Brief for the United States — Coleman v. United States

CONTENTS.

| STATEMENT OF THE CASE..

ARGUMENT .. on a

I. The claim is barred by the act of July

' 7, 1912, because not presented to

the Commissioner of Internal Rev-

enue on or before January 1, 1914

Thatcher v. United States, 149 Fed.

902.

United States v. Shipley, 197 Fed.

265.

IL The language of the act of July 27, 1912,

is plain and unambiguous and can

not be divested of its obvious mean-

ing by resort to construction

Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S.

470.

Thompson v. United States, 246 U. 8.

547.

III. This court has plainly decided that the

act of July 27, 1912, should be given

a literal interpretation

Hvoslef v. United States, 237 U. 8. 1.

IV. The act of July 27, 1912, has been given

a literal interpretation by the ad-

seen i pee a ata ms

execution . .

“ens States v. Nane 185 U. 8.

Walia Basten ©. me S. 760.

Adams Express Co. v. Kentucky, 238 U. S. 190

Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470.

Daley Case, The, 26 Ops. Atty. Gen. 194.

Fidelity Trust Co. v. United States, 45 Ct. Ch. 302

Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175 U. S. 414 a

Hvoslef v. United States, 237 U. 8. 1

Lowisiana v. Jack, 244 U. 8. 7.

Thatcher v. United States, 149 Fed. 902

Thompson v. United States, 246 U. S. 547

United States v. Finnell, 185 U. S. 236.

United States v. Lexington Mill ee. ou. 232 U. 8.

399 ¥

United States v. “Moore, 95 U. S. 760.

United States v. Philbrick, 120 U. S. 62.

United States v. Shipley, 197 Fed. 265

STATUTES CITED.

-~oon pee

Act of June 13, 1898, ch. 448, 30 Stat. 448

Act of June 27, 1902, ch. 1160, 32 Stat. 406

Act of July 27, 1912, ch. 336, 37 Stat. 240..

Judicial Code, section 24 (par. 20). .

Judicial Code, section Sa

eer Ooo

Inthe Supreme Gourtof the United States.

Ocroser Term, 1918.

Rosert L. CoLeEMAN, as Amme

and Louise L. Coleman, as Adminis-

tratrix, of the Estate of Walter H. Cole-

man, Deceased, Appellants,

v.

Tae Unrrep Srares. J

>No. 348.

APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF CLAIMS.

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE.

On March 9, 1916, appellants, as administrators of

the estate of Walter H. Coleman, filed in the Court

of Claims their petition seeking to recover from the

United States the sum of $6,721.71, paid on May 29,

1908, as a tax on the interest of the next of kin of

the deceased in his personal estate (R. 1-8).

The general traverse was entered thereto (R. 9).

The findings of fact (R. 10-12) showed that Walter

H. Coleman died in Brooklyn, New York, on June 1,

1902, intestate, leaving three children as his heirs

Q)

2

and next of kin, each entitled to receive one-third

of said personal estate after payment of debts and

charges. Appellants qualified as his administrators

on June 9, 1902. On June 12, 1902, they advanced

$500 to each of said next of kin, and on June 25,

1902, the further sum of $500 to one of them.

On July 1, 1902, the debts of decedent and the

expenses of administration were unascertained and

unpaid. :

On May 29, 1903, the United States Internal

Revenue Collector for the First District of New York

collected from appellants as the tax due on the

interest of said next of kin in said estate said sum

of $6,721.71. It was demanded under section 29 of

the Act of Congress approved June 13, 1898, ch. 448,

30 Stat. 448, entitled An Act to provide ways and

means to meet war expenditures and for other pur-

poses,” and amendments thereto. The tax was paid

voluntarily without protest, and was by the collector

covered into the treasury of the United States in

the ordinary course of business.

On March 17, 1914, the appellant, Louise L. Cole-

man filed a claim for said sum of said tax as erro-

neously and illegally paid and collected under the

provisions of said War Revenue Act and amend-

ments and as. due to be refunded under section 3

of the Act of June 27, 1902, o. 1160, 82 Stat. 406, and

~ the Act of July 27, 1912, c. 856, 87 Stat. 240.

+ The claim was rejected on the ground that not

u bons presented by January 1, 1914, it was

a

pe ee, PR eS, oo

.

