Amicus Curiae Brief — Hecla Mining Co. v. Washington Wilderness Coalition

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~ | Supreme Court, U.S.

— fee eS

No. 98-751 FEB 4 1999

CLERK

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1998

+

HECLA MINING COMPANY,

Petitioner,

WASHINGTON WILDERNESS COALITION,

OKANOGAN HIGHLANDS ALLIANCE, and ATLANTIC

STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION, INC.,

Respondents.

«

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Ninth Circuit

*

BRIEF AMICI CURIAE OF CHAMBER OF

COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF

MANUFACTURERS, NATIONAL MINING

ASSOCIATION, CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL

ENFORCEMENT COUNCIL, AMERICAN FOREST &

PAPER ASSOCIATION, INC., AND ALASKA MINERS

ASSOCIATION IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER

*

SANFORD M. STEIN

Counsel of Record

Leo P. DomBrowski

IAN J. McPHERON

WILDMAN, HaArRROLD, ALLEN & DIxon

225 West Wacker Drive

Chicago, Illinois 60606-1229

(312) 201-2000

Counsel for Amici Curiae

(Additional Counsel Listed on Inside Cover)

Rosin S. Conrap

National Chamber Litigation Center, Inc.

1615 H Street, N.W.

Washington, DC 20062

(202) 463-5337

Counsel for Chamber of Commerce of the United States

Jan S. Amunpson, General Counsel

QueENTIN RigGEL, Deputy General Counsel

National Association of Manufacturers

1331 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20004-1790

(202) 637-3000

Harovtp P. Quinn, Jr., General Counsel

National Mining Association

1130 17th St., N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20036

(202) 463-2625

Also Counsel for Alaska Miners Association

Paut G. WALLACH

Eric S. ANDREAS

Hate AND Dorr, LLP

1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.

Washington, D.C. 20004

(202) 942-8400

Counsel for Corporate Environmental Enforcement Council

Russet. S. Frye

Roy S. BELDEN

CHADBOURNE & Parke LLP

1200 New Hampshire Ave., N.W.

Washington D.C. 20036

(202) 974-5600

Counsel for American Forest & Paper Association, Inc.

vere manny gi)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Einmpae TIE PASTORATE oc oo oc ec wc nce cadens il

IDENTITY AND STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF THE

RIN fos ng Sh neo an veuh vcd cae ee

I. THE COURT SHOULD REVIEW THE NINTH

CIRCUIT’S DECISION TO DECIDE WHETHER

THE DUAL STANDARD SHOULD CONTINUE

TO BE USED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES

UNDER THE ENVIRONMENTAL FEE-SHIFTING

RUE Ms pe tenet aida cep cee ee ea aie Re 5

A. Congress Intended That the District Courts

Would Exercise Their Discretion When Award-

ing Attorney’s Fees in Environmental Citizen

SR ec es 3 ea ae ue cee ee 5

B. Congress Could Have Easily Mandated the

Se III de oe edd ho heen seca ats 7

Il. THE FACTORS THAT MOTIVATED THIS COURT

IN CHRISTIANSBURG ARE NOT PRESENT

WO eg re eet ar nee Baik sects 5 10

Ill. THE COURT SHOULD GRANT THE PETITION

BECAUSE THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION

PERMITS CITIZEN PLAINTIFFS TO ENCROACH

UPON THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH’S ENFORCE-

WORE, DOERR ES cea ue se ies coe ek 12

AEN aa ee On an rk eee eee, 18

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CASES

Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Train, 544 F.2d 657 (3d Cir.

yl.) Mtedpte ty be ey Ey oe 17

Bittner v. Sadoff & Rudoy Indus., 728 F.2d 820 (7th

Cae. Fas ee oe eso ciesccsces 12

Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment

Opportunity Comm'n, 434 U.S. 412 (1978)

bn a8 ba hoe IRR ae ee 3, 6 10, 11, 17, 18

Cohen v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 617 F. Supp.

619 (E.D. Va. 1985), aff’d on other grounds, 788

F208 241 COR Ce a ee ee Pda sees. 14

Connecticut Nat’! Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249

(1992) os kak eS ee... 7

Consolidated Edison Co. v. Realty Investments

Assocs., L.P., 524 F. Supp. 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ....6, 7

Fogerty v. Fantasy, 510 U.S. 517 (1994) .......... passim

Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S.

49 (1967). oc. sca es 13, 15

Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20 (1989). .13, 15

National Wildlife Federation v. Consumers Power

Co., 729 F. Supp. 62 (W.D. Mich. 1989)...... 6, 10, 11

Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, 510 F.2d

692 (D.C. Cie, S078). 2.5 sco ae een ens eews sce 7

Razore v. Tulalip Tribes of Washington, 66 F.3d 236

(Sth -Cor.-1999) sa a i a 6, 10

Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 462 U.S. 680 ............ 4,6

_« |

ill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES —- Continued

Page

Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 118 S. Ct.

as ke ials Eee aks ht aan Fase eee aes 155 tay ae

United States v. Marine Shale Processors, (5th Cir.

