Appendices — Satellite Broadcasting & Communications Ass'n of America v. Ringer
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APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 93-8395
SATELLITE BROADCASTING AND COMMUNICATIONS
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, et al.,
Plaintiffs-A ppellees,
Vv.
RALPH OMAN, in his capacity as Register of Copyrights,
and Director of the Copyright Office of the Library of
Congress, and the COPYRIGHT OFFICE OF THE LIBRARY
OF CONGRESS and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Defendants-A ppellants.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
March 24, 1994
Before KRAVITCH and CARNES, Circuit Judges, and
HAND *, Senior District Judge.
KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge:
This appeal calls upon the court te review the United
States Copyright Office’s (“Copyright Office”) promulga-
* Honorable William B. Hand, Senior U.S. District Judge for the
Southern District of Alabama, sitting by designation.
2a
tion of regulations which deny satellite broadcasters the
right to subscribe to the compulsory licensing scheme set
forth at 17 U.S.C. § 111. Based on this court’s previous
holding in NBC v. Satellite Broadcast Networks, 940 F.2d
1467 (11th Cir.1991) (“SBN”), the district court invali-
dated the Copyright Office regulations. The Copyright
Office appeals.
Although the new regulations conflict with our inter-
pretation of the term “cable system” in SBN, they are
neither arbitrary, capricious, nor in conflict with the clear
meaning of the statute. They are therefore valid exer-
cises of the Copyright Office’s statutory authority to inter-
pret the provisions of the compulsory licensing scheme,
and are binding on this circuit. Accordingly, we RE-
VERSE the district court’s invalidation of the regulations.
Ae
Plaintiffs comprise the Satellite Broadcasting and
Communications Association (“SBCA”), a trade group
representing satellite carriers. Satellite carriers receive
signals broadcast by television stations and then retransmit
those signals by satellite to satellite dishes located in the
homes of their subscribers.
This dispute centers on whether satellite carriers are
“cable systems” for purposes of Copyright Act § 111,
which defines a “cable system” as:
a facility, located in any State, Territory, trust Terri-
tory, or Possession, that . . . receives signals trans-
mitted or programs broadcast by one or more tele-
vision broadcast stations . . . and makes secondary
transmissions of such signals.
17 U.S.C. § 111(f) (emphasis added). If satellite car-
riers are “cable systems,” then they are entitled to sub-
scribe to the compulsory licensing system set forth in that
3a
section.’ This, in turn, would entitle satellite carriers to
transmit copyrighted television broadcasts, so long as they
pay royalties and abide by the procedures of the licensing
scheme. By contrast, if satellite carriers are not “cable
systems,” then they are not permitted to subscribe to the
licensing scheme and must find an alternate method of
obtaining rights to their desired broadcasts.?
The Eleventh Circuit held in SBN that satellite carriers
are “cable systems” covered by the compulsory licensing
scheme. In SBN, NBC brought a copyright infringement
action against SBN, a satellite carrier, alleging that SBN
had rebroadcast NBC’s signals without its permission. In-
terpreting the definition of “cable system” under § 111(f),
this court held that satellite carriers implicitly were in-
cluded in the compulsory licensing scheme, and that SBN
1Title 17 U.S.C. §111 provides for the compulsory licensing
scheme, stating:
[S]econdary transmissions to the public by a cable system of
a primary transmission made by a broadcast station . . . shall
be subject to compulsory licensing upon compliance with [pro-
cedural requirements and payment of mandatory royalties]
where the carriage of the signals comprising the secondary
transmission is permissible under the rules, regulations or
authorizations of the Federal Communications Commission.
17 U.S.C. § 111(c) <1) (emphasis added).
2In the Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988, Congress created a
compulsory licensing scheme for satellite carriers by adding § 119
to the Copyright Act. Pub.L. No. 100-667, §§ 201-02, 102 Stat.
3949-58 (1988). However, Section 119—which will expire on Dec.
31, 1994—cffers little guidance in interpreting § 111 because the
accompanying House Report stated:
[N]lothing in this Act is intended to reflect any view as to
the proper interpretation of section 111 of this title prior to
enactment of this Act, or after this Act ceases to be effec-
tive. . . . In particular, nothing in this Act is intended to
reflect any view concerning whether ... an entity that re-
transmits television broadcast signais by satellite to private
home could qualify as a “cable system” under section 111(f).
H.R.Rep. No. 100-887(1I). 100th Cong.2d Sess. at 27 (1988), U.S.
Code Cong. & Admin.News 1988 at 5527, 5630.
4a
thus had engaged in no infringing behavior. We rejected
the suggestion that to be a “facility located in any state”
pursuant to § 111(f), a “cable system” must be located
entirely within a single state.* We further reasoned that
there existed “no good reason” to prevent the often rural
customers of satellite carriers from receiving the benefits
afforded other cable viewers. See 940 F.2d at 1470.
Subsequent to oral argument in SBN, the Copyright
Office issued a policy decision stating that satellite carriers
are not “cable systems” under § 111(f). The Office rea-
soned that § 111(f) requires carriers to receive and trans-
mit signals from within a single state, which is not the
case with satellite technology. See Id. at 1469-70 n. 4
(citing Fed.Reg. 31,580 (1991)). We considered this
policy decision in deciding SBN, but ultimately found it
unpersuasive and, in any event, not retroactive. We em-
phasized, however, that we “of course express[ed] no
opinion on the new rule’s validity as applied prospec-
tively.” Id.
