Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Standard Insurance Co. v. Saklad

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93-799

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1993

STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY,

Petitioner,

Vv.

JEROME SAKLAD,

Respondent.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

Court of Appeals of the State of Oregon

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

JAIME RUTH EBENSTEIN

Counsel of Record

MARK E. SCHMIDTKE

J R EBENSTEIN CONSULTANTS

17867 Foxborough Lane

Boca Raton, Florida 33496

(407) 451-4406

Attorneys for Petitioner

Standard Insurance Company

Of Counsel:

JEFFREY C. CAREY

STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY

900 S.W. Fifth Avenue

Portland, Oregon 97207

(503) 321-8871

Midwest Law Printing Co., Chicago 60611, (312) 321-0220

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether the Employee Retirement Income Security

Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seg., as amended

(“ERISA”) preempts a state law which creates both

substantive and procedural rights in third parties

which are not recognized by ERISA and which are

inconsistent with ERISA’s exclusive civil enforcement

scheme.

Whether ERISA preempts a state law which does

not “expressly refer to” ERISA plans but which en-

compasses both ERISA and non-ERISA plans.

Whether a state garnishment exemption “relates to”

an employee benefit plan or merely “relates to”? em-

ployee benefits.

il

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

QUESTIONS PRESENTED .................. i

OPINIONS AND ORDERS BELOW .......... 2

OU RE: £45 dn hn boekoeensimssaanaenes 3

SEALE SVAN ERD 6 ks dewcavaddacsacduats 4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ............... 4

A. Teme GE Fe aidan kau swaes 4

B. Decisions of the Courts Below .......... 5

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT.... 7

A. This Case Presents Important Questions of

Federal Law Concerning the Employee Re-

tirement Income Security Act .......... 7

B. This Court Should Resolve the Conflict Be-

tween the Oregon Court of Appeals on the

One Hand and the Fifth Circuit and the

California Supreme Court on the Other

Hand Regarding Whether ERISA Preempts

a State Law Which Creates Substantive

Rights in Third Parties Not Recognized by

ERISA and that Conflict with ERISA’s Ex-

clusive Civil Enforcement Scheme ....... 10

C. This Court Should Resolve the Conflict Be-

tween the Oregon Court of Appeals and the

Tenth Circuit as well as the Confusion and

Uncertainty Among State and Federal

Courts Regarding What it Means for a

State Law to Make “Reference to” ERISA

Plans for Preemption Purposes ......... 14

D. This Court Should Resolve the Conflict Be-

tween the Oregon Court of Appeals and the

Tenth Circuit Regarding Whether a State

Garnishment Exemption “Relates to” an

Employee Benefit Plan, Not Just Employee

Benefits, and is Preempted ............- 22

CI weve ccesccccccescccassccccceces 24

APPENDIX APP.

PAGE

“A—Opinion of the Court of Appeals, March 31,

sc biechedeivk ence ces cadensa esta 1

B—Supreme Court Denied Review, August 24,

th ka cue bs eee secon sone ceeweate « 5

C—Opinion of the Circuit Court, January 27, 1992 . 6

Opinion of the Circuit Court, April 2, 1992 ... 8

Opinion of the Circuit Court, May 1, 1992... 9

D—Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law of the

District Court, May 8, 1991 ............... 10

Judgment Order of the District Court, May 28,

CECA caeaebesssseuscecesevesess

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES: PAGE

Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451 U.S. 504

EEE Mccubecete cna deaheneea odds thde ne 8

CSCAC v. El Capitan Development Co., 53 Cal.3d

1041, 282 Cai. Rptr. 277, 811 P.2d 296 cert. den.

fe Pr eerrrerre es 9, 11, 12, 13

Donald H. Hartvig, Inc. v. Kellas, 113 B.R. 673

eb i cabscdesddckasedacsangecess 20

Eickhoff v. Eickhoff, 1993 Ga. Lexis 713 (Ga. Oc-

RE i ob bow aee caweekac detasanssna 23

FMC Corporation v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990) .

jabmenowand oe hadi as aaah eakaaaeaa 15, 17, 18

Ft. Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S.

D Ge Fass tates cadaksseenean ein cueves 7, 22

Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat’l. Pension Fund,

Oe Se re rrr errr 18

Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Int'l. Assoc., Local

No. 9, ___. F.8d ___, 1993 U.S. App. Lexis

28698 (10th Cir. November 4, 1993)....... passim

Heitkamp v. Dyke, 943 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir. 1991) .

ob bb Reb ow Ka ONOaeeheeibe tell ea ent aa 9, 15, 19, 20

In re Bartlett, 116 B.R. 1015 (S.D. Iowa 1990) ... 20

In re Garvin, 129 B.R. 598 (S.D. Ind. 1991)..... 20

In re Martinez, 107 B.R. 378 (S.D. Fla. 1989) ... 21

In re Shaker, 137 B.R. 930 (W.D. Wis. 1992) .... 20

In re Volpe, 100 B.R. 840 (W.D. Tex.) aff'd. 943

Pe BGs Ge GR. Bee scdccccoscasesssns 20, 21

Vv

Ingersoll-Rand Company v. McClendon, 498 U.S.

Oe Es css nce dads ducacesadandansenees 7,9, 15

Iron Workers Pension Fund v. Terotechnology, 391

F.2d 548 (5th Cir.) cert. den. 497 U.S. 1024

GE ainbcuadvscegsancedbasaeseeen 9, 11, 12, 13

Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Service,

Inc., 486 U.S. 825 (1988) ...........--eee- passim

Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S. 58

CUEE gcc kuna cin scnsseeauensakeeeenaneeaes 7,9

Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S.Ct. 2242 (1992) ..... 21

Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41 (1987) .

ob skw sede den web aeaeaeedeeekeeeeksae 7, 8,9, 15

Pitrat v. Garlikov, 947 F.2d 419 (9th Cir. 1991) .. 21

Plumber’s Local 458 Holiday Vacation Fund v.

