Opposition Brief — Talmidge International, Ltd. v. Dahiya
Supreme Court brief2005
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No. 04-567
Iu the
Supreme Court of the United States
TALMIDGE INTERNATIONAL, LTD., NEPTUNE
SHIPMANAGEMENT SERVICES (PTE) LTD..,
AMERICAN EAGLE TANKERS, INC., LTD., AND
THE BRITANNIA STEAMSHIP INSURANCE
ASSOCIATION, LTD.,
Petitioners,
w,
VINOD KUMAR DAHIYA
Respondent.
On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
to the United States Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit
BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
Kevin O’Bryon
O’Bryon & Schnabel, PLC
1515 Poydras Street
Suite 830
New Orleans, LA 70112
(504) 799-4200
(504) 799-4211 fax
Attorney for Respondent
REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT
While petitioners ultimately seek review of the
enforceability of their claimed arbitration remedies, their
appeal below was dismissed for lack of appellate jurisdiction
after the district court remanded the suit to state court.
Where, as here, the remand order is based upon the lack of
subject matter jurisdiction, that order is statutorily immune
from review on appeal. 28 USC 1447(d), Thermtron
Products, Inc. v. Hermansdorfer, 423 U.S. 336, 96 S.Ct. 584,
46 L.Ed.2d 542 (1976). Respondent cannot improve upon
the concise explanation of the lack of appellate jurisdiction
set forth in the panel opinion of the circuit court of appeals.
That the district court’s remand order was based upon
the lack of subject matter jurisdiction is patent. The notice
of removal filed by petitioners in the U.S. district court
expressly recited the Convention on the Recognition and
Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, 9 USC 201, et seq.
as the basis for federal jurisdiction. In fact, because the
removal would have been untimely under any other basis of
jurisdiction, the Convention was the only possible grounds
for federal jurisdiction.’ Whether the district court was right
or wrong in finding that the purported arbitration agreement
was unenforceable under the Convention, and therefore
provided no grounds for removal under 9 USC 205, the
remand order necessarily was based on the lack of subject
Contrary to the representation of the petition for certiorari
(at p. 7), the district court’s remand order expressly noted
that the untimely removal waived bases for subject matter
jurisdiction other than the Convention (see, Appendix B to
petition for certiorari, at p. 45a).
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matter jurisdiction, and was thus unreviewable as a matter of
law.
“Without jurisdiction the court cannot proceed at all
in any case. Jurisdiction is the power to declare the law, and
when it ceases to exist, the only function remaining to the
court is that of announcing the fact and dismissing the
cause.” Ex parte McCardle, 74 U.S. (7 Wall) 506, 514, 19
L.Ed. 264 (1868).
Of course, petitioners’ characterization of the
underlying substantive issue as whether an Act of the
Louisiana Legislature can abrogate a treaty of the United
States is a quintessential strawman argument. The statute
enacted by the Louisiana Legislature merely evidences public
policy of the State of Louisiana. That the public policy of the
forum is a factor to be considered in assessing the
enforceability of an arbitration agreement has long been
established law.”
The relief sought by petitioners is particularly distant.
To reach the underlying substantive issue of the
enforceability of the purported arbitration agreement, the
Court would have to traverse a labyrinth of jurisdictional and
other obstacles. After the question of appellate jurisdiction,
next would come the equally-fatal bar of res judicata (the
circuit court of appeals initially dismissed the appeal as
barred by res judicata due to the rulings denying petitioners’
requested arbitration remedies in the state district, appellate
and supreme courts, before withdrawing that ruling to instead
2
M/S BREMEN v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 92
S.Ct. 1907, 32 L.Ed.2d 513 (1972).
2
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dismiss upon the threshold jurisdictional issue). After that
would come multiple other substantive and procedural
defenses to arbitration raised by respondent in the state and
federal district courts, but not reached by those courts due to
the either substantive (state) or jurisdictional (federal)
determinations.
Should the Court be of the opinion that the
underlying substantive issue is one which is of significance,
the dissent to the circuit court of appeal’s decision notes the
pendency of another case in that court which squarely
presents the identical substantive issue, but without the host
of complications afflicting the petitioners’ action.
Ultimately, what petitioners seek is the substantive
review of a district court decision which petitioners contend
amounts to a misapplication of a properly stated rule of law.
This case does not present any of the compelling reasons
which govern review on certiorari in this Court.
CONCLUSION
The petition for writ of certiorari should be denied.
Respectfully submitted:
Kevin O’Bryon
O’Bryon & Schnabel, PLC
1515 Poydras Street, Suite 830
New Orleans, LA 70112
(504) 799-4200
(504) 799-4211 fax
Attorney for Respondent
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