Opposition Brief — Mt. Hope Asphalt Corp. v. Zagata

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(4) No. 98-595 F L E DB

IN THE NOV 6 - 1996

Supreme Court of the Ur ited States"

October Term 1998

MT.HOPE ASPHALT CORP., a/k/a MOUNT HOPE ASPHALT CORP., and

BARBARA PETROSKY, as Executrix of the Estate of Frank Petrosky,

Petitioners,

-V .*

MICHAEL ZAGATA, Commissioner of the New York State Department of

Environmental Conservation and the NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSERVATION,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT, APPELLATE

DIVISION, SECOND DEPARTMENT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO THE PETITION

FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

DENNIS C. VACCO

Attorney General of the State of New York

BARBARA G. BILLETT Attorney for Respondents

Solicitor General 120 Broadway

New York, NY 10271

JOHN W. MCCONNELL (212) 416-8484

Deputy Solicitor General

NORMAN SPIEGEL*

JOHN GIBSON

Assistant Attorneys General

Of Counsel

*Counsel of Record

THE REPORTER COMPANY, Printers and Publishers, Inc.

181 Delaware Street, Walton, NY 13856—800-252-7181

(4875 — 1998)

Printed on Recycled Paper

i

QUESTION PRESENTED

Whether certiorari should be granted to examine petitioners'

claims that the State's issuance of a temporary operating license

for asphalt production using contaminated soil from certain New

York oil spills violated the Commerce and Equal Protection

(lauses, where: (1) petitioners voluntarily proposed such terms

to address the regulators' environmental concerns over the

quality of its production process and to obtain a temporary

operating permit; (2) the State does not impose such source

restrictions on license applicants by statute, regulation, or

policy; (3) petitioners' permanent license application was

ultimately denied on other grounds, including falsification of

records and use of undocumented contaminated soil; and (4)

petitioners' constitutional challenge to the terms of the tempo-

rary license was first raised four years after its issuance and

following its expiration.

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Question Prescamted: os éisins vis iced scree sew ae et ade i

Table of AnmQROrtIne 23i56.6660.65 6 ise e le os Halwa dee bs iii

Ontnions Beha 6.6.35 cise ed Ss CARRE eee b ae eee 2

Jurisdiction 6d Sisk he dain a ee he sone wks eee bes 2

Counterstatemiont OF Gre Cate ook cies cere vestesdivees 2

ARGUMENT

IN THE ABSENCE OF A SUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUT-

IONAL ISSUE OR ANY CONFLICT BETWEEN THE

DECISION OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION AND THE

DECISIONS OF THIS COURT OR THE FEDERAL COURTS

OF APPEAL, NO REASON EXISTS FOR THE GRANT OF A

WRIT OF CERTIORARI IN THIS MATTER ............. 5

Concehee 66 5 ee ees inn 8 4 eee oe hs 9

Moe we tS ee ee oe ee po Be OF ae tS x

= 5

ill

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases Page

Bitondo v. State of New York, 182 A.D.2d 948 (3rd nies

Brey Orit Fier er eee eee eee ee 7

C.&A. Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, 511 U.S.

ED. cnc cdcadanvesaasebersrneas innate 6

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975) ............. 6

Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938) ............--. 6

Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1985) ............-+4-- 8

Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137 (1969) ...... 7,8

Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261 (1984) ..............-. 7

United States Constitution

Commerce CHSC nic cc ccc ccc ccc ccccccccees 5, 7,8

Equal Protection Clause ...........6+eeeeeeeeeeees 5,8

United States Statutes

Teese ene pedecorsaceceseses 5

New York Statutes and Regulations

Civil Practice Law and Rules §214 ............-.-4-- 7

PE Souda ea vases oes 5

No. 98-595

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1998

MT.HOPE ASPHALT CORP., a/k/a MOUNT HOPE

ASPHALT CORP., and BARBARA PETROSKY, as Executrix

of the Estate of Frank Petrosky,

Petitioners,

MICHAEL ZAGATA, Commissioner of the New York State

Department of Environmental Conservation and the NEW

YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL

CONSERVATION,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE SUPREME COURT,

APPELLATE DIVISION, SECOND DEPARTMENT OF THE STATE OF

NEW YORK

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO THE PETITION FOR A

WRIT OF CERTIORARI

OPINIONS BELOW

Respondents adopt the statement of opinions below set

forth in the petition for a writ of certiorari (Pet. 1).'