Howard Immel, Inc., 151 Wis.2d 233, 445 N.W.

ee Fer per rrre rrr rrrrr rr rrr Te 20

Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983) .

cpukenanedches tdee sana tee needraeass eae 7, 8, 15, 16

STATUTES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS:

A uiidandawenrs 3

ERISA, § 1, 29 U.S.C. § 1001 ............0c00es 7

ERISA, §§ 103-104, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1023-1024 ...... 14

ERISA, § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) ..........5. 4

ERISA, § 502(eX1), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(eX(1) ........ 4

ERISA, § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a) .......... 4,7, 8, 16

Col. Rev. Stat. 13-54-104 ..............0eeeeeees 10, 19

eR 8 A rere err re 10

vi

Ga. Code Ann. § 18-4-20 (Supp. 1987) ............ 16

Ga Se I, UIE ede cceceacccccacccsnes 16

Ga. Code Ann. § 18-4-60 (1982) ...............04. 11

IE bbb 6.00000000000064 60000008 10

Or. Rev. Stat. § 23.160(1IKjNXC) ........ 2... eee eee 4,5

Ge, Bec ee, PEE bb b0ncccccdescsccucuens 4

75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1720 (1987) ................. 18

ERs Gis GEA 6b 60.666 ceenececcesdecnstaainens

ee S| Perret ee

a ek ft Pr 1

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OcToBER TERM, 1993

STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY,

Petitioner,

Vv.

JEROME SAKLAD,

Respondent.

Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

Court of Appeals of the State of Oregon

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Standard Insurance Company (“Standard”) respectfully

petitions this Court for a writ of certiorari to review the

final judgment of the Court of Appeals of the State of

Oregon in this case.

The Oregon Court of Appeals held that, as long as

ERISA plans are not singled out (i.e., the state law en-

compasses both ERISA and non-ERISA plans), the states

may enforce exemption statutes which prevent an ERISA

* All parties to the proceeding below are listed in the caption

to this petition. Standard Insurance Company has no parent com-

ies or subsidiaries (other than wholly owned subsidiaries) to

be dudinanll wader . Ct. R. 29.1. In addition, at all times rele-

vant hereto, Stan was a fiduciary with respect to the Master

aa Inc. Benefits Plan (“Master ing Plan”) and the Indus-

trial Electronics Engineers Benefits Plan (“IEE Plan”).

a

plan from collecting money judgments against a defraud-

ing welfare benefit plan participant. This holding effec-

tively creates substantive rights in third parties (e.g.,

welfare benefit plan debtors) which are not recognized by

ERISA’s civil enforcement scheme. Specifically, the Oregon

Court held that a state garnishment exemption for dis-

ability benefits was not preempted by ERISA where the

exemption did not single out ERISA plans for special

treatment. It did so, apparently believing that Congress

meant that exemptions, not just garnishment procedures,

are purely matters of state law. This holding was based

on an incorrect application of prior holdings of this Court,

was at odds with decisions in state and federal courts,

created substantive rights in third parties not recognized

by ERISA and which are inconsistent with ERISA’s ex-

clusive civil enforcement scheme, destroyed the uniformity

of regulation created by Congress in enacting ERISA, was

based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the policies

of Congress that underlie ERISA, and will have a pro-

found effect on defrauded ERISA plans in their attempt

to recoup plan losses.

OPINIONS AND ORDERS BELOW

The opinion of the Court of Appeals of the State of Oregon,

filed on March 31, 1993, is reported at 119 Or.App. 91,

849 P.2d 1150 and is reproduced at Appendix (“App.’’)

1-4. The Supreme Court of Oregon denied review on

August 24, 1993, which decision is reported at 317 Or.

486 and is reproduced at App. 5. The opinions of the trial

court are reproduced at App. 6-9.

Br SS

JURISDICTION

This action was filed in the Circuit Court, Multnomah

County, Oregon. On three separate occasions, the trial

court rendered judgment in favor of petitioner on January

27, 1992, April 2, 1992, and May 1, 1992, permitting peti-

tioner to garnish certain employee disability benefits in

order to satisfy a judgment for fraud rendered by the

United States District Court for the Central District of

California on May 28, 1991. The federal trial court had juris-

diction over this action pursuant to section 502(eX1) of

ERISA, 29 U.S.C. § 1132(eX1).2 Respondent appealed the

state court garnishment order to the Court of Appeals

of Oregon. The state appellate court reversed the trial

court garnishment order on March 31, 1993. The Supreme

Court of Oregon denied discretionary review on August

24, 1993. This Petition is being filed within the 90-day

period following entry of that order pursuant to Sup. Ct.

R. 13.1 and 13.3. This Court has jurisdiction pursuant to

28 U.S.C. § 1257 because the validity of a state statute

is drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant

to the laws of the United States.

2 ERISA, section 502(eX1) [29 U.S.C. § 1132(eX1)] provides as

follows:

Except for actions under subsection (aX1XB) of this section,

the district courts of the United States shall have exclusive

jurisdiction of civil actions under this subchapter brought by

the Secretary or by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary.

