Opposition Brief — Mayco Oil & Chemical Co. v. Transtech Industries, Inc.
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No. 93-960. “) | RITE
ja 2 @ 1994
In The '
Supreme Court of the United ‘Statés wie CLERK |
October Term, 1993
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MAYCO OIL & CHEMICAL COMPANY; AT&T TECHNOLO-
GIES, INC., BY ITS SUCCESSOR AMERICAN TELEPHONE
AND TELEGRAPH CO.; BIOCRAFT LABORATORIES, INC.;
CHESEBROUGH-POND’S USA CO.; CPC INTERNATIONAL,
INC., INCLUDING BEST FOODS DIVISION AND PENICK
CORPORATION, SUCCESSOR TO S.B. PENICK COMPANY;
FLUID PACKAGING CO., INC.; FMC CORPORATION;
GANES CHEMICALS, INC.; SIEGFRIED CHEMICAL; GEN-
ERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY; HULS AMERICA, INC.; IBM
CORPORATION; J.T. BAKER, INC.; LEVER BROTHERS COM-
PANY; MARISOL, INC.; MOBILE OIL CORPORATION; PROC-
TER & GAMBLE MANUFACTURING CO.; PHELPS DODGE
CORPORATION; RUSSELL REID COMPANY; SAFT NIFE
INC.; SMITHKLINE BEECHAM CORPORATION; SYBKON
TRANSITION CORP.; SYBRON CHEMICALS, INC., INCLUD-
ING AS TRADE NAMES GAMLEN CHEMICAL AND TAN-
ATEX; WITCO CORPORATION,
Petitioners,
TRANSTECH INDUSTRIES, INC.; KIN-BUC, INC.;
FILCREST REALTY, INC.,
Respondents.
+
On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari
To The United States Court Of Appeals
For The Third Circuit
*
RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
*
DanTE J. ROMANINI*
RicHARD M. CoHEN
Koz.ov, SEATON, ROMANINI &
Brooks, P.C.
1940 Route 70 East, Suite 200
Cherry Hill, New Jersey 08003
(609) 424-8200
Counsel for Respondents
*Counsel of Record
COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964
OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831
QUESTION PRESENTED
Should a petition for a writ of certiorari be granted
pursuant to the collateral order doctrine based upon a
partial settlement under Section 113(f)(2) of the Compre-
hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and
Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2), which does not pro-
vide a full release of liability or protection from claims for
contribution to Petitioners.
RULE 29.1 STATEMENT
Respondent Transtech Industries, Inc., is a publicly
owned company that is neither a wholly nor partially
owned subsidiary of any other entity, nor does it have
any subsidiaries that are not wholly owned.
Respondent Kin-Buc, Inc., is a wholly owned subsid-
iary of Respondent Transtech Industries, Inc., and has no
subsidiaries.
Respondent Filcrest Realty, Inc., is a wholly owned
subsidiary of Respondent Transtech Industries, Inc., and
has no subsidiaries.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ey Eg a i
CE ey ii
ee 8g. Fr iV
RPP MRMMEIEMED MUEEMIOE 5 wcrc ccccccccccccccceccsesceces 1
ES is 5 ody bi dk 6604666060 nd dda cncveos 1
ys Ee hs) 2
waranmemenren Gr Bets CASE... ccc ccc wcccccccces 2
A. The Action which Resulted in Petitioners’
Consent Decree with the United States .... 2
nn MIN PUEIIOL Ss cnc cecaccssccescccecess 5
REASONS FOR DENYING CERTIORARI........... 7
1. The Consent Decree Does Not Provide a
Final Release of Liability to Petitioners and
Therefore Does Not Warrant Review Under
the Collateral Order Doctrine .............. 7
2. The Consent Decree at Issue Does Not Pro-
vide Protection from Respondents’ Claims
for Contribution as Those Claims are Not
“Matters Addressed in the Settlement” ..... u
APPENDIX
The Consent Decree, filed August 1, 1988........ A-1
District Court Opinion Approving the Consent
AR ee A-28
iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
Cases
Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541
A Vi Sey heel Oe 7
Denver v. Adolph Coors Co., 829 F. Supp. 340 (D.
i EE Aeon « Vnc vada oh ca eee naa aeeA heres eas 11
Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 993
F.2d 755 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct.
rk re er ek uh 8
Forbus v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 958 F.2d 1036 (11th
Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 415 (1992)........ 8
Grillet v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 927 F.2d 217 (5th Cir.
og ) Re PEE errr re rs Pn err eee 8
Janneh v. GAF Corp., 887 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1989),
cert. denied, 498 U.S. 865 (1990) .................... 8
Towers Hotel Corp. v. Rimmel, 871 F.2d 766 (8th Cir.
a toa ns hors CASK oes Makan aie oa renee 8
U.S. v. Cannon's Engineering Corp., 899 F.2d 79 (1st
2 |: errr rer rrr errr Sry rrr rey 10, 11
U.S. v. Rohm & Haas, 721 F. Supp. 666, 675 (D.N.J.
APP a rind eae iy errata pares pera Pe |p aere 11
United States v. Absolute Fire Protection Co., Inc.,
Civ. Action No. 88-2087 (D.N.J., filed October
Sh ca ake veda Cabs s CELE TOREITR |
StaTuTORY PROVISIONS
Be ae aid d puke a badd ph ekan Kanes eax ene bade 2
, ek me yo: per re yr eye rarer 1, 6
gk ae De Pe rere Pr ren terror Ter rrr 2
ein ome eke Te ree «+++ passim
OPINIONS BELOW
In addition to the opinions of the courts below in the
instant action which were provided by Petitioners,
reprinted in the appendix (“A”) hereto at A28, is the
unreported decision of the United States District Court
for the District of New Jersey, captioned United States v.
Absolute Fire Protection Co., Inc., Civ. Action No. 88-2087
(D.N.J., filed October 18, 1988), providing judicial
approval of the Consent Decree which Petitioners claim
affords them the right to take this interlocutory appeal.
Consideration of this opinion (as well as the actual Con-
sent Decree reprinted in the appendix hereto at Al) is
essential to determine the “matters addressed in the set-
tlement,” as they pertain to 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2).
-¢
JURISDICTION
Respondents maintain that the jurisdictional require-
ments of this Court have not been satisfied. The District
Court refused to certify this case for interlocutory review
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), finding no substantial
ground for difference of opinion and holding the instant
Consent Decree was “not intended to cover this contribu-
tion suit by plaintiffs.” (61a).
Subsequently, Petitioners sought appellate review
pursuant to the collateral order doctrine. The Third Cir-
cuit denied jurisdiction, declaring that Petitioners’ appeal
is not “distinct from the underlying merits of the law-
suit,” and Petitioners’ “contentions can be raised on
direct appeal after final judgment.” (17a).
¢
i
STATUTES INVOLVED
Respondents concur with Petitioners that the statutes
at issue are: 28 U.S.C. § 1291; and the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act (“CERCLA”) § 113(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2).
— @ ——_
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case involves the disposal of hazardous waste at
the Kin-Buc Landfill (“Landfill” or “Site”), located in
Edison, New Jersey. In 1980, the United States Environ-
mental Protection Agency (“EPA”) undertook certain
environmental activities at the Landfill. Thereafter, on
September 23, 1983, EPA issued an Administrative Order
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (Docket No. II-
CERCLA-30102), requiring that a number of private par-
ties, including Respondents, take additional environmen-
tal actions. As a result of Respondents’ compliance with
that administrative order, EPA was able to conclude its
direct activities at the Site. Respondents continue to con-
duct cleanup activities related to the environmental reme-
diation at the Landfill
A. The Action which Resulted in Petitioners’ Consent
Decree with the United States
In 1984, EPA sought recoupment for the costs it had
incurred as a result of activities it had undertaken at the
Landfill. Failing to obtain reimbursement from Respon-
dents, EPA issued demand letters to approximately 360
parties. On May 16, 1988, the United States filed an
action, captioned United States of America v. Absolute Fire
setae etme
Protection Company, Inc., No. 88-2087, seeking these costs
Thereafter, Petitioners and EPA entered into a consent
decree (the “Consent Decree”) concluding that litigation
(Al)
The Consent Decree provides that the “Basic Settle-
ment Amount” was “the total amount of ali the Past
Response Costs incurred by the United States and is
intended to reimburse the United States for any and all
such Past Response Costs.” (A18-19). This payment was
specifically limited as satisfaction of the United States’
“Past Response Costs and Past Response Actions and for
iny administrative costs and civil penalties which may
have accrued prior to April 30, 1987, and for interest on
such sums, which may have accrued prior to September
22, 1987, with regard to the Kin-Buc Landfill.” (A20)
Nothing in the Consent Decree provides Petitioners
with a complete release regarding their liability for fur
ther environmental remediation of the Landfill nor for
costs incurred by other private parties. Likewise, the
Consent Decree does not provide any protection from
third-party claims for contribution. The only provision in
the Consent Decree regarding other environmental!
response costs states that the United States would seek
tuture response costs it incurred, if any, from other poten-
tially responsible parties (identified therein as the Non-
settling Parties) before going back to the Petitioners (the
Settling Parties)
[I]In the event the United States has made all
reasonable efforts to recover from the Nonset-
tling Parties the amount of Future Response
Costs or such other sums at the Kin-Buc Land-
fill, pursuant to relevant statutes and authori-
ties, the United States may commence an
administrative or judicial civil action against the
Settling Parties to recover the amount of those
Future Response Costs or such other sums it has
been unable, after having made all reasonable
efforts, to recover from Nonsettling Parties.
