Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Standard Insurance Co. v. Saklad
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93-799
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OCTOBER TERM, 1993
STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY,
Petitioner,
Vv.
JEROME SAKLAD,
Respondent.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
Court of Appeals of the State of Oregon
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
JAIME RUTH EBENSTEIN
Counsel of Record
MARK E. SCHMIDTKE
J R EBENSTEIN CONSULTANTS
17867 Foxborough Lane
Boca Raton, Florida 33496
(407) 451-4406
Attorneys for Petitioner
Standard Insurance Company
Of Counsel:
JEFFREY C. CAREY
STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY
900 S.W. Fifth Avenue
Portland, Oregon 97207
(503) 321-8871
Midwest Law Printing Co., Chicago 60611, (312) 321-0220
i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Whether the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seg., as amended
(“ERISA”) preempts a state law which creates both
substantive and procedural rights in third parties
which are not recognized by ERISA and which are
inconsistent with ERISA’s exclusive civil enforcement
scheme.
Whether ERISA preempts a state law which does
not “expressly refer to” ERISA plans but which en-
compasses both ERISA and non-ERISA plans.
Whether a state garnishment exemption “relates to”
an employee benefit plan or merely “relates to”? em-
ployee benefits.
il
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
QUESTIONS PRESENTED .................. i
OPINIONS AND ORDERS BELOW .......... 2
OU RE: £45 dn hn boekoeensimssaanaenes 3
SEALE SVAN ERD 6 ks dewcavaddacsacduats 4
STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............... 4
A. Teme GE Fe aidan kau swaes 4
B. Decisions of the Courts Below .......... 5
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT.... 7
A. This Case Presents Important Questions of
Federal Law Concerning the Employee Re-
tirement Income Security Act .......... 7
B. This Court Should Resolve the Conflict Be-
tween the Oregon Court of Appeals on the
One Hand and the Fifth Circuit and the
California Supreme Court on the Other
Hand Regarding Whether ERISA Preempts
a State Law Which Creates Substantive
Rights in Third Parties Not Recognized by
ERISA and that Conflict with ERISA’s Ex-
clusive Civil Enforcement Scheme ....... 10
C. This Court Should Resolve the Conflict Be-
tween the Oregon Court of Appeals and the
Tenth Circuit as well as the Confusion and
Uncertainty Among State and Federal
Courts Regarding What it Means for a
State Law to Make “Reference to” ERISA
Plans for Preemption Purposes ......... 14
D. This Court Should Resolve the Conflict Be-
tween the Oregon Court of Appeals and the
Tenth Circuit Regarding Whether a State
Garnishment Exemption “Relates to” an
Employee Benefit Plan, Not Just Employee
Benefits, and is Preempted ............- 22
CI weve ccesccccccescccassccccceces 24
APPENDIX APP.
PAGE
“A—Opinion of the Court of Appeals, March 31,
sc biechedeivk ence ces cadensa esta 1
B—Supreme Court Denied Review, August 24,
th ka cue bs eee secon sone ceeweate « 5
C—Opinion of the Circuit Court, January 27, 1992 . 6
Opinion of the Circuit Court, April 2, 1992 ... 8
Opinion of the Circuit Court, May 1, 1992... 9
D—Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the
District Court, May 8, 1991 ............... 10
Judgment Order of the District Court, May 28,
CECA caeaebesssseuscecesevesess
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2.
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iv
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES: PAGE
Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504
EEE Mccubecete cna deaheneea odds thde ne 8
CSCAC v. El Capitan Development Co., 53 Cal.3d
1041, 282 Cai. Rptr. 277, 811 P.2d 296 cert. den.
fe Pr eerrrerre es 9, 11, 12, 13
Donald H. Hartvig, Inc. v. Kellas, 113 B.R. 673
eb i cabscdesddckasedacsangecess 20
Eickhoff v. Eickhoff, 1993 Ga. Lexis 713 (Ga. Oc-
RE i ob bow aee caweekac detasanssna 23
FMC Corporation v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990) .
jabmenowand oe hadi as aaah eakaaaeaa 15, 17, 18
Ft. Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S.
D Ge Fass tates cadaksseenean ein cueves 7, 22
Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat’l. Pension Fund,
Oe Se re rrr errr 18
Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l. Assoc., Local
No. 9, ___. F.8d ___, 1993 U.S. App. Lexis
28698 (10th Cir. November 4, 1993)....... passim
Heitkamp v. Dyke, 943 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir. 1991) .
ob bb Reb ow Ka ONOaeeheeibe tell ea ent aa 9, 15, 19, 20
In re Bartlett, 116 B.R. 1015 (S.D. Iowa 1990) ... 20
In re Garvin, 129 B.R. 598 (S.D. Ind. 1991)..... 20
In re Martinez, 107 B.R. 378 (S.D. Fla. 1989) ... 21
In re Shaker, 137 B.R. 930 (W.D. Wis. 1992) .... 20
In re Volpe, 100 B.R. 840 (W.D. Tex.) aff'd. 943
Pe BGs Ge GR. Bee scdccccoscasesssns 20, 21
Vv
Ingersoll-Rand Company v. McClendon, 498 U.S.
Oe Es css nce dads ducacesadandansenees 7,9, 15
Iron Workers Pension Fund v. Terotechnology, 391
F.2d 548 (5th Cir.) cert. den. 497 U.S. 1024
GE ainbcuadvscegsancedbasaeseeen 9, 11, 12, 13
Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Service,
Inc., 486 U.S. 825 (1988) ...........--eee- passim
Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58
CUEE gcc kuna cin scnsseeauensakeeeenaneeaes 7,9
Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S.Ct. 2242 (1992) ..... 21
Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987) .
ob skw sede den web aeaeaeedeeekeeeeksae 7, 8,9, 15
Pitrat v. Garlikov, 947 F.2d 419 (9th Cir. 1991) .. 21
Plumber’s Local 458 Holiday Vacation Fund v.
Howard Immel, Inc., 151 Wis.2d 233, 445 N.W.
ee Fer per rrre rrr rrrrr rr rrr Te 20
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983) .
cpukenanedches tdee sana tee needraeass eae 7, 8, 15, 16
STATUTES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS:
A uiidandawenrs 3
ERISA, § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 ............0c00es 7
ERISA, §§ 103-104, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1023-1024 ...... 14
ERISA, § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) ..........5. 4
ERISA, § 502(eX1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(eX(1) ........ 4
ERISA, § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) .......... 4,7, 8, 16
Col. Rev. Stat. 13-54-104 ..............0eeeeeees 10, 19
eR 8 A rere err re 10
vi
Ga. Code Ann. § 18-4-20 (Supp. 1987) ............ 16
Ga Se I, UIE ede cceceacccccacccsnes 16
Ga. Code Ann. § 18-4-60 (1982) ...............04. 11
IE bbb 6.00000000000064 60000008 10
Or. Rev. Stat. § 23.160(1IKjNXC) ........ 2... eee eee 4,5
Ge, Bec ee, PEE bb b0ncccccdescsccucuens 4
75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1720 (1987) ................. 18
ERs Gis GEA 6b 60.666 ceenececcesdecnstaainens
ee S| Perret ee
a ek ft Pr 1
IN THE
Supreme Court of the United States
OcToBER TERM, 1993
STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY,
Petitioner,
Vv.
JEROME SAKLAD,
Respondent.
Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the
Court of Appeals of the State of Oregon
PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI
Standard Insurance Company (“Standard”) respectfully
petitions this Court for a writ of certiorari to review the
final judgment of the Court of Appeals of the State of
Oregon in this case.
The Oregon Court of Appeals held that, as long as
ERISA plans are not singled out (i.e., the state law en-
compasses both ERISA and non-ERISA plans), the states
may enforce exemption statutes which prevent an ERISA
* All parties to the proceeding below are listed in the caption
to this petition. Standard Insurance Company has no parent com-
ies or subsidiaries (other than wholly owned subsidiaries) to
be dudinanll wader . Ct. R. 29.1. In addition, at all times rele-
vant hereto, Stan was a fiduciary with respect to the Master
aa Inc. Benefits Plan (“Master ing Plan”) and the Indus-
trial Electronics Engineers Benefits Plan (“IEE Plan”).
a
plan from collecting money judgments against a defraud-
ing welfare benefit plan participant. This holding effec-
tively creates substantive rights in third parties (e.g.,
welfare benefit plan debtors) which are not recognized by
ERISA’s civil enforcement scheme. Specifically, the Oregon
Court held that a state garnishment exemption for dis-
ability benefits was not preempted by ERISA where the
exemption did not single out ERISA plans for special
treatment. It did so, apparently believing that Congress
meant that exemptions, not just garnishment procedures,
are purely matters of state law. This holding was based
on an incorrect application of prior holdings of this Court,
was at odds with decisions in state and federal courts,
created substantive rights in third parties not recognized
by ERISA and which are inconsistent with ERISA’s ex-
clusive civil enforcement scheme, destroyed the uniformity
of regulation created by Congress in enacting ERISA, was
based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the policies
of Congress that underlie ERISA, and will have a pro-
found effect on defrauded ERISA plans in their attempt
to recoup plan losses.
OPINIONS AND ORDERS BELOW
The opinion of the Court of Appeals of the State of Oregon,
filed on March 31, 1993, is reported at 119 Or.App. 91,
849 P.2d 1150 and is reproduced at Appendix (“App.’’)
1-4. The Supreme Court of Oregon denied review on
August 24, 1993, which decision is reported at 317 Or.
486 and is reproduced at App. 5. The opinions of the trial
court are reproduced at App. 6-9.
