Reply Brief — Estate of Mueller v. Commissioner

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Text

No. 98-794

In the (eile

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Supreme Court of the United Sistes

October Term, 1998

ESTATE OF BESSIE I. MUELLER. DECEASED.

JOHN S. MUELLER AND MILTON W. BUSH. 8R..

PERSONAL REPRESENTATIVES.

Petitioners.

v.

COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE.

Kesbondent.

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the United

States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

REPLY TO BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

MILLER, CANFIELD,

PADDOCK AND STONE

Stevan Uzelac, Esquire

Counsel of Record

150 West Jefferson,

Suite 2500

Detroit, Michigan 48226

(313) 963-6420

Attorney for Petitioner

Appe'late Service: Curry & Taylor (800) 222-8738/Appellate@webtv.com

i

Table of Contents

Table OF AMOOIOG oie iis idee cen erccscneccteassevess ii

Reason for Supplemental Brief ..............-.0+eeeee- l

Facts and Holding in Flight Attendants Case ........... l

I. The Flight Attendants Case Provides Ad-

ditional Reason To Grant Petition for Cer-

torari Because It Is in Conflict With

Decision of Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals

Below On Issue Of Tax Court Jurisdiction

To Consider Equitable Defenses ................++ 4

Il. Equitable Recoupment Is Well Estab-

lished As An Available Defense In Tax

Cases Which The Tax Court Has Jurisdic-

tion To Consider Under The Decision In

The Flight Aitemdants Cane ooo cnc cec ccs cceicesvaes 5

Conclusion ..... dee 5d Gh lw ae seem evenensdeeeatieeaK 8

Supplemental Appendix

Flight Attendants Against UAL Offset

(FAAUO) and United Air Lines, Inc. v.

Commissioner, 1999 U.S. App. Lexis

LS FEE Ee SEP PET Ee Me TERS TTP EOP EEE lsa

il

Table of Authorities

Cases

Bokum v. Commissioner, 992 F.2d 1136

25 ik A... hy Beemer ON ae metic pea Oe pe, oe 3

Buchine v. Commissioner, 20 F.3d 173

(S” Ce FON ie a ee 3

Commissioner v. Gooch Milling & Ele-

wator Cw. S00 455 SUR CE oa aes 2

Commissioner v. McCoy, 484 U.S. 3

ESB T) is ciew cca vunteres kee ee ee

Dalm v. United States, 494 U.S. 596

CEI) Cos Ba es dv a ee i 3

Flight Attendants Against UAL Offset

(FAAUQO) and United Air Lines, Inc. v.

Commissioner,1999 U.S. App. Lexis

RIS aonb re ees i Pe ee ee eee 1,4,5

Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 US.

we (E991 si acea satin cc ee a ee ee

Kelley v. Commissioner, 45 F.3d 348

CF" Cit 1908) oe 3

Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins. Co.,

mE OER. AR Re, | Bere me nage epU Ug aay ep Pend em 2

Mueller v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 551

CEPR) os ii cicneces ee aes ad ee ak 3

Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport

Workers Union, 451 U5. Ft GGT) eo ie kc ivacces 2

Old Colony Trust Co. v. Commissioner,

EPL ESO CREAT 555 a ik a 2

Nee ee

lil

Shepherd v. Commissioner, 147 F.3d

I a eo ee 4

Woods v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 776

act Skea vast bak CEN or deduce bak ko hubenitewe 3

Statutes

l

Reason for Supplemental Brief

This Supplemental Brief is submitted pursuant to

Rule 15.8. The purpose of this Supplemental Brief is to di-

rect the Court’s attention to the recent case of Flight Atten-

dants Against UAL Offset (FAAUO) and United Air Lines,

Inc. v. Commissioner, Nos. 97-3151 and 97-3335, decided

January 15, 1999 by the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, re-

ported at 1999 U.S. App. Lexis 493. This decision is impor-

tant to the issues in this case and was rendered subsequent to

the submission of Briefs by Petitioner and Respondent.

Facts and Holding in Flight Attendants Case

In the Flight Attendants case an association of flight

attendants sought a declaration in the Tax Court under 26

U.S.C. sec. 7476 that the Internal Revenue Service had erred

in determining that their employer, United Air Lines, could

convert a retirement savings plan into a 401(k) plan without

adverse tax consequences. The flight attendants sought a de-

termination of adverse tax consequences on the conversion so

that the savings plan’s assets would become currently distrib-

utable to them rather than being retained in the 401(k) plan.

