Appendices — Satellite Broadcasting & Communications Ass'n of America v. Ringer

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APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 93-8395

SATELLITE BROADCASTING AND COMMUNICATIONS

ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA, et al.,

Plaintiffs-A ppellees,

Vv.

RALPH OMAN, in his capacity as Register of Copyrights,

and Director of the Copyright Office of the Library of

Congress, and the COPYRIGHT OFFICE OF THE LIBRARY

OF CONGRESS and UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendants-A ppellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

March 24, 1994

Before KRAVITCH and CARNES, Circuit Judges, and

HAND *, Senior District Judge.

KRAVITCH, Circuit Judge:

This appeal calls upon the court te review the United

States Copyright Office’s (“Copyright Office”) promulga-

* Honorable William B. Hand, Senior U.S. District Judge for the

Southern District of Alabama, sitting by designation.

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tion of regulations which deny satellite broadcasters the

right to subscribe to the compulsory licensing scheme set

forth at 17 U.S.C. § 111. Based on this court’s previous

holding in NBC v. Satellite Broadcast Networks, 940 F.2d

1467 (11th Cir.1991) (“SBN”), the district court invali-

dated the Copyright Office regulations. The Copyright

Office appeals.

Although the new regulations conflict with our inter-

pretation of the term “cable system” in SBN, they are

neither arbitrary, capricious, nor in conflict with the clear

meaning of the statute. They are therefore valid exer-

cises of the Copyright Office’s statutory authority to inter-

pret the provisions of the compulsory licensing scheme,

and are binding on this circuit. Accordingly, we RE-

VERSE the district court’s invalidation of the regulations.

Ae

Plaintiffs comprise the Satellite Broadcasting and

Communications Association (“SBCA”), a trade group

representing satellite carriers. Satellite carriers receive

signals broadcast by television stations and then retransmit

those signals by satellite to satellite dishes located in the

homes of their subscribers.

This dispute centers on whether satellite carriers are

“cable systems” for purposes of Copyright Act § 111,

which defines a “cable system” as:

a facility, located in any State, Territory, trust Terri-

tory, or Possession, that . . . receives signals trans-

mitted or programs broadcast by one or more tele-

vision broadcast stations . . . and makes secondary

transmissions of such signals.

17 U.S.C. § 111(f) (emphasis added). If satellite car-

riers are “cable systems,” then they are entitled to sub-

scribe to the compulsory licensing system set forth in that

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section.’ This, in turn, would entitle satellite carriers to

transmit copyrighted television broadcasts, so long as they

pay royalties and abide by the procedures of the licensing

scheme. By contrast, if satellite carriers are not “cable

systems,” then they are not permitted to subscribe to the

licensing scheme and must find an alternate method of

obtaining rights to their desired broadcasts.?

The Eleventh Circuit held in SBN that satellite carriers

are “cable systems” covered by the compulsory licensing

scheme. In SBN, NBC brought a copyright infringement

action against SBN, a satellite carrier, alleging that SBN

had rebroadcast NBC’s signals without its permission. In-

terpreting the definition of “cable system” under § 111(f),

this court held that satellite carriers implicitly were in-

cluded in the compulsory licensing scheme, and that SBN

1Title 17 U.S.C. §111 provides for the compulsory licensing

scheme, stating:

[S]econdary transmissions to the public by a cable system of

a primary transmission made by a broadcast station . . . shall

be subject to compulsory licensing upon compliance with [pro-

cedural requirements and payment of mandatory royalties]

where the carriage of the signals comprising the secondary

transmission is permissible under the rules, regulations or

authorizations of the Federal Communications Commission.

17 U.S.C. § 111(c) <1) (emphasis added).

2In the Satellite Home Viewer Act of 1988, Congress created a

compulsory licensing scheme for satellite carriers by adding § 119

to the Copyright Act. Pub.L. No. 100-667, §§ 201-02, 102 Stat.

3949-58 (1988). However, Section 119—which will expire on Dec.

31, 1994—cffers little guidance in interpreting § 111 because the

accompanying House Report stated:

[N]lothing in this Act is intended to reflect any view as to

the proper interpretation of section 111 of this title prior to

enactment of this Act, or after this Act ceases to be effec-

tive. . . . In particular, nothing in this Act is intended to

reflect any view concerning whether ... an entity that re-

transmits television broadcast signais by satellite to private

home could qualify as a “cable system” under section 111(f).

H.R.Rep. No. 100-887(1I). 100th Cong.2d Sess. at 27 (1988), U.S.

Code Cong. & Admin.News 1988 at 5527, 5630.

4a

thus had engaged in no infringing behavior. We rejected

the suggestion that to be a “facility located in any state”

pursuant to § 111(f), a “cable system” must be located

entirely within a single state.* We further reasoned that

there existed “no good reason” to prevent the often rural

customers of satellite carriers from receiving the benefits

afforded other cable viewers. See 940 F.2d at 1470.

Subsequent to oral argument in SBN, the Copyright

Office issued a policy decision stating that satellite carriers

are not “cable systems” under § 111(f). The Office rea-

soned that § 111(f) requires carriers to receive and trans-

mit signals from within a single state, which is not the

case with satellite technology. See Id. at 1469-70 n. 4

(citing Fed.Reg. 31,580 (1991)). We considered this

policy decision in deciding SBN, but ultimately found it

unpersuasive and, in any event, not retroactive. We em-

phasized, however, that we “of course express[ed] no

opinion on the new rule’s validity as applied prospec-

tively.” Id.