Br SS
JURISDICTION
This action was filed in the Circuit Court, Multnomah
County, Oregon. On three separate occasions, the trial
court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner on January
27, 1992, April 2, 1992, and May 1, 1992, permitting peti-
tioner to garnish certain employee disability benefits in
order to satisfy a judgment for fraud rendered by the
United States District Court for the Central District of
California on May 28, 1991. The federal trial court had juris-
diction over this action pursuant to section 502(eX1) of
ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(eX1).2 Respondent appealed the
state court garnishment order to the Court of Appeals
of Oregon. The state appellate court reversed the trial
court garnishment order on March 31, 1993. The Supreme
Court of Oregon denied discretionary review on August
24, 1993. This Petition is being filed within the 90-day
period following entry of that order pursuant to Sup. Ct.
R. 13.1 and 13.3. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to
28 U.S.C. § 1257 because the validity of a state statute
is drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant
to the laws of the United States.
2 ERISA, section 502(eX1) [29 U.S.C. § 1132(eX1)] provides as
follows:
Except for actions under subsection (aX1XB) of this section,
the district courts of the United States shall have exclusive
jurisdiction of civil actions under this subchapter brought by
the Secretary or by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary.
State courts of competent jurisdiction and district courts of
the United States shall have concurrent jurisdiction of actions
under subsection (aX1XB) of this section.
eer eel
ellie
STATUTES INVOLVED
This case involves sections 502(a) and 514(a) of ERISA, 29
U.S.C. §§ 1132(a), 1144(a)? and Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 23.160(1)
(jXC) and 743.050.4
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A. Statement of Facts
From 1980 through 1984, Standard paid defendant ap-
proximately $200,000 in disability benefits, including a
substantial lump sum payout of benefits for the duration
of defendant’s expected life. The benefits were paid under
an ERISA plan known as the IEE Plan. Standard paid
these benefits in reliance on defendant’s representations
that he was totally disabled and that he was not engaged
in any occupation, work, or employment for wage or profit.
The defendant’s representations were fraudulent.
As found by the federal district court,5 in January, 1980,
at a time when defendant was receiving monthly disability
benefits from Standard under the IEE Plan, defendant
became employed by Master Plating, Inc. and became a
participant in a disability plan known as the Master
Plating Plan. The Master Plating Plan became funded by
a policy of insurance issued by Standard. In 1989, defen-
dant made a claim for, and was awarded, disability bene-
fits under the Master Plating Plan. In the course of re-
3 The text of these statutes is set out verbatim at App. 25 and
App. 26, respectively.
4 The text of these statutes is set out verbatim at App. 27 and
App. 28, respectively.
5 The federal district court opinion and judgment are attached
at App. 10-24.
uidiiine
viewing defendant’s claim for benefits, Standard learned
that defendant had been working at Master Plating during
the time period for which he received disability benefits
under the IEE Plan and that defendant had obtained bene-
fits under the IEE Plan by fraud and deceit.
Pursuant to ERISA, Standard filed suit against defen-
dant to obtain restitution of said benefits in the United
States District Court for the Central District of Califor-
nia. On or about May 28, 1991, judgment was entered in
favor of Standard for over $360,000.
B. Decisions of the Courts Below
In order to collect on its fraud judgment, Standard reg-
istered the judgment in Oregon and attempted to garnish
the benefits payable by Standard to Saklad under the
Master Plating Plan.* Saklad claimed that his benefits
were partially exempt from garnishment under a state
statute which exempts from garnishment “‘payment in
compensation of loss of future earnings’. Or. Rev. Stat.
§ 23.160(1XjXC). On three separate occasions, the state
trial court denied Saklad’s exemption claims on the ground
that the state garnishment exemption was preempted by
ERISA. See App. 6-9.
Saklad appealed the trial court decisions. On March 31,
1993, the Court of Appeals of Oregon reversed the trial
court decisions and held that the state garnishment ex-
emption was not preempted by ERISA. See App. 1-4.
The Oregon Court of Appeals, like other courts, relied
on but misread Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency &
6 The judgment was registered in Oregon because Standard is
an Oregon domiciliary insurance company headquartered in Port-
land, Oregon. Saklad’s benefits were issued from Oregon.
~~ S
a at ETL
Service, Inc., 486 U.S. 825 (1988). The Oregon appeals
court held that congressional silence concerning garnish-
ment of ERISA welfare benefits “acknowledged and ac-
cepted various state practices concerning garnishment, in-
cluding the practice of refusing garnishment”. See App. 3
(emphasis added). While Mackey held that collection of
money judgments was a matter left to the States, it did
not hold that a State may prohibit the collection of an
ERISA judgment won in federal court against a plan par-
ticipant pursuant to ERISA’s exclusive civil enforcement
scheme.
The Oregon Court, like many other courts, also misread
footnote 12 of Mackey, and concluded that a garnishment
exemption statute was not preempted unless it singled
out ERISA plans for special treatment. Because the Oregon
exemption statute did not expressly mention ERISA or
ERISA plans, the appellate court held that the state garnish-
ment exemption was not preempted. The Oregon Court, like
others, operated under the erroneous belief that Mackey
altered the “relates to” test of ERISA.
Finally, the Oregon Court incorrectly held that a state
garnishment exemption applicable to welfare benefits is
not preempted because it does not relate to an ERISA
plan, but merely relates to plan benefits.
Standard filed its petition for review with the Supreme
Court of Oregon. Review was denied on August 24, 1993.7
7 After the Oregon Supreme Court denied review, Standard filed
a —— action against Saklad under ERISA pursuant to § 502(aX3),
king to coordinate the benefits payable to under the Master
Plating Plan with the benefits already received by Saklad under
the IEE Plan as well as for equitable setoff under federal common
law. This action is pending in the United States District Court
for the Central District of California.
a
=<
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT
A. This Case Presents Important Questions Of Federal
Law Concerning The Employee Retirement Income
Security Act.
This Court has repeatedly acknowledged the importance
of issues arising under the Exnployee Retirement Income
Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seg. (“ERISA’’) with
regard to: (1) preemption of state law; (2) the exclusivity
of ERISA’s civil enforcement scheme; and (8) the uniform
regulation of employee benefit plans. See, e.g., Ingersoll-
Rand Company v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990); FMC
Corporation v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990); Mackey v.
Lanier Collections Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U.S. 825
(1988); Ft. Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S.
1 (1987); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S.
58 (1987); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41
(1987); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983).
This particular case presents important questions in all
of these areas because the Court below misread and mis-
applied the preemption test as set forth in ERISA. In
so doing, the Oregon Court denied an effective remedy
to a defrauded ERISA plan, frustrating collection of a
judgment won pursuant to ERISA’s exclusive civil en-
forcement scheme, and thus making a sham of the uniform
regulation of employee benefits. Moreover, the Oregon
Court of Appeals decision is one of numerous cases caus-
ing confusion and conflict between various state and fed-
eral courts regarding application of the “relates to”’ test
set forth in ERISA.
ERISA contains an express preemption provision which
states that ERISA supersedes all State laws that “relate
to”’ any employee benefit plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). This
Court has stated on several occasions that the preemption
=
provision of ERISA is extremely broad. See, e.g., Pilot
Life, 481 U.S. 45-46 (“the express pre-emption provisions
of ERISA are deliberately expansive”); Shaw v. Delta
Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983) (“the breadth of [29
U.S.C. § 1144(a)’s] pre-emptive reach is apparent... .”’).
Furthermore, because Congress used the phrase “relate
to” in its broad sense, this Court has “emphasized that
the pre-emption clause is not limited to ‘state laws spe-
cifically designed to affect employee benefit plans.’ ”’ Pilot
Life, 481 U.S. at 47-48. Accord, Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98 (pre-
emption clause should not “be interpreted to pre-empt
only state laws dealing with the subject matters covered
by ERISA—reporting, disclosure, fiduciary responsibility,
and the like.’’)
This Court has also recognized that a primary concern
of Congress in enacting ERISA was the uniform regula- |
tion of employee benefit plans. Congress used “‘deliberate-
ly expansive” language in ERISA’s preemption clause
which was “designed to ‘establish pension plan regulation
as exclusively a federal concern’ ”’. Pilot Life, 481 U.S.
at 46 (quoting Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451
U.S. 504 (1981)).
Nowhere did Congress more clearly demonstrate its
desire for uniform regulation of employee benefit plans
than in its enactment of ERISA’s detailed civil enforce-
ment scheme. This Court has stated that the civil enforce-
ment scheme “‘is one of the essential tools for accomplish-
ing the stated purposes of ERISA”’. Pilot Life, 481 U.S.
at 52. These detailed provisions constitute “a comprehen-
sive civil enforcement scheme”’. Id. at 54. In order to fur-
ther the purpose of uniformly regulating employee benefit
plans, this Court has held that “(t]he deliberate care with
which ERISA’s civil enforcement remedies were drafted
and the balancing of policies embodied in its choice of
TO
=
remedies argue strongly for the conclusion that ERISA’s
civil enforcement remedies were intended to be exclusive’.
Id. Thus, states are prohibited from supplementing or de-
tracting from these remedies. See, e.g., Pilot Life, supra
(state claim for bad faith is preempted); Metropolitan Life
v. Taylor, supra (state tort and breach of contract claims
are preempted); Ingersoll-Rand v. McClendon, supra
(state wrongful discharge claim preempted by ERISA).
Despite this Court’s consistent reasoning regarding the
breadth of ERISA preemption, the exclusive nature of
ERISA’s civil enforcement scheme, and the uniform regu-
lation of employee benefit plans, this Court’s decision in
Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Service, Inc., 486
U.S. 825 (1988), has been the subject of conflicting inter-
pretations in federal and state courts. Two such matters
are at issue in this case. First, courts have split over the
extent to which the state laws regarding the collection
of money judgments are preempted by ERISA, particular-
ly where they create substantive rights in welfare benefit
plan debtors not recognized by ERISA and in conflict
with ERISA’s civil enforcement scheme. Compare Iron
Workers Pension Fund v. Terotechnology, 891 F.2d 548
(5th Cir.) cert. den. 497 U.S. 1024 (1990) and CSCAC v.