In 1992, after a notice and comment period, the Copy-
right Office affirmed its prior policy decision by promul-
gating a final rule which provided that carriers are not
“cable systems” under § 111(f). 57 Fed.Reg. 3283, 3296
(January 29, 1992) (codified at 37 C.F.R. § 201.17(k) ).*
In its analysis, the Office roundly criticized our decision in
3 We based our broader reading of $111(f) primarily on the
section’s restriction of “secondary transmissions” to transmissions
by “ ‘cable system[s]’ not located in whole or in part within the
boundary of the forty-eight contiguous States, Hawaii, or Puerto
Rico.” 940 F.2d at 1470. This definition suggested to us that a
cable system might be located partly in Alaska and partly in
another state, and thus need not be located within a single state.
4 The Copyright Office added to 37 C.F.R. § 201.17 paragraph (k),
which provides:
Satellite carriers and MMDS not eligible. Satellite carriers,
[and] satellite resale carriers . . . are not eligible for the cable
compulsory license based upon an interpretation of the whole
section 111 of title 17 of the United States Code.
Sa
SBN and offered several reasons directing an opposite
conclusion. First, as the Copyright Office interpreted the
Statute, satellite carriers are not “located in any siate, let
alone the same state,” a “critical requirement” under
§ 111(f). 57 Fed.Reg. at 3290. Moreover, the Office
concluded that § 111(f) was “clearly directed at localized
retransmission services,” based on the section’s provision
that “two or more cable systems in contiguous communi-
ties . . . operating from one headend” constitute one
“cable system” for purposes of determining royalties. Id.
at 3292. The Office reasoned that the terms “contiguous
communities” and “headend” *—applicable to local re-
transmissions—are anomalous in the context of geospheri-
cally orbiting satellite technology. Jd. The Office further
noted that § 111(f)’s definition of a “distant signal equiv-
alent” * by reference to television stations “within whose
local service area the cable system is located” is similarly
inapplicable to satellite carriers. Id. Finally, the Office
concluded that the legislative history is devoid of any in-
dication that Congress considered satellite carriers when
enacting the compulsory licensing scheme. Id. at 3291.
IT.
The Copyright Office is a federal agency with authority
to promulgate rules concerning the meaning and applica-
5 A cable system’s “headend” is its control center, from which a
cable company receives signals and then transmits them, by coaxial
cable, to the company’s subscribers. See generally Eastern Micro-
wave, Inc. v. Doubleday Sports, Inc., 691 F.2d 125, 128 (2d Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226, 103 S.Ct. 1282, 75 L.Ed.2d 467
(1983); United States v. Norris, 833 F.Supp. 1392, 1394 (N.D.
Ind.1993).
* The “distant signal equivalent” is a figure used to calculate the
percentage of gross receipts owed by a cable system to the copyright
holders of programs broadcast. The figure takes into account the
number of “distant,” i.e. not receivable via antenna, independent,
network and educational stations carried. See e.g., Cablevision
Sys. Dev. Co. v. Motion Picture Ass’n of America, Inc., 836 F.2d 599,
608-09 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1235, 108 S.Ct. 2901, 101
L.Ed.2d 934 (1988).
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tion of § 111. See SBN, 940 F.2d at 1469 n. 4; Cable-
vision Sys. Dev. Co. v. Motion Picture Ass’n of America,
Inc., 836 F.2d 599, 608-09 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 487
U.S. 1235, 108 S.Ct. 2901, 101 L.Ed2d 934 (1988);
see also DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 577-78, 76
S.Ct. 974, 978, 100 L.Ed. 1415 (1956) (recognizing
that Copyright Office’s interpretation of Copyright Act
should ordinarily receive deference). As such, the Office’s
regulations must be upheld unless “they are arbitrary,
capricious, or manifestly contrary” to the provisions of the
Copyright Act. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844, 104
S.Ct. 2778, 2782, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Stated other-
wise, if the Office has promulgated regulations which
contradict the “clear meaning” or “plain language” of the
statute, then those regulations must be struck down. See,
e.g., Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, USS. : :
112 S.Ct. 841, 847, 117 L.Ed.2d 79 (1992); Public
Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 171,
109 S.Ct. 2854, 2863, 106 L.Ed.2d 134 (1989); Barrett
v. Adams Fruit Co., Inc., 867 F.2d 1305 (11th Cir.
1989), affd, 494 U.S. 638, 110 S.Ct. 1384, 108 L.Ed.2d
585 (1990).
Courts generally must defer to an agency statutory in-
terpretation that is at odds with circuit precedent, so
long as “the agency’s answer is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844,
104 S.Ct. at 2782 (upholding Environment Protection
Agency regulation which contradicted prior D.C.Circuit
precedent).’ Because the rule at issue in Chevron was
7 The regulatory scheme at issue in Chevron required that “non-
attainment” states under the Clean Air Act establish a permit pro-
gram regulating “new or modified major stationary sources” of air
pollution. 467 U.S. at 840-42, 104 S.Ct. at 2780-81. Under an
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rule, however, “nonat-
tainment” stafes could adopt a plantwide definition of the term
“stationary source,” enabling plants with several pollution-emitting
devices to circumvent certain EPA permit conditions. Jd. The D.C.