In 1992, after a notice and comment period, the Copy-

right Office affirmed its prior policy decision by promul-

gating a final rule which provided that carriers are not

“cable systems” under § 111(f). 57 Fed.Reg. 3283, 3296

(January 29, 1992) (codified at 37 C.F.R. § 201.17(k) ).*

In its analysis, the Office roundly criticized our decision in

3 We based our broader reading of $111(f) primarily on the

section’s restriction of “secondary transmissions” to transmissions

by “ ‘cable system[s]’ not located in whole or in part within the

boundary of the forty-eight contiguous States, Hawaii, or Puerto

Rico.” 940 F.2d at 1470. This definition suggested to us that a

cable system might be located partly in Alaska and partly in

another state, and thus need not be located within a single state.

4 The Copyright Office added to 37 C.F.R. § 201.17 paragraph (k),

which provides:

Satellite carriers and MMDS not eligible. Satellite carriers,

[and] satellite resale carriers . . . are not eligible for the cable

compulsory license based upon an interpretation of the whole

section 111 of title 17 of the United States Code.

Sa

SBN and offered several reasons directing an opposite

conclusion. First, as the Copyright Office interpreted the

Statute, satellite carriers are not “located in any siate, let

alone the same state,” a “critical requirement” under

§ 111(f). 57 Fed.Reg. at 3290. Moreover, the Office

concluded that § 111(f) was “clearly directed at localized

retransmission services,” based on the section’s provision

that “two or more cable systems in contiguous communi-

ties . . . operating from one headend” constitute one

“cable system” for purposes of determining royalties. Id.

at 3292. The Office reasoned that the terms “contiguous

communities” and “headend” *—applicable to local re-

transmissions—are anomalous in the context of geospheri-

cally orbiting satellite technology. Jd. The Office further

noted that § 111(f)’s definition of a “distant signal equiv-

alent” * by reference to television stations “within whose

local service area the cable system is located” is similarly

inapplicable to satellite carriers. Id. Finally, the Office

concluded that the legislative history is devoid of any in-

dication that Congress considered satellite carriers when

enacting the compulsory licensing scheme. Id. at 3291.

IT.

The Copyright Office is a federal agency with authority

to promulgate rules concerning the meaning and applica-

5 A cable system’s “headend” is its control center, from which a

cable company receives signals and then transmits them, by coaxial

cable, to the company’s subscribers. See generally Eastern Micro-

wave, Inc. v. Doubleday Sports, Inc., 691 F.2d 125, 128 (2d Cir.

1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1226, 103 S.Ct. 1282, 75 L.Ed.2d 467

(1983); United States v. Norris, 833 F.Supp. 1392, 1394 (N.D.

Ind.1993).

* The “distant signal equivalent” is a figure used to calculate the

percentage of gross receipts owed by a cable system to the copyright

holders of programs broadcast. The figure takes into account the

number of “distant,” i.e. not receivable via antenna, independent,

network and educational stations carried. See e.g., Cablevision

Sys. Dev. Co. v. Motion Picture Ass’n of America, Inc., 836 F.2d 599,

608-09 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 487 U.S. 1235, 108 S.Ct. 2901, 101

L.Ed.2d 934 (1988).

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tion of § 111. See SBN, 940 F.2d at 1469 n. 4; Cable-

vision Sys. Dev. Co. v. Motion Picture Ass’n of America,

Inc., 836 F.2d 599, 608-09 (D.C.Cir.), cert. denied, 487

U.S. 1235, 108 S.Ct. 2901, 101 L.Ed2d 934 (1988);

see also DeSylva v. Ballentine, 351 U.S. 570, 577-78, 76

S.Ct. 974, 978, 100 L.Ed. 1415 (1956) (recognizing

that Copyright Office’s interpretation of Copyright Act

should ordinarily receive deference). As such, the Office’s

regulations must be upheld unless “they are arbitrary,

capricious, or manifestly contrary” to the provisions of the

Copyright Act. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Re-

sources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844, 104

S.Ct. 2778, 2782, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984). Stated other-

wise, if the Office has promulgated regulations which

contradict the “clear meaning” or “plain language” of the

statute, then those regulations must be struck down. See,

e.g., Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, USS. : :

112 S.Ct. 841, 847, 117 L.Ed.2d 79 (1992); Public

Employees Retirement Sys. v. Betts, 492 U.S. 158, 171,

109 S.Ct. 2854, 2863, 106 L.Ed.2d 134 (1989); Barrett

v. Adams Fruit Co., Inc., 867 F.2d 1305 (11th Cir.

1989), affd, 494 U.S. 638, 110 S.Ct. 1384, 108 L.Ed.2d

585 (1990).

Courts generally must defer to an agency statutory in-

terpretation that is at odds with circuit precedent, so

long as “the agency’s answer is based on a permissible

construction of the statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844,

104 S.Ct. at 2782 (upholding Environment Protection

Agency regulation which contradicted prior D.C.Circuit

precedent).’ Because the rule at issue in Chevron was

7 The regulatory scheme at issue in Chevron required that “non-

attainment” states under the Clean Air Act establish a permit pro-

gram regulating “new or modified major stationary sources” of air

pollution. 467 U.S. at 840-42, 104 S.Ct. at 2780-81. Under an

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rule, however, “nonat-

tainment” stafes could adopt a plantwide definition of the term

“stationary source,” enabling plants with several pollution-emitting

devices to circumvent certain EPA permit conditions. Jd. The D.C.