El Capitan Development Co., 53 Cal.3d 1041, 282 Cal.
Rptr. 277, 811 P.2d 296 cert. den. 112 S.Ct. 430 (1991)
with the decision at issue in this case. Second, there is
substantial confusion over the breadth of the “relates to”
test and what type of “express reference” to ERISA
plans is necessary for a state law to be preempted by
ERISA. Compare Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l.
Assoc., Local No. 9, ___. F.3d ___., 1993 U.S. App. Lexis
28698 (10th Cir. November 4, 1993) and Heitkamp v.
Dyke, 943 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir. 1991) with the decision at
issue in this case.
es
It is important for the Court to clarify these issues.
Numerous state and federal courts, including the Court
below, have misread and misapplied ERISA’s preemption
provision by failing to find state laws preempted even
though they “relate to”’ employee benefit plans. In the
case at hand, the Oregon Court held that a state garnish-
ment exemption applicable to ERISA disability benefits
was not preempted. If this interpretation of ERISA’s pre-
emption provision is allowed to stand, it will result in
defrauded employee benefit plans being denied an effec-
tive remedy for judgments won pursuant to ERISA’s civil
enforcement scheme. It will also allow state law, rather
than federal law, to govern the viability of ERISA judg-
ments, vitiating ERISA’s exclusive civil enforcement
scheme and eradicating the uniform regulation of em-
ployee benefit plans envisioned by Congress.®
B. This Court Should Resolve The Conflict Between The
Oregon Court Of Appeals On The One Hand And The
Fifth Circuit And The California Supreme Court On
The Other Hand Regarding Whether ERISA Preempts A |
State Law Which Creates Substantive Rights In Third |
Parties Not Recognized By ERISA And That Conflict
With ERISA’s Exclusive Civil Enforcement Scheme.
The Court below erroneously preserved a state anti-
garnishment exemption from preemption where the state
law created substantive rights in third parties which are
8 If state garnishment exemptions are not preempted by ERISA,
regulation concerning the satisfaction of judgments obtained pur-
suant to ERISA’s exclusive civil enforcement scheme will not be
uniform. Compare Ind. Code § 34-2-28-1 (no specific garnishment
exemption for disability benefits) with Col. Rev. Stat. 13-54-104
(limited garnishment exemption for disability benefits) and Fla.
08 ch. 222.18 (general garnishment exemption for disability bene-
its).
ee
=
not recognized by ERISA and which are inconsistent with
ERISA’s exclusive civil remedy scheme. The decision by
the Oregon Court of Appeals is in conflict with decisions
by the Fifth Circuit in Iron Workers Pension Fund v.
Terotechnology, 891 F.2d 548 (5th Cir.) cert. den. 497 U.S.
1024 (1990) and the California Supreme Court in CSCAC
v. El Capitan Development Co., 53 Cal.3d 1041, 282 Cal.
Rptr. 277, 811 P.2d 296 cert. den. 112 S.Ct. 430 (1991).
In Mackey v. Lanier Collections, this Court held that
a general state garnishment statute was not preempted.
This holding was premised in part on the fact that the
state law was merely a procedural mechanism for the col-
lection of money judgments and did not create any sub-
stantive rights. The Court noted:
[Under Georgia law (at least), garnishment is a ‘pro-
cedural’ mechanism for the enforcement of judgments.
Georgia’s statute that provides for garnishment cre-
ates no substantive causes of action, no new bases
for relief, or any grounds for recovery; the Georgia
garnishment law does not create the rule of decision
in any case affixing liability. Rather under Georgia
law, post-judgment garnishment is nothing more than
a method to collect judgments otherwise obtained by
prevailing on a claim against the garnishee. See Ga.
Code Ann. § 18-4-60 (1982).
Mackey, 486 US at 834, n. 10. In other words, if state
garnishment statutes are merely procedural in nature and
do not conflict with the substantive provisions of ERISA,
they are not preempted under section 514(a) of ERISA.
To hold otherwise would mean that ERISA plans and
their fiduciaries would have no means of collecting on
judgments. Jd. On the other hand, Mackey should not be
interpreted to mean that a garnishment exemption statute
which creates both procedural and substantive rights, and
which conflicts with ERISA’s civil enforcement scheme,
is not preempted. In this case, the state statute, rather
than being a convenient method to collect a money judg-
ment, actually frustrates an ERISA fiduciary’s obligation
to recoup monies fraudulently taken from the plan.
Relying on Mackey, the Fifth Circuit and the California
Supreme Court have held that state laws which created
substantive rights in third parties not otherwise recog-
nized by ERISA were preempted. In Iron Workers and
El Capitan, the Fifth Circuit and the California Supreme
Court respectively dealt with the issue of whether state
statutes creating real property liens in favor of pension
plans to assure payment of contributions by the employer
were preempted by ERISA. In each case, the court con-
cluded that such a lien created substantive rights not
otherwise available under the civil enforcement scheme
of ERISA and thus was preempted. In Iron Workers, the
Fifth Circuit held:
[T]he lien statutes involved do more than provide
remedies for collecting judgments; they create sub-
stantive rights ... . The Private Works Act creates
a substantive right against the property owner that
is not created by ERISA, and goes beyond being
merely a means of enforcing a judgment.
891 F.2d at 555-556. Similarly, in El Capitan, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court held:
[SJection 3111 cannot be upheld under Mackey as it
creates a new substantive right against the property
of a third party that is not created by ERISA and,
thus, goes beyond being a mere means of enforcing
a judgment.
811 P.2d at 304.
The decision of the Oregon Court in this case conflicts
with these decisions. All three are based on the proce-
dural/substantive distinction enunciated by this Court in
Se eo
alias
Mackey. Mackey allows garnishment statutes in general
to survive preemption since they are mere procedural
mechanisms to collect money judgments. However, exemp-
tions from a general garnishment statute affect these pro-
cedural rights in a substantive manner. This state law ex-
emption creates a substantive right for the plan bene-
ficiary by extending anti-alienation protection to welfare
benefits—a limitation that Congress chose only to impose
on ERISA pension benefits. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 836. As
such, the state law is preempted by ERISA. Because the
Oregon Court of Appeals decision held otherwise, it direct-
ly conflicts with the decisions in Iron Workers and El
Capitan as well as with this Court’s decision in Mackey.
The state law exemption also obstructs an ERISA plan’s
right “‘to sue’’, which implies a right to collect on money
judgments. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 832. This frustrates con-
gressional intent that ERISA’s civil enforcement scheme
be the exclusive means of regulating and enforcing obliga-
tions under employee benefit plans. To allow a state to
effectively refuse to enforce a judgment obtained pursuant
to ERISA’s civil enforcement scheme, whether for fraud,
overpayment, or subrogation, would give states unfettered
discretion to override federal law. The Courts in [ron
Workers and El Capitan understood that the states could
not supplement nor detract from ERISA’s civil enforce-
ment scheme. Thus, they struck down statutes which pro-
vided supplemental substantive enforcement mechanisms
to those available to benefit plans under ERISA. By allow-
ing a substantive right which essentially prevents the en-
forcement of a judgment obtained under ERISA’s exclu-
sive civil enforcement scheme, the Oregon Court of Ap-
peals decision directly conflicts with the Fifth Circuit deci-
sion in Iron Workers and the California Supreme Court
decision in El Capitan, as well as with this Court’s deci-
sion in Mackey.
—14—
This Court should resolve this conflict. To fail to do so
will only add to the existing confusion regarding the cor-
rect interpretation of Mackey, will subject employee
benefit plans to inconsistent substantive regulation by the
states, and result in the vitiation of the right of plans and
their fiduciaries to utilize the civil enforcement scheme
set forth in ERISA. While garnishment is a valid area
of state concern, it is a matter of federal concern when
a state garnishment exemption impacts the civil enforce-
ment scheme of ERISA and the right of ERISA plans
to sue and collect a money judgment pursuant to that
scheme, particularly given the fact that there are millions
of welfare benefit plan participants.® To alleviate the con-
flicting decisions in this area, this Court should issue a
writ of certiorari.
C. This Court Should Resolve The Conflict Between The
Oregon Court of Appeals And The Tenth Circuit As
Well As The Confusion And Uncertainty Among State
And Federal Courts Regarding What It Means For A
State Law To Make “Reference To’’ ERISA Plans
For Preemption Purposes.
The Oregon Court of Appeals erroneously held that a
state antigarnishment exemption which was applicable
both to ERISA and non-ERISA benefits and plans, was
not preempted because the exemption did not single out
ERISA plans by “expressly referring” to ERISA. This
decision is completely at odds with the recent decision
*® According to the Amicus Brief of the United States in Mackey
v. Lanier, focusing only on multiemployer welfare plans (other than
life and health insurance plans), the nt of Labor esti-
ene ee ee ae a a
excess Se roe ts. These figures were tabula’
from annual rts with the t of Labor as re-
quired by ERISA, §§ 103-104, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1023-1024.
NF
=x =
of the Tenth Circuit in Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers
Int'l. Assoc., Local No. 9, supra. These two decisions are
the latest in a long line of state and federal court deci-
sions which have propounded conflicting interpretations
of ERISA’s preemption clause and the breadth of the
“relates to” test.
