeal. Ortho, 882 F.2d at 814. Under

such circumstances, it may be necessary to alter the status quo

to prevent the injury and preserve the appeal. /d. The two

formulas, however, have much more in common than in

conflict. Regardless of the precise formula used, it is clear

that any injunctive action taken pursuant to Rule 62(c) "must

be designed to aid the appeal and, accordingly, may not

materially alter the status of the case on appeal." A. Ides, The

Authority of a Federal District Court to Proceed After a

Notice of Appeal Has Been Filed, 143 F.R.D. 307, 321-322

(1992). Where, as here, modification of the injunction would

not materially alter the status of the case on appeal, either

paradigm allows the district court to modify, the injunction

pursuant to Rule 62(c). Thus, I need not decide between the

subtly different formulas.

As noted above, the June 10 order requires defendants

to "provide financial assurance in the amount of $3,500,000

pursuant to 6 COLO. CODE REGS. 1007-3 § 266 and all

applicable subparts." (Ord. of 6/10/98 at 46.) Defendants

could have complied with the June 10 order by providing any

type of financial assurance allowed by § 266, including a

bond, trust, insurance, or any combination thereof. In light of

defendants’ insufficient trust proposal, however, the United

States now moves for issuance of an order requiring

defendants to provide a specific form of financial assurance

allowed by § 266, a "Surety Bond Guaranteeing Payment into

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

a Closure and/or Post Closure Trust Fund." See 6 COLO.

CODE REGS. 1007-3 § 266.14(f). The United States’ motion

can be characterized as either a motion to enforce the June 10

order or as a request for modification of the order. As noted

above, the United States does not raise the issue of contempt.

Nor does the United States seek to re-litigate any of the issues

presented at the injunction hearing.

If construed as a motion to enforce the June 10 order,

this court has continuing jurisdiction to address the United

States' motion. See Tyler v. City of Manhattan, 118 F.3d

1400, 1402 n. 1 (10th Cir. 1997) (district court necessarily

retained jurisdiction over parties until they complied with the

terms of injunctive order even though injunctive order

appealed). If construed as a motion to modify the June 10

order, jurisdiction also exists. The requested modification, if

granted, does not materially alter the status of the appeal. Nor

would granting the modification deprive or otherwise affect

the jurisdiction of the Tenth Circuit over the appeal.

As no risk of interference exists, I conclude that this

court has jurisdiction to entertain the United States' motion to

enforce or modify, the injunction. I also conclude that this

court retains jurisdiction to proceed with the action on the

merits. See State of Colorado y. [darado Mining Co., 916

F.2d at 1490. Lastly, I conclude that the June 10 order, as an

interlocutory., order granting mandatory, injunctive relief, is

not automatically stayed by defendant's notice of appeal. Fed.

R. Civ. P. 62(a): Wright, Miller & Kane, Federal Practice

and Procedure: Civil 2d § 2904. Thus, the June 10 order

remains in effect. Contrary to the United States' assertion

(PIf.'s Mot. Vacate Sched. at 4, 8), the order need not be

"restored." Accordingly, I address the merits of the United

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

States' motion. I also vacate my previous order, entered in

open court on August 6, 1998, establishing a briefing

schedule regarding the issue of continuing jurisdiction.

IV. ANALYSIS OF THE UNITED STATES' MOTION

TO ENFORCE OR MODIFY

The United States requests the issuance of an order

directing defendants to obtain financial assurances in the form

of a surety bond in the amount of $3,500,000 that complies

with the provisions of 6 COLO. CODE REGS. 1007-3 §

266.14(f) ("Surety Bond Guaranteeing Payment into a Closure

and/or Post Closure Trust Fund"). Considering the

insufficiency and insecurity of defendants’ proposed trust

arrangement, the delay in compliance with the June 10 order

caused thereby, and defendants’ failure to respond adequately

to the insufficiencies raised by the United States in its

response to defendants' Show Cause Submission, I grant the

United States' motion. Requiring defendants to provide

financial assurance in the form of a proper surety bond will

likely avoid further delay, provide clarity of purpose, and

does not alter the status of the appeal.

Additionally, I attach to this order the documents

attached to the United States' motion as Attachments A, B,

and C. "Attachment A" describes the United States’

requirements for the surety bond and standby trust to be

obtained by defendants. "Attachment B" is a proposed draft

of the surety bond instrument. "Attachment C" is a proposed

draft of the standby trust agreement. I find and conclude that

the stated requirements and the proposed drafts are reasonable

and fair. The stated requirements and the proposed drafts also

appear to comply with 6 COLO. CODE REGS. 1007-3 §

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

266.14(f). Accordingly, the surety bond and standby trust

created by defendants shall comply with the requirements

Stated in the attachments and 6 COLO. CODE REGS. 1007-3

§ 266. 14(f). Further, the final drafts of the bond instrument

and the standby trust agreement shall mimic the proposed

drafts. The United States and defendants may, by stipulation,

vary these requirements and terms. Such stipulation must be

approved by the court.

Accordingly, I ORDER that:

(1) the briefing schedule regarding continuing

jurisdiction, established in open court on

August 6, 1998, is VACATED;

(2) the hearing set for October 2, 1998 at 3:30

p.m. is VACATED: and

(3) defendants SHALL PROVIDE | financial

assurances in the amount of $3,500,000 in the

form of a surety, bond guaranteeing payment

into a closure and/or post-closure trust fund

pursuant to6 COLO. CODE REGS. 1007-3 {}

266.14(f);

(4) the surety bond and Standby trust shall comply,

as set forth above with more particularity, with

Attachments A, B, and C to this order;

(5) plaintiff and defendants may vary the

requirements and terms of Attachments A,B,

and C only by stipulation after approval by the

court; and

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

(6) defendants shall so comply within twenty Gays

or show good cause as to why they have not

achieved such compliance.

Dated: August 17, 1998 in Denver, Colorado.

BY THE COURT:

/s/

LEWIS T. BABCOCK, JUDGE

—

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

ATTACHMENT A A

With respect to the surety bond:

¥.

The Defendants must obtain a Surety bond ("the

bond") which conforms to the requirements of the

Order and must submit the bond to EPA within Pa.

days after the effective date of the Order.

The wording in the bond must be identical to the

wording in the bond format provided in Attachment B.

The bond must be effective as of the

submit the bond to EPA. The sure

the bond and any co-sureties must

day Defendants

ty company issuing

, at 4 Minimum, be

among those listed as acceptable sureties on Federal

bonds in Circular 570 of the U.S. Department of the

Treasury. If the surety is using reinsurance, a

Treasury reinsurance form must be submitted with the

bond of within 45 days thereafter. If co-sureties are

being used, the Original bond must reflect that fact.

The Defendants must also establish a standby trust

fund as provided in 6 CCR 1007-3 §§ 266.14(f) and

266.14(a) ("Surety Bond Guaranteeing Payment into

a Closure and/or Post Closure Trust Fund"

“Closure and/or Post Closure Trust Fund"),

that the trust shall run to the benefit of EPA.

the terms of the bond, all Payments made thereunder

shell be deposited by the surety directly into the

standby trust fund in accordance with the instructions

from EPA. Defendants shall submit an originally

signed duplicate of the trust agreement to EPA with

and

except

Under

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

the surety bond on the same day the trust agreement is

fully executed. Only one standby trust shall be

executed, although all

defendants may be grantors.