Circuit had invalidated the rule, based on its previous holding in

Ta

not “arbitrary, capricious, or manifestly contrary to the

statute,” it was valid, notwithstanding circuit precedent

to the contrary. /d.

SBCA argues that the instant action is controlled not

by Chevron, but rather by Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB,

US. , 112 S.Ct. 841, 117 L.Ed.2d 79 (1992).

Lechmere overruled an NLRB order which contradicted

established Supreme Court precedent by extending pro-

tection under NLRA § 8(a)(1) to union organizers who

were not “employees” covered by the Act. See US.

at - , 112 S.Ct. at 845-46 (citing, inter alia,

NLRB v. Babcock & Wilcox Co., 351 U.S. 105, 113,

76 S.Ct. 679, 684, 100 L.Ed. 975 (1956)). The Lech-

mere Court rejected the Board’s application of NLRA

protections to nonemployee organizers, and reiterated the

rule that “[o]nce we have determined a statute’s clear

meaning, we adhere to that determination under the doc-

trine of stare decisis, and we judge an agency’s later in-

terpretation of the statute against our prior determina-

tion.” U.S. at . , 112 S.Ct. at 847-48

(quoting Maslin Indus. Inc. v. Primary Steel, Inc., 497

U.S. 116, 130, 110 S.Ct. 2759, 2768, 111 L.Ed.2d 94

(199C)}). Relying on Lechmere, SBCA contends that

we are bound by our holding in SBN, absent en banc

reconsideration of the issues.

Unlike the statutory scheme in Lechmere, which ex-

plicitly confined the protected class under NLRA § 8

(a)(1) to “employees,” § 111(f) is far from explicit as

to the inclusion of satellite carriers. For this reason, we

rested our decision in SBN not upon the statute’s “clear

meaning,” but rather upon inferences drawn from the

statutory scheme and upon our policy determination that

satellite carriers should be included for the benefit of

ASARCO, Inc. v. EPA, 578 F.2d 319 (D.C.Cir.1978). Natural

Resources Defense Council, Inc. v. Gorusch, 685 F.2d 718, 727

(D.C.Cir.1982) ; see also ASARCO, 578 F.2d at 325-27 (rejecting

EPA’s application of same rule in similar air-quality program).

8a

their rural customers. We left open the possibility that

we might later consider a contrary rule. Noting that the

Copyright Office had issued a contrary 1991 policy de-

cision, and anticipating the promulgation of a new rule,

we “express[ed] no opinion on the new rule’s validity as

applied prospectively.” 940 F.2d at 1470 n. 4.

Because we did not address the “clear meaning” of

§$ 111(f) in SBN, this circuit is not precluded from re-

visiting our initial interpretation of the regulatory scheme

in SBN. See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842, 104 S.Ct. at

2781 (Court of Appeals erred by “adopt[ing] a static

judicial definition of [the statutory term at issue] when

it had decided that Congress itself had not commanded

that definition”). A contrary result illogically would wed

this circuit to the SBN decision, while all other circuits

and the Supreme Court would be bound under Chevron

to defer to the Copyright Office rule. Moreover, it would

create a rush to the courthouse among parties wishing to

litigate a statute’s meaning before an agency has exer-

cised its broad “knowledge respecting the matters sub-

jected to agency regulations.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 844-

45, 104 S.Ct. at 2782-83 (quoting United States v.

Shimer, 367 U.S. 374, 382, 81 S.Ct. 1554, 156, 6

L.Ed.2d 908 (1961) ).°

If.

Having determined that SBN did not address the “clear

meaning” of “cable system” under § 111(f), we likewise

hold that the Copyright Office’s construction of “cable

8 We find further support for our decision in Schisler v. Sullivan,

8 F.2d 563, 568 (2d Cir. 1993), which addressed a challenge to HHS

regulations interpreting the “treating physician rule” used to evalu-

ate disability claims. The Second Circuit upheld the new HHS

regulations even though they conflicted with prior circuit precedent,

because “[nlew regulations at variance with prior judicial prece-

dents are upheld unless ‘they exceed[] the Secretary’s authority

for] are arbitrary and capricious.’” 3 F.3d at 568 (quoting Heckler

v. Campbell, 461 U.S. 458, 466, 103 S.Ct. 1952, 1956, 76 L.Ed.2d 66

(1983) ).

9a

system” to exclude satellite carriers is neither arbitrary,

capricious, nor contrary to the statute’s “clear meaning.”

As discussed above, the Copyright Office’s exclusion of

Satellite carriers from the definition of “cable systems”

is an interpretation based on reasonable inferences drawn

from statutory scheme and policy. Although such an in-

terpretation is not “the only one it permissibly could have

adopted . . . or even the reading the court would have

[and indeed has] reached ... in a judicial proceeding,”

see Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843 n. 11, 104 S.Ct. at 2781

n. 11, neither can it be said that the interpretation con-

tradicts Congress’s “clear meaning.” Indeed, virtually

nothing in the section’s legislative history suggests that

Congress even contemplated the entrance of satellite tech-

nology into the cable industry. See 57 Fed.Reg. at 3291.°

Accordingly, we REVERSE the decision of the dis-

trict court, and REMAND for entry of judgment on be-

half of the Copyright Office.

®The subsequent addition of § 119 to the Copyright Act, see

supra n. 2, creating a compulsory licensing scheme for satellite

carriers, makes it further apparent that §111 did not plainly

address the inclusion of satellite carriers. If it had, §119 would

have been unnecessary.