This Court has repeatedly employed a broad definition
in determining whether a law “relates to” an employee
welfare benefit plan. According to an early ERISA case
decided by this Court, a state law “relates to ‘a benefit
plan . . . if it has a connection with or reference to such
a plan.’” Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. at 96-97 (em-
phasis added).?°
Yet, despite a consistent line of authority from this
Court, there is widespread confusion over the holding in
Mackey. This confusion has taken numerous forms. It has
arisen in the application of the preemption standard based
on a determination of what it means for a state law to
“make reference to” ERISA plans. Some courts have con-
cluded that a state law “‘makes reference to” ERISA
plans where it has a decided impact on such plans. See,
e.g., Guidry v. Local No. 9, supra; Heitkamp v. Dyke,
943 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir. 1991). Others hold that a state
law does not “make reference to” ERISA plans unless
the language of the state law expressly refers to ERISA
and/or ERISA plans. See, e.g., the decision rendered by
the court below. Still others seem to believe that this
Court intended to expand the “relates to” test first set
forth in Shaw. See discussion in Heitkamp v. Dyke, 943
F.2d at 1448 n.33 (“The language in Mackey is different
10 See also Pilot Life v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. at 47; Ingersoll-Rand
a “g v. —_— 498 U.S. at 139; FMC Corp. v. Holliday,
». at ,
ih.
from the language in Shaw . . . Some commentators have
argued that the language in Mackey expands ERISA’s
preemptive effect beyond that which the Court anticipated
in Shaw”’’). It is clear from this confusion that this Court
should give additional guidance in this area.
In Mackey, this Court struck down a state garnishment
exemption law which expressly excepted ERISA plans
from garnishment.!! This Court held that a state law
which “makes reference to” and which “singles out ERISA
employee welfare benefit plans for different treatment
under state garnishment procedures, is pre-empted . . .
[t]he statute’s express reference to ERISA plans suffices
to bring it within the federal law’s preemptive reach”’.
486 U.S. at 830. The Court upheld the State’s general
garnishment procedure statute, which did not expressly
refer to ERISA plans but which was applicable to ERISA
and non-ERISA benefits, preserving it from preemption
under ERISA. The Court distinguished between preemp-
tion of the general garnishment statute and the exemp-
tion statute which expressly referred to ERISA plans:
It is not incongruous to find that Ga. Code Ann.
§ 18-4-20 (Supp. 1987), which provides for garnishment
of ERISA welfare benefit plans, escapes pre-emption
under ERISA, while striking down § 18-4-22.1—an
exception to the general state-law provision—as pre-
empted. While we believe that state-law garnishment
procedures are not pre-empted by § 514(a), we also
conclude that any state law which singles out ERISA
plans, by express reference, for special treatment is
11 The State law at issue in Mackey provided as follows:
Funds or benefits of a pension, retirement, or employee
benefit plan or program subject to the provisions of [ERISA],
shall not be subject to the process or garnishment... .
Ga. Code Ann. § 18-4-22.1.
———————————————
=
pre-empted . . . It is this “singling out” that pre-
empts the Georgia antigarnishment exception.
486 U.S. at 838 n. 12 (emphasis in original).
Although Mackey based its decision on the fact that a
state law which “singles out ERISA plans by express
reference” is preempted, id., express reference has never
been the sole basis for preemption. Unfortunately, foot-
note 12 of Mackey has caused many courts, such as the
Court below, to ignore other decisions of this Court re-
garding preemption. These courts have relied solely on
“express reference” as the test for preemption. Both
before and after Mackey, this Court has found state laws
to be preempted even where state laws did not specifically
mention ERISA or ERISA plans. For example, in FMC
Corp. v. Holliday, supra, this Court found a state law
prohibiting subrogation to have a “reference to” and “con-
nection with” ERISA plans and to be preempted although
the state law was generally applicable to ERISA and non-
ERISA benefits and did not make express reference to
ERISA or ERISA plans. 498 U.S. at 59 (“Pennsylvania’s
antisubrogation law has a ‘reference’ to benefit plans . . .
[and it] also has a ‘connection’ to ERISA benefit plans”’).
The decision below represents an incorrect reading of
this Court’s opinions in Mackey and FMC. The Oregon
statute exempts “[a] payment in compensation of loss of
future earnings” from garnishment. Although the statute
applies to disability benefits payable under an employee
welfare benefit plan, the appellate court held that the stat-
ute was not preempted because “(t]he only provision is
that the state garnishment law cannot single out ERISA
plans for special treatment”. In other words, because the
state law does not expressly mention ERISA plans and
single them out for special treatment, even though it
clearly regulates both ERISA and non-ERISA plans, in
oe
the view of the Oregon Court of Appeals, the state law
is not preempted. Not only does this holding misapply
Mackey, but it misapplies and fails to recognize that the
Oregon statute at issue is very similar to the Pennsylvania
statute in FMC. In FMC, the statute did not specifically
refer to ERISA or ERISA plans, but rather was a gen-
eral statute applicable to both ERISA and non-ERISA
plans. 12
The Oregon Court of Appeals decision conflicts with the
recent decision of the Tenth Circuit in Guidry, supra.'*
In Guidry, the union sought to garnish certain pension
benefits after the benefits were paid to Guidry. Among
other things, Guidry argued that the benefits were ex-
empt from garnishment under a state statute which placed
a cap on the amount of a debtor’s “earnings” which could
be subjected to garnishment. Like Oregon, the state law
at issue in Guidry applied to employee benefits, defining
“earnings” as “compensation paid or payable for personal
services, whether denominated as wages, salary, commis-
sion, bonus, avails of any pension or retirement benefits,
12 Section 1720 of Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Respon-
sibility Law, 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1720 (1987) states:
In actions arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor
vehicle, there shall be no right of subrogation or reimburse-
ment from a claimant’s tort recovery with respect to . . . bene-
fits . . . payable under section 1719.
Section 1719 refers to benefit payments by “{alny program, group
contract or other arrangement”.
13 The Tenth Circuit decision in Guidry is an appeal following
a remand by this Court in Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat’.
Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365 (1991). This Court ruled that the anti-
alienation provisions of ERISA applicable to pension plans super-
seded the union’s claim for a constructive trust on benefits payable
to Guidry because of Guidry’s criminal misconduct against the
union.
i.
or deferred compensation plan’’. Col. Rev. Stat. 13-54-104.
Although this statute did not expressly mention ERISA
or ERISA plans, the Tenth Circuit apparently believed
that the statute ‘‘expressly referfred] to” ERISA plans
because it implicitly encompassed such plans. (1993 U.S.
App. Lexis 28698, at *38.) Citing Mackey, the Tenth Cir-
cuit held:
The Colorado statute ‘relates to’ employee benefit
plans because it expressly refers to such plans...
(T]he garnishment exemption is preempted by ERISA
514(a) because it singles out ERISA benefits for spe-
cial treatment. It is this singling out that preempts
the Colorado anti-garnishment exception.
(Id. at *39-40.)
The Oregon holding also conflicts with decisions in sev-
eral other courts. For example, in Heitkamp v. Dyke, 948
F.2d 1435 (5th Cir. 1991), the Fifth Circuit determined
that a state statute “relate[d] to” ERISA plans where
its language “encompassed” such plans. The case arose
where a bankruptcy trustee objected to the exemption of
a debtor’s pension interest from the bankruptcy estate.
The debtor’s exemption was based on a state law which
exempted from attachment, execution, and seizure for the
satisfaction of debts the debtor’s interest in any “stock
bonus, pension, profitsharing, or similar plan”. Citing
Mackey, the Fifth Circuit noted that “absent an applicable
exception, ERISA automatically preempts all state laws
which specifically refer to ERISA benefit plans”. Jd. at
1448. Although the state statute did not expressly men-
tion ERISA or ERISA plans, the Fifth Circuit held that
the statute was “a state law which specifically refers to
ERISA benefit plans”, which conclusion was based on the
Court’s observation that the statutory exemption “clear-
ly encompasses ERISA-qualified benefit plans”.14 Jd. See
also In re Shaker, 137 B.R. 930 (W.D. Wis. 1992) (al-
though the fact that a state exemption statute makes no
express reference to ERISA or the Internal Revenue
Code “could provide a strong argument that the [state]
statute does not therefore ‘relate to’? ERISA in the sense
prohibited by Mackey and its progeny . . . ERISA’s broad
preemptive reach is not merely triggered by an express
reference to ERISA”); Donald H. Hartvig, Inc. v. Kellas,
113 B.R. 678, 678 (D. Ore. 1990) (‘elven though Mackey
relied on an express reference to ERISA plans, the ab-
sence of an express reference does not necessarily mean |
the statute is not preempted’). |
Unfortunately, other courts have not followed the reason-
ing in Guidry, Heitkamp, and similar decisions. See, e.g.,
Plumber’s Local 458 Holiday Vacation Fund v. Howard
Immel, Inc., 151 Wis.2d 233, 445 N.W.2d 43 (1989) (“Wis-
consin’s construction lien law is a general statute without
any specific reference to ERISA obligations’, and thus
is not preempted); Jn re Bartlett, 116 B.R. 1015, 1023
(S.D. Iowa 1990) (“{the Iowa pension exemption statute]
cannot be construed as making any reference to ERISA
or to attendant IRS provisions. Thus, it is not preempted
by ERISA... .”); In re Garvin, 129 B.R. 598 (S.D. Ind.
1991) (noting that the courts are split over whether ERISA
preempts state exemption statutes dealing with pension
plans, the court held that a state law which does not ex-
pressly mention ERISA “makes no reference to ERISA
whatsoever’); In re Volpe, 100 B.R. 840, 848 (W.D. Tex.)
14 Because ERISA does not preempt other federal laws, the Fifth
Circuit held that the state statute was “saved” from preemption
because the state law enforced federal goals under bankruptcy law.
943 F.2d at 1449-1450.
Ee |
iin.
aff'd. 943 F.2d 1451 (5th Cir. 1991) (state law which makes
passing mention of ERISA “makes reference to” ERISA
under Mackey, but does not “have reference to” ERISA
plans under Shaw because it does not purport to regulate
the terms and conditions of an employee benefit plan nor
does it affect the relationship between the principal ERISA
entities). Compare In re Martinez, 107 B.R. 378, 380 (S.D.