The bond must guarantee that Defendants will:

(i) Fund the standby trust in an amount equal to

the penal sum of the bond prior to the

beginning of final closure of the facility; or

(11) Fund the standby trust fund in an amount equal

to the penal sum within 15 days after an order

to begin closure is issued by CDPHE, EPA, or

a State court or other court of competent

jurisdiction; or

(iii) Provide alternate financial assurance as

provided in 6 CCR 1007-3 § 266, Subpart A,

and obtain EPA's written approval of the

assurance provided, within 90 days after

receipt by both Defendants and EPA of a

notice of cancellation of the bond from the

surety.

The penal amount of the bond must be three million

five hundred thousand U.S. dollars (US

$3 500,000.00) or more.

Under the terms of the bond, the surety may cancel

the bond by sending notice of cancellation by certified

mail to Defendants and to EPA. Cancellation may not

occur, however, during the 120 days beginning on the

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/ 17/98

date of receipt of the notice of cancellation by both

Defendants and EPA, as evidenced by the return

receipts.

Defendants may cancel the bond if EPA has given

prior written consent based on its receipt of evidence

of alternate financial assurance as specified in6 CCR

1007-3 § 266, Subpart A.

With respect to the standby trust:

3

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Defendants must submit an originally signed duplicate

of the trust agreement to EPA within days after

the effective date of the Court's order.

The trustee must be an entity which has the authority

fo act as a trustee and whose trust Operations are

regulated and examined by a Federal or State agency.

The wording of the trust agreement must be identical

to the wording specified in Attachment C. Schedule A

of the trust agreement must be updated within 60 days

after a change in the amount of the current closure

and/or post-closure cost estimate covered by the

agreement.

Whenever the current closure and/or post-closure cost

estimate changes, Defendants must compare the new

Cost estimate with the trustee's most recent annual

valuation of the trust fund. If the value of the fund is

less than the amount of the new estimate, Defendants,

Within 60 days after the change in the cost estimate.

must either deposit an amount into the fund SO that its

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

value after this deposit at least equals the amount of

the current closure and/or post-closure cost estimate,

or obtain other financial assurance as specified in this

section to cover the difference.

If the value of the trust fund is greater than the current

amount of the current closure and/or post-closure cost

estimate, Defendants may submit a written request to

EPA for the release of the amount in excess of the

current closure and/or post-closure cost estimate.

If Defendants substitute other financial assurance as

specified in Section 266 for all or part of the trust

fund, they may submit a written request to EPA for

release of the amount in excess of the $3,500,000.00

covered by the trust fund less closure or post-closure

costs already paid by the trust fund.

Within 60 days after receiving a request from

Defendants for release of funds as specified in

paragraphs 5 or 6 above, EPA will instruct the trustee

to release to Defendants such funds as EPA specifies

in writing.

Closure and post-closure care reimbursements:

(1) After beginning partial or final closure,

Defendants or another person authorized to

conduct partial or final closure may request

reimbursements for partial or final closure

expenditures by submitting itemized bills to

EPA. Defendants may request reimbursements

for partial closure only if sufficient funds are

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

remaining in the trust fund to cover the

maximum costs of closing the facility over its

remaining operating life. Within 60 days after

receiving bills for Partial or final closure

activities, EPA will instruct the trustee to

make reimbursements in those amounts as

EPA specifies in writing, if EPA determines

that the partial or final closure expenditures

are in accordance with the approved closure

plan, or otherwise justified. If EPA has reason

to believe that the maximum cost of closure

over the remaining life of the facility will be

Significantly greater than the value of the trust

fund, it may withhold reimbursements of such

amounts as it deems prudent until it

determines, in accordance with 266. 14(1) that

Defendants are no longer required to maintain

financial assurance for final Closure of the

facility. IF EPA does not instruct the trustee to

make such reimbursements, it will provide

Defendants with a detailed written statement of

reasons.

During the period of post-closure care, EPA

may approve a release of funds if Defendants

demonstrate to EPA that the value of the trust

fund exceeds the remaining cost of post-

closure care.

Defendants or any other person authorized to

conduct post-closure care may request

reimbursements — for post-closure care

expenditures by submitting itemized bill to

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

EPA. Within 60 days after receiving bills for

post-closure care activities, EPA will instruct

the trustee to make reimbursements in those

amounts as EPA specifies in writing, if EPA

determines that the post-closure care

expenditures are in accordance with the

approved post-closure plan or otherwise

justified. If EPA does not instruct the trustee

to make such reimbursements, it will provide

Defendants with a detailed written statement of

reasons.

9. EPA will agree to termination of the trust when:

(1) Defendants substitute alternate financial

assurance as specified in 6 CCR 1007-3 § 266,

Subpart A; or

(11) EPA releases Defendants from _ the

requirements of Section 266 in accordance

with

6 CCR 1007-3 § 266.14(1).

Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/ 17/98

ATTACHMENT B

FINANCIAL GUARANTEE BOND

Date bond executed:

Effective date:

Principal: [Legal name and business

address of owner or operator]

Type of organization: [Insert "individual", "joint

venture”, "partnership", or

"Corporation" ]

State of incorporation:

Surety(ies): [Name(s) and business address(es) ]

EPA ID No.: COD007060999

Power Engineering Company

2525 Delaware Street

Denver, Colorado

Remediation Amount: US $3,500,000.00

Total penal sum of bond: US $3,500,000.00

Surety's bond number:

Know All Persons By These Presents, That we, the Principal

and Surety(ies) hereto are firmly bound to the United States

Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") inthe above penal

sum for the payment of which we bind ourselves, our heirs,

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

executors, administrators, successors, and assigns jointly and

severally; provided that, where the Surety(les) are

corporations acting as co-sureties, we, the Sureties, bind

ourselves in such sum "jointly and severally; only for the

purpose of allowing a joint action or action against any or all

of us, and for all other purposes each Surety binds itself,

jointly and severally with the Principal, for the payment of

such sum only as is set forth opposite the name of such

Surety, but if no limit of liability is indicated, the limit of

liability shall be the full amount of the penal sum.

Whereas said Principal is required, under the Colorado

Hazardous Waste Management Regulations, to have a permit

Or interim status in order to own or operate each hazardous

waste management facility identified above, and

Whereas said Principal is required to provide financial

assurance for closure, or closure and post-closure care, as a

condition of the permit or interim status, and

Whereas said Principal shall establish a standby trust fund as

is required when a surety bond is used to provide such

financial assurance, unless an alternate mechanism has been

established by the State of Colorado to directly receive

monies.

Now, Therefore, the conditions of the obligation are such that

if the Principal shall faithfully, before the beginning of final

closure of each facility identified above, fund the standby trust

fund in the amount(s) identified above for the facility.

Or, if the Principal shall fund the standby trust fund in such

amount(s) within 15 days after an order to begin closure is

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/ 17/98

issued by the Colorado Department of Public Health and

Environment ("the Department") or EPA or a U.S. district

court or other court of competent jurisdictior.,

Or, if the Principal shall provide alternate financial assurance,

as specified in these regulations and obtain EPA's written

approval of such assurance, within 90 days after the date

notice of cancellation is received by both the Principal and

EPA from the Surety(ies), then this obligation shall be null

and void, otherwise it is to remain in full force and effect.

