Opposition Brief — Mayco Oil & Chemical Co. v. Transtech Industries, Inc.

Supreme Court brief1994

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Text

No. 93-960. “) | RITE

ja 2 @ 1994

In The '

Supreme Court of the United ‘Statés wie CLERK |

October Term, 1993

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MAYCO OIL & CHEMICAL COMPANY; AT&T TECHNOLO-

GIES, INC., BY ITS SUCCESSOR AMERICAN TELEPHONE

AND TELEGRAPH CO.; BIOCRAFT LABORATORIES, INC.;

CHESEBROUGH-POND’S USA CO.; CPC INTERNATIONAL,

INC., INCLUDING BEST FOODS DIVISION AND PENICK

CORPORATION, SUCCESSOR TO S.B. PENICK COMPANY;

FLUID PACKAGING CO., INC.; FMC CORPORATION;

GANES CHEMICALS, INC.; SIEGFRIED CHEMICAL; GEN-

ERAL ELECTRIC COMPANY; HULS AMERICA, INC.; IBM

CORPORATION; J.T. BAKER, INC.; LEVER BROTHERS COM-

PANY; MARISOL, INC.; MOBILE OIL CORPORATION; PROC-

TER & GAMBLE MANUFACTURING CO.; PHELPS DODGE

CORPORATION; RUSSELL REID COMPANY; SAFT NIFE

INC.; SMITHKLINE BEECHAM CORPORATION; SYBKON

TRANSITION CORP.; SYBRON CHEMICALS, INC., INCLUD-

ING AS TRADE NAMES GAMLEN CHEMICAL AND TAN-

ATEX; WITCO CORPORATION,

Petitioners,

TRANSTECH INDUSTRIES, INC.; KIN-BUC, INC.;

FILCREST REALTY, INC.,

Respondents.

+

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Third Circuit

*

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

*

DanTE J. ROMANINI*

RicHARD M. CoHEN

Koz.ov, SEATON, ROMANINI &

Brooks, P.C.

1940 Route 70 East, Suite 200

Cherry Hill, New Jersey 08003

(609) 424-8200

Counsel for Respondents

*Counsel of Record

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

QUESTION PRESENTED

Should a petition for a writ of certiorari be granted

pursuant to the collateral order doctrine based upon a

partial settlement under Section 113(f)(2) of the Compre-

hensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and

Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2), which does not pro-

vide a full release of liability or protection from claims for

contribution to Petitioners.

RULE 29.1 STATEMENT

Respondent Transtech Industries, Inc., is a publicly

owned company that is neither a wholly nor partially

owned subsidiary of any other entity, nor does it have

any subsidiaries that are not wholly owned.

Respondent Kin-Buc, Inc., is a wholly owned subsid-

iary of Respondent Transtech Industries, Inc., and has no

subsidiaries.

Respondent Filcrest Realty, Inc., is a wholly owned

subsidiary of Respondent Transtech Industries, Inc., and

has no subsidiaries.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

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RPP MRMMEIEMED MUEEMIOE 5 wcrc ccccccccccccccceccsesceces 1

ES is 5 ody bi dk 6604666060 nd dda cncveos 1

ys Ee hs) 2

waranmemenren Gr Bets CASE... ccc ccc wcccccccces 2

A. The Action which Resulted in Petitioners’

Consent Decree with the United States .... 2

nn MIN PUEIIOL Ss cnc cecaccssccescccecess 5

REASONS FOR DENYING CERTIORARI........... 7

1. The Consent Decree Does Not Provide a

Final Release of Liability to Petitioners and

Therefore Does Not Warrant Review Under

the Collateral Order Doctrine .............. 7

2. The Consent Decree at Issue Does Not Pro-

vide Protection from Respondents’ Claims

for Contribution as Those Claims are Not

“Matters Addressed in the Settlement” ..... u

APPENDIX

The Consent Decree, filed August 1, 1988........ A-1

District Court Opinion Approving the Consent

AR ee A-28

iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

Cases

Cohen v. Beneficial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541

A Vi Sey heel Oe 7

Denver v. Adolph Coors Co., 829 F. Supp. 340 (D.

i EE Aeon « Vnc vada oh ca eee naa aeeA heres eas 11

Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 993

F.2d 755 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct.

rk re er ek uh 8

Forbus v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 958 F.2d 1036 (11th

Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 415 (1992)........ 8

Grillet v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 927 F.2d 217 (5th Cir.

og ) Re PEE errr re rs Pn err eee 8

Janneh v. GAF Corp., 887 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1989),

cert. denied, 498 U.S. 865 (1990) .................... 8

Towers Hotel Corp. v. Rimmel, 871 F.2d 766 (8th Cir.

a toa ns hors CASK oes Makan aie oa renee 8

U.S. v. Cannon's Engineering Corp., 899 F.2d 79 (1st

2 |: errr rer rrr errr Sry rrr rey 10, 11

U.S. v. Rohm & Haas, 721 F. Supp. 666, 675 (D.N.J.

APP a rind eae iy errata pares pera Pe |p aere 11

United States v. Absolute Fire Protection Co., Inc.,

Civ. Action No. 88-2087 (D.N.J., filed October

Sh ca ake veda Cabs s CELE TOREITR |

StaTuTORY PROVISIONS

Be ae aid d puke a badd ph ekan Kanes eax ene bade 2

, ek me yo: per re yr eye rarer 1, 6

gk ae De Pe rere Pr ren terror Ter rrr 2

ein ome eke Te ree «+++ passim

OPINIONS BELOW

In addition to the opinions of the courts below in the

instant action which were provided by Petitioners,

reprinted in the appendix (“A”) hereto at A28, is the

unreported decision of the United States District Court

for the District of New Jersey, captioned United States v.

Absolute Fire Protection Co., Inc., Civ. Action No. 88-2087

(D.N.J., filed October 18, 1988), providing judicial

approval of the Consent Decree which Petitioners claim

affords them the right to take this interlocutory appeal.

Consideration of this opinion (as well as the actual Con-

sent Decree reprinted in the appendix hereto at Al) is

essential to determine the “matters addressed in the set-

tlement,” as they pertain to 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2).

-¢

JURISDICTION

Respondents maintain that the jurisdictional require-

ments of this Court have not been satisfied. The District

Court refused to certify this case for interlocutory review

pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), finding no substantial

ground for difference of opinion and holding the instant

Consent Decree was “not intended to cover this contribu-

tion suit by plaintiffs.” (61a).

Subsequently, Petitioners sought appellate review

pursuant to the collateral order doctrine. The Third Cir-

cuit denied jurisdiction, declaring that Petitioners’ appeal

is not “distinct from the underlying merits of the law-

suit,” and Petitioners’ “contentions can be raised on

direct appeal after final judgment.” (17a).

¢

i

STATUTES INVOLVED

Respondents concur with Petitioners that the statutes

at issue are: 28 U.S.C. § 1291; and the Comprehensive

Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability

Act (“CERCLA”) § 113(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2).

— @ ——_

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case involves the disposal of hazardous waste at

the Kin-Buc Landfill (“Landfill” or “Site”), located in

Edison, New Jersey. In 1980, the United States Environ-

mental Protection Agency (“EPA”) undertook certain

environmental activities at the Landfill. Thereafter, on

September 23, 1983, EPA issued an Administrative Order

pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9606 (Docket No. II-

CERCLA-30102), requiring that a number of private par-

ties, including Respondents, take additional environmen-

tal actions. As a result of Respondents’ compliance with

that administrative order, EPA was able to conclude its

direct activities at the Site. Respondents continue to con-

duct cleanup activities related to the environmental reme-

diation at the Landfill

A. The Action which Resulted in Petitioners’ Consent

Decree with the United States

In 1984, EPA sought recoupment for the costs it had

incurred as a result of activities it had undertaken at the

Landfill. Failing to obtain reimbursement from Respon-

dents, EPA issued demand letters to approximately 360

parties. On May 16, 1988, the United States filed an

action, captioned United States of America v. Absolute Fire

setae etme

Protection Company, Inc., No. 88-2087, seeking these costs

Thereafter, Petitioners and EPA entered into a consent

decree (the “Consent Decree”) concluding that litigation

(Al)

The Consent Decree provides that the “Basic Settle-

ment Amount” was “the total amount of ali the Past

Response Costs incurred by the United States and is

intended to reimburse the United States for any and all

such Past Response Costs.” (A18-19). This payment was

specifically limited as satisfaction of the United States’

“Past Response Costs and Past Response Actions and for

iny administrative costs and civil penalties which may

have accrued prior to April 30, 1987, and for interest on

such sums, which may have accrued prior to September

22, 1987, with regard to the Kin-Buc Landfill.” (A20)

Nothing in the Consent Decree provides Petitioners

with a complete release regarding their liability for fur

ther environmental remediation of the Landfill nor for

costs incurred by other private parties. Likewise, the

Consent Decree does not provide any protection from

third-party claims for contribution. The only provision in

the Consent Decree regarding other environmental!

response costs states that the United States would seek

tuture response costs it incurred, if any, from other poten-

tially responsible parties (identified therein as the Non-

settling Parties) before going back to the Petitioners (the

Settling Parties)

[I]In the event the United States has made all

reasonable efforts to recover from the Nonset-

tling Parties the amount of Future Response

Costs or such other sums at the Kin-Buc Land-

fill, pursuant to relevant statutes and authori-

ties, the United States may commence an

administrative or judicial civil action against the

Settling Parties to recover the amount of those

Future Response Costs or such other sums it has

been unable, after having made all reasonable

efforts, to recover from Nonsettling Parties.

(A22).

