Amicus Curiae Brief — Hecla Mining Co. v. Washington Wilderness Coalition
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~ | Supreme Court, U.S.
— fee eS
No. 98-751 FEB 4 1999
CLERK
In The
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1998
+
HECLA MINING COMPANY,
Petitioner,
WASHINGTON WILDERNESS COALITION,
OKANOGAN HIGHLANDS ALLIANCE, and ATLANTIC
STATES LEGAL FOUNDATION, INC.,
Respondents.
«
On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Ninth Circuit
*
BRIEF AMICI CURIAE OF CHAMBER OF
COMMERCE OF THE UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, NATIONAL ASSOCIATION OF
MANUFACTURERS, NATIONAL MINING
ASSOCIATION, CORPORATE ENVIRONMENTAL
ENFORCEMENT COUNCIL, AMERICAN FOREST &
PAPER ASSOCIATION, INC., AND ALASKA MINERS
ASSOCIATION IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONER
*
SANFORD M. STEIN
Counsel of Record
Leo P. DomBrowski
IAN J. McPHERON
WILDMAN, HaArRROLD, ALLEN & DIxon
225 West Wacker Drive
Chicago, Illinois 60606-1229
(312) 201-2000
Counsel for Amici Curiae
(Additional Counsel Listed on Inside Cover)
Rosin S. Conrap
National Chamber Litigation Center, Inc.
1615 H Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20062
(202) 463-5337
Counsel for Chamber of Commerce of the United States
Jan S. Amunpson, General Counsel
QueENTIN RigGEL, Deputy General Counsel
National Association of Manufacturers
1331 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004-1790
(202) 637-3000
Harovtp P. Quinn, Jr., General Counsel
National Mining Association
1130 17th St., N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20036
(202) 463-2625
Also Counsel for Alaska Miners Association
Paut G. WALLACH
Eric S. ANDREAS
Hate AND Dorr, LLP
1455 Pennsylvania Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20004
(202) 942-8400
Counsel for Corporate Environmental Enforcement Council
Russet. S. Frye
Roy S. BELDEN
CHADBOURNE & Parke LLP
1200 New Hampshire Ave., N.W.
Washington D.C. 20036
(202) 974-5600
Counsel for American Forest & Paper Association, Inc.
vere manny gi)
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Einmpae TIE PASTORATE oc oo oc ec wc nce cadens il
IDENTITY AND STATEMENT OF INTEREST OF THE
RIN fos ng Sh neo an veuh vcd cae ee
I. THE COURT SHOULD REVIEW THE NINTH
CIRCUIT’S DECISION TO DECIDE WHETHER
THE DUAL STANDARD SHOULD CONTINUE
TO BE USED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES
UNDER THE ENVIRONMENTAL FEE-SHIFTING
RUE Ms pe tenet aida cep cee ee ea aie Re 5
A. Congress Intended That the District Courts
Would Exercise Their Discretion When Award-
ing Attorney’s Fees in Environmental Citizen
SR ec es 3 ea ae ue cee ee 5
B. Congress Could Have Easily Mandated the
Se III de oe edd ho heen seca ats 7
Il. THE FACTORS THAT MOTIVATED THIS COURT
IN CHRISTIANSBURG ARE NOT PRESENT
WO eg re eet ar nee Baik sects 5 10
Ill. THE COURT SHOULD GRANT THE PETITION
BECAUSE THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION
PERMITS CITIZEN PLAINTIFFS TO ENCROACH
UPON THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH’S ENFORCE-
WORE, DOERR ES cea ue se ies coe ek 12
AEN aa ee On an rk eee eee, 18
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
CASES
Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Train, 544 F.2d 657 (3d Cir.
yl.) Mtedpte ty be ey Ey oe 17
Bittner v. Sadoff & Rudoy Indus., 728 F.2d 820 (7th
Cae. Fas ee oe eso ciesccsces 12
Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal Employment
Opportunity Comm'n, 434 U.S. 412 (1978)
bn a8 ba hoe IRR ae ee 3, 6 10, 11, 17, 18
Cohen v. Virginia Electric & Power Co., 617 F. Supp.
619 (E.D. Va. 1985), aff’d on other grounds, 788
F208 241 COR Ce a ee ee Pda sees. 14
Connecticut Nat’! Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249
(1992) os kak eS ee... 7
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Realty Investments
Assocs., L.P., 524 F. Supp. 150 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) ....6, 7
Fogerty v. Fantasy, 510 U.S. 517 (1994) .......... passim
Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S.
49 (1967). oc. sca es 13, 15
Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20 (1989). .13, 15
National Wildlife Federation v. Consumers Power
Co., 729 F. Supp. 62 (W.D. Mich. 1989)...... 6, 10, 11
Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, 510 F.2d
692 (D.C. Cie, S078). 2.5 sco ae een ens eews sce 7
Razore v. Tulalip Tribes of Washington, 66 F.3d 236
(Sth -Cor.-1999) sa a i a 6, 10
Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 462 U.S. 680 ............ 4,6
_« |
ill
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES —- Continued
Page
Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env’t, 118 S. Ct.
as ke ials Eee aks ht aan Fase eee aes 155 tay ae
United States v. Marine Shale Processors, (5th Cir.