Fla. 1989) (even though a state exemption statute men-
tions the Internal Revenue Code provisions under which
an ERISA plan is qualified, the state law is not pre-
empted unless it creates a conflict between state law and
the federal scheme of ERISA) with Pitrat v. Garlikov,
947 F.2d 419, 427 (9th Cir. 1991) (“by naming those sec-
tions of the I.R.C. which designate ERISA-qualified plans
{a state exemption statute] clearly makes reference to
ERISA plans” and is preempted).
This Court decided in Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S.Ct.
2242 (1992) that ERISA’s prohibition of alienation of quali-
fied pension plan benefits allows a debtor’s pension plan
interest to be excluded from the bankruptcy estate, thus
mooting much of the preemption issue as it applies in the
bankruptcy context with respect to ERISA pension plans.
However, outside the bankruptcy context, preemption is-
sues with respect to pension plans still linger. See, e.g.,
Guidry, supra. Furthermore, Patterson does not resolve
any issues with respect to ERISA welfare plans and does
not resolve the preemption issue raised herein. This issue
arises in numerous contexts involving judgments awarded
to welfare benefit plans pursuant to ERISA’s civil enforce-
ment scheme in areas such as fraud, mistaken overpay-
ment, and subrogation.
These conflicting holdings demonstrate the ongoing con-
fusion as to the breadth of ERISA’s preemption clause
and the “relates to’”’ test. The confusion created by the
29
Oregon Court of Appeals decision and others destroys the
full force and effect of ERISA’s exclusive civil enforce-
ment scheme by subjecting ERISA plans to a variety of
conflicting court decisions, state and federal, regarding the
breadth of the “relates to” test of ERISA. This Court
should clarify the “relates to” test and the breadth of pre-
emption and set right the misinterpretations of Mackey.
D. This Court Should Resolve the Conflict Between the
Oregon Court Of Appeals And The Tenth Circuit Re-
garding Whether A State Garnishment Exemption
*‘Relates To’? An Employee Benefit Plan, Not Just
Employee Benefits, And Is Preempted.
The Oregon Court of Appeals effectively held that a
state garnishment exemption is not preempted because
it never “relates to’”’ an employee benefit plan, but only
“relates to”” employee benefits. According to the Oregon
Court, this holding applies even where benefits have not
yet been paid to the plan participant. The Tenth Circuit,
on the other hand, held in Guidry, supra, that a state
garnishment exemption is preempted because it “relates
to” employee benefit plans, even where plan benefits are
already paid and received by the plan participant.
The Oregon Court of Appeals stated that “({wJhether or
not a check is garnished after administrative procedures
are complete has nothing to do with a ‘plan’... .” App.
4. In Ft. Halifax, this Court held that ERISA preemp-
tion only applies to state laws which “relate to” ERISA |
plans, and not to laws which only “relate to” plan |
benefits. According to the Oregon Court, a garnishment
exemption statute can never “relate to” an ERISA plan
because the garnishment process only “relates to” plan
benefits. The Oregon Court apparently believed that once
a plan calculates the amount of benefits due a participant,
|
—~23—
an exemption protecting those benefits from garnishment
no longer “relates to” the benefit plan. What the Oregon
Court failed to recognize was that the plan paying benefits
to Saklad was not the only plan affected by the exemption.
Rather, the plan which had previously been defrauded by
Saklad was also affected by the exemption, because the
judgment it won pursuant to ERISA’s civil enforcement
scheme, which it sought to satisfy in Oregon, was com-
pletely frustrated by the exemption.
The Oregon decision directly conflicts with the Tenth
Circuit’s decision in Guidry. The issue in Guidry was
whether the union could garnish plan benefits which were
already paid and received by the participant. The Tenth
Circuit held that a state garnishment exemption was pre-
empted by ERISA. Responding to Guidry’s argument that
the statute did not “‘relate to” ERISA plans because the
plan benefits were already paid out, the Tenth Circuit
held:
[TJhe fact that this case is about paid benefits, and
not about benefits in the plan, does not take the Col-
orado statute out of ERISA 514(a). A statute relating
to benefits paid and received is a state law relating
to an employee benefit plan.
(1993 U.S. App. Lexis 28698, at *40.) But see Eickhoff
v. Eickhoff, 1993 Ga. Lexis 713 (Ga. October 25, 1993)
(benefits are not protected by ERISA once they are re-
ceived by the beneficiary).
The conflict between these two decisions is clear: while
the Tenth Circuit holds that a state garnishment exemp-
tion “relates to” ERISA plans and is preempted even
where benefits have already been paid to the participant,
the Oregon Court of Appeals holds that a state garnish-
ment exemption never “relates to” an ERISA plan. If
the Oregon interpretation is allowed to prevail, state law
olin
will effectively preempt federal law by eradicating ERISA’s
exclusive civil enforcement scheme, frustrating the at-
tempts of defrauded plans to satisfy judgments won pur-
suant to that scheme. This is exactly the result Congress
sought to avoid in enacting ERISA. Federal law, not state
law, was intended to be supreme. |
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the petition should be granted
and this Court should issue a writ of certiorari to review
the decision and judgment of the Court of Appeals of the
State of Oregon.
Respectfully submitted,
JAIME RUTH EBENSTEIN
Counsel of Record
MARK E. SCHMIDTKE
J R EBENSTEIN CONSULTANTS
17867 Foxborough Lane
Boca Raton, Florida 33496
(407) 451-4406
Attorneys for Petitioner
Standard Insurance Company
Of Counsel:
JEFFREY C. CAREY
STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY
900 S.W. Fifth Avenue
Portland, Oregon 97207
(503) 321-8871
November 18, 1993
APPENDICES
App. 1
APPENDIX A
Filed: March 31, 1993
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY,
Respondent,
v.
JEROME W. SAKLAD,
” Appellant.
(9108-05506; CA A73687)
Appeal from Circuit Court, Multnomah County.
Lee Johnson, Judge. (April 2, 1992, Order)
Gerald R. Pullen, Judge pro tempore.
(January 27, 1992, Order)
Argued and submitted January 13, 1993.
Christopher F. McCracken, Portland, argued the cause
for appellant. With him on the briefs were Stuart
C. Harris and Davis Wright Tremaine, Portland.
James Ray Streinz, Portland, argued the cause for re-
spondent. With him on the brief were Russell B.
Weed and McEwen, Gisvold, Rankin & Stewart,
Portland.
Before Deits, Presiding Judge, and Riggs and
Durham, Judges.
RIGGS, J.
Defendant, judgment debtor, appeals from three orders
denying three claims that his disability benefits are exempt
from garnishment under ORS 23.160(1XjXC). At issue is
whether the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(ERISA) preempts a state law which exempts proceeds
App. 2
of disability benefits from garnishment. 29 USC § 1144(a).
He also argues that his disability benefits are exempt
under ORS 743.050, which exempts from garnishment pro-
ceeds of a health insurance policy. Finally, he argues that
Standard engayed in a prohibited transaction under ERISA
by garnishing the benefits paid by an ERISA plan for
which it was also a fiduciary. We reverse and remand.
Defendant was a beneficiary of two disability policies
issued by plaintiff. He defrauded plaintiff of over $250,000
under the first policy but was entitled to benefits under
the second policy. After winning a judgment against de-
fendant for fraud, plaintiff sought to garnish the benefits
paid under the second policy. Plaintiff registered a judg-
ment against defendant and sought to satisfy that judg-
ment through a writ of continuing garnishment which gar-
nished defendant’s monthly disability payments under the
second policy. The second policy was administered by an
ERISA welfare plan for which plaintiff was a fiduciary.'
The ERISA welfare plan filed three certificates of gar-
nishee. In response to each certificate of garnishee, defen-
dant filed a claim of exemption under ORS 23.160(1XjXC),
which exempts from garnishment “payment in compensa-
tion of loss of future earnings.” The court denied all three
claims of exemption, holding that ORS 23.160(1XjXC) is
preempted by ERISA.
With certain exceptions not applicable to this case,
§ 514(a) of ERISA preempts all state laws that “relate
to any employee benefit plan.” 29 USC § 1144(a). The
1 “Welfare plans” refers to plans providing health and disability
insurance ad po benefits with + prohibits of pension benefits.
29 USC § 1002(1). ERISA its garnishment of pen-
sion benefits, 29 USC § 1056(d), but iS silent concerning the gar-
nishment of welfare benefits.
EOE
App. 3
supreme Court has repeatedly stated that ERISA’s pre-
emptive reach is broad. See, e.g. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,
Inc., 463 US 85, 97, 103 S Ct 2890, 77 L Ed 2d 490 (1983).
But that reach is not boundless.
Plaintiff argues that Oregon’s anti-garnishment law, ORS
23.160(1XjXC), is preempted by ERISA under Mackey v.
Lanier Collections Agency, 486 US 825, 100 L Ed 836,
108 S Ct 2182 (1988). Mackey involved two different
Georgia laws. The first law prohibited garnishment of the
benefits of ERISA welfare plans while permitting garnish-
ment of benefits from non-ERISA plans. The first law was
preempted because it gave differential treatment to ERISA
plans. Specific reference to ERISA in a state law invari-
ably leads to preemption. 486 US at 829. In contrast, ORS
23.160(1)GXC) does not treat ERISA plans differently from
non-ERISA plans and so is not automatically preempted.