The Surety(ies) shall become liable on this bond obligation

only when the Principal has failed to fulfill the conditions

described above. Upon notification by EPA that the Principal

has failed to perform as guaranteed by this bind, the

Surety(ies) shall place funds in the amount guaranteed for the

facility(ies) into the Standby trust fund as directed by EPA.

The liability of the Surety(ies) shall not be discharged by any

Payment or succession of payments hereunder, unless and

until such payment or payments shall amount in the aggregate

to the penal sum of the bond, but in no event shall the

obligation of the Surety(ies) hereunder exceed the amount of

said penal sum.

The Surety(ies) may cancel the bond by sending notice of

cancellation by certified mail to the Principal and to EPA.

provided, however, that cancellation shall not occur during

the 120 days beginning on the date of receipt of the notice of

cancellation by both the Principal and EPA

the return receipts.

, as evidenced by

Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

The Principal may terminate this bond by sending written

notice to the Surety(ies), provided, however, that no such

notice shall become effective until the Surety(ies) receive(s)

written authorization for termination of the bond by EPA.

In Witness Whereof, the Principal and Surety(ies) have

executed this Financial Guarantee Bond and have affixed their

seals on the date set forth above.

The persons whose signatures appear below hereby certify

that they are authorized to execute this surety bond on behalf

of the Principal and Surety(ies) and that the wording of this

surety bond is identical to the wording specified in 6 CCR

1007-3 § 266. 18(f) as such regulations were constituted on the

date this bond was executed, with the exception of the

substitution of EPA for the Colorado Department of Public

Health and Environment.

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/ 17/98

Principal

[Signature(s)]

[Name(s)]

[ Title(s)]

[Corporate seal]

Corporate Surety(ies)

{Name and address]

State of incorporation:

Liability limit: _

[Signature(s)]

[Name(s) and Title(s)]

[Corporate seal]

[For every co-surety, provide signature(s), corporate seal, and

other information in the same manner as for Surety above. ]

Bond premium:

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

ATTACHMENT C

TRUST AGREEMENT

Trust Agreement, the "Agreement", entered into as of [date]

by and between [name of the owner or operator], a [name of

State][insert "corporation", "partnership", "association", or

"proprietorship"], the "Grantor", and [name of Corporate

trustee], [insert "incorporated in the State of Colorado" or "a

national bank"], the "Trustee."

Whereas, the Colorado Department of Public Health and

Environment, Hazardous Materials and Waste Management

Division, a regulatory Agency of the State of Colorado, has

established certain regulations applicable to the Grantor,

requiring that an owner or operator of a hazardous waste

management facility shall provide assurance that funds will be

available when needed for closure and/or post-closure care of

the facility,

Whereas, the Grantor has elected to establish a trust to

provide all or a pan of such financial assurance for the

facilities identified herein,

Whereas, the Grantor, acting through its duly authorized

officers, has selected the Trustee to be the trustee under this

Agreement, and the Trustee is willing to act as trustee,

Now, Therefore, the Grantor and the Trustee agree as

follows:

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

Section 1. Definitions.

As used in this Agreement:

(a) The term "Grantor" means the owner or operator

who enters into this Agreement and any successors or

assigns of the Grantor.

(b) The term "Trustee" means the Trustee who enters

into this Agreement and any successor Trustee.

Section 2: Identification of Facilities and Cost Estimates.

This Agreement pertains to the facilities and cost estimates

identified on attached Schedule A [on Schedule A, for each

facility list the EPA Identification Number, name, address,

and the current closure and/or post-closure cost estimates, or

portions thereof, for which financial assurance js

demonstrated by this Agreement].

Section 3. Establishment ef Fund.

The Grantor and the Trustee hereby establish a trust fund, the

"Fund", for the benefit of the United States Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA"). The Grantor and the Trustee

intend that no third party have access to the Fund except as

herein provided. The Fund is established initially as consisting

of the property which is acceptable to the Trustee, described

in Schedule B attached hereto. Such property and any other

property subsequently transferred to the Trustee is referred to

as the Fund, together with all earnings and profits thereon,

less any payments or distributions made by the Trustee

pursuant to this Agreement. The Fund shall be held by the

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

Trustee, In Trust, as hereinafter provided. The Trustee shall

not be responsible nor shall it undertake any responsibility for

the amount or adequacy of, nor any duty to-collect from the

Grantor, any payments necessary to discharge any liabilities

of the Granior established by EPA.

Section 4. Payment for Closure and Post-Closure Care.

The Trustee shall make payments from the Fund as EPA shall

direct, in writing, to provide for the payment of the costs of

closure and/or post-closure care of the facilities covered by

this Agreement. The Trustee shall reimburse the Grantor or

other persons specified by EPA from the Fund for closure and

post-closure expenditures in such amount as EPA shall direct

in writing. In addition, the Trustee shall refund to the Grantor

such amounts as EPA specifies in writing. Upon refund, such

funds shall no longer constitute part of the Fund as defined

herein.

Section 5. Payment Comprising the Fund.

Payments made to the Trustee for the Fund shall consist of

cash or securities acceptable to the Trustee.

Section 6. Trustee Management.

The Trustee shall invest and reinvest the principal and income

of the Fund and keep the Fund invested as a single fund,

without distinction between principal and income, in

accordance with general investment policies and guidelines

which the Grantor may communicate in writing to the Trustee

from time to time, subject, however, to the provisions of this

Section. In investing, reinvesting, exchanging, selling, and

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/ 17/98

managing the Fund, the Trustee shall discharge his/her duties

with respect to the trust fund solely in the interest of the

beneficiary and with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence

under the circumstances then prevailing which persons of

prudence, acting in a like Capacity and familiar with such

matters, would use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like

character and with like aims: EXCEPT THAT:

(i) Securities or other obligations of Grantor, or any other

Owner Or operator of the facilities, or any of their affiliates as

defined in the Investment Company Act of 1940, as amended,

15 U.S.C. 80a-2.(a), shall not be acquired or held, unless

they are securities or other obligations of the Federal or a

State government:

(ii) The Trustee is authorized to invest the Fund in time or

demand deposits of the Trustee, to the extent insured by an

agency of the Federal or State government; and

(iii) The Trustee is authorized to hold cash awaiting

investment or distribution uninvested for a reasonable time

and without liability for the payment of interest thereon.

Section 7. Commingling and Investment.

The Trustee is express authorized in its discretion:

(a) To transfer from time to time any or all of the assets of the

Fund to any common, commingled, or collective trust fund

created by the Trustee in which the Fund is eligible to

Participate, subject to all of the provisions thereof, to be

commingled with the assets of other trusts participating

therein; and

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

(b) To purchase shares in any investment company registered

under the Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. 80a-1

et seg., including one which may be created, managed,

underwritten, or to which investment advice is rendered or the

shares of which are sold by the Trustee. The Trustee may vote

such shares in its discretion.

Section 8. Express Powers of Trustee.