State courts of competent jurisdiction and district courts of

the United States shall have concurrent jurisdiction of actions

under subsection (aX1XB) of this section.

eer eel

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STATUTES INVOLVED

This case involves sections 502(a) and 514(a) of ERISA, 29

U.S.C. §§ 1132(a), 1144(a)? and Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 23.160(1)

(jXC) and 743.050.4

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. Statement of Facts

From 1980 through 1984, Standard paid defendant ap-

proximately $200,000 in disability benefits, including a

substantial lump sum payout of benefits for the duration

of defendant’s expected life. The benefits were paid under

an ERISA plan known as the IEE Plan. Standard paid

these benefits in reliance on defendant’s representations

that he was totally disabled and that he was not engaged

in any occupation, work, or employment for wage or profit.

The defendant’s representations were fraudulent.

As found by the federal district court,5 in January, 1980,

at a time when defendant was receiving monthly disability

benefits from Standard under the IEE Plan, defendant

became employed by Master Plating, Inc. and became a

participant in a disability plan known as the Master

Plating Plan. The Master Plating Plan became funded by

a policy of insurance issued by Standard. In 1989, defen-

dant made a claim for, and was awarded, disability bene-

fits under the Master Plating Plan. In the course of re-

3 The text of these statutes is set out verbatim at App. 25 and

App. 26, respectively.

4 The text of these statutes is set out verbatim at App. 27 and

App. 28, respectively.

5 The federal district court opinion and judgment are attached

at App. 10-24.

uidiiine

viewing defendant’s claim for benefits, Standard learned

that defendant had been working at Master Plating during

the time period for which he received disability benefits

under the IEE Plan and that defendant had obtained bene-

fits under the IEE Plan by fraud and deceit.

Pursuant to ERISA, Standard filed suit against defen-

dant to obtain restitution of said benefits in the United

States District Court for the Central District of Califor-

nia. On or about May 28, 1991, judgment was entered in

favor of Standard for over $360,000.

B. Decisions of the Courts Below

In order to collect on its fraud judgment, Standard reg-

istered the judgment in Oregon and attempted to garnish

the benefits payable by Standard to Saklad under the

Master Plating Plan.* Saklad claimed that his benefits

were partially exempt from garnishment under a state

statute which exempts from garnishment “‘payment in

compensation of loss of future earnings’. Or. Rev. Stat.

§ 23.160(1XjXC). On three separate occasions, the state

trial court denied Saklad’s exemption claims on the ground

that the state garnishment exemption was preempted by

ERISA. See App. 6-9.

Saklad appealed the trial court decisions. On March 31,

1993, the Court of Appeals of Oregon reversed the trial

court decisions and held that the state garnishment ex-

emption was not preempted by ERISA. See App. 1-4.

The Oregon Court of Appeals, like other courts, relied

on but misread Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency &

6 The judgment was registered in Oregon because Standard is

an Oregon domiciliary insurance company headquartered in Port-

land, Oregon. Saklad’s benefits were issued from Oregon.

~~ S

a at ETL

Service, Inc., 486 U.S. 825 (1988). The Oregon appeals

court held that congressional silence concerning garnish-

ment of ERISA welfare benefits “acknowledged and ac-

cepted various state practices concerning garnishment, in-

cluding the practice of refusing garnishment”. See App. 3

(emphasis added). While Mackey held that collection of

money judgments was a matter left to the States, it did

not hold that a State may prohibit the collection of an

ERISA judgment won in federal court against a plan par-

ticipant pursuant to ERISA’s exclusive civil enforcement

scheme.

The Oregon Court, like many other courts, also misread

footnote 12 of Mackey, and concluded that a garnishment

exemption statute was not preempted unless it singled

out ERISA plans for special treatment. Because the Oregon

exemption statute did not expressly mention ERISA or

ERISA plans, the appellate court held that the state garnish-

ment exemption was not preempted. The Oregon Court, like

others, operated under the erroneous belief that Mackey

altered the “relates to” test of ERISA.

Finally, the Oregon Court incorrectly held that a state

garnishment exemption applicable to welfare benefits is

not preempted because it does not relate to an ERISA

plan, but merely relates to plan benefits.

Standard filed its petition for review with the Supreme

Court of Oregon. Review was denied on August 24, 1993.7

7 After the Oregon Supreme Court denied review, Standard filed

a —— action against Saklad under ERISA pursuant to § 502(aX3),

king to coordinate the benefits payable to under the Master

Plating Plan with the benefits already received by Saklad under

the IEE Plan as well as for equitable setoff under federal common

law. This action is pending in the United States District Court

for the Central District of California.

a

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REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

A. This Case Presents Important Questions Of Federal

Law Concerning The Employee Retirement Income

Security Act.

This Court has repeatedly acknowledged the importance

of issues arising under the Exnployee Retirement Income

Security Act, 29 U.S.C. § 1001, et seg. (“ERISA’’) with

regard to: (1) preemption of state law; (2) the exclusivity

of ERISA’s civil enforcement scheme; and (8) the uniform

regulation of employee benefit plans. See, e.g., Ingersoll-

Rand Company v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133 (1990); FMC

Corporation v. Holliday, 498 U.S. 52 (1990); Mackey v.

Lanier Collections Agency & Service, Inc., 486 U.S. 825

(1988); Ft. Halifax Packing Co., Inc. v. Coyne, 482 U.S.

1 (1987); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Taylor, 481 U.S.

58 (1987); Pilot Life Ins. Co. v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. 41

(1987); Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983).