Pursuant to the CERCLA requirement for approval of

a consent decree, the District Court Judge for the District

of New Jersey, the Honorable Alfred J. Lechner, delin-

eated the matters addressed in the settlement:

Under the agreement, the two hundred twenty

six defendants in this case agree to pay

$4,980,398, which represents the response costs

incurred through April 30, 1987, plus interest

through September 22, 1987 (“past response

costs”). The delivery of this payment will extin-

ghish [sic] the United States’ claims for past

response costs against the settling parties. (A31,

citation omitted).

By contrast, Judge Lechner specifically found that the

Consent Decree did nof release Petitioners from future

costs incurred at the Landfill:

According to the consent decree, the settling

parties are not released from any liability with

respect to any actions or costs incurred by the

United States after April 30, 1987 (“future

response actions” or “future response costs”).

(A32, citation omitted).

Furthermore, the District Court Judge determined that

the Consent Decree did not bar a contribution action by a

private party for its independently incurred costs:

|

As pointed out by the Government, the

decree only requires the Government to oppose

joinder when it is sought in the context of a

direct enforcement action brought by the Gov-

ernment against a non-settling PRP [potentially

responsible party]. Thus, as long as Earthline [a

Non-settling Party] complies with its legal obli-

gations and no action is brought against it by

the United States, paragraph 8(c) will not apply

and Earthline may seek contributions from the

settling parties without opposition from the

Government. (A40, emphasis supplied).

No appeal from Judge Lechner’s interpretation of the

Consent Decree was ever taken by any party, including

Petitioners.

B. The Instant Action

On August 24, 1990, Respondents filed the instant

action claiming, inter alia, a right to contribution from 445

defendants, including Petitioners, for the costs they

incurred related to the environmental remediation of the

Landfill. None of those costs pertain to those incurred by

the United States which were addressed in the Consent

Decree.

On April 1, 1991, Petitioners sought dismissal of

Respondents’ complaint, claiming that by operation of

CERCLA § 113(f)(2), 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2), they were

absolved of all further liability at the Site. That section

provides:

A person who has resolved its liability to

the United States or a State in an administrative

or judicially approved settlement shall not be

liable for claims for contribution regarding mat-

ters addressed in the settlement. Such settle-

ment does not discharge any of the other

potentially liable persons unless its terms so

provide, but it reduces the potential liability of

others by the amount of the settlement.

42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2).

The District Court below, the Honorable Harold A.

Ackerman, held that the Consent Decree “only covers the

past response costs and past response actions incurred by

the United States.” (42a). Judge Ackerman determined

that, in accord with the District Judge’s approval of the

Consent Decree, Respondents’ contribution claim against

Petitioners was permitted:

Moreover, in response to a concern by a non-

settling party, Judge Lechner held that “as long

as (a non-settling party) complies with its legal

obligations . . . [it] may seek contributions from

the settling parties.” Id. at 17. [A40] A judge

approving a consent decree in a CERCLA case is

mandated to take into account the equities of

the situation. He or she cannot approve a con-

sent decree that is simply unjust or unfair. Given

Judge Lechner’s own equitable interpretation of

the decree he approved, it would be illogical for

this court to hold that as a matter of law, a

contrary, inequitable interpretation, governs.

[39a].

On August 13, 1992, Petitioners sought reconsidera-

tion or, in the alternative, certification for interlocutory

review pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). In a second unre-

ported opinion, the District Court flatly rejected Peti-

tioners’ motion and refused to certify this matter for

interlocutory appeal, stating that the facts “clearly show

that the Consent Decree was not intended to cover this

contribution suit by plaintiffs.” (61a).

Despite the District Court’s refusal to certify this

matter, Petitioners, nevertheless, sought appellate review,

this time pursuant to the narrow exception to the final

judgment rule known as the “collateral order doctrine”

first delineated in the Court’s decision in Cohen v. Benefi-

cial Indus. Loan Corp., 337 U.S. 541 (1949). The Third

Circuit, however, also rejected Petitioners’ attempt at

appellate jurisdiction stating that it had “substantial

doubts .. . that the issues raised in defense of appellate

jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine are dis-

tinct from the underlying merits of the lawsuit,” and

uetermined that “it is quite clear that the settlor-defen-

dants’ contentions can be raised on direct appeal after

final judgment.” (17a). Petitioners’ request for mandamus

was also denied by the Third Circuit for failure to assert a

cognizable basis for relief.

REASONS FOR DENYING CERTIORARI

1. The Consent Decree Does Not Provide a Final

Release of Liability to Petitioners and Therefore

Does Not Warrant Review Under the Collateral

Order Doctrine

Petitioners have provided no issue that merits review

by this Court. Both decisions by the trial court below, as

well as the opinion of the District Court approving the

Consent Decree, are specific in holding that Petitioners

did not obtain a final release for their liability related to

o8$

the Kin-Buc Landfill. Thus, unlike the case cited by Peti-

tioners, Digital Equipment Corp. v. Desktop Direct, Inc., 993

F.2d 755 (10th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 379

(November 1, 1993), this case is distinguishable. Accord-

ingly, even if this Court were to extend the collateral

order doctrine to include settlement agreements, it would

not be applicable to the petition herein.

In each case which addresses the relationship

between the collateral order doctrine and a settlement

agreement, the determination has centered on whether a

party has the right not to go to trial by virtue of that

agreement. See Forbus v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 958 F.2d

1036 (11th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 412 (1992)

(releasor’s retention of benefits constituted a ratification,

thereby releasing defendant from all liability); Grillet v.

Sears, Roebuck & Co., 927 F.2d 217 (5th Cir. 1991) (ratifica-

tion of release affording party right not to go to trial

reviewable under collateral order doctrine); Janneh v. GAF

Corp., 87 F.2d 432 (2d Cir. 1989), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 865

(1990) (enforceable settlement includes bargained-for

right to avoid trial, reviewable under the collateral order

doctrine); Towers Hotel Corp. v. Rimmel, 871 F.2d 766 (8th

Cir. 1989) (settlement between the parties provided, inter

alia, dismissal of all litigation). In each of these cases,

sustaining those settlements resulted in the dismissal of

the underlying action because all liability had been

resolved by the settlement itself.

Here, Respondents have shown that the Consent

Decree does not provide Petitioners with a full release for

their liability. In fact, in the Decree, the Government

expressly reserved its right to hold Petitioners liable for

future costs related to the cleanup of the Landfill:

[Ijt is the intention of the United States to retain

its legal rights to seek further relief from the

settling Parties as defined and limited by the

provisions herein, (1) from any and all Future

Response Costs, and (2) for injunctive or other

relief which may be available at law or equity in

connection with the Kin-Buc Landfill[.]

(A17-18).

Clearly, Petitioners’ attempt to link the instant matter

to the Desktop case is misplaced for it is evident that

whatever result is reached in Desktop it will have no

bearing on the instant case. To suggest that the Consent

Decree provides a final settlement of Petitioners’ liability

and resolves this matter is indisputably in error and over-

reaching. Therefore, Respondents maintain that there is

no basis, in law or in fact, for Petitioners’ request for

certiorari based on the collateral order doctrine.

2. The Consent Decree at Issue Does Not Provide Pro-

tection from Respondents’ Claims for Contribution

as Those Claims are Not “Matters Addressed in the

Settlement”

Petitioners claim that pursuant to the Consent Decree

they were afforded protection from third-party claims for

contribution. However, this issue is not properly before

the Court, as it was not ruled upon by the Third Circuit.

Thus, even if this Court does decide that the instant

matter is entitled to interlocutory review pursuant to the

collateral order doctrine, Respondents maintain that this

case should be remanded to the Third Circuit for a deter-

mination on the merits.

10

Nevertheless, this claim is clearly without merit, as

shown by this brief response. First, nowhere in the Con-

sent Decree does there appear any language affording

protection from claims for contribution. As was correctly

observed by the District Court below, it is the Consent

Decree that determines the scope of protection provided

a €

to Petitioners, “ ‘A person who has resolved its liability to

the United States or a State in an administrative or judi-

cially approved settlement cannot be liable for claims for

contribution regarding matters addressed in the settle-

ont

ment. (56a, emphasis in original).

Further, Judge Lechner, the District Court Judge

approving the Consent Decree, specifically held at the

time the settlement was approved that an objecting Non-

settling Party “may seek contributions from the settling

parties. ... ” (A40). Thus the Judge charged with the

responsibility of determining whether the Consent

Decree was reasonable and fair found that the Consent

Decree did not afford such contribution protection as now

claimed by Petitioners. Compare U.S. v. Cannon's Engineer-

ing Corp., 899 F.2d 79 (1st Cir. 1990) (court must deter-

mine whether a proposed consent decree is procedurally

fair, substantively fair and reasonable).

Finally, while not disclosed by Petitioners, the United

States Department of Justice filed an amicus curiae brief

with the Third Circuit opposing Petitioners’ assertion that

the Consent Decree bars Respondents’ claim for contribu-

tion. The Government's position is revealing and persua-

sive as it was the other party to the Consent Decree and

therefore has knowledge regarding the actual intent of

that document.

11

Ultimately, Petitioners are attempting to entice the

Court to grant certiorari on the basis of whether or not

§ 113(f)(2) provides “immunity” to suit. However, to

reach that issue, a settlement pursuant to Section 113(f)(2)

of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) must have addressed

the issue of Respondents’ claims. Unquestionably, where

a consent decree does not provide for protection from

those claims, no “immunity” can exist.

As further proof of Respondents’ position, other

decisions which Petitioners have pointed to approving

settlements pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2) are clearly

distinguishable from the case at bar as each explicitly

refers to the grant of contribution protection. See, e.g.,

Denver v. Adolph Coors Co., 829 F. Supp. 340 (D. Col. 1993)

(decision approved settlement, barred claims for contri-

bution and determined non-settlors’ share of liability);

U.S. v. Cannon’s Engineering Corp., 899 F.2d 79, 85 (1st Cir.