Circuit had invalidated the rule, based on its previous holding in
Ta
not “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the
statute,” it was valid, notwithstanding circuit precedent
to the contrary. /d.
SBCA argues that the instant action is controlled not
by Chevron, but rather by Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB,
US. , 112 S.Ct. 841, 117 L.Ed.2d 79 (1992).
Lechmere overruled an NLRB order which contradicted
established Supreme Court precedent by extending pro-
tection under NLRA § 8(a)(1) to union organizers who
were not “employees” covered by the Act. See US.
at - , 112 S.Ct. at 845-46 (citing, inter alia,
NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113,
76 S.Ct. 679, 684, 100 L.Ed. 975 (1956)). The Lech-
mere Court rejected the Board’s application of NLRA
protections to nonemployee organizers, and reiterated the
rule that “[o]nce we have determined a statute’s clear
meaning, we adhere to that determination under the doc-
trine of stare decisis, and we judge an agency’s later in-
terpretation of the statute against our prior determina-
tion.” U.S. at . , 112 S.Ct. at 847-48
(quoting Maslin Indus. Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497
U.S. 116, 130, 110 S.Ct. 2759, 2768, 111 L.Ed.2d 94
(199C)}). Relying on Lechmere, SBCA contends that
we are bound by our holding in SBN, absent en banc
reconsideration of the issues.
Unlike the statutory scheme in Lechmere, which ex-
plicitly confined the protected class under NLRA § 8
(a)(1) to “employees,” § 111(f) is far from explicit as
to the inclusion of satellite carriers. For this reason, we
rested our decision in SBN not upon the statute’s “clear
meaning,” but rather upon inferences drawn from the
statutory scheme and upon our policy determination that
satellite carriers should be included for the benefit of
ASARCO, Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319 (D.C.Cir.1978). Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gorusch, 685 F.2d 718, 727
(D.C.Cir.1982) ; see also ASARCO, 578 F.2d at 325-27 (rejecting
EPA’s application of same rule in similar air-quality program).
8a
their rural customers. We left open the possibility that
we might later consider a contrary rule. Noting that the
Copyright Office had issued a contrary 1991 policy de-
cision, and anticipating the promulgation of a new rule,
we “express[ed] no opinion on the new rule’s validity as
applied prospectively.” 940 F.2d at 1470 n. 4.
Because we did not address the “clear meaning” of
§$ 111(f) in SBN, this circuit is not precluded from re-
visiting our initial interpretation of the regulatory scheme
in SBN. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842, 104 S.Ct. at
2781 (Court of Appeals erred by “adopt[ing] a static
judicial definition of [the statutory term at issue] when
it had decided that Congress itself had not commanded
that definition”). A contrary result illogically would wed
this circuit to the SBN decision, while all other circuits
and the Supreme Court would be bound under Chevron
to defer to the Copyright Office rule. Moreover, it would
create a rush to the courthouse among parties wishing to
litigate a statute’s meaning before an agency has exer-
cised its broad “knowledge respecting the matters sub-
jected to agency regulations.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844-
45, 104 S.Ct. at 2782-83 (quoting United States v.
Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382, 81 S.Ct. 1554, 156, 6
L.Ed.2d 908 (1961) ).°
If.
Having determined that SBN did not address the “clear
meaning” of “cable system” under § 111(f), we likewise
hold that the Copyright Office’s construction of “cable
8 We find further support for our decision in Schisler v. Sullivan,
8 F.2d 563, 568 (2d Cir. 1993), which addressed a challenge to HHS
regulations interpreting the “treating physician rule” used to evalu-
ate disability claims. The Second Circuit upheld the new HHS
regulations even though they conflicted with prior circuit precedent,
because “[nlew regulations at variance with prior judicial prece-
dents are upheld unless ‘they exceed[] the Secretary’s authority
for] are arbitrary and capricious.’” 3 F.3d at 568 (quoting Heckler
v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 466, 103 S.Ct. 1952, 1956, 76 L.Ed.2d 66
(1983) ).
9a
system” to exclude satellite carriers is neither arbitrary,
capricious, nor contrary to the statute’s “clear meaning.”
As discussed above, the Copyright Office’s exclusion of
Satellite carriers from the definition of “cable systems”
is an interpretation based on reasonable inferences drawn
from statutory scheme and policy. Although such an in-
terpretation is not “the only one it permissibly could have
adopted . . . or even the reading the court would have
[and indeed has] reached ... in a judicial proceeding,”
see Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. at 2781
n. 11, neither can it be said that the interpretation con-
tradicts Congress’s “clear meaning.” Indeed, virtually
nothing in the section’s legislative history suggests that
Congress even contemplated the entrance of satellite tech-
nology into the cable industry. See 57 Fed.Reg. at 3291.°
Accordingly, we REVERSE the decision of the dis-
trict court, and REMAND for entry of judgment on be-
half of the Copyright Office.
®The subsequent addition of § 119 to the Copyright Act, see
supra n. 2, creating a compulsory licensing scheme for satellite
carriers, makes it further apparent that §111 did not plainly
address the inclusion of satellite carriers. If it had, §119 would
have been unnecessary.
10a
APPENDIX B
DISTRICT COURT
N.D. GEORGIA
No. 1:92-cv-666-HTW
SATELLITE BROADCASTING AND COMMUNICATIONS
ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA
Vv.
