Reply Brief — Club Car (Quebec) Import, Inc. v. Club Car, Inc.

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| Supreme Court, U.S. 1

FILED

(3) NOV 2 3 2004

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

No. 04-421

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

CLUB CAR (QUEBEC) IMPORT, INC.,

MARTIN MURPHY, PETITIONERS

v.

YLUB CAR, INC.,

AND

PIERRE CHAMPIGNY, EQUIPMENTS PIERRE CHAMPIGNY, LTD.,

ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

REPLY BRIEF

STEPHEN F. HUMPHREYS SAM G. NICHOLSON

Attorney for Petitioners Counsel of Record

STEPHEN F. HUMPHREYS, NICHOLSON REVELL LLP

P.C. 4 George C. Wilson Court,

191 E. Broad Street, Suite A

Suite 305 Augusta, Georgia 30909

Athens, Georgia 30601 (706) 722-8784

(706) 546-8892

2 EIEN ED SLT IE LEST, EIEN EE LLL TE OEE I OLE TLE, SLL LEELA LD LIES LLP ELIE EDI S LLL EE AEE RSE

CURRY & TAYLOR @ WAGH D.C. @ (202) 223-3160 @ USSCINFO.COM

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

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TABLE OF CONTENTS .....cscssssscsssssssssseesessescnenescesaseneneneseneneneneassees i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......scsssssssssssseseseesesesensncnsnserenseenenenensneens ii

IRRELEVANT FACTORG.........0e000 ies onnvossunsaninessasecesueunsenennesenanees 3

AFTER THE FACT AUTHORITY .....:ssescssssesenesseeneeees Smatans 5

EX PARTE ARGUMENT. oicsccsccsssssssssssssssssceesssesssssnsnnnnsnssssesenssesssnsnsnnnnsassess 7

CONCLUSION. ccccccccsscscssscsssescscscssscscsssssesescnsnsesssesevensssceesenensnsasaneness 8

SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX

TRANSCRIPT EXCERPTS (02/18/038)......::ssssecesesseseeeenens 150a

TRANSCRIPT EXCERPTS (03/12/08)......escsssseeeesserereeeenes 157a

il

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

BAZEMORE V. FRIDAY, 478 U.S. 285 (1986)............ssccssssssssssees 6

SHAW V. RUIZ, 207 GA. APP. 299, 428 S.E.2D 98 (1993)........... 5

1

Respondents’ Briefs in Opposition provide ample

evidence why Daubert determinations must not ‘be

allowed to become an exercise in hide the ball by the

attorneys or snap decisions by the trial court.

Respondents try to draw the eye of this Court to every

irrelevant consideration, up to and including the time

the mailman postmarked their service copies. They

distort the facts, characterizing this as a routine

collections case, for example, conveniently overlooking

the fact that the jury found against Club Car on CCQ’s

counterclaims for breach of contract, promissory

estoppel, unpaid commissions, and breach of fiduciary

duty. However, the jury was unable to award

significant damages because virtually all the damages

evidence was excluded after an abbreviated and chaotic

hearing on a motion first raised after the close of

evidence.

Respondents also argued in their briefs that

there was no harm in the deficient proceedings because

the trial court did not strike the entire testimony of

CCQ’s expert, Peter Ryan, though they argued

forcefully for exactly that during all five minutes of the

Daubert hearing, and the court obliged, pronouncing

the witness completely excluded. See Petition, p. 7 &

App. 137a. Respondents reverse course on appeal,

realizing that there is no basis whatsoever in the record

for excluding, for failure to discount to present value,

CCQ’s past damages, or for excluding, for failure to

deduct expenses, damages based on reduced margins,

promissory estoppel, unpaid commissions, or breach of

fiduciary duty. They invoke instead another post-trial

rationale, the supposed failure to follow generally

accepted accounting principles, though no evidence was

offered at trial on this subject.