1990) (settling parties “were released outright from all

liability” and “were also exempted from suits for contri-

bution”); U.S. v. Rohm & Haas, 721 F. Supp. 666, 675

(D.N.J. 1989) (under consent decree’s provisions, non-

settling defendants barred from seeking contribution

from any of the settling defendants).

Looking to the language of the instant Consent

Decree, the District Court Judge approving that Decree

and the interpretation given to that Decree by the Gov-

ernment itself, it is obvious that Petitioners were never

afforded protection from Respondents’ claim for contri-

bution. As a result, Respondents maintain that interlocu-

tory review is not appropriate as Respondents’ claim for

12

~

contribution is not a “matter[] addressed in the settle-

ment” as required under Section 113(f)(2) of CERCLA, 42

U.S.C. § 9613(f)(2).

= -@—

CONCLUSION

Based upon the foregoing, review by this Court is

unnecessary and inappropriate. The Consent Decree

upon which the Petition tor a Writ of Certiorari is based

provides Petitioners neither a full release of liability nor

protection against Respondents’ claim for contribution.

Thus, unlike cases argued by Petitioners in support of

their request for interlocutory review pursuant to the

collateral order doctrine, the instant Consent Decree does

not afford Petitioners a right not to go to trial.

For all the foregoing reasons, Respondents respect-

fully request that the instant Petition for a Writ of Cer

tiorart be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

Dante J. ROMANINI*

RicHARD M. COHEN

Kozitov, SEATON, ROMANINI &

Brooks, P.C.

1940 Route 70 East

Suite 200

Cherry Hill, New Jersey 08003

(609) 424-8200

Counsel for Respondents

* Counsel of Record

Dated: January 18, 1994

A-l

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF NEW JERSEY

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Plaintiff,

V.

ABSOLUTE FIRE PROTECTION,

CO., INC., ACCURATE FORMING

DIVISION TYCO LABORATORIES,

ACTIVE OIL SERVICE, ADCHEM

CORP., AIR PRODUCTS AND

CHEMICALS, INC., BOC GROUP,

INC., f/k/a/ AIRCO, INC.,

ALCAN ALUMINUM CORP.

ALCOLAC, INC., GOULD, INC.,

as successor to ITE IMPERIAL

CORP., ALKON PRODUCTS

DIVISION, ALLIED-SIGNAL INC.,

as successor to ALLIED CORP. (f/

k/a/ ALLIED CHEMICAL CORP),

THE BENDIX CORP., and

SINCLAIR & VALENTINE CO.,

INC., and on behalf of its wholly-

owned subsidiaries UOP INC. and

BARON BLAKESLEE, INC,

PORTFOLIO ONE, INC. (f/k/a

CHEMLIME CORP.), successor to

ALMO ANTI-POLLUTION

SERVICES CORP., ALPHA

METALS INC., AMFRADA HESS

CORP., AMERICAN CYANAMID

CO., including its wholly-owned

subsidiary SHULTON, INC.,

tet ttt i i

CIVIL ACTION

NO. 88-2087

(AJL)

(Filed

Aug. 1, 1988)

BAXTER HEALTHCARE

CORPORATION, formerly

TRAVENOL LABORATORIES,

INC., successor to AMERICAN

HOSPITAL SUPPLY CORP.,

AMERICAN PRODUCTS

COMPANY, INC., AMERICAN

STANDARD INC., ASHLAND OIL,

INC., on behalf of its ASHLAND

CHEMICAL CO. and DREW

CHEMICAL CORP. divisions,

ASSOCIATED MARBLE CO.,

ASTRO PAK CORPORATION,

AUTOMATIC CONNECTOR INC.,

AVANTE PRODUCTS

CORPORATION, AXTON CROSS

COMPANY, INC., BASF CORP., as

successor in interest to BASF

WYANDOTTE CORP. and the

INMONT CORP., and on behalf of

its wholly-owned subsidiaries

FRITSCHE, DODGE AND OLCOTT

and KNOLL PHARMACEUTICALS,

THE BATES MANUFACTURING

CO., BEACON FAST FREIGHT

CO., INC., BECTON, DICKINSON

AND COMPANY, BIDDLE

SAWYER CORP., BENJAMIN

MOORE & CO., BIOCRAFT

LABORATORIES, INC., BORDEN,

INC., BORG-WARNER

CHEMICALS, INC., BOROUGH OF

WALLINGTON, UNISYS CORP.

(formerly BURROUGHS CORP.,

and successor to SPERRY CORP.),

mee ee a ee ee eee ee ee”

A-3

CPC INTERNATIONAL, INC.,

including its division BEST FOODS

and its wholly-owned subsidiary

PENICK CORP., successor to S.B.

PENICK AND CO., CARBOLINE

CO., on behalf of TOCH

BROTHERS, INC., CARPENTER

TECHNOLOGY CORPORATION,

HOECHST CELANESE CORP., on

behalf of its divisions, CELANESE

COATINGS CO. and CELANESE

RESEARCH CORP., CHEMICAL

LEAMAN TANK LINES INC.

(including VANGUARD

TRANSPORTATION, both

subsidiaries of CHEMICAL

LEAMAN CORP.), CIBA-GEIGY

CORP. (including TOMS RIVER

CHEMICAL CORP.), CLAIROL

INC., COCA-COLA FOODS, a

division of THE COCA-COLA CO.,

COLGATE-PALMOLIVE CO., CON-

LUX COATINGS, INC.,

CONTINENTAL CAN CO., INC.,

ICI AMERICAS INC. (successor to

CONVERTERS INK CO.), JOHN H.

COONEY, INC., a/k/a COONEY

CONSTRUCTION, COVINO’S

INDUSTRIAL DISPOSAL SERVICE,

INC., CRANE & CO., INC.,

CURTISS-WRIGHT CORP.,

DARWORTH CoO., DIVISION OF

ENSIGN-BICKFORD INDUSTRIES,

INC., DATA GENERAL CORP.,

tt

A-4

DELEET MERCHANDISING

CORP., OCCIDENTAL CHEMICAI

CORP., as successor to

OCCIDENTAL

ELECTROCHEMICALS CORP. (f,

k/a DIAMOND SHAMROCK

CHEMICALS CO.), THE DOW

CHEMICAL CO., including DOW

INDUSTRIAL SERVICES, DUBOIS

CHEMICALS, INC., E.l. DUPONT

DE NEMOURS AND CO., INC

(including CONOCO, INC.,

CONTINENTAL OIL,

CONTINENTAL CHEMICAL CO.,

and DUPONT-TAU

LABORATORIES), DURO-TEST

CORP., E.R. SQUIBB & SONS,

INC., BAROUH EATON ALLEN

CORP., EDAL INDUSTRIES, INC.,

BROWNING-FERRIS INDUSTRIES

OF ELIZABETH, NEW JERSEY,

INC., NIAGARA SANITATION

COMPANY, INC., as successor to

RAPID DISPOSAL SERVICE, INC.,

CECOS INTERNATIONAL, INC.,

ELMWOOD TANK & PIPING

CORP., ECUADORIAN LINE, INC.,

EXXON CORP., FMC CORP.,

FETTE FORD, INC., HEXCEL

CORP. (as successor to FINE

ORGANICS), OCCIDENTAL

CHEMICAL CORP., as successor to

FIRESTONE PLASTICS, FISHER

SCIENTIFIC CO., FLUID

PACKAGING CO., INC. (formerly

FLUID CHEMICAL CO., INC.),

FORD MOTOR CO.,

~— i i i i i

ee ee ee ee ee

FYN PAINT & LACQUER CO.,

GAF CORP., SYBRON

TRANSITION CORP. and SYBRON

CHEMICALS INC. (one or both

having done business as GAMLEN

CHEMICAL CO.), GANES

CHEMICALS, INC. (including its

wholly-owned subsidiary

SIGFRIED CHEMICALS), GATX

TERMINALS CORP., GENERAI

ELECTRIC CO., GENERAL

MOTORS CORP. (including its

DELCO REMY DIVISION),

GOODALL RUBBER CO., THE

GOODYEAR TIRE & RUBBER CO.,

GUARD ALL CHEMICAL CO.,,

INC., CHEVRON U.S.A. INC. (on

behalf of GULF OIL CORP.),

CHEVRON CHEMICAL CO. (on

behalf of KEWANEE INDUSTRIES,

INC. and its former divisions

BERKELEY CHEMICAL and

MILLMASTER CHEMICAL), H & S

CHEMICAL CO., HATCO

CHEMICAL DIVISION, HATFIELD

WIRE & CABLE DIVISION OF

CCX, INC., HERCULES, INC.

(including its wholly-owned

subsidiary HAVEG INDUSTRIES,

INC.), HI-PURE CHEMICALS,

INC., HOFFMAN-LA ROCHE

INC., HYDROCARBON

RESEARCH, INC., IBM CORP.,

INTERNATIONAL FLAVORS AND _ )

FRAGRANCES, INC., ITT )

CORPORATION (including its ITT

AVIONICS and DEFENSE )

COMMUNICATIONS divisions), '

ILFORD PHOTO CORP.

A-6

f/k/a ILFORD INC., SAFETY-

KLEEN ENVIROSYSTEMS CO. (on

behalf of INLAND CHEMICAL

CORP. and McKESSON

CORPORATION), INTERDATA

CORP., J.M. HUBER CORP., J.T.

BAKER, INC. (formerly J.T. BAKER

CHEMICAL CO.), JAMES P.