OMAN
Decided January 27, 1993
Ward, J.
This matter is currently before this court on the fol-
lowing motions: (1) plaintiff's motion for summary
judgment, (2) plaintiff's motion for summary judgment
against defendant United States of America, (3) defen-
dants’ cross-motion for summary judgment, and (4)
plaintiff's motion for a hearing on its motion for sum-
mary judgment. As a preliminary matter, this court
DENIES plaintiffs motion for a hearing: in this court’s
view, the pleadings already submitted in this case provide
a sufficient basis for the court’s resolution of the parties’
motions.
FACTS
Plaintiffs in this matter comprise the Satellite Broad-
casting and Communications Association, (hereinafter
“SBCA”), as well as several of its members who are
so-called “satellite carriers.” The satellite carrier plain-
lla
tiffs retransmit broadcast programming via satellite for
viewing by home satellite dish owners.
Defendants constitute the Register of Copyrights, the
Copyright Office of the Library of Congress, and the
United States, all of which have construed Section 111
of the Copyright Act to exclude satellite carriers from
the statute’s definition of “cable systems.” In this law-
suit plaintiffs now challenge the validity of the defend-
ants’ interpretation of the statute.
Under Section 111, a “cable system” has an absolute
right to retransmit broadcasts, subject to the filing of a
statement of account and the payment of royalty fees, as
long as it refrains from deleting or altering the broad-
cast’s commercial advertising. See 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 111
(d)1, 2(A)-(D), & (3). The Act defines a “cable Sys-
tem” as follows:
[A] facility, located in any State, Territory, Trust
Territory, or Possession, that in whole or in part
receives signals transmitted or programs broadcast
by one or more television broadcast stations licensed
by the Federal Communications Commission, and
makes secondary transmissions of such signals or
programs by wires, cables or other communications
channels to subscribing members of the public who
pay for such service.
17 U.S.C.A. § 111(f). (Emphasis supplied).
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
In 1987, the National Broadcasting Company, (here-
inafter “NBC”), together with several of its affiliate sta-
tions, filed suit against the Satellite Broadcast Networks,
(hereinafter “SBN”), one of the plaintiffs in this action.
NBC and its affiliates alleged that SBN had infringed
their copyrights by retransmitting network programming
broadcast by local affiliates. In its defense, SBN stated
that it had not infringed the plaintiff's copyrights, since
12a
the rebroadcasts were licensed pursuant to the Section
111 compulsory license procedure.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of NBC, holding that the defendant satellite carrier was
not a cable system, as defined by Section 111(f). The
court reasoned that because the defendant satellite car-
rier was not “located entirely within a single state,” the
statutory definition of a cable system could not encom-
pass a carrier of this sort.
On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed. National
Broadcasting Company v. Satellite Broadcast Networks,
940 F.2d 1467 [20 USPQ2d 1071] (11th Cir. 1991).
In its opinion, the court held that “SBN is a cable system
as defined under § 111 whose secondary transmissions
were permissible under FCC rules and regulations.”
Satellite, supra, 940 F.2d at 1471. The court also stated
that it saw “no good reason why a satellite broadcasting
company such as SBN should not be a cable system.”
Satellite, supra, 940 F.2d at 1470. The court finally re-
jected NBC’s argument that “‘located in any State’
means located entirely within a single state.” 7d. at 1470.
In 1992, the Copyright Office rejected the Eleventh
Circuit’s Satellite decision, and promulgated a new and
final regulation providing that satellite carriers were not
cable systems within the meaning of Section 111. The
Copyright Office based this final interpretation on three
grounds: (1) that the facilities of a satellite carrier are
not located in any state, let alone in the same state, (2)
that the Section 111 compulsory license applies only to
localized retransmission services regulated by the FCC as
cable systems, and (3) that retransmission via satellites
were not retransmissions by “other communications chan-
nels,” as required by the provisions of Section 111. See
57 Fed. Reg. 3284, 3290-91.
Plaintiffs then filed this lawsuit in order to challenge
the validity of the Copyright Office’s regulation.
13a
DISCUSSION
A. Plaintiff's Motions for Summary Judgment:
This matter is first before this court on two separate
motions for summary judgment submitted by plaintiffs.
In plaintiffs’ second motion, plaintiffs note that they have
added the United States as an additional defendant in this
matter, and then advise the court that they intend for
the contentions submitted in their first motion to apply to
this defendant as well.
Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party
establishes that there is no genuine issue as to any mate-
rial fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter
of law. Carlin Communication, Inc. v. Southern Bell Tel.
& Tel. Co., 802 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir. 1986);
Warrior Tombigbee Transportation Co. v. M/V Nan
Fung, 695 F.2d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 1983); Fed. R.
Civ. P. 56(c). To determine if the moving party meets
its burden of proof, the court must view all evidence and
inferences to be drawn from it in a light most favorable
to the party opposing the motion. Carlin Communication,
802 F.2d at 1356; Sweat v. Miller Brewing Co., 708 F.2d
655, 656 (11th Cir. 1983).