The association’s petition in the Tax Court was filed one

business day later than the statutory period of ninety days fol-

lowing mailing of the notice of the determination by the In-

ternal Revenue Service. The Government sought to dismiss

the suit as being not timely filed. The association raised

claims of equitable tolling and equitable estoppel to avoid the

bar of the statute of limitations. These claims were rejected

by the Tax Court on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to

consider equitable defenses to the statute of limitations. In

holding that the Tax Court did have jurisdiction to consider

2

equitable defenses relating to the statute of limitations Judge

Posner stated at pages 7-8:

“The argument that the Tax Court can-

not apply the doctrines of equitable tolling and

equitable estoppel because it is a court of lim-

ited jurisdiction is fatuous. All federal courts

are courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v.

Guardian Life Ins. Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377

(1994); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport

Workers Union, 451 U.S. 77, 95 (1981). We

are given no reason to suppose that statutes of

limitations are intended to be administered dif-

ferently in the Tax Court than in the federal

district courts, which share jurisdiction in fed-

eral tax cases with the Tax Court. It is true

that the predecessor bodies to the Tax Court,

such as the Board of Tax Appeals, were ad-

ministrative agencies having more limited

powers than a regular court. Old Colony Trust

Co. v. Commissioner, 279 U.S. 716, 725

(1929); Commissioner v. Gooch Milling &

Elevator Co., 320 U.S. 418 (1943). But the

present Tax Court operates pretty indistin-

guishable from a federal district court. Frey-

fag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 891

(1991). It differs in some respects—it has a

specialized jurisdiction, obviously, and its

judges are not Article III judges. But none of

the differences bear on whether the court is

empowered to recognize defenses to the stat-

ute of limitations. In context, the Supreme

Court’s dictum in Commissioner v. McCoy,

484 U.S. 3, 7 (1987) (per curiam), that the Tax

3

Court lacks “general equitable powers” means

only that the Tax Court is not empowered to

override statutory limits on its power by for-

giving interest and penalties that Congress has

imposed for aonpayment of taxes—but then

no court is, unless the imposition would be

unconsititutional.

Without citing McCoy or Dalm yv. United

States, 494 U.S. 596, 611 and n. 8 (1990),

which reserves the issue of the Tax Court’s

equitable powers, the Supreme Court in Frey-

tag v. Commissioner, supra, 501 U.S. at 891,

pointed out that the Tax Court has been given

injunctive and other equitable powers; and nu-

merous cases affirm the Tax Court’s power to

enforce equitable principles, such as contract

reformation and judicial estoppel, without ex-

press congressional authorization. E.g., Kelley

v. Commissioner, 45 F.3d 348, 351-52 (9 Cir.

1995); Buchine v. Commissioner, 20 F.3d 173,

177-78 (5" Cir. 1994); Bokum v. Commis-

sioner, 992 F.2d 1136, 1140-41 (11" Cir.

1993); Mueller v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 551

(1993); Woods v. Commissioner, 92 T.C. 776,

784-87 (1989). We are at a loss to understand

why equitable tolling and equitable estoppel

shouldn’t be among the equitable principles

applicable to proceedings in the Tax Court.

Bokum v. Commissioner, supra, holds that

they are among them. The overlap between

the district courts’ jurisdiction over refund

suits and the Tax Court’s jurisdiction over de-

ficiency suits—both jurisdictions exclusive,

—

en ee eee ee oe

4

but the taxpayer allowed to choose between

them—makes it anomalous and confusing to

multiply distinctions between the doctrines ap-

plied by the two types of court. Cf. Shepherd

v. Commissioner, 147 F.3d 633 (7" Cir. 1998).

On the basis of this rationale and these authorities the Sev-

enth Circuit held that the Tax Court did indeed have jurisdic-

tion to consider equitable defenses to the bar of limitations in

tax cases properly before it. In reaching this conclusion the

Court found that on the facts before it the requirements for

equitable estoppel were not present. It also declined to rule

whether as a substantive matter the defense of equitable toll-

ing was generally available in tax cases. It found that on the

particular facts of the Flight Attendants case the requirements

for this defense also could not be shown to be present. The

decision thus determined that the Tax Court has jurisdiction

to consider equitable defenses to the bar of limitations and

should have considered these claims, but holds that the spe-

cific defenses raised in the case (equitable estoppel and equi-

table tolling) were inapplicable on the facts.