Without in any way limiting the powers and discretions

conferred upon the Trustee by the other provision of this

Agreement or by law, the Trustee is expressly authorized and

empowered:

(a) To sell, exchange, convey, transfer, or otherwise

dispose of any property held by it, by public or private

sale. No person dealing with the Trustee shall be

bound to see to the application of the purchase money

or to inquire into the validity or expediency of any

such sale or other disposition;

(b) To make, execute, acknowledge, and deliver any

and all documents of transfer and conveyance and any

and all other instruments that may be necessary or-

appropriate to carry out the powers herein granted;

(c) To register any securities held in the Fund in its

own name or in the name of a nominee and to hold

any security in bearer form or in book entry, or to

combine certificates representing such securities with

certificates of the same issue held by the Trustee in

other fiduciary capacities, or to deposit or arrange for

the deposit of such securities in a qualified central

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/ 17/98

depository even though, when so deposited, such

securities may be merged and held in bulk in the name

of the nominee of such depository with other securities

deposited therein by another person, or to deposit or

arrange for the deposit of any securities issued by the

United States Government, or any agency or

instrumentality thereof, with a Federal Reserve bank,

but the books and records of the Trustee shall at all

times show that all such securities are part of the

Fund;

(d) To deposit any cash in the Fund in interest-

beating accounts maintained or Savings

certificates issued by the Trustee, in its

separate Corporate capacity, or in any other

banking institution affiliated with the Trustee,

to the extent insured by an agency of the

Federal or State government: and

(¢) To compromise or otherwise adjust all

claims in favor of or against the Fund.

Section 9. Taxes and Expenses.

All taxes of any kind that may be assessed or levied against or

in respect of the Fund and all brokerage commissions incurred

by the Fund shall be paid from the Fund. All other expenses

incurred by the Trustee in connection with the administration

of this Trust, including fees for legal services rendered to the

Trustee, the compensation of the Trustee to the extent not

paid directly by the Grantor, and all other proper charges and

disbursements of the Trustee shall be paid from the Fund.

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

Section 10. Annual Valuation.

The Trustee shall annually, at least 30 days prior to the

anniversary date of establishment of the Fund, furnish to the

Grantor and to EPA a statement confirming the value of the

Trust. Any securities in the Fund shall be valued at market

value as of no more than 60 days prior to the anniversary sate

of establishment of the Fund. The failure of the Grantor to

object in writing to the Trustee within 90 days after the

statement has been furnished to the Grantor and EPA shall

constitute a conclusively binding assent by the Grantor,

barring the Grantor from asserting any claim or liability

against the Trustee with respect to matters disclosed in the

statement.

Section 11. Advice of Counsel.

The Trustee may from time to time consult with counsel, who

may be counsel to the Grantor, with respect to any question

arising as to the construction of this Agreement or any action

to be taken hereunder. The Trustee shall be fuily protected, to

the extent permitted by law, in acting upon the advice of

counsel.

Section 12. Trustee Compensation.

The Trustee shall be entitled to reasonable compensation for

its services as agreed upon in writing from time to time

with the Grantor.

Section 13. Successor Trustee.

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The Trustee may resign or the Grantor may replace the

Trustee, but such resignation or replacement shall not be

effective until the Grantor has appointed a successor trustee

and this successor accepts the appointment. The successor

trustee shall have the same powers and duties as those

conferred upon the Trustee hereunder. Upon the successor

trustee's acceptance of the appointment, the Trustee shall

assign, transfer and pay over to the successor trustee the funds

and properties then constituting the Fund. If for any reason

the Grantor cannot or does not act in the event of the

resignation of the Trustee, the Trustee may apply to a court

of competent jurisdiction for the appointment of a successor

trustee or for instructions. The successor trustee shall specify

the date on which it assumes the administration of the trust in

writing sent to the Grantor, EPA, and the present Trustee by

certified mail 10 days before such change becomes effective.

Any expenses incurred by the Trustee as a result of any of the

acts contemplated by this Section shall be paid as provided in

Section 9.

Section 14, Instructions to the Trustee.

All orders, requests, and instructions by the Grantor to the

Trustee shall be in writing, signed by such persons as are

designated in the attached Exhibit A or such other designees

as the Grantor may designate by amendment to Exhibit A.

The Trustee shall be fully protected in acting without inquiry

in accordance with the Grantor's orders, requests, and

instructions. All orders, requests, and instructions by EPA to

the Trustee shall be in writing, signed by the EPA Regional

Administrator or his/her designees, and the Trustee shall act

and shall be fully protected in acting in accordance with such

orders, requests, and instructions. The Trustee shall have the

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

right to assume, in the absence of written notice to the

contrary, that no event constituting a change or a termination

of the authority of any person to act on behalf of the Grantor

or EPA hereunder has occurred. The Trustee shall have no

duty to act in the absence of such orders, requests, and

instructions from the Grantor and/or EPA, except as provided

for herein.

Section 15. Notice of Nonpayment.

[Deleted]

Section 16. Standby Trust Exemptions.

Unless this trust fund is fumed pursuant to the requirements

of Part 266 of the Colorado Hazardous Waste Regulations 6

CCR 1007-3, as mended, updating of Schedule A hereto as

current closure or post-closure costs shall not be required, nor

shall annual valuations under Section 10 be required.

Section 17. Amendment of Agreement.

This Agreement may be amended by an instrument in writing

executed by the Grantor, the Trustee, and EPA, or by the

Trustee and EPA if the Grantor ceases to exist.

Section 18. Irrevocability and Termination.

Subject to the right of the parties to amend this Agreement as

provided in Section 16, this Trust shall be irrevocable and

shall continue until terminated at the written agreement of the

Grantor, the Trustee and EPA, or by the Trustee and EPA, if

the Grantor ceases to exist. Upon termination of the Trust, all

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

remaining trust property, less final trust administration

expenses, shall be delivered to the Grantors.

Section 19, Immunity and Indemnification.

The Trustee shall not incur personal liability of any nature in

connection with any act or omission, made in good faith, in

the administration of this Trust, or in carrying out any

directions by the Grantor or EPA issued in accordance with

this Agreement. The Trustee Shall be indemnified and saved

harmless by the Grantor or from the Trust Fund. or both,

from and against any personal liability to which the Trustee

may be subjected by reason of any act or conduct in its

Official capacity, including all expenses reasonably incurred

in its defense in the event the Grantor falls to provide such

defense.

Section 20. Choice of Law.

This Agreement shall be administered, construed, and

enforced according to the laws of the State of Colorado.

Section 21. Interpretation.

As used in this Agreement. words in the singular include the

plural and words in the plural include the singular. The

descriptive headings for each Section of this Agreement shall

not affect the interpretation or the legal efficacy of this

Agreement.