Fe ee ee

2

The trial court and the Eleventh Circuit failed to

uphold the trust placed in them by Dawbert--by

presiding over and allowing such a confused and

illogical proceeding, and allowing such rationales to be

advanced post-trial, after the witness had already been

excluded.

While Respondents also seek to draw even this

Court into irrelevant and distorted factual inquiries on

appeal, Respondents never give a single reason for

letting the motion in limine deadline pass without

making their objections known. They do not allege

they were not aware of the expert’s methodology, after

deposing him twice. In fact, their arguments that the

deficiency of his method was so obvious merely beg the

questions: Why did Respondents not file a timely

motion in limine? Why could they not find an opposing

expert to dispute the methodology of CCQ’s expert?

The only reason, which Respondents cannot deny, is to

substitute ambush value for a full airing of the issues.

What has occurred instead of the careful review

and creation of a record that should precede a Daubert

decision is that the courts below have undertaken an

after-the-fact revision, in which all the argument and

authority, inapposite as it is, was supplied after the

ruling was already reached. This reverse-order justice,

in which the conclusions precede the analysis, turns this

Court’s decisions in Daubert and its progeny on their

heads, as what is supposed to be a careful and reasoned

analysis to determine the reliability of evidence is itself

turned into a process without reliability or credibility.

Thus Respondents’ attempts to argue that there

is no important federal issue here, only a little

collections case in Augusta, Georgia, are highly

deceptive. Dawbert has been gutted in this trial, and

this evisceration has been blessed by the Eleventh

3

Circuit. The federal court system can ill afford to let

Daubert proceedings jump the track into anarchy, as

the Eleventh Circuit has done in this case, and this

Court must draw admissibility determinations back

within the ample and flexible bounds set by Daubert.

Irrrelevant Factors

Respondents argue that, despite the amendment

of its claims, CCQ was asking for future damages at

trial. See Petition, p. 4. Because CCQ originally had

claims for future damages, which were dropped

immediately prior to trial, CCQ expert Peter Ryan

dealt with these claims in his preliminary expert

reports—which were preliminary because Respondents

had not produced the invoices from which damages

were being determined. Since these future damages

claims were dropped with the court’s approval in the

pre-trial conference, CCQ sought to subtract those

numbers from Ryan’s damages estimates at trial. Trial

Transcript, Vol. IV, App. 151-156a. Respondents and

the court insisted, however, that Ryan present his

report as originally written, without revising his

presentation to eliminate claims no longer in the case.

Id. Yet those are the very future damages claims

which, according to the court, were not discounted for

present value, from which expenses were supposedly

not deducted, and on which Respondents very Daubert

objection hinges. Thus it is yet another example of the

ways in which Respondents and the court below drew

the inquiry away from the relevant issues.

Respondents still seek to confuse those issues today,

and confusion should not be the hallmark of a Daubert

proceeding.

The fact that there is still an argument about

what claims are in the case demonstrates quite

effectively how little analysis preceded the court’s

4

ruling. Trial courts should at least be required to match

the grounds for excluding evidence with the

corresponding issues and claims.- That did not occur

prior to the exclusion, in his entirety, of CCQ’s expert.

At trial, the court based its ruling solely on a

failure to deduct expenses. It paid no attention to

Ryan’s unrebutted testimony that the sales lost

through Club Car’s breach of contract would not have

added significantly to CCQ’s expenses. See Petition, p.

14 & n.18.' It paid no attention to the fact that expense

deductions have no bearing on several categories of

damages excluded on that basis, such as reduced

margin damages. The courts below and Respondents

completely ignore this context with all their out-of-

context citations to Ryan’s gross margin testimony.

As part of its after-the-fact clean-up, the trial

court mentioned for the first time Ryan’s failure to

follow generally accepted accounting procedures.

Respondents now rely on the Eleventh Circuit seizing

on this rationale to uphold the exclusion. However,

there was no evidence whatsoever at trial as to what

those accepted procedures were or how Ryan

supposedly violated them—by failing to deduct

expenses that he testified, without opposition, did not

apply. Club Car’s own expert did not challenge Ryan’s

accounting methodology, and was not called to testify at

trial.