Ce PEPE EEE OE Oe Pe ea pie at 17
STATUTES
See a PO .P ROO cS W.iso bie-k one ea eek eee ee 9
Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552b(i)....... 8
Hart-Scott Rodino Antitrust Improvements Act, 15
eC RUOEE vada cwaca des ceseda es scaehaat eae en 8
Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2618(d)..... 5
Cooperative Research Act, 15 U.S.C. § 4304(a)......... 8
Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C. § 1540(g)(4)........ 5
Ry gts 3 one o - a eee eee ere ree 9
False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. § 3730(d)(4) .............. &
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A)........... 12
Cee Weeeer AGL, 32 UBL. © PIOMED Sic ccc csvecccs: 5
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C.
RG GEIS eS Se Ee a ee ee 5
eS a ae BE ee yy |) 5
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. % 9613(h) ......... 13
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensa-
tion and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9659(f)........... >
Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know
a 5
iV
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES — Continued
Page
Health Care Quality Improvement Act, 42 U.S.C.
Pee leuuet Gere Upae Gee ae ds ee enews ace te nas 8
Pipeline Safety Act, 49 U.S.C. § 60121(b).............. 8
MisCELLANEOUS
47 Fea. Ree. 52000 (Nov. 18, 1962) ..... 2.20. ceaccscs 17
‘61 Fed. Reg. 30061 (June 13, 1996) ................... 4
Gl Free. Rew. G7Ot7 Cilec. 19, 1996) .. 5.06 ccc cena 3
GZ Fea.. Ree. B5i4 (rem. 26, PSG7). 2.60 on ccc caacs dca 17
a ee Pe. see ae 3
EPA’s Toxic Release Inventory Is Useful but Can Be
Improved (June 1991) GAO/RCED 91-121............ 3
Executive Summary/The National Biennial RCRA
Hazardous Waste Report (Based on 1995 Data),
Gee iig SA SE 5 oa vas bn oe aK eaia oe esha ee aa 4
Michael S. Greve, Private Enforcement, Private
Rewards: How Environmental Citizen Suits Became
an Entitlement Program, in Environmental Politics:
Public Costs, Private Rewards 105 (Praeger Pub-
Pe re 7 en ere 16, 17
]
IDENTITY AND STATEMENT OF INTEREST
OF THE AMICI CURIAE
This brief of amici curiae, the Chamber of Commerce of
the United States of America, er al., is submitted in support of
the petition for writ of certiorari filed by Hecla Mining
Company. Like Petitioner, amici submit that the Court should
grant the petition and decide whether the lower courts should
continue to hold prevailing defendants to a much higher
standard than that applied to prevailing plaintiffs when ruling
on a request for attorney’s fees in environmental citizen
suits.!
Amicus Chamber of Commerce of the United States of
America (the “Chamber”) is the world’s largest business fed-
eration. The Chamber represents an underlying membership
of more than three million businesses and organizations of
every size, sector and region. Ninety-six percent of the Cham-
ber’s members are businesses with fewer than 100 employees.
The Chamber regularly advocates its members’ views in court
on environmental issues of national concern to the business
community.
Amicus the National Association of Manufacturers is the
nation’s oldest and largest broad-based industrial trade asso-
ciation. Its more than 14,000 member companies and subsid-
iaries, including 10,000 small manufacturers, employ
approximately 85 percent of all manufacturing workers and
produce over 80 percent of the nation’s manufactured goods.
More than 158,000 additional businesses are affiliated with
the National Association of Manufacturers through its Asso-
ciations Council and National Industrial Council.
Amicus the National Mining Association is the national
trade association for the mining industry whose members are
the producers of most of America’s coal, metals, industrial
' Pursuant to Rule 37 of the Rules of this Court, the amici have
obtained letters of consent to the filing of this brief from the parties and
have filed those letters with the Clerk of the Court. Additionally, pursuant
to Rule 37, this brief was authored, prepared and paid for in its entirety by
the amici.
2
and agricultural minerals. Its members also include manufac-
turers of mining and mineral processing machinery, equip-
ment and supplies, as well as engineering firms and financial
institutions that serve the mining industry.
Amicus Corporate Environmental Enforcement Council
(“CEEC”) is an organization of 25 diverse companies with a
strong commitment to the environment and environmental
compliance. CEEC focuses exclusively on environmental
enforcement and compliance issues, working to ensure that
environmental enforcement is consistent with our environ-
mental laws and advances the goals of those laws.
Amicus American Forest & Paper Association, Inc. is a
non-profit trade association for over 250 member companies
engaged in growing, harvesting, and processing wood and
wood fiber and manufacturing pulp, paper and paperboard
products from both virgin and recycled fiber, and solid wood
products. Its member companies account for over eight per-
cent of the total U.S. manufacturing output.
Amicus Alaska Miners Association (“AMA”) is a non-
profit corporation whose members include individuals and
companies engaged in the exploration, development and min-
ing of Alaska’s coal and hard mineral resources, as well as
supporting industries. The purpose of the AMA is to promote
the mining industry and development and use of Alaska’s
mineral resources.