The Supreme Court recently addressed the burdens of
proof which each party must carry on a motion for sun.-
mary judgment, and stated as follows:
[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the
entry of summary judgment after adequate time for
discovery and upon motion against a party who fails
to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence
of an element essential to that party’s case, and on
which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial. In such a situation, there can be “no genuine
issue as to any material fact,” since a complete fail-
ure of proof concerning an essential element of the
nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other
facts immaterial.
Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548,
2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The nonmoving party
14a
must identify specific facts which demonstrate that there
is a genuine issue for trial; that party may not rest on
the allegations or denials in its pleading. Celotex, 106
S.Ct. at 2553, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 US.
242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In
order to survive defendant’s motion, however, plaintiff
needed only present evidence from which a jury might
return a verdict in his favor. If he does so, there is a
genuine issue of fact that requires a trial. Anderson, 106
S.Ct. at 2514-15.
In this case, the regulation issued by the Copyright Office
clearly conflicts with the decision issued by the Eleventh
Circuit in National Broadcasting Company v. Satellite
Broadcast Networks, 940 F.2d 1467 [20 USPQ2d 1071]
(11th Cir. 1991). Plaintiffs contend that Satellite is now
the law of this circuit, and that principles of stare decisis
require this court to set aside the regulation of the Copy-
right Office. This court agrees. In this court’s view, how-
ever, plaintiffs’ brief shows evidence of some confusion
concerning the appropriate roles of district and appellate
court in the construction of judicial precedent; the court
accordingly offers the following elaboration in an effort
to clarify the question.
Defendants contend that the Supreme Court’s opinion
in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), governs this court’s resolu-
tion of the conflict between the agency’s regulation and
the court’s decision. Under Chevron, the court must first
consider whether Congress has already addressed the issue
in question; the court may determine whether the agency’s
interpretation is reasonable only if Congress has failed to
confront the matter through any explicit statutory direc-
tive. Defendants thus contend that this court’s only man-
date is to assess the credibility of the regulation issued by
the Copyright Office.
Plaintiffs, in contrast, urge that this court adopt the
analysis recently enunciated by the Supreme Court in
Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S.Ct. 841 (1992). In
15a
Lechmere, the Supreme Court emphasized that it would
not implement the two-pronged Chevron test without first
determining whether the agency’s construction of the stat-
ute is “consistent with our past interpretation” of the
provision. Lechmere, 112 S.Ct. at 847. As the court
stated in Lechmere, “[o]nce we have determined a stat-
ute’s clear meaning, we adhere to that determination
under the doctrine of stare decisis, and we judge an agen-
cy’s later interpretation of the statute against our prior
determination of the statute’s meaning.” Lechmere, 112
S.Ct. at 847-48. Plaintiffs accordingly contend that Lech-
mere compels this court to apply the precedent already
established by the Eleventh Circuit—that a satellite car-
rier, in short, is a cable system within the meaning of
Section 111.
In this court’s view, plaintiffs have somewhat miscon-
strued the nature of the Court’s directive in Lechmere;
in that case, the Supreme Court intended its language to
serve only as an illustration of its own procedure, as a
final and ultimate appellate authority, when interpreting
a statute in the face of pre-existing judicial precedent.
District courts, in contrast, must follow, as a matter of
course, the precedents established by their appellate courts.
As one circuit court has stated, “[t]he decision of an
appellate court is binding (not just persuasive) on those
lower in the hierarchy even if not binding on the parties
under principles of preclusion—that is, the parties are
free to relitigate but unlikely to get anywhere.” Bethune
Plaza, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 863 F.2d 525, 532 (7th Cir.
1988). As the Seventh Circuit further elaborated in an
earlier case, district courts are not at liberty to reconsider
issues already decided by an appellate court:
Whether a decision is authoritative depends on a
variety of factors, of which the most important is
the relationship between the court that decided it
and the court to which it is cited later as precedent.
The simplest relationship is hierarchical; the deci-
sions of a superior court in a unitary system binds
the inferior courts.
16a
Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1123 (7th Cir.
1987).
In this case, the Eleventh Circuit has already deter-
mined that a satellite carrier, in short, is a cable system
within the meaning of section 111. The Eleventh Circuit
therefore has made its decision, and must accordingly
“give considerable weight to [that] decision[] unless and
until [it has] been overruled or undermined by the deci-
sions of a higher court, or other supervening develop-
ments, such as a statutory overruling.” Colby, 811 F.2d
at 1123. By the same token, the Eleventh Circuit “is not
absolutely bound by [that decision], and must give fair
consideration to any substantial argument that a litigant
makes for overruling a previous decision.” Colby, 811
F.2d at 1123.
This court, in short, may not, and will not, reconsider
a question already resolved by a previous opinion issued
by its own appellate court. The Eleventh Circuit issued
the opinion, and defendants, if they wish, may argue on
appeal that that court should reexamine the question and
overrule its decision. That court, unlike this one, will
have the authority, at least, if not the inclination, to pur-
sue the course now urged by defendants today.
CONCLUSION
This court, therefore, after due consideration, GRANTS
both plaintiffs’ initial motion for summary judgment, and
plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment against defendant
United States of America. The court DENIES defend-
ants’ cross-motion for summary judgment, and likewise
DENIES plaintiff's motion for a hearing.’
SO ORDERED.
1 As a courtesy to the clerk of court, this court advises the clerk
that this Order terminates entries nos. 11, 17, 22 and 25 on the
docket sheet.
