Opposition Brief — Jones v. United States

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LESTER V. JONES, PETITIONER

v.

UnitTep STATES OF AMERICA

‘ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

. BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPCSITION

2

ai

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Whether the Constitution entitles a defendant in a

criminal case to jury instructions defining the term

“reasonable doubt.”

2. Whether the Constitution entitles a defendant in a

criminal case to present argument to the jury con-

cerning the meaning of the term “reasonable doubt.”

(I)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases:

Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975) ...............0000 10

Holland vy. United States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954) 20000000000... 6

Thompson v. Lynaugh, 821 F.2d 1054 (5th Cir.), cert.

8 eee 9

United States v. Crockett, 813 F.2d 1310 (4th Cir.),

cert. denied, 484 U.S. 884 (1987) .............cccccccccssssccsssees 10

United States v. Lawson, 507 F.2d 433 (7th Cir. 1974),

cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1004 (1975) ...................ccccccosese 9

United States v. Nolasco, 926 F.2d 869 (9th Cir.), cert.

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United States v. Olmstead, 832 F.2d 642 (1st Cir. 1987),

cert. denied, 486 U.S. 1009 (1988) .....................ceeeeceeees 9

United States v. Reives, 15 F.3d 42 (4th Cir.), cert.

denied, 114 S. Ct. 2679 (1994) .0...:...........cccccccscscsssssssssees 8

United States v. Taylor, 997 F.2d 1551 (D.C. Cir. 1993) .. 6,9

United States v. Wables, 731 F.2d 440 (7th Cir. 1984) ..... 10

Victor v. Nebraska, 114 8. Ct. 1239 (1994) ................. 6, 7, 8,9

Whiteside v. Parke, 705 F.2d 869 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,

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(III)

In the Supreme Court of the Ginited States

OCTOBER TERM, 1994

No. 93-1961

LESTER V. JONES, PETITIONER

vs

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT

BRIEF FOR THE UNITED STATES IN OPPOSITION

OPINION BELOW

The opinion of the court of appeals (Pet. App. la-6a) is

unpublished, but the judgment is noted at 21 F.3d 426

(Table).

JURISDICTION

The opinion of the court of appeals was issued on April

13, 1994. The petition for a writ of certiorari was filed on

June 8, 1994. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked

under 28 U.S.C. 1254(1).

(1)

2

STATEMENT

Petitioner, an attorney, was charged with two counts

of willfully attempting to evade income tax, in violation

of 26 U.S.C. 7201, and two counts of willfully filing

fraudulent amended tax returns, in violation of 26 U.S.C.

7206(1). Petitioner’s first trial ended in a mistrial when

the jury was unable to reach a verdict. At a second trial

petitioner was convicted on the tax evasion counts and

acquitted on the fraudulent return counts. Petitioner

was sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment and a fine.’

The court of appeals affirmed. Pet. App. la-6a.

1. Between 1982 and- 1984, petitioner operated a

successful law practice in Bel Air, Maryland. Gov’t C.A.

Br. 4; C.A. App. 40-41. Petitioner reported taxabie

income of $51,000 for 1983 and $50,000 for 1984, although

his true taxable income for those years was $164,000 and

$230,000. Gov’t C.A. Br. 9. Petitioner consistently and

accurately informed various financial institutions from

which he was requesting loans that his net annual

income ranged between $150,000 and $200,000. During

the same time period, petitioner spent more than

$410,000 on purchases of a variety of items including

automobiles and condominiums. /d. at 9-10.

In the spring of 1986, the Internal Revenue Service

audited petitioner’s 1984 tax return. Although petitioner

informed the IRS auditor that he had deposited all of his

1983-1984 gross receipts from his law practice into a

single business account, that account actuaily contained

only a portion of petitioner’s fees. Petitioner had also

! Citing the poor health of petitioner’s wife and daughter, the

district court later reduced the sentence. As a result of the court’s

action, petitioner served only six months’ imprisonment. Pet. App.

19a-20a.

3

deposited hundreds of thousands of dollars into various

personal accounts and had failed to report that income on

his tax returns. In addition, petitioner had not reported

all of the income deposited into the business account.