In Witness Whereof the parties have caused this Agreement to

be executed by their respective officers duly authorized and

their corporate seals to be here unto affixed and attested as of

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

the date first above written: The parties below certify that the

wording of this Agreement ts identical to the wording

specified in § 266.18(a)(1) as such regulations were

corstituted on the date first above written, with the exception

of the substitution of EPA tor the Colorado Department of

Public Health and Environment and the deletion of Section 15

(Notice of Nonpayment)

[Signature of Grantor]

[Title]

[Seal]

Attest: [Signature of Attestor]

[Tithe]

[Signature of Trustee]

[Name of Trustee]

[Title]

[Seal]

Attest: [Signature of Attestor]

[Title]

Tila

Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/17/98

State of ee ae eek

County of

On this [date], before me personally came [owner or operator |

lo me known, who, being by me duly sworn, did depose and

say that she/he resides at [address], that she/he is [title] of

[corporation], the corporation described it. and) which

executed the above instrument; that she/he knows the seal of

said Corporation; that the seal affixed to such instrument is

such corporate seal; that it was so affixed by order of the

Board of Directors of said corporation

, and that she/he signed

her/his name thereto by like order,

[Signature of Notary Public]

Memorandum Opinvon & Order - 8/17/98

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

Civil Case No. 97-B-1654

The undersigned certifies that a copy of the foregoing

order was served on August 17, 1998, by:

(X) delivery to:

Linda Surbaugh

Assistant U. S. Attorney

Magistrate Judge O. Edward Schlatter

(X) depositing the same in the United States Mail,

postage prepaid, addressed to:

John N. Moscato

Environmental Enforcement Section

Environment & Natural

Resources Division

United States Department of Justice

999 13th Street, Suite 945

Denver, CO 80202

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 8/ 17/98

John F. McBride, Esq.

John J. Zodrow, Esq.

Zodrow Et Al. P.C.

Independence Plaza, Suite 1700

1050 Seventeenth Street

Denver, CO 80265

Thomas E. Sitz

Enforcement Attorney

U.S. Environmental Protection Agency

Region VIII

999 18th Street, Suite 500

Denver, CO 80202

John L. Watson, Esq.

Freeborn & Peters

950 Seventeenth Street. Suite 2600

Denver, CO 80202-2826

/s/

Deputy Clerk

74a

APPENDIX D

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO

Lewis T. Babcock, Judge

[Filed June 10, 1998]

Civil Action No. 97-B-1654

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintff,

)

)

)

)

)

POWER ENGINEERING COMPANY, _ )

REDOUBT, LTD., and RICHARD J. )

LILIENTHAL, )

Defendants/Third Party Plaintiffs, — )

)

)

)

)

)

)

JACK LILIENTHAL,

Third Party Defendant.

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Plainutf, the United States of America (the "United

States"), acting on behalf of the United States Environmental

Protection Agency (the "EPA”), pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P.

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 6/10/98

65 and section 3008(a)(1) of the Resource Conservation and

Recovery Act of 1976 ("RCRA"), as amended, 42 U.S.C. §

6928(a)(1) (1994 & Supp. 1997), seeks a preliminary

injunction directing the defendants, Power Engineering

Company ("PEC"), Redoubt, Ltd. ("Redoubt"), and Richard

Lilienthal ("Lilienthal"), to comply with state regulations

adopted by the Colorado Department of Public Health and

Environment (the "CDPHE"), found at 6 COLO. CODE

REGS. 1007-3 § 266. These regulations require owners and

operators of all hazardous waste facilities to document that

they have secured the resources required to close their

facilities in an appropriate and safe manner, and to pay third-

party claims that may arise from its operations.

The United States commenced this action on August 1,

1997, alleging eight claims: (1) treatment of hazardous waste

without a permit or interim status; (2) disposal of hazardous

waste without a permit or interim status; (3) shipment of

hazardous waste to an un-permitted facility; (4) improper

container management; (5) storage of hazardous waste without

a permit or interim status; (6) failure to provide employee

training; (7) failure to have a hazardous waste contingency

plan; and (8) illegal operations (failure to have a groundwater

monitoring program, failure to have a closure plan, failure to

minimize releases of hazardous waste, and failure to obtain

and provide financial assurances for closure and post-closure).

The United States also alleges that Power Engineering has

failed to comply with CDPHE's Administrative Compliance

Order.

As discussed on the record, this is an “overfile"

action, indicating that the EPA is displeased with the manner

in which the CDPHE has sought enforcement of federal and

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 6/10/98

State regulations. The United States, therefore, at the request

of the EPA, exercises its authority to seek defendants’

compliance with Colorado hazardous waste regulations.

Subject matter jurisdiction exists pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §

1331 (1994) and venue is proper pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§

1391 (b), 1391(c), and 1395(a). A hearing was held beginning

May 11, 1998. Based on the evidence presented and for the

reasons set forth below, I grant the United States’ motion for

preliminary injunction.

1. STATUTORY AND REGULATORY GUIDELINES

RCRA is a comprehensive environmental statute

designed to protect the public health and environment by

ensuring the proper handling of solid and hazardous wastes.

42 U.S.C. § 6902(a). RCRA regulates the generation,

treatment, storage, transportation, and disposal of solid and

hazardous wastes. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 6922-6925. This

comprehensive regulatory scheme is frequently described as

"cradle-to-grave" oversight. See Sierra Club v. United States

Dept. of Energy, 770 F. Supp. 578, 579 (D.Colo. 1991); see

also H. R. Rep. No. 96-1016, at 17 (1980), reprinted in 1980

U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120.

Hazardous waste is tracked and regulated from the

point of generation, through storage, transportation, and

treatment, and to the point of ultimate disposal. The intent of

this regulatory scheme is to minimize the potential for public

health and environmental problems resulting from improper

management of hazardous waste. The potential for public

health and environmental problems, including hazards

associated with fire, explosion, direct contact, and

contamination of air, surface water, and groundwater

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resulting from inadequate management is well-documented.

See, e.g., H.R. Rep. No. 94-1491, at 17-24 (1976), reprinted

in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6238, 6254-6261 (documenting

hazardous waste tragedies in several states).

Owners and operators of hazardous waste facilities

must establish and maintain financial assurances for proper

closure and, if necessary, post-closure care of the facility, as

well as liability insurance for bodily injury and property

damage to third parties resulting from sudden and accidental

occurrences at the facility. 6 COLO. CODE REGS. 1007-3 §

266; 40 C.F.R. § 265. These financial responsibility,

requirements ensure that funds are available for proper

closure and, if necessary, post-closure care of the facility.

As enacted in 1976, RCRA required two types of

hazardous waste facilities to provide financial assurances: (1)

those with final operating permits; and (2) those with "interim

Status" that had applied for final operating permits. Congress

ceemed it impractical to halt all hazardous waste activity,

pending the issuance of permits. Congress, therefore, created

interim status, allowing the EPA to treat existing facilities

with pending permit applications as having been issued a

permit. 42 U.S.C. § 6925(e)(1); United States v. T& § Brass

and Bronze Works, Inc., 681 F. Supp. 314, 316 (D.S.C.)

aff'd in part vacated in part, 865 F.2d 1261 (4th Cir. 1988).

A facility in existence on November 19, 1980 could

obtain interim status by noticing the EPA of its activities and

submitting a Part A permit application. 42 U.S.C. §

6925(e)(1); 40 C.F.R. §§ 265.1(b), 270.10(e). The Part A

application contains information concerning the nature of the

applicant's business, a scale drawing, photographs and a

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 6/10/98

topographic map of the facility, a description of its hazardous

waste management processes and the design capacity of these

processes, a specification of the types and quantities of

hazardous wastes processed, stored, or disposed of at the

facility, as well as information regarding permits or

construction approvals. 40 C.F.R. § 270.14. A facility

operating pursuant to interim status is limited to the types of

wastes and procedures specified in the Part A application and

the facility must comply with the operating standards of 40

C.F.R. § 265, which include the provision of financial

assurances.