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
Amici are trade associations or representatives of indus-
tries and businesses that have demonstrated a commitment to
public health and the environment as well as a fair and even-
handed enforcement of environmental laws. Their members
are the industries and businesses charged with the important
duty of complying with environmental laws and regulations
and therefore have a keen awareness and interest in compli-
ance and fair enforcement.
In the environmental area, Congress has mandated a two-
tiered enforcement approach. The primary enforcers are the
Executive Branch, through the EPA and the Department of
3
Justice, and the individual states, who have been delegated
some of the authority to administer many of the congression-
ally-created programs. A secondary and carefully limited
enforcement role is accorded to private citizens, who may
bring citizen actions, after notice to an alleged offender and
an opportunity to cure. Congress was wary of providing too
much authority to citizen enforcers and ensured that citizens
were not to be co-equals of the government authorities.
In enacting these citizen suit provisions, Congress also
provided for fee-shifting to encourage the bringing of mer-
itorious actions but also to discourage the filing of actions
that result in little or no benefit to the environment. These fee
shifting provisions are neutral on their face, favoring neither
citizen plaintiffs nor regulated defendants.
At issue here are the fee-shifting provisions of the Clean
Water Act (“CWA”) and the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation and Liability Act (“CERCLA”),
which grant discretion to the district courts to award attor-
ney’s fees to a prevailing party in a citizen action without
distinguishing between prevailing plaintiffs and defendants.
Unfortunately, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
below, relying on Christiansburg Garment Co. v. Equal
Employment Opportunity Comm'n, 434 U.S. 412 (1978),
engrafted onto these neutral provisions a barrier to prevailing
defendants when they seek their fees: a prevailing defendant
may recover its fees only if the plaintiff’s action is frivolous
or without foundation — essentially applying the Rule 11
standard to prevailing defendants’ fee petitions. There is
simply no indication in either the language of the statutes or
their legislative history that Congress intended such a distinc-
tion.
The importance of this Court’s review of the decision
below is underscored by the huge number of companies and
industries potentially affected by this issue. For example,
over 900,000 facilities are subject to reporting requirements
of the Emergency Planning and Community Right-to-Know
Act (“EPCRA”). 62 Fed. Reg. 23834, 23884-85 (May 1,
1997); 61 Fed. Reg. 67017, 67018 (Dec. 19, 1996); EPA's
Toxic Release Inventory Is Useful but Can Be Improved, at 49
4
(June 1991) GAO/RCED 91-121. Over 130,000 facilities are
regulated under the discharge permitting requirements of the
CWA.? Over 25,000 facilities are subject to the Title V per-
mitting requirements of the Clean Air Act (“CAA”). 61 Fed.
Reg. 30061, 30062 (June 13, 1996). Almost 21,000 generators
of hazardous waste and 2,000 treatment, storage and disposal
facilities are subject to the standards and permitting require-
ments of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(“RCRA”). Executive Summary/The National Biennial RCRA
Hazardous Waste Report (Based on 1995 Data), August 1997,
at ES-3, 4 (available at www.epa.gov/epaoswer/hazwaste/
data/br95). All of these entities, being subject to environmen-
tal regulation, are also potentially subject to environmental
citizen suits and their fee-shifting provisions.
Amici recognize the citizen enforcement role, and where
citizen plaintiffs are successful, the discretion of the court to
award attorney’s fees. But amici also recognize that their
members might be and have been forced to defend citizen
claims and, when successful, should not automatically be
denied their fees. The importance of the question presented to
the Court is underscored by the huge number of companies
and industries that are subject to environmental regulation,
and that, therefore, are also subject to environmental citizen
suits and their fee-shifting provisions. In short, amici simply
ask that the district courts be allowed to exercise their discre-
tion when determining whether an award of attorney’s fees is
appropriate under the environmental fee-shifting provisions.
2 Based on a telephone conversation with Mr. Brian Rittenhaus of
the EPA Office of Wastewater Management/Permits Division.
;
a ee
5
ARGUMENT
I. THE COURT SHOULD REVIEW THE NINTH CIR-
CUIT’S DECISION TO DECIDE WHETHER THE
DUAL STANDARD SHOULD CONTINUE TO BE
USED IN AWARDING ATTORNEY FEES UNDER
THE ENVIRONMENTAL FEE-SHIFTING STATUTES
A. Congress Intended That the District Courts Would
Exercise Their Discretion When Awarding Attor-
ney’s Fees in Environmental Citizen Actions
In enacting the fee-shifting provisions of the CWA and
CERCLA, the statutes at issue here, Congress did not distin-
guish between prevailing plaintiffs and defendants. It rejected
a dual standard and instead opted for neutral language, pro-
viding that the district courts may award costs of litigation “to
any prevailing or substantially prevailing party, whenever the
court determines such an award is appropriate.” 33 U.S.C.