Ce PEPE EEE OE Oe Pe ea pie at 17

STATUTES

See a PO .P ROO cS W.iso bie-k one ea eek eee ee 9

Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b(i)....... 8

Hart-Scott Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, 15

eC RUOEE vada cwaca des ceseda es scaehaat eae en 8

Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2618(d)..... 5

Cooperative Research Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4304(a)......... 8

Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4)........ 5

Ry gts 3 one o - a eee eee ere ree 9

False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(4) .............. &

Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A)........... 12

Cee Weeeer AGL, 32 UBL. © PIOMED Sic ccc csvecccs: 5

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.

RG GEIS eS Se Ee a ee ee 5

eS a ae BE ee yy |) 5

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-

tion and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. % 9613(h) ......... 13

Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-

tion and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9659(f)........... >

Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know

a 5

iV

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued

Page

Health Care Quality Improvement Act, 42 U.S.C.

Pee leuuet Gere Upae Gee ae ds ee enews ace te nas 8

Pipeline Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. § 60121(b).............. 8

MisCELLANEOUS

47 Fea. Ree. 52000 (Nov. 18, 1962) ..... 2.20. ceaccscs 17

‘61 Fed. Reg. 30061 (June 13, 1996) ................... 4

Gl Free. Rew. G7Ot7 Cilec. 19, 1996) .. 5.06 ccc cena 3

GZ Fea.. Ree. B5i4 (rem. 26, PSG7). 2.60 on ccc caacs dca 17

a ee Pe. see ae 3

EPA’s Toxic Release Inventory Is Useful but Can Be

Improved (June 1991) GAO/RCED 91-121............ 3

Executive Summary/The National Biennial RCRA

Hazardous Waste Report (Based on 1995 Data),

Gee iig SA SE 5 oa vas bn oe aK eaia oe esha ee aa 4

Michael S. Greve, Private Enforcement, Private

Rewards: How Environmental Citizen Suits Became

an Entitlement Program, in Environmental Politics:

Public Costs, Private Rewards 105 (Praeger Pub-

Pe re 7 en ere 16, 17

]

IDENTITY AND STATEMENT OF INTEREST

OF THE AMICI CURIAE

This brief of amici curiae, the Chamber of Commerce of

the United States of America, er al., is submitted in support of

the petition for writ of certiorari filed by Hecla Mining

Company. Like Petitioner, amici submit that the Court should

grant the petition and decide whether the lower courts should

continue to hold prevailing defendants to a much higher

standard than that applied to prevailing plaintiffs when ruling

on a request for attorney’s fees in environmental citizen

suits.!

Amicus Chamber of Commerce of the United States of

America (the “Chamber”) is the world’s largest business fed-

eration. The Chamber represents an underlying membership

of more than three million businesses and organizations of

every size, sector and region. Ninety-six percent of the Cham-

ber’s members are businesses with fewer than 100 employees.

The Chamber regularly advocates its members’ views in court

on environmental issues of national concern to the business

community.

Amicus the National Association of Manufacturers is the

nation’s oldest and largest broad-based industrial trade asso-

ciation. Its more than 14,000 member companies and subsid-

iaries, including 10,000 small manufacturers, employ

approximately 85 percent of all manufacturing workers and

produce over 80 percent of the nation’s manufactured goods.

More than 158,000 additional businesses are affiliated with

the National Association of Manufacturers through its Asso-

ciations Council and National Industrial Council.

Amicus the National Mining Association is the national

trade association for the mining industry whose members are

the producers of most of America’s coal, metals, industrial

' Pursuant to Rule 37 of the Rules of this Court, the amici have

obtained letters of consent to the filing of this brief from the parties and

have filed those letters with the Clerk of the Court. Additionally, pursuant

to Rule 37, this brief was authored, prepared and paid for in its entirety by

the amici.

2

and agricultural minerals. Its members also include manufac-

turers of mining and mineral processing machinery, equip-

ment and supplies, as well as engineering firms and financial

institutions that serve the mining industry.

Amicus Corporate Environmental Enforcement Council

(“CEEC”) is an organization of 25 diverse companies with a

strong commitment to the environment and environmental

compliance. CEEC focuses exclusively on environmental

enforcement and compliance issues, working to ensure that

environmental enforcement is consistent with our environ-

mental laws and advances the goals of those laws.

Amicus American Forest & Paper Association, Inc. is a

non-profit trade association for over 250 member companies

engaged in growing, harvesting, and processing wood and

wood fiber and manufacturing pulp, paper and paperboard

products from both virgin and recycled fiber, and solid wood

products. Its member companies account for over eight per-

cent of the total U.S. manufacturing output.

Amicus Alaska Miners Association (“AMA”) is a non-

profit corporation whose members include individuals and

companies engaged in the exploration, development and min-

ing of Alaska’s coal and hard mineral resources, as well as

supporting industries. The purpose of the AMA is to promote

the mining industry and development and use of Alaska’s

mineral resources.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

Amici are trade associations or representatives of indus-

tries and businesses that have demonstrated a commitment to

public health and the environment as well as a fair and even-

handed enforcement of environmental laws. Their members

are the industries and businesses charged with the important

duty of complying with environmental laws and regulations

and therefore have a keen awareness and interest in compli-

ance and fair enforcement.