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APPENDIX B

DISTRICT COURT

N.D. GEORGIA

No. 1:92-cv-666-HTW

SATELLITE BROADCASTING AND COMMUNICATIONS

ASSOCIATION OF AMERICA

Vv.

OMAN

Decided January 27, 1993

Ward, J.

This matter is currently before this court on the fol-

lowing motions: (1) plaintiff's motion for summary

judgment, (2) plaintiff's motion for summary judgment

against defendant United States of America, (3) defen-

dants’ cross-motion for summary judgment, and (4)

plaintiff's motion for a hearing on its motion for sum-

mary judgment. As a preliminary matter, this court

DENIES plaintiffs motion for a hearing: in this court’s

view, the pleadings already submitted in this case provide

a sufficient basis for the court’s resolution of the parties’

motions.

FACTS

Plaintiffs in this matter comprise the Satellite Broad-

casting and Communications Association, (hereinafter

“SBCA”), as well as several of its members who are

so-called “satellite carriers.” The satellite carrier plain-

lla

tiffs retransmit broadcast programming via satellite for

viewing by home satellite dish owners.

Defendants constitute the Register of Copyrights, the

Copyright Office of the Library of Congress, and the

United States, all of which have construed Section 111

of the Copyright Act to exclude satellite carriers from

the statute’s definition of “cable systems.” In this law-

suit plaintiffs now challenge the validity of the defend-

ants’ interpretation of the statute.

Under Section 111, a “cable system” has an absolute

right to retransmit broadcasts, subject to the filing of a

statement of account and the payment of royalty fees, as

long as it refrains from deleting or altering the broad-

cast’s commercial advertising. See 17 U.S.C.A. §§ 111

(d)1, 2(A)-(D), & (3). The Act defines a “cable Sys-

tem” as follows:

[A] facility, located in any State, Territory, Trust

Territory, or Possession, that in whole or in part

receives signals transmitted or programs broadcast

by one or more television broadcast stations licensed

by the Federal Communications Commission, and

makes secondary transmissions of such signals or

programs by wires, cables or other communications

channels to subscribing members of the public who

pay for such service.

17 U.S.C.A. § 111(f). (Emphasis supplied).

PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1987, the National Broadcasting Company, (here-

inafter “NBC”), together with several of its affiliate sta-

tions, filed suit against the Satellite Broadcast Networks,

(hereinafter “SBN”), one of the plaintiffs in this action.

NBC and its affiliates alleged that SBN had infringed

their copyrights by retransmitting network programming

broadcast by local affiliates. In its defense, SBN stated

that it had not infringed the plaintiff's copyrights, since

12a

the rebroadcasts were licensed pursuant to the Section

111 compulsory license procedure.

The district court granted summary judgment in favor

of NBC, holding that the defendant satellite carrier was

not a cable system, as defined by Section 111(f). The

court reasoned that because the defendant satellite car-

rier was not “located entirely within a single state,” the

statutory definition of a cable system could not encom-

pass a carrier of this sort.

On appeal, the Eleventh Circuit reversed. National

Broadcasting Company v. Satellite Broadcast Networks,

940 F.2d 1467 [20 USPQ2d 1071] (11th Cir. 1991).

In its opinion, the court held that “SBN is a cable system

as defined under § 111 whose secondary transmissions

were permissible under FCC rules and regulations.”

Satellite, supra, 940 F.2d at 1471. The court also stated

that it saw “no good reason why a satellite broadcasting

company such as SBN should not be a cable system.”

Satellite, supra, 940 F.2d at 1470. The court finally re-

jected NBC’s argument that “‘located in any State’

means located entirely within a single state.” 7d. at 1470.

In 1992, the Copyright Office rejected the Eleventh

Circuit’s Satellite decision, and promulgated a new and

final regulation providing that satellite carriers were not

cable systems within the meaning of Section 111. The

Copyright Office based this final interpretation on three

grounds: (1) that the facilities of a satellite carrier are

not located in any state, let alone in the same state, (2)

that the Section 111 compulsory license applies only to

localized retransmission services regulated by the FCC as

cable systems, and (3) that retransmission via satellites

were not retransmissions by “other communications chan-

nels,” as required by the provisions of Section 111. See

57 Fed. Reg. 3284, 3290-91.

Plaintiffs then filed this lawsuit in order to challenge

the validity of the Copyright Office’s regulation.

13a

DISCUSSION

A. Plaintiff's Motions for Summary Judgment:

This matter is first before this court on two separate

motions for summary judgment submitted by plaintiffs.

In plaintiffs’ second motion, plaintiffs note that they have

added the United States as an additional defendant in this

matter, and then advise the court that they intend for

the contentions submitted in their first motion to apply to

this defendant as well.

Summary judgment is appropriate if the moving party

establishes that there is no genuine issue as to any mate-

rial fact and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter

of law. Carlin Communication, Inc. v. Southern Bell Tel.

& Tel. Co., 802 F.2d 1352, 1356 (11th Cir. 1986);

Warrior Tombigbee Transportation Co. v. M/V Nan

Fung, 695 F.2d 1294, 1296 (11th Cir. 1983); Fed. R.

Civ. P. 56(c). To determine if the moving party meets

its burden of proof, the court must view all evidence and

inferences to be drawn from it in a light most favorable

to the party opposing the motion. Carlin Communication,

802 F.2d at 1356; Sweat v. Miller Brewing Co., 708 F.2d

655, 656 (11th Cir. 1983).

