Reply Brief — Estate of Mueller v. Commissioner
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No. 98-794
In the (eile
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Supreme Court of the United Sistes
October Term, 1998
ESTATE OF BESSIE I. MUELLER. DECEASED.
JOHN S. MUELLER AND MILTON W. BUSH. 8R..
PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES.
Petitioners.
v.
COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.
Kesbondent.
On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United
States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
REPLY TO BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
MILLER, CANFIELD,
PADDOCK AND STONE
Stevan Uzelac, Esquire
Counsel of Record
150 West Jefferson,
Suite 2500
Detroit, Michigan 48226
(313) 963-6420
Attorney for Petitioner
Appe'late Service: Curry & Taylor (800) 222-8738/Appellate@webtv.com
i
Table of Contents
Table OF AMOOIOG oie iis idee cen erccscneccteassevess ii
Reason for Supplemental Brief ..............-.0+eeeee- l
Facts and Holding in Flight Attendants Case ........... l
I. The Flight Attendants Case Provides Ad-
ditional Reason To Grant Petition for Cer-
torari Because It Is in Conflict With
Decision of Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals
Below On Issue Of Tax Court Jurisdiction
To Consider Equitable Defenses ................++ 4
Il. Equitable Recoupment Is Well Estab-
lished As An Available Defense In Tax
Cases Which The Tax Court Has Jurisdic-
tion To Consider Under The Decision In
The Flight Aitemdants Cane ooo cnc cec ccs cceicesvaes 5
Conclusion ..... dee 5d Gh lw ae seem evenensdeeeatieeaK 8
Supplemental Appendix
Flight Attendants Against UAL Offset
(FAAUO) and United Air Lines, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 1999 U.S. App. Lexis
LS FEE Ee SEP PET Ee Me TERS TTP EOP EEE lsa
il
Table of Authorities
Cases
Bokum v. Commissioner, 992 F.2d 1136
25 ik A... hy Beemer ON ae metic pea Oe pe, oe 3
Buchine v. Commissioner, 20 F.3d 173
(S” Ce FON ie a ee 3
Commissioner v. Gooch Milling & Ele-
wator Cw. S00 455 SUR CE oa aes 2
Commissioner v. McCoy, 484 U.S. 3
ESB T) is ciew cca vunteres kee ee ee
Dalm v. United States, 494 U.S. 596
CEI) Cos Ba es dv a ee i 3
Flight Attendants Against UAL Offset
(FAAUQO) and United Air Lines, Inc. v.
Commissioner,1999 U.S. App. Lexis
RIS aonb re ees i Pe ee ee eee 1,4,5
Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 US.
we (E991 si acea satin cc ee a ee ee
Kelley v. Commissioner, 45 F.3d 348
CF" Cit 1908) oe 3
Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.,
mE OER. AR Re, | Bere me nage epU Ug aay ep Pend em 2
Mueller v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 551
CEPR) os ii cicneces ee aes ad ee ak 3
Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport
Workers Union, 451 U5. Ft GGT) eo ie kc ivacces 2
Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner,
EPL ESO CREAT 555 a ik a 2
Nee ee
lil
Shepherd v. Commissioner, 147 F.3d
I a eo ee 4
Woods v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 776
act Skea vast bak CEN or deduce bak ko hubenitewe 3
Statutes
l
Reason for Supplemental Brief
This Supplemental Brief is submitted pursuant to
Rule 15.8. The purpose of this Supplemental Brief is to di-
rect the Court’s attention to the recent case of Flight Atten-
dants Against UAL Offset (FAAUO) and United Air Lines,
Inc. v. Commissioner, Nos. 97-3151 and 97-3335, decided
January 15, 1999 by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, re-
ported at 1999 U.S. App. Lexis 493. This decision is impor-
tant to the issues in this case and was rendered subsequent to
the submission of Briefs by Petitioner and Respondent.
Facts and Holding in Flight Attendants Case
In the Flight Attendants case an association of flight
attendants sought a declaration in the Tax Court under 26
U.S.C. sec. 7476 that the Internal Revenue Service had erred
in determining that their employer, United Air Lines, could
convert a retirement savings plan into a 401(k) plan without
adverse tax consequences. The flight attendants sought a de-
termination of adverse tax consequences on the conversion so
that the savings plan’s assets would become currently distrib-
utable to them rather than being retained in the 401(k) plan.