§ 1365(d), 42 U.S.C. § 9659(f). Nor did Congress distinguish
between prevailing plaintiffs and defendants in the fee-shift-
ing provisions of other environmental statutes, likewise pro-
viding the district courts with discretion to determine when an
award of fees is appropriate.3
> Congress also used the “prevailing or substantially prevailing party,
whenever the court determines such an award is appropriate” language
when it enacted the RCRA, 42 U.S.C. § 6972(e), and EPCRA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 11046(f). Under the CAA, 42 U.S.C. § 7607(f), Toxic Substances Control
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2618(d), and Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 1540(g)(4), Congress provided that the district courts may award fees
“whenever it determines such an award is appropriate.” Although the
“prevailing party” language is absent from these provisions, this Court in
Ruckelshaus v. Sierra Club, 462 U.S. 680 (1983), examined this language
and held that only prevailing parties are eligible for fee awards. Thus,
under Ruckelshaus, the differences in the language Congress used are of no
consequence and the fee-shifting provisions of the environmental statutes
are to be interpreted identically — a court may award fees to “the prevailing
or the substantially prevailing party whenever the court determines such an
award is appropriate.”
6
Despite Congress using this neutral language, the Ninth
Circuit and other courts have engrafted onto these fee-shifting
provisions a much higher standard when a prevailing defen-
dant seeks to recover its fees. See, e.g., Razore v. Tulalip
Tribes of Washington, 66 F.3d 236, 240 (9th Cir. 1995) (in
CWA and RCRA suits, prevailing defendant may not recover
its fees unless plaintiff’s action was frivolous or without
foundation); National Wildlife Federation v. Consumers
Power Co., 729 F. Supp. 62, 65 (W.D. Mich. 1989) (same in
CWA suit); Consolidated Edison Co. v. Realty Investments
Assocs., L.P., 524 F. Supp. 150, 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1981) (same
under CAA).4 There is simply no indication, however, that
Congress intended the stricter standard to apply to a petition
for attorney’s fees brought by a prevailing environmental
citizen suit defendant. To the contrary, the language of the
statutes endorses, if anything, an even-handed treatment of
prevailing plaintiffs and defendants and shows, at the very
least, that Congress left to the district courts’ discretion to
determine when it was appropriate to award fees to a prevail-
ing defendant.
Nor does the legislative history of the environmental fee-
shifting provisions provide any support for the dual standard.
As Petitioner points out, an early version of the CWA manda-
ted that prevailing plaintiffs receive their attorney’s fees.
Congress deleted this language, however, and replaced it with
the neutral provision authorizing the district courts to award
fees to either prevailing party. Cert. Pet. 14.
Also, in debating the wisdom of giving such unprece-
dented enforcement authority to private citizens, some mem-
bers of Congress questioned whether some plaintiffs would
use the citizen suit provisions to bring “frivolous and harass-
ing actions.” To deter this abuse, Congress provided that the
courts could award fees to either party “whenever the court
4 Other courts have even gone beyond the Christiansburg standard
aid injected an element of “bad faith.” Still others apply a modified
Christiansburg approach. See Cert. Pet. 23-24. The result is an unclear area
of the law that warrants this Court’s review.
7
determines such an action is in the public interest.” Reprinted
in Natural Resources Defense Council v. Train, 510 F.2d 692,
725-26, 728-29 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (relevant legislative history
of CAA of 1970).5 As in the statutes, there is simply no
indication in the iegislative history that Congress intended to
limit the district courts’ discretion in determining whether an
award of fees is appropriate.
The best indicator of congressional intent is, of course,
the language of the statutes. And, it is clear that Congress did
not limit prevailing defendants to an award of fees, as it has
done under several other statutes (see Section I.B., below),
only if a plaintiff’s action is frivolous or without foundation.
The Ninth Circuit has run afoul of the principal canon of
statutory construction: when the text of a statute is clear, the
court’s interpretive inquiry ends. Connecticut Nat’! Bank v.
Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 254 (1992).
B. Congress Could Have Easily Mandated the Dual
Standard
Had Congress wished to apply a dual standard to fee
petitions brought by prevailing environmental citizen suit
defendants, and thus condition the award of fees on certain
behavior of the plaintiff, it easily could have done so. The
Ninth Circuit’s standard ignores the many instances where
Congress has adopted the dual standard when it wished to
make it more difficult for the prevailing defendant to recover
its attorney’s fees. For example, the Administrative Procedure
Act expressly provides that costs of litigation, including attor-
ney’s fees, may be awarded to the substantially prevailing
party, “except that costs may be assessed against the plaintiff
only where the court finds that the suit was initiated by the
plaintiff primarily for frivolous or dilatory purposes.” 5
° Nothing in the legislative history indicates that prevailing
defendants should recover their fees “only where the action may be fairly
characterized as frivolous or harassing,” as one court misread the history.
Consolidated Edison, 524 F. Supp. at 153.
8
U.S.C. § 552b(1). Likewise, in certain antitrust cases, district
courts shall:
(1) award to a substantially prevailing claimant
the cost of suit attributable to such claim, including
a reasonable attorney’s fee, or
(2) award to a substantially prevailing party
defending against any such claim the cost of suit
attributable to such claim, including a reasonable
attorney’s fee, if the claim, or the claimant’s con-
duct during the litigation of the claim, was frivo-
lous, unreasonable, without foundation, or in bad
faith.
15 U.S.C. § 4304(a); see also 15 U.S.C. § 15c(d) (in antitrust
actions brought by a state, court may award fees to prevailing
defendant if “the State attorney general has acted in bad faith,
vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive reasons.”); 31 U.S.C.