The Supreme Court recently addressed the burdens of

proof which each party must carry on a motion for sun.-

mary judgment, and stated as follows:

[T]he plain language of Rule 56(c) mandates the

entry of summary judgment after adequate time for

discovery and upon motion against a party who fails

to make a showing sufficient to establish the existence

of an element essential to that party’s case, and on

which that party will bear the burden of proof at

trial. In such a situation, there can be “no genuine

issue as to any material fact,” since a complete fail-

ure of proof concerning an essential element of the

nonmoving party’s case necessarily renders all other

facts immaterial.

Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 106 S.Ct. 2548,

2552-53, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). The nonmoving party

14a

must identify specific facts which demonstrate that there

is a genuine issue for trial; that party may not rest on

the allegations or denials in its pleading. Celotex, 106

S.Ct. at 2553, Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 US.

242, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). In

order to survive defendant’s motion, however, plaintiff

needed only present evidence from which a jury might

return a verdict in his favor. If he does so, there is a

genuine issue of fact that requires a trial. Anderson, 106

S.Ct. at 2514-15.

In this case, the regulation issued by the Copyright Office

clearly conflicts with the decision issued by the Eleventh

Circuit in National Broadcasting Company v. Satellite

Broadcast Networks, 940 F.2d 1467 [20 USPQ2d 1071]

(11th Cir. 1991). Plaintiffs contend that Satellite is now

the law of this circuit, and that principles of stare decisis

require this court to set aside the regulation of the Copy-

right Office. This court agrees. In this court’s view, how-

ever, plaintiffs’ brief shows evidence of some confusion

concerning the appropriate roles of district and appellate

court in the construction of judicial precedent; the court

accordingly offers the following elaboration in an effort

to clarify the question.

Defendants contend that the Supreme Court’s opinion

in Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984), governs this court’s resolu-

tion of the conflict between the agency’s regulation and

the court’s decision. Under Chevron, the court must first

consider whether Congress has already addressed the issue

in question; the court may determine whether the agency’s

interpretation is reasonable only if Congress has failed to

confront the matter through any explicit statutory direc-

tive. Defendants thus contend that this court’s only man-

date is to assess the credibility of the regulation issued by

the Copyright Office.

Plaintiffs, in contrast, urge that this court adopt the

analysis recently enunciated by the Supreme Court in

Lechmere, Inc. v. NLRB, 112 S.Ct. 841 (1992). In

15a

Lechmere, the Supreme Court emphasized that it would

not implement the two-pronged Chevron test without first

determining whether the agency’s construction of the stat-

ute is “consistent with our past interpretation” of the

provision. Lechmere, 112 S.Ct. at 847. As the court

stated in Lechmere, “[o]nce we have determined a stat-

ute’s clear meaning, we adhere to that determination

under the doctrine of stare decisis, and we judge an agen-

cy’s later interpretation of the statute against our prior

determination of the statute’s meaning.” Lechmere, 112

S.Ct. at 847-48. Plaintiffs accordingly contend that Lech-

mere compels this court to apply the precedent already

established by the Eleventh Circuit—that a satellite car-

rier, in short, is a cable system within the meaning of

Section 111.

In this court’s view, plaintiffs have somewhat miscon-

strued the nature of the Court’s directive in Lechmere;

in that case, the Supreme Court intended its language to

serve only as an illustration of its own procedure, as a

final and ultimate appellate authority, when interpreting

a statute in the face of pre-existing judicial precedent.

District courts, in contrast, must follow, as a matter of

course, the precedents established by their appellate courts.

As one circuit court has stated, “[t]he decision of an

appellate court is binding (not just persuasive) on those

lower in the hierarchy even if not binding on the parties

under principles of preclusion—that is, the parties are

free to relitigate but unlikely to get anywhere.” Bethune

Plaza, Inc. v. Lumpkin, 863 F.2d 525, 532 (7th Cir.

1988). As the Seventh Circuit further elaborated in an

earlier case, district courts are not at liberty to reconsider

issues already decided by an appellate court:

Whether a decision is authoritative depends on a

variety of factors, of which the most important is

the relationship between the court that decided it

and the court to which it is cited later as precedent.

The simplest relationship is hierarchical; the deci-

sions of a superior court in a unitary system binds

the inferior courts.

16a

Colby v. J.C. Penney Co., 811 F.2d 1119, 1123 (7th Cir.

1987).

In this case, the Eleventh Circuit has already deter-

mined that a satellite carrier, in short, is a cable system

within the meaning of section 111. The Eleventh Circuit

therefore has made its decision, and must accordingly

“give considerable weight to [that] decision[] unless and

until [it has] been overruled or undermined by the deci-

sions of a higher court, or other supervening develop-

ments, such as a statutory overruling.” Colby, 811 F.2d

at 1123. By the same token, the Eleventh Circuit “is not

absolutely bound by [that decision], and must give fair

consideration to any substantial argument that a litigant

makes for overruling a previous decision.” Colby, 811

F.2d at 1123.

This court, in short, may not, and will not, reconsider

a question already resolved by a previous opinion issued

by its own appellate court. The Eleventh Circuit issued

the opinion, and defendants, if they wish, may argue on

appeal that that court should reexamine the question and

overrule its decision. That court, unlike this one, will

have the authority, at least, if not the inclination, to pur-

sue the course now urged by defendants today.

CONCLUSION

This court, therefore, after due consideration, GRANTS

both plaintiffs’ initial motion for summary judgment, and

plaintiffs’ motion for summary judgment against defendant

United States of America. The court DENIES defend-

ants’ cross-motion for summary judgment, and likewise

DENIES plaintiff's motion for a hearing.’

SO ORDERED.

