Opposition Brief — Balcor Film Investors v. Eckstein

Supreme Court brief1994

Ask Donna

What actually matters in this document.

Text

¢) [| BIQKED

No. 94-897 DEC 17 1993 fev |

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcrosBEer TERM, 1993

BALCOR FILM INVESTORS, et al.,

Petitioners,

vs.

ROBERT ECKSTEIN and SYLVIA ECKSTEIN, et al.,

Respondents.

ON PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION TO

THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

GeorcE P. KERSTEN Rosin F. ZwWERLING

E. CAMPION KERSTEN Counsel of Record

KERSTEN & MCKINNON, Rosert S. SCHACHTER

S.C. HiLiary SOBEL

231 West Wisconsin Avenue ZWERLING, SCHACHTER

Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53203 & ZWERLING

(414) 271-0054 767 Third Avenue

New York, New York 10017

(212) 223-3900

Attorneys for Respondents

(For Further Appearances See Reverse Side of Cover)

MICHAEL S. GLASSMAN

KATHLEEN L. CLEMENS

GLASSMAN AND CLEMENS,

A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION

3200 Wilshire Boulevard

Los Angeles, California 90010

(213) 389-9623

Jerry H. FRIEDLAND

GALANIS, FRIEDLAND & POLLACK, S.C.

2 Plaza East, Suite 560

330 East Kilbourn Avenue

Milwaukee, Wisconsin 53202

(414) 271-5400

Attorneys for Respondents

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

1. Was the Seventh Circuit correct that its choice of law

rules permitted the application of the statute of limitations in

the Central District of California to actions for violations of

section 10(b) to Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, an action

transferred from the Central District of California to the

Eastern District of Wisconsin?

a Was the Seventh Circuit correct in following its own

decision in McCool v. Strata Oil Co., 972 F.2d 1452 (7th

Cir. 1992) in holding the principles of retroactivity in the

Seventh Circuit as of June 19, 1991 permitted choice of

forum to constitute "reliance" on a prior limitations period?

a oe

TABLE OF CONTENTS

COUNTERSTATEMENT OF

QUES We PRESEINIee... 2050.05.35 .2%, i

SARee OP AU TROtnee 5k oe ee iil

I ees ea eee ]

I. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION

IN THE ECKSTEIN ACTION IS NOT

APPROPRIATE FOR REVIEW .......... 3

A. The Seventh Circuit Applied Its

Own Choice of Law Rules ............. 3

B. The Seventh Circuit Choice of Law

Rules Directed the Court to Van Dusen

SNA ae es Ran a frame, ne 4

= The Seventh Circuit Discussion Of

Section 27A Does Not Merit Review

yt eee Co ae ee ee 8

II. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN

THE MAJESKI ACTION IS NOT APPROPRIATE

FOR REVIEW ...... Pe ea fre, 9

CALA AMID 6s 6 eS ee eee 11

- ili -

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Cases

Ceres Partners v. GEL Assoc..

918 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1990) ......... 3, 4

DelCostello v. Int'l Brotherhood of Teamsters,

662 U.S. 151 (1983) ww a 2, 3, 6

Ferens v. John Deere Co.,

474 U.S. 576,

PID D.C. S26 CID Ser es Ae ee

In re Korean Air Disaster of September ], 1983,

829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir. 1987) ..... ye

Lampf, Pleva, Lipkind, Prupis & Petigrow v.

Gilbertson,

_. US. _, 121 S. G. 2773, 115 L. Bt.

eS oe ee ee ee ree i A

McCool v. Strata Oil Co..