This particular case presents important questions in all

of these areas because the Court below misread and mis-

applied the preemption test as set forth in ERISA. In

so doing, the Oregon Court denied an effective remedy

to a defrauded ERISA plan, frustrating collection of a

judgment won pursuant to ERISA’s exclusive civil en-

forcement scheme, and thus making a sham of the uniform

regulation of employee benefits. Moreover, the Oregon

Court of Appeals decision is one of numerous cases caus-

ing confusion and conflict between various state and fed-

eral courts regarding application of the “relates to”’ test

set forth in ERISA.

ERISA contains an express preemption provision which

states that ERISA supersedes all State laws that “relate

to”’ any employee benefit plan. 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a). This

Court has stated on several occasions that the preemption

=

provision of ERISA is extremely broad. See, e.g., Pilot

Life, 481 U.S. 45-46 (“the express pre-emption provisions

of ERISA are deliberately expansive”); Shaw v. Delta

Airlines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983) (“the breadth of [29

U.S.C. § 1144(a)’s] pre-emptive reach is apparent... .”’).

Furthermore, because Congress used the phrase “relate

to” in its broad sense, this Court has “emphasized that

the pre-emption clause is not limited to ‘state laws spe-

cifically designed to affect employee benefit plans.’ ”’ Pilot

Life, 481 U.S. at 47-48. Accord, Shaw, 463 U.S. at 98 (pre-

emption clause should not “be interpreted to pre-empt

only state laws dealing with the subject matters covered

by ERISA—reporting, disclosure, fiduciary responsibility,

and the like.’’)

This Court has also recognized that a primary concern

of Congress in enacting ERISA was the uniform regula- |

tion of employee benefit plans. Congress used “‘deliberate-

ly expansive” language in ERISA’s preemption clause

which was “designed to ‘establish pension plan regulation

as exclusively a federal concern’ ”’. Pilot Life, 481 U.S.

at 46 (quoting Alessi v. Raybestos-Manhattan, Inc., 451

U.S. 504 (1981)).

Nowhere did Congress more clearly demonstrate its

desire for uniform regulation of employee benefit plans

than in its enactment of ERISA’s detailed civil enforce-

ment scheme. This Court has stated that the civil enforce-

ment scheme “‘is one of the essential tools for accomplish-

ing the stated purposes of ERISA”’. Pilot Life, 481 U.S.

at 52. These detailed provisions constitute “a comprehen-

sive civil enforcement scheme”’. Id. at 54. In order to fur-

ther the purpose of uniformly regulating employee benefit

plans, this Court has held that “(t]he deliberate care with

which ERISA’s civil enforcement remedies were drafted

and the balancing of policies embodied in its choice of

TO

=

remedies argue strongly for the conclusion that ERISA’s

civil enforcement remedies were intended to be exclusive’.

Id. Thus, states are prohibited from supplementing or de-

tracting from these remedies. See, e.g., Pilot Life, supra

(state claim for bad faith is preempted); Metropolitan Life

v. Taylor, supra (state tort and breach of contract claims

are preempted); Ingersoll-Rand v. McClendon, supra

(state wrongful discharge claim preempted by ERISA).

Despite this Court’s consistent reasoning regarding the

breadth of ERISA preemption, the exclusive nature of

ERISA’s civil enforcement scheme, and the uniform regu-

lation of employee benefit plans, this Court’s decision in

Mackey v. Lanier Collections Agency & Service, Inc., 486

U.S. 825 (1988), has been the subject of conflicting inter-

pretations in federal and state courts. Two such matters

are at issue in this case. First, courts have split over the

extent to which the state laws regarding the collection

of money judgments are preempted by ERISA, particular-

ly where they create substantive rights in welfare benefit

plan debtors not recognized by ERISA and in conflict

with ERISA’s civil enforcement scheme. Compare Iron

Workers Pension Fund v. Terotechnology, 891 F.2d 548

(5th Cir.) cert. den. 497 U.S. 1024 (1990) and CSCAC v.

El Capitan Development Co., 53 Cal.3d 1041, 282 Cal.

Rptr. 277, 811 P.2d 296 cert. den. 112 S.Ct. 430 (1991)

with the decision at issue in this case. Second, there is

substantial confusion over the breadth of the “relates to”

test and what type of “express reference” to ERISA

plans is necessary for a state law to be preempted by

ERISA. Compare Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Int’l.

Assoc., Local No. 9, ___. F.3d ___., 1993 U.S. App. Lexis

28698 (10th Cir. November 4, 1993) and Heitkamp v.

Dyke, 943 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir. 1991) with the decision at

issue in this case.

es

It is important for the Court to clarify these issues.

Numerous state and federal courts, including the Court

below, have misread and misapplied ERISA’s preemption

provision by failing to find state laws preempted even

though they “relate to”’ employee benefit plans. In the

case at hand, the Oregon Court held that a state garnish-

ment exemption applicable to ERISA disability benefits

was not preempted. If this interpretation of ERISA’s pre-

emption provision is allowed to stand, it will result in

defrauded employee benefit plans being denied an effec-

tive remedy for judgments won pursuant to ERISA’s civil

enforcement scheme. It will also allow state law, rather

than federal law, to govern the viability of ERISA judg-

ments, vitiating ERISA’s exclusive civil enforcement

scheme and eradicating the uniform regulation of em-

ployee benefit plans envisioned by Congress.®

B. This Court Should Resolve The Conflict Between The

Oregon Court Of Appeals On The One Hand And The

Fifth Circuit And The California Supreme Court On

The Other Hand Regarding Whether ERISA Preempts A |

State Law Which Creates Substantive Rights In Third |

Parties Not Recognized By ERISA And That Conflict

With ERISA’s Exclusive Civil Enforcement Scheme.