I. The Flight Attendants Case Provides Additional Reason

To Grant Petition for Certorari Because It Is in Conflict-

With Decision of Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals Below

On Issue Of Tax Court Jurisdiction To Consider Equita-

ble Defenses

The Flight Attendants case held that the Tax Court

has jurisdiction to consider equitable defenses regarding ap-

plication of the statute of limitations. The case is significant

to the pending Petition because it set aside the Tax Court’s

own determination that it had no jurisdiction to consider

5

equitable defenses to the bar of limitations. In doing so the

Court of Appeals specifically considered and rejected the

Government’s contention that the Tax Court lacks such juris-

diction because it is a statutory court with limited jurisdic-

tional powers which do not expressly provide for its

consideration of equitable defenses. This identical argument

is the fundamental basis upon which the present case below

was decided by the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and upon

which the Government has relied in opposing the Petition for

Writ of Certiorari. The Flight Attendants case creates a con-

flict between the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals and the Sev-

enth Circuit Court of Appeals regarding the jurisdiction of the

Tax Court to consider equitable defenses to the bar of limita-

tions in tax cases. This conflict provides an additional and

compelling reason for this Court to grant Certorari.

Il. Equitable Recoupment Is Well Established As An

Available Defense In Tax Cases Which The Tax Court

Has Jurisdiction To Consider Under The Decision In The

Flight Attendants Case

There are three equitable defenses to limitations

which have been recognized by the courts. These defenses

are equitable recoupment, equitable tolling and equitable es-

toppel. Each are based upon a showing of different factual

circumstances. Equitable recoupment rests upon the showing

of payment of a prior tax which is mutually inconsistent with

a second tax upon the same transaction sought to be enforced

in the main action. As recognized in Flight Attendants, supra

at pg. 3, equitable tolling permits a prospective plaintiff to

delay filing suit beyond the statute of limitations if despite

due diligence on his part he can show that he could not obtain

the information needed in order to determine, in time to sue

within the deadline, whether he has a claim on which a suit

OS in cc iba TREN BOER aah en DRE My rates 3 wale

mac et |

6

can be founded. And equitable estoppel allows delay in suing

when it can be shown that the defendant (IRS) has taken steps

to prevent the plaintiff from suing in time. Id.

Of these three equitable defenses, the one which is

most firmly established and available to both parties in tax

cases is equitable recoupment. This defense is regularly ap-

plied not only in litigation but also administratively in the

collection of taxes by the Internal Revenue Service. The ju-

risdictional authority of the Tax Court to consider this de-

fense either exists as collateral to its jurisdiction to resolve all

of the substantive issues arising in tax cases properly before

it, or it does not for want of an express statutory grant of ju-

risdiction over equitable claims as the Government contends.

The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals concluded that no leg-

islative purpose exists for denying jurisdiction over equitable

defenses to the Tax Court. It further found that the Govern-

ment’s reliance on dicta in case authorities to support its posi-

tion was misplaced. This analysis is correct and sets forth the

basis for error in the decision of the Sixth Circuit Court of

Appeals below.

aaa |

7

Conclusion

The issue presented by the Petition is important to the

administration of the tax laws and there now exists a conflict

between the Sixth and Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals. This

Court should grant the Petition for Certiorari to resolve this

conflict and determine that the Tax Court has jurisdiction to

consider equitable defenses to the bar of limitations in the

same manner as a district court.

Respectfully submitted.

MILLER, CANFIELD,

PADDOCK AND STONE, P.L.C.

Stevan Uzelac, Esquire

150 West Jefferson,

Suite 2500

Detroit, Michigan 48226

(313) 963-6420

Attorney for Petitioners

Baie ree ress

lsa

Flight Attendants Against UAL Offset (FAAUO) and United

Air Lines, Inc., Petitioners-Appellants, v. Commissioner of

Internal Revenue, Respondent-Appellee.