The association’s petition in the Tax Court was filed one
business day later than the statutory period of ninety days fol-
lowing mailing of the notice of the determination by the In-
ternal Revenue Service. The Government sought to dismiss
the suit as being not timely filed. The association raised
claims of equitable tolling and equitable estoppel to avoid the
bar of the statute of limitations. These claims were rejected
by the Tax Court on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to
consider equitable defenses to the statute of limitations. In
holding that the Tax Court did have jurisdiction to consider
2
equitable defenses relating to the statute of limitations Judge
Posner stated at pages 7-8:
“The argument that the Tax Court can-
not apply the doctrines of equitable tolling and
equitable estoppel because it is a court of lim-
ited jurisdiction is fatuous. All federal courts
are courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v.
Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377
(1994); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport
Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981). We
are given no reason to suppose that statutes of
limitations are intended to be administered dif-
ferently in the Tax Court than in the federal
district courts, which share jurisdiction in fed-
eral tax cases with the Tax Court. It is true
that the predecessor bodies to the Tax Court,
such as the Board of Tax Appeals, were ad-
ministrative agencies having more limited
powers than a regular court. Old Colony Trust
Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716, 725
(1929); Commissioner v. Gooch Milling &
Elevator Co., 320 U.S. 418 (1943). But the
present Tax Court operates pretty indistin-
guishable from a federal district court. Frey-
fag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 891
(1991). It differs in some respects—it has a
specialized jurisdiction, obviously, and its
judges are not Article III judges. But none of
the differences bear on whether the court is
empowered to recognize defenses to the stat-
ute of limitations. In context, the Supreme
Court’s dictum in Commissioner v. McCoy,
484 U.S. 3, 7 (1987) (per curiam), that the Tax
3
Court lacks “general equitable powers” means
only that the Tax Court is not empowered to
override statutory limits on its power by for-
giving interest and penalties that Congress has
imposed for aonpayment of taxes—but then
no court is, unless the imposition would be
unconsititutional.
Without citing McCoy or Dalm yv. United
States, 494 U.S. 596, 611 and n. 8 (1990),
which reserves the issue of the Tax Court’s
equitable powers, the Supreme Court in Frey-
tag v. Commissioner, supra, 501 U.S. at 891,
pointed out that the Tax Court has been given
injunctive and other equitable powers; and nu-
merous cases affirm the Tax Court’s power to
enforce equitable principles, such as contract
reformation and judicial estoppel, without ex-
press congressional authorization. E.g., Kelley
v. Commissioner, 45 F.3d 348, 351-52 (9 Cir.
1995); Buchine v. Commissioner, 20 F.3d 173,
177-78 (5" Cir. 1994); Bokum v. Commis-
sioner, 992 F.2d 1136, 1140-41 (11" Cir.
1993); Mueller v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 551
(1993); Woods v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 776,
784-87 (1989). We are at a loss to understand
why equitable tolling and equitable estoppel
shouldn’t be among the equitable principles
applicable to proceedings in the Tax Court.
Bokum v. Commissioner, supra, holds that
they are among them. The overlap between
the district courts’ jurisdiction over refund
suits and the Tax Court’s jurisdiction over de-
ficiency suits—both jurisdictions exclusive,
—
en ee eee ee oe
4
but the taxpayer allowed to choose between
them—makes it anomalous and confusing to
multiply distinctions between the doctrines ap-
plied by the two types of court. Cf. Shepherd
v. Commissioner, 147 F.3d 633 (7" Cir. 1998).
On the basis of this rationale and these authorities the Sev-
enth Circuit held that the Tax Court did indeed have jurisdic-
tion to consider equitable defenses to the bar of limitations in
tax cases properly before it. In reaching this conclusion the
Court found that on the facts before it the requirements for
equitable estoppel were not present. It also declined to rule
whether as a substantive matter the defense of equitable toll-
ing was generally available in tax cases. It found that on the
particular facts of the Flight Attendants case the requirements
for this defense also could not be shown to be present. The
decision thus determined that the Tax Court has jurisdiction
to consider equitable defenses to the bar of limitations and
should have considered these claims, but holds that the spe-
cific defenses raised in the case (equitable estoppel and equi-
table tolling) were inapplicable on the facts.