1 As a courtesy to the clerk of court, this court advises the clerk

that this Order terminates entries nos. 11, 17, 22 and 25 on the

docket sheet.

17a

APPENDIX C

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 90-8597

NATIONAL BROADCASTING COMPANY, INC.,

Plaintiff-A ppellee,

Vv.

SATELLITE BROADCAST NETWORKS, INC.,

Defendant-A ppellant.

NBC TELEVISION AFFILIATES,

Plaintiff-A ppellee,

Vv.

SATELLITE BROADCAST NETWORKS, INC.,

Defendant-A ppellant.

Appeals from the United States District Court

for the Northern District of Georgia

Sept. 4, 1991

Before EDMONDSON and DUBINA, Circuit Judges,

and ESCHBACH,* Senior Circuit Judge.

* Honorable Jesse E. Eschbach, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for

the Seventh Circuit, sitting by designation.

18a

ESCHBACH, Senior Circuit Judge:

Is Satellite Broadcast Networks, Inc. (“SBN”) a “cable

system” under 17 U.S.C. $111? If it is, then it was

free to rebroadcast the television signal of a National

Broadcasting Company (NBC) affiliate. If not, then

SBN is liable to NBC for copyright infringement. We

conclude that SBN is a cable system and so reverse the

District Court’s summary judgment in NBC’s favor.

The facts are undisputed. SBN has facilities in Geor-

gia, Illinois and New Jersey that receive the broadcast

signals from local television stations. SBN then scrambles

the signals and rebroadcasts them across the country by

satellite. Any owner of a home satellite dish can receive

the signal and, for a fee, receive’ an unscrambling box

from SBN. One of the local signals that SBN has re-

transmitted is that of WXIJA, the Atlanta affiliate of NBC.

NBC filed this action in 1987 claiming that SBN has

infringed NBC’s exclusive rights in copyrighted work ' by

rebroadcasting WXIA’s signal without NBC’s permission.

NBC’s suit is based on 17 U.S.C. § 501(b), which en-

titles “[t]he legal or beneficial owner of an exclusive right

under a copyright . . . to institute an action for any in-

fringement of that particular right. . . .” SBN responds

that it committed no infringement. It argues that NBC

and its affiliates had no choice but to grant SBN the

right to rebroadcast their transmissions because of a

“compulsory license” provided in 17 U.S.C. § 111, which

states:

[S]lecondary transmissions to the public by a cable

system of a primary transmission made by a broad-

cast station . . . shall be subject to compulsory li-

censing upon compliance with [procedural require-

1 NBC owns the copyright to a very few television programs,

such as NBC Nightly News and Today. For the majority of its

programs, NBC possesses the exclusive right to broadcast. Affidavit

of John Damiano {f 8-9.

19a

ments and payment of mandatory royalties] where

the carriage of the signals comprising the secondary

transmission is permissible under the rules, regula-

tions or authorizations of the Federal Communica-

tions Commission.

17 U.S.C. § 111(c)(1). NBC must grant SBN the li-

cense as long as SBN meets the requirements of § 111.

If SBN qualifies for the license, it is not an infringer be-

cause it has violated no exclusive rights.

No one disputes that SBN’s satellite broadcast was a

“secondary transmission”; that WXIA is a broadcast sta-

tion; and that SBN complied with all the procedural and

royalty requirements. The question is whether SBN is a

“cable system.” The District Court concluded on sum-

mary judgment that SBN cannot be a “cable system,” and

so has no rebroadcast rights under § 111, because its fa-

cilities are not located entirely within a single state. Our

review of a district court’s grant of summary judgment

is plenary. Kendrick v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ.,

932 F.2d 910, 912 (11th Cir.1991).

The District Court’s view* was based on § 111(f),

which defines “cable system” as:

* Outside this litigation, no court has addressed the question

whether a satellite rebroadcast facility like SBN can be a cable

system under § 111. And it is highly likely that we will be one of

the last courts to address the issue. Through the Satellite Home

Viewer Act of 1988, Congress has provided a new compulsory

license for satellite carriers like SBN. See 17 U.S.C.A. § 119 (West

Supp.1991). Section 119(e) provides that § 111 is not to be con-

strued as providing any authority for secondary transmissions

by satellite carriers while § 119 remains effective. Section 119 be-

came effective on January 1, 1989 and ceases to be effective on

December 31, 1994. See Pub.L. 100-667 §§ 206-07, 102 Stat. 3960

(1988). The Congress was very careful to note that the Satellite

Home Viewer Act is not to be interpreted as impacting SBN’s

alleged status as a cable system in the current lawsuit. See H.R.

No. 100-887 (1), 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 14, reprinted in 1988 U.S.Code

Cong. & Admin.News 5611, 5617 and 5630.

20a

a facility located in any State, Territory, Trust Ter-

ritory, or Possession, that . . . receives signals trans-

mitted or programs broadcast by one or more tele-

vision broadcast stations . . . and makes secondary

transmissions of such signals... .

17 U.S.C. § 111(f) (emphasis added).* The District

Court concluded that to be a “facility located in any

State,” the facility must be located entirely within a single

state.* In drawing this construction, the Court was at-

3 Section 111(f) goes on to require that the secondary trans-

mission be made through “wires, cables, or other communications

channels.” A question arises whether a transmission via satellite

is one through “other communications channels.” We think so.

The legislative history shows that in considering the Copyrights

Act, Congress understood that the development of satellites promised

a new channel for communicating in the future. See H.R.Rep. No.

94-1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 47, reprinted in 1976 U.S.Code Cong.