§ 3730(d)(4) (in qui tam actions, court may award fees to
prevailing defendant if plaintiff's claim “was clearly frivo-
lous, clearly vexatious, or brought primarily for purposes of
harassment.”); 42 U.S.C. § 11113 (in antitrust actions under
Health Care Quality Improvement Act, court shall award fees
to prevailing defendant if plaintiff's claim was “frivolous,
unreasonable, without foundation, or in bad faith.”); 49
U.S.C. § 60121(b) (under Pipeline Safety Act, court may
award attorney’s fees to any prevailing plaintiff, but may
award fees to prevailing defendant only “when the action is
unreasonable, frivolous, or meritless.”) In contrast, although
it easily could have, Congress did not so distinguish between
prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants when it
enacted the CWA and CERCLA, as well as other environmen-
tal statutes, illustrating that it rejected the dual standard
adopted here by the Ninth Circuit.
By advancing the one-sided “frivolous or without foun-
dation” standard, the Ninth Circuit has effectively ruled that a
prevailing environmental citizen suit defendant may recover
its fees only when the plaintiff’s action violates Rule 11. See
Fed. Rule Civ. Proc. 11(b) (a plaintiff violates Rule 11 if its
complaint is frivolous or without support). Consequently,
apart from disregarding the clear language of the statutes, the
9
Ninth Circuit’s standard is additionally questionable because
it is already established under Rule 11 that a prevailing
defendant may be awarded its fees if a complaint is frivolous
or without foundation, even in the absence of a fee-shifting
provision.
Under a nearly identical fee-shifting statute, the Copy-
right Act, this Court recently found that prevailing plaintiffs
and defendants must be treated alike. Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.,
510 U.S. 517 (1994). Sirsiiar to the environmental statutes,
the Copyright Act provides that “the court may . . . award a
reasonable attorney’s fee to the prevailing party as part of the
costs.” 17 U.S.C. § 505. This Court found that the statutory
language gave “no hint that successful plaintiffs are to be
treated differently from successful defendants.” /d. at 522.
This Court also found that the legislative history of the
Copyright Act “provides no support for treating prevailing
plaintiffs and defendants differently with respect to the recov-
ery of attorney’s fees.” /d. at 523. As noted above, the
legislative history of the environmental! provisions likewise
provides no support for the Ninth Circuit’s position that
prevailing plaintiffs and defendants should be treated differ-
ently. Here we have essentially identical language receiving
vastly different treatment: this Court found that the neutral
language of the Copyright Act must be given an even-handed
interpretation, while the courts construing the same language
of the environmental statutes have concluded that a harsh,
dual standard should be applied.
Accordingly, the language of the statutes, their legisla-
tive history, and this Court’s ruling in Fogerty contradict the
Ninth Circuit’s decision. The Court should grant Hecla Min-
ing’s petition to resolve the uncertainty created by the con-
flicting interpretations of this congressional language.
ee a
10
Il. THE FACTORS THAT MOTIVATED THIS COURT
IN CHRISTIANSBURG ARE NOT PRESENT HERE
The Ninth Circuit, with no analysis, adopted the standard
articulated by this Court in Christiansburg as the standard to
be applied to environmental fee-shifting provisions. Razore,
66 F.3d at 240 (where the Ninth Circuit simply stated that,
“We agree with the district court that Christiansburg” is the
proper standard).© Other courts have also unhesitatingly
adopted Christiansburg. See, e.g., National Wildlife, 729
F. Supp. at 64. In Christiansburg, this Court was asked to
decide what standard should apply to a claim for attorney’s
fees by a prevailing defendant in a Title VII employment
case. Focusing on congressional policy that Title VII plain-
tiffs were “the chosen instrument of Congress” to enforce
civil rights laws, this Court held that prevailing Title VII
defendants may recover their fees only if the plaintiff’s action
was “frivolous, unreasonable, or without foundation, even
though not brought in subjective bad faith.” Jd. at 418, 421.
In Fogerty, the respondent contended that Christiansburg
supported different treatment for prevailing plaintiffs and
defendants. Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 522. Finding that the objec-
tives of the Copyright Act and Civil Rights Act were “not
completely similar,” this Court easily distinguished Chris-
tiansburg. In particular, the Court stressed that in the civil
rights context:
impecunious “private attorney general” plaintiffs
can ill afford to litigate their claims against defen-
dants with more resources. Congress sought to
redress this balance in part, and to provide incen-
tives for the bringing of meritorious lawsuits, by
treating successful plaintiffs more favorably than
successful defendants in terms of the award of
attorney’s fees. . . . In the copyright context, it has
been noted that “[e]ntities which sue for copyright
© In this case, the Ninth Circuit simply referred to Razore as the
“settled law of this circuit.” Cert. Pet. 4a.
11
infringement as plaintiffs can run the gamut from
corporate behemoths to starving artists. . .
Id. at 524 (citation omitted).