I. The Flight Attendants Case Provides Additional Reason
To Grant Petition for Certorari Because It Is in Conflict-
With Decision of Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals Below
On Issue Of Tax Court Jurisdiction To Consider Equita-
ble Defenses
The Flight Attendants case held that the Tax Court
has jurisdiction to consider equitable defenses regarding ap-
plication of the statute of limitations. The case is significant
to the pending Petition because it set aside the Tax Court’s
own determination that it had no jurisdiction to consider
5
equitable defenses to the bar of limitations. In doing so the
Court of Appeals specifically considered and rejected the
Government’s contention that the Tax Court lacks such juris-
diction because it is a statutory court with limited jurisdic-
tional powers which do not expressly provide for its
consideration of equitable defenses. This identical argument
is the fundamental basis upon which the present case below
was decided by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and upon
which the Government has relied in opposing the Petition for
Writ of Certiorari. The Flight Attendants case creates a con-
flict between the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals regarding the jurisdiction of the
Tax Court to consider equitable defenses to the bar of limita-
tions in tax cases. This conflict provides an additional and
compelling reason for this Court to grant Certorari.
Il. Equitable Recoupment Is Well Established As An
Available Defense In Tax Cases Which The Tax Court
Has Jurisdiction To Consider Under The Decision In The
Flight Attendants Case
There are three equitable defenses to limitations
which have been recognized by the courts. These defenses
are equitable recoupment, equitable tolling and equitable es-
toppel. Each are based upon a showing of different factual
circumstances. Equitable recoupment rests upon the showing
of payment of a prior tax which is mutually inconsistent with
a second tax upon the same transaction sought to be enforced
in the main action. As recognized in Flight Attendants, supra
at pg. 3, equitable tolling permits a prospective plaintiff to
delay filing suit beyond the statute of limitations if despite
due diligence on his part he can show that he could not obtain
the information needed in order to determine, in time to sue
within the deadline, whether he has a claim on which a suit
OS in cc iba TREN BOER aah en DRE My rates 3 wale
mac et |
6
can be founded. And equitable estoppel allows delay in suing
when it can be shown that the defendant (IRS) has taken steps
to prevent the plaintiff from suing in time. Id.
Of these three equitable defenses, the one which is
most firmly established and available to both parties in tax
cases is equitable recoupment. This defense is regularly ap-
plied not only in litigation but also administratively in the
collection of taxes by the Internal Revenue Service. The ju-
risdictional authority of the Tax Court to consider this de-
fense either exists as collateral to its jurisdiction to resolve all
of the substantive issues arising in tax cases properly before
it, or it does not for want of an express statutory grant of ju-
risdiction over equitable claims as the Government contends.
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that no leg-
islative purpose exists for denying jurisdiction over equitable
defenses to the Tax Court. It further found that the Govern-
ment’s reliance on dicta in case authorities to support its posi-
tion was misplaced. This analysis is correct and sets forth the
basis for error in the decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of
Appeals below.
aaa |
7
Conclusion
The issue presented by the Petition is important to the
administration of the tax laws and there now exists a conflict
between the Sixth and Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. This
Court should grant the Petition for Certiorari to resolve this
conflict and determine that the Tax Court has jurisdiction to
consider equitable defenses to the bar of limitations in the
same manner as a district court.
Respectfully submitted.
MILLER, CANFIELD,
PADDOCK AND STONE, P.L.C.
Stevan Uzelac, Esquire
150 West Jefferson,
Suite 2500
Detroit, Michigan 48226
(313) 963-6420
Attorney for Petitioners
Baie ree ress
lsa
Flight Attendants Against UAL Offset (FAAUO) and United
Air Lines, Inc., Petitioners-Appellants, v. Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, Respondent-Appellee.