Nos. 97-3151 and 97-3335

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SEV-

ENTH CIRCUIT

1999 U.S. App. LEXIS 493

November 9, 1998, Argued

January 15, 1999, Decided

COUNSEL: For FLIGHT ATTENDANTS AGAINST

UNITED AIR LINES OFFSET, Petitioner - Appellant,

(97-3151): Michael S. Gordon, Washington, DC USA. For

UNITED AIR LINES, INCORPORATED, Petitioner - Ap-

pellant, (97-3335): Kim M. Boylan, MAYER, BROWN &

PLATT, Washington, DC USA. Thomas C. Durham,

MAYER, BROWN & PLATT, Chicago, IL USA.

For COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE, Respon-

dent - Appellee, (97-3151): Gary R. Allen, Gilbert S. Rothen-

berg, Ellen P. DelSole, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Tax

Division, Appellate Section, Washington, DC USA. Sally J.

Schornstheimer, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Tax Divi-

sion, Washington, DC USA. For COMMISSIONER OF IN-

TERNAL REVENUE, Respondent - Appellee, (97-3335):

2sa

Gary R. Allen, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Tax Division,

Appellate Section, Washington, DC USA.

JUDGES: Before Posner, Chief Judge, and Cudahy and Cof-

fey, Circuit Judges.

OPINIONBY: POSNER

OPINION: Posner, Chief Judge. The plaintiff, an association

of flight attendants employed by United Air Lines, filed suit

in the Tax Court under 26 U.S.C. § 7476 seeking a declara-

tion that the Internal Revenue Service had erred in determin-

ing that the conversion of United's retirement savings plan for

flight attendants into a 401(k) plan had no tax consequences.

The association wanted the plan terminated rather than con-

verted and the plan's assets distributed to the flight attendants,

and it believed that this would happen if the new plan was de-

nied the favorable tax status that the original plan had

enjoyed.

The suit had to be filed "before the ninety-first day after the

day after such notice is mailed." 26 U.S.C. § 7476(b)(5); Rule

of Practice and Procedure of U.S. Tax Court 25(a). The no-

tice was mailed to the association on August 23, 1996: the

day after was August 24; the ninety-first day after August 24

was Saturday, November 23; the last day for filing the suit

was therefore Friday, November 22, 1996. The association

did not file until the following Monday, November 25. The

Tax Court dismissed the suit as untimely. It also dismissed,

as moot, United's motion to dismiss the suit on the ground

that United was a necessary party and the association had

failed to join it. Both the association and United appeal. The

association invokes the doctrine of equitable tolling to justify

its untimely filing. The government asserts that the doctrine

gedit RRS AL Ae ia DBS cE ft Jando sesso phi 5 Stacie Salvin, Ssiaanlneela ae

3sa

has no application to tax cases, and alternatively that the as-

sociation has failed to make a case for equitable tolling.

We must consider first whether the association has standing

to litigate over the IRS's grant of favorable tax status to

United. Ordinarily a person does not have standing to com-

plain about someone else's receipt of a tax benefit. Allen v.

Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 82 L. Ed. 2d 556, 104 S. Ct. 3315

(1984). The injury is too attenuated for the dispute to reach

the level of a real "case" or "controversy" in the sense that the

Supreme Court has impressed on these terms found in Article

Ill, section 2 of the Constitution. This case is different,

however--is a real "case"--because the members of the asso-

ciation are participants in the retirement savings plan that

was the subject of the IRS's ruling. They could certainly have

challenged a denial of favorable tax treatment for the plan; it

would have been an injury to them; the Internal Revenue

Code and its implementing regulations make clear their right

to seek declaratory relief. 26 U.S.C. § 7476(b)(1); 26 C.F.R.

§ 1.7476-1(b)(1); Self-Insurance Institute v. Korioth, 993

F.2d 479, 484 (Sth Cir. 1993). It might seem that they would

have no interest in challenging the grant of such treatment.

But they do, because denial, while unfavorable to them in one

sense, would have been favorable in another. It would have

precipitated termination of the plan, because it would have re-

quired the participants to pay taxes on United's contributions

to the plan and forbidden United to deduct those contribu-

tions from its taxable income, see 26 U.S.C. §§ 401, 402(b),

404(a)(5), 501, and these tax consequences would have been

fatal to the plan's viability. See generally John D. Colombo,

"Paying for Sins of the Master: An Analysis of the Tax Ef-

fects of Pension Plan Disqualification and a Proposal for Re-

form.” 34 Arizona Law Review 53 (1992). The plan provided

that upon termination its assets would be distributed to the

4sa

participants. Thus a successful challenge to the IRS's ruling

would have initiated a sequence of actions the result of which

would have been to put money in the pockets of the associa-

tion's members. The total value of their benefits would have

been less because of the loss of favorable tax treatment, but

they prefer a bird in the hand to two birds in the bush; for

them, continued favorable tax treatment is a harm.