Gov’t C.A. Br. 4-5, 8.2 After the IRS corrected his gross

receipts and taxable income, petitioner owed approxi-

mately $135,000 in additional tax for 1983-1984. Id. at 8-9.

In the fall of 1986, after the IRS’s civil auditor had

referred petitioner’s case to the IRS Criminal Investi-

gatien Division, petitioner filed amended 1983-1984 tax

returns. On those amended returns, petitioner did not

report as gross receipts the full amount of his cash fees

or the proceeds of certain fee checks that he had cashed

but not deposited. Gov’t C.A. Br. 5-6.

2. In March 1991, a federal grand jury returned an

indictment charging petitioner with attempted tax

evasion for 1983-1984 and with willfully filing false 1983-

1984 amended returns.’ Gov’t C.A. Br. 2; see 26 U.S.C.

7201, 7206(1). Petitioner’s July 1991 trial ended in a

mistrial when the jury was unable to reach a verdict. Jd.

at 3.

During his retrial, which occurred during a three-

week period in April 1992, petitioner did not dispute the

existence or the amount of his understated income, nor

did he testify or call any witnesses on his own behalf.

His defense, which he presented in both his opening

statement and his closing argument, was that the

2 Petitioner reported gross receipts of $171,200 for 1983 and

$184,500 for 1984. His correct gross receipts for those years were,

respectively, $332,000 and $448,000. Gov’t C.A. Br. 8.

3 Although the government offered substantial evidence

regarding petitioner’s 1982 tax year in order to establish a pattern

of unreported income, the statute of limitations barred any charges

relating to that year. Gov’t C.A. Br. 2 n.1.

4

government had failed to prove his guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt. Pet. 2-3; C.A. App. 34-37, 213-217.

During the court’s charge conference, petitioner

requested that the district court define the term

“reasonable doubt” in its jury instructions. The court

refused to give petitioner’s requested instruction, which

defined “reasonable doubt” largely in terms of a

hesitancy to act in important matters. The court ex-

plained that giving the instruction was prohibited by

existing circuit precedent. In instructing the jury,

however, the court repeatedly stated that petitioner was

presumed innocent and that the government bore the

burden of proving his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

See C.A. App. 24, 203-210, 224-227, 234, 237-240, 245, 247.

In addition to requesting a jury instruction defining

reasonable doubt, petitioner requested that the district

court allow him to define the term in his closing

argument to the jury. The court stated that petitioner

could present a portion of his proposed definition, to the

effect that “reasonable doubt” did not require the

government to prove “its case to a mathematical

certainty,” but refused to allow him to argue the

remainder, which stated that “reasonable doubt” was

“any concern of the kind that would cause you to hesitate

in the most important of your own personal or family or

business or job situations.” C.A. App. 211. Petitioner

rejected the option offered by the court. Jd. at 212. The

court also allowed petitioner in his closing argument to

explain “reasonable doubt” in “precisely the same

words” as he had used in his opening statement. Jd. at

208. Petitioner presented an extensive closing argu-

ment, in which he repeatedly stressed the presumption of

innocence and the government’s burden of proving his

guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. Jd. at 213-217. He also

repeated the gist of a metaphor that he had used during

5

his opening statement, to the effect that “a reasonable

doubt means that * * * if it is anywhere near close, the

Government hasn’t made its case. They have to throw us

out by a mile, to use a baseball metaphor.” Pet. App. 4a-

5a, 42a.

The jury convicted petitioner of the two evasion

counts and acquitted him of the two false filing counts.

The court sentenced petitioner to 18 months’ imprison-

ment and required him to pay a $25,000 fine. Pet. App.

10a-12a.

3. Petitioner appealed, contending that the district

court had erroneously refused to define reasonable doubt

in its jury instructions and had improperly refused to

allow him to argue the meaning of the term in his closing

argument. Pet. C.A. Br. 7-8. Acknowledging that the

court of appeals had previously “ruled against the

position advanced in [his] appeal,” petitioner included a

suggestion for en banc review in his appellate brief. Jd.

at 8-9.