Here, Respondents most surely will maintain that Chris-
tiansburg should also inform a district court’s discretion when
it is asked to rule on a prevailing environmental citizen suit
defendant’s petition for attorney’s fees. As this Court found
with Copyright Act suits, the policy considerations at work in
Christiansburg are also absent in most environmental citizen
litigation. In civil rights cases, the plaintiff is typically an
individual or class of individuals seeking to vindicate per-
sonal rights against an employer, municipality, or other entity
with greater resources. In environmental citizen litigation, on
the other hand, plaintiffs are often large, well-funded organi-
zations devoted to bringing lawsuits.
In this case, the district court aptly found that, “Plaintiffs
are public interest groups, but they are also professional
litigants.” Cert. Pet. 50a. Indeed, citizen plaintiffs draw finan-
cial support from huge memberships and, bolstered by the
environmental fee-shifting provisions, have used those contri-
butions to bring thousands of lawsuits under the environmen-
tal statutes.?7 Consequently, the kind of plaintiff bringing
environmental citizen litigation often resembles much more
the “behemoth” noted in Fogerty than the impecunious plain-
tiff that influenced the Court in Christiansburg.
Some courts have applied the Christiansburg standard to
prevailing citizen suit defendants seeking their fees because
they did not want to unreasonably deter citizen plaintiffs from
bringing meritorious actions. See, e.g., National Wildlife, 729
7 Perhaps energized by the fee-shifting provisions, typical citizen_
plaintiffs are hardly ever individuals, but rather large, well-funded, national
organizations. Today, the Natural Resources Defense Council has more
than 170,000 members nationwide. The Sierra Club has more than 500,000
national members. State Public Interest Research Groups have over |
nillion members. They, and many others, are extremely active in
environmental litigation. See Brief Amici Curiae of Natural Resources
Defense Council, et al., Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, No. 96-643,
at I n. 2.
12
F. Supp. at 64. However, this concern is misplaced because a
court may consider, as part of the exercise of its discretion,
whether a fee award to a prevailing defendant in a particular
case would unfairly burden a plaintiff or have any “chilling
effect” on potentially deserving plaintiffs.’ Therefore, even if
Congress intended to avoid such an effect, there is no need to
read into these statutes a requirement that a prevailing defen-
dant automatically be denied its fees unless it demonstrates
that the plaintiff’s action violated Rule 11. See also Fogerty,
510 U.S. at 535 n. 19 (factors that may be used to guide a
district court’s discretion include “motivation, objective
unreasonableness (both in the factual and in the legal compo-
nents of the case) and the need in particular circumstances to
advance considerations of compensation and deterrence.”)
Ill. THE COURT SHOULD GRANT THE PETITION
BECAUSE THE NINTH CIRCUIT’S DECISION
PERMITS CITIZEN PLAINTIFFS TO ENCROACH
UPON THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH’S ENFORCE-
MENT AUTHORITY
By enacting environmental citizen suit provisions, Con-
gress decided that citizens may act as private attorneys gen-
eral and aid in enforcing environmental laws. Congress did
not, however, place citizen plaintiffs on an even plane with
Executive Branch enforcement officials and endow them with
the full panoply of Article II enforcement authority. Rather,
Congress limited citizen enforcement in several significant
ways. It required a would-be citizen plaintiff to first provide
notice of the alleged violation to the EPA, the state and the
alleged violator at least 60 days before filing suit. See, e.g.,
33 U.S.C. § 1365(b)(1)(A). The purpose of the notice period
is two-fold: (1) it gives the alleged violator the opportunity to
8 The parties’ resources is but one factor a court could consider in
deciding whether an award of fees is appropriate. See, v.g., Bittner v. Sadoff
& Rudoy Indus., 728 F.2d 820, 828-31 (7th Cir. 1984) (one of the factors
district court may consider in awarding fees to an ERISA prevailing
defendant is plaintiff’s ability to pay).
<< i
13
bring itself into compliance, thus rendering a citizen suit
unnecessary; and (2) it also allows the government the oppor-
tunity to determine whether it should utilize its own authority
to enforce compliance, which likewise bars a citizen suit.
Hallstrom v. Tillamook County, 493 U.S. 20, 29-3: (1989);
Gwaltney v. Chesapeake Bay Found., Inc., 484 U.S. 49, 60-61
(1987). Similarly, to ensure that remediation of contaminated
waste sites will not be hindered by the “potentially intrusive”
citizen plaintiff, see Gwaltney, 484 U.S. at 61, Congress
prohibited citizen suits where the EPA is already undertaking
removal or remedial action at a site. 42 U.S.C. § 9613(h).
Further, a citizen plaintiff may not recover civil penalties (or
any type of damages) for itself. Rather, these penalties are
payable to the United States Treasury. See Steel Co. v. Citi-
zens for a Better Env't, 118 S. Ct. 1003, 1018 (1998).
The various checks on environmental citizen enforcement
demonstrate that Congress was not interested in simply maxi-
mizing the number of citizen suits brought under environmen-
tal statutes. This Court has long noted that, while Congress
provided for citizen participation in enforcing environmental
laws, Congress intended citizen suits only “to supplement, not
supplant, governmental action.” Gwaltney 484 U.S. at 60.