The second law in Mackey was a general garnishment
statute which, once the first law was struck down, author-
ized garnishment of all employee welfare benefits. The
Supreme Court held that congressional silence concern-
ing garnishment of employee welfare plan benefits shows
that Congress “acknowledged and accepted” the practice
of garnishing ERISA welfare plan benefits under general
garnishment statutes. 486 US at 837. Plaintiff argues that
by “acknowledging and accepting the practice” Congress
intended ERISA plan benefits to be subject to garnish-
ment. Plaintiff misreads Mackey. It does not follow that
by acquiescing in garnishment Congress mandated that
practice. We understand Mackey to mean that the con-
gressional silence concerning garnishment of ERISA
welfare plans acknowledged and accepted various state
practices concerning garnishment, including the practice
of refusing garnishment. The only provision is that the
state garnishment law cannot single out ERISA plans for
special treatment.
App. 4
Plaintiff next argues that:
“preemption of ORS 23.160(1XjXC) provides for uni-
formity of treatment of ERISA benefits. If the Oregon
statute is not preempted, disability benefits paid pur-
suant to an ERISA plan would be exempt in Oregon,
but the same benefits would not be exempt in Georgia
based upon the Mackey case.”
Plaintiff incorrectly implies that ERISA mandates uniform
treatment of ERISA benefits. ERISA mandates uniform
treatment of ERISA plans.
“ERISA’s preemption provision does not refer to
state laws relating to ‘employee benefits’ but to state
laws relating to ‘employee benefit plans.’ * * * The
words ‘benefit’ and ‘plan’ are used separately through-
out ERISA, and nowhere iri the statute are they
treated as the equivalent of one another.” Fort Hali-
fax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 US 1, 7-8, 96 L Ed
2d 1, 107 S. Ct 2211 (1986).
“Benefit plans” refers to a set of administrative proce-
dures including claims processing, benefit calculation, and
pay out. 482 US at 9. Whether or not a check is garnished
after administrative procedures are complete has nothing
to do with a “plan” as that term was defined in Fort
Halifax. The benefit/plan distinction made in Fort Halifax
explains why Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency, supra,
permitted Georgia to regulate garnishment of benefits
even though state regulation meant that ERISA benefits
would be garnished via procedures that vary from state
to state. If uniformity of garnishment procedures was a
central regulatory concern of ERISA, Mackey would not
have left garnishment of disability benefits up to the
states.
Due to our disposition of the preemption issue, we do
not reach defendant’s other assignments of error.
Reversed and remanded.
|
App. 5
APPENDIX B
IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF OREGON
STANDARD INSURANCE
COMPANY
Respondent/Petitioner ORDER
DENYING REVIEW
v.
CA A73687
JEROME W SAKLAD SC §40211
Appellant/Respondent
AMERICAN COUNCIL OF
LIFE INS
Amicus Curiae
The Court has considered the petition for review and
orders that it be denied.
DATE: August 24, 1993.
/S/ WALLACE P. CARSON, JR.
WALLACE P. CARSON, JR.
CHIEF JUSTICE
App. 6
APPENDIX C
[Dated: January 27, 1992]
C{RCUIT COURT
OF THE STATE OF OREGON
FOR THE COUNTY OF MULTNOMAH
STANDARD INSURANCE Case No. 9108-05506
COMPANY,
Plaintiff, ORDER ON CLAIM OF
EXEMPTION TO
V. WRIT OF GARNISHMENT
JEROME W. SAKLAD,
Defendant.
This matter having come before the Court on plaintiff's
Motion for Review of Defendant’s Claim of Exemption to
a garnishment by plaintiff of certain disability benefits be-
ing paid to defendant by Standard Insurance Company,
and the Court having reviewed the file and a letter from
the defendant dated January 6, 1991, and having heard
argument on behalf of plaintiff, it is hereby
ORDERED that defendant’s claim of exemption of the
entire amount of disability benefits is denied on the
grounds that any Oregon exemption for disability benefits
is pre-empted by federal law, specifically the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that the sum of $400 of the funds
garnished is exempt as a one-time exemption under ORS
23.160(1Xk), which will not be available to defendant on
any further garnishments by plaintiff; and it is
App. 7
FURTHER ORDERED that of the funds deposited into
Court by Standard Insurance Company pursuant to the
garnishment and the exemption claim thereon that the
Clerk of the Court is directed to pay $400 of these funds
to the defendant, Jerome W. Saklad, and to pay the rest
to plaintiff, Standard Insurance Company.
Dated this 27 day of January, 1992.
/S/ Gerald R. Pullen
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE PRO TEM
Presented by:
James Ray Streinz, OSB 79410
App. 8
CIRCUIT COURT
OF THE STATE OF OREGON
FOR THE COUNTY OF MULTNOMAH
STANDARD INSURANCE Case No. 9108-05506
COMPANY,
ORDER ON SECOND
Plaintiff, CLAIM OF EXEMPTION
TO THE WRIT
vs. OF GARNISHMENT
JEROME W. SAKLAD,
Defendant.
This matter having come before the Court for hearing
on March 5, 1992, on defendant’s Claim of Exemption
from a garnishment filed by plaintiff, this being defen-
dant’s Second Claim of Exemption, and the Court hav-
ing reviewed the file, the Memorandum in Opposition to
Claim of Exemption filed by Standard Insurance Com-
pany, and having heard the arguments of counsel for
plaintiff and defendant, it is hereby
ORDERED that defendant’s Claim of Exemption, includ-
ing the claims based upon ORS 23.160(1XjXC) and ORS
743.050, is denied; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that any funds deposited into
Court by Standard Insurance Company pursuant to the
- garnishment and the exemption claim shall be returned
to Standard Insurance Company as Plaintiff by the Clerk
of the Court.
Dated this 2 day of April, 1992.
/S/ Lee Johnson
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE
Presented by:
James Ray Streinz, OSB 79410
App. 9
CIRCUIT COURT
OF THE STATE OF OREGON
FOR THE COUNTY OF MULTNOMAH
STANDARD INSURANCE Case No. 9108-05506
COMPANY,
ORDER ON THIRD
Plaintiff, CLAIM OF EXEMPTION TO
WRIT OF GARNISHMENT
Vs.
JEROME W. SAKLAD,
Defendant.
This matter having come before the Court for hearing
on May 1, 1992, on defendant’s claim of exemption from
a garnishment filed by plaintiff, this being defendant’s
Third Claim of Exemption, and the Court having reviewed
the file, the Memorandum in Opposition to Claim of Ex-
emption filed by Standard Insurance Company, the Memo-
randum in Support of Ciaim of Exemption filed by defen-
dant, and having heard the arguments of counsel for plain-
tiff and defendant, it is hereby
ORDERED that Defendant’s Claim of Exemption is
denied, specifically including each of the separate argu-
ments raised in Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of
Claim of Exemption; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED that any funds deposited into
Court by Standard Insurance Company pursuant to the
garnishment and the exemption claim shall be returned
to Standard Insurance Company as plaintiff by the Clerk
of the Court.
Dated this 1 day of May, 1992.
/S/ Lee Johnson
CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE
App. 10
APPENDIX D
[Dated: May 8, 1991]
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
STANDARD INSURANCE )
COMPANY, an Oregon ) CASE NO.
corporation ) CV89-4048 RG(Tx)
)
Plaintiff, )
Vv. ) FINDINGS OF FACT
) AND
JEROME W. SAKLAD, ) CONCLUSIONS
an individual, ) OF LAW
)
Defendant. )
After considering the testimony and documentary evi-
dence presented at trial, this Court enters the following
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Standard is, and at the time of the filing of this ac-
tion was, a corporation duly organized and existing under
and by virtue of the laws of the State of Oregon, with
its principal place of business in the State of Oregon.
2. Saklad is, and at the time of the filing of this action
was, a citizen of the United States domiciled in the State
of California, residing in the County of Ventura.
3. Effective February 1, 1974, Standard issued Group
Insurance Policy No. 330322 (the “IEE Policy’’) to Indus-
trial Electronics Engineers, Inc. (“IEE’’), providing long
term disability income insurance coverage to persons in-
sured thereunder.
App. 11
4. The IEE Policy provided benefits pursuant to an em-
ployee benefit plan established and maintained by IEE
subject to and governed by the terms of the Employee
Retirement Income and Security Act (“ERISA”) [29
U.S.C. Sections 1001 et seq.].
5. On May 1, 1978, Saklad became employed by Souriau,
Inc. (“Souriau”) as its marketing manager.
6. After becoming employed by Souriau, Saklad com-
pleted Standard’s Group Insurance Enrollment Card for
coverage under the IEE Policy.
7. Saklad became insured under the IEE Policy.
8. Under the IEE Policy, long term disability income
benefits were payable to those covered employees who
became totally disabled as defined in the IEE Policy and
who otherwise complied with the terms and provisions of
the IEE Policy.
9. Long term disability income benefits under the IEE
Policy were payable in the amount of 66%4% of the first
$3,000 of the covered employee’s basic monthly earnings,
reduced by defined “Deductible Benefits.”
10. The IEE Policy contained a one-month elimination
period during which no benefits accrued.
11. During the elimination period and for the first 24
months thereafter, long term disability income benefits
were payable under the IEE Policy only if the covered
employee was unable to perform the substantial and ma-
terial acts necessary to work with reasonable continuity
in his regular occupation. Thereafter, benefits were pay-
able only if the covered employee was unable to perform
the substantial and material acts necessary to work with
reasonable continuity in an occupation in which he might
be reasonably expected to engage in view of his physical
App. 12
capacity, his education, training or experience, and his
station in life.
12. Also under the IEE Policy, no long term disability
income benefits were payable for any period of time dur-
ing which the covered employee was engaged in any oc-
cupation, work or employment for wage or profit unless
such occupation, work or employment was part of an Ap-
proved Rehabilitation Program as defined under the IEE
Policy, and approved in writing by Standard.
13. Saklad submitted a claim for long term disability
income benefits under the IEE Policy, which was received
by Standard on October 29, 1979.
14. In connection with his claim for long term disability
income benefits under the IEE Policy, Saklad represented
to Standard that he was totally disabled under the terms
of the IEE Policy due to Legionnaires’ Disease and vari-
ous other health problems, including pericarditis.