8 Mage

barred of consideration by the cid Act of July 27,

1912.

The Court of Claims found as a AEC SE of law

that no claim for the refund of said tax was filed

with the Commissioner of Internal Revenue within

the time required by law and that the petition must

therefore be, and it is, dismissed (R. 12). 5

From the decree so adjudging, this appeal is

prosecuted. ; 5

ARGUMENT.

I.

The claim is barred by the Act of July 27, 1912,

because not presented to the Commissioner of

Internal Revenue on or before January 1, 1914.

Recovery in the present suit is sought under section -

3 of the Act of Congress of June 27, 1902, ch. 1160,

82 Stat. 406, called the Refunding Act, which pro-

vides, in substance, (a) for the refund upon proper

application of all taxes theretofore or thereafter col-

lected under the Act of June 13, 1898, upon con-

tingent beneficial interests which should not become

vested prior to July 1, 1902, and (6) that no tax

should thereafter be collected under said act upon

any contingent beneficial interest which should not

become absolutely vested in possession and enjoy-

ment prior to that date (R. 7, 8). -

Claims for refunds under this provision have been

held to be in the nature of claims for a bounty

specially set aside by the Government. The pro-

vision contains no limitation on the time in which

claims thereunder may be presented; and in view of

4

the special nature of such claims, it is held that they

are not-subject to the two-year limitation imposed

by section 3228 of the Revised Statutes upon claims

for the refund of taxes generally. Fidelity Trust Co.

v. United States, 45 Ct. Cls. 362; Thatcher v. United

States, 149 Fed. 902; United States v. Shipley, 197

Fed. 265; The Daley Case, 26 Ops. Atty. Gen. 194.

Accordingly, for a period -of ten years claims

arising under this provision were not affected by

any limitation save the general six-year limitation

on the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims and the

Circuit and District Courts imposed by section 1069

of the Revised Statutes and section 1 of the Tucker

Act (see Judicial Code, sections 24 (par. 20) and 156),

while during the same period other claims also

growing out of section 29 of the War Revenue Act

were subject to the two-year limitation contained in

section 3228 of the Revised Statutes.

In order to place all claims growing out of the

War Revenue Act on an equal footing, Congress

passed the Act of July 27, 1912 (ch. 356, 37 Stat.

240), extending the time for the filing of such claims

for refunds growing out of section 29 of the War

Revenue Act as had become barred by the several

statutes of limitation, and providing that all claims

for the refund of taxes alleged to have been errone-

ously or illegally collected under said War Revenue

Act might be presented to the Commissioner of In-

ternal Revenue on or before January 1, 1914, and not

thereafter.

\

PC

a 5

The language of the act is plain and unmistakable

and leaves no room for doubt that it was the purpose

of Congress to place a definite limitation on all claims

growing out of the Act of 1898:

* „* „* all claims for the refunding of any

internal tax alleged to have been erroneously

or illegally assessed or collected under [section

29 of the War Revenue Act], or of any sums

alleged to have been excessive, or in any manner

wrongfully collected under the provisions of said

act may be presented to the Commissioner of

Internal Revenue on or before [January 1, 1914),

and not thereafter. [Italics ours.

This sum of $6,721.71 if wrongfully collected was

erroneously collected as taxes on May 29, 1903, in

violation of the provisions of the act of June 27, 1902,

and such is the allegation ot the claim filed with the

Commissioner of Interral Revenue. (R. 11-12.)

In this case it is conceded that the payment was

made voluntarily in 1903. No steps had been taken

to collect the sum paid when the act of 1912 was

passed. No attention was called to the claim until

Masch 17, 1914, when the claimant, Louise L. Cole-

man filed her claim with the Commissioner of In-

te nal Revenue. This was nearly two yeas after

this act of 1912 was passed and over two months

after the time fixed by said act for filing such claims.

The conclusion is inevitable that the same was

then too late and the claim could not lawfully be

paid by the Secretary of the Treasury.

6

II.

The language of the Act of July 27, 1912, is plain and

unambiguous and can not be divested of its obvious

meaning by resort to construction.