(A22).
Pursuant to the CERCLA requirement for approval of
a consent decree, the District Court Judge for the District
of New Jersey, the Honorable Alfred J. Lechner, delin-
eated the matters addressed in the settlement:
Under the agreement, the two hundred twenty
six defendants in this case agree to pay
$4,980,398, which represents the response costs
incurred through April 30, 1987, plus interest
through September 22, 1987 (“past response
costs”). The delivery of this payment will extin-
ghish [sic] the United States’ claims for past
response costs against the settling parties. (A31,
citation omitted).
By contrast, Judge Lechner specifically found that the
Consent Decree did nof release Petitioners from future
costs incurred at the Landfill:
According to the consent decree, the settling
parties are not released from any liability with
respect to any actions or costs incurred by the
United States after April 30, 1987 (“future
response actions” or “future response costs”).
(A32, citation omitted).
Furthermore, the District Court Judge determined that
the Consent Decree did not bar a contribution action by a
private party for its independently incurred costs:
|
As pointed out by the Government, the
decree only requires the Government to oppose
joinder when it is sought in the context of a
direct enforcement action brought by the Gov-
ernment against a non-settling PRP [potentially
responsible party]. Thus, as long as Earthline [a
Non-settling Party] complies with its legal obli-
gations and no action is brought against it by
the United States, paragraph 8(c) will not apply
and Earthline may seek contributions from the
settling parties without opposition from the
Government. (A40, emphasis supplied).
No appeal from Judge Lechner’s interpretation of the
Consent Decree was ever taken by any party, including
Petitioners.
B. The Instant Action
On August 24, 1990, Respondents filed the instant
action claiming, inter alia, a right to contribution from 445
defendants, including Petitioners, for the costs they
incurred related to the environmental remediation of the
Landfill. None of those costs pertain to those incurred by
the United States which were addressed in the Consent
Decree.
On April 1, 1991, Petitioners sought dismissal of
Respondents’ complaint, claiming that by operation of
CERCLA § 113(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2), they were
absolved of all further liability at the Site. That section
provides:
A person who has resolved its liability to
the United States or a State in an administrative
or judicially approved settlement shall not be
liable for claims for contribution regarding mat-
ters addressed in the settlement. Such settle-
ment does not discharge any of the other
potentially liable persons unless its terms so
provide, but it reduces the potential liability of
others by the amount of the settlement.
42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2).
The District Court below, the Honorable Harold A.
Ackerman, held that the Consent Decree “only covers the
past response costs and past response actions incurred by
the United States.” (42a). Judge Ackerman determined
that, in accord with the District Judge’s approval of the
Consent Decree, Respondents’ contribution claim against
Petitioners was permitted:
Moreover, in response to a concern by a non-
settling party, Judge Lechner held that “as long
as (a non-settling party) complies with its legal
obligations . . . [it] may seek contributions from
the settling parties.” Id. at 17. [A40] A judge
approving a consent decree in a CERCLA case is
mandated to take into account the equities of
the situation. He or she cannot approve a con-
sent decree that is simply unjust or unfair. Given
Judge Lechner’s own equitable interpretation of
the decree he approved, it would be illogical for
this court to hold that as a matter of law, a
contrary, inequitable interpretation, governs.
[39a].
On August 13, 1992, Petitioners sought reconsidera-
tion or, in the alternative, certification for interlocutory
review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). In a second unre-
ported opinion, the District Court flatly rejected Peti-
tioners’ motion and refused to certify this matter for
interlocutory appeal, stating that the facts “clearly show
that the Consent Decree was not intended to cover this
contribution suit by plaintiffs.” (61a).
Despite the District Court’s refusal to certify this
matter, Petitioners, nevertheless, sought appellate review,
this time pursuant to the narrow exception to the final
judgment rule known as the “collateral order doctrine”
first delineated in the Court’s decision in Cohen v. Benefi-
cial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The Third
Circuit, however, also rejected Petitioners’ attempt at
appellate jurisdiction stating that it had “substantial
doubts .. . that the issues raised in defense of appellate
jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine are dis-
tinct from the underlying merits of the lawsuit,” and
uetermined that “it is quite clear that the settlor-defen-
dants’ contentions can be raised on direct appeal after
final judgment.” (17a). Petitioners’ request for mandamus
was also denied by the Third Circuit for failure to assert a
cognizable basis for relief.
REASONS FOR DENYING CERTIORARI
1. The Consent Decree Does Not Provide a Final
Release of Liability to Petitioners and Therefore
Does Not Warrant Review Under the Collateral
Order Doctrine
Petitioners have provided no issue that merits review
by this Court. Both decisions by the trial court below, as
well as the opinion of the District Court approving the
Consent Decree, are specific in holding that Petitioners
did not obtain a final release for their liability related to
o8$
the Kin-Buc Landfill. Thus, unlike the case cited by Peti-
tioners, Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 993
F.2d 755 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 379
(November 1, 1993), this case is distinguishable. Accord-
ingly, even if this Court were to extend the collateral
order doctrine to include settlement agreements, it would
not be applicable to the petition herein.
In each case which addresses the relationship
between the collateral order doctrine and a settlement
agreement, the determination has centered on whether a
party has the right not to go to trial by virtue of that
agreement. See Forbus v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 958 F.2d
1036 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 412 (1992)
(releasor’s retention of benefits constituted a ratification,
thereby releasing defendant from all liability); Grillet v.
Sears, Roebuck & Co., 927 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1991) (ratifica-
tion of release affording party right not to go to trial
reviewable under collateral order doctrine); Janneh v. GAF
Corp., 87 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 865
(1990) (enforceable settlement includes bargained-for
right to avoid trial, reviewable under the collateral order
doctrine); Towers Hotel Corp. v. Rimmel, 871 F.2d 766 (8th
Cir. 1989) (settlement between the parties provided, inter
alia, dismissal of all litigation). In each of these cases,
sustaining those settlements resulted in the dismissal of
the underlying action because all liability had been
resolved by the settlement itself.
Here, Respondents have shown that the Consent
Decree does not provide Petitioners with a full release for
their liability. In fact, in the Decree, the Government
expressly reserved its right to hold Petitioners liable for
future costs related to the cleanup of the Landfill:
[Ijt is the intention of the United States to retain
its legal rights to seek further relief from the
settling Parties as defined and limited by the
provisions herein, (1) from any and all Future
Response Costs, and (2) for injunctive or other
relief which may be available at law or equity in
connection with the Kin-Buc Landfill[.]
(A17-18).
Clearly, Petitioners’ attempt to link the instant matter
to the Desktop case is misplaced for it is evident that
whatever result is reached in Desktop it will have no
bearing on the instant case. To suggest that the Consent
Decree provides a final settlement of Petitioners’ liability
and resolves this matter is indisputably in error and over-
reaching. Therefore, Respondents maintain that there is
no basis, in law or in fact, for Petitioners’ request for
certiorari based on the collateral order doctrine.
2. The Consent Decree at Issue Does Not Provide Pro-
tection from Respondents’ Claims for Contribution
as Those Claims are Not “Matters Addressed in the
Settlement”
Petitioners claim that pursuant to the Consent Decree
they were afforded protection from third-party claims for
contribution. However, this issue is not properly before
the Court, as it was not ruled upon by the Third Circuit.
Thus, even if this Court does decide that the instant
matter is entitled to interlocutory review pursuant to the
collateral order doctrine, Respondents maintain that this
case should be remanded to the Third Circuit for a deter-
mination on the merits.
10
Nevertheless, this claim is clearly without merit, as
shown by this brief response. First, nowhere in the Con-
sent Decree does there appear any language affording
protection from claims for contribution. As was correctly
observed by the District Court below, it is the Consent
Decree that determines the scope of protection provided
a €
to Petitioners, “ ‘A person who has resolved its liability to
the United States or a State in an administrative or judi-
cially approved settlement cannot be liable for claims for
contribution regarding matters addressed in the settle-
ont
ment. (56a, emphasis in original).
Further, Judge Lechner, the District Court Judge
approving the Consent Decree, specifically held at the
time the settlement was approved that an objecting Non-
settling Party “may seek contributions from the settling
parties. ... ” (A40). Thus the Judge charged with the
responsibility of determining whether the Consent
Decree was reasonable and fair found that the Consent
Decree did not afford such contribution protection as now
claimed by Petitioners. Compare U.S. v. Cannon's Engineer-
ing Corp., 899 F.2d 79 (1st Cir. 1990) (court must deter-
mine whether a proposed consent decree is procedurally
fair, substantively fair and reasonable).
Finally, while not disclosed by Petitioners, the United
States Department of Justice filed an amicus curiae brief
with the Third Circuit opposing Petitioners’ assertion that
the Consent Decree bars Respondents’ claim for contribu-
tion. The Government's position is revealing and persua-
sive as it was the other party to the Consent Decree and
therefore has knowledge regarding the actual intent of
that document.
11
Ultimately, Petitioners are attempting to entice the
Court to grant certiorari on the basis of whether or not
§ 113(f)(2) provides “immunity” to suit. However, to
reach that issue, a settlement pursuant to Section 113(f)(2)
of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) must have addressed
the issue of Respondents’ claims. Unquestionably, where
a consent decree does not provide for protection from
those claims, no “immunity” can exist.
As further proof of Respondents’ position, other
decisions which Petitioners have pointed to approving
settlements pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) are clearly
distinguishable from the case at bar as each explicitly
refers to the grant of contribution protection. See, e.g.,
Denver v. Adolph Coors Co., 829 F. Supp. 340 (D. Col. 1993)
(decision approved settlement, barred claims for contri-
bution and determined non-settlors’ share of liability);
U.S. v. Cannon’s Engineering Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 85 (1st Cir.