Nos. 97-3151 and 97-3335
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEV-
ENTH CIRCUIT
1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 493
November 9, 1998, Argued
January 15, 1999, Decided
COUNSEL: For FLIGHT ATTENDANTS AGAINST
UNITED AIR LINES OFFSET, Petitioner - Appellant,
(97-3151): Michael S. Gordon, Washington, DC USA. For
UNITED AIR LINES, INCORPORATED, Petitioner - Ap-
pellant, (97-3335): Kim M. Boylan, MAYER, BROWN &
PLATT, Washington, DC USA. Thomas C. Durham,
MAYER, BROWN & PLATT, Chicago, IL USA.
For COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respon-
dent - Appellee, (97-3151): Gary R. Allen, Gilbert S. Rothen-
berg, Ellen P. DelSole, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Tax
Division, Appellate Section, Washington, DC USA. Sally J.
Schornstheimer, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Tax Divi-
sion, Washington, DC USA. For COMMISSIONER OF IN-
TERNAL REVENUE, Respondent - Appellee, (97-3335):
2sa
Gary R. Allen, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Tax Division,
Appellate Section, Washington, DC USA.
JUDGES: Before Posner, Chief Judge, and Cudahy and Cof-
fey, Circuit Judges.
OPINIONBY: POSNER
OPINION: Posner, Chief Judge. The plaintiff, an association
of flight attendants employed by United Air Lines, filed suit
in the Tax Court under 26 U.S.C. § 7476 seeking a declara-
tion that the Internal Revenue Service had erred in determin-
ing that the conversion of United's retirement savings plan for
flight attendants into a 401(k) plan had no tax consequences.
The association wanted the plan terminated rather than con-
verted and the plan's assets distributed to the flight attendants,
and it believed that this would happen if the new plan was de-
nied the favorable tax status that the original plan had
enjoyed.
The suit had to be filed "before the ninety-first day after the
day after such notice is mailed." 26 U.S.C. § 7476(b)(5); Rule
of Practice and Procedure of U.S. Tax Court 25(a). The no-
tice was mailed to the association on August 23, 1996: the
day after was August 24; the ninety-first day after August 24
was Saturday, November 23; the last day for filing the suit
was therefore Friday, November 22, 1996. The association
did not file until the following Monday, November 25. The
Tax Court dismissed the suit as untimely. It also dismissed,
as moot, United's motion to dismiss the suit on the ground
that United was a necessary party and the association had
failed to join it. Both the association and United appeal. The
association invokes the doctrine of equitable tolling to justify
its untimely filing. The government asserts that the doctrine
gedit RRS AL Ae ia DBS cE ft Jando sesso phi 5 Stacie Salvin, Ssiaanlneela ae
3sa
has no application to tax cases, and alternatively that the as-
sociation has failed to make a case for equitable tolling.
We must consider first whether the association has standing
to litigate over the IRS's grant of favorable tax status to
United. Ordinarily a person does not have standing to com-
plain about someone else's receipt of a tax benefit. Allen v.
Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 82 L. Ed. 2d 556, 104 S. Ct. 3315
(1984). The injury is too attenuated for the dispute to reach
the level of a real "case" or "controversy" in the sense that the
Supreme Court has impressed on these terms found in Article
Ill, section 2 of the Constitution. This case is different,
however--is a real "case"--because the members of the asso-
ciation are participants in the retirement savings plan that
was the subject of the IRS's ruling. They could certainly have
challenged a denial of favorable tax treatment for the plan; it
would have been an injury to them; the Internal Revenue
Code and its implementing regulations make clear their right
to seek declaratory relief. 26 U.S.C. § 7476(b)(1); 26 C.F.R.
§ 1.7476-1(b)(1); Self-Insurance Institute v. Korioth, 993
F.2d 479, 484 (Sth Cir. 1993). It might seem that they would
have no interest in challenging the grant of such treatment.