972 F.2d 1452 (7th Cir. 1992) .... 1,3,9,10

Menowitz v. Brown,

991 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1993) ......... 1,3

Robert Eckstein, et al. v. Balcor Film

Investors, et al,

Fed. Sec. L. Rep. [Current] (CCH) $ 97,712

(7th Cir. Aug. 20,1993) ........... 1,3

-1V-

Short v. Belleville Shoe Mfg. Co., —

908 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied.

ano. 4% geev Geel) 4s wd, ne 3, 4

Van Dusen v. Barrack

376 U.S. 612 (1984) ........... 2,4, 5,7

STATUTES

IS U.S.C. §10() 2... Passim

SP 8 tl 7! A a eee Passim

OP rs ED ho wd vw ch wee 4

SOU SL. $1406 nw cece. 4

MISCELLANEOUS

Marcus, Conflicts Among Circuits and Transfers

Within The Federal Jurisdiction System,

93 Yale L.J. 677, 708-09 (1984) ...... 4,7

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

Summary

The Seventh Circuit decision’ of which review is

sought deals solely with the law "in [that] jurisdiction" -- .e.,

Seventh Circuit law as of June 19, 1991, relating to §10(b)

limitations periods, choice of law and retroactivity. The

questions at issue are esoteric and unlikely to recur.

Moreover, the answers to these questions are not dispositive

of the instant controversy.

No intolerable conflict exists between Balcor and

Menowitz v. Brown, 991 F.2d 36 (2d Cir. 1993). Each

court applied the law of its Circuit -- the law of the transferee

court -- as "the jurisdiction" under §27A, to determine the

applicable statute of limitations. Each court, the Seventh

Circuit in Balcor and the Second Circuit in Menowitz, applied

its choice of law rules to guide its determination. Any

"conflict" is in the result only and therefore is tolerable

because it arises only due to the differing choice of law rules

in those circuits. Furthermore, there are both legal and

factual distinctions between the Balcor and Menowitz

opinions which render any "conflict" unimportant and

unworthy of Supreme Court review.

_With regard to the Eckstein action’, Seventh Circuit

' Robert Eckstein, et al. v. Balcor Film Investors, et al., Fed. Sec.

L. Rep. [Current] (CCH) 497,712 (7th Cir. Aug. 20, 1993) ("Balcor").

2 There are two related cases to which the petition addressed itself:

Robert Eckstein and Sylvia Eckstein v. Balcor Film Investors, et al. (the

"Eckstein action") and Majeski v. Balcor Film Investors, et al. (the

"Majeski action").

choice of laws rules directed the court to Van Dusen v.

Barrack, 376 U.S. 612 (1984) and Ferens v. John Deere Co..

494 U.S. 576, 110 S. Ct. 1274 (1990). The court then

applied Van Dusen and Ferens to reach the conclusion that

the transferor forum supplied the statute of limitations.

Neither the holding in De/Costello v. Int'l Brotherhood of

Teamsters, 462 U.S. 151 (1983) nor Jn re Korean Air

Disaster of September 1, 1983, 829 F.2d 1171 (D.C. Cir.

1987) precludes the application of the Van Dusen and Ferens

principles.

The sole question in the Majeski action is whether the

Seventh Circuit properly followed its own law relating to its

well-established test for retroactivity, which Majeski clearly

satisfies. The Majeski action being timely, the litigation

against the Petitioners will continue. Moreover, even without

a §10(b) claim, the same underlying facts would be tried in

one forum or another under Majeski's breach of fiduciary

duty claim.

All issues in these cases cannot be resolved by the

grant of the petition because the Seventh Circuit remanded

both cases. Thus, no final resolution of the issues will result

from this Court's review.

This Court should deny review of the matters

presented in the petition.

i

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION

IN THE ECKSTEIN ACTION IS NOT

APPROPRIATE FOR REVIEW

A. The Seventh Circuit Applied Its Own Choice of

Law Rules

In its decision (App. 8), the Seventh Circuit pointed

out that §27A recognizes a "non-uniform" practice of

determining the appropriate statute of limitations in a §10(b)

case. It characterized §27A by stating: "[s]ection 27A

recognizes that different circuits had taken different

approaches to the appropriate statute of limitations in suits

under §10(b), and it codifies this fractured nature of federal

law for cases filed before June 20, 1991." App. 8. The

Seventh Circuit thus looked to its own law prior to Lampf,

Pleva, Lipkind. Prupis & Petigrow v. Gilbertson, _ U.S. _

111 S. Ct. 2773, 115 L.Ed.2d 321 (1991) to determine the

proper statute of limitations to apply to the Eckstein action.