& Admin.News 5659, 5660. Moreover, in interpreting another pro-

vision of § 111, both the Second and the Eighth Circuits have con-

cluded that transmission by “wires, cables or other communications

channels” includes satellite broadcasts. See Hubbard Broadcasting

v. Southern Satellite, 777 F.2d 393, 401-02 (8th Cir.1985), cert.

den., 479 U.S. 1005, 107 S.Ct. 648, 93 L.Ed.2d 699 (1986) ; Eastern

Microwave, Inc. v. Doubleday Sports, Inc., 691 F.2d 125, 181 (2d

Cir.1982), cert. den., 459 U.S. 1226, 103 S.Ct. 1232, 75 L.Ed.2d 467

(1983).

4 Subsequent to oral argument in this case, the Ccepyright Office

issued a policy decision that satellite carriers like SBN are not

“cable systems” under § 111. Cable Compulsory License; Definition

of Cable Systems, Fed.Reg. 31,580 (1991). Specifically, the Copy-

right Office has ruled that a facility must both receive and trans-

mit signals from within the same state in order to qualify for

compulsory licensure. Jd. at 31,590-91. The Copyright Office’s policy

decision is one of general applicability (see id. at 31,588) and fits

within the Agency’s rulemaking authority. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(4);

cf. Cablevision Sys. Dev. Co. v. Motion Picture Ass’n of America,

Inc., 836 F.2d 599, 607-10 (D.C.Cir.1988) (recognizing the au-

thority of the Copyright Office to interpret § 111), cert. den., 487

U.S. 1285, 108 S.Ct. 2901, 101 L.Ed.2d 934 (1988). If this recent

promulgation applied retroactively to this case, it might be entitled

to deferential review under Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. National Re-

sources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-45, 104 S.Ct. 2778,

21a

tempting to limit cable system status to traditional cable

companies that serve only local communities. But nothing

in the words Congress chose counsel that only local cable

2781-83, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984) and Rust v. Sullivan, —— US.

- , 111 S.Ct. 1759, 1766-72, 114 L.Ed.2d 233 (1991).

But the inweinds of the Notice does not require that it apply retro-

actively. And even if it did, we are unconvinced that the Copyright

Office would have the authority to issue a retroactive cule, because

nuthing in either the Administrative Procedure Act or the Copy-

rights Act explicitly so empowers the Agency. See 5 U.S.C. § 551(4)

(“ ‘rule’ means the whole or a part of an agency statement of gen-

eral or particular applicability and future effect designed to imple-

ment, interpret, or prescribe law or policy. ...”) (emphasis added) ;

17 U.S.C. §§ 701-10; Bowen v. Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S.

204, 109 S.Ct. 468, 471, 102 L.Ed.2d 493 (1988) (“[C]Jongressional

enactments and administrative rules will not be construed to have

retroactive effect unless their language requires this result. By

the same principle, a statutory grant of legislative rulemaking

authority will not, as a general matter, be understood to encom-

pass the power to promulgate retroactive rules unless that power

is conveyed by Congress in express terms.”) (citations omitted) ;

Kaiser Aluminum & Chem. Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 110

S.Ct. 1570, 1577, 108 L.Ed.2d 842 (1990); Wright v. Director of

Fed. Emergency Mgmt. Agency, 913 F.2d 1566, 1571-74 and n. 11

(11th Cir.1990) ; Chaves County Home Health Serv., Inc. v. Sullivan,

931 F.2d 914, 923 (D.C.Cir.1991) ; General Motors Corp. v. National

Hwy. Traffic Sajety Admin., 898 F.2d 165, 169 (D.Cir.1990) ; Gen-

eral Am. Transp. Corp. v. Interstate Commerce Comm’n, 872 F.2d

1048, 1060-61 (D.C.Cir.1989), on rehearing, 883 F.2d 1029, 1030-31

and n. 2 (D.C.Cir.1989) (Silberman, J., concurring), cert. den.,

—_— U.S. ——, 110 S.Ct. 1112, 107 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1990) ; Chemi-

cal Waste Mgmt., Inc. v. United States Environmental Protection

Agency, 869 F.2d 1526, 1535-37 (D.C.Cir.1989) ; ef. Myers v. Sulli-

van, 916 F.2d 659, 675-78 (11th Cir.1990) (discussing retroactive

application of judicial decisions in an agency proceeding) ; Alacare

Home Health Serv., Inc. v. Sullivan, 891 F.2d 850, 854-55 (11th

Cir.1990) (retroactivity in an agency adjudicatory proceeding) ;

Kaiser, 110 £.Ct. at 1585-88 (Scalia, J., concurring) (discussing

the precedent and policy reasons supporting the presumption of

nonretroactivity). In any event, we have considered the views of

the Copyright Office on the language and legislative history of

§ 111, but we find those views unpersuasive. We of course express

no opinion on the new rule’s validity as applied prospectively.

22a

companies be included,® and if Congress had intended to

benefit only community-based systems, it could have de-

fined “cable system” more narrowly. Cf. 47 U.S.C.

§ 522(6) (defining “cable system” in the Cable Commu-

nications Policy Act to mean a facility that provides

video programming to multiple subscribers “within a com-

munity”). We are thus unpersuaded that “located in any

State” means located entirely within a single state. In-

deed, if this narrow reading were to prevail, many of the

concededly traditional local systems serving communities

that cross a state border * would lose their cable system

status.