Since the members of the association had Article III standing,

so did the association. Hunt v. Washington State Apple Ad-

vertising Comm'n, 432 U.S. 333, 343, 53 L. Ed. 2d 383, 97 S.

Ct. 2434 (1977); North Shore Gas Co. v. EPA, 930 F.2d

1239, 1243 (7th Cir. 1991); Self-Insurance Institute v. Kori-

oth, 993 F.2d 479, 484. But the statute under which the asso-

ciation sued authorizes only employees to sue, which may be

why throughout the administrative proceedings in this case

the IRS communicated directly with the association's presi-

dent (who is an employee of United) rather than with the as-

sociation as such. By the time the case had reached the Tax

Court, everyone had forgotten that there might be an issue of

the association's right to sue, although it is mentioned in a

footnote in the government's brief in this court. The footnote

points out that the government may not be sued without statu-

tory authorization, Lane v. Pena, 518 U.S. 187, 192, 135 L.

Ed. 2d 486, 116 S. Ct. 2092 (1996); United States v. Nordic

Village, Inc., 503 U.S. 30, 33-34, 117 L. Ed. 2d 181, 112 S.

Ct. 1011 (1992); United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584.

586, 85 L. Ed. 1058, 61 S. Ct. 767 (1941); Gibson v. Brown,

137 F.3d 992, 997-98 (7th Cir. 1998), here lacking. But it

makes no practical difference whether the association is the

proper party plaintiff, or its president. She is a participant in

the plan and so has standing to seek declaratory relief against

the IRS's ruling on the plan's tax status. We can thus treat this

as a suit by her rather than by the association without

5sa

consequence. So let us move on to the issue of the timeliness

of the suit.

The doctrine of equitable tolling permits a prospective plain-

tiff to delay filing suit beyond the statute of limitations if de-

spite due diligence on his part he cannot obtain the

information he needs in order to determine, in time to sue

within the deadline, whether he has a claim on which a suit

can be founded. A closely related doctrine, equitable estop-

pel, allows delay in suing when the defendant, in this case the

IRS, has taken steps to prevent the plaintiff from suing in

time. (On both doctrines, see, e.g., Wolin v. Smith Barney

Inc., 83 F.3d 847, 852 (7th Cir. 1996); Cada v. Baxter Health-

care Corp., 920 F.2d 446, 450-53 (7th Cir. 1990); Currier v.

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Inc., 159 F.3d 1363, 1367

(D.C. Cir. 1998).) This case has a whiff of equitable estoppel

because, as we are about to see, the basis of the claim of equi-

table tolling is the IRS's failure to give the association infor-

mation that the association claims it needed in order to sue.

Yet the association does not mention that doctrine, and so any

reliance on it is waived; in any event, as will soon become

apparent, the facts no more show equitable estoppel than they

show equitable tolling.

United asked for a ruling from the IRS on the tax status of its

new plan late in 1995. On August 14 of the following year,

the association asked the IRS for copies of all comments or

other correspondence that had been submitted to the IRS in

connection with United's request. Nine days later the IRS

mailed to the association's president a notice of a final deter-

mination (dated the previous day) that the new plan did qual-

ify for continued favorable tax treatment. It was this mailing

that set the period for the association to challenge the deter-

mination running, and the period expired as we said on

6sa

November 22. The IRS had not replied to the association's re-

quest for comments. On the contrary, on November 15 the

IRS had notified the association's president that it had for-

warded her request to the appropriate office for consideration.

She should have known that it was unlikely, to say the least,

that a response would be forthcoming in time for the associa-

tion to prepare a pleading due a week later. And in fact the

IRS did not reply until February of the following year, when

it told the association that it had received no comments apart

from those submitted by the association itself. Despite not

having received any comments, the association filed its suit

three days (only one business day) after the November 2?

deadline expired.

