Reply Brief — Club Car (Quebec) Import, Inc. v. Club Car, Inc.
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| Supreme Court, U.S. 1
FILED
(3) NOV 2 3 2004
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
No. 04-421
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
CLUB CAR (QUEBEC) IMPORT, INC.,
MARTIN MURPHY, PETITIONERS
v.
YLUB CAR, INC.,
AND
PIERRE CHAMPIGNY, EQUIPMENTS PIERRE CHAMPIGNY, LTD.,
ON PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
REPLY BRIEF
STEPHEN F. HUMPHREYS SAM G. NICHOLSON
Attorney for Petitioners Counsel of Record
STEPHEN F. HUMPHREYS, NICHOLSON REVELL LLP
P.C. 4 George C. Wilson Court,
191 E. Broad Street, Suite A
Suite 305 Augusta, Georgia 30909
Athens, Georgia 30601 (706) 722-8784
(706) 546-8892
2 EIEN ED SLT IE LEST, EIEN EE LLL TE OEE I OLE TLE, SLL LEELA LD LIES LLP ELIE EDI S LLL EE AEE RSE
CURRY & TAYLOR @ WAGH D.C. @ (202) 223-3160 @ USSCINFO.COM
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF CONTENTS .....cscssssscsssssssssseesessescnenescesaseneneneseneneneneassees i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......scsssssssssssseseseesesesensncnsnserenseenenenensneens ii
IRRELEVANT FACTORG.........0e000 ies onnvossunsaninessasecesueunsenennesenanees 3
AFTER THE FACT AUTHORITY .....:ssescssssesenesseeneeees Smatans 5
EX PARTE ARGUMENT. oicsccsccsssssssssssssssssceesssesssssnsnnnnsnssssesenssesssnsnsnnnnsassess 7
CONCLUSION. ccccccccsscscssscsssescscscssscscsssssesescnsnsesssesevensssceesenensnsasaneness 8
SUPPLEMENTAL APPENDIX
TRANSCRIPT EXCERPTS (02/18/038)......::ssssecesesseseeeenens 150a
TRANSCRIPT EXCERPTS (03/12/08)......escsssseeeesserereeeenes 157a
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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
BAZEMORE V. FRIDAY, 478 U.S. 285 (1986)............ssccssssssssssees 6
SHAW V. RUIZ, 207 GA. APP. 299, 428 S.E.2D 98 (1993)........... 5
1
Respondents’ Briefs in Opposition provide ample
evidence why Daubert determinations must not ‘be
allowed to become an exercise in hide the ball by the
attorneys or snap decisions by the trial court.
Respondents try to draw the eye of this Court to every
irrelevant consideration, up to and including the time
the mailman postmarked their service copies. They
distort the facts, characterizing this as a routine
collections case, for example, conveniently overlooking
the fact that the jury found against Club Car on CCQ’s
counterclaims for breach of contract, promissory
estoppel, unpaid commissions, and breach of fiduciary
duty. However, the jury was unable to award
significant damages because virtually all the damages
evidence was excluded after an abbreviated and chaotic
hearing on a motion first raised after the close of
evidence.
Respondents also argued in their briefs that
there was no harm in the deficient proceedings because
the trial court did not strike the entire testimony of
CCQ’s expert, Peter Ryan, though they argued
forcefully for exactly that during all five minutes of the
Daubert hearing, and the court obliged, pronouncing
the witness completely excluded. See Petition, p. 7 &
App. 137a. Respondents reverse course on appeal,
realizing that there is no basis whatsoever in the record
for excluding, for failure to discount to present value,
CCQ’s past damages, or for excluding, for failure to
deduct expenses, damages based on reduced margins,
promissory estoppel, unpaid commissions, or breach of
fiduciary duty. They invoke instead another post-trial
rationale, the supposed failure to follow generally
accepted accounting principles, though no evidence was
offered at trial on this subject.