Daubert, on the other hand, must be about

placing the evidence in context, not about taking it out

' Respondents argue that this testimony was not directed precisely

at the substance of their motion. That is because they did not

make their motion based on the accounting methodology until after

the witness was excused. This only reinforces the necessity of

giving appropriate prior notice and bringing on a timely basis

Daubert objections that are known and planned in advance.

5

of context, considering evidence that was never

presented—or even substituting the “common sense” of

the court for evidence and testimony. App. 160-161la.

Such sheer fabrication of a rationale without a record

must be called an abuse of discretion and a breach of

Daubert’s requirements.

After the Fact Authority

Respondents now argue Shaw v. Ruiz, 207 Ga.

App. 299, 428 S.E.2d 98 (1993) as proper grounds for the

“common sense” exclusion of CCQ’s expert. This is the

only legal authority ever offered to justify the

exclusion, though it was never cited, briefed, or argued

prior to the exclusion of CCQ’s expert. Respondents

and the courts below, however, all cite as conclusive the

proposition from Shaw that damages equal lost profits

minus expenses. Nowhere is there any mention of the

fact that this language in Shaw relates to claims for lost

future “anticipated damages,” which were not in issue

in the instant case. 428 S.E.2d at 102. In Shaw, these

future damages were excluded because there were no

past sales from which to extrapolate future damages.

Id. The expenses referred to in the dicta of Shaw were

not even at issue because—unlike the instant case, in

which CCQ’s expert gave unrebutted testimony that

increased sales in the ongoing enterprise would not

have created additional overhead expense—it was

admitted in Shaw that all but $10,000 of the $79,000

claimed in lost future profits would have been eaten up

by expenses. /d.

Does Shaw even apply to the facts and issues in

the instant case? That is arguable. CCQ would have

argued that it did not. Clearly, however, the time to

argue this authority would have been at the time of the

Daubert hearing, not on appeal, and not to the U.S.

Supreme Court. The seminal point is, rather, that this

6

authority was never raised, briefed or argued prior to

the exclusion of CCQ’s expert. Shaw was first cited by

the court on post trial motions to justify what had

already been decided. It was not proper for the

Eleventh Circuit to uphold this unexamined, post facto

authority as conclusive.

If allowed, this practice of supplying the legal

authority after the fact, without allowing the parties to

argue whether it applies to the facts and issues in the

instant case, effectively destroys Daubert. Daubert

procedures were so deficient here that no legal

authority whatsoever was offered for exclusion of the

witness in advance of the ruling.

Respondents also engage in lengthy argument

that this Court’s ruling in Bazemore v. Friday, that

failure include a single cost variable goes to credibility,

not admissibility, does not apply to the facts of this

case.’ Again, the fact that this argument is occurring

now, in briefs to the Supreme Court, almost two years

later, and never occurred prior to the exclusion of the

witness, is a clear indication that the trial court never

fulfilled its responsibility to air these issues before

making a ruling under Daubert.

That is a sure sign that the requirements of

Daubert have not been followed, when all authority and

factors are raised in retrospect to justify a snap

judgment already made, based on a motion withheld

until the last day of trial for the very purpose of

confusing the issues and prejudicing CCQ. The

Eleventh Circuit must be reversed for stating that a

proper Daubert analysis does not require more care and

* 478 U.S. 285 (1986).

* Id. at 400.

CEE Eee

7

exactitude by the court or professionalism by the

attorneys.

Ex parte Argument

Respondents’ counsel explains the attempt,

without CCQ’s knowledge, to impart legal argument to

the court, by saying that copies of the document

supporting the argument were left on CCQ’s counsel

table and given to the clerk of the court. As no one

remembers seeing either of those copies and they have

never been located, CCQ cannot say how that document

and the argument it purported to support were

transmitted to the court. App. 158a (document not in

court record and clerk has no recollection of it).