In the environmental area, Congress has mandated a two-

tiered enforcement approach. The primary enforcers are the

Executive Branch, through the EPA and the Department of

3

Justice, and the individual states, who have been delegated

some of the authority to administer many of the congression-

ally-created programs. A secondary and carefully limited

enforcement role is accorded to private citizens, who may

bring citizen actions, after notice to an alleged offender and

an opportunity to cure. Congress was wary of providing too

much authority to citizen enforcers and ensured that citizens

were not to be co-equals of the government authorities.

In enacting these citizen suit provisions, Congress also

provided for fee-shifting to encourage the bringing of mer-

itorious actions but also to discourage the filing of actions

that result in little or no benefit to the environment. These fee

shifting provisions are neutral on their face, favoring neither

citizen plaintiffs nor regulated defendants.

At issue here are the fee-shifting provisions of the Clean

Water Act (“CWA”) and the Comprehensive Environmental

Response, Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”),

which grant discretion to the district courts to award attor-

ney’s fees to a prevailing party in a citizen action without

distinguishing between prevailing plaintiffs and defendants.

Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit

below, relying on Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal

Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 434 U.S. 412 (1978),

engrafted onto these neutral provisions a barrier to prevailing

defendants when they seek their fees: a prevailing defendant

may recover its fees only if the plaintiff’s action is frivolous

or without foundation — essentially applying the Rule 11

standard to prevailing defendants’ fee petitions. There is

simply no indication in either the language of the statutes or

their legislative history that Congress intended such a distinc-

tion.

The importance of this Court’s review of the decision

below is underscored by the huge number of companies and

industries potentially affected by this issue. For example,

over 900,000 facilities are subject to reporting requirements

of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know

Act (“EPCRA”). 62 Fed. Reg. 23834, 23884-85 (May 1,

1997); 61 Fed. Reg. 67017, 67018 (Dec. 19, 1996); EPA's

Toxic Release Inventory Is Useful but Can Be Improved, at 49

4

(June 1991) GAO/RCED 91-121. Over 130,000 facilities are

regulated under the discharge permitting requirements of the

CWA.? Over 25,000 facilities are subject to the Title V per-

mitting requirements of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”). 61 Fed.

Reg. 30061, 30062 (June 13, 1996). Almost 21,000 generators

of hazardous waste and 2,000 treatment, storage and disposal

facilities are subject to the standards and permitting require-

ments of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

(“RCRA”). Executive Summary/The National Biennial RCRA

Hazardous Waste Report (Based on 1995 Data), August 1997,

at ES-3, 4 (available at www.epa.gov/epaoswer/hazwaste/

data/br95). All of these entities, being subject to environmen-

tal regulation, are also potentially subject to environmental

citizen suits and their fee-shifting provisions.

Amici recognize the citizen enforcement role, and where

citizen plaintiffs are successful, the discretion of the court to

award attorney’s fees. But amici also recognize that their

members might be and have been forced to defend citizen

claims and, when successful, should not automatically be

denied their fees. The importance of the question presented to

the Court is underscored by the huge number of companies

and industries that are subject to environmental regulation,

and that, therefore, are also subject to environmental citizen

suits and their fee-shifting provisions. In short, amici simply

ask that the district courts be allowed to exercise their discre-

tion when determining whether an award of attorney’s fees is

appropriate under the environmental fee-shifting provisions.

2 Based on a telephone conversation with Mr. Brian Rittenhaus of

the EPA Office of Wastewater Management/Permits Division.

;

a ee

5

ARGUMENT

I. THE COURT SHOULD REVIEW THE NINTH CIR-

CUIT’S DECISION TO DECIDE WHETHER THE

DUAL STANDARD SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE

USED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES UNDER

THE ENVIRONMENTAL FEE-SHIFTING STATUTES

A. Congress Intended That the District Courts Would

Exercise Their Discretion When Awarding Attor-

ney’s Fees in Environmental Citizen Actions

In enacting the fee-shifting provisions of the CWA and

CERCLA, the statutes at issue here, Congress did not distin-

guish between prevailing plaintiffs and defendants. It rejected

a dual standard and instead opted for neutral language, pro-

viding that the district courts may award costs of litigation “to

any prevailing or substantially prevailing party, whenever the

court determines such an award is appropriate.” 33 U.S.C.

§ 1365(d), 42 U.S.C. § 9659(f). Nor did Congress distinguish

between prevailing plaintiffs and defendants in the fee-shift-

ing provisions of other environmental statutes, likewise pro-

viding the district courts with discretion to determine when an

award of fees is appropriate.3

> Congress also used the “prevailing or substantially prevailing party,

whenever the court determines such an award is appropriate” language

when it enacted the RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e), and EPCRA, 42 U.S.C.

§ 11046(f). Under the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(f), Toxic Substances Control

Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2618(d), and Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.