HORAN, INC., JOHN

DUSENBERRY CO., INC.,

JOHNSON & JOHNSON (on behalf

of its wholly-owned subsidiaries

PERSONAL PRODUCTS

COMPANY, ORTHO DIAGNOSTIC

SYSTEMS, INC., and ORTHO

PHARMACEUTICAL

CORPORATION), STROH

CONTAINER CO. (successer to

JOS. SCHLITZ BREWING CO.),

LUCAS INDUSTRIES INC.,

(successor to JOSEPH LUCAS

NORTH AMERICA, INC.), KTK

CORP., KAY-FRIES, INC., KEUFFEL

& ESSER CO., KOPPERS CO.,

INC., L.E. CARPENTER & CO.,

THE LAWRENCE McFADDEN

CO., LAWSON PRODUCTS, INC.,

LEHIGHTON ELECTRONICS,

INC., LEVER BROTHERS CO., and

on behalf of its affiliate

CHESEBOROUGH-PONDS, INC.,

LCP CHEMICALS AND PLASTICS,

INC. (formerly LINDEN

CHLORINE PRODUCTS), LINDEN

MOTOR FREIGHT CO., INC.,

M & T CHEMICALS, INC.,

i ee ee ee ee ee Le ee ee ee ee Le ee ee ee ee oe, ee Le Le ee ee Le ee Le Le Le ee oe

A-7

MASS |sic] & WALDSTEIN,

MALLINCKRODT INC., MANNON

EXCAVATING AND PAVING CO.,

INC., MARISOL, INC., THE

NUTRASWEET CO. (successor to

MATHESON GAS PRODUCTS,

INC.), JOHN MATTHEY, INC.

(successor to MATTHEY BISHOP,

INC.), MAYCO OIL & CHEMICAL,

THE MEARL CORPORATION,

MERCK & CO., INC., METRO OIL

& CHEMICAL CORP., MOBIL OIL

CORPORATION (including its

division MOBIL CHEMICAL CO.),

SPECTRASERV, INC. (f/k/a

MODERN TRANSPORTATION

CO.), MONMOUTH MEDICAL

CENTER, MONSANTO COMPANY,

MORTON THIOKOL, INC. (on

behalf of its divisions MORTON

CHEMICAL CO., VENTRON

CORP., and THIOKOL CHEMICAL

CO.), NL INDUSTRIES, INC.,

GENERAL CERAMICS, INC. (f/

k/a NATIONAL BERYLLIA

CORP.), NATIONAL GYPSUM CO.,

NATIONAL STARCH AND

CHEMICAL CORP., HIGH

VOLTAGE ENGINEERING CORP.

(successor to NATVAR CORP.),

NEPARA, INC., SAB NIFE, INC.,

f/k/a NIFE, INC., ADRON, INC.

(f/k/a NORDA, INC., and on

behalf of its wholly-owned

subsidiary ORBIS PRODUCTS

CORP.), NORTON & SON, INC.,

tte a a a ee ee ee ee

A-8

OAKITE PRODUCTS, INC. (on

behalf of its division OAKLEY

SERVICE CO.), THE OKONITE

CO., OLIN CORP. (including OLIN

CHEMICAL CORP. and PHILLIP

A. HUNT CHEMICAL) and on

behalf of WINCHESTER

REPEATING ARMS (f/k/a

WINCHESTER WESTERN),

PAQUET ONEIDA, INC. (as

successor to ONEIDA

PACKAGING), ORGANON, INC.,

THE ORMOND SHOPS, INC., PVO

INTERNATIONAL, INC., PUBLIC

SERVICE ELECTRIC AND GAS

CO., PQ CORPORATION (f/k/a

PHILADELPHIA QUARTZ),

PAMARCO INC., THE PENN

CENTRAL CORP. (including its

subsidiary GENERAL CABLE CO.),

PERK CHEMICAL CO., INC.,

PFIZER INC. (f/k/a CHARLES

PFIZER, INC.), and including its

division HOWMEDICA, PHELPS

DODGE CORP., PITNEY BOWES

INC., POLAROID CORPORATION,

POLYMER MATERIALS, INC.

(including POLYMER, INC.),

UNITED TECHNOLOGIES CORP.,

PRATT & WHITNEY GROUP,

PRINCETON NURSERIES,

PROCEDYNE CORP., THE

PROCTOR & GAMBLE

MANUFACTURING CO., QUAKER

CHEMICAL CORP., R.W. EAKEN,

INC., RADIAC RESEARCH CORP.,

ee

A-9

REAGENT CHEMICAL &

RESEARCH, THE GREYHOUND

CORP. (for REHEIS CHEMICAL

CO.), REICHHOLD CHEMICALS,

INC., REVERE COPPER & BRASS,

INC., REYNOLDS METALS CO.,

RHEEM MANUFACTURING CO.,

RIVERVIEW HOSPITAL, ROLLINS

ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES

(N.J.), INC., RUSSELL REID CO.,

RUSSELL-STANLEY CORP.,

RUTGERS-THE STATE

UNIVERSITY, RYCOLINE

PRODUCTS, INC., SANDOZ

CHEMICALS CORP. (successor to

COLORS AND CHEMICALS

DIVISION OF SANDOZ, INC.),

LEKSI, INC. (f/k/a SARTOMER

INDUSTRIES, INC.), SCHERING

CORP., SCOTT PAPER COMPANY,

SEALED AIR CORP., SEN-DURE

PRODUCTS INC., SETON HALL

UNIVERSITY, SHELL CHEMICAL

CO., SIKA CORP., SMITHKLINE

BECKMAN CORPORATION,

SOLVENTS RECOVERY SERVICE

OF NEW JERSEY, INC.,

SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA

CHEMICAL CO., INC., SAINT

BARNABAS MEDICAL CTR., A.E.

STALEY MANUFACTURING CO.,

on behalf of its STALEY

CHEMICAL DIVISION,

STANDARD TOOL &

MANUFACTURING CO.,

Nm Nee eee Nee Oe ee

A-10

THE STANLEY WORKS (as

successor to STANLEY-WETTY

INC.), STAUFFER MANAGEMENT

CO., successor to STAUFFER

CHEMICAL CO., STEPAN

COMPANY, SEQUA CORP.

(formerly SUN CHEMICAL CO.), —

TENNECO RESINS, INC.,

TEXACO, INC., TEXACO

BUTADIENE CO., formerly TEXAS-

U.S. CHEMICAL CO., TEXTRON,

INC., on behalf of its former

SPENCER-KELLOGG and

BOSTITCH DIVISIONS, UNITED

STATES METALS REFINING

COMPANY, SAFETY LIGHT CORP.

(f/k/a U.S. RADIUM), US

SAMICA CORP., UNION CARBIDE

CORP., UNIROYAL CHEMICAL

CO., INC. (as successor to THE

CHEMICAL BUSINESS OF

UNIROYAL, INC.), THE UPJOHN

CO., VINELAND CHEMICAL CO.,

INC., ARCO PETROLEUM

PRODUCTS (on behalf of

WILLIAM C. PULLEN, INC.),

COOPER INDUSTRIES, INC. (on

behalf of its subsidiary WAGNER

ELECTRIC CORP.), WALL

TRENDS, INC., WALTER KIDDE,

DIVISION OF KIDDE, INC., AT&T

TECHNOLOGIES, INC. (formerly

WESTERN ELECTRIC CO., INC.),

WESTERN UNION,

i Le La ee a a Le ee a a a a a a ee a ee

A-11

WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC

CORP., WHITE CHEMICAL CORP.,

WITCO CHEMICAL CORP., Z & W

ENTERPRISES, INC., ATI, INC., on

behalf of CHEMSPRAY, ASARCO,

INCORPORATED (f/k/a AMERI-

CAN SMELTING AND REFINING

CO., including its wholly-owned

subsidiary FEDERATED METALS

CORP.), RCA CORP., AKZO CHEMI-

CALS INC., on behalf of its division

INTERSTAB CHEMICALS (formerly

INTERSTAB CHEMICALS, INC.),

ECOLAB INC., successor to APO-

LLO TECHNOLOGIES, INC. (f/k/a

APOLLO CHEMICAL CO.), IMPE-

RIAL OIL COMPANY, INC., W.W.

ANDRESS COMPANY, GULTON

INDUSTRIES, INC., as successor to

GULTON BATTERY CORP.,

Defendants

'

ee meee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee ee See”

CONSENT DECREE

WHEREAS, the United States of America (“United

States”), at the request of the Administrator of the United

States Environmental Protection Agency (“Administra-

tor”), on May 16, 1988 filed a complaint in this matter

pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. § 9601 et seq.,

as Public Law No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613, (“CERCLA”) for

the recovery of all response costs that have been incurred

A-12

by the United States in response to alleged releases and

threatened releases of hazardous substances from the

Kin-Buc Ladfill [sic], located at 383 Meadow Road in

Edison, New Jersey; and

WHEREAS, the Administrator issued Findings of

Fact, Determination and Order on September 3, 1983

under authority of Section 106(a) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C.