And while in the civil rights context Congress sought to
maximize citizen litigation to eradicate discrimination, in
authorizing environmental citizen suits Congress sought “to
strike a balance between encouraging citizen enforcement of
environmental regulations and avoiding burdening the federal
courts with excessive numbers of citizen suits.” Hallstrom,
493 U.S. at 29. The policies served by the CWA and CERCLA
(and the other environmental statutes) are “more complex,
more measured than simply maximizing the number of” citi-
zen suits. See Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 526. Far from being
Congress’s “chosen instrument” to enforce environmental
laws — which remain the federal and state environmental
agencies — Congress relegated the citizen plaintiff to a much-
restricted, secondary role.
If the dual standard is allowed to prevail, citizen suit
defendants will continue to be deterred from fully litigating
meritorious defenses because they are faced with payment of
14
plaintiff’s fees if they are unsuccessful and, on the other
hand, have no expectation that they will be able to recover
their own attorney’s fees, no matter how meritorious and
successful their defenses. It often simply makes more busi-
ness sense to settle quickly on the plaintiff’s terms and avoid
protracted litigation that may lead to paying both parties’
attorney’s fees (in addition to sizable civil penalties). This
puts a citizen suit defendant in a lose-lose situation. If it
loses, it must not only pay the plaintiff’s attorney’s fees, it
must also pay its own. And if it wins, it still must pay its own
attorney’s fees (except in the rare case where the plaintiff
violates Rule 11). “Indeed, if there is any difference between
the [plaintiff and defendant] we must remember that it wasn’t
the defendant who chose to litigate.” Cohen v. Virginia Elec-
tric & Power Co., 617 F. Supp. 619, 622 (E.D. Va. 1985)
(holding that prevailing copyright plaintiffs and defendants
should be treated alike when awarding fees), aff’d on other
grounds, 788 F.2d 247 (4th Cir. 1986).
In enacting these fee-shifting statutes, Congress clearly
intended to alter the American Rule, albeit by providing the
district courts with the discretion to determine when a fee
award is appropriate. The Ninth Circuit has distorted that
intent by fashioning an “enhanced British Rule,” whereby a
prevailing plaintiff almost always gets its fees while the
prevailing defendant almost never does. Given this imbalance
in litigation strengths, a plaintiff has an incentive to adopt
uncompromising positions knowing that the defendant is
faced with a “running meter” and always has to consider the
possibility of having to pay both sides’ attorney’s fees.
Allowing the district courts to exercise their discretion in
determining when an award of attorney’s fees is appropriate
would force citizen plaintiffs to consider more critically
whether bringing a suit will actually further the public inter-
est. In the instant action, the district court essentially found
that plaintiffs had no legitimate reason to file their action
because the Washington Department of Ecology had already
taken the appropriate steps to address any environmental
harm that could result from the discharges at issue:
15
This action turned awkward on the eve of trial. It
became less of a public interest case after plaintiffs
abandoned their claim for injunctive relief. As the
evidence unfolded, it appeared even less of a public
interest case. . . . The point of this suit was not to
close the Aspen Pond and save the environment.
DOE had already done that.
Cert. Pet. 19-20. Eliminating the automatic prohibition on a
defendant recovering its fees would serve and further Con-
gress’s intent that citizen plaintiffs be encouraged to bring
actions that benefit the environment and discouraged from
filing actions that are of marginal or no value to society.
It is important that defendants not be chilled from assert-
ing their rights because one major purpose of litigating
defenses to citizen suits is to define the scope of citizen suit
enforcement authority. See, e.g., Steel Co. 118 S. Ct. 1003 (an
interest in attorney’s fees or civil penalties does not afford
citizen plaintiff standing to sue); Hallstrom, 493 U.S. 20
(citizen plaintiff must strictly comply with statutory notice
requirements before bringing suit); Gwaltney, 484 U.S. 49
(Congress did not intend that citizen plaintiffs be allowed to
sue for past violations). If citizen suit defendants are hesitant
to fully litigate meritorious defenses, the congressional man-
date that citizen plaintiffs only supplement governmental
enforcement authority will be undermined. Maintaining the
dual standard allows citizen suit plaintiffs to assume an
enforcement role larger than that intended by Congress
because, given the prospect of paying the, often substantial,
attorney’s fees of both parties, defendants often find them-
selves compelled to yield to the citizen plaintiff’s demands. If
the decision below is allowed to stand, the finely-crafted
congressional balance between governmental and citizen
enforcement authority will continue to be thwarted by the
inappropriate incentives created by the dual standard.
Congress recognized the basic principles of fairness and
the balance between the interests of citizen plaintiffs and
government enforcement when it enacted the fee-shifting pro-
visions with no distinction between prevailing plaintiffs and
defendants. Under the Ninth Circuit’s dual standard, however,
Oe
16
a citizen suit defendant who helps to define the proper scope
of citizen suit enforcement by maintaining meritorious
defenses is unable to recover its attorney’s fees. To maintain
the proper citizen plaintiff's role and ensure that it does not
encroach upon the Executive’s authority, this Court should
grant the writ and decide whether the dual standard is appro-
priate for environmental citizen actions. As with copyright
law, it is important that the boundaries of private citizen suit
enforcement authority “be demarcated as clearly as possible.”
Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 527.