This Court is not the place to engage in such a

factual inquiry. What is clear, however, is that until the

time Respondents’ counsel made the oral argument for

exclusion, CCQ had no prior notice either of the

document or the argument previously transmitted to

the court for excluding CCQ’s expert for failure to

deduct unspecified costs from his damages calculations.

The court then ruled to exclude CCQ’s expert before

there was any opportunity to challenge that argument,

consider the document, offer competing authority, or

explore any of the ramifications of the very general

proposition on which Respondents and the court relied.

That is how past damages came to be excluded for

failure to “discount them to present value.”

Again, this cannot be the way a Daubert hearing

is conducted, based on tardy motions and phantom

submissions, with ao actual prior notice to the other

party. Basic standards of notice and fairness must

apply. This case shows how the analysis suffers when

they do not, as relevant factors are not considered, and

irrelevant factors are substituted.

8

The Eleventh Circuit dismissed these concerns,

overlooking the problem of “legal argument” being

offered to the court before the other side even has

notice of a challenge to the expert’s methodology--so

long as “evidence” is not being offered to the court on

an ex parte basis. See Petition, pp. 16-17 & App. 6a.

This Court should reverse the Eleventh Circuit on this

point to make it clear that a higher standard of

professionalism is required in a Daubert hearing, or any

other phase of litigation.

Perhaps a more important consideration, for

purposes of upholding the integrity of Dawbert, is that

the court excluded CCQ’s expert evidence in its

entirety within minutes of the disclosure of the

document transmitted to the court and the objection it

was offered to support. This was the first mention ever

of any objection to the accounting methodology used by

CCQ’s expert. Respondents and the courts below

maintain that some lengthy deliberative process

followed this surprise development. The record speaks

for itself that it did not, however, and this Court must

re-draw the line to emphasize that the brief and chaotic

developments in the trial of this case, sprung without

any legitimate prior notice, do not satisfy Daubert. See

Petition, p. 10 & App. 6a, 125-137a.

Conclusion

Under Respondents’ theory, the discretion of the

trial court is unlimited and cannot be abused. A five-

minute discussion after the judge has already made up

his mind and allows no further argument can be termed

a “lengthy discussion” and thereby satisfy Dawbert.

Daubert objections may be planned in advance and

sprung in ambush at the last minute.

This case provides a perfect example of the chaos

this approach will cause. Almost two years after the

9

trial, exactly what was excluded, and upon what basis,

is still debated. Accounting rationales and legal

authority, which were never raised or argued before

the decision to exclude, have been supplied after the

fact.

Failure to discount to present value is one

rationale offered, though it does not apply to past

damages evidence that was excluded, and no future

damages were argued to the jury. Failure to follow

generally accepted accounting procedures is another

post facto rationale, though this term was never used

prior to exclusion, and no evidence was offered on this

subject, including from Respondents’ own expert

accounting witness.

This failure to follow accepted accounting

procedures purportedly rests on the failure to deduct

expenses, though the undeducted expenses have never

been identified. Expense deductions, furthermore,

clearly do not apply to some categories of damages

excluded. The unrebutted evidence is that there were

no expenses to deduct. The only case law authority

offered on this point was a future damages case, and

was never cited, briefed, or argued prior to the

exclusion of CCQ’s expert.

This confusion is, in part, predictable given the

tardiness of Respondents’ motion to exclude based on

faulty methodology. Yet Club Car cannot say why it

waited till the last day of trial to make this motion. Nor

can it say why, if the issue was so clear, it could not just

follow proper, professional procedure and file a timely

motion in limine. |

The Eleventh Circuit has allowed Respondents

and the trial court to make up after-the-fact

explanations and justifications and confuse the issues

after trial instead of clarifying the issues prior to a

10

ruling on admissibility. If that is not an abuse of

discretion, then there can be no abuse of discretion

under Daubert, and the purported procedure for

ensuring the reliability of expert testimony is itself

rendered completely unreliable. Instead, the order of

the day will be surprise last-minute motions, adverse

rulings without an airing of the issues, and after-the-

fact application of factors which do not even relate to

the issues in the case and authorities which were never

raised or argued prior to exclusion of the expert.