After the court of appeals denied en banc review, see

Pet. App. 7a-8a, a panel affirmed petitioner’s conviction

in an unpublished per curiam opinion. Jd. at la-6a.

Stating that it had “never found a refusal of a party’s

request for a clarifying instruction to be error,” the

court reaffirmed its “longstanding, albeit forgiving,

proscription against any attempts to define reasonable

doubt to jurors.” Jd. at 5a-6a. The court also rejected

petitioner’s contention regarding the limitation placed

on his closing remarks, explaining that the court had

“consistently” allowed district ccurts to prohibit

counsel from defining reasonable doubt in their argu-

ments to the jury. Jd. at 6a.

6

ARGUMENT

1. Although the reasonable doubt standard “is an

ancient and honored aspect of our criminal justice

system,” Victor v. Nebraska, 1148. Ct. 1289, 1242 (1994),

this Court has noted that “attempts to explain the,term

‘reasonable doubt’ do not usually result in making it any

clearer to the minds of the jury,” Holland v. United

States, 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954). * For that reason, many

courts of appeals have expressed the view that the

“purposes of having juries may be best served if juries, in

the first instance, bear the responsibility for defining”

reasonable doubt. E.g., United States v. Taylor, 997 F.2d

1551, 1558 (D.C. Cir. 1993); United States v. Nolasco, 926

F.2d 869, 871-873 (9th Cir.) (citing cases), cert. denied,

1128S. Ct. 111 (1991).

That approach is consistent with this Court’s recent

decision in Victor v. Nebraska, in which the Court

stated:

The beyond a reasonable doubt standard is a

requirement of due process, but the Constitution

neither prohibits trial courts from defining reason-

able doubt nor requires them to do so as a matter of

course. Indeed, so long as the court instructs the

4 This case illustrates that point nicely. The instruction

requested by petitioner defined “reasonable doubt” as, inter alia,

“a doubt which would cause a reasonable person to hesitate to act in

a matter of importance in his or her personal life.” C.A. App. 24.

Petitioner contends that the district court’s refusal to give that

instruction was constitutional error. Justice Ginsburg and other

federal jurists, however, have specifically criticized the “hesitate

to act” formulation as unhelpful and confusing to the jury, and

potentially prejudicial to the defendant. See Victor v. Nebraska,

114 S. Ct. at 1252 (Ginsburg, J., concurring in part and concurring

in the judgment).

7

jury on the necessity that the defendant’s guilt be

proven beyond a reasonable doubt, the Constitution

does not require that any particular form of words be

used in advising the jury of the government’s burden

of proof. Rather, taken as a whole, the instructions

must correctly convey the concept of reasonable

doubt to the jury.

114 8S. Ct. at 1243 (citations, brackets, and internal

quotation marks omitted).

The court’s jury instructions in petitioner’s case

suffered from no constitutional infirmity. In instructing

the jury, the district court mentioned the reasonable

doubt standard at least 18 times and was careful to

explain that the government bore the burden of proof.

C.A. App. 222-251. The court stated, for example, that:

As a result of the defendant’s plea of not guilty, the

burden is on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt. This burden never shifts to a

defendant for the simple reason that the law never

imposes upon a defendant in a criminal case, the

burden or duty of calling any witness or producing

any evidence.

The law presumes the defendant to be innocent of

all charges against him. I therefore instruct you

that the defendant is presumed by you to be innocent

until such time, if ever, you as the jury are satisfied

that the government has proven him guilty beyond a

reasonable doubt.

The defendant begins the trial here with a clean

slate. This presumption of innocence alone is

sufficient to acquit a defendant unless you as jurors

are unanimously convinced beyond a reasonable doubt

8

of his guilt, after a careful and impartial con-

sideration of all of the evidence in this case. If the

government fails to sustain its burden, you must find

the defendant not guilty.

This presumption was with the defendant when the

trial began and remains with him even now as I speak

to you and will continue with the defendant into your

deliberations unless and until you are convinced that

the government has proven his guilt beyond a

reasonable doubt.