JURISDICTION

Respondents adopt the statement of jurisdiction set forth

in the petition for a writ certiorari (Pet. 1).

Counterstatement of the Case

A. Issuance ofa Temporary Air Emissions Permit and the

Denial of Permanent Operating Permit

In August 1990, petitioner Mt. Hope Asphalt Corp., a

manufacturer of asphalt, sought authorization from respondent

New York State Department of Environmental Conservation

("NYSDEC") to utilize petroleum contaminated soil ("PCS") as

an aggregate to produce asphalt at its facility in Calverton, New

York (AT1379, 1485). PCS is scil contaminated with virgin

petroleum and no other hazardous substances, typically the

result of accidental spills trom fuel trucks or leakage at gasoline

stations. Previously, Mt. Hope's production process, and all

other asphalt production permitted in New York State, employed

virgin petroleum and clean soil.

Petitioners’ proposal raised a number of significant public

health and environmental concerns: it is quite difficult to

' Numbers in parentheses preceded by "Pet." refer to pages in the petition

for a writ of certiorari in No. 98-595. Numbers in parentheses preceded by

"A" and "AT" refer respectively to pages in Appellants’ Appendix and the

Administrative Transcript submitted to the Appellate Division.

3

distinguish PCS from soils contaminated with waste oil and

other hazardous substances; heating soil contaminated with

hazardous substances during the production of asphalt could

release harmful products into the ambient air; storage of such

contaminated soil at the Mt. Hope facility could threaten the

underlying aquifer system, a sole source of drinking water,

without proper controls, the proposed operation could become

a means for the illegal disposal of hazardous wastes.

Aware of the environmental concerns and desirous of

addressing them in an economically feasible manner, Mt. Hope

proposed that it employ only PCS removed from certain spill

sites within New York State, assigned a NYSDEC Spill Number

and made the subject of a spill report. By this means, NYSDEC

could more easily assure that the PCS was contaminated only

with virgin petroleum and no other contaminants (AT104-105,

AT1525-1527, 1550, A240). Characterizing this restriction as a

"self-imposed condition," Mt. Hope inserted it into its permit

application to NYSDEC (A243, "Overview".

In August 1991, NYSDEC issued a one-year interim air

permit, including the PCS limitation, allowing Mt. Hope to test

the manufacturing process including its pollution control

technology. As part of its one year interim permit, Mt. Hope was

required to maintain and submit quarterly a log of all PCS

deliveries received at the facility (A317-331).

In June 1992, Mt. Hope requested both a one-month

extension of its permit and a permit modification that would

allow it to utilize PCS from New Jersey during the one-month

period (A335, AT1455). NYSDEC granted the extension, but

because Mt. Hope proposed no means by which NYSDEC could

confirm that the New Jersey PCS was contaminated solely by

virgin petroleum and not by other hazardous substances, the

agency did not modify the permit (A338). Mt. Hope did not

object to or otherwise challenge this determination.

4

In January 1993, NYSDEC issued an administrative

consent order allowing Mt. Hope to continue its operations on

a temporary basis pending consideration of its application for a

permanent operating permit. (A156-170).

Thereafter, NYSDEC became award that Mt. Hope

maintained false logs, submitted false reports, fabricated

NYSDEC spill numbers, and utilized PCS unauthorized under

its temporary operating permit on thirty-six occasions between

November 1991 and September 1992. On September 15, 1993,

NYSDEC denied Mt. Hope's application for a permanent

operating permit, withdrew Mt. Hope's temporary operating

authority, and, shortly thereafter, sought civil penalties for this

malfeasance.