Fe ee ee
2
The trial court and the Eleventh Circuit failed to
uphold the trust placed in them by Dawbert--by
presiding over and allowing such a confused and
illogical proceeding, and allowing such rationales to be
advanced post-trial, after the witness had already been
excluded.
While Respondents also seek to draw even this
Court into irrelevant and distorted factual inquiries on
appeal, Respondents never give a single reason for
letting the motion in limine deadline pass without
making their objections known. They do not allege
they were not aware of the expert’s methodology, after
deposing him twice. In fact, their arguments that the
deficiency of his method was so obvious merely beg the
questions: Why did Respondents not file a timely
motion in limine? Why could they not find an opposing
expert to dispute the methodology of CCQ’s expert?
The only reason, which Respondents cannot deny, is to
substitute ambush value for a full airing of the issues.
What has occurred instead of the careful review
and creation of a record that should precede a Daubert
decision is that the courts below have undertaken an
after-the-fact revision, in which all the argument and
authority, inapposite as it is, was supplied after the
ruling was already reached. This reverse-order justice,
in which the conclusions precede the analysis, turns this
Court’s decisions in Daubert and its progeny on their
heads, as what is supposed to be a careful and reasoned
analysis to determine the reliability of evidence is itself
turned into a process without reliability or credibility.
Thus Respondents’ attempts to argue that there
is no important federal issue here, only a little
collections case in Augusta, Georgia, are highly
deceptive. Dawbert has been gutted in this trial, and
this evisceration has been blessed by the Eleventh
3
Circuit. The federal court system can ill afford to let
Daubert proceedings jump the track into anarchy, as
the Eleventh Circuit has done in this case, and this
Court must draw admissibility determinations back
within the ample and flexible bounds set by Daubert.
Irrrelevant Factors
Respondents argue that, despite the amendment
of its claims, CCQ was asking for future damages at
trial. See Petition, p. 4. Because CCQ originally had
claims for future damages, which were dropped
immediately prior to trial, CCQ expert Peter Ryan
dealt with these claims in his preliminary expert
reports—which were preliminary because Respondents
had not produced the invoices from which damages
were being determined. Since these future damages
claims were dropped with the court’s approval in the
pre-trial conference, CCQ sought to subtract those
numbers from Ryan’s damages estimates at trial. Trial
Transcript, Vol. IV, App. 151-156a. Respondents and
the court insisted, however, that Ryan present his
report as originally written, without revising his
presentation to eliminate claims no longer in the case.
Id. Yet those are the very future damages claims
which, according to the court, were not discounted for
present value, from which expenses were supposedly
not deducted, and on which Respondents very Daubert
objection hinges. Thus it is yet another example of the
ways in which Respondents and the court below drew
the inquiry away from the relevant issues.
Respondents still seek to confuse those issues today,
and confusion should not be the hallmark of a Daubert
proceeding.
The fact that there is still an argument about
what claims are in the case demonstrates quite
effectively how little analysis preceded the court’s
4
ruling. Trial courts should at least be required to match
the grounds for excluding evidence with the
corresponding issues and claims.- That did not occur
prior to the exclusion, in his entirety, of CCQ’s expert.
At trial, the court based its ruling solely on a
failure to deduct expenses. It paid no attention to
Ryan’s unrebutted testimony that the sales lost
through Club Car’s breach of contract would not have
added significantly to CCQ’s expenses. See Petition, p.
14 & n.18.' It paid no attention to the fact that expense
deductions have no bearing on several categories of
damages excluded on that basis, such as reduced
margin damages. The courts below and Respondents
completely ignore this context with all their out-of-
context citations to Ryan’s gross margin testimony.
As part of its after-the-fact clean-up, the trial
court mentioned for the first time Ryan’s failure to
follow generally accepted accounting procedures.
Respondents now rely on the Eleventh Circuit seizing
on this rationale to uphold the exclusion. However,
there was no evidence whatsoever at trial as to what
those accepted procedures were or how Ryan
supposedly violated them—by failing to deduct
expenses that he testified, without opposition, did not
apply. Club Car’s own expert did not challenge Ryan’s
accounting methodology, and was not called to testify at
trial.