To avoid that result, now is the time for this

Court to follow the Tenth Circuit’s suggestion and set a

level of professionalism, competence, and reliability

that will restore and maintain confidence in

determinations of expert admissibility in the federal

court system. See Petition, pp. 20-21. It can do that

without altering the flexibility inherent in Daubert by

simply requiring that the factors on which admission or

exclusion is based meticulously match the facts and

issues in the case, that a good faith attempt be made to

examine the issues, that adequate notice and an

opportunity to respond be given to all sides, and that a

record be created with specific findings. None of that

occurred in this case. In addition, this Court can

require a justification for making a Daubert objection

after missing a motion in limine deadline. No less is

required to uphold the rulings of this Court under

Daubert and to ensure the accuracy and reliability of

expert witness admissibility determinations in federal

court. :

Respectfully submitted,

SAM G. NICHOLSON

4 George C. Wilson Court, Suite A

Augusta, Georgia 30909

150a

No.CV 100-195

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

AUGUSTA DIVISION

CLUB CAR, INC.,

Plaintiff,

VS.

CLUB CAR (QUEBEC) IMPORT INC.

and MARTIN MURPHY,

Defendants.

ok

CLUB CAR (QUEBEC) IMPORT, INC.

Counterclaim Plaintiff,

VS.

CLUB CAR, INC.; PIERRE CHAMPIGNY;

EQUIPEMENTS PIERRE CHAMFIGNY, LTD. and

INGERSOLL-RAND CO., LTD., :

Counterclaim Defendants.

Augusta, Georgia

February 13, 2003

VOLUME 4

TRANSCRIPT OF TRIAL PROCEEDINGS

BEFORE THE HONORABLE

ANTHONY A. ALAIMO

15la

United States District Judge and a Jury

Reported By: Norma Hatfield

Official Court Reporter

801 Gloucester Street, Rm. 216

Post Office Box 1316

Brunswick, Georgia 31521—1316

(912) 262—9989

FAX (912) 262—9100

normah@thebest.net

* **

The total damages identified in my report at that

date are $10,464,176. :

Q Okay. Now since that time, have you revised

those numbers based on the claims that exist today?

A Some of the damages that I have identified I

believe have not been presented as claims in this court.

But by and large, those claims which have been

presented reflect the numbers in this court.

Q And have -- since some of the claims have not

been, are there revised numbers within that framework

of the numbers that you provided earlier?

A There may be minor changes in terms of the

number of units or variations of percentage or average

selling price, something like that.

Q Let's talk about some of the specific numbers.

152a

MR. PENN: Bob, if you will put up the

damages.

BY MR. PENN:

Q Let's talk about how you arrived at these

numbers. One portion is the calculation of damages for

the sale of free new parts. And can you see that, by the

way?

A Yes, I can.

Q If you want a copy --

MR. PENN: Your Honor, may I approach?

THE COURT: Yes.

MR. PENN: Thank you.

BY MR. PENN:

Q Under (A), what is this calculation right here?

A During the course of reviewing the documents

which were produced, it was discovered that Club Car

had been -- Club Car, Inc. -- had been shipping parts

packages to Mr. Champigny with his cars. That

information came -- what I did was -- Mr. Champigny

produced his Customs documents. After a considerable

period of time and considerable reduction in the

number of documents due to duplication, I prepared a

summary.

153a

MR. ELLINGTON: Your Honor, I hate to

object, but I'm going to object here because the

testimony we're seeing now is brand-new testimony

outside of the scope of his expert report. These type of

calculations have not been presented here before.

MR. PENN: Actually, it comes right out of his

report. -

MR. PURCELL: I'm going to object, too,

because I have a document that's got a different

number on it.

THE COURT: You can cross-examine him on

that.

MR. PURCELL: I understood the Court to limit

the witness to his report.

THE COURT: Yes, yes.