The Court below erroneously preserved a state anti-

garnishment exemption from preemption where the state

law created substantive rights in third parties which are

8 If state garnishment exemptions are not preempted by ERISA,

regulation concerning the satisfaction of judgments obtained pur-

suant to ERISA’s exclusive civil enforcement scheme will not be

uniform. Compare Ind. Code § 34-2-28-1 (no specific garnishment

exemption for disability benefits) with Col. Rev. Stat. 13-54-104

(limited garnishment exemption for disability benefits) and Fla.

08 ch. 222.18 (general garnishment exemption for disability bene-

its).

ee

=

not recognized by ERISA and which are inconsistent with

ERISA’s exclusive civil remedy scheme. The decision by

the Oregon Court of Appeals is in conflict with decisions

by the Fifth Circuit in Iron Workers Pension Fund v.

Terotechnology, 891 F.2d 548 (5th Cir.) cert. den. 497 U.S.

1024 (1990) and the California Supreme Court in CSCAC

v. El Capitan Development Co., 53 Cal.3d 1041, 282 Cal.

Rptr. 277, 811 P.2d 296 cert. den. 112 S.Ct. 430 (1991).

In Mackey v. Lanier Collections, this Court held that

a general state garnishment statute was not preempted.

This holding was premised in part on the fact that the

state law was merely a procedural mechanism for the col-

lection of money judgments and did not create any sub-

stantive rights. The Court noted:

[Under Georgia law (at least), garnishment is a ‘pro-

cedural’ mechanism for the enforcement of judgments.

Georgia’s statute that provides for garnishment cre-

ates no substantive causes of action, no new bases

for relief, or any grounds for recovery; the Georgia

garnishment law does not create the rule of decision

in any case affixing liability. Rather under Georgia

law, post-judgment garnishment is nothing more than

a method to collect judgments otherwise obtained by

prevailing on a claim against the garnishee. See Ga.

Code Ann. § 18-4-60 (1982).

Mackey, 486 US at 834, n. 10. In other words, if state

garnishment statutes are merely procedural in nature and

do not conflict with the substantive provisions of ERISA,

they are not preempted under section 514(a) of ERISA.

To hold otherwise would mean that ERISA plans and

their fiduciaries would have no means of collecting on

judgments. Jd. On the other hand, Mackey should not be

interpreted to mean that a garnishment exemption statute

which creates both procedural and substantive rights, and

which conflicts with ERISA’s civil enforcement scheme,

is not preempted. In this case, the state statute, rather

than being a convenient method to collect a money judg-

ment, actually frustrates an ERISA fiduciary’s obligation

to recoup monies fraudulently taken from the plan.

Relying on Mackey, the Fifth Circuit and the California

Supreme Court have held that state laws which created

substantive rights in third parties not otherwise recog-

nized by ERISA were preempted. In Iron Workers and

El Capitan, the Fifth Circuit and the California Supreme

Court respectively dealt with the issue of whether state

statutes creating real property liens in favor of pension

plans to assure payment of contributions by the employer

were preempted by ERISA. In each case, the court con-

cluded that such a lien created substantive rights not

otherwise available under the civil enforcement scheme

of ERISA and thus was preempted. In Iron Workers, the

Fifth Circuit held:

[T]he lien statutes involved do more than provide

remedies for collecting judgments; they create sub-

stantive rights ... . The Private Works Act creates

a substantive right against the property owner that

is not created by ERISA, and goes beyond being

merely a means of enforcing a judgment.

891 F.2d at 555-556. Similarly, in El Capitan, the Califor-

nia Supreme Court held:

[SJection 3111 cannot be upheld under Mackey as it

creates a new substantive right against the property

of a third party that is not created by ERISA and,

thus, goes beyond being a mere means of enforcing

a judgment.

811 P.2d at 304.

The decision of the Oregon Court in this case conflicts

with these decisions. All three are based on the proce-

dural/substantive distinction enunciated by this Court in

Se eo

alias

Mackey. Mackey allows garnishment statutes in general

to survive preemption since they are mere procedural

mechanisms to collect money judgments. However, exemp-

tions from a general garnishment statute affect these pro-

cedural rights in a substantive manner. This state law ex-

emption creates a substantive right for the plan bene-

ficiary by extending anti-alienation protection to welfare

benefits—a limitation that Congress chose only to impose

on ERISA pension benefits. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 836. As

such, the state law is preempted by ERISA. Because the

Oregon Court of Appeals decision held otherwise, it direct-

ly conflicts with the decisions in Iron Workers and El

Capitan as well as with this Court’s decision in Mackey.

The state law exemption also obstructs an ERISA plan’s

right “‘to sue’’, which implies a right to collect on money

judgments. Mackey, 486 U.S. at 832. This frustrates con-

gressional intent that ERISA’s civil enforcement scheme

be the exclusive means of regulating and enforcing obliga-

tions under employee benefit plans. To allow a state to

effectively refuse to enforce a judgment obtained pursuant

to ERISA’s civil enforcement scheme, whether for fraud,

overpayment, or subrogation, would give states unfettered

discretion to override federal law. The Courts in [ron

Workers and El Capitan understood that the states could

not supplement nor detract from ERISA’s civil enforce-

ment scheme. Thus, they struck down statutes which pro-

vided supplemental substantive enforcement mechanisms

to those available to benefit plans under ERISA. By allow-

ing a substantive right which essentially prevents the en-

forcement of a judgment obtained under ERISA’s exclu-

sive civil enforcement scheme, the Oregon Court of Ap-

peals decision directly conflicts with the Fifth Circuit deci-

sion in Iron Workers and the California Supreme Court

decision in El Capitan, as well as with this Court’s deci-

sion in Mackey.