Daubert, on the other hand, must be about
placing the evidence in context, not about taking it out
' Respondents argue that this testimony was not directed precisely
at the substance of their motion. That is because they did not
make their motion based on the accounting methodology until after
the witness was excused. This only reinforces the necessity of
giving appropriate prior notice and bringing on a timely basis
Daubert objections that are known and planned in advance.
5
of context, considering evidence that was never
presented—or even substituting the “common sense” of
the court for evidence and testimony. App. 160-161la.
Such sheer fabrication of a rationale without a record
must be called an abuse of discretion and a breach of
Daubert’s requirements.
After the Fact Authority
Respondents now argue Shaw v. Ruiz, 207 Ga.
App. 299, 428 S.E.2d 98 (1993) as proper grounds for the
“common sense” exclusion of CCQ’s expert. This is the
only legal authority ever offered to justify the
exclusion, though it was never cited, briefed, or argued
prior to the exclusion of CCQ’s expert. Respondents
and the courts below, however, all cite as conclusive the
proposition from Shaw that damages equal lost profits
minus expenses. Nowhere is there any mention of the
fact that this language in Shaw relates to claims for lost
future “anticipated damages,” which were not in issue
in the instant case. 428 S.E.2d at 102. In Shaw, these
future damages were excluded because there were no
past sales from which to extrapolate future damages.
Id. The expenses referred to in the dicta of Shaw were
not even at issue because—unlike the instant case, in
which CCQ’s expert gave unrebutted testimony that
increased sales in the ongoing enterprise would not
have created additional overhead expense—it was
admitted in Shaw that all but $10,000 of the $79,000
claimed in lost future profits would have been eaten up
by expenses. /d.
Does Shaw even apply to the facts and issues in
the instant case? That is arguable. CCQ would have
argued that it did not. Clearly, however, the time to
argue this authority would have been at the time of the
Daubert hearing, not on appeal, and not to the U.S.
Supreme Court. The seminal point is, rather, that this
6
authority was never raised, briefed or argued prior to
the exclusion of CCQ’s expert. Shaw was first cited by
the court on post trial motions to justify what had
already been decided. It was not proper for the
Eleventh Circuit to uphold this unexamined, post facto
authority as conclusive.
If allowed, this practice of supplying the legal
authority after the fact, without allowing the parties to
argue whether it applies to the facts and issues in the
instant case, effectively destroys Daubert. Daubert
procedures were so deficient here that no legal
authority whatsoever was offered for exclusion of the
witness in advance of the ruling.
Respondents also engage in lengthy argument
that this Court’s ruling in Bazemore v. Friday, that
failure include a single cost variable goes to credibility,
not admissibility, does not apply to the facts of this
case.’ Again, the fact that this argument is occurring
now, in briefs to the Supreme Court, almost two years
later, and never occurred prior to the exclusion of the
witness, is a clear indication that the trial court never
fulfilled its responsibility to air these issues before
making a ruling under Daubert.
That is a sure sign that the requirements of
Daubert have not been followed, when all authority and
factors are raised in retrospect to justify a snap
judgment already made, based on a motion withheld
until the last day of trial for the very purpose of
confusing the issues and prejudicing CCQ. The
Eleventh Circuit must be reversed for stating that a
proper Daubert analysis does not require more care and
* 478 U.S. 285 (1986).
* Id. at 400.
CEE Eee
7
exactitude by the court or professionalism by the
attorneys.
Ex parte Argument
Respondents’ counsel explains the attempt,
without CCQ’s knowledge, to impart legal argument to
the court, by saying that copies of the document
supporting the argument were left on CCQ’s counsel
table and given to the clerk of the court. As no one
remembers seeing either of those copies and they have
never been located, CCQ cannot say how that document
and the argument it purported to support were
transmitted to the court. App. 158a (document not in
court record and clerk has no recollection of it).