Point out in the report what you're questioning

him about, where in the exhibit it is.

BY MR. PENN:

Q Where does this --

THE COURT: No, no. My question is: Where

in the report he filed, where is it?

MR. PENN: Right. That is my question to Mr.

Ryan.

THE COURT: All right.

| 154a

BY MR. PENN:

Q Mr. Ryan, where does this section (A) come from

in your report?

A Section (A) refers to, under my summary and

conclusions, item two, Damages on Parts Packages.

Q What is the number on your report?

A The number on my report is $921,435.

Q All right. And the number here is a little higher.

Can you give an explanation as to why, what is the

difference?

~

MR. PURCELL: Judge, he --

THE COURT: He cannot testify to that. He is

limited to this.

MR. PENN: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.

MR. PURCELL: And we would object to the

screen showing the jurors numbers other than what is

on the report, Judge.

MR. ELLINGTON: I have the same objection.

THE COURT: I will sustain the objection.

MR. PENN: May I consult with co-counsel for a

second?

THE COURT: Certainly.

155a

(Pause)

BY MR. PENN:

Q Mr. Ryan, the numbers that were on the screen,

the total numbers for everything that is in that

demonstrative exhibit, are they higher or are they

lower than the numbers in your report?

A I would say for all intents and purposes, they are

virtually identical. There are minor differences,

certainly.

Q You just gave us a total --

THE COURT: Go on to your next question.

MR. PENN: I don't think he understood my

question, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Did you understand his

question?

THE WITNESS: I'm not sure I did, Your

Honor.

THE COURT: All right. Go ahead. Restate the

question.

BY MR. PENN:

Q Give us again, what is the total number that was

on your report?

A The total number on my report was $10,464,176.

156a

Q And what was the total number for the revised

number that came out of your report?

A The total number, based on an extrapolation of

my report ranged from $5,395,994 to $5,870,936.

Q So the revised numbers that are based on your

report are lower than the numbers that were in your

report?

A Yes, they are.

MR. PENN: Your Honor --

THE COURT: Generally speaking, his

testimony is to what he filed in this Court, or rather the

opinion that you filed in this Court.

BY MR. PENN:

Q Okay. Let's go back to your report, Mr. Ryan,

and let's talk about the first conclusion. What was the

number again? What was the conclusion and what was

the number?

A The conclusion was that the damages on lost

sales of one year old cars for the period 1997 to 2000

was $821,813.

Q All right. And that was for the loss of new sales?

A That would have been the gross margin on the

sale of one year old cars for that period of time.

Q Okay. And how did you arrive at that

calculation?

157a

No.CV 100-195

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA

AUGUSTA DIVISION

CLUB CAR, INC.,

Plaintiff,

VS.

CLUB CAR (QUEBEC) IMPORT INC.

and MARTIN MURPHY,

Defendants.

KK

CLUB CAR (QUEBEC) IMPORT, INC.

Counterclaim Plaintiff,

VS.

CLUB CAR, INC.; PIERRE CHAMPIGNY;

EQUIPEMENTS PIERRE CHAMFIGNY, LTD. and

INGERSOLL-RAND CO., LTD., :

Counterclaim Defendants.

Brunswick, Georgia

March 12, 2003

HEARING ON ATTORNEYS’ FEES

BEFORE THE HONORABLE

ANTHONY A. ALAIMO

United States District Judge

158a

Reported By: Norma Hatfield

Official Court Reporter

801 Gloucester Street, Rm. 216

Post Office Box 1316

Brunswick, Georgia 31521—1316

(912) 262—9989

FAX (912) 262—9100

normah@thebest.net

2K

any other counsel or party, other than perhaps “good

morning” or some other pleasantry.

Further, Mr. Harris incorrectly assumes that

this document is the only basis upon which the Court

could have ruled as it did. That’s absurd. This Court has

been on the bench since 1971 and has heard damage

cases of all sorts since that time and can use its common

sense and doesn’t even have to rely on a document such

as the one I put on Mr. Rowe’s table.