§ 1540(g)(4), Congress provided that the district courts may award fees

“whenever it determines such an award is appropriate.” Although the

“prevailing party” language is absent from these provisions, this Court in

Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 462 U.S. 680 (1983), examined this language

and held that only prevailing parties are eligible for fee awards. Thus,

under Ruckelshaus, the differences in the language Congress used are of no

consequence and the fee-shifting provisions of the environmental statutes

are to be interpreted identically — a court may award fees to “the prevailing

or the substantially prevailing party whenever the court determines such an

award is appropriate.”

6

Despite Congress using this neutral language, the Ninth

Circuit and other courts have engrafted onto these fee-shifting

provisions a much higher standard when a prevailing defen-

dant seeks to recover its fees. See, e.g., Razore v. Tulalip

Tribes of Washington, 66 F.3d 236, 240 (9th Cir. 1995) (in

CWA and RCRA suits, prevailing defendant may not recover

its fees unless plaintiff’s action was frivolous or without

foundation); National Wildlife Federation v. Consumers

Power Co., 729 F. Supp. 62, 65 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (same in

CWA suit); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Realty Investments

Assocs., L.P., 524 F. Supp. 150, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (same

under CAA).4 There is simply no indication, however, that

Congress intended the stricter standard to apply to a petition

for attorney’s fees brought by a prevailing environmental

citizen suit defendant. To the contrary, the language of the

statutes endorses, if anything, an even-handed treatment of

prevailing plaintiffs and defendants and shows, at the very

least, that Congress left to the district courts’ discretion to

determine when it was appropriate to award fees to a prevail-

ing defendant.

Nor does the legislative history of the environmental fee-

shifting provisions provide any support for the dual standard.

As Petitioner points out, an early version of the CWA manda-

ted that prevailing plaintiffs receive their attorney’s fees.

Congress deleted this language, however, and replaced it with

the neutral provision authorizing the district courts to award

fees to either prevailing party. Cert. Pet. 14.

Also, in debating the wisdom of giving such unprece-

dented enforcement authority to private citizens, some mem-

bers of Congress questioned whether some plaintiffs would

use the citizen suit provisions to bring “frivolous and harass-

ing actions.” To deter this abuse, Congress provided that the

courts could award fees to either party “whenever the court

4 Other courts have even gone beyond the Christiansburg standard

aid injected an element of “bad faith.” Still others apply a modified

Christiansburg approach. See Cert. Pet. 23-24. The result is an unclear area

of the law that warrants this Court’s review.

7

determines such an action is in the public interest.” Reprinted

in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, 510 F.2d 692,

725-26, 728-29 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (relevant legislative history

of CAA of 1970).5 As in the statutes, there is simply no

indication in the iegislative history that Congress intended to

limit the district courts’ discretion in determining whether an

award of fees is appropriate.

The best indicator of congressional intent is, of course,

the language of the statutes. And, it is clear that Congress did

not limit prevailing defendants to an award of fees, as it has

done under several other statutes (see Section I.B., below),

only if a plaintiff’s action is frivolous or without foundation.

The Ninth Circuit has run afoul of the principal canon of

statutory construction: when the text of a statute is clear, the

court’s interpretive inquiry ends. Connecticut Nat’! Bank v.

Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992).

B. Congress Could Have Easily Mandated the Dual

Standard

Had Congress wished to apply a dual standard to fee

petitions brought by prevailing environmental citizen suit

defendants, and thus condition the award of fees on certain

behavior of the plaintiff, it easily could have done so. The

Ninth Circuit’s standard ignores the many instances where

Congress has adopted the dual standard when it wished to

make it more difficult for the prevailing defendant to recover

its attorney’s fees. For example, the Administrative Procedure

Act expressly provides that costs of litigation, including attor-

ney’s fees, may be awarded to the substantially prevailing

party, “except that costs may be assessed against the plaintiff

only where the court finds that the suit was initiated by the

plaintiff primarily for frivolous or dilatory purposes.” 5

° Nothing in the legislative history indicates that prevailing

defendants should recover their fees “only where the action may be fairly

characterized as frivolous or harassing,” as one court misread the history.

Consolidated Edison, 524 F. Supp. at 153.

8

U.S.C. § 552b(1). Likewise, in certain antitrust cases, district

courts shall:

(1) award to a substantially prevailing claimant

the cost of suit attributable to such claim, including

a reasonable attorney’s fee, or

(2) award to a substantially prevailing party

defending against any such claim the cost of suit

attributable to such claim, including a reasonable

attorney’s fee, if the claim, or the claimant’s con-

duct during the litigation of the claim, was frivo-

lous, unreasonable, without foundation, or in bad

faith.

15 U.S.C. § 4304(a); see also 15 U.S.C. § 15c(d) (in antitrust

actions brought by a state, court may award fees to prevailing

defendant if “the State attorney general has acted in bad faith,

vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.”); 31 U.S.C.