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APPENDIX C
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
No. 90-8597
NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMPANY, INC.,
Plaintiff-A ppellee,
Vv.
SATELLITE BROADCAST NETWORKS, INC.,
Defendant-A ppellant.
NBC TELEVISION AFFILIATES,
Plaintiff-A ppellee,
Vv.
SATELLITE BROADCAST NETWORKS, INC.,
Defendant-A ppellant.
Appeals from the United States District Court
for the Northern District of Georgia
Sept. 4, 1991
Before EDMONDSON and DUBINA, Circuit Judges,
and ESCHBACH,* Senior Circuit Judge.
* Honorable Jesse E. Eschbach, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for
the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.
18a
ESCHBACH, Senior Circuit Judge:
Is Satellite Broadcast Networks, Inc. (“SBN”) a “cable
system” under 17 U.S.C. $111? If it is, then it was
free to rebroadcast the television signal of a National
Broadcasting Company (NBC) affiliate. If not, then
SBN is liable to NBC for copyright infringement. We
conclude that SBN is a cable system and so reverse the
District Court’s summary judgment in NBC’s favor.
The facts are undisputed. SBN has facilities in Geor-
gia, Illinois and New Jersey that receive the broadcast
signals from local television stations. SBN then scrambles
the signals and rebroadcasts them across the country by
satellite. Any owner of a home satellite dish can receive
the signal and, for a fee, receive’ an unscrambling box
from SBN. One of the local signals that SBN has re-
transmitted is that of WXIJA, the Atlanta affiliate of NBC.
NBC filed this action in 1987 claiming that SBN has
infringed NBC’s exclusive rights in copyrighted work ' by
rebroadcasting WXIA’s signal without NBC’s permission.
NBC’s suit is based on 17 U.S.C. § 501(b), which en-
titles “[t]he legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right
under a copyright . . . to institute an action for any in-
fringement of that particular right. . . .” SBN responds
that it committed no infringement. It argues that NBC
and its affiliates had no choice but to grant SBN the
right to rebroadcast their transmissions because of a
“compulsory license” provided in 17 U.S.C. § 111, which
states:
[S]lecondary transmissions to the public by a cable
system of a primary transmission made by a broad-
cast station . . . shall be subject to compulsory li-
censing upon compliance with [procedural require-
1 NBC owns the copyright to a very few television programs,
such as NBC Nightly News and Today. For the majority of its
programs, NBC possesses the exclusive right to broadcast. Affidavit
of John Damiano {f 8-9.
19a
ments and payment of mandatory royalties] where
the carriage of the signals comprising the secondary
transmission is permissible under the rules, regula-
tions or authorizations of the Federal Communica-
tions Commission.
17 U.S.C. § 111(c)(1). NBC must grant SBN the li-
cense as long as SBN meets the requirements of § 111.
If SBN qualifies for the license, it is not an infringer be-
cause it has violated no exclusive rights.
No one disputes that SBN’s satellite broadcast was a
“secondary transmission”; that WXIA is a broadcast sta-
tion; and that SBN complied with all the procedural and
royalty requirements. The question is whether SBN is a
“cable system.” The District Court concluded on sum-
mary judgment that SBN cannot be a “cable system,” and
so has no rebroadcast rights under § 111, because its fa-
cilities are not located entirely within a single state. Our
review of a district court’s grant of summary judgment
is plenary. Kendrick v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ.,
932 F.2d 910, 912 (11th Cir.1991).
The District Court’s view* was based on § 111(f),
which defines “cable system” as:
* Outside this litigation, no court has addressed the question
whether a satellite rebroadcast facility like SBN can be a cable
system under § 111. And it is highly likely that we will be one of
the last courts to address the issue. Through the Satellite Home
Viewer Act of 1988, Congress has provided a new compulsory
license for satellite carriers like SBN. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 119 (West
Supp.1991). Section 119(e) provides that § 111 is not to be con-
strued as providing any authority for secondary transmissions
by satellite carriers while § 119 remains effective. Section 119 be-
came effective on January 1, 1989 and ceases to be effective on
December 31, 1994. See Pub.L. 100-667 §§ 206-07, 102 Stat. 3960
(1988). The Congress was very careful to note that the Satellite
Home Viewer Act is not to be interpreted as impacting SBN’s
alleged status as a cable system in the current lawsuit. See H.R.
No. 100-887 (1), 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in 1988 U.S.Code
Cong. & Admin.News 5611, 5617 and 5630.
20a
a facility located in any State, Territory, Trust Ter-
ritory, or Possession, that . . . receives signals trans-
mitted or programs broadcast by one or more tele-
vision broadcast stations . . . and makes secondary
transmissions of such signals... .
17 U.S.C. § 111(f) (emphasis added).* The District
Court concluded that to be a “facility located in any
State,” the facility must be located entirely within a single
state.* In drawing this construction, the Court was at-
3 Section 111(f) goes on to require that the secondary trans-
mission be made through “wires, cables, or other communications
channels.” A question arises whether a transmission via satellite
is one through “other communications channels.” We think so.
The legislative history shows that in considering the Copyrights
Act, Congress understood that the development of satellites promised
a new channel for communicating in the future. See H.R.Rep. No.
94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47, reprinted in 1976 U.S.Code Cong.