15. In connection with his claim for long term disability
income benefits under the IEE Policy, Saklad further
represented to Standard that he was not engaged in any
occupation, work or employment. for wage or profit.
16. In the case of a claim for total disability, Section
6.B. of the IEE Policy required the covered employee to
furnish written proofs of continuance of total disability at
intervals reasonably required by Standard.
17. Saklad signed and submitted to Standard written
statements representing that he was disabled and not
working on or about the following dates: October 17, 1979;
February 5, 1980; June 27, 1980; August 22, 1980; January
6, 1981; February 25, 1981; June 1, 1981; September 6,
1981; and October 28, 1982.
App. 13
18. In addition, Saklad made other written representa-
tions to Standard representing that he remained disabled
and was not working on or about the following dates: Jan-
uary 3, 1981; August 6, 1981; December 9, 1981; Sep-
tember 20, 1982; November 1, 1982; September 19, 1983;
October 2, 1983; March 22, 1984; and November 10, 1984.
19. The representations made by Saklad as described
in paragraphs 14 through 18 above were false. The true
facts were that Saklad was not totally disabled as he was
engaged in an occupation, work or employment for wage
or profit.
20. Saklad made the representations described in para-
graphs 14 through 18 above with knowledge o: their falsity.
21. Saklad made the representations described in para-
graphs 14 through 18 above intending to induce Standard
to act in reliance thereon.
22. Standard approved Saklad’s claim for long term dis-
ability income benefits under the IEE Policy and paid
monthly benefits to Saklad for the period August 24, 1979,
through December 23, 1984.
23. Standard approved Saklad’s claim for long term dis-
ability income benefits under the IEE Policy and paid
monthly benefits to Saklad in the mistaken belief that
Saklad was totally disabled under the terms of the IEE
Policy due to Legionnaires’ Disease and various other
health problems and was not engaged in any occupation,
work or employment for wage or profit.
24. Standard approved Saklad’s claim for long term dis-
ability income benefits under the IEE Policy and paid
monthly benefits to Saklad in justifiable reliance upon
Saklad’s representations that he was totally disabled
under the terms of the IEE Policy due to Legionnaires’
Disease and various other health problems and was not
App. 14
engaged in any occupation, work or employment for wage
or profit.
25. At the time Saklad made the representations that
he was totally disabled under the terms of the IEE Policy
due to Legionnaires’ Disease and various other health
problems and was not engaged in any occupation, work
or employment for wage or profit, and at the time Stan-
dard approved Saklad’s claim for long term disability in-
come benefits under the IEE Policy and paid monthly
benefits to Saklad, Standard believed Saklad’s represen-
tations to be true. Had Standard known of the falsity of
Saklad’s representations, Standard would not have ap-
proved Saklad’s claim for long term disability income
benefits under the IEE policy nor would it have paid
monthly benefits to Saklad.
26. The total amount of monthly benefits paid by Stan-
dard to Saklad for the period January 1, 1980, through
December 23, 1984, was $117,234.
27. On September 20, 1982, Saklad wrote to Standard
indicating that his doctors had advised him to leave the
Southern California area for a warm, dry climate with
clean air. In that letter, Saklad raised the subject of
settling his claim for long term disability income benefits
under the IEE Policy for a lump sum settlement.
28. On November 1, 1982, Saklad wrote to Standard
indicating that at that time he no longer desired a lump
sum settlement.
29. On September 19, 1983, Saklad wrote to Standard,
again raising the possibility of a lump sum settlement and
his desire to relocate to a different climate.
30. Standard responded to Saklad’s requests for a lump
sum settlement by discouraging settlement and advising
Saklad to obtain the advice of counsel.
App. 15
31. On October 2, 1983, Saklad wrote to Standard indi-
cating that he had obtained the advice of counsel and that
he desired a lump sum settlement.
32. On March 22, 1984, Saklad again wrote to Standard
reiterating his request for a lump sum settlement and
stating, “My doctors admit there will not be a reversal
of my problems. My damage is permanent, so is my dis-
ability.”
33. In connection with his request for a lump sum settle-
ment of all future long term disability income benefits
under the IEE Policy, Saklad represented to Standard
that he was totally disabled under the terms of the IEE
Policy.
34. In connection with his request for a lump sum set-
tlement of all future long term disability income benefits
under the IEE Policy, Saklad further represented to Stan-
dard that his total disability was on-going.
35. In connection with his request for a lump sum settle-
ment of all future long term disability income benefits
under the IEE Policy, Saklad further represented to Stan-
dard that he was not engaged in any occupation, work
or employment for wage or profit.
36. In connection with his request for a lump sum
settlement of all future long term disability income
benefits under the IEE Policy, Saklad further represented
to Standard that he did not intend to engage in any oc-
cupation, work or employment for wage or profit in the
future.
37. The representations made by Saklad as described
in paragraphs 33 through 36 above were false. The true
facts were that Saklad was not totally disabled as he had
been, was and was planning to continue to be engaged
in an occupation, work or employment for wage or profit.
App. 16
38. Saklad made the representations described in para-
graphs 33 through 36 above with knowledge of their
falsity.
39. Saklad made the representations described in para-
graphs 33 through 36 above intending to induce Standard
to act in reliance thereon.
40. On or about December 7, 1984, Standard and Sak-
lad entered into an Accord and Satisfaction Agreement
in final settlement of Saklad’s claim for disability benefits
under the IEE Policy.
41. On December 24, 1984, Standard paid to Saklad the
sum of $80,000 pursuant to the Accord and Satisfaction
Agreement.
42. Standard entered into the Accord and Satisfaction
Agreement with Saklad and paid to Saklad the sum of
$80,000 pursuant to the Accord and Satisfaction Agree-
ment in the mistaken belief that Saklad was totally dis-
abled under the terms of the IEE Policy, that Saklad’s
total disability was ongoing, that Saklad was not engaged
and had not been engaged in any occupation, work or em-
ployment for wage or profit, and that Saklad did not in-
tend to engage in any occupation, work or employment
for wage or profit in the future.
43. Standard would not have entered into the Accord
and Satisfaction Agreement with Saklad and paid to Sak-
lad the sum of $80,000 pursuant to the Accord and Satis-
faction Agreement except for Standard’s mistaken belief
that Saklad was totally disabled under the terms of the
IEE Policy, that Saklad’s total disability was ongoing, that
Saklad was not engaged and had not been engaged in any
occupation, work or employment for wage or profit, and
that Saklad did not intend to engage in any occupation,
work or employment for wage or profit in the future.
;
:
;
App. 17
44. Saklad was aware, or should reasonably have been
aware, of Standard’s mistaken belief that Saklad was
totally disabled under the IEE Policy, that Saklad’s total
disability was ongoing, that Saklad was not engaged and
had not been engaged in any occupation, work or employ-
ment for wage or profit, and that Saklad did not intend
to engage in any occupation, work or employment for
wage or profit in the future.
45. Standard entered into the Accord and Satisfaction
Agreement with Saklad and paid to Saklad the sum of
$80,000 pursuant to the Accord and Satisfaction Agree-
ment in justifiable reliance on Saklad’s representations
that he was totally disabled under the terms of the IEE
Policy, that Saklad’s total disability was ongoing, that
Saklad was not engaged and had not been engaged in any
occupation, work or employment for wage or profit, and
that Saklad did not intend to engage in any occupation,
work or employment for wage or profit in the future.
46. On August 24, 1987, Standard received from Saklad
a claim for long term disability income benefits under an-
other policy of group long term disability income insur-
ance, this one issued to The Master Plating, Inc. (the
“Master Plating Policy”).
47. Master Plating was a family business, owned and
operated by members of the Saklad family.
48. On a Long Term Disability Claim Employer’s State-
ment signed by Saklad on August 17, 1987, and submitted
by Saklad to Standard in connection with his 1987 claim
for benefits under the Master Plating Policy, Saklad gave
January 1980 as the date he was employed by Master
Plating.
49. Also in connection with his 1987 claim for benefits
under the Master Plating Policy, on August 18, 1987,
App. 18
Saklad signed and submitted to Standard a Long Term
Disability Claim Employee’s Statement indicating that
during the period January 1980, through November 1985,
Saklad was employed as a sales and marketing vice presi-
dent, with duties of outside sales and product marketing
at a salary of $650 per week.
50. In 1988, Saklad submitted another claim for long
term disability income benefits under the Master Plating
Policy.
51. In connection with Saklad’s 1988 claim for benefits
under the Master Plating Policy, on February 11, 1988,
Saklad signed and submitted to Standard a Long Term
Disability Claim Employee’s Statement that stated that
he was employed as vice president of sales and marketing
from November 1980, through November 1985, with duties
of outside sales and marketing at a salary of $650 per
week.
52. In connection with Saklad’s 1988 claim for benefits
under the Master Plating Policy, Standard contacted Max
Van daaleen Wetters, vice president of Master Plating,
who confirmed in a telephone conversation that Saklad
was employed by Master Plating in January 1980.
53. Also in connection with his 1988 claim for benefits
under the Master Plating Policy, Saklad provided Stan-
dard with a copy of his resume which stated that he was
employed from 1980 to 1985 as vice president, sales at
Master Plating at a salary of $24,000 to $36,000 per year.
54. Also in connection with his 1988 claim for bene-
fits under the Master Plating Policy, Saklad submitted
to Standard a Long Term Disability Claim Employer’s
Statement signed by Claudette LeMay, Office Manager
of Master Plating, that indicated that Saklad was em-
ployed by Master Plating in January 1980.
App. 19
55. In February 1989, Saklad made another claim for
long term disability income benefits under the Master
Plating Policy.