In 1984, primarily because of widespread industry

noncompliance, Congress amended RCRA to provide that all

interim status facilities would lose their interim status unless

they certified by November 8, 1985, that they complied with

all applicable groundwater monitoring and financial

responsibility requirements. Hazardous and Solid Waste

Amendments of 1984, P. L. No. 98-616, 98 Stat. 3221,

codified at 42 U.S.C. § 6925(e)(2) (Supp. II 1984). Upon

losing interim status, the facility must have immediately

ceased its hazardous waste management operations and,

within fifteen days, submitted a closure plan for approval by

the state or the EPA. 42 U.S.C. § 6925(a); 40 C.F.R. §

265.112(d)(3)(i). The facility must have begun final closure

within ninety days of approval of that closure plan and

achieved closure within 18 days of approval of the closure

plan, unless the state or the EPA allowed an extension of the

closure period. 40 C.F.R. § 265.113.

Closure of a hazardous waste facility must be

performed in a manner that:

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 6/10/98

(a) Minimizes the need for

further maintenance, and

(b) Controls, minimizes or

eliminates, to the extent

necessary to protect human

health and the environment,

post-closure escape of

hazardous waste, hazardous

constituents, leachate,

contaminated run-off, or

hazardous waste decomposition

products to the ground or

surface waters or to the

atmosphere, and

(c) Complies with the closure

requirements of [other

regulations promulgated under

RCRA].

40 C.F.R. § 265.111. Even after closure has been completed,

the owner or operator may be required to maintain post-

closure care of the facility, for a period of thirty years. 40

C.F.R. § 265.117. Thus, RCRA provides for extensive

regulation of a hazardous waste facility long after the facility

has stopped operating. See American Iron & Steel Institute vy.’

EPA, 886 F.2d 390, 393 (D.C.Cir. 1989) ("While invariably

described as a 'cradle-to-grave' system, [RCRA] in fact

reaches. . . well beyond the grave.").

In an effort to secure enforcement of RCRA's

provisions to the fullest extent possible, Congress conferred

enforcement power upon the EPA, as well as federally

authorized state agencies and United States citizens. RCRA

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 6/10/98

allows states to implement their own programs in lieu of the

federal program if the state's program is "equivalent to” and

"consistent with" the federal program and provides for

"adequate enforcement of compliance." 42 U.S.C. {} 6926(b).

The EPA delegated to the State of Colorado

authorization to operate a federally authorized hazardous

waste program. See, generally, 49 Fed. Reg. 41036 (Oct. 19,

1984); 54 Fed. Reg. 20847 (May 15, 1989); 56 Fed. Reg.

21601 (May 10, 1991). Colorado has promulgated

regulations. pursuant to the Colorado Hazardous Waste

Management Act ("CHWMA"), C.R.S. 9 25-15-302(2) and

(3), that specifically govern generators of hazardous waste

and the operation and maintenance of hazardous waste

treatment, storage, and disposal facilities. 6 COLO. CODE

REGS. 1007-3 §§ 262, 264-268. Any action taken by the

State of Colorado pursuant to its federally authorized

hazardous waste program "shall have the same force and

effect as action taken by the [EPA]." 42 U.S.C. § 6926(d).

The EPA, however, retains the right to bring

enforcement actions compelling compliance with Colorado's

hazardous waste regulations. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6928, 6934, and

6973; accord 49 Fed. Reg. 41036 (Oct. 19, 1984); 51 Fed.

Reg. 37729 (Oct. 26, 1986); 54 Fed. Reg. 20847 (May 12,

1989); 56 Fed. Reg. 21601 (May 10, 1991); 59 Fed. Reg.

16568 (April 7, 1994). Whenever the EPA determines that a

violation of RCRA has occurred, the EPA “. . may

commence a civil action in the United States district court in

the district in which the violation occurred for appropriate

relief, including a temporary or permanent injunction.” 42

U.S.C. § 6928(a)(1).

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 6/10/98

II. PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION STANDARDS

Because a preliminary, injunction is an extraordinary

remedy, "the right to relief must be clear and unequivocal."

SCFCILC, Inc. v. Visa USA, Inc., 936 F.2d 1096, 1098 (10th

Cir. 1991). Preliminary injunctions that preserve the status

quo pending a trial on the merits are known as "prohibitory"

injunctions. Injunctions that disturb the status quo, by

requiring some affirmative act, are denominated "mandatory"

injunctions. Because mandatory, injunctions are more

burdensome than prohibitory, injunctions, the plaintiff must

demonstrate entitlement to the injunction by compelling

evidence. Visa, 936 F.2d at 1099. This heightened evidentiary

burden must also be met when the issuance of the injunction

would provide the plaintiff with substantially all the relief that

would be available following success on the merits. Phillip v.

Fairfield Univ., 118 F.3d 131,133 (2d Cir. 1997).

A court passing judgment ona motion for preliminary,

injunction considers whether plaintiff establishes that: (1) it

will suffer irreparable injury unless an injunction is issued; (2)

its threatened injury outweighs any harm the proposed

injunction may cause to the opposing party; (3) it will likely

prevail on the merits of the litigation; and (4) an injunction,

if issued, would not be adverse to the public interest.

Chemical Weapons Working Group, Inc. v. United States

Dept. of the Army, 111 F.3d 1485, 1489 (10th Cir. 1997)

(citation omitted); accord Visa, 936 F.2d at 1098; United

States ex rel. Citizen Band Potawatomi Indian Tribe of

Oklahoma v. Enterprise Management Consultants, Inc., 883

F.2d 886, 888-889 (10th Cir. 1989).

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 6/10/98

Normally, the most important equitable factor is

irreparable harm. When a case is brought pursuant to an

environmental or public health statute, however, the primary

focus shifts from irreparable harm to concern for the general

public interest. Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305,

313 (1982); accord Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v.

Lamphier, 714 F.2d 331, 337-338 (4th Cir. 1983); Wilson v.

Amoco Corp., 989 F. Supp. 1159, 1171 (D.Wyo. 1998)

(citations omitted). A plaintiff seeking injunctive relief,

however, still must demonstrate irreparable harm in the

absence of express Congressional intent to the contrary.

Wilson, 989 F. Supp. at 1171 (citing Romero-Barcelo, 456

U.S. at 312). Based on these established standards, I will

apply the traditional equitable factors, as modified for RCRA,

and weigh more heavily the general public's interest in the

issuance of the injunction. Because the United States seeks a

mandatory injunction, however, it bears the burden of

showing that the four factors, when balanced, weigh

compellingly in its favor.

Il]. FINDINGS OF FACT

The following findings of fact are based upon the

stipulations of the parties and the evidence presented at the

hearing. These findings of fact apply only to the United

States’ motion for preliminary injunction.

Both PEC and Redoubt are Colorado corporations.

PEC operates a metal refinishing business located at 2525

South Delaware Street in Denver, Colorado ("the Facility").

Redoubt owns the land and buildings leased to PEC.

Lilienthal is the president of PEC and owns 51% of the

outstanding stock of both PEC and Redoubt. The Lilienthal

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 6/10/98

Family Trust owns the remaining minority, interests of both

PEC and Redoubt. Lilienthal js now, and has been, involved

in making management decisions for PEC and Redoubt,

including decisions regarding environmental compliance.

(Stip. 44 6-9.)