§ 3730(d)(4) (in qui tam actions, court may award fees to

prevailing defendant if plaintiff's claim “was clearly frivo-

lous, clearly vexatious, or brought primarily for purposes of

harassment.”); 42 U.S.C. § 11113 (in antitrust actions under

Health Care Quality Improvement Act, court shall award fees

to prevailing defendant if plaintiff's claim was “frivolous,

unreasonable, without foundation, or in bad faith.”); 49

U.S.C. § 60121(b) (under Pipeline Safety Act, court may

award attorney’s fees to any prevailing plaintiff, but may

award fees to prevailing defendant only “when the action is

unreasonable, frivolous, or meritless.”) In contrast, although

it easily could have, Congress did not so distinguish between

prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants when it

enacted the CWA and CERCLA, as well as other environmen-

tal statutes, illustrating that it rejected the dual standard

adopted here by the Ninth Circuit.

By advancing the one-sided “frivolous or without foun-

dation” standard, the Ninth Circuit has effectively ruled that a

prevailing environmental citizen suit defendant may recover

its fees only when the plaintiff’s action violates Rule 11. See

Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 11(b) (a plaintiff violates Rule 11 if its

complaint is frivolous or without support). Consequently,

apart from disregarding the clear language of the statutes, the

9

Ninth Circuit’s standard is additionally questionable because

it is already established under Rule 11 that a prevailing

defendant may be awarded its fees if a complaint is frivolous

or without foundation, even in the absence of a fee-shifting

provision.

Under a nearly identical fee-shifting statute, the Copy-

right Act, this Court recently found that prevailing plaintiffs

and defendants must be treated alike. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.,

510 U.S. 517 (1994). Sirsiiar to the environmental statutes,

the Copyright Act provides that “the court may . . . award a

reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the

costs.” 17 U.S.C. § 505. This Court found that the statutory

language gave “no hint that successful plaintiffs are to be

treated differently from successful defendants.” /d. at 522.

This Court also found that the legislative history of the

Copyright Act “provides no support for treating prevailing

plaintiffs and defendants differently with respect to the recov-

ery of attorney’s fees.” /d. at 523. As noted above, the

legislative history of the environmental! provisions likewise

provides no support for the Ninth Circuit’s position that

prevailing plaintiffs and defendants should be treated differ-

ently. Here we have essentially identical language receiving

vastly different treatment: this Court found that the neutral

language of the Copyright Act must be given an even-handed

interpretation, while the courts construing the same language

of the environmental statutes have concluded that a harsh,

dual standard should be applied.

Accordingly, the language of the statutes, their legisla-

tive history, and this Court’s ruling in Fogerty contradict the

Ninth Circuit’s decision. The Court should grant Hecla Min-

ing’s petition to resolve the uncertainty created by the con-

flicting interpretations of this congressional language.

ee a

10

Il. THE FACTORS THAT MOTIVATED THIS COURT

IN CHRISTIANSBURG ARE NOT PRESENT HERE

The Ninth Circuit, with no analysis, adopted the standard

articulated by this Court in Christiansburg as the standard to

be applied to environmental fee-shifting provisions. Razore,

66 F.3d at 240 (where the Ninth Circuit simply stated that,

“We agree with the district court that Christiansburg” is the

proper standard).© Other courts have also unhesitatingly

adopted Christiansburg. See, e.g., National Wildlife, 729

F. Supp. at 64. In Christiansburg, this Court was asked to

decide what standard should apply to a claim for attorney’s

fees by a prevailing defendant in a Title VII employment

case. Focusing on congressional policy that Title VII plain-

tiffs were “the chosen instrument of Congress” to enforce

civil rights laws, this Court held that prevailing Title VII

defendants may recover their fees only if the plaintiff’s action

was “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even

though not brought in subjective bad faith.” Jd. at 418, 421.

In Fogerty, the respondent contended that Christiansburg

supported different treatment for prevailing plaintiffs and

defendants. Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 522. Finding that the objec-

tives of the Copyright Act and Civil Rights Act were “not

completely similar,” this Court easily distinguished Chris-

tiansburg. In particular, the Court stressed that in the civil

rights context:

impecunious “private attorney general” plaintiffs

can ill afford to litigate their claims against defen-

dants with more resources. Congress sought to

redress this balance in part, and to provide incen-

tives for the bringing of meritorious lawsuits, by

treating successful plaintiffs more favorably than

successful defendants in terms of the award of

attorney’s fees. . . . In the copyright context, it has

been noted that “[e]ntities which sue for copyright

© In this case, the Ninth Circuit simply referred to Razore as the

“settled law of this circuit.” Cert. Pet. 4a.

11

infringement as plaintiffs can run the gamut from

corporate behemoths to starving artists. . .

Id. at 524 (citation omitted).

Here, Respondents most surely will maintain that Chris-

tiansburg should also inform a district court’s discretion when

it is asked to rule on a prevailing environmental citizen suit

defendant’s petition for attorney’s fees. As this Court found

with Copyright Act suits, the policy considerations at work in

Christiansburg are also absent in most environmental citizen

litigation. In civil rights cases, the plaintiff is typically an

individual or class of individuals seeking to vindicate per-

sonal rights against an employer, municipality, or other entity

with greater resources. In environmental citizen litigation, on

the other hand, plaintiffs are often large, well-funded organi-

zations devoted to bringing lawsuits.