& Admin.News 5659, 5660. Moreover, in interpreting another pro-
vision of § 111, both the Second and the Eighth Circuits have con-
cluded that transmission by “wires, cables or other communications
channels” includes satellite broadcasts. See Hubbard Broadcasting
v. Southern Satellite, 777 F.2d 393, 401-02 (8th Cir.1985), cert.
den., 479 U.S. 1005, 107 S.Ct. 648, 93 L.Ed.2d 699 (1986) ; Eastern
Microwave, Inc. v. Doubleday Sports, Inc., 691 F.2d 125, 181 (2d
Cir.1982), cert. den., 459 U.S. 1226, 103 S.Ct. 1232, 75 L.Ed.2d 467
(1983).
4 Subsequent to oral argument in this case, the Ccepyright Office
issued a policy decision that satellite carriers like SBN are not
“cable systems” under § 111. Cable Compulsory License; Definition
of Cable Systems, Fed.Reg. 31,580 (1991). Specifically, the Copy-
right Office has ruled that a facility must both receive and trans-
mit signals from within the same state in order to qualify for
compulsory licensure. Jd. at 31,590-91. The Copyright Office’s policy
decision is one of general applicability (see id. at 31,588) and fits
within the Agency’s rulemaking authority. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(4);
cf. Cablevision Sys. Dev. Co. v. Motion Picture Ass’n of America,
Inc., 836 F.2d 599, 607-10 (D.C.Cir.1988) (recognizing the au-
thority of the Copyright Office to interpret § 111), cert. den., 487
U.S. 1285, 108 S.Ct. 2901, 101 L.Ed.2d 934 (1988). If this recent
promulgation applied retroactively to this case, it might be entitled
to deferential review under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. National Re-
sources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45, 104 S.Ct. 2778,
21a
tempting to limit cable system status to traditional cable
companies that serve only local communities. But nothing
in the words Congress chose counsel that only local cable
2781-83, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) and Rust v. Sullivan, —— US.
- , 111 S.Ct. 1759, 1766-72, 114 L.Ed.2d 233 (1991).
But the inweinds of the Notice does not require that it apply retro-
actively. And even if it did, we are unconvinced that the Copyright
Office would have the authority to issue a retroactive cule, because
nuthing in either the Administrative Procedure Act or the Copy-
rights Act explicitly so empowers the Agency. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(4)
(“ ‘rule’ means the whole or a part of an agency statement of gen-
eral or particular applicability and future effect designed to imple-
ment, interpret, or prescribe law or policy. ...”) (emphasis added) ;
17 U.S.C. §§ 701-10; Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S.
204, 109 S.Ct. 468, 471, 102 L.Ed.2d 493 (1988) (“[C]Jongressional
enactments and administrative rules will not be construed to have
retroactive effect unless their language requires this result. By
the same principle, a statutory grant of legislative rulemaking
authority will not, as a general matter, be understood to encom-
pass the power to promulgate retroactive rules unless that power
is conveyed by Congress in express terms.”) (citations omitted) ;
Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 110
S.Ct. 1570, 1577, 108 L.Ed.2d 842 (1990); Wright v. Director of
Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 913 F.2d 1566, 1571-74 and n. 11
(11th Cir.1990) ; Chaves County Home Health Serv., Inc. v. Sullivan,
931 F.2d 914, 923 (D.C.Cir.1991) ; General Motors Corp. v. National
Hwy. Traffic Sajety Admin., 898 F.2d 165, 169 (D.Cir.1990) ; Gen-
eral Am. Transp. Corp. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 872 F.2d
1048, 1060-61 (D.C.Cir.1989), on rehearing, 883 F.2d 1029, 1030-31
and n. 2 (D.C.Cir.1989) (Silberman, J., concurring), cert. den.,
—_— U.S. ——, 110 S.Ct. 1112, 107 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1990) ; Chemi-
cal Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection
Agency, 869 F.2d 1526, 1535-37 (D.C.Cir.1989) ; ef. Myers v. Sulli-
van, 916 F.2d 659, 675-78 (11th Cir.1990) (discussing retroactive
application of judicial decisions in an agency proceeding) ; Alacare
Home Health Serv., Inc. v. Sullivan, 891 F.2d 850, 854-55 (11th
Cir.1990) (retroactivity in an agency adjudicatory proceeding) ;
Kaiser, 110 £.Ct. at 1585-88 (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing
the precedent and policy reasons supporting the presumption of
nonretroactivity). In any event, we have considered the views of
the Copyright Office on the language and legislative history of
§ 111, but we find those views unpersuasive. We of course express
no opinion on the new rule’s validity as applied prospectively.
22a
companies be included,® and if Congress had intended to
benefit only community-based systems, it could have de-
fined “cable system” more narrowly. Cf. 47 U.S.C.
§ 522(6) (defining “cable system” in the Cable Commu-
nications Policy Act to mean a facility that provides
video programming to multiple subscribers “within a com-
munity”). We are thus unpersuaded that “located in any
State” means located entirely within a single state. In-
deed, if this narrow reading were to prevail, many of the
concededly traditional local systems serving communities
that cross a state border * would lose their cable system
status.
Reading “located in any State” so narrowly also ig-
nores the definition that immediately precedes that of
“cable system”—the definition of “secondary transmis-
sion.” A secondary transmission:
“is the further transmitting of a primary transmis-
sion simultaneously with the primary transmission,
or nonsimultaneously with the primary transmission
if by a ‘cable system’ not located in whole or in part
within the boundary of the forty-eight contiguous
States, Hawaii, or Puerto Rico... .”