When asked at oral argument how, if the comments (or at

least a denial that there were any Comments) were essential to

its being able’to file suit, the association was able to file suit

before it received either the comments or the denial, the asso-

ciation's lawyer said that the petition for declaratory relief

that he filed on November 25, 1996, was "unreal," that it was

really a request for additional time for filing the "real" peti-

tion. But if it was "unreal," then the Tax Court was right to

dismiss it irrespective of any deadline considerations, and the

association should have filed the "real" petition after it

learned in February of 1997 that there were no comments.

Because the association has never filed what it considers a

"real" petition, we cannot gauge what difference it would

make to a challenger's ability to file a petition to have in hand

either the comments or a denial that there were comments.

Probably very little. The "unreal" petition asked the Tax

Court to overrule the IRS's determination and rescind the

plan's favorable tax treatment. No more was required in an

initial pleading, which under the rules of the Tax Court need

only be a "clear and concise statement of each ground ... and

ee

7sa

the facts to support each ground." Rule of Practice and Proce-

dure of the U.S. Tax Court 211(c)(4)(D).

A regulation requires the applicant (here United) for IRS ap-

proval of favorable tax treatment of a retirement plan to make

any comments received on the application "immediately"

available to all parties. 26 C.F.R. § 601.201 (0)(3)(xvii); see

also Stevens v. Commissioner, 1985 T.C. Memo 192, 49

T.C.M. (CCH) 1261, 1267 (1985). The association did not

take advantage of this regulation; instead it asked the IRS for

the comments. It offers no excuse for this blunder.

Statutes of limitations are not merely traps for the unwary;

they serve important social purposes. Board of Regents v. To-

manio, 446 U.S. 478, 487, 64 L. Ed. 2d 440, 100 S. Ct. 1790

(1980); United States v. Kubrick, 444 U.S. 111, 117, 62 L.

Ed. 2d 259, 100 S. Ct. 352 (1979); Galloway v. General Mo-

tors Service Parts Operations, 78 F.3d 1164, 1165-66 (7th

Cir. 1996); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Seale, 13 F.3d 850, 852

(Sth Cir. 1994); Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d

1385, 1393-94 (7th Cir. 1990) (concurring opinion). This is

conspicuously the case with respect to determinations of the

tax status of retirement plans. Because the alteration of that

Status as a consequence of litigation can require a revision of

tax liabilities for past years, disturbing expectations and en-

tailing heavy administrative expenses, it is vital that such liti-

gation be instituted as soon as possible after the initial

determination of the plan's status; that may be why the statute

of limitations is so short. It is equally vital that a party who

wants to appeal to the doctrine of equitable tolling to excuse a

late filing show (as the doctrine requires him to do, e.g.,

Wolin v. Smith Barney Inc., supra, 83 F.3d at 852; Cada v.

Baxter Healthcare Corp., supra, 920 F.2d at 451; Currier v.

Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, Inc., supra, 159 F.3d at

8sa

1367) that he tried diligently to file within the deadline or as

soon afterwards as possible. The flight attendants’ association

did not exhibit diligence. If it could file suit on November 25

it could have filed three days earlier: nothing had changed in

the interim. If, as we do not for a moment believe. it could

not file a "real" suit until February 1997, when it learned that

there were no comments, it should have filed a real petition

then. Had that petition been turned down as untimely, at least

we would have a concrete record on which to base a judg-

ment about a challenger's actual need for such comments.

And rather than sit on its hands waiting for an agency not

known for its celerity to respond to a request that should have

been directed to the applicant for the tax ruling, the associa-

tion should have complied with the regulation and directed its

request to United.

Since, so far as appears, the association could have sued in

time notwithstanding the IRS's foot dragging, the latter's con-

duct or rather nonconduct did not work an estoppel because it

did not make it impossible for the association to sue in time.

It is implicit in the doctrine that the conduct alleged as the ba-

sis for the estoppel have been the cause of the plaintiff's not

suing in time. See Speer v. Rand McNally & Co., 123 F.3d

658, 663 (7th Cir. 1997); Cange v. Stotler & Co., 826 F.2d

581, 587-88 (7th Cir. 1987); Redman v. U.S. West Business

Resources, Inc., 153 F.3d 691, 695 (8th Cir. 1998). It is there-

fore immaterial whether, as we believe, diligence is not an

element of equitable estoppel, Wolin v. Smith Barney Inc.,

supra, 83 F.3d at 852, or, as other courts believe, Benitez-

Pons v. Puerto Rico, 136 F.3d 54, 63 (Ist Cir. 1998); Robin-

son v. Dalton, 107 F.3d 1018, 1023 (3d Cir. 1997), it is. (In

Klehr v. A.O. Smith Corp., 521 U.S. 179, [*12] 194, 138 L.