In this case, the district court aptly found that, “Plaintiffs

are public interest groups, but they are also professional

litigants.” Cert. Pet. 50a. Indeed, citizen plaintiffs draw finan-

cial support from huge memberships and, bolstered by the

environmental fee-shifting provisions, have used those contri-

butions to bring thousands of lawsuits under the environmen-

tal statutes.?7 Consequently, the kind of plaintiff bringing

environmental citizen litigation often resembles much more

the “behemoth” noted in Fogerty than the impecunious plain-

tiff that influenced the Court in Christiansburg.

Some courts have applied the Christiansburg standard to

prevailing citizen suit defendants seeking their fees because

they did not want to unreasonably deter citizen plaintiffs from

bringing meritorious actions. See, e.g., National Wildlife, 729

7 Perhaps energized by the fee-shifting provisions, typical citizen_

plaintiffs are hardly ever individuals, but rather large, well-funded, national

organizations. Today, the Natural Resources Defense Council has more

than 170,000 members nationwide. The Sierra Club has more than 500,000

national members. State Public Interest Research Groups have over |

nillion members. They, and many others, are extremely active in

environmental litigation. See Brief Amici Curiae of Natural Resources

Defense Council, et al., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, No. 96-643,

at I n. 2.

12

F. Supp. at 64. However, this concern is misplaced because a

court may consider, as part of the exercise of its discretion,

whether a fee award to a prevailing defendant in a particular

case would unfairly burden a plaintiff or have any “chilling

effect” on potentially deserving plaintiffs.’ Therefore, even if

Congress intended to avoid such an effect, there is no need to

read into these statutes a requirement that a prevailing defen-

dant automatically be denied its fees unless it demonstrates

that the plaintiff’s action violated Rule 11. See also Fogerty,

510 U.S. at 535 n. 19 (factors that may be used to guide a

district court’s discretion include “motivation, objective

unreasonableness (both in the factual and in the legal compo-

nents of the case) and the need in particular circumstances to

advance considerations of compensation and deterrence.”)

Ill. THE COURT SHOULD GRANT THE PETITION

BECAUSE THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION

PERMITS CITIZEN PLAINTIFFS TO ENCROACH

UPON THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH’S ENFORCE-

MENT AUTHORITY

By enacting environmental citizen suit provisions, Con-

gress decided that citizens may act as private attorneys gen-

eral and aid in enforcing environmental laws. Congress did

not, however, place citizen plaintiffs on an even plane with

Executive Branch enforcement officials and endow them with

the full panoply of Article II enforcement authority. Rather,

Congress limited citizen enforcement in several significant

ways. It required a would-be citizen plaintiff to first provide

notice of the alleged violation to the EPA, the state and the

alleged violator at least 60 days before filing suit. See, e.g.,

33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A). The purpose of the notice period

is two-fold: (1) it gives the alleged violator the opportunity to

8 The parties’ resources is but one factor a court could consider in

deciding whether an award of fees is appropriate. See, v.g., Bittner v. Sadoff

& Rudoy Indus., 728 F.2d 820, 828-31 (7th Cir. 1984) (one of the factors

district court may consider in awarding fees to an ERISA prevailing

defendant is plaintiff’s ability to pay).

<< i

13

bring itself into compliance, thus rendering a citizen suit

unnecessary; and (2) it also allows the government the oppor-

tunity to determine whether it should utilize its own authority

to enforce compliance, which likewise bars a citizen suit.

Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 29-3: (1989);

Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 60-61

(1987). Similarly, to ensure that remediation of contaminated

waste sites will not be hindered by the “potentially intrusive”

citizen plaintiff, see Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 61, Congress

prohibited citizen suits where the EPA is already undertaking

removal or remedial action at a site. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h).

Further, a citizen plaintiff may not recover civil penalties (or

any type of damages) for itself. Rather, these penalties are

payable to the United States Treasury. See Steel Co. v. Citi-

zens for a Better Env't, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1018 (1998).

The various checks on environmental citizen enforcement

demonstrate that Congress was not interested in simply maxi-

mizing the number of citizen suits brought under environmen-

tal statutes. This Court has long noted that, while Congress

provided for citizen participation in enforcing environmental

laws, Congress intended citizen suits only “to supplement, not

supplant, governmental action.” Gwaltney 484 U.S. at 60.

And while in the civil rights context Congress sought to

maximize citizen litigation to eradicate discrimination, in

authorizing environmental citizen suits Congress sought “to

strike a balance between encouraging citizen enforcement of

environmental regulations and avoiding burdening the federal

courts with excessive numbers of citizen suits.” Hallstrom,

493 U.S. at 29. The policies served by the CWA and CERCLA

(and the other environmental statutes) are “more complex,

more measured than simply maximizing the number of” citi-

zen suits. See Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 526. Far from being

Congress’s “chosen instrument” to enforce environmental

laws — which remain the federal and state environmental

agencies — Congress relegated the citizen plaintiff to a much-

restricted, secondary role.