But they do, because denial, while unfavorable to them in one
sense, would have been favorable in another. It would have
precipitated termination of the plan, because it would have re-
quired the participants to pay taxes on United's contributions
to the plan and forbidden United to deduct those contribu-
tions from its taxable income, see 26 U.S.C. §§ 401, 402(b),
404(a)(5), 501, and these tax consequences would have been
fatal to the plan's viability. See generally John D. Colombo,
"Paying for Sins of the Master: An Analysis of the Tax Ef-
fects of Pension Plan Disqualification and a Proposal for Re-
form.” 34 Arizona Law Review 53 (1992). The plan provided
that upon termination its assets would be distributed to the
4sa
participants. Thus a successful challenge to the IRS's ruling
would have initiated a sequence of actions the result of which
would have been to put money in the pockets of the associa-
tion's members. The total value of their benefits would have
been less because of the loss of favorable tax treatment, but
they prefer a bird in the hand to two birds in the bush; for
them, continued favorable tax treatment is a harm.
Since the members of the association had Article III standing,
so did the association. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Ad-
vertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343, 53 L. Ed. 2d 383, 97 S.
Ct. 2434 (1977); North Shore Gas Co. v. EPA, 930 F.2d
1239, 1243 (7th Cir. 1991); Self-Insurance Institute v. Kori-
oth, 993 F.2d 479, 484. But the statute under which the asso-
ciation sued authorizes only employees to sue, which may be
why throughout the administrative proceedings in this case
the IRS communicated directly with the association's presi-
dent (who is an employee of United) rather than with the as-
sociation as such. By the time the case had reached the Tax
Court, everyone had forgotten that there might be an issue of
the association's right to sue, although it is mentioned in a
footnote in the government's brief in this court. The footnote
points out that the government may not be sued without statu-
tory authorization, Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192, 135 L.
Ed. 2d 486, 116 S. Ct. 2092 (1996); United States v. Nordic
Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33-34, 117 L. Ed. 2d 181, 112 S.
Ct. 1011 (1992); United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584.
586, 85 L. Ed. 1058, 61 S. Ct. 767 (1941); Gibson v. Brown,
137 F.3d 992, 997-98 (7th Cir. 1998), here lacking. But it
makes no practical difference whether the association is the
proper party plaintiff, or its president. She is a participant in
the plan and so has standing to seek declaratory relief against
the IRS's ruling on the plan's tax status. We can thus treat this
as a suit by her rather than by the association without
5sa
consequence. So let us move on to the issue of the timeliness
of the suit.
The doctrine of equitable tolling permits a prospective plain-
tiff to delay filing suit beyond the statute of limitations if de-
spite due diligence on his part he cannot obtain the
information he needs in order to determine, in time to sue
within the deadline, whether he has a claim on which a suit
can be founded. A closely related doctrine, equitable estop-
pel, allows delay in suing when the defendant, in this case the
IRS, has taken steps to prevent the plaintiff from suing in
time. (On both doctrines, see, e.g., Wolin v. Smith Barney
Inc., 83 F.3d 847, 852 (7th Cir. 1996); Cada v. Baxter Health-
care Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450-53 (7th Cir. 1990); Currier v.
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Inc., 159 F.3d 1363, 1367
(D.C. Cir. 1998).) This case has a whiff of equitable estoppel
because, as we are about to see, the basis of the claim of equi-
table tolling is the IRS's failure to give the association infor-
mation that the association claims it needed in order to sue.
Yet the association does not mention that doctrine, and so any
reliance on it is waived; in any event, as will soon become
apparent, the facts no more show equitable estoppel than they
show equitable tolling.
United asked for a ruling from the IRS on the tax status of its
new plan late in 1995. On August 14 of the following year,
the association asked the IRS for copies of all comments or
other correspondence that had been submitted to the IRS in
connection with United's request. Nine days later the IRS
mailed to the association's president a notice of a final deter-
mination (dated the previous day) that the new plan did qual-
ify for continued favorable tax treatment. It was this mailing
that set the period for the association to challenge the deter-
mination running, and the period expired as we said on
6sa
November 22. The IRS had not replied to the association's re-
quest for comments. On the contrary, on November 15 the
IRS had notified the association's president that it had for-
warded her request to the appropriate office for consideration.
She should have known that it was unlikely, to say the least,
that a response would be forthcoming in time for the associa-
tion to prepare a pleading due a week later. And in fact the
IRS did not reply until February of the following year, when
it told the association that it had received no comments apart
from those submitted by the association itself. Despite not
having received any comments, the association filed its suit
three days (only one business day) after the November 2?
deadline expired.