This Court is not the place to engage in such a
factual inquiry. What is clear, however, is that until the
time Respondents’ counsel made the oral argument for
exclusion, CCQ had no prior notice either of the
document or the argument previously transmitted to
the court for excluding CCQ’s expert for failure to
deduct unspecified costs from his damages calculations.
The court then ruled to exclude CCQ’s expert before
there was any opportunity to challenge that argument,
consider the document, offer competing authority, or
explore any of the ramifications of the very general
proposition on which Respondents and the court relied.
That is how past damages came to be excluded for
failure to “discount them to present value.”
Again, this cannot be the way a Daubert hearing
is conducted, based on tardy motions and phantom
submissions, with ao actual prior notice to the other
party. Basic standards of notice and fairness must
apply. This case shows how the analysis suffers when
they do not, as relevant factors are not considered, and
irrelevant factors are substituted.
8
The Eleventh Circuit dismissed these concerns,
overlooking the problem of “legal argument” being
offered to the court before the other side even has
notice of a challenge to the expert’s methodology--so
long as “evidence” is not being offered to the court on
an ex parte basis. See Petition, pp. 16-17 & App. 6a.
This Court should reverse the Eleventh Circuit on this
point to make it clear that a higher standard of
professionalism is required in a Daubert hearing, or any
other phase of litigation.
Perhaps a more important consideration, for
purposes of upholding the integrity of Dawbert, is that
the court excluded CCQ’s expert evidence in its
entirety within minutes of the disclosure of the
document transmitted to the court and the objection it
was offered to support. This was the first mention ever
of any objection to the accounting methodology used by
CCQ’s expert. Respondents and the courts below
maintain that some lengthy deliberative process
followed this surprise development. The record speaks
for itself that it did not, however, and this Court must
re-draw the line to emphasize that the brief and chaotic
developments in the trial of this case, sprung without
any legitimate prior notice, do not satisfy Daubert. See
Petition, p. 10 & App. 6a, 125-137a.
Conclusion
Under Respondents’ theory, the discretion of the
trial court is unlimited and cannot be abused. A five-
minute discussion after the judge has already made up
his mind and allows no further argument can be termed
a “lengthy discussion” and thereby satisfy Dawbert.
Daubert objections may be planned in advance and
sprung in ambush at the last minute.
This case provides a perfect example of the chaos
this approach will cause. Almost two years after the
9
trial, exactly what was excluded, and upon what basis,
is still debated. Accounting rationales and legal
authority, which were never raised or argued before
the decision to exclude, have been supplied after the
fact.
Failure to discount to present value is one
rationale offered, though it does not apply to past
damages evidence that was excluded, and no future
damages were argued to the jury. Failure to follow
generally accepted accounting procedures is another
post facto rationale, though this term was never used
prior to exclusion, and no evidence was offered on this
subject, including from Respondents’ own expert
accounting witness.
This failure to follow accepted accounting
procedures purportedly rests on the failure to deduct
expenses, though the undeducted expenses have never
been identified. Expense deductions, furthermore,
clearly do not apply to some categories of damages
excluded. The unrebutted evidence is that there were
no expenses to deduct. The only case law authority
offered on this point was a future damages case, and
was never cited, briefed, or argued prior to the
exclusion of CCQ’s expert.
This confusion is, in part, predictable given the
tardiness of Respondents’ motion to exclude based on
faulty methodology. Yet Club Car cannot say why it
waited till the last day of trial to make this motion. Nor
can it say why, if the issue was so clear, it could not just
follow proper, professional procedure and file a timely
motion in limine. |
The Eleventh Circuit has allowed Respondents
and the trial court to make up after-the-fact
explanations and justifications and confuse the issues
after trial instead of clarifying the issues prior to a
10
ruling on admissibility. If that is not an abuse of
discretion, then there can be no abuse of discretion
under Daubert, and the purported procedure for
ensuring the reliability of expert testimony is itself
rendered completely unreliable. Instead, the order of
the day will be surprise last-minute motions, adverse
rulings without an airing of the issues, and after-the-
fact application of factors which do not even relate to
the issues in the case and authorities which were never
raised or argued prior to exclusion of the expert.