1990) (settling parties “were released outright from all
liability” and “were also exempted from suits for contri-
bution”); U.S. v. Rohm & Haas, 721 F. Supp. 666, 675
(D.N.J. 1989) (under consent decree’s provisions, non-
settling defendants barred from seeking contribution
from any of the settling defendants).
Looking to the language of the instant Consent
Decree, the District Court Judge approving that Decree
and the interpretation given to that Decree by the Gov-
ernment itself, it is obvious that Petitioners were never
afforded protection from Respondents’ claim for contri-
bution. As a result, Respondents maintain that interlocu-
tory review is not appropriate as Respondents’ claim for
12
~
contribution is not a “matter[] addressed in the settle-
ment” as required under Section 113(f)(2) of CERCLA, 42
U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2).
= -@—
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing, review by this Court is
unnecessary and inappropriate. The Consent Decree
upon which the Petition tor a Writ of Certiorari is based
provides Petitioners neither a full release of liability nor
protection against Respondents’ claim for contribution.
Thus, unlike cases argued by Petitioners in support of
their request for interlocutory review pursuant to the
collateral order doctrine, the instant Consent Decree does
not afford Petitioners a right not to go to trial.
For all the foregoing reasons, Respondents respect-
fully request that the instant Petition for a Writ of Cer
tiorart be denied.
Respectfully submitted,
Dante J. ROMANINI*
RicHARD M. COHEN
Kozitov, SEATON, ROMANINI &
Brooks, P.C.
1940 Route 70 East
Suite 200
Cherry Hill, New Jersey 08003
(609) 424-8200
Counsel for Respondents
* Counsel of Record
Dated: January 18, 1994
A-l
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff,
V.
ABSOLUTE FIRE PROTECTION,
CO., INC., ACCURATE FORMING
DIVISION TYCO LABORATORIES,
ACTIVE OIL SERVICE, ADCHEM
CORP., AIR PRODUCTS AND
CHEMICALS, INC., BOC GROUP,
INC., f/k/a/ AIRCO, INC.,
ALCAN ALUMINUM CORP.
ALCOLAC, INC., GOULD, INC.,
as successor to ITE IMPERIAL
CORP., ALKON PRODUCTS
DIVISION, ALLIED-SIGNAL INC.,
as successor to ALLIED CORP. (f/
k/a/ ALLIED CHEMICAL CORP),
THE BENDIX CORP., and
SINCLAIR & VALENTINE CO.,
INC., and on behalf of its wholly-
owned subsidiaries UOP INC. and
BARON BLAKESLEE, INC,
PORTFOLIO ONE, INC. (f/k/a
CHEMLIME CORP.), successor to
ALMO ANTI-POLLUTION
SERVICES CORP., ALPHA
METALS INC., AMFRADA HESS
CORP., AMERICAN CYANAMID
CO., including its wholly-owned
subsidiary SHULTON, INC.,
tet ttt i i
CIVIL ACTION
NO. 88-2087
(AJL)
(Filed
Aug. 1, 1988)
BAXTER HEALTHCARE
CORPORATION, formerly
TRAVENOL LABORATORIES,
INC., successor to AMERICAN
HOSPITAL SUPPLY CORP.,
AMERICAN PRODUCTS
COMPANY, INC., AMERICAN
STANDARD INC., ASHLAND OIL,
INC., on behalf of its ASHLAND
CHEMICAL CO. and DREW
CHEMICAL CORP. divisions,
ASSOCIATED MARBLE CO.,
ASTRO PAK CORPORATION,
AUTOMATIC CONNECTOR INC.,
AVANTE PRODUCTS
CORPORATION, AXTON CROSS
COMPANY, INC., BASF CORP., as
successor in interest to BASF
WYANDOTTE CORP. and the
INMONT CORP., and on behalf of
its wholly-owned subsidiaries
FRITSCHE, DODGE AND OLCOTT
and KNOLL PHARMACEUTICALS,
THE BATES MANUFACTURING
CO., BEACON FAST FREIGHT
CO., INC., BECTON, DICKINSON
AND COMPANY, BIDDLE
SAWYER CORP., BENJAMIN
MOORE & CO., BIOCRAFT
LABORATORIES, INC., BORDEN,
INC., BORG-WARNER
CHEMICALS, INC., BOROUGH OF
WALLINGTON, UNISYS CORP.
(formerly BURROUGHS CORP.,
and successor to SPERRY CORP.),
mee ee a ee ee eee ee ee”
A-3
CPC INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
including its division BEST FOODS
and its wholly-owned subsidiary
PENICK CORP., successor to S.B.
PENICK AND CO., CARBOLINE
CO., on behalf of TOCH
BROTHERS, INC., CARPENTER
TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION,
HOECHST CELANESE CORP., on
behalf of its divisions, CELANESE
COATINGS CO. and CELANESE
RESEARCH CORP., CHEMICAL
LEAMAN TANK LINES INC.
(including VANGUARD
TRANSPORTATION, both
subsidiaries of CHEMICAL
LEAMAN CORP.), CIBA-GEIGY
CORP. (including TOMS RIVER
CHEMICAL CORP.), CLAIROL
INC., COCA-COLA FOODS, a
division of THE COCA-COLA CO.,
COLGATE-PALMOLIVE CO., CON-
LUX COATINGS, INC.,
CONTINENTAL CAN CO., INC.,
ICI AMERICAS INC. (successor to
CONVERTERS INK CO.), JOHN H.
COONEY, INC., a/k/a COONEY
CONSTRUCTION, COVINO’S
INDUSTRIAL DISPOSAL SERVICE,
INC., CRANE & CO., INC.,
CURTISS-WRIGHT CORP.,
DARWORTH CoO., DIVISION OF
ENSIGN-BICKFORD INDUSTRIES,
INC., DATA GENERAL CORP.,
tt
A-4
DELEET MERCHANDISING
CORP., OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAI
CORP., as successor to
OCCIDENTAL
ELECTROCHEMICALS CORP. (f,
k/a DIAMOND SHAMROCK
CHEMICALS CO.), THE DOW
CHEMICAL CO., including DOW
INDUSTRIAL SERVICES, DUBOIS
CHEMICALS, INC., E.l. DUPONT
DE NEMOURS AND CO., INC
(including CONOCO, INC.,
CONTINENTAL OIL,
CONTINENTAL CHEMICAL CO.,
and DUPONT-TAU
LABORATORIES), DURO-TEST
CORP., E.R. SQUIBB & SONS,
INC., BAROUH EATON ALLEN
CORP., EDAL INDUSTRIES, INC.,
BROWNING-FERRIS INDUSTRIES
OF ELIZABETH, NEW JERSEY,
INC., NIAGARA SANITATION
COMPANY, INC., as successor to
RAPID DISPOSAL SERVICE, INC.,
CECOS INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
ELMWOOD TANK & PIPING
CORP., ECUADORIAN LINE, INC.,
EXXON CORP., FMC CORP.,
FETTE FORD, INC., HEXCEL
CORP. (as successor to FINE
ORGANICS), OCCIDENTAL
CHEMICAL CORP., as successor to
FIRESTONE PLASTICS, FISHER
SCIENTIFIC CO., FLUID
PACKAGING CO., INC. (formerly
FLUID CHEMICAL CO., INC.),
FORD MOTOR CO.,
~— i i i i i
ee ee ee ee ee
FYN PAINT & LACQUER CO.,
GAF CORP., SYBRON
TRANSITION CORP. and SYBRON
CHEMICALS INC. (one or both
having done business as GAMLEN
CHEMICAL CO.), GANES
CHEMICALS, INC. (including its
wholly-owned subsidiary
SIGFRIED CHEMICALS), GATX
TERMINALS CORP., GENERAI
ELECTRIC CO., GENERAL
MOTORS CORP. (including its
DELCO REMY DIVISION),
GOODALL RUBBER CO., THE
GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO.,
GUARD ALL CHEMICAL CO.,,
INC., CHEVRON U.S.A. INC. (on
behalf of GULF OIL CORP.),
CHEVRON CHEMICAL CO. (on
behalf of KEWANEE INDUSTRIES,
INC. and its former divisions
BERKELEY CHEMICAL and
MILLMASTER CHEMICAL), H & S
CHEMICAL CO., HATCO
CHEMICAL DIVISION, HATFIELD
WIRE & CABLE DIVISION OF
CCX, INC., HERCULES, INC.
(including its wholly-owned
subsidiary HAVEG INDUSTRIES,
INC.), HI-PURE CHEMICALS,
INC., HOFFMAN-LA ROCHE
INC., HYDROCARBON
RESEARCH, INC., IBM CORP.,
INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS AND _ )
FRAGRANCES, INC., ITT )
CORPORATION (including its ITT
AVIONICS and DEFENSE )
COMMUNICATIONS divisions), '
ILFORD PHOTO CORP.
A-6
f/k/a ILFORD INC., SAFETY-
KLEEN ENVIROSYSTEMS CO. (on
behalf of INLAND CHEMICAL
CORP. and McKESSON
CORPORATION), INTERDATA
CORP., J.M. HUBER CORP., J.T.
BAKER, INC. (formerly J.T. BAKER
CHEMICAL CO.), JAMES P.