Appellants point to the report of the Committee

on the Judiciary of the House of Representatives

recommending the passage of the act which states

that the purpose of the act is to extend until Janu-

ary 1, 1914, the time in which to file certain classes

of claims ‘already barred by the statute of limita-

tions, and from said report and the title of the act

they argue that this was the only purpose which

Congress had in mind and that Congress did not

intend to place a limitation on other claims, such as

theirs, which at the time of the passage of the act

were not barred by any limitation.

Conceding, arguendo, that it was the purpose, even

the immediate purpose, of the act to extend until

January 1, 1914, the time in which to file certain

claims, it by no means follows that this was the only

purpose which Congress had in‘mind. The existence

of this particular intent is in no wise inconsistent

with the existence of a further intent, as disclosed

by the wording of the act, to place a final limitation

on all claims growing out of the War Revenue Act,

and thereby end the unjust discrimination between

different classes of claims in the matter of limitation,

The conclusive answer to the coutention is that

the language of the Act is plain and unambiguous

and can not be divested of its obvious meaning by

7

ne

a

3

*

a9

2 5 7

resort to construction. Hamilton v. Rathbone, 175

U. S. 414, 421; United States v. Lexington Mill & c Co,

232 U. S. 399, 409-107 Adams Express Co. v. Ken-

tucky, 238 U. S. 190, 199; Caminetti v. United States,

242 U. S. 470, 485; Thompson v. United States, 246

U. S. 547, 551.

In Thompson v. United States, supra, this elemen-

tary rule is stated as follows:

The intention of Congress is to be sought for

primarily in the language used, and where

this expresses an intention reasonably intelli-

gible and plain it must be accepted without

modification by resort to construction or

conjecture.

And in Caminetti v. United States, supra, the court

thus stated the rule:

It is elementary that the meaning of a

statute must, in the first instance, be sought in

the language in which the act is framed, and if

that is plain, and if the law is within the con-

stitutional authority of the law-making body .

which passed it, the sole function of the courts

is to enforce it according to its terms. * * *

Where the language is plain and admits of

no more than one meaning the duty of inter-

pretation does not arise and the rules which

are to aid doubtful meanings need no dis-

cussion. 5

8

III.

This court has plainly decided that the Act of July

27, 1912, should be given a literal Interpretation.

In the case of Hvoslef v. United States, 287 U. S. 1,

this court plainly decided that the language of the

Act of July 27, 1912, should receive a literal inter-

pretation. That case involved a claim filed under

the Act of 1912 for the refund of certain stamp taxes

collected on charter parties under section 25 of the

War Revenue Act. The Government contended that

the purpose of Congress, as disclosed by the report

of the House Committee on the Judiciary, was

merely to extend the time for filing claims growing

out of section 29 of the War Revenue Act, and not as

to claims growing out of other sections of said act.

The court rejected the contention, saying:

It is urged by the Government that Con-

gress intended to limit the Act of 1912 to the

refunding of death duties erroneously or ille-

gally assessed under Section 29 of the War

Revenue Act. Reference is made to the

legislative history of the statute, but the

contention lacks adequate support. (See

House Reports, 62d Cong. 2d Sess., Report

No. 848, June 6, 1912.) While the pendency

of claims for the refunding of such taxes may

have induced the passage of the Act its terms

were not confined to these. On the contrary,

after providing for the claims arising under

Section 29, Congress added the further clause

making express provision for the presentation

of elaims for the refunding of any sums

*

8 9

alleged to have been excessive, or in any

manner wrongfully collected under the pro-

visions of said Act”; * * * We are not

at liberty to read these explicit clauses out of

the statute. (P. 11.)

IV.

The Act of July 27, 1912, has been given a literal inter-

pretation by the administrative officers charged

with its execution.

As shown by the letter from the Acting Secretary

of the Treasury dated September 26, 1917, printed as

an appendix hereto, the Act of July 27, 1912, has

been given a literal interpretation by the adminis-

trative officers charged with itsexecution. This inter-

pretation has been contemporaneous, long continued,

and uniform, and is entitled to great weight. United

States v. Moore, 95 U. S. 760, 763; United States v.

Philbrick, 120 U. S. 52, 59; United States v. Finnell,

185 U. S. 236, 244; Louisiana v. Jack, 244 U. 8.

397, 406.

CONCLUSION.

The judgment of the Court of Claims should be

affirmed. :

ALEX. C. Kine,

Solicitor General.

Apri, 1919.