Ed. 2d 373, 117 S. Ct. 1984 (1997), the Supreme Court noted

the conflict but left it unresolved.) For however that issue is

Osa

resolved, the IRS's foot-dragging and failure to remind the as-

sociation that it could ask for the comments directly from

United are not the kind of obstructive conduct that would

warrant estopping a defendant to plead the statute of limita-

tions. Not being prompt and helpful is a lot different from ac-

tually preventing a plaintiff from suing in time. See, e.g.,

Speer v. Rand McNally & Co., supra, 123 F.3d at 663; Red-

man v. U.S. West Business Resources, Inc., supra, 153 F.3d

at 695.

Because the association has failed to make a case for equita-

ble tolling, we need not decide (as the parties invite us to do)

whether the doctrine may ever be invoked in a federal tax

case. In Irwin v. Department of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S.

89, 112 L. Ed. 2d 435, 111 S. Ct. 453 (1990), the Supreme

Court held that the doctrine does apply to suits against the

federal government, but in United States v. Brockamp, 519

U.S. 347, 136 L. Ed. 2d 818, 117 S. Ct. 849 (1997), it carved

an exception for tax refund suits. See also RHI Holdings, Inc.

v. United States, 142 F.3d 1459, 1461-63 (Fed. Cir. 1998).

The government asks us, on the authority of Brockamp, to

broaden the exception to cover the entire tax code. But

Brockamp is not broadly written. The Court pointed to em-

phatic statutory language not paralleled in the sections of the

code at issue in this case indicating Congress's disinclination

to permit any delays in the institution of tax refund litigation

and to the administrative complexities that would ensue from

injecting the complex, nuanced, case-by-case doctrine of eq-

uitable tolling into the assembly-line production of tax re-

funds in response to the enormous number of refund claims

(more than a hundred million) filed every year.

Taking a tack independent of Brockamp, the government ar-

gues that because the Tax Court, being a court of limited

10sa

jurisdiction (Brockamp was a refund case and thus originated

in a district court rather than the Tax Court), lacks the power

to recognize equitable defenses not specified by Congress.

This is also the position of the Tax Court. Rule of Practice

and Procedure of U.S. Tax Court 210(c)(3); Calvert Anesthe-

sia Associates v. Commissioner, 110 T.C. 285 (1998); Estate

of Rosenberg v. Commissioner, 73 T.C. 1014, 1017-18

(1980). Rule 210(c)(3) states that the [*14] Tax Court does

not have "jurisdiction" over a suit for declaratory judgment

under 26 U.S.C. § 7476 if it is filed after the statutory

deadline.

Had Congress delegated to the Tax Court the power to estab-

lish nonwaivable jurisdictional rules, akin to those that limit

the time for taking appeals, e.g., Fed. R. App. P. 26(b): Tor-

res v. INS, 144 F.3d 472, 475 (7th Cir. 1998); Nowak v. INS,

94 F.3d 390, 391 (7th Cir. 1996), we would be bound. But

neither the government, nor the Tax Court in the Calvert or

Rosenberg decisions, has claimed this; nor have we found

any indication that this was Congress's intention in authoriz-

ing the Tax Court to adopt procedural rules. 26 U.S.C. §

7453. If, therefore, Rule 210(c)(3) is merely the Tax Court's

interpretation of the Internal Revenue Code, and of the princi-

ples of federal common law that guide the resolution of pro-

cedural issues to which the Code does not speak, we are not

bound. The Tax Court is a trial court rather than an appellate

court, and its views on questions of law are not entitled to

deference from the courts of appeals. Prussner v. United

States, 896 F.2d 218, 224 (7th Cir. 1990) (en banc); Cadwal-

lader v. Commissioner, 919 F.2d 1273, 1274 (7th Cir. 1990).

The argument that the Tax Court cannot apply the doctrines

of equitable tolling and equitable estoppel because it is a

court of limited jurisdiction is fatuous. All federal courts are

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courts of limited jurisdiction. Kokkonen v. Guardian Life Ins.