Following an eleven-day administrative hearing and the

issuance of a sixty-three page hearing report, the Commissioner

of NYSDEC accepted an administrative law judge's

recommendations and determined, inter alia, that Mt. Hope: (1)

received and processed 36 shipments of contaminated soil from

sites in New Jersey totaling some eighty-eight thousand tons; (2)

falsified records by inserting in its Log Book fabricated

NYSDEC Spill Numbers for each of those shipments; and (3)

submitted a falsified laboratory report with respect to the

contaminates in the PCS used at its facility. Based on these and

other findings, the Commissioner determined that Mt. Hope and

its President Frank Petrosky were "unsuitable and unfit" to hold

NYSDEC permits, denied their permit application for a

certificate to operate, and assessed $73,400 in civil penalties

against Mt. Hope.

5

B. The Proceeding and Action in State Court -

On November 2, 1995, petitioners commenced a

proceeding and action before New York State Supreme Court,

Nassau County, asserting claims under, inter alia, the

Commerce Clause, the Equal Protection Clause, and 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983, and seeking to set aside the Commissioner's

determination and remove the self-imposed PCS permit

restriction. Following removal of the matter to the Appellate

Division, Second Department, pursuant to New York Civil

Practice Law and Rules §7804(g), that court upheld the

Commissioner's determination in a Decision and Judgment

dated March 16, 1998. The Appellate Division found that the

Commissioner's determination was supported by substantial

evidence in the record and that petitioners' other contentions,

implicitly including their fully briefed Commerce Clause and

equal protection claims, were "without merit" (Pet. la-3a).

The New York State Court of Appeals denied petitioners’

motion for leave to appeal by order dated July 9, 1998. (Pet.

124a). Mt. Hope subsequently filed a petition for a writ of

certiorari which was docketed by this Court on October 8, 1998.

ARGUMENT

IN THE ABSENCE OF A SUBSTANTIAL CONSTITUTIONAL

ISSUE OR ANY CONFLICT BETWEEN THE DECISION OF

THE APPELLATE DIVISION AND THE DECISIONS OF THIS

COURT OR THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEAL, NO

REASON EXISTS FOR THE GRANT OF A WRIT OF

CERTIORARI IN THIS MATTER

The petition for certiorari should be denied because it fails

to raise a substantial constitutional issue worthy of this Court's

review and raises no conflict between the decision of the

Appellate Division and the holdings of this Court or other

6

Federal courts. On the contrary, the Commissioner's

determination in the instant matter, subsequently confirmed by

the Appellate Division, correctly denied petitioners’ permit

application on ground which petitioners have conveniently

failed to address in their petition -- that Mt. Hope had falsified

records, failed to disclose the source of its production materials,

and demonstrated unsuitability to conduct the activities

authorized under the permit (Pet. 7a-11a). Moreover, the PCS

limitation here challenged was originally proposed by petitioners

to advance their own purposes, was set forth in a temporary

permit which has long expired, and had a negligible effect on

interstate commerce. Finally, petitioners' constitutional claims

are barred by relevant statutes of limitations.

The record in this matter clearly demonstrates that the

permit requirement calling for Mt. Hope to utilize PCS only

from sites assigned a NYSDEC Spill Number, inserted at

petitioners' written request and characterized by petitioners in

their permit application as a "self-imposed condition" (A239,

243, 249, 259), was designed to address the State's concern that

only soil contaminated with virgin petroleum and no other

hazardous substances be utilized in petitioners’ asphalt

production process (AT 1452-1454). Such a business decision by

an experienced corporation, designed to minimize its costs of

ascertaining and demonstrating the quality of its materials,

represents a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent waiver of any

conceivable claim to use of out-of-state material and raises no

constitutional concerns. See, Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458,

468-69 (1938) (circumstances evidencing an "intentional

relinquishment of a known right or privilege" constitute waiver);

Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975).