§ 9606(a), styled “IN THE MATTER OF SCIENTIFIC,

INC., KIN-BUC, INC., WASTEQUID, INC., INMAR

ASSOCIATES, INC., FILCREST REALTY, INC., MARVIN

MAHAN, ROBERT MEAGER [sic], SCA SERVICES, INC.,

SCA SERVICES OF PASSAIC, INC., ANTHONY GAESS,

and EARTHLINE COMPANY, Respondents.” Docket No.:

II-CERCLA-30102 and the Administrator issued further

Findings of Fact, Determination, and Amended Order on

March 25, 1986, also under authority of Section 106(a) of

CERCLA, styled “IN THE MATTER OF KIN-BUC LAND-

FILL, EDISON, NEW JERSEY: ANTHONY GAESS, MAR-

VIN MAHAN, and ROBERT MEAGHER, individuals,

EARTHLINE COMPANY, a partnership, and CHEMICAL

WASTE MANAGEMENT, INC., FILCREST REALTY,

INC., INMAR ASSOCIATES, INC., KIN-BUC, INC., SCA

SERVICES, INC., SCA SERVICES OF PASSAIC, INC., SCI-

ENTIFIC, INC., and WASTEQUID, INC., corporations

Respondents.” Docket No.: II-CERCLA-60105 (hereinafter

the “Kin-Buc 106 Orders”); and

WHEREAS, the Kin-Buc 106 Orders require the above

named captioned respondents (herein the “Owners/

Operators”) to take certain actions as specified therein

directed to the abatement of the release and threat of

release into the environment of hazardous substances at

the said Kin-Buc Landfill and related facilities, as defined

A-13

in the Kin-Buc 106 Orders (herein collectively the “Kin-

Buc Landfill”); and

WHEREAS, the Kin-Buc 106 Orders, being the only

Administrative Orders issued by the Administrator in

effect with regard to the Kin-Buc Landfill as of the date of

this Consent Decree, remain in effect as of the date of this

Consent Decree against all of the Owners/Operators and

are not in effect as to any Defendant; and

WHEREAS, the United States intends and expects

that the Kin-Buc 106 Orders shall remain in full force and

effect against the Owners/Operators and that said Orders

shall result in the abatement of release and threat of

release into the environment of hazardous substances at

the Kin-Buc Landfill; and

WHEREAS, the President, through authority granted

to the Administrator deriving from CERCLA, the Clean

Water Act, and the Solid Waste Disposal Act, has from

time to time, prior to April 30, 1987, taken action in

addition to the issuance of the Kin-Buc 106 Orders to

respond to and arrange for response actions relating to,

the release and threat of release of hazardous substances

at the Kin-Buc Landfill (herein the “Past Response

Actions”); and

WHEREAS, the United States contends that all Past

Response Actions have not been inconsistent with the

National Contingency Plan; and

WHEREAS, the United States contends that Past

Response Actions have resulted in the incurrence of costs

through April 30, 1987, and interest on such costs through

September 22, 1987, by the United States totaling

A-14

$4,980,398 (FOUR MILLION, NINE HUNDRED AND

EIGHTY THOUSAND, THREE HUNDRED AND

NINETY-EIGHT DOLLARS, herein the “Past Response

Costs”); and

WHEREAS, as used herein, the terms “Past Response

Costs,” and “Past Response Actions” shall not be con-

strued to include any claims for damages for injury to,

destruction of, or loss of natural resources, whenever

such claims arose, or any related enforcement costs; and

WHEREAS, the United States expects, from time to

time after April 30, 1987, to take actions to further

respond to, and arrange for or compel response to, the

alleged release and threat of release of hazardous sub-

stances at the Kin-Buc Landfill, including, if necessary,

actions to abate imminent and substantial endangerments

to prevent threats to public health, welfare or the envi-

ronment, to ameliorate environmental harm, or to seek

damages for injury to, destruction of, or loss of natural

resources in connection with the Kin-Buc Landfill (herein

“Future Response Actions”) and, in so doing, to cause the

United States to incur further costs (herein “Future

Response Costs”); and

WHEREAS, the United States contends that certain

persons and entities, including the Defendants hereto, by

reason of their arrangement for disposal or treatment, or

by reason of their transport, or arrangement for transport

for disposal or treatment of the hazardous substances at

the Kin-Buc Landfill, are responsible parties pursuant to

§ 107(a) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a), (hereinafter

“Potentially Responsible Parties”) and are, together with

A-15

the Owners/Operators, jointly and severally responsible

for the Past Response Costs; and

WHEREAS, the Administrator has madeeeéemand of

the Owners/Operators and also of certain Potentially

Responsible Parties, including the Defendants, to reim-

burse the United States for the Past Response Costs; and

WHEREAS, some, but not all of the Potentially

Responsible Parties, and none of the Owner/Operators,

have responded to the Administrator’s demand for reim-

bursement (hereinafter those Potentially Responsible Par-

ties that have agreed to enter into this Consent Decree to

settle the claims of the United States for reimbursement

of Past Response Costs are referred to as “Settling Par-

ties” and hereinafter the Owners/Operators, together

with those Potentially Responsible Parties that have not

agreed to enter into this Consent Decree, are referred to

as “Nonsettling Parties”); and

WHEREAS, the Settling Parties deny any and all

responsibility or liability of any kind whatsoever under

any statute or common law for any release or threat of

release of hazardous materials at the Kin-Buc Landfill;

and

WHEREAS, the Settling Parties have agreed, pur-

suant to the terms of this Consent Decree, to pay the Past

Response Costs, and the United States is agreeable to

their so doing in full satisfaction of all claims of the

United States with regard to Past Response Costs and

Past Response Actions; and

WHEREAS, in entering into this consent Decree, the

United States has considered the circumstances of the

A-16

releases and threatened releases of hazardous substances

at the Kin-Buc Landfill and the involvement of various

persons and entities in the ownership and operation of

the Kin-Buc Landfill and the arrangement and transporta-

tion for disposal of hazardous substances at the Kin-Buc

Landfill, and has considered the willingness and capacity

of various parties to resolve this matter and is entering

into this Consent Decree in the exercise of its pros-

ecutorial discretion; and

WHEREAS, the United States, in consideration of

payments of the Settling Parties as set forth herein,

desires (a) to release and discharge any claim for any and

all Past Response Costs and Past Response Actions

against the Settling Parties and (b) to covenant to limit

civil suit and administrative process against the Settling

Parties for any Future Response Actions and any Future

Response Costs which may be incurred by the United

States in connection with the Kin-Buc Landfill, including

any civil action or suit for affirmative or injunctive relief,

or any other civil relief which may hereafter be available

to the United States at law or equity, in connection with

the Kin-Buc Landfill, but not in such a manner as to

release any Settling party for Future Response Actions,

Future Response Costs or to impair, except as expressly

set forth herein, any claim for affirmative or injunctive

relief, or any other relief which may hereafter be avail-

able to the United States at law or equity, in connection

with the Kin-Buc Landfill; and

WHEREAS, except for the particular claims extin-

guished by payment pursuant to this Consent Decree, it

is not the intention of the parties to this Consent Decree

to settle any claim, release any persons or entities, or

A-17

covenant not to sue or covenant not to issue administra-

tive process against any Nonsettling Party or any other

person or entity not a party to this Consent Decree; and

WHEREAS, in recognition of the consideration pro-

vided hereunder by the Settling Parties, to the extent the

United States deems it necessary to seek with regard to

the Kin-Buc Landfill from any person or entity any civil

relief in addition to the reimbursement of Past Response

Costs provided for in this Consent Decree, including

affirmative or injunctive relief or any other civil relief

available to the United States at law or equity, it is the

purpose of the covenant to limit suit contained in this

Consent Decree that the United States shall seek such

relief initially from Nonsettling Parties and shall be per-

mitted to seek such relief from Settling Parties only in the

event that the United States shall fail in its efforts to

obtain such relief fron Nonsettling Parties pursuant to the

terms spelled out in this Consent Decree; and

WHEREAS, in the event that the United States should

fail to obtain from Nonsettling Parties their voluntary

conduct of all Future Response Actions and their volun-

tary payment of all Future Response Costs, it is the

present expectation of the parties to this Consent Decree

that the United States shall use all reasonable efforts to

compel the conduct of such Future Response Actions and

obtain the payment of such Future Response Costs

through litigation against Nonsettling Parties; and

WHEREAS, it is the intention of the United States to

retain its legal rights to seek further relief from the Set-

tling Parties as defined and limited by the provisions

herein, (1) for any and all Future Response Costs, and (2)

A-18

for injunctive or other relief which may be available at

law or equity in connection with the Kin-Buc Landfill;

and

WHEREAS, the United States and the Settling Parties

have each stipulated and agreed to the making and entry

of this Consent Decree prior to the taking of any testi-

mony, based upon the pleadings herein, and without any

admission of liability or fault as to any allegation or

matter arising out of the pleadings by any party; and

WHEREAS, the United States and the Settling Parties

agree that settlement of this matter and entry of this

Consent Decree is made in good faith in an effort to avoid

further expensive and protracted litigation, without any

admission as to liability for any purpose; and

WHEREAS, each undersigned representative ot the

parties to the Consent Decree certifies that he or she is

fully authorized to enter into the terms and conditions of

this Decree and to execute and legally bind such party to

this document

NOW THEREFORE it is ORDERED, ADJUDGED

AND DECREED as follows:

1. JURISDICTION. The Court has jurisdiction over

the subject matter of this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C

§ 1331, 28 U.S.C. § 1345, 42 U.S.C. § 9613 and has jurisdic-

tion over to the parties to this Consent Decree. The Set-

tling Parties waive any objection they may have to the

jurisdiction of the Court

2. THE BASIC SETTLEMENT AMOUNT. The Set-

tling Parties agree to make and the United States has

agreed to accept a payment to the United States in the

A-19

amount of $4,980,398.00 which amount is the total

amount of all the Past Response Costs incurred by the

United States and is intended to reimburse the United

States for any and all such Past Response Costs.