Specifically, it looked to its choice of law principles and

analogized the situation to one where the laws of two states

presented two different limitations period. App. 7-9.

Contrary to the Petitioners’ portrayal, the Seventh

Circuit did not state that: "[s]ection 27A requires a transferee

court to apply the law of the transferor forum." Rather, the

court stated: "The district in which the court that decides the

case sits must be 'the jurisdiction’ for purposes of §27A", as

Menowitz stated.

Menowitz, in deciding under §27A whether its pre-

Lampf limitations period’ could be applied to a §1407

transferred case, considered "whether Second Circuit doctrine

directs application of the Eleventh Circuit limitations rule to

such a transferred claim." Each circuit court looked to its

own doctrine as of June 19, 1991, to determine the

appropriate limitations period "provided by the laws

applicable in [its] jurisdiction,” pursuant to §27A. Thus,

there is no intolerable conflict between Balcor and Menowitz.

B. The Seventh Circuit Choice of Law Rules Directed

the Court to Van Dusen and Ferens

The Eckstein action was initially commenced on

February 10, 1989 in the United States District Court for the

Central District of California. At that time, the statute of

limitations applicable to §10(b) actions in both the Central

District of California and the Eastern District of Wisconsin

was three (3) years from discovery. Indeed, it was not until

one and one-half years of active litigation (and one year after

the transfer of the Eckstein action) that the Seventh Circuit

announced a new statute of limitations in Short v. Belleville

Shoe Mfg. Co., 908 F.2d 1385 (7th Cir. 1990), cert. denied,

111 S. Ct. 2887 (1991). Thus, the potential effect of the

transfer of Eckstein -- more than a mere change of location -

- did not arise until long after the transfer had been ordered.*

> Ceres Partners v. GEL Assoc., 918 F.2d 349 (2d Cir. 1990).

* On the other hand, the Menowitz court addressed the issue of

which statute of limitations applied to an action commenced and

transferred to a district court in the Second Circuit after the Second

Circuit adopted its new statute of limitations in Ceres.

In deciding which statute of limitations to apply to the

Eckstein action. the court looked to the law of the Seventh

Circuit, including its choice of law rules. Those rules direct

the application of Van Dusen and Ferens

This Court held in Van Dusen and again in Ferens

that a transfer of venue from one district court to a district

court within another circuit

should be regarded as a federal judicial

housekeeping measure, dealing with the

placement of litigation in the federal courts

and generally intended, on the basis ol

convenience and fairness, simply to authorize

a change of courtrooms

Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 636-37 (emphasis added); see also

Ferens, 110 S. Ct. at 1279, 1281

Petitioners rely heavily upon De/Costello and Korean

Air, claiming that those cases eroded Van Dusen. However,

Petitioners ignore that this Court, in Ferens (decided after

both De/Costello and Korean Air), reaffirmed the principles

of Van Dusen.

DelCostello fails to offer support for Petitioners’

conclusion that the Seventh Circuit erred. De/Costello stated:

"that our holding today should not be taken as a departure

from prior practice in borrowing limitations periods for

federal causes of action, in labor law or elsewhere." /d at

171. The footnote upon which Petitioners re!y goes further

than the mere snippet they provide to this Court; it states:

Since Erie, no decision of this Court has held

or suggested that the Act requires borrowing

S

State law to fill gaps in federal substantive

statutes. Of course, we have continued since

Erie to apply state limitations periods to many

federal causes of action....