—14—

This Court should resolve this conflict. To fail to do so

will only add to the existing confusion regarding the cor-

rect interpretation of Mackey, will subject employee

benefit plans to inconsistent substantive regulation by the

states, and result in the vitiation of the right of plans and

their fiduciaries to utilize the civil enforcement scheme

set forth in ERISA. While garnishment is a valid area

of state concern, it is a matter of federal concern when

a state garnishment exemption impacts the civil enforce-

ment scheme of ERISA and the right of ERISA plans

to sue and collect a money judgment pursuant to that

scheme, particularly given the fact that there are millions

of welfare benefit plan participants.® To alleviate the con-

flicting decisions in this area, this Court should issue a

writ of certiorari.

C. This Court Should Resolve The Conflict Between The

Oregon Court of Appeals And The Tenth Circuit As

Well As The Confusion And Uncertainty Among State

And Federal Courts Regarding What It Means For A

State Law To Make “Reference To’’ ERISA Plans

For Preemption Purposes.

The Oregon Court of Appeals erroneously held that a

state antigarnishment exemption which was applicable

both to ERISA and non-ERISA benefits and plans, was

not preempted because the exemption did not single out

ERISA plans by “expressly referring” to ERISA. This

decision is completely at odds with the recent decision

*® According to the Amicus Brief of the United States in Mackey

v. Lanier, focusing only on multiemployer welfare plans (other than

life and health insurance plans), the nt of Labor esti-

ene ee ee ae a a

excess Se roe ts. These figures were tabula’

from annual rts with the t of Labor as re-

quired by ERISA, §§ 103-104, 29 U.S.C. §§ 1023-1024.

NF

=x =

of the Tenth Circuit in Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers

Int'l. Assoc., Local No. 9, supra. These two decisions are

the latest in a long line of state and federal court deci-

sions which have propounded conflicting interpretations

of ERISA’s preemption clause and the breadth of the

“relates to” test.

This Court has repeatedly employed a broad definition

in determining whether a law “relates to” an employee

welfare benefit plan. According to an early ERISA case

decided by this Court, a state law “relates to ‘a benefit

plan . . . if it has a connection with or reference to such

a plan.’” Shaw v. Delta Airlines, 463 U.S. at 96-97 (em-

phasis added).?°

Yet, despite a consistent line of authority from this

Court, there is widespread confusion over the holding in

Mackey. This confusion has taken numerous forms. It has

arisen in the application of the preemption standard based

on a determination of what it means for a state law to

“make reference to” ERISA plans. Some courts have con-

cluded that a state law “‘makes reference to” ERISA

plans where it has a decided impact on such plans. See,

e.g., Guidry v. Local No. 9, supra; Heitkamp v. Dyke,

943 F.2d 1435 (5th Cir. 1991). Others hold that a state

law does not “make reference to” ERISA plans unless

the language of the state law expressly refers to ERISA

and/or ERISA plans. See, e.g., the decision rendered by

the court below. Still others seem to believe that this

Court intended to expand the “relates to” test first set

forth in Shaw. See discussion in Heitkamp v. Dyke, 943

F.2d at 1448 n.33 (“The language in Mackey is different

10 See also Pilot Life v. Dedeaux, 481 U.S. at 47; Ingersoll-Rand

a “g v. —_— 498 U.S. at 139; FMC Corp. v. Holliday,

». at ,

ih.

from the language in Shaw . . . Some commentators have

argued that the language in Mackey expands ERISA’s

preemptive effect beyond that which the Court anticipated

in Shaw”’’). It is clear from this confusion that this Court

should give additional guidance in this area.

In Mackey, this Court struck down a state garnishment

exemption law which expressly excepted ERISA plans

from garnishment.!! This Court held that a state law

which “makes reference to” and which “singles out ERISA

employee welfare benefit plans for different treatment

under state garnishment procedures, is pre-empted . . .

[t]he statute’s express reference to ERISA plans suffices

to bring it within the federal law’s preemptive reach”’.

486 U.S. at 830. The Court upheld the State’s general

garnishment procedure statute, which did not expressly

refer to ERISA plans but which was applicable to ERISA

and non-ERISA benefits, preserving it from preemption

under ERISA. The Court distinguished between preemp-

tion of the general garnishment statute and the exemp-

tion statute which expressly referred to ERISA plans:

It is not incongruous to find that Ga. Code Ann.

§ 18-4-20 (Supp. 1987), which provides for garnishment

of ERISA welfare benefit plans, escapes pre-emption

under ERISA, while striking down § 18-4-22.1—an

exception to the general state-law provision—as pre-

empted. While we believe that state-law garnishment

procedures are not pre-empted by § 514(a), we also

conclude that any state law which singles out ERISA

plans, by express reference, for special treatment is

11 The State law at issue in Mackey provided as follows:

Funds or benefits of a pension, retirement, or employee

benefit plan or program subject to the provisions of [ERISA],

shall not be subject to the process or garnishment... .

Ga. Code Ann. § 18-4-22.1.

———————————————

=

pre-empted . . . It is this “singling out” that pre-

empts the Georgia antigarnishment exception.