Contrary to petitioners’ contention (Pet. 8), this case does

not involve flow control laws comparable to those in C. & A.

Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown; nor does it involve

discrimination against environmentally sensitive materials

7

originating beyond a state's borders (Pet. 12). New York State

has neither statute nor regulation nor policy prohibiting the

importation of out-of-state PCS. Nor does the State bar use of

out-of-state PCS in asphalt production. Indeed, petitioners

concede that New York has granted at least one permit for PCS

originating in New Jersey (Pet. 18-19) -- provided that the

source of the PCS had been inspected by the New Jersey

Department of Environmental Protection. As long as the.

permittee could reasonably show that the PCS contained only

virgin petroleum and was not contaminated by other hazardous

substances, its use might be permissible without regard to its

state of origin.

In any event, petitioners' Commerce Clause and equal

protection challenges to NYSDEC's issuance of the August 1991

permit, raised for the first time at the commencement of this

proceeding and action in Novemter 1995, were time-barred

under even the longest state law statute of limitations

conceivably applicable to such claims. Wilson v. Garcia, 471

U.S.-261 (1984) ("most appropriate" period of limitations

provided by state law must be applied in Section 1983 actions),

New York Civil Practice Law and Rules § 214 (three year

statute of limitations to recover damages for injury to property);

see also, New York Environmental Conservation Law §19-

0511(2)(b) (60-day statute of limitations for challenges to permit

conditions); Bitondo v. State of New York, 182 A.D.2d 948, 950-

51 (3d Dept. 1992)(same).

Moreover, the PCS limitation contained in petitioners’

temporary license imposed, at the very worst, a small and

incidental burden on interstate commerce that is unworthy of

this Court's review. It is well established that the Commerce

Clause is not violated by a restriction which serves an important

public health purpose and poses a relatively small incidental

burden on interstate commerce. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397

U.S. 137, 142 (1969). This Court has consistently recognized

8

that "the States retain authority under their general police

powers to regulate matters of ‘legitimate local concern,' even

though interstate commerce may be affected." Maine v. Taylor,

477 U.S. 131, 138 (1985) (citation omitted). State regulations

that "burden" interstate transactions only incidentally raise

Commerce Clause concerns solely if such burdens are "clearly

excessive in relation to the putative local benefits." Pike v.

Bruce Church, Inc., at 142. In the instant matter, the self-

imposed limitation on use of in-state PCS, intended by a single

manufacturer to allow that State to ascertain the quality of their

production materials, had a minimal effect on commerce and a

substantial public benefit, and presents no matter of

constitutional concern. Significantly, there is nothing in the

record to suggest even remotely that NYSDEC would have been

indisposed to adopt any alternative effective method of assuring

PCS quality.

Finally, petitioners have conceded explicitly that the

record in this matter does not support their claim under the

Equal Protection Clause (Pet. 5, 16). Indeed, evidence in the

record demonstrates that the State treated Mt. Hope in the same

manner as other similarly situated asphalt producers: granting

permits to the extent that the permittee could reasonable show

that the PCS was not contaminated with other hazardous

substances.

In sum, the agency determination in this matter, and the

Appellate Division holding confirming that determination, were

eminently correct in all respects; petitioners' constitutional

claims were properly dismissed; and this matter raises no issues

worthy of this Court's review.

CONCLUSION

The Petition For a Writ of Certiorari Should Be

Denied.

Dated: New York, New York

November 6, 1998

Respectfully submitted,

DENNIS C. VACCO

Attorney General of the

State of New York

Attorney for Respondents

BARBARA G. BILLETT

Solicitor General

JOHN W. MCCONNELL

Deputy Solicitor General

NORMAN SPIEGEL*

JOHN GIBSON

Assistant Attorneys General

of Counsel

*Counsel of Record

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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