In the past, the Executive Branch has expressed concern
that citizen plaintiffs may have replaced government officials
as the party that controls enforcement policy. When Congress
was considering the reauthorization of the Clean Water Act in
1987, the Department of Justice testified that the flood of
private enforcement actions under the CWA was coming dan-
gerously close to producing the result Congress apparently
meant to prevent — a shift of control over enforcement from
the government to private parties. See Michael S. Greve,
Private Enforcement, Private Rewards: How Environmental
Citizen Suits Became an Entitlement Program, in Environ-
mental Politics: Public Costs, Private Rewards 105, 120
(Praeger Publishers 1992). These concerns are just as legiti-
mate today because citizen organizations continue to file
hundreds of citizen suits, the fee-shifting provisions some-
times being used as a thinly-veiled fund-raising mechanism.
Cert. Pet. 2 n. 2; Greve, Private Enforcement, at 109-110.
Courts can play their role only when construing cases and
controversies arising under the environmental laws. But with
a dual standard applied to requests for attorney’s fees, citi-
zens suit defendants with meritorious defenses are discour-
aged from asserting those defenses, finding a greater than
usual incentive to settle. The plaintiffs’ incentives to settle,
however, is diminished because it can drive a hard bargain
knowing that the defendant faces the prospect of paying
double fees if its defenses fall short. Additionally, given the
dual standard, citizen plaintiffs are also encouraged to bring
17
cases of questionable merit or of doubtful value to the envi-
ronment, cases that the EPA would decline to pursue.? Conse-
quently, the congressionally crafted balance between
government and citizen enforcers is harmed, and citizen
plaintiffs are able to arrogate power that Congress never
envisioned.
“A fair adversary process presupposes both a vigorous
prosecution and a vigorous defense.” Christiansburg, 434
U.S. at 419. “Defendants who seek to advance a variety of
meritorious . . . defenses should be encouraged to litigate
them to the same extent that Plaintiffs are encouraged to
litigate meritorious claims.” Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 527. By not
distinguishing between prevailing plaintiffs and defendants,
Congress intended to maintain this balanced adversary pro-
cess by giving both plaintiff or defendant the fair opportunity
9 The EPA acknowledges that even properly operated and maintained
facilities will sometimes violate their permitted limits. See, e.g., United
States v. Marine Shale Processors, 8\ F.3d 1329, 1336 (Sth Cir. 1996) (the
EPA's Training Manual for NPDES Permit Writers concedes that a properly
operated facility has only “a 95 to 99 percent chance of complying with its
permit limits.”); 47 Fed. Reg. 52006, 52018 (Nov. 18, 1982) (even at
properly designed and operated facilities, certain effluent limits will result
in three to four violations each year because of the statistical method used
by the EPA to select the limits). Because the EPA knows that violations
will result despite the best intentions and equipment, it will “exercise
prosecutorial discretion” and not seek penalties for every violation. In
exercising its discxetion, the EPA considers factors such as the harm posed
by a violation, the possibility of recurrence and the facility’s compliance
history. See, e.g., 62 Fed. Reg. 8314, 8118 (Feb. 24, 1997); 47 Fed. Reg. at
52018 (although CWA is a strict liability statute, enforcement by the EPA is
discretionary and, “We have exercised and intend to exercise that discretion
in a manner that recognizes and promotes good faith compliance efforts.’’)
In contrast, the citizen prosecutor is not bound to follow the Agency's
enforcement policies or the U.S. Constitution and has no economic interest
in settling for less than the maximum amount possible. See Greve, Private
Enforcement, at 109-113. See also Bethlehem Steel Corp. v. Train, 544 F.2d
657, 660 (3d Cir. 1976) (“(T)here is no authorization to block a citizen's
suit . . . even though the agency believes that the suit should not go
forward.”)
18
to recover their fees upon prevailing. Simply put, there is
nothing to indicate that Congress intended to distort the
balance in the adversary process by providing well-funded
citizen plaintiffs considerable incentives to sue, while chilling
the advocacy of a defendant to vindicate its rights by forcing
it to risk paying both its own attorney’s fees and those of the
plaintiff.
This case presents a rare opportunity for the Court to
address the apparent principal reason why citizen plaintiffs
have come close to displacing governmental agencies as the
primary enforcers of environmental laws — the unequal and,
amici suggest, unfair treatment courts apply when ruling on
petitions for attorney’s fees under the environmental fee-
shifting provisions. The Court should grant the petition to
determine whether the Christiansburg standard should con-
tinue to apply to prevailing environmental citizen suit defen-
dants.
CONCLUSION
The Ninth Circuit’s decision promotes disproportion and
unfairness in the prosecuting and defending of environmental
citizen suits. This disparity places regulated entities in an
untenable position by subjecting them to an imbalance of
power in these cases. To ensure fair treatment in this impor-
tant area of federal law, this Court should grant the writ of
certiorari and determine whether the Christiansburg standard
should continue to be applied to the citizen suit fee-shifting
provisions of environmental statutes.
Respectfully submitted,
SANFORD M. STEIN
Counsel of Record
Leo P. Domsrowski
IAN J. McPHERON
WiLpMAN, Harro_p, ALLEN & Dixon
225 West Wacker Drive
Chicago, Illinois 60606-1229
(312) 201-2000
Counsel for Amici Curiae
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.