Co., 511 U.S. 375, 377, 128 L. Ed. 2d 391, 114 S. Ct. 1673

(1994); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers Union,

451 U.S. 77, 95, 67 L. Ed. 2d 750, 101 S. Ct. 1571 (1981).

We are given no reason to suppose that statutes of limitations

are intended to be administered differently in the Tax Court

than in the federal district courts, which share jurisdiction in

federal tax cases with the Tax Court. It is true that the prede-

cessor bodies to the Tax Court, such as the Board of Tax Ap-

peals, were administrative agencies having more limited

powers than a regular court. Old Colony Trust Co. v. Com-

missioner, 279 U.S. 716, 725, 73 L. Ed. 918, 49 S. Ct. 499

(1929); Commissioner v. Gooch Milling & Elevator Co., 320

U.S. 418, 88 L. Ed. 139, 64 S. Ct. 184 (1943). But the present

Tax Court operates pretty indistinguishably from a federal

district court. Freytag v. Commissioner, 501 U.S. 868, 891,

115 L. Ed. 2d 764, 111 S. Ct. 2631 (1991). It differs in some

respects--it has a specialized jurisdiction, obviously, and its

judges are not Article III judges. But none of the differences

bear on whether the court is empowered to recognize de-

fenses to the statute of limitations. In context, the Supreme

Court's dictum in Commissioner v. McCoy, 484 U.S. 3, 7, 98

L. Ed. 2d 2, 108 S. Ct. 217 (1987) (per curiam), that the Tax

Court lacks "general equitable powers" means only that the

Tax Court is not empowered to override statutory limits on its

power by forgiving interest and penalties that Congress has

imposed for nonpayment of taxes--but then no court is, unless

the imposition would be unconstitutional.

Without citing McCoy or Dalm v. United States, 494 U.S.

596, 611, 108 L. Ed. 2d 548, 110 S. Ct. 1361 and n. 8 (1990),

which reserves the issue of the Tax Court's equitable powers,

the Supreme Court in Freytag v. Commissioner, supra, 501

U.S. at 891, pointed out that the Tax Court has been given

12sa

injunctive and other equitable powers; and numerous cases

affirm the Tax Court's power to enforce equitable principles,

such as contract reformation and judicial estoppel, without

express congressional authorization. E.g., Kelley v. Commis-

sioner, 45 F.3d 348, 351-52 (9th Cir. 1995); Buchine v. Com-

missioner, 20 F.3d 173, 177-78 (Sth Cir. 1994); Bokum v.

Commissioner, 992 F.2d 1136, 1140-41 (11th Cir. 1993):

Mueller v. Commissioner, 101 T.C. 551 (1993); Woods v.

Commissioner, 92 T.C. 776, 784-87 (1989). We are at a loss

to understand why equitable tolling and equitable estoppel

shouldn't be among the equitable principles applicable to pro-

ceedings in the Tax Court. Bokum v. Commissioner, supra,

holds that they are among them. The overlap between the dis-

trict courts’ jurisdiction over refund suits and the Tax Court's

jurisdiction over deficiency suits--both jurisdictions exclu-

sive, but the taxpayer allowed to choose between them--

makes it anomalous and confusing to multiply distinctions

between the doctrines applied by the two types of court. Cf.

Shepherd v. Commissioner, 147 F.3d 633 (7th Cir. 1998).

At argument the government's lawyer emphasized quite prop-

erly not dry legalisms about jurisdiction but instead the im-

portance of prompt resolution of issues involving the tax

Status of retirement plans, and this may justify the extension

of the holding of Brockamp to the present case after all. But

that we need not decide.

Our disposition of the association's appeal moots United's ap-

peal. United had moved to dismiss the suit because the asso-

ciation had failed to join a necessary party, namely United.

Rule of Practice and Procedure of U.S. Tax Court 215(a)(3).

The Tax Court denied the motion as moot when it ruled that

it had no jurisdiction over the suit because it had been filed

late. Although United has appealed from that denial, the

aii...

l3sa

appeal is conditional on our reversing the Tax Court's dis-

missal of the suit, which we have not done.

So: No. 97-3151 is affirmed and No. 97-3335 is dismissed as

moot.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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