HORAN, INC., JOHN
DUSENBERRY CO., INC.,
JOHNSON & JOHNSON (on behalf
of its wholly-owned subsidiaries
PERSONAL PRODUCTS
COMPANY, ORTHO DIAGNOSTIC
SYSTEMS, INC., and ORTHO
PHARMACEUTICAL
CORPORATION), STROH
CONTAINER CO. (successer to
JOS. SCHLITZ BREWING CO.),
LUCAS INDUSTRIES INC.,
(successor to JOSEPH LUCAS
NORTH AMERICA, INC.), KTK
CORP., KAY-FRIES, INC., KEUFFEL
& ESSER CO., KOPPERS CO.,
INC., L.E. CARPENTER & CO.,
THE LAWRENCE McFADDEN
CO., LAWSON PRODUCTS, INC.,
LEHIGHTON ELECTRONICS,
INC., LEVER BROTHERS CO., and
on behalf of its affiliate
CHESEBOROUGH-PONDS, INC.,
LCP CHEMICALS AND PLASTICS,
INC. (formerly LINDEN
CHLORINE PRODUCTS), LINDEN
MOTOR FREIGHT CO., INC.,
M & T CHEMICALS, INC.,
i ee ee ee ee ee Le ee ee ee ee Le ee ee ee ee oe, ee Le Le ee ee Le ee Le Le Le ee oe
A-7
MASS |sic] & WALDSTEIN,
MALLINCKRODT INC., MANNON
EXCAVATING AND PAVING CO.,
INC., MARISOL, INC., THE
NUTRASWEET CO. (successor to
MATHESON GAS PRODUCTS,
INC.), JOHN MATTHEY, INC.
(successor to MATTHEY BISHOP,
INC.), MAYCO OIL & CHEMICAL,
THE MEARL CORPORATION,
MERCK & CO., INC., METRO OIL
& CHEMICAL CORP., MOBIL OIL
CORPORATION (including its
division MOBIL CHEMICAL CO.),
SPECTRASERV, INC. (f/k/a
MODERN TRANSPORTATION
CO.), MONMOUTH MEDICAL
CENTER, MONSANTO COMPANY,
MORTON THIOKOL, INC. (on
behalf of its divisions MORTON
CHEMICAL CO., VENTRON
CORP., and THIOKOL CHEMICAL
CO.), NL INDUSTRIES, INC.,
GENERAL CERAMICS, INC. (f/
k/a NATIONAL BERYLLIA
CORP.), NATIONAL GYPSUM CO.,
NATIONAL STARCH AND
CHEMICAL CORP., HIGH
VOLTAGE ENGINEERING CORP.
(successor to NATVAR CORP.),
NEPARA, INC., SAB NIFE, INC.,
f/k/a NIFE, INC., ADRON, INC.
(f/k/a NORDA, INC., and on
behalf of its wholly-owned
subsidiary ORBIS PRODUCTS
CORP.), NORTON & SON, INC.,
tte a a a ee ee ee ee
A-8
OAKITE PRODUCTS, INC. (on
behalf of its division OAKLEY
SERVICE CO.), THE OKONITE
CO., OLIN CORP. (including OLIN
CHEMICAL CORP. and PHILLIP
A. HUNT CHEMICAL) and on
behalf of WINCHESTER
REPEATING ARMS (f/k/a
WINCHESTER WESTERN),
PAQUET ONEIDA, INC. (as
successor to ONEIDA
PACKAGING), ORGANON, INC.,
THE ORMOND SHOPS, INC., PVO
INTERNATIONAL, INC., PUBLIC
SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS
CO., PQ CORPORATION (f/k/a
PHILADELPHIA QUARTZ),
PAMARCO INC., THE PENN
CENTRAL CORP. (including its
subsidiary GENERAL CABLE CO.),
PERK CHEMICAL CO., INC.,
PFIZER INC. (f/k/a CHARLES
PFIZER, INC.), and including its
division HOWMEDICA, PHELPS
DODGE CORP., PITNEY BOWES
INC., POLAROID CORPORATION,
POLYMER MATERIALS, INC.
(including POLYMER, INC.),
UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP.,
PRATT & WHITNEY GROUP,
PRINCETON NURSERIES,
PROCEDYNE CORP., THE
PROCTOR & GAMBLE
MANUFACTURING CO., QUAKER
CHEMICAL CORP., R.W. EAKEN,
INC., RADIAC RESEARCH CORP.,
ee
A-9
REAGENT CHEMICAL &
RESEARCH, THE GREYHOUND
CORP. (for REHEIS CHEMICAL
CO.), REICHHOLD CHEMICALS,
INC., REVERE COPPER & BRASS,
INC., REYNOLDS METALS CO.,
RHEEM MANUFACTURING CO.,
RIVERVIEW HOSPITAL, ROLLINS
ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES
(N.J.), INC., RUSSELL REID CO.,
RUSSELL-STANLEY CORP.,
RUTGERS-THE STATE
UNIVERSITY, RYCOLINE
PRODUCTS, INC., SANDOZ
CHEMICALS CORP. (successor to
COLORS AND CHEMICALS
DIVISION OF SANDOZ, INC.),
LEKSI, INC. (f/k/a SARTOMER
INDUSTRIES, INC.), SCHERING
CORP., SCOTT PAPER COMPANY,
SEALED AIR CORP., SEN-DURE
PRODUCTS INC., SETON HALL
UNIVERSITY, SHELL CHEMICAL
CO., SIKA CORP., SMITHKLINE
BECKMAN CORPORATION,
SOLVENTS RECOVERY SERVICE
OF NEW JERSEY, INC.,
SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA
CHEMICAL CO., INC., SAINT
BARNABAS MEDICAL CTR., A.E.
STALEY MANUFACTURING CO.,
on behalf of its STALEY
CHEMICAL DIVISION,
STANDARD TOOL &
MANUFACTURING CO.,
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A-10
THE STANLEY WORKS (as
successor to STANLEY-WETTY
INC.), STAUFFER MANAGEMENT
CO., successor to STAUFFER
CHEMICAL CO., STEPAN
COMPANY, SEQUA CORP.
(formerly SUN CHEMICAL CO.), —
TENNECO RESINS, INC.,
TEXACO, INC., TEXACO
BUTADIENE CO., formerly TEXAS-
U.S. CHEMICAL CO., TEXTRON,
INC., on behalf of its former
SPENCER-KELLOGG and
BOSTITCH DIVISIONS, UNITED
STATES METALS REFINING
COMPANY, SAFETY LIGHT CORP.
(f/k/a U.S. RADIUM), US
SAMICA CORP., UNION CARBIDE
CORP., UNIROYAL CHEMICAL
CO., INC. (as successor to THE
CHEMICAL BUSINESS OF
UNIROYAL, INC.), THE UPJOHN
CO., VINELAND CHEMICAL CO.,
INC., ARCO PETROLEUM
PRODUCTS (on behalf of
WILLIAM C. PULLEN, INC.),
COOPER INDUSTRIES, INC. (on
behalf of its subsidiary WAGNER
ELECTRIC CORP.), WALL
TRENDS, INC., WALTER KIDDE,
DIVISION OF KIDDE, INC., AT&T
TECHNOLOGIES, INC. (formerly
WESTERN ELECTRIC CO., INC.),
WESTERN UNION,
i Le La ee a a Le ee a a a a a a ee a ee
A-11
WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC
CORP., WHITE CHEMICAL CORP.,
WITCO CHEMICAL CORP., Z & W
ENTERPRISES, INC., ATI, INC., on
behalf of CHEMSPRAY, ASARCO,
INCORPORATED (f/k/a AMERI-
CAN SMELTING AND REFINING
CO., including its wholly-owned
subsidiary FEDERATED METALS
CORP.), RCA CORP., AKZO CHEMI-
CALS INC., on behalf of its division
INTERSTAB CHEMICALS (formerly
INTERSTAB CHEMICALS, INC.),
ECOLAB INC., successor to APO-
LLO TECHNOLOGIES, INC. (f/k/a
APOLLO CHEMICAL CO.), IMPE-
RIAL OIL COMPANY, INC., W.W.
ANDRESS COMPANY, GULTON
INDUSTRIES, INC., as successor to
GULTON BATTERY CORP.,
Defendants
'
ee meee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee See”
CONSENT DECREE
WHEREAS, the United States of America (“United
States”), at the request of the Administrator of the United
States Environmental Protection Agency (“Administra-
tor”), on May 16, 1988 filed a complaint in this matter
pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq.,
as Public Law No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613, (“CERCLA”) for
the recovery of all response costs that have been incurred
A-12
by the United States in response to alleged releases and
threatened releases of hazardous substances from the
Kin-Buc Ladfill [sic], located at 383 Meadow Road in
Edison, New Jersey; and
WHEREAS, the Administrator issued Findings of
Fact, Determination and Order on September 3, 1983
under authority of Section 106(a) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.