When asked at oral argument how, if the comments (or at
least a denial that there were any Comments) were essential to
its being able’to file suit, the association was able to file suit
before it received either the comments or the denial, the asso-
ciation's lawyer said that the petition for declaratory relief
that he filed on November 25, 1996, was "unreal," that it was
really a request for additional time for filing the "real" peti-
tion. But if it was "unreal," then the Tax Court was right to
dismiss it irrespective of any deadline considerations, and the
association should have filed the "real" petition after it
learned in February of 1997 that there were no comments.
Because the association has never filed what it considers a
"real" petition, we cannot gauge what difference it would
make to a challenger's ability to file a petition to have in hand
either the comments or a denial that there were comments.
Probably very little. The "unreal" petition asked the Tax
Court to overrule the IRS's determination and rescind the
plan's favorable tax treatment. No more was required in an
initial pleading, which under the rules of the Tax Court need
only be a "clear and concise statement of each ground ... and
ee
7sa
the facts to support each ground." Rule of Practice and Proce-
dure of the U.S. Tax Court 211(c)(4)(D).
A regulation requires the applicant (here United) for IRS ap-
proval of favorable tax treatment of a retirement plan to make
any comments received on the application "immediately"
available to all parties. 26 C.F.R. § 601.201 (0)(3)(xvii); see
also Stevens v. Commissioner, 1985 T.C. Memo 192, 49
T.C.M. (CCH) 1261, 1267 (1985). The association did not
take advantage of this regulation; instead it asked the IRS for
the comments. It offers no excuse for this blunder.
Statutes of limitations are not merely traps for the unwary;
they serve important social purposes. Board of Regents v. To-
manio, 446 U.S. 478, 487, 64 L. Ed. 2d 440, 100 S. Ct. 1790
(1980); United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117, 62 L.
Ed. 2d 259, 100 S. Ct. 352 (1979); Galloway v. General Mo-
tors Service Parts Operations, 78 F.3d 1164, 1165-66 (7th
Cir. 1996); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Seale, 13 F.3d 850, 852
(Sth Cir. 1994); Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d
1385, 1393-94 (7th Cir. 1990) (concurring opinion). This is
conspicuously the case with respect to determinations of the
tax status of retirement plans. Because the alteration of that
Status as a consequence of litigation can require a revision of
tax liabilities for past years, disturbing expectations and en-
tailing heavy administrative expenses, it is vital that such liti-
gation be instituted as soon as possible after the initial
determination of the plan's status; that may be why the statute
of limitations is so short. It is equally vital that a party who
wants to appeal to the doctrine of equitable tolling to excuse a
late filing show (as the doctrine requires him to do, e.g.,
Wolin v. Smith Barney Inc., supra, 83 F.3d at 852; Cada v.
Baxter Healthcare Corp., supra, 920 F.2d at 451; Currier v.
Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Inc., supra, 159 F.3d at
8sa
1367) that he tried diligently to file within the deadline or as
soon afterwards as possible. The flight attendants’ association
did not exhibit diligence. If it could file suit on November 25
it could have filed three days earlier: nothing had changed in
the interim. If, as we do not for a moment believe. it could
not file a "real" suit until February 1997, when it learned that
there were no comments, it should have filed a real petition
then. Had that petition been turned down as untimely, at least
we would have a concrete record on which to base a judg-
ment about a challenger's actual need for such comments.
And rather than sit on its hands waiting for an agency not
known for its celerity to respond to a request that should have
been directed to the applicant for the tax ruling, the associa-
tion should have complied with the regulation and directed its
request to United.
Since, so far as appears, the association could have sued in
time notwithstanding the IRS's foot dragging, the latter's con-
duct or rather nonconduct did not work an estoppel because it
did not make it impossible for the association to sue in time.