Reading “located in any State” so narrowly also ig-

nores the definition that immediately precedes that of

“cable system”—the definition of “secondary transmis-

sion.” A secondary transmission:

“is the further transmitting of a primary transmis-

sion simultaneously with the primary transmission,

or nonsimultaneously with the primary transmission

if by a ‘cable system’ not located in whole or in part

within the boundary of the forty-eight contiguous

States, Hawaii, or Puerto Rico... .”

§ 111(f) (emphasis added). The highlighted portion is

a rather cumbersome way of describing a cable system

located entirely within Alaska. But a nonsimultaneous

broadcast is not a secondary transmission if made by a

5 The legislative history supports our conclusion that Congress

intended to paint with a broad brush: “Cable television systems

are commercial subscription services that pick up broadcasts of

programming originated by others and retransmit them to paying

subscribers.” 1976 U.S.Code Cong. & Admin.News at 5702. SBN

clearly fits this definition.

®TCI of Maryland, Inc. serves subscribers in West Virginia,

Pennsylvania and Maryland; Cox Cable Quint-Cities serves sub-

scribers in Illinois and Iowa; and Comcast Cablevision of Paducah

serves subscribers in Kentucky and Illinois. Affidavit of G. Todd

Hardy { 3.

23a

cable system located partly in Alaska and partly in some

other state. If a cable system must be located entirely

within a single state, it would have been sufficient for

Congress to say “if by a ‘cable system’ located in Alaska.”

This suggests that Congress understood it would be pos-

sible for a cable system to exist “in part” within Alaska

and “in part” elsewhere. This suggestion is consistent

with our analysis, but conflicts with the District Court’s

view, that a cable system can never exist in part in one

state and in part in another.

Finally there is no good reason why a satellite broad-

casting company such as SBN should not be a cable sys-

tem.’ Without dispute, SBN could have broadcasted its

signal to other cable systems located throughout the na-

tion with each of these cable systems passing the signal

along to the public. See EMI, 691 F.2d at 132-35 and

n. 17 (EMI transmitted its signal to 600 cable systems);

Hubbard Broadcasting, 777 F.2d at 401-05. SBN has

simply eliminated the middleman. See EMI, 691 F.2d

at 131, 133. Moreover, to conclude that SBN cannot be

a cable system because of its geographic reach would be

to prevent those in sparsely populated areas from receiv-

ing the quality television reception technology can pro-

vide. Common practice in the traditional community-

based cable television industry assumes it is uneconomical

™NBC laments that because of SBN’s broad geographic reach,

SBN threatens the major television networks. For instance, an

SBN subscriber in Arizona could view the WXIA broadcasts of

L.A. Law or Cheers hours before the NBC affiliate in Arizona

broadcasted these episodes. NBC may have a legitimate gripe,

but protecting the network system is not a concern of § 111. “[T]he

retransmission of network programming, including network pro-

gramming in ‘distant’ markets, does not injure the copyright

owner. The copyright owner contracts with the network on the

basis of his programming reaching all markets served by the net-

work and is compensated accordingly.” 1976 U.S.Code Cong. &

Admin.News at 5704; see also Cablevision Sys. Dev., 836 F.2d at

603; Hubbard, 777 F.2d at 396. NBC’s concerns are more about

communications policy than about copyright infringement and are

more appropriately directed to the FCC.

24a

to wire homes in areas with less than 40 households per

square mile. Affidavit of Mary (Kazie) Catherine Metz-

ger 4 10. The majority of SBN’s customers live in these

sparsely populated areas not served by traditional cable

television. /d. at 4 14. Indeed, many live outside the

reach of the signals of one or all of the networks’ pro-

gramming. /d. at 415. If these people are to receive

cable at all, it will have to be satellite-based cable. In

short, there is no good reason to read “cable system” nar-

rowly to deny SBN its license, and to do so will do an

injustice to those who live in rural areas. SBN is a cable

system.

A minor issue that remains is that § 111(c)(1) gives

SBN rebroadcast rights only if that rebroadcast was “per-

missible under the rules, regulations, or authorizations”

of the FCC. The short answer is that the rebroadcast

was permissible because no rule or regulation forbade it.

NBC has argued that before SBN’s transmissions could

become “permissible,” the FCC had to affirmatively ap-

prove them. But to require express approval of the FCC

would be to reach a result from the FCC’s inaction that

the FCC unequivocally does not intend. The FCC has

expressed sympathy for NBC’s concerns that direct-to-home

satellite distribution threatens the network-affiliate rela-

tionship (see supra note 7), but the FCC has explicitly

stated it would not address these concerns until after the

courts have resolved the copyright infringement issue.

See Inquiry into the Scrambling of Satellite Television

Signals, First Report, 2 FCC Rcd. 1669 4 200-01

(1987). More to the point, the FCC has said “The ques-

tion of whether the cable compulsory license applies to

[home satellite dish] sales is unresclved. We do not pur-

port to resolve it.” Inquiry into the Scrambling of Satel-

lite Television Signals, Second Report, FCC 88-67,

Docket No. 86-336 n. 27 (released March 11, 1988)

(emphasis added). We will not read a result from the

FCC’s failure to act that the FCC neither intends nor

= J

25a

foresees. The secondary transmissions were “permissible”

under existing FCC rules, regulations and authorizations.

SBN is a cable system as defined under § 111 whose

secondary transmissions were permissible under FCC rules

and regulations. Therefore, SBN’s rebroadcast of WXIA’s

signal infringed no copyright. The judgment of the Dis-

trict Court is REVERSED. The award of attorney’s fees

in favor of NBC is also REVERSED.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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