§ 9606(a), styled “IN THE MATTER OF SCIENTIFIC,
INC., KIN-BUC, INC., WASTEQUID, INC., INMAR
ASSOCIATES, INC., FILCREST REALTY, INC., MARVIN
MAHAN, ROBERT MEAGER [sic], SCA SERVICES, INC.,
SCA SERVICES OF PASSAIC, INC., ANTHONY GAESS,
and EARTHLINE COMPANY, Respondents.” Docket No.:
II-CERCLA-30102 and the Administrator issued further
Findings of Fact, Determination, and Amended Order on
March 25, 1986, also under authority of Section 106(a) of
CERCLA, styled “IN THE MATTER OF KIN-BUC LAND-
FILL, EDISON, NEW JERSEY: ANTHONY GAESS, MAR-
VIN MAHAN, and ROBERT MEAGHER, individuals,
EARTHLINE COMPANY, a partnership, and CHEMICAL
WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC., FILCREST REALTY,
INC., INMAR ASSOCIATES, INC., KIN-BUC, INC., SCA
SERVICES, INC., SCA SERVICES OF PASSAIC, INC., SCI-
ENTIFIC, INC., and WASTEQUID, INC., corporations
Respondents.” Docket No.: II-CERCLA-60105 (hereinafter
the “Kin-Buc 106 Orders”); and
WHEREAS, the Kin-Buc 106 Orders require the above
named captioned respondents (herein the “Owners/
Operators”) to take certain actions as specified therein
directed to the abatement of the release and threat of
release into the environment of hazardous substances at
the said Kin-Buc Landfill and related facilities, as defined
A-13
in the Kin-Buc 106 Orders (herein collectively the “Kin-
Buc Landfill”); and
WHEREAS, the Kin-Buc 106 Orders, being the only
Administrative Orders issued by the Administrator in
effect with regard to the Kin-Buc Landfill as of the date of
this Consent Decree, remain in effect as of the date of this
Consent Decree against all of the Owners/Operators and
are not in effect as to any Defendant; and
WHEREAS, the United States intends and expects
that the Kin-Buc 106 Orders shall remain in full force and
effect against the Owners/Operators and that said Orders
shall result in the abatement of release and threat of
release into the environment of hazardous substances at
the Kin-Buc Landfill; and
WHEREAS, the President, through authority granted
to the Administrator deriving from CERCLA, the Clean
Water Act, and the Solid Waste Disposal Act, has from
time to time, prior to April 30, 1987, taken action in
addition to the issuance of the Kin-Buc 106 Orders to
respond to and arrange for response actions relating to,
the release and threat of release of hazardous substances
at the Kin-Buc Landfill (herein the “Past Response
Actions”); and
WHEREAS, the United States contends that all Past
Response Actions have not been inconsistent with the
National Contingency Plan; and
WHEREAS, the United States contends that Past
Response Actions have resulted in the incurrence of costs
through April 30, 1987, and interest on such costs through
September 22, 1987, by the United States totaling
A-14
$4,980,398 (FOUR MILLION, NINE HUNDRED AND
EIGHTY THOUSAND, THREE HUNDRED AND
NINETY-EIGHT DOLLARS, herein the “Past Response
Costs”); and
WHEREAS, as used herein, the terms “Past Response
Costs,” and “Past Response Actions” shall not be con-
strued to include any claims for damages for injury to,
destruction of, or loss of natural resources, whenever
such claims arose, or any related enforcement costs; and
WHEREAS, the United States expects, from time to
time after April 30, 1987, to take actions to further
respond to, and arrange for or compel response to, the
alleged release and threat of release of hazardous sub-
stances at the Kin-Buc Landfill, including, if necessary,
actions to abate imminent and substantial endangerments
to prevent threats to public health, welfare or the envi-
ronment, to ameliorate environmental harm, or to seek
damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural
resources in connection with the Kin-Buc Landfill (herein
“Future Response Actions”) and, in so doing, to cause the
United States to incur further costs (herein “Future
Response Costs”); and
WHEREAS, the United States contends that certain
persons and entities, including the Defendants hereto, by
reason of their arrangement for disposal or treatment, or
by reason of their transport, or arrangement for transport
for disposal or treatment of the hazardous substances at
the Kin-Buc Landfill, are responsible parties pursuant to
§ 107(a) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), (hereinafter
“Potentially Responsible Parties”) and are, together with
A-15
the Owners/Operators, jointly and severally responsible
for the Past Response Costs; and
WHEREAS, the Administrator has madeeeéemand of
the Owners/Operators and also of certain Potentially
Responsible Parties, including the Defendants, to reim-
burse the United States for the Past Response Costs; and
WHEREAS, some, but not all of the Potentially
Responsible Parties, and none of the Owner/Operators,
have responded to the Administrator’s demand for reim-
bursement (hereinafter those Potentially Responsible Par-
ties that have agreed to enter into this Consent Decree to
settle the claims of the United States for reimbursement
of Past Response Costs are referred to as “Settling Par-
ties” and hereinafter the Owners/Operators, together
with those Potentially Responsible Parties that have not
agreed to enter into this Consent Decree, are referred to
as “Nonsettling Parties”); and
WHEREAS, the Settling Parties deny any and all
responsibility or liability of any kind whatsoever under
any statute or common law for any release or threat of
release of hazardous materials at the Kin-Buc Landfill;
and
WHEREAS, the Settling Parties have agreed, pur-
suant to the terms of this Consent Decree, to pay the Past
Response Costs, and the United States is agreeable to
their so doing in full satisfaction of all claims of the
United States with regard to Past Response Costs and
Past Response Actions; and
WHEREAS, in entering into this consent Decree, the
United States has considered the circumstances of the
A-16
releases and threatened releases of hazardous substances
at the Kin-Buc Landfill and the involvement of various
persons and entities in the ownership and operation of
the Kin-Buc Landfill and the arrangement and transporta-
tion for disposal of hazardous substances at the Kin-Buc
Landfill, and has considered the willingness and capacity
of various parties to resolve this matter and is entering
into this Consent Decree in the exercise of its pros-
ecutorial discretion; and
WHEREAS, the United States, in consideration of
payments of the Settling Parties as set forth herein,
desires (a) to release and discharge any claim for any and
all Past Response Costs and Past Response Actions
against the Settling Parties and (b) to covenant to limit
civil suit and administrative process against the Settling
Parties for any Future Response Actions and any Future
Response Costs which may be incurred by the United
States in connection with the Kin-Buc Landfill, including
any civil action or suit for affirmative or injunctive relief,
or any other civil relief which may hereafter be available
to the United States at law or equity, in connection with
the Kin-Buc Landfill, but not in such a manner as to
release any Settling party for Future Response Actions,
Future Response Costs or to impair, except as expressly
set forth herein, any claim for affirmative or injunctive
relief, or any other relief which may hereafter be avail-
able to the United States at law or equity, in connection
with the Kin-Buc Landfill; and
WHEREAS, except for the particular claims extin-
guished by payment pursuant to this Consent Decree, it
is not the intention of the parties to this Consent Decree
to settle any claim, release any persons or entities, or
A-17
covenant not to sue or covenant not to issue administra-
tive process against any Nonsettling Party or any other
person or entity not a party to this Consent Decree; and
WHEREAS, in recognition of the consideration pro-
vided hereunder by the Settling Parties, to the extent the
United States deems it necessary to seek with regard to
the Kin-Buc Landfill from any person or entity any civil
relief in addition to the reimbursement of Past Response
Costs provided for in this Consent Decree, including
affirmative or injunctive relief or any other civil relief
available to the United States at law or equity, it is the
purpose of the covenant to limit suit contained in this
Consent Decree that the United States shall seek such
relief initially from Nonsettling Parties and shall be per-
mitted to seek such relief from Settling Parties only in the
event that the United States shall fail in its efforts to
obtain such relief fron Nonsettling Parties pursuant to the
terms spelled out in this Consent Decree; and
WHEREAS, in the event that the United States should
fail to obtain from Nonsettling Parties their voluntary
conduct of all Future Response Actions and their volun-
tary payment of all Future Response Costs, it is the
present expectation of the parties to this Consent Decree
that the United States shall use all reasonable efforts to
compel the conduct of such Future Response Actions and
obtain the payment of such Future Response Costs
through litigation against Nonsettling Parties; and
WHEREAS, it is the intention of the United States to
retain its legal rights to seek further relief from the Set-
tling Parties as defined and limited by the provisions
herein, (1) for any and all Future Response Costs, and (2)
A-18
for injunctive or other relief which may be available at
law or equity in connection with the Kin-Buc Landfill;
and
WHEREAS, the United States and the Settling Parties
have each stipulated and agreed to the making and entry
of this Consent Decree prior to the taking of any testi-
mony, based upon the pleadings herein, and without any
admission of liability or fault as to any allegation or
matter arising out of the pleadings by any party; and
WHEREAS, the United States and the Settling Parties
agree that settlement of this matter and entry of this
Consent Decree is made in good faith in an effort to avoid
further expensive and protracted litigation, without any
admission as to liability for any purpose; and
WHEREAS, each undersigned representative ot the
parties to the Consent Decree certifies that he or she is
fully authorized to enter into the terms and conditions of
this Decree and to execute and legally bind such party to
this document
NOW THEREFORE it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED
AND DECREED as follows:
1. JURISDICTION. The Court has jurisdiction over
the subject matter of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C
§ 1331, 28 U.S.C. § 1345, 42 U.S.C. § 9613 and has jurisdic-
tion over to the parties to this Consent Decree. The Set-
tling Parties waive any objection they may have to the
jurisdiction of the Court
2. THE BASIC SETTLEMENT AMOUNT. The Set-
tling Parties agree to make and the United States has
agreed to accept a payment to the United States in the
A-19
amount of $4,980,398.00 which amount is the total
amount of all the Past Response Costs incurred by the
United States and is intended to reimburse the United
States for any and all such Past Response Costs.
3. TRUST ACCOUNT. The Settling Parties have
established a Kin-Buc Trust Account (hereinafter the
“Trust Account”). Each Settling Party has paid into the
Trust Account an amount equal to its allocation obliga-
tion as set forth in a separate agreement among them-
selves, which is not part of this Consent Decree, plus an
amount representing a proportional share of the alloca-
tions of Nonsettling parties. Within 45 days after the date
of this Consent Decree, the Trustee of the Trust Account
shall pay over to the United States the monies received
and collected from Settling Parties in the amount of
$4,980,398.00. The payment of the Trust Account to the
United States shall be by certified or cashiers check made
payable to “Hazardous Substances Superfund” and shall
be mailed or otherwise delivered to:
Hazardous Substances Superfund
U.S. E.P.A., Superfund
P.O. Box 371003M
Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15251
Upon receipt by the United States of the payment
from the Trust Account the United States’ claims for Past
Response Costs and Past Response Actions shall be extin-
guished.