3. TRUST ACCOUNT. The Settling Parties have

established a Kin-Buc Trust Account (hereinafter the

“Trust Account”). Each Settling Party has paid into the

Trust Account an amount equal to its allocation obliga-

tion as set forth in a separate agreement among them-

selves, which is not part of this Consent Decree, plus an

amount representing a proportional share of the alloca-

tions of Nonsettling parties. Within 45 days after the date

of this Consent Decree, the Trustee of the Trust Account

shall pay over to the United States the monies received

and collected from Settling Parties in the amount of

$4,980,398.00. The payment of the Trust Account to the

United States shall be by certified or cashiers check made

payable to “Hazardous Substances Superfund” and shall

be mailed or otherwise delivered to:

Hazardous Substances Superfund

U.S. E.P.A., Superfund

P.O. Box 371003M

Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania 15251

Upon receipt by the United States of the payment

from the Trust Account the United States’ claims for Past

Response Costs and Past Response Actions shall be extin-

guished.

4. SATISFACTION. The delivery of the payment by

the Trust Fund to the United States as specified in this

A-20

Consent Decree, together with the other promises, agree-

ments, covenants, conditions and mutual undertakings of

this Consent Decree, extinguish the United States’ claims

tor Past Response Costs and Past Response Actions and

shall be full and complete satisfaction of the Settling

Parties’ liabilities under CERCLA, or under any other

statute or common law, with respect to Past Response

Costs and Past Response Actions and for any administra-

tive costs and civil penalties which may have accrued

prior to April 30, 1987, and for interest on such sums

which may have accrued prior to September 22, 1987,

with regard to the Kin-Buc Landfill.

5. SETTLING PARTIES’ RETENTION OF RIGHTS

TO SEEK CONTRIBUTION OR INDEMNITY AND COVE-

NANT NOT TO SUE EACH OTHER. Each Settling Party

shall retain all rights under statutory and common law to

seek contribution or indemnity against any and all other

persons, including any of the Owners/Operators or other

Nonsettling Parties or any other person or entity, for any

amount such Settling Party shall have paid pursuant to

this Consent Decree except that no such rights are

retained against any other Settling Party and such rights

are hereby expressly waived, released and discharged

with regard to other Settling Parties. For and in consider-

ation of the mutual covenants and promises of the Set-

tling parties made herein, each Settling Party hereby

covenants not to sue or otherwise assert any claim

against any other Settling party for reimbursement for

any payment made pursuant to this Consent Decree.

6. RESERVATION OF RELEASE. (a) As a result of

payments made for Past Response Costs and Past

Response Actions pursuant to this Consent Decree, the

A-21

Settling parties are not released by the United States for

any liability to the United States to which they may be

subject for Future Response Actions or Future Response

Costs, provided that such liability, if any, shall be limited

by the provisions of this Consent Decree and shall not be

imposed except pursuant to the terms hereof.

(b) Asa result of payments made for Past Response

Costs and Past Response Actions pursuant to this Con-

sent Decree, the Settling Parties are not released by the

United States for any liability for damages to, destruction

of, or loss of natural resources in connection with the Kin-

Buc Landfill and nothing in this Consent Decree shall be

construed as a covenant not to sue Settling Parties for

such natural resources damages or as the agreement of

any Federal natural resource trustee to a covenant not to

sue Settling Parties pursuant to Section 122(j)(2) of

CERCLA.

7. COVENANTS TO LIMIT ADMINISTRATIVE AND

JUDICIAL ACTION AGAINST SETTLING PARTIES. The

provisions of Paragraph 6 or any other provision of this

Consent Decree notwithstanding:

(a) In the event that the United States shall at any

time deem it necessary to take any administrative or

judicial civil action or actions to cause or compel any

person or entity to implement Future Response Actions at

or with regard to the Kin-Buc Landfill, the United States

agrees that it shall not take such action against Settling

Parties provided, however, that in the event the United

States has made all reasonable efforts to cause or compel

Nonsettling parties to implement Future Response

A-22

Actions at the Kin-Buc Landfill pursuant to relevant stat-

utes and authorities, the United States may commence an

administrative or judicial civil action agains: Settling Par-

ties in order to cause or compel the Settling Parties to

implement those Future Response Actions it has been

unable, after having made all reasonable efforts, to cause

or compel the Nonsettling Parties to undertake.

(b) In the event that the United States shall at any

time deem it necessary to take any administrative or

judicial civil action or actions to seek Future Response

Costs or any other sum of money of whatever kind

related to the Kin-Buc Landfill, the United States agrees

that it shall not take such action against Settling Parties,

provided, however, that in the event the United States

has made all reasonable efforts to recover from the Non-

settling Parties the amount of Future Response Costs or

such other sums at the Kin-Buc Landfill, pursuant to

relevant statutes and authorities, the United States may

commence an administrative or judicial! civil action

against the Settling Parties to recover the amount of those

Future Response Costs or such other sums it has been

unable, after having made all reasonable efforts, to

recover from Nonsettling Parties.

(c) Actions taken by the United States for relief

provided in Paragraph 7(a) shall not satisfy the covenant

of the United States arising under Paragraph 7(b) and

actions taken by the United States for relief provided for

in Paragraph 7(b) shall not satisfy the covenant of the

United States arising under Paragraph 7(a).

8. EXCEPTIONS TO COVENANTS. (a) Nothing con-

tained in this Consent Decree shall be construed to defeat

A-23

the enforcement discretion of the United States by impair-

ing its right to select which Nonsettling Parties to pro-

ceed against and the manner in which litigation will be

conducted; provided, however, that said enforcement dis-

cretion shall not be construed to defeat the provisions of

Paragraphs 7(a) and 7(b) regarding the making of all

reasonable efforts to cause or compel the Nonsettling

Parties to implement Future Response Actions or to

recover Future Response Costs from the Nonsettling Par-

ties.

(b) Provided the United States files an action for

Future Response Actions or Future Response Costs

against one or more of the Nonsettling parties which is

not time-barred as of the date of filing of that action, the

Settling Parties agree not to raise as a defense any statute

of limitation in a subsequent action for the same relief

brought by the United States against Settling Parties,

provided such action is brought within 270 days of the

termination of the action against Nonsettling parties.

(c) It is the intention of the parties to this Consent

Decree that the Settling Parties not be joined in any action

brought by the United States against Nonsettling Parties

for Future Response Actions or Future Response Costs. In

the event that in any such action brought against Nonset-

tling parties by the United States any Nonsettling Party

seeks to have joined any Settling Party as a third party

defendant, or otherwise, the United States shall not agree

tc the joinder of any Settling Party or the assertion of any

direct claims by the United States against any Settling

Party unless the United States is required to do so by

order of Court. If requested by the Court to express its

views with regard to the efforts of the Settling Parties to

|

A-24

avoid joinder, stay the filing of claims against them,

obtain a severence of claims against them, or persuade

the Court it should take no action to defeat the purposes

of this Consent Decree and of the Covenant herein to

limit suit, or otherwise, the United States shall express its

continued support for the nonjoinder of Settling Parties

on the grounds of effectuation of this Consent Decree and

the Covenant to limit suit contained in Paragraph 7 of

this Consent Decree. Provided that in the event that any

Settling Party is, nevertheless, successfully joined in such

an action by a Nonsettling Party and the United States

asserts no claims of its own against such Settling Party,

the Settling Party shall not, in any action or proceeding,

whether taken under this Consent Decree or otherwise,

assert as defenses against the United States as res judicata

or collateral estoppel any matter of law or fact asserted

by the parties to such third party action and adjudicated

in the course of that third party action, nor shall such

Settling Party assert as a defense that the United States’

claims against the Settling Party should or could have

been litigated in such earlier proceedings.

9. RESERVATION OF SETTLING PARTIES’ RIGHTS.

In the event that the United States asserts any unsatisfied

claims for Future Response Costs or Future Response

Actions against the Settling Parties, in any judicial or

administrative proceeding, each and every Settling Party

shall have preserved and may assert any and all defenses

it shall have to such unsatisfied claims, except as pro-

vided in Paragraph 8 above.

10. AGREEMENT NOT TO ASSERT CLAIMS. The

Settling Parties each agree not to assert any claims for

relief, causes of action, or demands against the United

A-25

States or the Hazardous Substances Superfund with

regard to any payment made pursuant to this Consent

Decree.

11. DENIAL OF LIABILITY. Neither the perfor-

mance of the agreement to make the payments provided

for in Paragraphs 2 and 3 hereof, nor anything else con-

tained in this Consent Decree shall be deemed an admis-

sion by any of the Settling Parties of any violation of law,

or of jurisdiction over them under CERCLA or any other

law, and this Consent Decree shall not be admissible as

evidence in any proceeding at law or in equity, except to

enforce or preserve the rights and obligations expressly

set forth herein. Any payment made hereunder shal! not

be deemed a fine, penalty, or monetary sanction. The

Settling Parties do not admit that payments made here-

under are not in settlement of damages; nor do they

admit or contend that the payments made hereunder are

in settlement of damages to, destruction of, or losses of

natural resources in connection with the Kin-Buc Landfill

The Settling Parties, in entering into this Consent Decree,

do not admit, accept, or acknowledge any liability or

fault with respect to any matter arising out of or relating

to the Kin-Buc Landfill. The Settling Parties do not admit,

accept or acknowledge the procedural or substantive

accuracy of any determinations made by the United

States in connection with the Kin-Buc Landfill or of any

contention of the United States expressed in the Whereas

clauses of this Consent Decree. These express denials

attach to any and all matters relating to or arising out of

the Kin-Buc site.

A-26

12. EXCLUSION. Only Settling Parties and parties

to the Agreement establishing the Trust Account are par-

ties or may become parties to this Consent Decree.

13. REPRESENTATION OF AUTHORITY.Each sig-

natory for a Settling Party represents that he or she has

fully authority to enter into this Consent Decree on behalf

of that party and to bind that party as provided herein.

14. SUCCESSORS. This Consent Decree shall apply

to and be binding upon the parties, their successors, and

assigns.