If the dual standard is allowed to prevail, citizen suit

defendants will continue to be deterred from fully litigating

meritorious defenses because they are faced with payment of

14

plaintiff’s fees if they are unsuccessful and, on the other

hand, have no expectation that they will be able to recover

their own attorney’s fees, no matter how meritorious and

successful their defenses. It often simply makes more busi-

ness sense to settle quickly on the plaintiff’s terms and avoid

protracted litigation that may lead to paying both parties’

attorney’s fees (in addition to sizable civil penalties). This

puts a citizen suit defendant in a lose-lose situation. If it

loses, it must not only pay the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees, it

must also pay its own. And if it wins, it still must pay its own

attorney’s fees (except in the rare case where the plaintiff

violates Rule 11). “Indeed, if there is any difference between

the [plaintiff and defendant] we must remember that it wasn’t

the defendant who chose to litigate.” Cohen v. Virginia Elec-

tric & Power Co., 617 F. Supp. 619, 622 (E.D. Va. 1985)

(holding that prevailing copyright plaintiffs and defendants

should be treated alike when awarding fees), aff’d on other

grounds, 788 F.2d 247 (4th Cir. 1986).

In enacting these fee-shifting statutes, Congress clearly

intended to alter the American Rule, albeit by providing the

district courts with the discretion to determine when a fee

award is appropriate. The Ninth Circuit has distorted that

intent by fashioning an “enhanced British Rule,” whereby a

prevailing plaintiff almost always gets its fees while the

prevailing defendant almost never does. Given this imbalance

in litigation strengths, a plaintiff has an incentive to adopt

uncompromising positions knowing that the defendant is

faced with a “running meter” and always has to consider the

possibility of having to pay both sides’ attorney’s fees.

Allowing the district courts to exercise their discretion in

determining when an award of attorney’s fees is appropriate

would force citizen plaintiffs to consider more critically

whether bringing a suit will actually further the public inter-

est. In the instant action, the district court essentially found

that plaintiffs had no legitimate reason to file their action

because the Washington Department of Ecology had already

taken the appropriate steps to address any environmental

harm that could result from the discharges at issue:

15

This action turned awkward on the eve of trial. It

became less of a public interest case after plaintiffs

abandoned their claim for injunctive relief. As the

evidence unfolded, it appeared even less of a public

interest case. . . . The point of this suit was not to

close the Aspen Pond and save the environment.

DOE had already done that.

Cert. Pet. 19-20. Eliminating the automatic prohibition on a

defendant recovering its fees would serve and further Con-

gress’s intent that citizen plaintiffs be encouraged to bring

actions that benefit the environment and discouraged from

filing actions that are of marginal or no value to society.

It is important that defendants not be chilled from assert-

ing their rights because one major purpose of litigating

defenses to citizen suits is to define the scope of citizen suit

enforcement authority. See, e.g., Steel Co. 118 S. Ct. 1003 (an

interest in attorney’s fees or civil penalties does not afford

citizen plaintiff standing to sue); Hallstrom, 493 U.S. 20

(citizen plaintiff must strictly comply with statutory notice

requirements before bringing suit); Gwaltney, 484 U.S. 49

(Congress did not intend that citizen plaintiffs be allowed to

sue for past violations). If citizen suit defendants are hesitant

to fully litigate meritorious defenses, the congressional man-

date that citizen plaintiffs only supplement governmental

enforcement authority will be undermined. Maintaining the

dual standard allows citizen suit plaintiffs to assume an

enforcement role larger than that intended by Congress

because, given the prospect of paying the, often substantial,

attorney’s fees of both parties, defendants often find them-

selves compelled to yield to the citizen plaintiff’s demands. If

the decision below is allowed to stand, the finely-crafted

congressional balance between governmental and citizen

enforcement authority will continue to be thwarted by the

inappropriate incentives created by the dual standard.

Congress recognized the basic principles of fairness and

the balance between the interests of citizen plaintiffs and

government enforcement when it enacted the fee-shifting pro-

visions with no distinction between prevailing plaintiffs and

defendants. Under the Ninth Circuit’s dual standard, however,

Oe

16

a citizen suit defendant who helps to define the proper scope

of citizen suit enforcement by maintaining meritorious

defenses is unable to recover its attorney’s fees. To maintain

the proper citizen plaintiff's role and ensure that it does not

encroach upon the Executive’s authority, this Court should

grant the writ and decide whether the dual standard is appro-

priate for environmental citizen actions. As with copyright

law, it is important that the boundaries of private citizen suit

enforcement authority “be demarcated as clearly as possible.”

Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 527.