4. SATISFACTION. The delivery of the payment by
the Trust Fund to the United States as specified in this
A-20
Consent Decree, together with the other promises, agree-
ments, covenants, conditions and mutual undertakings of
this Consent Decree, extinguish the United States’ claims
tor Past Response Costs and Past Response Actions and
shall be full and complete satisfaction of the Settling
Parties’ liabilities under CERCLA, or under any other
statute or common law, with respect to Past Response
Costs and Past Response Actions and for any administra-
tive costs and civil penalties which may have accrued
prior to April 30, 1987, and for interest on such sums
which may have accrued prior to September 22, 1987,
with regard to the Kin-Buc Landfill.
5. SETTLING PARTIES’ RETENTION OF RIGHTS
TO SEEK CONTRIBUTION OR INDEMNITY AND COVE-
NANT NOT TO SUE EACH OTHER. Each Settling Party
shall retain all rights under statutory and common law to
seek contribution or indemnity against any and all other
persons, including any of the Owners/Operators or other
Nonsettling Parties or any other person or entity, for any
amount such Settling Party shall have paid pursuant to
this Consent Decree except that no such rights are
retained against any other Settling Party and such rights
are hereby expressly waived, released and discharged
with regard to other Settling Parties. For and in consider-
ation of the mutual covenants and promises of the Set-
tling parties made herein, each Settling Party hereby
covenants not to sue or otherwise assert any claim
against any other Settling party for reimbursement for
any payment made pursuant to this Consent Decree.
6. RESERVATION OF RELEASE. (a) As a result of
payments made for Past Response Costs and Past
Response Actions pursuant to this Consent Decree, the
A-21
Settling parties are not released by the United States for
any liability to the United States to which they may be
subject for Future Response Actions or Future Response
Costs, provided that such liability, if any, shall be limited
by the provisions of this Consent Decree and shall not be
imposed except pursuant to the terms hereof.
(b) Asa result of payments made for Past Response
Costs and Past Response Actions pursuant to this Con-
sent Decree, the Settling Parties are not released by the
United States for any liability for damages to, destruction
of, or loss of natural resources in connection with the Kin-
Buc Landfill and nothing in this Consent Decree shall be
construed as a covenant not to sue Settling Parties for
such natural resources damages or as the agreement of
any Federal natural resource trustee to a covenant not to
sue Settling Parties pursuant to Section 122(j)(2) of
CERCLA.
7. COVENANTS TO LIMIT ADMINISTRATIVE AND
JUDICIAL ACTION AGAINST SETTLING PARTIES. The
provisions of Paragraph 6 or any other provision of this
Consent Decree notwithstanding:
(a) In the event that the United States shall at any
time deem it necessary to take any administrative or
judicial civil action or actions to cause or compel any
person or entity to implement Future Response Actions at
or with regard to the Kin-Buc Landfill, the United States
agrees that it shall not take such action against Settling
Parties provided, however, that in the event the United
States has made all reasonable efforts to cause or compel
Nonsettling parties to implement Future Response
A-22
Actions at the Kin-Buc Landfill pursuant to relevant stat-
utes and authorities, the United States may commence an
administrative or judicial civil action agains: Settling Par-
ties in order to cause or compel the Settling Parties to
implement those Future Response Actions it has been
unable, after having made all reasonable efforts, to cause
or compel the Nonsettling Parties to undertake.
(b) In the event that the United States shall at any
time deem it necessary to take any administrative or
judicial civil action or actions to seek Future Response
Costs or any other sum of money of whatever kind
related to the Kin-Buc Landfill, the United States agrees
that it shall not take such action against Settling Parties,
provided, however, that in the event the United States
has made all reasonable efforts to recover from the Non-
settling Parties the amount of Future Response Costs or
such other sums at the Kin-Buc Landfill, pursuant to
relevant statutes and authorities, the United States may
commence an administrative or judicial! civil action
against the Settling Parties to recover the amount of those
Future Response Costs or such other sums it has been
unable, after having made all reasonable efforts, to
recover from Nonsettling Parties.
(c) Actions taken by the United States for relief
provided in Paragraph 7(a) shall not satisfy the covenant
of the United States arising under Paragraph 7(b) and
actions taken by the United States for relief provided for
in Paragraph 7(b) shall not satisfy the covenant of the
United States arising under Paragraph 7(a).
8. EXCEPTIONS TO COVENANTS. (a) Nothing con-
tained in this Consent Decree shall be construed to defeat
A-23
the enforcement discretion of the United States by impair-
ing its right to select which Nonsettling Parties to pro-
ceed against and the manner in which litigation will be
conducted; provided, however, that said enforcement dis-
cretion shall not be construed to defeat the provisions of
Paragraphs 7(a) and 7(b) regarding the making of all
reasonable efforts to cause or compel the Nonsettling
Parties to implement Future Response Actions or to
recover Future Response Costs from the Nonsettling Par-
ties.
(b) Provided the United States files an action for
Future Response Actions or Future Response Costs
against one or more of the Nonsettling parties which is
not time-barred as of the date of filing of that action, the
Settling Parties agree not to raise as a defense any statute
of limitation in a subsequent action for the same relief
brought by the United States against Settling Parties,
provided such action is brought within 270 days of the
termination of the action against Nonsettling parties.
(c) It is the intention of the parties to this Consent
Decree that the Settling Parties not be joined in any action
brought by the United States against Nonsettling Parties
for Future Response Actions or Future Response Costs. In
the event that in any such action brought against Nonset-
tling parties by the United States any Nonsettling Party
seeks to have joined any Settling Party as a third party
defendant, or otherwise, the United States shall not agree
tc the joinder of any Settling Party or the assertion of any
direct claims by the United States against any Settling
Party unless the United States is required to do so by
order of Court. If requested by the Court to express its
views with regard to the efforts of the Settling Parties to
|
A-24
avoid joinder, stay the filing of claims against them,
obtain a severence of claims against them, or persuade
the Court it should take no action to defeat the purposes
of this Consent Decree and of the Covenant herein to
limit suit, or otherwise, the United States shall express its
continued support for the nonjoinder of Settling Parties
on the grounds of effectuation of this Consent Decree and
the Covenant to limit suit contained in Paragraph 7 of
this Consent Decree. Provided that in the event that any
Settling Party is, nevertheless, successfully joined in such
an action by a Nonsettling Party and the United States
asserts no claims of its own against such Settling Party,
the Settling Party shall not, in any action or proceeding,
whether taken under this Consent Decree or otherwise,
assert as defenses against the United States as res judicata
or collateral estoppel any matter of law or fact asserted
by the parties to such third party action and adjudicated
in the course of that third party action, nor shall such
Settling Party assert as a defense that the United States’
claims against the Settling Party should or could have
been litigated in such earlier proceedings.
9. RESERVATION OF SETTLING PARTIES’ RIGHTS.
In the event that the United States asserts any unsatisfied
claims for Future Response Costs or Future Response
Actions against the Settling Parties, in any judicial or
administrative proceeding, each and every Settling Party
shall have preserved and may assert any and all defenses
it shall have to such unsatisfied claims, except as pro-
vided in Paragraph 8 above.
10. AGREEMENT NOT TO ASSERT CLAIMS. The
Settling Parties each agree not to assert any claims for
relief, causes of action, or demands against the United
A-25
States or the Hazardous Substances Superfund with
regard to any payment made pursuant to this Consent
Decree.
11. DENIAL OF LIABILITY. Neither the perfor-
mance of the agreement to make the payments provided
for in Paragraphs 2 and 3 hereof, nor anything else con-
tained in this Consent Decree shall be deemed an admis-
sion by any of the Settling Parties of any violation of law,
or of jurisdiction over them under CERCLA or any other
law, and this Consent Decree shall not be admissible as
evidence in any proceeding at law or in equity, except to
enforce or preserve the rights and obligations expressly
set forth herein. Any payment made hereunder shal! not
be deemed a fine, penalty, or monetary sanction. The
Settling Parties do not admit that payments made here-
under are not in settlement of damages; nor do they
admit or contend that the payments made hereunder are
in settlement of damages to, destruction of, or losses of
natural resources in connection with the Kin-Buc Landfill
The Settling Parties, in entering into this Consent Decree,
do not admit, accept, or acknowledge any liability or
fault with respect to any matter arising out of or relating
to the Kin-Buc Landfill. The Settling Parties do not admit,
accept or acknowledge the procedural or substantive
accuracy of any determinations made by the United
States in connection with the Kin-Buc Landfill or of any
contention of the United States expressed in the Whereas
clauses of this Consent Decree. These express denials
attach to any and all matters relating to or arising out of
the Kin-Buc site.
A-26
12. EXCLUSION. Only Settling Parties and parties
to the Agreement establishing the Trust Account are par-
ties or may become parties to this Consent Decree.
13. REPRESENTATION OF AUTHORITY.Each sig-
natory for a Settling Party represents that he or she has
fully authority to enter into this Consent Decree on behalf
of that party and to bind that party as provided herein.
14. SUCCESSORS. This Consent Decree shall apply
to and be binding upon the parties, their successors, and
assigns.