486 U.S. at 838 n. 12 (emphasis in original).

Although Mackey based its decision on the fact that a

state law which “singles out ERISA plans by express

reference” is preempted, id., express reference has never

been the sole basis for preemption. Unfortunately, foot-

note 12 of Mackey has caused many courts, such as the

Court below, to ignore other decisions of this Court re-

garding preemption. These courts have relied solely on

“express reference” as the test for preemption. Both

before and after Mackey, this Court has found state laws

to be preempted even where state laws did not specifically

mention ERISA or ERISA plans. For example, in FMC

Corp. v. Holliday, supra, this Court found a state law

prohibiting subrogation to have a “reference to” and “con-

nection with” ERISA plans and to be preempted although

the state law was generally applicable to ERISA and non-

ERISA benefits and did not make express reference to

ERISA or ERISA plans. 498 U.S. at 59 (“Pennsylvania’s

antisubrogation law has a ‘reference’ to benefit plans . . .

[and it] also has a ‘connection’ to ERISA benefit plans”’).

The decision below represents an incorrect reading of

this Court’s opinions in Mackey and FMC. The Oregon

statute exempts “[a] payment in compensation of loss of

future earnings” from garnishment. Although the statute

applies to disability benefits payable under an employee

welfare benefit plan, the appellate court held that the stat-

ute was not preempted because “(t]he only provision is

that the state garnishment law cannot single out ERISA

plans for special treatment”. In other words, because the

state law does not expressly mention ERISA plans and

single them out for special treatment, even though it

clearly regulates both ERISA and non-ERISA plans, in

oe

the view of the Oregon Court of Appeals, the state law

is not preempted. Not only does this holding misapply

Mackey, but it misapplies and fails to recognize that the

Oregon statute at issue is very similar to the Pennsylvania

statute in FMC. In FMC, the statute did not specifically

refer to ERISA or ERISA plans, but rather was a gen-

eral statute applicable to both ERISA and non-ERISA

plans. 12

The Oregon Court of Appeals decision conflicts with the

recent decision of the Tenth Circuit in Guidry, supra.'*

In Guidry, the union sought to garnish certain pension

benefits after the benefits were paid to Guidry. Among

other things, Guidry argued that the benefits were ex-

empt from garnishment under a state statute which placed

a cap on the amount of a debtor’s “earnings” which could

be subjected to garnishment. Like Oregon, the state law

at issue in Guidry applied to employee benefits, defining

“earnings” as “compensation paid or payable for personal

services, whether denominated as wages, salary, commis-

sion, bonus, avails of any pension or retirement benefits,

12 Section 1720 of Pennsylvania’s Motor Vehicle Financial Respon-

sibility Law, 75 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 1720 (1987) states:

In actions arising out of the maintenance or use of a motor

vehicle, there shall be no right of subrogation or reimburse-

ment from a claimant’s tort recovery with respect to . . . bene-

fits . . . payable under section 1719.

Section 1719 refers to benefit payments by “{alny program, group

contract or other arrangement”.

13 The Tenth Circuit decision in Guidry is an appeal following

a remand by this Court in Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Nat’.

Pension Fund, 493 U.S. 365 (1991). This Court ruled that the anti-

alienation provisions of ERISA applicable to pension plans super-

seded the union’s claim for a constructive trust on benefits payable

to Guidry because of Guidry’s criminal misconduct against the

union.

i.

or deferred compensation plan’’. Col. Rev. Stat. 13-54-104.

Although this statute did not expressly mention ERISA

or ERISA plans, the Tenth Circuit apparently believed

that the statute ‘‘expressly referfred] to” ERISA plans

because it implicitly encompassed such plans. (1993 U.S.

App. Lexis 28698, at *38.) Citing Mackey, the Tenth Cir-

cuit held:

The Colorado statute ‘relates to’ employee benefit

plans because it expressly refers to such plans...

(T]he garnishment exemption is preempted by ERISA

514(a) because it singles out ERISA benefits for spe-

cial treatment. It is this singling out that preempts

the Colorado anti-garnishment exception.

(Id. at *39-40.)

The Oregon holding also conflicts with decisions in sev-

eral other courts. For example, in Heitkamp v. Dyke, 948

F.2d 1435 (5th Cir. 1991), the Fifth Circuit determined

that a state statute “relate[d] to” ERISA plans where

its language “encompassed” such plans. The case arose

where a bankruptcy trustee objected to the exemption of

a debtor’s pension interest from the bankruptcy estate.

The debtor’s exemption was based on a state law which

exempted from attachment, execution, and seizure for the

satisfaction of debts the debtor’s interest in any “stock

bonus, pension, profitsharing, or similar plan”. Citing

Mackey, the Fifth Circuit noted that “absent an applicable

exception, ERISA automatically preempts all state laws

which specifically refer to ERISA benefit plans”. Jd. at

1448. Although the state statute did not expressly men-

tion ERISA or ERISA plans, the Fifth Circuit held that

the statute was “a state law which specifically refers to

ERISA benefit plans”, which conclusion was based on the

Court’s observation that the statutory exemption “clear-

ly encompasses ERISA-qualified benefit plans”.14 Jd. See

also In re Shaker, 137 B.R. 930 (W.D. Wis. 1992) (al-

though the fact that a state exemption statute makes no

express reference to ERISA or the Internal Revenue

Code “could provide a strong argument that the [state]

statute does not therefore ‘relate to’? ERISA in the sense

prohibited by Mackey and its progeny . . . ERISA’s broad

preemptive reach is not merely triggered by an express

reference to ERISA”); Donald H. Hartvig, Inc. v. Kellas,

113 B.R. 678, 678 (D. Ore. 1990) (‘elven though Mackey

relied on an express reference to ERISA plans, the ab-

sence of an express reference does not necessarily mean |

the statute is not preempted’). |

Unfortunately, other courts have not followed the reason-

ing in Guidry, Heitkamp, and similar decisions. See, e.g.,

Plumber’s Local 458 Holiday Vacation Fund v. Howard

Immel, Inc., 151 Wis.2d 233, 445 N.W.2d 43 (1989) (“Wis-

consin’s construction lien law is a general statute without

any specific reference to ERISA obligations’, and thus

is not preempted); Jn re Bartlett, 116 B.R. 1015, 1023

(S.D. Iowa 1990) (“{the Iowa pension exemption statute]

cannot be construed as making any reference to ERISA

or to attendant IRS provisions. Thus, it is not preempted

by ERISA... .”); In re Garvin, 129 B.R. 598 (S.D. Ind.