15. CONTINUING JURISDICTION. The Court speci-

fically retains jurisdiction over both the subject matter of

and the Parties to this action for the duration of this

Consent Decree.

16. SECTION HEADINGS. The section headings set

forth in this Consent Decree are included for convenience

of reference only and shall be disregarded in the con-

struction and interpretation of any of the provisions of

this Decree.

This Consent Decree approved and entered on this

Ist day of August, 1988. (AJL)

/s/ Alfred J. Lechner, Jr.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT

JUDGE

A-27

For the United States:

/s/

/s/

/s/

Roger J. Marzulla

ROGER J. MARZULLA

Assistant Attorney General

Land and Natural Resources

Division

Washington, D.C. 20530

SAMUEL A. ALITO, JR.

United States Attorney

JAMES WOODS,

Special Assistant

United States Attorney

Leonard H. Shen

LEONARD H. SHEN

Attorney

Environmental Enforcement

Section

Land and Natural Resources

Livision

U.S. Department of Justice

Washington, D.C. 20530

Illegible

For THOMAS L. ADAMS, JR.

Assistant Administrator for

Enforcement and Compliance

Monitoring

U.S. Environmental Protection

Agency

401 M Street, S.W.

Washington, D.C. 20460

A-28

IN THe Unitrep States District Court

For THet District Or New Jersey

Civil Action No. 88-2087

UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA, TRANSCRIPT OF

e PROCEEDINGS

ABSOLUTE FIRE | shea

PROTECTION CO., INC., — : (Filed

et al. Oct. 18, 1988)

Newark, New Jersey

Defendants.

Ee ee Be gS —~=

BEFORE:

THE HONORABLE ALFRED J. LECHNER, JR.

Appearances:

None

[p. 2] THE COURT: This is an action instituted

by the United States under section 107 of the Comprehen-

sive Environmental Response, Compensation and 1.ia-

bility Act of 1980 (“CERCLA”), 42 U.S.C. section 9607, for

reimbursement of costs incurred by the United States in

response to the release or threatened release of hazardous

substances into the environment from the Kin-Buc Land-

fill Facility in Edison, New Jersey (the “landfill”). After

lengthy negotiations, the Government and two hundred

twenty six defendants in this case arrived at a settlement

agreement. The Government now moves for an order

entering the consent decree proposed by the parties. The

matter is decided on the basis of the papers submitted

pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 78.

A-29

Background

The landfill at issue in this case is commonly known

as the Kin-Buc Sanitary Landfill and is located at 383

Meadow Road, Edison, New Jersey. The landfill was for-

merly used for the disposal of solid and liquid domestic

and commercial waste, and municipal, industrial and

chemical wastes and sludges. Complaint, paragraph 5.

The complaint alleges these wastes contained hazardous

substances, pollutants and contaminants, as those terms

are defined in section 101 of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. section

9601. Complaint, paragraph 5.

[p. 3] According to the complaint, between 1973 and

1976 at least seventy million gallons of chemical wastes

and unspecified quantities of solid materials were

accepted for disposal at the landfill. The complaint

alleges the disposal of these wastes at the landfill has

resulted in a release of hazardous substances, po!lutants

and contaminants into the convironment [sic] since at

least as early as 1976. Id., paragraphs 7-8.

The United States has incurred costs through April

30, 1987, including interest through September 22, 1987,

of at least $4,980,398 for response actions taken at the

landfill. The United States continues to incur response

costs, including costs of enforcement. Id., paragraph 10.

The Government contends that certain persons and

entities, including the defendants named in this action,

by reason of their arrangement for disposal or treatment,

or by reason of their arrangement for transport for dis-

posal or treatment of the hazardous substances at the

landfill, are responsible parties under section 107(a) of

CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. section 9607(a), and are, together

A-30

with the owners and operators, jointly and severally

responsible for response costs.

The Government was engaged for several years in

negotiations with persons or entities which are [p. 4]

assertedly responsible parties under CERCLA (“poten-

tially responsible parties” or “PRPs”). A steering commit-

tee was established for those PRPs who would participate

in the negotiations and in the ultimate settlement. During

the course of the negotiations certain deadlines had to be

met by PRPs in order to be able to participate. A final

agreement was reached between the Government and

two hundred twenty six PRPs (the “settling PRPs” or the

“settling parties”). The proposed settlement then was

considered and approved by the Environmental Protec-

tion Agency (“EPA”) and the Justice Department.

On May 16, 1988, the United States filed the com-

plaint in this action naming as defendants the two hun-

dred twenty six PRPs who were part of the settlement

agreement. The complaint alleges that the defendants are

jointly and severally liable under section 107(a) of

CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. section 9607(a), for the reimburse-

ment costs of actions taken by the United States at the

landfill in response to the released or threatened release

of hazardous substances into the environment. Id., para-

graph 24.

The complaint seeks as relief: (1) a judgment against

the defendants in favor of the United States for response

costs incurred, plus interest, which costs through April

30, 1987 and interest through September 22, [p. 5] 1987,

total at least $4,980,398; (2) a judgment in favor of the

United States declaring the defendants liable for all

A-31

response costs incurred after April 30, 1987, plus interest;

(3) an award to the United States of its costs including

enforcement costs and attorney’s fees; and (4) any other

proper relief.

On the same day the complaint was filed, the pro-

posed consent decree was lodged with the court. Federal

regulations require publication of notice of the settlement

in the Federal Register and a thirty day public comment

period. In light of the posture of this case with respect to

settlement, on June 15, 1988 I granted the Government's

request for an order staying all discovery and litigation

proceedings pending consideration of the proposed con-

sent decree. All deadlines for filing responsive pleadings

and motions were suspended.

The principal terms of the proposed consent decree

are as follows. The decree specifies that performance of

the agreement shall not be deemed as an admission of

liability or fault. Consent Decree, paragraph 11. Under

the agreement, the two hundred twenty six defendants in

this case agree to pay $4,980,398, which represents the

response costs incurred through April 30, 1987, plus

interest through September 22, 1987 (“past response [p. 6]

costs”). Id., paragraph 2. The delivery of this payment

will extinghish [sic] the United States’ claims for past

response costs against the settling parties. Id., paragraph

4. Accordingly, the complaint’s request for relief concern-

ing these costs is to be dismissed with prejudice.

According to the consent decree, the settling parties

are not released from any liability with respect to any

actions or costs incurred by the United States after April

30, 1987 (“future response actions” or “future response

A-32

costs”). Id., paragraph 6(a). The United States does cove-

nant that if it is deemed necessary to institute any admin-

istrative or judicial civil aciton [sic] to compel the

implementation of future response acitons, [sic] the

United States shall not take such action against the set-

tling parties until after having made all reasonable efforts

to compel non-settling PRPs to implement future

response actions. Id., paragraph 7(a). The United States

similarly covenants to not seek reimbursement of future

response costs from the settling [p. 7] parties until after it

has made all reasonable efforts to recover from non-

settling PRPs. Id., paragraph 7(b). In light of these cove-

nants the complaint’s claims which go beyond past

response costs are to be dismissed without prejudice.

According to federal regulations, 28 C.F.R. section 50.7,

notice of the consent decree was published in the Federal

Register on June 3, 1988. See 53 Fed. Reg. 20379. The thirty

day public comment period required by the reguiations

expired on July 5, 1988. Comments were received from two

non-settling PRPs: St. Joe Paper Company, and Earthline

Company and its affiliates SCA Services of Passaic, Inc.,

Wasteguid, Inc., and SCA Services, Inc. St. Joe Paper Com-

pany does not object to the terms of the settlement. St. Joe

Paper Company seeks to be included as a settling party.

Earthline Company objects that it is not included in the

settlement and also makes certain objections with respect to

the terms of the proposed consent decree.

' The settling parties are also not released by the United

States for any liability for damages to, destruction of, or loss of

natural resources in connection with the landfill. Id., paragraph

6(b).

A-33

Now that the public comment period has expired, the

United States moves for the entry of the consent decree.

For the reasons which follow, the motion is granted.

Discussion

CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. sections 9601 et seqg., authorizes

government cleanup of hazardous waste sites using

money [p. 8] provided by the Hazardous Substances

Superfund (“Superfund”). However, it is generally

acknowledged that the Superfund is limited and the costs

of response activities nationwide greatly exceed the

Superfund. Section 107(a) of CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. section

9607, therefore provides an avenue for the United States

to recover response costs from responsible parties and

thus replenish the Superfund in order to finance the

cleanup of other sites. Theough this action the United

States seeks to recoup for the Superfund substantial sums

that have been spent in connection with the Kin-Buc

landfill from at least some of the numerous PRPs.

In an effort to save the time and costs involved in

litigation, the Government and the defendants named in

this action were involved in lengthy negotiations which

resulted in the proposed consent decree. There is a strong

policy favoring the voluntary settlement of civil actions

because settlement saves both the parties and the courts

the substantial resources required to proceed with litiga-

tion of the issues. Pennwalt Corp. v. Plough, Inc., 676 F.2d

77, 80 (3d Cir. 1982).

A-34

A. Review of the Proposed Consent Decree

The decision to approve or reject a settlement pro-

posal is committed to the sound discretion of the trial

judge. SEC v. Randolph, 736 F.2d 525, 529 (9th [p. 9] Cir.

1984). Nevertheless, a proposed consent decree ought to

be approved unless it is unfair, inadequate or unreason-

able. Id.; Walsh v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., Inc., 726

F.2d 956, 965 (3d Cir. 1983). Furthermore, “the courts

should pay deference to the judgment of the government

agency which has negotiated and submitted the proposed

judgment.” Randolph, 736 F.2d at 529.