15. CONTINUING JURISDICTION. The Court speci-
fically retains jurisdiction over both the subject matter of
and the Parties to this action for the duration of this
Consent Decree.
16. SECTION HEADINGS. The section headings set
forth in this Consent Decree are included for convenience
of reference only and shall be disregarded in the con-
struction and interpretation of any of the provisions of
this Decree.
This Consent Decree approved and entered on this
Ist day of August, 1988. (AJL)
/s/ Alfred J. Lechner, Jr.
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
JUDGE
A-27
For the United States:
/s/
/s/
/s/
Roger J. Marzulla
ROGER J. MARZULLA
Assistant Attorney General
Land and Natural Resources
Division
Washington, D.C. 20530
SAMUEL A. ALITO, JR.
United States Attorney
JAMES WOODS,
Special Assistant
United States Attorney
Leonard H. Shen
LEONARD H. SHEN
Attorney
Environmental Enforcement
Section
Land and Natural Resources
Livision
U.S. Department of Justice
Washington, D.C. 20530
Illegible
For THOMAS L. ADAMS, JR.
Assistant Administrator for
Enforcement and Compliance
Monitoring
U.S. Environmental Protection
Agency
401 M Street, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20460
A-28
IN THe Unitrep States District Court
For THet District Or New Jersey
Civil Action No. 88-2087
UNITED STATES OF
AMERICA, TRANSCRIPT OF
e PROCEEDINGS
ABSOLUTE FIRE | shea
PROTECTION CO., INC., — : (Filed
et al. Oct. 18, 1988)
Newark, New Jersey
Defendants.
Ee ee Be gS —~=
BEFORE:
THE HONORABLE ALFRED J. LECHNER, JR.
Appearances:
None
[p. 2] THE COURT: This is an action instituted
by the United States under section 107 of the Comprehen-
sive Environmental Response, Compensation and 1.ia-
bility Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. section 9607, for
reimbursement of costs incurred by the United States in
response to the release or threatened release of hazardous
substances into the environment from the Kin-Buc Land-
fill Facility in Edison, New Jersey (the “landfill”). After
lengthy negotiations, the Government and two hundred
twenty six defendants in this case arrived at a settlement
agreement. The Government now moves for an order
entering the consent decree proposed by the parties. The
matter is decided on the basis of the papers submitted
pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78.
A-29
Background
The landfill at issue in this case is commonly known
as the Kin-Buc Sanitary Landfill and is located at 383
Meadow Road, Edison, New Jersey. The landfill was for-
merly used for the disposal of solid and liquid domestic
and commercial waste, and municipal, industrial and
chemical wastes and sludges. Complaint, paragraph 5.
The complaint alleges these wastes contained hazardous
substances, pollutants and contaminants, as those terms
are defined in section 101 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. section
9601. Complaint, paragraph 5.
[p. 3] According to the complaint, between 1973 and
1976 at least seventy million gallons of chemical wastes
and unspecified quantities of solid materials were
accepted for disposal at the landfill. The complaint
alleges the disposal of these wastes at the landfill has
resulted in a release of hazardous substances, po!lutants
and contaminants into the convironment [sic] since at
least as early as 1976. Id., paragraphs 7-8.
The United States has incurred costs through April
30, 1987, including interest through September 22, 1987,
of at least $4,980,398 for response actions taken at the
landfill. The United States continues to incur response
costs, including costs of enforcement. Id., paragraph 10.
The Government contends that certain persons and
entities, including the defendants named in this action,
by reason of their arrangement for disposal or treatment,
or by reason of their arrangement for transport for dis-
posal or treatment of the hazardous substances at the
landfill, are responsible parties under section 107(a) of
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. section 9607(a), and are, together
A-30
with the owners and operators, jointly and severally
responsible for response costs.
The Government was engaged for several years in
negotiations with persons or entities which are [p. 4]
assertedly responsible parties under CERCLA (“poten-
tially responsible parties” or “PRPs”). A steering commit-
tee was established for those PRPs who would participate
in the negotiations and in the ultimate settlement. During
the course of the negotiations certain deadlines had to be
met by PRPs in order to be able to participate. A final
agreement was reached between the Government and
two hundred twenty six PRPs (the “settling PRPs” or the
“settling parties”). The proposed settlement then was
considered and approved by the Environmental Protec-
tion Agency (“EPA”) and the Justice Department.
On May 16, 1988, the United States filed the com-
plaint in this action naming as defendants the two hun-
dred twenty six PRPs who were part of the settlement
agreement. The complaint alleges that the defendants are
jointly and severally liable under section 107(a) of
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. section 9607(a), for the reimburse-
ment costs of actions taken by the United States at the
landfill in response to the released or threatened release
of hazardous substances into the environment. Id., para-
graph 24.
The complaint seeks as relief: (1) a judgment against
the defendants in favor of the United States for response
costs incurred, plus interest, which costs through April
30, 1987 and interest through September 22, [p. 5] 1987,
total at least $4,980,398; (2) a judgment in favor of the
United States declaring the defendants liable for all
A-31
response costs incurred after April 30, 1987, plus interest;
(3) an award to the United States of its costs including
enforcement costs and attorney’s fees; and (4) any other
proper relief.
On the same day the complaint was filed, the pro-
posed consent decree was lodged with the court. Federal
regulations require publication of notice of the settlement
in the Federal Register and a thirty day public comment
period. In light of the posture of this case with respect to
settlement, on June 15, 1988 I granted the Government's
request for an order staying all discovery and litigation
proceedings pending consideration of the proposed con-
sent decree. All deadlines for filing responsive pleadings
and motions were suspended.
The principal terms of the proposed consent decree
are as follows. The decree specifies that performance of
the agreement shall not be deemed as an admission of
liability or fault. Consent Decree, paragraph 11. Under
the agreement, the two hundred twenty six defendants in
this case agree to pay $4,980,398, which represents the
response costs incurred through April 30, 1987, plus
interest through September 22, 1987 (“past response [p. 6]
costs”). Id., paragraph 2. The delivery of this payment
will extinghish [sic] the United States’ claims for past
response costs against the settling parties. Id., paragraph
4. Accordingly, the complaint’s request for relief concern-
ing these costs is to be dismissed with prejudice.
According to the consent decree, the settling parties
are not released from any liability with respect to any
actions or costs incurred by the United States after April
30, 1987 (“future response actions” or “future response
A-32
costs”). Id., paragraph 6(a). The United States does cove-
nant that if it is deemed necessary to institute any admin-
istrative or judicial civil aciton [sic] to compel the
implementation of future response acitons, [sic] the
United States shall not take such action against the set-
tling parties until after having made all reasonable efforts
to compel non-settling PRPs to implement future
response actions. Id., paragraph 7(a). The United States
similarly covenants to not seek reimbursement of future
response costs from the settling [p. 7] parties until after it
has made all reasonable efforts to recover from non-
settling PRPs. Id., paragraph 7(b). In light of these cove-
nants the complaint’s claims which go beyond past
response costs are to be dismissed without prejudice.
According to federal regulations, 28 C.F.R. section 50.7,
notice of the consent decree was published in the Federal
Register on June 3, 1988. See 53 Fed. Reg. 20379. The thirty
day public comment period required by the reguiations
expired on July 5, 1988. Comments were received from two
non-settling PRPs: St. Joe Paper Company, and Earthline
Company and its affiliates SCA Services of Passaic, Inc.,
Wasteguid, Inc., and SCA Services, Inc. St. Joe Paper Com-
pany does not object to the terms of the settlement. St. Joe
Paper Company seeks to be included as a settling party.
Earthline Company objects that it is not included in the
settlement and also makes certain objections with respect to
the terms of the proposed consent decree.
' The settling parties are also not released by the United
States for any liability for damages to, destruction of, or loss of
natural resources in connection with the landfill. Id., paragraph
6(b).
A-33
Now that the public comment period has expired, the
United States moves for the entry of the consent decree.
For the reasons which follow, the motion is granted.
Discussion
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. sections 9601 et seqg., authorizes
government cleanup of hazardous waste sites using
money [p. 8] provided by the Hazardous Substances
Superfund (“Superfund”). However, it is generally
acknowledged that the Superfund is limited and the costs
of response activities nationwide greatly exceed the
Superfund. Section 107(a) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. section
9607, therefore provides an avenue for the United States
to recover response costs from responsible parties and
thus replenish the Superfund in order to finance the
cleanup of other sites. Theough this action the United
States seeks to recoup for the Superfund substantial sums
that have been spent in connection with the Kin-Buc
landfill from at least some of the numerous PRPs.
In an effort to save the time and costs involved in
litigation, the Government and the defendants named in
this action were involved in lengthy negotiations which
resulted in the proposed consent decree. There is a strong
policy favoring the voluntary settlement of civil actions
because settlement saves both the parties and the courts
the substantial resources required to proceed with litiga-
tion of the issues. Pennwalt Corp. v. Plough, Inc., 676 F.2d
77, 80 (3d Cir. 1982).
A-34
A. Review of the Proposed Consent Decree
The decision to approve or reject a settlement pro-
posal is committed to the sound discretion of the trial
judge. SEC v. Randolph, 736 F.2d 525, 529 (9th [p. 9] Cir.
1984). Nevertheless, a proposed consent decree ought to
be approved unless it is unfair, inadequate or unreason-
able. Id.; Walsh v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc., 726
F.2d 956, 965 (3d Cir. 1983). Furthermore, “the courts
should pay deference to the judgment of the government
agency which has negotiated and submitted the proposed
judgment.” Randolph, 736 F.2d at 529.