* * *

We do not suggest that the Erie

doctrine is wholly irrelevant to all federal

causes of action. On the contrary, where

Congress directly or impliedly directs the

courts to look to state law to fill in details of

federal law, Erie will ordinarily provide the

framework for doing so. (citations omitted)

(emphasis added).

DelCostello, 462 U.S. at 159-161 n.13. Therefore, it is

inaccurate to suggest that De/Costello abrogated Van Dusen.

Notably, in De/Costello, this Court was not

confronted with circumstances presented in Van Dusen, in

Ferens or here. However, this Court, both before

DelCostello (in Van Dusen) and after DelCostello (in

Ferens), recognized the likelihood of the Balcor issue arising

(relating to the Eckstein action) when it declared:

The possibilities suggested by the plaintiffs’

argument illustrate the difficulties that would

arise if a change of venue, granted at the

motion of a defendant, were to result in a

change of law.... /JJn other cases the

transferee forum might have a shorter statute

of limitations... In such cases a defendant's

motion to transfer could be tantamount to a

motion to dismiss.

a

Van Dusen, 376 U.S. at 629-30 (emphasis added). See also,

Ferens, 110 S. Ct. at 1281. Accord: Marcus, Conflicts

Among Circuits and Transfers Within The Federal

Jurisdiction System, 93 Yale L. J. 677, 708-09 (1984).

Petitioners also erroneously contend that Korean Air

mandates the rejection of Van Dusen as the applicable

standard in the circumstances presented in Eckstein.

Petitioners misunderstand both the nature of the Korean Air

decision and the concept of a "federal question" for purposes

of determining which statute of limitations applies to

Eckstein, the Ninth Circuit (as the transferor court) or the

Seventh Circuit (as the transferee court).

In Korean Air, the court was concerned with the

consolidation of litigation commenced in five different district

courts, representing four different circuits, arising out of a

disaster occurring over international waters. The court

addressed the quagmire presented by the possible application

of multiple interpretations of the law under which the actions

were commenced, the Warsaw Convention and the Montreal

Agreement. Korean Air, 829 F.2d at 1174. Given that these

international agreements have the force of federal statutes in

the United States and that the matter involved no state laws,

the Korean Air court concluded that because there would be

one interpretation of those agreements, it could, as well as

any other court, determine the issues. /d at 1175-76.

The circumstances of Korean Air cannot, however, be

analogized to §10(b) statute of limitations issues in the era

preceding Lampf when no "unitary federal law" existed. In

pre-Lampf securities litigation, most federal district courts

looked to the state cause of action most analogous to §10(b)

and borrowed its statute of limitations, Lampf, 111 S. Ct. at

2785-86, to assess the timeliness of the action.

a

The issue before the District Court, and again before

the Seventh Circuit, was not the interpretation of a federal

statute. Rather, it was confronted with determining the

proper statute of limitations by which to evaluate the

timeliness of the Eckstein action. Pursuant to Seventh Circuit

choice of law rules, this Court's decisions in Van Dusen and

Ferens require the District Court to apply the statute of

limitations applicable in the transferor court. Thus, this

Court should not review the Seventh Circuit's application of

its choice of law rules.

_ tees The Seventh Circuit Discussion Of Section 27A

Does Not Merit Review By The Court

The issue, if any exists, regarding the interpretation

of §27A, is of limited import since the statute was enacted as

a stop gap measure of limited duration. The number of cases

still pending to which the interpretation of §27A may apply

is limited. The circumstances present in Eckstein, a pre-

Lampf case commenced in one jurisdiction and transferred to

another, further narrow the field of cases on which the

resolution of such an "issue" would have an effect. Indeed,

it would relate only to: (a) §10(b) cases which (b) were

commenced on or before June 19, 1991, where (c) there is

a difference in two limitations periods.