PEC's business consists primarily of refinishing metal

crankshafts, connecting rods, and rod journals for large diesel

engines used in heavy equipment. PEC's meta] refinishing

process includes stripping, preparation of the surface for

refinishing, and chrome-plating. As a result of PECs

operations, the Facility produces more than 1,000 kilograms

per month and stores more than 6,000 kilograms per month

of"hazardous waste" as that term is defined by 6 COLO.

CODE RETS. 1007-3 § 261.3. The Facility generates

approximately thirteen different “waste streams" including,

but not limited to, arsenic, lead, mercury, and hexavalent

chromium contaminated media that exceed established

regulatory toxicity, standards. Hexavalent chromium is a

corrosive hazardous waste and known carcinogen.

CONDENSED CHEMICAL DICTIONARY at 249 (10th ed.

1981).

In 1992, Denver Health and Hospitals contacted the

CDPHE concerning a discharge into the Platte River of high

levels of hexavalent chromium. Denver Health and Hospitals

had investigated all of the businesses in the area and

determined that PEC was the likely source of that discharge

The CDPHE then conducted compliance review inspections

at the Facility on August 3, 1992, September 3-4, 1992,

September 25, 1992, February 23, 1993, and March 10,

1993. (Stip. € 18; Ex. Tat 15-16.) During these inspections,

the CDPHE inspector observed and reported numerous

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 6/10/98

violations of Federal and Colorado regulations governing

treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste. The

inspector communicated the nature of these violations to

PEC's representative. (Ex. 1 at 101, 110-111,130-131,132-

134, and 139-140.) As a result of these inspections, the

CDPHE prepared "Notice of Inspection" reports, signed by

the CDPHE inspector and PEC's representative. Based on the

stipulations and evidence from the hearing, I find that PEC is

guilty of numerous violations of Colorado hazardous waste

regulations. While many of the violations occurred in the

past, some violations continue.

a. Illegal Treatment, Disposal, and Storage of

Hazardous Waste

PEC has never filed a Part A notification, a Part B

permit application, received an EPA or State of Colorado

permit, Or attained interim status for the treatment, storage,

or disposai of hazardous waste. (Stip. § 42.) Michael Hansen,

PEC's Environmental Manager, testified that, after the

CDPHE informed PEC in 1993 that its storage and disposal

of hazardous waste without a permit violated federal and state

regulations, "We looked up part B and saw that was too much

for us to do." PEC concedes, however, that it engaged in

treatment, storage, and disposal of hazardous waste.

a Treatment

On August 3, 1992, a CDPHE inspector notified PEC

that its placement of electrostripping and plating waste into an

evaporation trait and an annealing oven at the Facility

constituted treatment of hazardous waste without obtaining a

permit or Interim Status from the EPA or the State of

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 6/10/98

Colorado. PEC utilized the evaporation unit (Exs. 11-12) and

the annealing oven to "de-water" and recover chrome waste.

(Stip. 44 20-22.) Approximately thirty-days after the August

3, 1992 inspection, PEC closed the evaporation unit pursuant

to a plan submitted to and approved by the CDPHE. (Stip. ¢

66.) The annealing oven, however, was not closed pursuant

to a closure plan submitted to and approved by the CDPHE.

Rather, the annealing oven was dismantled and sold for scrap

metal by PEC in 1992. The evidence Shows that, when PEC

closed its annealing oven and evaporator in 1992, it ceased

"treatment" of hazardous waste as that term is defined by 6

COLO. CODE REGS. 1007-3 § 260.10. The United States

concedes that, based on the limited information available from

its files and a site review conducted on April 2, 1998, PEC is

not currently treating waste. (Stip. 67.)

ra Disposal

From 1978 to 1992, hazardous waste leaked into the

soil beneath the Facility's 17 chrome-plating tanks. (Stip. §

26; Exs. 3, 4.) The plating tanks are located inside the

Facility's main building. As Originally installed and used, the

plating tanks were composed of steel with PVC lining,

Situated on a floor of earth and timber or within a concrete

pit. Beginning in 1985 and concluding in 1994, PEC installed

additional containment structures underneath the plating tanks.

During installation of these additional containment

structures, PEC excavated some, but not all, of the soil

beneath plating tanks. Although PEC 'knew that the soil was

discolored by chrome contamination, PEC did not investigate

the precise toxicity of the soil or ascertain the quantity of

contaminated soil. PEC placed some of the excavated soil into

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 6/10/98

three open waste piles on land adjacent to the Facility'’s main

building. (Answer 4 24; Stip. § 27; Exs. 7-10.) Two of the

piles exist on land owned by Redoubt and the third pile was

placed on adjacent land owned by the Atchison, Topeka &

Santa Fe Railroad. These three waste piles remain there

today. (Answer § 24; Stip. ¢ 27.) PEC placed the remainder

of excavated soil into fifty-five gallon drums (Ex. 16), which

PEC eventually shipped to a permitted waste disposal facility

in 1993.

PEC utilizes "air scrubbers," also known as “air

misters,” installed in 1978, to draw air from above the plating

baths located inside the Facility's main building. The air-

cleansing process causes hexavalent chromium, lead,

mercury, and arsenic to condense in aqueous form inside the

ducts located outside the Facility's main building. On June 19,

1992, PEC obtained initial approval from the CDPHE for an

air pollution emission permit pertaining to the air scrubbers.

(Ex. Il). The initial approval allows emission of 0.83 Ibs/hour

or 1.5 tons/year of "chromic acid." The record does not

disclose whether PEC obtained final approval for air

emissions of chromic acid or other hazardous wastes.

The ducts have discharged and continue to discharge

air as well as a mist of hexavalent chromium, lead, mercury,

and arsenic. Christopher Erzinger, the CDPHE's

Environmental Protection Specialist and lead inspector of the

Facility beginning in 1992, testified that the mist contained

hexavalent chromium in the form of a "suspended liquid."

This testimony is uncontroverted. This mist condensed, and

continues to condense, on the soil adjacent to the air

scrubbers. Such condensation is evidenced by stained soil

extending approximately thirty, feet from the Facility's main

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 6/10/98

building towards the west. (Exs. 18-19.) The CDPHE

sampled this soil and determined that it contained 360 ppm

(parts per million) of hexavalent chromium. The CDPHE's

established toxicity level for hexavalent chromium in soil is 5

ppm.

Beginning in 1978, a yellow/orange liquid leaked from

air scrubbers down the west side of the Facility's main

building into the soil. (Ex. 6.) The CDPHE assayed this

liquid in 1992 and determined that it contained 250,000 ppm

of hexavalent chromium, 50,000 times the concentration

permissible in soil. Despite having knowledge of the leaking

liquid since the late 1980's, and despite being informed by the

CDPHE in 1992 that allowing such liquid to leak into the soil

constituted illegal disposal, PEC did nothing to repair the

leaks until August 1994. (Ex. 55.) Although the

yellow/orange liquid no longer leaks down the west side of

the Facility's main building into the soil, the soil remains

contaminated.

a Storage

At times after August 1, 1992, PEC Stored at the

Facility unlabeled drums containing chromium-contaminated

byproducts, open drums containing chromium wastes, and

drums without marked accumulation dates. PEC also failed to

maintain adequate aisle space between its stored drums. (Stip.