It is implicit in the doctrine that the conduct alleged as the ba-
sis for the estoppel have been the cause of the plaintiff's not
suing in time. See Speer v. Rand McNally & Co., 123 F.3d
658, 663 (7th Cir. 1997); Cange v. Stotler & Co., 826 F.2d
581, 587-88 (7th Cir. 1987); Redman v. U.S. West Business
Resources, Inc., 153 F.3d 691, 695 (8th Cir. 1998). It is there-
fore immaterial whether, as we believe, diligence is not an
element of equitable estoppel, Wolin v. Smith Barney Inc.,
supra, 83 F.3d at 852, or, as other courts believe, Benitez-
Pons v. Puerto Rico, 136 F.3d 54, 63 (Ist Cir. 1998); Robin-
son v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 1023 (3d Cir. 1997), it is. (In
Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, [*12] 194, 138 L.
Ed. 2d 373, 117 S. Ct. 1984 (1997), the Supreme Court noted
the conflict but left it unresolved.) For however that issue is
Osa
resolved, the IRS's foot-dragging and failure to remind the as-
sociation that it could ask for the comments directly from
United are not the kind of obstructive conduct that would
warrant estopping a defendant to plead the statute of limita-
tions. Not being prompt and helpful is a lot different from ac-
tually preventing a plaintiff from suing in time. See, e.g.,
Speer v. Rand McNally & Co., supra, 123 F.3d at 663; Red-
man v. U.S. West Business Resources, Inc., supra, 153 F.3d
at 695.
Because the association has failed to make a case for equita-
ble tolling, we need not decide (as the parties invite us to do)
whether the doctrine may ever be invoked in a federal tax
case. In Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S.
89, 112 L. Ed. 2d 435, 111 S. Ct. 453 (1990), the Supreme
Court held that the doctrine does apply to suits against the
federal government, but in United States v. Brockamp, 519
U.S. 347, 136 L. Ed. 2d 818, 117 S. Ct. 849 (1997), it carved
an exception for tax refund suits. See also RHI Holdings, Inc.
v. United States, 142 F.3d 1459, 1461-63 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
The government asks us, on the authority of Brockamp, to
broaden the exception to cover the entire tax code. But
Brockamp is not broadly written. The Court pointed to em-
phatic statutory language not paralleled in the sections of the
code at issue in this case indicating Congress's disinclination
to permit any delays in the institution of tax refund litigation
and to the administrative complexities that would ensue from
injecting the complex, nuanced, case-by-case doctrine of eq-
uitable tolling into the assembly-line production of tax re-
funds in response to the enormous number of refund claims
(more than a hundred million) filed every year.
Taking a tack independent of Brockamp, the government ar-
gues that because the Tax Court, being a court of limited
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jurisdiction (Brockamp was a refund case and thus originated
in a district court rather than the Tax Court), lacks the power
to recognize equitable defenses not specified by Congress.
This is also the position of the Tax Court. Rule of Practice
and Procedure of U.S. Tax Court 210(c)(3); Calvert Anesthe-
sia Associates v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 285 (1998); Estate
of Rosenberg v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 1014, 1017-18
(1980). Rule 210(c)(3) states that the [*14] Tax Court does
not have "jurisdiction" over a suit for declaratory judgment
under 26 U.S.C. § 7476 if it is filed after the statutory
deadline.
Had Congress delegated to the Tax Court the power to estab-
lish nonwaivable jurisdictional rules, akin to those that limit
the time for taking appeals, e.g., Fed. R. App. P. 26(b): Tor-
res v. INS, 144 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 1998); Nowak v. INS,
94 F.3d 390, 391 (7th Cir. 1996), we would be bound. But
neither the government, nor the Tax Court in the Calvert or
Rosenberg decisions, has claimed this; nor have we found
any indication that this was Congress's intention in authoriz-
ing the Tax Court to adopt procedural rules. 26 U.S.C. §
7453. If, therefore, Rule 210(c)(3) is merely the Tax Court's
interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code, and of the princi-
ples of federal common law that guide the resolution of pro-
cedural issues to which the Code does not speak, we are not
bound. The Tax Court is a trial court rather than an appellate
court, and its views on questions of law are not entitled to
deference from the courts of appeals. Prussner v. United
States, 896 F.2d 218, 224 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc); Cadwal-
lader v. Commissioner, 919 F.2d 1273, 1274 (7th Cir. 1990).