In the past, the Executive Branch has expressed concern

that citizen plaintiffs may have replaced government officials

as the party that controls enforcement policy. When Congress

was considering the reauthorization of the Clean Water Act in

1987, the Department of Justice testified that the flood of

private enforcement actions under the CWA was coming dan-

gerously close to producing the result Congress apparently

meant to prevent — a shift of control over enforcement from

the government to private parties. See Michael S. Greve,

Private Enforcement, Private Rewards: How Environmental

Citizen Suits Became an Entitlement Program, in Environ-

mental Politics: Public Costs, Private Rewards 105, 120

(Praeger Publishers 1992). These concerns are just as legiti-

mate today because citizen organizations continue to file

hundreds of citizen suits, the fee-shifting provisions some-

times being used as a thinly-veiled fund-raising mechanism.

Cert. Pet. 2 n. 2; Greve, Private Enforcement, at 109-110.

Courts can play their role only when construing cases and

controversies arising under the environmental laws. But with

a dual standard applied to requests for attorney’s fees, citi-

zens suit defendants with meritorious defenses are discour-

aged from asserting those defenses, finding a greater than

usual incentive to settle. The plaintiffs’ incentives to settle,

however, is diminished because it can drive a hard bargain

knowing that the defendant faces the prospect of paying

double fees if its defenses fall short. Additionally, given the

dual standard, citizen plaintiffs are also encouraged to bring

17

cases of questionable merit or of doubtful value to the envi-

ronment, cases that the EPA would decline to pursue.? Conse-

quently, the congressionally crafted balance between

government and citizen enforcers is harmed, and citizen

plaintiffs are able to arrogate power that Congress never

envisioned.

“A fair adversary process presupposes both a vigorous

prosecution and a vigorous defense.” Christiansburg, 434

U.S. at 419. “Defendants who seek to advance a variety of

meritorious . . . defenses should be encouraged to litigate

them to the same extent that Plaintiffs are encouraged to

litigate meritorious claims.” Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 527. By not

distinguishing between prevailing plaintiffs and defendants,

Congress intended to maintain this balanced adversary pro-

cess by giving both plaintiff or defendant the fair opportunity

9 The EPA acknowledges that even properly operated and maintained

facilities will sometimes violate their permitted limits. See, e.g., United

States v. Marine Shale Processors, 8\ F.3d 1329, 1336 (Sth Cir. 1996) (the

EPA's Training Manual for NPDES Permit Writers concedes that a properly

operated facility has only “a 95 to 99 percent chance of complying with its

permit limits.”); 47 Fed. Reg. 52006, 52018 (Nov. 18, 1982) (even at

properly designed and operated facilities, certain effluent limits will result

in three to four violations each year because of the statistical method used

by the EPA to select the limits). Because the EPA knows that violations

will result despite the best intentions and equipment, it will “exercise

prosecutorial discretion” and not seek penalties for every violation. In

exercising its discxetion, the EPA considers factors such as the harm posed

by a violation, the possibility of recurrence and the facility’s compliance

history. See, e.g., 62 Fed. Reg. 8314, 8118 (Feb. 24, 1997); 47 Fed. Reg. at

52018 (although CWA is a strict liability statute, enforcement by the EPA is

discretionary and, “We have exercised and intend to exercise that discretion

in a manner that recognizes and promotes good faith compliance efforts.’’)

In contrast, the citizen prosecutor is not bound to follow the Agency's

enforcement policies or the U.S. Constitution and has no economic interest

in settling for less than the maximum amount possible. See Greve, Private

Enforcement, at 109-113. See also Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Train, 544 F.2d

657, 660 (3d Cir. 1976) (“(T)here is no authorization to block a citizen's

suit . . . even though the agency believes that the suit should not go

forward.”)

18

to recover their fees upon prevailing. Simply put, there is

nothing to indicate that Congress intended to distort the

balance in the adversary process by providing well-funded

citizen plaintiffs considerable incentives to sue, while chilling

the advocacy of a defendant to vindicate its rights by forcing

it to risk paying both its own attorney’s fees and those of the

plaintiff.

This case presents a rare opportunity for the Court to

address the apparent principal reason why citizen plaintiffs

have come close to displacing governmental agencies as the

primary enforcers of environmental laws — the unequal and,

amici suggest, unfair treatment courts apply when ruling on

petitions for attorney’s fees under the environmental fee-

shifting provisions. The Court should grant the petition to

determine whether the Christiansburg standard should con-

tinue to apply to prevailing environmental citizen suit defen-

dants.

CONCLUSION

The Ninth Circuit’s decision promotes disproportion and

unfairness in the prosecuting and defending of environmental

citizen suits. This disparity places regulated entities in an

untenable position by subjecting them to an imbalance of

power in these cases. To ensure fair treatment in this impor-

tant area of federal law, this Court should grant the writ of

certiorari and determine whether the Christiansburg standard

should continue to be applied to the citizen suit fee-shifting

provisions of environmental statutes.

Respectfully submitted,

SANFORD M. STEIN

Counsel of Record

Leo P. Domsrowski

IAN J. McPHERON

WiLpMAN, Harro_p, ALLEN & Dixon

225 West Wacker Drive

Chicago, Illinois 60606-1229

(312) 201-2000

Counsel for Amici Curiae

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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