Id. at 225-226. The court went on to instruct, inter alia,

that the government was required to establish each

element of petitioner’s charged offenses “beyond a

reasonable doubt,” id. at 227, 237-240, and that the jury

must find petitioner not guilty if it was not convinced of

his guilt “beyond a reasonable doubt” after weighing all

the evidence, id. at 227. These instructions correctly

apprised the jury of the government’s burden of proof and

“econve[yed] the concept of reasonable doubt to the jury.”

Victor v. Nebraska, 114 S. Ct. at 1248.

Nor is this Court’s review warranted to resolve “a

conflict among the federal Courts of Appeals” (Pet. 19)

on whether a definition of reasonable doubt should be

provided when requested by a defendant. Although

various federal courts of appeals and state courts have

given different directions to trial courts within their

jurisdictions regarding whether to define the term

“reasonable doubt” and what verbal formulations to use,”

5 The majority of the federal courts of appeals to consider the

issue have either discouraged defining the term or have left the

matter to the discretion of the trial court. See, e.g., United States

v. Reives, 15 F.3d 42, 44 n.1, 45 (4th Cir.) (condemns giving

9

this Court made clear in Victor that the Constitution

does not require that the term be defined or that any

particular formulation be used. 114 S. Ct. at 1243.° Nor

do the differences in the prescribed verbal formulations

among the lower courts call for this Court’s review.

Preferences as to the appropriate language to be used to

define a term such as reasonable doubt—when the

choices are all within constitutionally permissible

bounds—are matters properly left to the individual

choice of the lower appellate courts in the exercise of

their supervisory powers over the trial courts within

their jurisdictions.

2. There is no merit to petitioner’s assertion (Pet. 15)

that the district court refused to permit him to present

“any meaningful argument to the jury on the meaning of

definition but leaves decision to do so with trial court), cert.

denied, 114 S. Ct. 2679 (1994); United States v. Taylor, 997 F.2d

1551, 1557-1558 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (district court “need not give any

definition of reasonable doubt at all”); United States v. Nolasco,

926 F.2d 869, 872 (9th Cir.) (definition is permissible but not

required) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 111 (1991); United

States v. Olmstead, 832 F.2d 642, 646 (1st Cir. 1987) (instruction

using words “reasonable doubt” without further definition

adequately apprises the jury of the proper burden of proof), cert.

denied, 486 U.S. 1009 (1988); Thompson v. Lynaugh, 821 F.2d 1054,

1060-1061 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 485 U.S. 1035 (1987); United

States v. Lawson, 507 F.2d 433, 442 (7th Cir. 1974) (trial judge has

option to define), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 1004 (1975); cf. Whiteside

v. Parke, 705 F.2d 869, 871-872 (6th Cir.) (using “totality of

circumstances” approach to determine whether failure to define

was constitutional violation), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 843 (1983).

6 Of course, this Court’s decision in Victor does not prevent the

States from requiring, as a matter of their own law, that such an

instruction be given. Nor did the Court forbid district courts to

give such instructions in federal criminal trials; it simply made

clear that instructions of the sort requested by petitioner are not

constitutionally required.

10

the reasonable doubt standard” and thereby abridged his

constitutional rights. The record shows (C.A. App. 213-

217) that, far from being prevented from making his

point, petitioner was permitted to present an extensive

closing argument in which he repeatedly asserted that

the government had failed to overcome his presumption

of innocence by proving his guilt “beyond a reasonable

doubt.” Because it is the role of the court, not counsel,

to explain the law to the jury, the district court’s refusal

to allow petitioner to argue his own definition of

reasonable doubt fell well within the court’s broad

discretion to control closing argument in order to

ensure “that [it] d[id] not stray unduly from the mark.”

United States v. Wables, 731 F.2d 440, 449 (7th Cir. 1984),

quoting Herring v. New York, 422 U.S. 853 (1975);

United States v. Crockett, 813 F.2d 1310, 1317 (4th Cir.)

(no abuse of discretion in trial court’s refusal to allow

defendant to define reasonable doubt in closing argu-

ment), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 834 (1987).

CONCLUSION

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted.

DREw S. Days, III

Solicitor General

LORETTA C. ARGRETT

Assistant Attorney General

ROBERT E. LINDSAY

ALAN HECHTKOPF

JANET KAY JONES

Attorneys

AUGUST 1994

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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