The argument that the Tax Court cannot apply the doctrines
of equitable tolling and equitable estoppel because it is a
court of limited jurisdiction is fatuous. All federal courts are
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courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.
Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 128 L. Ed. 2d 391, 114 S. Ct. 1673
(1994); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union,
451 U.S. 77, 95, 67 L. Ed. 2d 750, 101 S. Ct. 1571 (1981).
We are given no reason to suppose that statutes of limitations
are intended to be administered differently in the Tax Court
than in the federal district courts, which share jurisdiction in
federal tax cases with the Tax Court. It is true that the prede-
cessor bodies to the Tax Court, such as the Board of Tax Ap-
peals, were administrative agencies having more limited
powers than a regular court. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Com-
missioner, 279 U.S. 716, 725, 73 L. Ed. 918, 49 S. Ct. 499
(1929); Commissioner v. Gooch Milling & Elevator Co., 320
U.S. 418, 88 L. Ed. 139, 64 S. Ct. 184 (1943). But the present
Tax Court operates pretty indistinguishably from a federal
district court. Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 891,
115 L. Ed. 2d 764, 111 S. Ct. 2631 (1991). It differs in some
respects--it has a specialized jurisdiction, obviously, and its
judges are not Article III judges. But none of the differences
bear on whether the court is empowered to recognize de-
fenses to the statute of limitations. In context, the Supreme
Court's dictum in Commissioner v. McCoy, 484 U.S. 3, 7, 98
L. Ed. 2d 2, 108 S. Ct. 217 (1987) (per curiam), that the Tax
Court lacks "general equitable powers" means only that the
Tax Court is not empowered to override statutory limits on its
power by forgiving interest and penalties that Congress has
imposed for nonpayment of taxes--but then no court is, unless
the imposition would be unconstitutional.
Without citing McCoy or Dalm v. United States, 494 U.S.
596, 611, 108 L. Ed. 2d 548, 110 S. Ct. 1361 and n. 8 (1990),
which reserves the issue of the Tax Court's equitable powers,
the Supreme Court in Freytag v. Commissioner, supra, 501
U.S. at 891, pointed out that the Tax Court has been given
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injunctive and other equitable powers; and numerous cases
affirm the Tax Court's power to enforce equitable principles,
such as contract reformation and judicial estoppel, without
express congressional authorization. E.g., Kelley v. Commis-
sioner, 45 F.3d 348, 351-52 (9th Cir. 1995); Buchine v. Com-
missioner, 20 F.3d 173, 177-78 (Sth Cir. 1994); Bokum v.
Commissioner, 992 F.2d 1136, 1140-41 (11th Cir. 1993):
Mueller v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 551 (1993); Woods v.
Commissioner, 92 T.C. 776, 784-87 (1989). We are at a loss
to understand why equitable tolling and equitable estoppel
shouldn't be among the equitable principles applicable to pro-
ceedings in the Tax Court. Bokum v. Commissioner, supra,
holds that they are among them. The overlap between the dis-
trict courts’ jurisdiction over refund suits and the Tax Court's
jurisdiction over deficiency suits--both jurisdictions exclu-
sive, but the taxpayer allowed to choose between them--
makes it anomalous and confusing to multiply distinctions
between the doctrines applied by the two types of court. Cf.
Shepherd v. Commissioner, 147 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 1998).
At argument the government's lawyer emphasized quite prop-
erly not dry legalisms about jurisdiction but instead the im-
portance of prompt resolution of issues involving the tax
Status of retirement plans, and this may justify the extension
of the holding of Brockamp to the present case after all. But
that we need not decide.
Our disposition of the association's appeal moots United's ap-
peal. United had moved to dismiss the suit because the asso-
ciation had failed to join a necessary party, namely United.
Rule of Practice and Procedure of U.S. Tax Court 215(a)(3).
The Tax Court denied the motion as moot when it ruled that
it had no jurisdiction over the suit because it had been filed
late. Although United has appealed from that denial, the
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l3sa
appeal is conditional on our reversing the Tax Court's dis-
missal of the suit, which we have not done.
So: No. 97-3151 is affirmed and No. 97-3335 is dismissed as
moot.
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