56. In connection with his 1989 claim for benefits under
the Master Plating Policy, on February 11, 1989, Saklad
signed and submitted to Standard a Long Term Disabil-
ity Claim Employee’s Statement that indicated that he
was employed from November 1980, through November
1985, as a vice president of sales and marketing, with
duties of outside sales and marketing at a salary of $650
per week.
57. In connection with his 1989 claim for benefits under
the Master Plating Policy, Saklad submitted a Long Term
Disability Claim Employer’s Statement indicating that
Saklad was employed by Master Plating on January 1,
1980.
58. In light of this new information, Standard commenced
an investigation to determine whether any false state-
ments, misrepresentations or omissions had been made by
Saklad in connection with his claim for long term disability
income benefits under the IEE Policy or the Accord and
Satisfaction Agreement.
59. Saklad was engaged in an occupation, work or em-
ployment for wage or profit during the period that Stan-
dard paid him benefits under the IEE Policy.
60. Saklad performed sales and marketing, management
and various other services for Master Plating from at least
January 1, 1980, through 1984 and beyond.
61. Saklad was compensated for services he performed
for Master Plating during the period that Standard paid
him benefits under the IEE Policy.
App. 20
62. At times, Saklad was compensated for the services
he performed for Master Plating in the form of a weekly
check payable to Saklad personally.
63. At other times, Saklad was compensated for the
services he performed for Master Plating in the form of
a weekly check payable to an entity known as the Marilyn
Morgan Company.
64. Marilyn Morgan is a name that has been used by
Saklad’s present wife.
65. It is most probable that Marilyn Morgan Company
never provided any services to Master Plating, and the
checks made payable to Marilyn Morgan Company by
Master Plating were for the purpose of compensating
Saklad for services he performed for Master Plating.
66. Saklad also participated in other work and employ-
ment, including activities connected with an entity known
as The Palma Properties, during the period that. Standard
paid him long term disability income benefits under the
IEE Policy.
67. Even though Saklad represented to Standard that
he was not working during the period that Standard paid
him long term disability income benefits under the IEE
Policy, Saklad represented to others, including health and
life insurers, that he was working during that period in
order to obtain insurance coverage and benefits.
68. Saklad did not tell Standard that he was engaged
in any occupation, work or employment for wage or profit
during the period that Standard paid long term disabil-
ity income benefits to Saklad under the IEE Policy.
69. Saklad did not tell Standard that he was perform-
ing services for Master Plating during the period that
App. 21
Standard paid him long term disability income benefits
under the IEE Policy.
70. Saklad did not tell Standard that he was compen-
sated for the services he performed for Master Plating
during the period that Standard paid him benefits under
the IEE Policy.
71. Saklad did not tell Standard that he was engaged
in other-work and employment, including activities con-
nected with an entity known as The Palma Properties,
during the period that Standard paid him long term dis-
ability income benefits under the IEE Policy.
72. None of Saklad’s activities was ever approved by
Standard in writing or otherwise as an Approved Reha-
bilitation Program under the IEE Policy.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Any and all findings of fact included in the Conclu-
sions of Law are hereby adopted as part of the Findings
of Fact. Any and all conclusions of law included in the
Findings of Fact are hereby adopted as part of the Con-
clusions of Law.
2. This action arises under the provisions of ERISA,
29 U.S.C. Sections 1001 et seg., and is subject to the
jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section
1331.
3. In addition, the matter in controversy exceeds the
sum of $50,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and this
action therefore is further subject to the jurisdiction of
this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(aX1).
4. Venue properly lies in the Central District of Califor-
nia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sections 1391(a) and (b).
:
App. 22
5. Under the IEE Policy, Saklad was not entitled to
the long term disability income benefits paid to Saklad
by Standard during the period January 1, 1980, through
December 23, 1984.
6. Standard has been damaged in the sum of $117,234
in that Standard paid long term disability income benefits
to Saklad during the period January 1, 1980, through
December 23, 1984, under a mistake of fact.
7. Standard has been damaged in the sum of $117,234
in that Standard paid long term disability income benefits
to Saklad during the period January 1, 1980, through De-
cember 23, 1984, in justifiable reliance upon fraudulent
misrepresentations made by Saklad.
8. It would be unjust and inequitable to allow Saklad
to retain the long term disability income benefits paid to
Saklad by Standard during the period January 1, 1980,
through December 23, 1984.
9. Standard is entitled to the return of all benefits paid
to Saklad under the IEE Policy during the period January
1, 1980, through December 23, 1984, in the amount of
$117,234, plus interest at the legal rate.
10. Prejudgment interest on said sum of $117,234 through
April 19, 1991, is in the amount of $124,043.
11. Saklad was not entitled to the $80,000 paid to him
by Standard under the Accord and Satisfaction Agree-
ment.
12. Standard has been damaged in the sum of $80,000
in that Standard entered into the Accord and Satisfac-
- tion Agreement with Saklad and paid to Saklad the sum
of $80,000 pursuant to the Accord and Satisfaction Agree-
ment under a mistake of fact.
App. 23
13. Standard has been damaged in the sum of $80,000
in that Standard entered into the Accord and Satisfaction
Agreement with Saklad and paid to Saklad the sum of
$80,000 pursuant to the Accord and Satisfaction Agree-
ment in justifiable reliance upon fraudulent misrepresen-
tations made by Saklad.
14. It would be unjust and inequitable to allow Saklad
to retain the $80,000 paid by Standard pursuant to the
Accord and Satisfaction Agreement.
15. Standard is entitled to rescind the Accord and
Satisfaction Agreement.
16. Standard is entitled to the return of the $80,000
paid to Saklad pursuant to the Accord and Satisfaction
Agreement, plus interest at the legal rate from and after
December 24, 1984.
17. Prejudgment interest on said sum cf $80,000 through
April 19, 1991, is in the amount of $45,881.
18. Judgment on the Complaint shall be entered in
Standard’s favor and against Saklad.
19. Standard shall be awarded the sum of $367,158,
plus post judgment interest at the legal rate.
20. Standard shall recover its costs of suit herein.
21. Judgment shall be entered as provided herein.
/S/ Richard A. Gadbois, Jr.
RICHARD A. GADBOIS, JR.
United States District Judge
DATED: May 8, 1991
App. 24
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA
STANDARD INSURANCE
COMPANY, an Oregon CASE NO.
corporation CV 89-4048 RG (Tx)
Plaintiff, JUDGMENT
THIS CONSTITUTES NOTICE
OF ENTRY AS
REQUIRED BY
FRCP, RULE 77(d)
JEROME W. SAKLAD,
an individual,
)
)
)
)
)
Vv. )
)
)
)
)
)
Defendant.
This action came on for trial before the Court, the Honor-
able Richard A. Gadbois, Jr., District Judge, Presiding,
on April 25 and 30, and on May 1 and 2, 1991. The issues
having been duly tried, findings of fact and conclusions
of law and an Order for Judgment having been filed on
May 8, 1991,
IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the plaintiff
Standard Insurance Company recover of the defendant
Jerome W. Saklad the sum of $367,158, with interest
thereon at the rate of 6.07% as provided by law from the
date of this Judgment, and its costs of suit in the amount
of $ ,
DATED: May 28, 1991
/S/ Richard A. Gadbois, Jr.
Honorable Richard A. Gadbois, Jr.
Judge of the United States District Court
App. 25
APPENDIX E
ERISA, § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)
(a) Persons empowered to bring a civil action
A civil action may be brought—
(1)
(2)
(3)
(4)
(5)
(6)
by a participant or beneficiary—
(A) for the relief provided for in subsection (c) of
this section, or
(B) to recover benefits due to him under the
terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under
the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights
to future benefits under the terms of the plan;
by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary
or fiduciary for appropriate relief under section 1109
of this title;
by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to en-
join any act or practice which violates any provi-
sion of this subchapter or the terms of the plan,
or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief
(i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any
provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the
plan;
by the Secretary, or by a participant, or benefici-
ary for appropriate relief in the case of a violation
of 1025(c) of this title;
except as otherwise provided in subsection (B) of
this section, by the Secretary (A) to enjoin any act
or practice which violates any provision of this sub-
chapter, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable
relief (i) to redress such violation or (ii) to enforce
any provision of this subchapter; or
by the Secretary to collect any civil penalty under
subsection (cX2) or (i) or (1) of this section.
App. 26
APPENDIX F
ERISA, § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)
(a) Supersedure; effective date
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the
provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this
chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as
they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit
plan described in section 1003(a) of this title and not ex-
empt under section 1003(b) of this title. This section shall
take effect on January 1, 1975.
App. 27
APPENDIX G
Or. Rev. Stat. § 23.160(1)(j)(C)
23.160 Leviable property generally; selectable exemp-
tions. (1) All property, including franchises, or rights or
interest therein, of the judgment debtor, shall be liable
to an execution, except as provided in this section and
in other statutes granting exemptions from execution. If
selected and reserved by the judgment debtor or the
agent of the judgment debtor at the time of the levy, or
as soon thereafter before sale thereof as the same shall
be known to the judgment debtor, the following property,
or rights or interest therein of the judgment debtor,
except as provided in ORS 23.220, shall be exempt from
execution:
QG) The debtor’s right to receive, or property that
is traceable to:
(C) A payment in compensation of loss of future earn-
ings of the debtor or an individual of whom the
debtor is or was a dependent, to the extent
reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor
and any dependent of the debtor.
App. 28
APPENDIX H
Or. Rev. Stat. 743.050
Exemption of proceeds, health insurance.
Except as may otherwise be expressly provided by the
policy, the proceeds or avails of all health insurance
policies and of provisions providing benefits on account
of the insured’s disability which are supplemental to life
insurance policies, issued before, on or after June 8, 1967,
shall be exempt from all liability for any debt of the in-
sured, and from any debt of the beneficiary existing at
the time the proceeds are made available for the use of
the beneficiary.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.