§ 111(f) (emphasis added). The highlighted portion is
a rather cumbersome way of describing a cable system
located entirely within Alaska. But a nonsimultaneous
broadcast is not a secondary transmission if made by a
5 The legislative history supports our conclusion that Congress
intended to paint with a broad brush: “Cable television systems
are commercial subscription services that pick up broadcasts of
programming originated by others and retransmit them to paying
subscribers.” 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News at 5702. SBN
clearly fits this definition.
®TCI of Maryland, Inc. serves subscribers in West Virginia,
Pennsylvania and Maryland; Cox Cable Quint-Cities serves sub-
scribers in Illinois and Iowa; and Comcast Cablevision of Paducah
serves subscribers in Kentucky and Illinois. Affidavit of G. Todd
Hardy { 3.
23a
cable system located partly in Alaska and partly in some
other state. If a cable system must be located entirely
within a single state, it would have been sufficient for
Congress to say “if by a ‘cable system’ located in Alaska.”
This suggests that Congress understood it would be pos-
sible for a cable system to exist “in part” within Alaska
and “in part” elsewhere. This suggestion is consistent
with our analysis, but conflicts with the District Court’s
view, that a cable system can never exist in part in one
state and in part in another.
Finally there is no good reason why a satellite broad-
casting company such as SBN should not be a cable sys-
tem.’ Without dispute, SBN could have broadcasted its
signal to other cable systems located throughout the na-
tion with each of these cable systems passing the signal
along to the public. See EMI, 691 F.2d at 132-35 and
n. 17 (EMI transmitted its signal to 600 cable systems);
Hubbard Broadcasting, 777 F.2d at 401-05. SBN has
simply eliminated the middleman. See EMI, 691 F.2d
at 131, 133. Moreover, to conclude that SBN cannot be
a cable system because of its geographic reach would be
to prevent those in sparsely populated areas from receiv-
ing the quality television reception technology can pro-
vide. Common practice in the traditional community-
based cable television industry assumes it is uneconomical
™NBC laments that because of SBN’s broad geographic reach,
SBN threatens the major television networks. For instance, an
SBN subscriber in Arizona could view the WXIA broadcasts of
L.A. Law or Cheers hours before the NBC affiliate in Arizona
broadcasted these episodes. NBC may have a legitimate gripe,
but protecting the network system is not a concern of § 111. “[T]he
retransmission of network programming, including network pro-
gramming in ‘distant’ markets, does not injure the copyright
owner. The copyright owner contracts with the network on the
basis of his programming reaching all markets served by the net-
work and is compensated accordingly.” 1976 U.S.Code Cong. &
Admin.News at 5704; see also Cablevision Sys. Dev., 836 F.2d at
603; Hubbard, 777 F.2d at 396. NBC’s concerns are more about
communications policy than about copyright infringement and are
more appropriately directed to the FCC.
24a
to wire homes in areas with less than 40 households per
square mile. Affidavit of Mary (Kazie) Catherine Metz-
ger 4 10. The majority of SBN’s customers live in these
sparsely populated areas not served by traditional cable
television. /d. at 4 14. Indeed, many live outside the
reach of the signals of one or all of the networks’ pro-
gramming. /d. at 415. If these people are to receive
cable at all, it will have to be satellite-based cable. In
short, there is no good reason to read “cable system” nar-
rowly to deny SBN its license, and to do so will do an
injustice to those who live in rural areas. SBN is a cable
system.
A minor issue that remains is that § 111(c)(1) gives
SBN rebroadcast rights only if that rebroadcast was “per-
missible under the rules, regulations, or authorizations”
of the FCC. The short answer is that the rebroadcast
was permissible because no rule or regulation forbade it.
NBC has argued that before SBN’s transmissions could
become “permissible,” the FCC had to affirmatively ap-
prove them. But to require express approval of the FCC
would be to reach a result from the FCC’s inaction that
the FCC unequivocally does not intend. The FCC has
expressed sympathy for NBC’s concerns that direct-to-home
satellite distribution threatens the network-affiliate rela-
tionship (see supra note 7), but the FCC has explicitly
stated it would not address these concerns until after the
courts have resolved the copyright infringement issue.
See Inquiry into the Scrambling of Satellite Television
Signals, First Report, 2 FCC Rcd. 1669 4 200-01
(1987). More to the point, the FCC has said “The ques-
tion of whether the cable compulsory license applies to
[home satellite dish] sales is unresclved. We do not pur-
port to resolve it.” Inquiry into the Scrambling of Satel-
lite Television Signals, Second Report, FCC 88-67,
Docket No. 86-336 n. 27 (released March 11, 1988)
(emphasis added). We will not read a result from the
FCC’s failure to act that the FCC neither intends nor
= J
25a
foresees. The secondary transmissions were “permissible”
under existing FCC rules, regulations and authorizations.
SBN is a cable system as defined under § 111 whose
secondary transmissions were permissible under FCC rules
and regulations. Therefore, SBN’s rebroadcast of WXIA’s
signal infringed no copyright. The judgment of the Dis-
trict Court is REVERSED. The award of attorney’s fees
in favor of NBC is also REVERSED.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.