The proposed consent decree in this case appears to
be fair, adequate and reasonable. The settling parties’
agreement to pay the United States almost five million
dollars implements the underlying cost recovery scheme
of CERCLA by replenishing the Superfund promptly. In
exchange the United States releases these parties from
any liability concerning the response costs incurred prior
to April 30, 1987. The settling parties remain liable for
future response costs after the Government has made all
reasonable efforts to seek recovery from non-settling par-
ties. The settling parties also remain liable for any natural
resource damage. This settlement agreed to by the
numerous defendants is fair, adequate and safeguards the
environment and the public interest.
A-35
[p. 10] B. The Comments of the Non-Settling Parties
1. St. Joe Paper Company
St. Joe Paper Company (“St. Joe”) submitted a public
comment concerning the proposed settlement of this case
St. Joe “objects to the settlement since it does not include
them as a settling party.” St. Joe Comment Letter at 1. St.
Joe emphasizes that it believes the proposed settlement is
fair, except for its exclusion, and asks this court to order
the inclusion of St. Joe as a settling party. Id. at 4.
St. Joe concedes that it failed to comply with the
deadline set by the Government for the submission of
signature pages from those PRPs who desired to partici-
pate in the proposed settlement. St. Joe explains that a
lack of proper communication between St. Joe and their
New jersey counsel resulted in a two month delay in
forwarding the signature pages; St. Joe contends this was
excusable neglect. Id. at 2, 4. The Government exercised
its discretion to not accept St. Joe’s belated offer to partic-
ipate in the settlement because it would have further
delayed the settlement process with respect to the two
hundred twenty six PRPs who met the deadline for inclu-
sion.
In considering St. Joe’s objection and request, this
court must pay deference to the judgment of the [p. 11]
Government agency which has negotiated and submitted
the proposed consent decree. Randolph, 736 F.2d at 529.
The balancing of competing interests affected by a pro-
posed consent decree “must be left, in the first instance,
to the discretion of the Attorney General.” United States v.
Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660, 666 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454
U.S. 1083 (1981).
A-36
Furthermore, in considering the proposed settlement,
this court’s role is limited. A court may either approve or
disapprove a settlement, but may not rewrite the parties’
agreement. Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Commission,
688 F.2d 615, 630 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1217
(1983); Harris v. Pernsley, 654 F. Supp. 1042, 1049 (E.D. Pa.
1987). Accordingly, in United States v. Jones & Laughlin
Steel Corp., 804 F.2d 348 (6th Cir. 1986), the court of
appeals held the district court abused its discretion when
it conditioned approval of a proposed consent decree
upon an amendment to allow a non-settling party to
receive part of the settlement money. Id. at 351-52.
In light of the deference which the Government is
due with respect to the settlement which it arrived at
exercising its prosecutorial discretion, and in light of a
court’s limited role in reviewing a proposed settlement, it
is inappropriate to order a modification [p. 12] of the
decree to include St. Joe. Furthermore, even if a modifica-
tion were proper, an order requiring the inclusion of St.
Joe at this time would substantially prejudice the United
States, while only providing a speculative benefit to St.
Joe. As pointed out by the Government, St. Joe will only
be prejudiced if the United States eventually brings suit
against it for claims covered by this settlement, and if in
attempting to settle such an action, St. Joe is faced with
terms worse than those of this settlement. On the other
hand, the inclusion of St. Joe at this time would result in a
costly delay for the United States. A modification of the
decree would require reapproval by the EPA and the
Justice Department, as well as republication of the notice
of settlement and a new thirty day public comment
period. The delay would cost the United States several
BE Riear Ce, Hinson
A-37
tens of thousands of dollars in interest on the nearly
several tens of thousands of dollars in interest on the
nearly five million dollar settlement amount. Considering
this court’s appropriate scope of review of the consent
decree and the equities involved in a modification to
include a new party, St. Joe’s request for inclusion is
denied.
[p. 13] 2. Earthline Company
The second comment which was received was from
another non-settling PRP, Earthline Company and its
affiliates (collectively “Earthline”). In its comment letter,
Earthline describes its involvement in the cleanup of the
landfill and makes certain objections concerning the pro-
posed consent decree.
First, Earthline states that it did not participate in
settlement negotiations because the settling PRPs and the
Government excluded Earthline from the negotiations.
Earthline states that in 1985 it was refused an opportunity
to review the drafts of the consent degree [sic]. Earthline
asserts the “inescapable conclusion” is that the settling
parties deliberately negotiated the decree behind Earth-
line’s back. Earthline Comment Letter at 4.
The intentions of the settling parties with respect to
non-settling parties are not relevant to this court’s review
of the proposed consent decree in this case. Moreover, the
Government may properly exercise its discretion in
selecting among PRPs when settling claims. Nevertheless,
the Government has submitted affidavits which indicate
A-38
that Earthline was invited to participate in the negotia-
tions but it declined to do so. No counter-affidavits were
submitted.
[p. 14] According to the Government, in November,
1984, representatives of Earthline indicated to the counsel
of the settling parties’ Steering Committee that Earthline
was not interested in joining the settlement discussions.
Affidavit of James W. Moorman (“Moorman Aff.”), para-
graphs 7-8. In May, 1985, the EPA urged Earthline once
“mere to participate in the negotiations. Affidavit of Dou-
glas R. Blazey (“Blazey Aff.”), paragraph 17. Subse-
quently, in July, 1985 Earthline asked the Steering
Committee for a copy of the draft consent decree which
was being discussed. Mooreman Aff., paragraph 12. In
light of Earthline’s prior refusal to participate, Earthline
was asked to write a letter to the Steering Committee
clarifying whether it would participate in the settlement
negotiations. Id. The Government points out it would
have been inappropriate to disclose confidential settle-
ment documents with parties who had not declared an
interest in negotiating and who were potential litigants.
Blazey Aff., paragraph 18. In the past three years, Earth-
line did not communicate, in writing or otherwise, with
the EPA or the settling parties’ Steering Committee to
request participation. Id., paragraph 19; Moorman Aff.,
paragraphs 13-14.
In light of the Government’s submissions, it appears
that Earthline’s failure to participate inthe [p. 15] settle-
ment negotiations was due to its own failure to properly
declare its interest. In any event; as mentioned, the bal-
ancing of competing interests affected by a proposed
consent decree “must be left, in the first instance, to the
A-39
discretion of the Attorney General.” Bechtel Corp., 648
F.2d at 666.
Earthline’s second complaint concerning the pro-
posed decree is that it unfairly penalizes Earthline for
complying with an EPA cleanup order while it rewards
the settling PRP’s for failing to come forward with
cleanup proposals. Earthline asserts that paragraph seven
of the consent decree commits the Government to direct
all future enforcement efforts at non-settling PRPs such as
Earthline and thereby “shoots the volunteers.” Earthline
Comment Letter at 4.
In response, the Government points out that Earth-
line did not volunteer to perform certain response actions
with respect to the landfill. Earthline was compelled by
an EPA Unilateral Administrative Order, originally issued
in 1984, to complete all necessary cleanup actions at the
landfill. The proposed consent decree in this case does
not penalize Earthline in that it does not change Earth-
line’s obligations under the 1984 EPA order.
[p. 16] In addition, contrary to Earthline’s assertions,
the consent decree does not “reward” the settling defen-
dants for failing to undertake cleanup actions in the past.
Rather, the consent decree requires the settling parties to
pay nearly five million dollars for past response costs
incurred by the United States, and further maintains the
settling parties’ liability for future response costs which
cannot be recovered from the non-settling PRPs.
Earthline’s last objection pertains to the consent
decree provision that if the United States sues non-set-
tling PRP’s for additional relief and any non-settling PRP
seeks to join one of the settling PRPs as a third-party
A-40
defendant, “the United States shall not agree to the join-
der of any Settling Party or the assertion of any direct
claims by the United States against any Settling Party
unless the United States is required to do so by order of
Court.” Consent Decree, paragraph 8(c). Earthline asserts
this provision is inconsistent with section 113(f)(1) of
CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. section 9613(f)(1), which provides
that any person may seek contribution from any other
person during or following a civil action instituted under
sections 106 or 107(a), 42 U.S.C. sections 9606, 9607(a).
[p. 17] As pointed out by the Government, the decree
only requires the Government to oppose joinder when it
is sought in the context of a direct enforcement action
brought by the Government against a non-settling PRP.
Thus, as long as Earthline complies with its legal obliga-
tions and no action is brought against it by the United
States, paragraph 8(c) will not apply and Earthline may
seek contributions from the set:ling parties without oppo-
sition from the Government.
Furthermore, even if paragraph 8(c) is triggered in
the context of an enforcement action brought by the
United States, the consent decree’s provision only
requires the United States to take a legal position in
opposition to the joinder of a settling party in order to
provide some repose to the settling parties in return for
their settlement payment. The decree’s provision, how-
ever, is not a legal bar to a third party contribution action
as a court could order the joinder notwithstanding the
Government’s position.
snes
A-41
Earthline’s objections concerning the decree appear
to be based on misperceptions of the circumstances sur-
rounding the cleanup of the landfill and the effect’s pro-
visions. Earthline has not presented any compelling
reason why the proposed consent decree should not be
viewed as fair, adequate and reasonable.
[p. 18] Conclusion
The proposed consent decree in this case appears to
be fair, adequate and reasonable. Furthermore, the com-
ments submitted by St. Joe and Earthline do not present
any sound basis to reject this settlement reached after
lengthy negotiations and under which the two hundred
twenty six defendants in this case agree to settle for
almost five million dollars. The Government's motion for
an order entering the decree is granted.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.