14 31-34.)

On August 3, 1992, several fifty-five gallon drums

stored inside the east-central portion of the Facility'’s main

building that contained hazardous waste had accumulated for

over one year. (Exs. 13-15.) Also on August 3, 1992, several

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 6/10/98

fifty-five gallon drams stored outside the east side of the

Facility's main building that contained hazardous waste from

grinding operations had accumulated for at least three years.

(Stip. ¢ 50; Ex. 17.)

On August 3, 1992, PEC stored approximately one

hundred drums containing chrome-contaminated soil on the

southwest exterior dock of the Facility's main building. (Stip.

q 52; Ex. 16.) Some, but not all, of the drums stored on the

southwest exterior dock had been there for seven years by

August 3, 1992. Also on August 3, 1992, approximately nine

drums in the southwest external storage area containing

uazardous waste were not labeled as containing hazardous

waste, did not have lids, and did not have marked

accumulation dates. (Stip. ¢ 54.) As of August 3, 1992, PEC

stored drums containing hazardous waste at the Facility for

periods in excess of the ninety-day storage limitation for

generator facilities set forth in 40 C.F.R. § 262.34. (Stip. 4

57.) PEC does not currently have an EPA or State of

Colorado permit or Interim Status for the storage of hazardous

waste beyond the ninety-day limit. (Stip. § 56.) Nor has PEC

ever sought or obtained an exemption from the ninety-day

storage limitation period for generator facilities. (Stip. ¢ 38.)

PEC is managing hazardous wastes currently generated

by the Facility in compliance with applicable storage

regulations. (Stip. § 65.) Waste currently generated is stored

in properly labeled containers with adequate aisle space,

transported to a permanent disposal facility, and stored at the

Facility for less than ninety days. (Stip. § 65.) All drums of

hazardous waste that were present and accumulating at the

Facility for over ninety, days were transported from the

Facility for disposal at a permitted disposal facility by January

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1994. (Stip. { 68.) The United States concedes that, based on

the limited information available in its files and the site review

conducted on April 2, 1998, PEC is complying with pre-

transport accumulation time requirements. (Stip. § 65.)

b. Failure to Provide Notice of Activities

On May 14, 1986, PEC notified the CDPHE that it

was a generator of DOO2 (corrosive), DOOO (toxic), F006

(waste water treatment sludge), U226 (111 trichlorethane),

and &080 (methylene chloride) hazardous wastes. (Ex. 1 at

11). Although the notice references generic codes for

corrosive and toxic wastes, PEC failed to notify the CDPHE

that it generated hexavalent chromium. While the record

indicates PEC subsequently notified the CDPHE on March

10, 1993 that it is a large quantity generator of hazardous

waste, including those wastes identified as D007 (chromium),

D008 (lead), and D009 (mercury) (Stip. 4 17; Ex. 1 at 15-16),

PEC did not adequately disclose its generation, treatment,

Storage, and disposal of hazardous waste until cited for

numerous violations of the RCRA and its implementing

regulations.

The evidence shows that PEC failed to assess

adequately its generation, treatment, storage, and disposal of

hazardous waste. The evidence also shows that neither the

CDPHE nor the EPA knew the severity and extent of PEC's

noncompliance until the August 3, 1992 inspection.

Defendants' failure to report accurately their activities

impaired the ability of the CDPHE and the EPA to regulate

effectively PEC's generation, treatment, storage, and disposal

of hazardous wastes. As Walter Avramenko, the CDPHE's

Hazardous Waste Cleanup and Permitting Unit Leader,

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 6/10/98

testified, had PEC notified the CDPHE that it operated a

treatment, storage, or disposal facility, the permitting

requirements would have attached and, as part of those

requirements, the CDPHE would have expected PEC to

obtain a permit and provide closure plans, post-closure plans,

and financial assurances.

Cc. Contamination of Groundwater and Surface Water

As a result of this illegal disposal and storage of

hazardous waste, groundwater at and under the Facility, as

well as groundwater under areas outside the Facility, is

contaminated with levels of hexavalent chromium that greatly

exceed established toxicity standards. (Stip. 4 3940.) Two

geologists, both qualified as experts in the field of

groundwater hydrology, testified regarding groundwater

contamination.

Both Michael Wireman ("Wireman"), expert for the

United States, and Michael Galloway ("Galloway"), expert

for defendants, testified that a plume of chrome contamination

originates at the southwest corner of the Facility and extends

approximately 3,310 feet in a north-northwesterly direction to

the South Platte River. (Exs. 26, 27.) The contaminated

groundwater forms part of the South Platte Valley Fill

Aquifer, which is a quickly moving aquifer with a steep

gradient when compared to other aquifers in the region. The

aquifer and the South Platte River are hydrologically

connected. The bedrock gradient directs the aquifer towards

the South Platte River. Preferential flow paths created by

storm drainage pipes and other water conduits probably

accelerate the time of contaminant transport to the South

Platte River. Wireman believes the time of contaminant

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I aiiaciminiatatiinmemesininiiiiiiiihiiaiia ical

Memorandum Opinion & Order - 6/10/98

transport from the Facility to the South Platte River at eight

to ten years. I find Wireman's opinion credible.

The CDPHE 's established toxicity level for hexavalent

chromium in groundwater is 100 g/L (micrograms per liter).

The EPA tests detected 77,600 4g/L of hex2valent chromium

at the heart of the contaminant plume in 1997, one of the

highest concentrations in recent years. At the VFW outfall, a

storm pipe that drains into the South Platte River where the

plume intersects with the river, EPA groundwater tests

detected 3,200 g/L of hexavalent chromium. At the Harvard

Gulch outfall, a water conduit that runs through the plume but

intersects the South Platte River south of the plume's

intersection with the river, EPA tests detect 280 ug/L of

hexavalent chromium. foxs. 26,27.) —

The facility, began operations in the late 1970's. Most

of the plating tanks were installed in 1977. (Ex. Y, App. 3.)

Hexavalent chromium from the Facility first reached the

South Platte river in approximately 1986, as indicated by

water samples taken by the Denver Department of Health.

The CDPHE's established toxicity level for hexavalent

chromium in South Platte river surface water is 16 zg/L for

chronic conditions and 11] “g/L for acute conditions. In 1985,

water samples detected 1 g/L of hexavalent chromium in the

South Platte River near the Facility. Samples taken in 1987

and 1988 detected approximately 100 g/L of hexavalent

chromium at the same site, leading to the conclusion that

hexavalent chromium disposed by PEC in 1977 reached the

South Platte River in 1986 or 1987. This evidence further

supports Wireman's eight to ten year transport rate opinion.

In November 1989, samples detected more than 100 ug/L of

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Memorandum Opinion & Order - 6/10/98

hexavalent chromium at the same site. Both experts testified

that the following are sources or probable sources of the

hexavalent chromium plume: the three open waste piles of soil

excavated from beneath the plating tanks, the soil remaining

beneath the plating tanks, and the soil contaminated by the air

scrubbers. These sources will continue to create a contaminant

plume until remediated.

d. Issuance of Compliance and Administrative Penalty

Orders

The CDPHE inspected the Facility on May 11-12,

1993 and January 27, 1994, again observing and reporting

violations of federal and state regulations regarding storage

and disposal

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