Therefore, the review of the Seventh Circuit opinion

as to §27A will have a limited effect on a circumscribed

group of §10(b) cases, those filed on or before June 19, 1991

and transferred from one court to another. Therefore, there

is no need for this Court to determine the “interplay”

between §27A and §1404(a), as Petitioners claim.

_9.

Il.

THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT'S DECISION IN

THE MAJESKI ACTION IS NOT APPROPRIATE

FOR REVIEW

The petition's challenge to Balcor as it relates to the

Majeski action is limited to one paragraph. Petition at 14.

There. the Petitioners question whether the reliance (on the

earlier limitations period) proffered by the Majeski plaintiffs

(choice of forum) was sufficient under Seventh Circuit law

("including principles of retroactivity”) as of June 19, 1991

The Petitioners argued in the court below that

"reliance" on an earlier limitations period must consist in

postponement of the filing of the action in the belief that the

longer (earlier) limitations period was available. This

argument is repeated by Petitioners here (Petition at 14),

asserting it is "obvious" a choice of forum cannot suffice as

reliance because “it does not represent any detrimental

change of position as to the timing of the lawsuit." Id

That is incorrect. In this context, the Petitioners’

when-versus-where argument is a distinction without a

difference: "where" determines how much time a litigant has

(the limitations period for filing the action); "when"

determines how much time a litigant takes. Either question

satisfies the Petitioner's artificial requirement that "reliance"

must relate to timing. The Seventh Circuit's McCool

decision had already rejected the Petitioners’ argument and

specifically found that selection of a forum does satisfy the

reliance requirement. McCool, 972 F.2d at 1459.

Just as the McCoo! plaintiffs relied on the selection of

a forum (federal v. state), so did the Majeski plaintiffs

(selecting the Seventh Circuit over the Ninth Circuit), a move

-10- -

the Mayeski plaintiffs "presumably would not have made had

they anticipated their federal claims would be time-barred"

under Seventh Circuit law. McCool, 972 F.2d at 1459. The

controlling concern in McCool, as in the Chevron Oil

decision it follows, is whether inequity results from

retroactive application of a shortened limitations period to an

action that was timely when commenced. The inequity is as

great whether the reliance is in choosing where or when to

file.

Petitioners argue that “every plaintiff could say ‘If I

had known what the future would bring in this jurisdiction,

I would have sued somewhere else'." Petition at 14. Not

every §10(b) plaintiff had a choice of forums; but if one did.

making the choice may have involved detrimental reliance.

The reliance admitted by the petitioners as sufficing is subject

to the same comment: while not every §10(b) plaintiff had

the option of delaying the filing under the then prevailing

limitations period, those that had the option and did delay,

can say: “If I had known what the future would bring in this

jurisdiction, I would have filed earlier."

The Seventh Circuit clearly followed its own well-

established principles of retroactivity. There is no reason for

this Court to review its ruling.

=-]1 -

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Respondents respectfully

request that the petition for a writ of certiorari be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

Robin F. Zwerling

Counsel of Record

Robert S. Schachter

Hillary Sobel

ZWERLING, SCHACHTER &

ZWERLING

767 Third Avenue

New York, NY 10017

(212) 223-3900

George P. Kersten

E. Campion Kersten

KERSTEN & MCKINNON, S.C.

231 West Wisconsin Avenue

Milwaukee, WI 53203

(414) 271-0054

Michael S. Glassman

Kathleen L. Clemens

GLASSMAN AND CLEMENS,

A Professional Corporation

3200 Wilshire Blvd.

Los Angeles, CA 90010

(213) 389-9623

se

Jerry H. Friedland

GALANIS, FRIEDLAND &

POLLACK, S.C

Two Plaza East, Suite 560

330 East Kilbourn Avenue

Milwaukee, WI 53202

(414) 271-5400

Attorneys for Respondents

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

A word about cookies

We need a few to keep you signed in and the library working. The rest help us see which pages people use and where they get stuck. They stay off unless you say yes.