To avoid that result, now is the time for this
Court to follow the Tenth Circuit’s suggestion and set a
level of professionalism, competence, and reliability
that will restore and maintain confidence in
determinations of expert admissibility in the federal
court system. See Petition, pp. 20-21. It can do that
without altering the flexibility inherent in Daubert by
simply requiring that the factors on which admission or
exclusion is based meticulously match the facts and
issues in the case, that a good faith attempt be made to
examine the issues, that adequate notice and an
opportunity to respond be given to all sides, and that a
record be created with specific findings. None of that
occurred in this case. In addition, this Court can
require a justification for making a Daubert objection
after missing a motion in limine deadline. No less is
required to uphold the rulings of this Court under
Daubert and to ensure the accuracy and reliability of
expert witness admissibility determinations in federal
court. :
Respectfully submitted,
SAM G. NICHOLSON
4 George C. Wilson Court, Suite A
Augusta, Georgia 30909
150a
No.CV 100-195
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
AUGUSTA DIVISION
CLUB CAR, INC.,
Plaintiff,
VS.
CLUB CAR (QUEBEC) IMPORT INC.
and MARTIN MURPHY,
Defendants.
ok
CLUB CAR (QUEBEC) IMPORT, INC.
Counterclaim Plaintiff,
VS.
CLUB CAR, INC.; PIERRE CHAMPIGNY;
EQUIPEMENTS PIERRE CHAMFIGNY, LTD. and
INGERSOLL-RAND CO., LTD., :
Counterclaim Defendants.
Augusta, Georgia
February 13, 2003
VOLUME 4
TRANSCRIPT OF TRIAL PROCEEDINGS
BEFORE THE HONORABLE
ANTHONY A. ALAIMO
15la
United States District Judge and a Jury
Reported By: Norma Hatfield
Official Court Reporter
801 Gloucester Street, Rm. 216
Post Office Box 1316
Brunswick, Georgia 31521—1316
(912) 262—9989
FAX (912) 262—9100
normah@thebest.net
* **
The total damages identified in my report at that
date are $10,464,176. :
Q Okay. Now since that time, have you revised
those numbers based on the claims that exist today?
A Some of the damages that I have identified I
believe have not been presented as claims in this court.
But by and large, those claims which have been
presented reflect the numbers in this court.
Q And have -- since some of the claims have not
been, are there revised numbers within that framework
of the numbers that you provided earlier?
A There may be minor changes in terms of the
number of units or variations of percentage or average
selling price, something like that.
Q Let's talk about some of the specific numbers.
152a
MR. PENN: Bob, if you will put up the
damages.
BY MR. PENN:
Q Let's talk about how you arrived at these
numbers. One portion is the calculation of damages for
the sale of free new parts. And can you see that, by the
way?
A Yes, I can.
Q If you want a copy --
MR. PENN: Your Honor, may I approach?
THE COURT: Yes.
MR. PENN: Thank you.
BY MR. PENN:
Q Under (A), what is this calculation right here?
A During the course of reviewing the documents
which were produced, it was discovered that Club Car
had been -- Club Car, Inc. -- had been shipping parts
packages to Mr. Champigny with his cars. That
information came -- what I did was -- Mr. Champigny
produced his Customs documents. After a considerable
period of time and considerable reduction in the
number of documents due to duplication, I prepared a
summary.
153a
MR. ELLINGTON: Your Honor, I hate to
object, but I'm going to object here because the
testimony we're seeing now is brand-new testimony
outside of the scope of his expert report. These type of
calculations have not been presented here before.
MR. PENN: Actually, it comes right out of his
report. -
MR. PURCELL: I'm going to object, too,
because I have a document that's got a different
number on it.
THE COURT: You can cross-examine him on
that.
MR. PURCELL: I understood the Court to limit
the witness to his report.
THE COURT: Yes, yes.