The proposed consent decree in this case appears to

be fair, adequate and reasonable. The settling parties’

agreement to pay the United States almost five million

dollars implements the underlying cost recovery scheme

of CERCLA by replenishing the Superfund promptly. In

exchange the United States releases these parties from

any liability concerning the response costs incurred prior

to April 30, 1987. The settling parties remain liable for

future response costs after the Government has made all

reasonable efforts to seek recovery from non-settling par-

ties. The settling parties also remain liable for any natural

resource damage. This settlement agreed to by the

numerous defendants is fair, adequate and safeguards the

environment and the public interest.

A-35

[p. 10] B. The Comments of the Non-Settling Parties

1. St. Joe Paper Company

St. Joe Paper Company (“St. Joe”) submitted a public

comment concerning the proposed settlement of this case

St. Joe “objects to the settlement since it does not include

them as a settling party.” St. Joe Comment Letter at 1. St.

Joe emphasizes that it believes the proposed settlement is

fair, except for its exclusion, and asks this court to order

the inclusion of St. Joe as a settling party. Id. at 4.

St. Joe concedes that it failed to comply with the

deadline set by the Government for the submission of

signature pages from those PRPs who desired to partici-

pate in the proposed settlement. St. Joe explains that a

lack of proper communication between St. Joe and their

New jersey counsel resulted in a two month delay in

forwarding the signature pages; St. Joe contends this was

excusable neglect. Id. at 2, 4. The Government exercised

its discretion to not accept St. Joe’s belated offer to partic-

ipate in the settlement because it would have further

delayed the settlement process with respect to the two

hundred twenty six PRPs who met the deadline for inclu-

sion.

In considering St. Joe’s objection and request, this

court must pay deference to the judgment of the [p. 11]

Government agency which has negotiated and submitted

the proposed consent decree. Randolph, 736 F.2d at 529.

The balancing of competing interests affected by a pro-

posed consent decree “must be left, in the first instance,

to the discretion of the Attorney General.” United States v.

Bechtel Corp., 648 F.2d 660, 666 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 454

U.S. 1083 (1981).

A-36

Furthermore, in considering the proposed settlement,

this court’s role is limited. A court may either approve or

disapprove a settlement, but may not rewrite the parties’

agreement. Officers for Justice v. Civil Service Commission,

688 F.2d 615, 630 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1217

(1983); Harris v. Pernsley, 654 F. Supp. 1042, 1049 (E.D. Pa.

1987). Accordingly, in United States v. Jones & Laughlin

Steel Corp., 804 F.2d 348 (6th Cir. 1986), the court of

appeals held the district court abused its discretion when

it conditioned approval of a proposed consent decree

upon an amendment to allow a non-settling party to

receive part of the settlement money. Id. at 351-52.

In light of the deference which the Government is

due with respect to the settlement which it arrived at

exercising its prosecutorial discretion, and in light of a

court’s limited role in reviewing a proposed settlement, it

is inappropriate to order a modification [p. 12] of the

decree to include St. Joe. Furthermore, even if a modifica-

tion were proper, an order requiring the inclusion of St.

Joe at this time would substantially prejudice the United

States, while only providing a speculative benefit to St.

Joe. As pointed out by the Government, St. Joe will only

be prejudiced if the United States eventually brings suit

against it for claims covered by this settlement, and if in

attempting to settle such an action, St. Joe is faced with

terms worse than those of this settlement. On the other

hand, the inclusion of St. Joe at this time would result in a

costly delay for the United States. A modification of the

decree would require reapproval by the EPA and the

Justice Department, as well as republication of the notice

of settlement and a new thirty day public comment

period. The delay would cost the United States several

BE Riear Ce, Hinson

A-37

tens of thousands of dollars in interest on the nearly

several tens of thousands of dollars in interest on the

nearly five million dollar settlement amount. Considering

this court’s appropriate scope of review of the consent

decree and the equities involved in a modification to

include a new party, St. Joe’s request for inclusion is

denied.

[p. 13] 2. Earthline Company

The second comment which was received was from

another non-settling PRP, Earthline Company and its

affiliates (collectively “Earthline”). In its comment letter,

Earthline describes its involvement in the cleanup of the

landfill and makes certain objections concerning the pro-

posed consent decree.

First, Earthline states that it did not participate in

settlement negotiations because the settling PRPs and the

Government excluded Earthline from the negotiations.

Earthline states that in 1985 it was refused an opportunity

to review the drafts of the consent degree [sic]. Earthline

asserts the “inescapable conclusion” is that the settling

parties deliberately negotiated the decree behind Earth-

line’s back. Earthline Comment Letter at 4.

The intentions of the settling parties with respect to

non-settling parties are not relevant to this court’s review

of the proposed consent decree in this case. Moreover, the

Government may properly exercise its discretion in

selecting among PRPs when settling claims. Nevertheless,

the Government has submitted affidavits which indicate

A-38

that Earthline was invited to participate in the negotia-

tions but it declined to do so. No counter-affidavits were

submitted.

[p. 14] According to the Government, in November,

1984, representatives of Earthline indicated to the counsel

of the settling parties’ Steering Committee that Earthline

was not interested in joining the settlement discussions.

Affidavit of James W. Moorman (“Moorman Aff.”), para-

graphs 7-8. In May, 1985, the EPA urged Earthline once

“mere to participate in the negotiations. Affidavit of Dou-

glas R. Blazey (“Blazey Aff.”), paragraph 17. Subse-

quently, in July, 1985 Earthline asked the Steering

Committee for a copy of the draft consent decree which

was being discussed. Mooreman Aff., paragraph 12. In

light of Earthline’s prior refusal to participate, Earthline

was asked to write a letter to the Steering Committee

clarifying whether it would participate in the settlement

negotiations. Id. The Government points out it would

have been inappropriate to disclose confidential settle-

ment documents with parties who had not declared an

interest in negotiating and who were potential litigants.

Blazey Aff., paragraph 18. In the past three years, Earth-

line did not communicate, in writing or otherwise, with

the EPA or the settling parties’ Steering Committee to

request participation. Id., paragraph 19; Moorman Aff.,

paragraphs 13-14.

In light of the Government’s submissions, it appears

that Earthline’s failure to participate inthe [p. 15] settle-

ment negotiations was due to its own failure to properly

declare its interest. In any event; as mentioned, the bal-

ancing of competing interests affected by a proposed

consent decree “must be left, in the first instance, to the

A-39

discretion of the Attorney General.” Bechtel Corp., 648

F.2d at 666.

Earthline’s second complaint concerning the pro-

posed decree is that it unfairly penalizes Earthline for

complying with an EPA cleanup order while it rewards

the settling PRP’s for failing to come forward with

cleanup proposals. Earthline asserts that paragraph seven

of the consent decree commits the Government to direct

all future enforcement efforts at non-settling PRPs such as

Earthline and thereby “shoots the volunteers.” Earthline

Comment Letter at 4.

In response, the Government points out that Earth-

line did not volunteer to perform certain response actions

with respect to the landfill. Earthline was compelled by

an EPA Unilateral Administrative Order, originally issued

in 1984, to complete all necessary cleanup actions at the

landfill. The proposed consent decree in this case does

not penalize Earthline in that it does not change Earth-

line’s obligations under the 1984 EPA order.

[p. 16] In addition, contrary to Earthline’s assertions,

the consent decree does not “reward” the settling defen-

dants for failing to undertake cleanup actions in the past.

Rather, the consent decree requires the settling parties to

pay nearly five million dollars for past response costs

incurred by the United States, and further maintains the

settling parties’ liability for future response costs which

cannot be recovered from the non-settling PRPs.

Earthline’s last objection pertains to the consent

decree provision that if the United States sues non-set-

tling PRP’s for additional relief and any non-settling PRP

seeks to join one of the settling PRPs as a third-party

A-40

defendant, “the United States shall not agree to the join-

der of any Settling Party or the assertion of any direct

claims by the United States against any Settling Party

unless the United States is required to do so by order of

Court.” Consent Decree, paragraph 8(c). Earthline asserts

this provision is inconsistent with section 113(f)(1) of

CERCLA, 42 U.S.C. section 9613(f)(1), which provides

that any person may seek contribution from any other

person during or following a civil action instituted under

sections 106 or 107(a), 42 U.S.C. sections 9606, 9607(a).

[p. 17] As pointed out by the Government, the decree

only requires the Government to oppose joinder when it

is sought in the context of a direct enforcement action

brought by the Government against a non-settling PRP.

Thus, as long as Earthline complies with its legal obliga-

tions and no action is brought against it by the United

States, paragraph 8(c) will not apply and Earthline may

seek contributions from the set:ling parties without oppo-

sition from the Government.

Furthermore, even if paragraph 8(c) is triggered in

the context of an enforcement action brought by the

United States, the consent decree’s provision only

requires the United States to take a legal position in

opposition to the joinder of a settling party in order to

provide some repose to the settling parties in return for

their settlement payment. The decree’s provision, how-

ever, is not a legal bar to a third party contribution action

as a court could order the joinder notwithstanding the

Government’s position.

snes

A-41

Earthline’s objections concerning the decree appear

to be based on misperceptions of the circumstances sur-

rounding the cleanup of the landfill and the effect’s pro-

visions. Earthline has not presented any compelling

reason why the proposed consent decree should not be

viewed as fair, adequate and reasonable.

[p. 18] Conclusion

The proposed consent decree in this case appears to

be fair, adequate and reasonable. Furthermore, the com-

ments submitted by St. Joe and Earthline do not present

any sound basis to reject this settlement reached after

lengthy negotiations and under which the two hundred

twenty six defendants in this case agree to settle for

almost five million dollars. The Government's motion for

an order entering the decree is granted.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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