THE COURT: Mr. Rowe, was that ever

submitted to the Court?

THE CLERK: Judge, I just don’t remember.

There were so many documents, I don’t recall it.

THE COURT: All right. In any event, is there

any dispute that it was laid on your table?

MR. HARRIS: I never saw it. I just want to

briefly respond.

THE COURT: Do you dispute it?

i eee

159a

MR. HARRIS: I never saw the document.

THE COURT: Maybe not. Nevertheless, if he

put it on the table --

MR. HARRIS: It Mr. Purcell says he laid it on

the table, I’m not going to stand here and argue with

that, that he laid it on the table, because I believe what

he said. THE COURT: When you claim in a brief that

there has been an ex parte communication with the

Court, it ought to be pretty clear; should it not?

MR. HARRIS: Well, Your Honor, I think it was

clear because Mr. Purcell submitted to the Clerk of

Court a document. And then he took it -- and let’s think

about what the document was. It was a mimeographed

page from a book on damages. Assuming, for the sake of

argument -- and I believe him that he put it on our table

-- it’s meaningless. It’s not any kind of pleading during

the middle of trial that --

THE COURT: It bears on the question of

whether it was ex parte.

MR. HARRIS: I think it -- Your Honor, ex

parte simply -- he submits something that we don’t

have the opportunity to respond to because we don’t

know about it. And that’s exactly what happened.

THE COURT: Nevertheless, if it is submitted

to you and you did not see it or did not look at it --

MR. HARRIS: I would dispute the fact that if

you put a mimeographed piece of paper on someone’s

desk at trial and don’t tell him about it, that that’s

160a

submitting it to him. Clearly, Your Honor, I would

never submit a document to Mr. Purcell and expect him

to read it by sticking it on the table in the middle of

trial without any indication that it was a pleading or

something that had been served on the Court. I just

think that’s improper.

THE COURT: I think it is improper to make

that contention unless you are pretty clear on it.

MR. HARRIS: Well, Your Honor, all we know is

from the record that Mr. Purcell says he submitted a

document for the Court’s consideration that we weren't

aware of. I think we can stand by that position.

As to whether or not the Court read it or not, I

can’t --

THE COURT: Or even saw it.

MR. HARRIS: Or even saw it. I’m not

contending that the Court did. But I do know —-

THE COURT: Now let me ask you this: Was

that put up on the screen?

MR. HARRIS: No, Your Honor. It was a page -

it was a damages -- apparently, it was page from a

damages textbook.

But there is one other point I want to respond to.

And his point was that the Court could rule based on its

common sense about this testimony. And I respectfully

disagree with that. What they were making was a

Daubert motion. They were saying that this man’s

l6la

testimony did not have -- actually more correctly,

Kumo Tire did not have a scientific basis for its

admissibility. That’s precisely what they were doing.

I respectfully don’t think that courts can rule

based on their common sense about technical evidence.

The way it’s supposed to work is you have some other

expert come in and say, “That man’s testimony doesn’t

comport with what accountants in the field do.” Or you

submit documents --

THE COURT: Are you saying that I could not

come to a conclusion when the witness said he did not

take into consideration expenses when he says what

damages are, that I cannot, just asa matter of common

sense, without being an expert or anything else,

conclude that his opinion is valueless?

MR. HARRIS: Well, Your Honor, we're getting

into the notion for new trial, which I’ll be glad to talk

about. But the problem with it was this: There were

two elements of damages. There was a $5 million claim

for lost future profits that wasn’t even in the case. And

the reason it wasn’t in the case is because the Court had

made a series of rulings up until the week before trial

along the lines of, “You cannot maintain those claims.”

So we were doing precisely what we had to do,

and that was withdrawing certain claims from the

jury’s consideration. The $5 million that the cost or

expenses was not purported deducted from wasn’t even

in the case. The $5 million that was in the case was

simply Mr. Ryan taking invoices and calculating goods

that had already been sold

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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