Point out in the report what you're questioning
him about, where in the exhibit it is.
BY MR. PENN:
Q Where does this --
THE COURT: No, no. My question is: Where
in the report he filed, where is it?
MR. PENN: Right. That is my question to Mr.
Ryan.
THE COURT: All right.
| 154a
BY MR. PENN:
Q Mr. Ryan, where does this section (A) come from
in your report?
A Section (A) refers to, under my summary and
conclusions, item two, Damages on Parts Packages.
Q What is the number on your report?
A The number on my report is $921,435.
Q All right. And the number here is a little higher.
Can you give an explanation as to why, what is the
difference?
~
MR. PURCELL: Judge, he --
THE COURT: He cannot testify to that. He is
limited to this.
MR. PENN: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor.
MR. PURCELL: And we would object to the
screen showing the jurors numbers other than what is
on the report, Judge.
MR. ELLINGTON: I have the same objection.
THE COURT: I will sustain the objection.
MR. PENN: May I consult with co-counsel for a
second?
THE COURT: Certainly.
155a
(Pause)
BY MR. PENN:
Q Mr. Ryan, the numbers that were on the screen,
the total numbers for everything that is in that
demonstrative exhibit, are they higher or are they
lower than the numbers in your report?
A I would say for all intents and purposes, they are
virtually identical. There are minor differences,
certainly.
Q You just gave us a total --
THE COURT: Go on to your next question.
MR. PENN: I don't think he understood my
question, Your Honor.
THE COURT: Did you understand his
question?
THE WITNESS: I'm not sure I did, Your
Honor.
THE COURT: All right. Go ahead. Restate the
question.
BY MR. PENN:
Q Give us again, what is the total number that was
on your report?
A The total number on my report was $10,464,176.
156a
Q And what was the total number for the revised
number that came out of your report?
A The total number, based on an extrapolation of
my report ranged from $5,395,994 to $5,870,936.
Q So the revised numbers that are based on your
report are lower than the numbers that were in your
report?
A Yes, they are.
MR. PENN: Your Honor --
THE COURT: Generally speaking, his
testimony is to what he filed in this Court, or rather the
opinion that you filed in this Court.
BY MR. PENN:
Q Okay. Let's go back to your report, Mr. Ryan,
and let's talk about the first conclusion. What was the
number again? What was the conclusion and what was
the number?
A The conclusion was that the damages on lost
sales of one year old cars for the period 1997 to 2000
was $821,813.
Q All right. And that was for the loss of new sales?
A That would have been the gross margin on the
sale of one year old cars for that period of time.
Q Okay. And how did you arrive at that
calculation?
157a
No.CV 100-195
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF GEORGIA
AUGUSTA DIVISION
CLUB CAR, INC.,
Plaintiff,
VS.
CLUB CAR (QUEBEC) IMPORT INC.
and MARTIN MURPHY,
Defendants.
KK
CLUB CAR (QUEBEC) IMPORT, INC.
Counterclaim Plaintiff,
VS.
CLUB CAR, INC.; PIERRE CHAMPIGNY;
EQUIPEMENTS PIERRE CHAMFIGNY, LTD. and
INGERSOLL-RAND CO., LTD., :
Counterclaim Defendants.
Brunswick, Georgia
March 12, 2003
HEARING ON ATTORNEYS’ FEES
BEFORE THE HONORABLE
ANTHONY A. ALAIMO
United States District Judge
158a
Reported By: Norma Hatfield
Official Court Reporter
801 Gloucester Street, Rm. 216
Post Office Box 1316
Brunswick, Georgia 31521—1316
(912) 262—9989
FAX (912) 262—9100
normah@thebest.net
2K
any other counsel or party, other than perhaps “good
morning” or some other pleasantry.
Further, Mr. Harris incorrectly assumes that
this document is the only basis upon which the Court
could have ruled as it did. That’s absurd. This Court has
been on the bench since 1971 and has heard damage
cases of all sorts since that time and can use its common
sense and doesn’t even have to rely on a document such
as the one I put on Mr. Rowe’s table.
THE COURT: Mr. Rowe, was that ever
submitted to the Court?
THE CLERK: Judge, I just don’t remember.
There were so many documents, I don’t recall it.
THE COURT: All right. In any event, is there
any dispute that it was laid on your table?
MR. HARRIS: I never saw it. I just want to
briefly respond.
THE COURT: Do you dispute it?
i eee
159a
MR. HARRIS: I never saw the document.
THE COURT: Maybe not. Nevertheless, if he
put it on the table --
MR. HARRIS: It Mr. Purcell says he laid it on
the table, I’m not going to stand here and argue with
that, that he laid it on the table, because I believe what
he said. THE COURT: When you claim in a brief that
there has been an ex parte communication with the
Court, it ought to be pretty clear; should it not?
MR. HARRIS: Well, Your Honor, I think it was
clear because Mr. Purcell submitted to the Clerk of
Court a document. And then he took it -- and let’s think
about what the document was. It was a mimeographed
page from a book on damages. Assuming, for the sake of
argument -- and I believe him that he put it on our table
-- it’s meaningless. It’s not any kind of pleading during
the middle of trial that --
THE COURT: It bears on the question of
whether it was ex parte.
MR. HARRIS: I think it -- Your Honor, ex
parte simply -- he submits something that we don’t
have the opportunity to respond to because we don’t
know about it. And that’s exactly what happened.
THE COURT: Nevertheless, if it is submitted
to you and you did not see it or did not look at it --
MR. HARRIS: I would dispute the fact that if
you put a mimeographed piece of paper on someone’s
desk at trial and don’t tell him about it, that that’s
160a
submitting it to him. Clearly, Your Honor, I would
never submit a document to Mr. Purcell and expect him
to read it by sticking it on the table in the middle of
trial without any indication that it was a pleading or
something that had been served on the Court. I just
think that’s improper.
THE COURT: I think it is improper to make
that contention unless you are pretty clear on it.
MR. HARRIS: Well, Your Honor, all we know is
from the record that Mr. Purcell says he submitted a
document for the Court’s consideration that we weren't
aware of. I think we can stand by that position.
As to whether or not the Court read it or not, I
can’t --
THE COURT: Or even saw it.
MR. HARRIS: Or even saw it. I’m not
contending that the Court did. But I do know —-
THE COURT: Now let me ask you this: Was
that put up on the screen?
MR. HARRIS: No, Your Honor. It was a page -
it was a damages -- apparently, it was page from a
damages textbook.
But there is one other point I want to respond to.
And his point was that the Court could rule based on its
common sense about this testimony. And I respectfully
disagree with that. What they were making was a
Daubert motion. They were saying that this man’s
l6la
testimony did not have -- actually more correctly,
Kumo Tire did not have a scientific basis for its
admissibility. That’s precisely what they were doing.
I respectfully don’t think that courts can rule
based on their common sense about technical evidence.
The way it’s supposed to work is you have some other
expert come in and say, “That man’s testimony doesn’t
comport with what accountants in the field do.” Or you
submit documents --
THE COURT: Are you saying that I could not
come to a conclusion when the witness said he did not
take into consideration expenses when he says what
damages are, that I cannot, just asa matter of common
sense, without being an expert or anything else,
conclude that his opinion is valueless?
MR. HARRIS: Well, Your Honor, we're getting
into the notion for new trial, which I’ll be glad to talk
about. But the problem with it was this: There were
two elements of damages. There was a $5 million claim
for lost future profits that wasn’t even in the case. And
the reason it wasn’t in the case is because the Court had
made a series of rulings up until the week before trial
along the lines of, “You cannot maintain those claims.”
So we were doing precisely what we had to do,
and that was withdrawing certain claims from the
jury’s consideration. The $5 million that the cost or
expenses was not purported deducted from wasn’t even
in the case. The $5 million that was in the case was
simply Mr. Ryan taking invoices and calculating goods
that had already been sold
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.