1991) (noting that the courts are split over whether ERISA

preempts state exemption statutes dealing with pension

plans, the court held that a state law which does not ex-

pressly mention ERISA “makes no reference to ERISA

whatsoever’); In re Volpe, 100 B.R. 840, 848 (W.D. Tex.)

14 Because ERISA does not preempt other federal laws, the Fifth

Circuit held that the state statute was “saved” from preemption

because the state law enforced federal goals under bankruptcy law.

943 F.2d at 1449-1450.

Ee |

iin.

aff'd. 943 F.2d 1451 (5th Cir. 1991) (state law which makes

passing mention of ERISA “makes reference to” ERISA

under Mackey, but does not “have reference to” ERISA

plans under Shaw because it does not purport to regulate

the terms and conditions of an employee benefit plan nor

does it affect the relationship between the principal ERISA

entities). Compare In re Martinez, 107 B.R. 378, 380 (S.D.

Fla. 1989) (even though a state exemption statute men-

tions the Internal Revenue Code provisions under which

an ERISA plan is qualified, the state law is not pre-

empted unless it creates a conflict between state law and

the federal scheme of ERISA) with Pitrat v. Garlikov,

947 F.2d 419, 427 (9th Cir. 1991) (“by naming those sec-

tions of the I.R.C. which designate ERISA-qualified plans

{a state exemption statute] clearly makes reference to

ERISA plans” and is preempted).

This Court decided in Patterson v. Shumate, 112 S.Ct.

2242 (1992) that ERISA’s prohibition of alienation of quali-

fied pension plan benefits allows a debtor’s pension plan

interest to be excluded from the bankruptcy estate, thus

mooting much of the preemption issue as it applies in the

bankruptcy context with respect to ERISA pension plans.

However, outside the bankruptcy context, preemption is-

sues with respect to pension plans still linger. See, e.g.,

Guidry, supra. Furthermore, Patterson does not resolve

any issues with respect to ERISA welfare plans and does

not resolve the preemption issue raised herein. This issue

arises in numerous contexts involving judgments awarded

to welfare benefit plans pursuant to ERISA’s civil enforce-

ment scheme in areas such as fraud, mistaken overpay-

ment, and subrogation.

These conflicting holdings demonstrate the ongoing con-

fusion as to the breadth of ERISA’s preemption clause

and the “relates to’”’ test. The confusion created by the

29

Oregon Court of Appeals decision and others destroys the

full force and effect of ERISA’s exclusive civil enforce-

ment scheme by subjecting ERISA plans to a variety of

conflicting court decisions, state and federal, regarding the

breadth of the “relates to” test of ERISA. This Court

should clarify the “relates to” test and the breadth of pre-

emption and set right the misinterpretations of Mackey.

D. This Court Should Resolve the Conflict Between the

Oregon Court Of Appeals And The Tenth Circuit Re-

garding Whether A State Garnishment Exemption

*‘Relates To’? An Employee Benefit Plan, Not Just

Employee Benefits, And Is Preempted.

The Oregon Court of Appeals effectively held that a

state garnishment exemption is not preempted because

it never “relates to’”’ an employee benefit plan, but only

“relates to”” employee benefits. According to the Oregon

Court, this holding applies even where benefits have not

yet been paid to the plan participant. The Tenth Circuit,

on the other hand, held in Guidry, supra, that a state

garnishment exemption is preempted because it “relates

to” employee benefit plans, even where plan benefits are

already paid and received by the plan participant.

The Oregon Court of Appeals stated that “({wJhether or

not a check is garnished after administrative procedures

are complete has nothing to do with a ‘plan’... .” App.

4. In Ft. Halifax, this Court held that ERISA preemp-

tion only applies to state laws which “relate to” ERISA |

plans, and not to laws which only “relate to” plan |

benefits. According to the Oregon Court, a garnishment

exemption statute can never “relate to” an ERISA plan

because the garnishment process only “relates to” plan

benefits. The Oregon Court apparently believed that once

a plan calculates the amount of benefits due a participant,

|

—~23—

an exemption protecting those benefits from garnishment

no longer “relates to” the benefit plan. What the Oregon

Court failed to recognize was that the plan paying benefits

to Saklad was not the only plan affected by the exemption.

Rather, the plan which had previously been defrauded by

Saklad was also affected by the exemption, because the

judgment it won pursuant to ERISA’s civil enforcement

scheme, which it sought to satisfy in Oregon, was com-

pletely frustrated by the exemption.

The Oregon decision directly conflicts with the Tenth

Circuit’s decision in Guidry. The issue in Guidry was

whether the union could garnish plan benefits which were

already paid and received by the participant. The Tenth

Circuit held that a state garnishment exemption was pre-

empted by ERISA. Responding to Guidry’s argument that

the statute did not “‘relate to” ERISA plans because the

plan benefits were already paid out, the Tenth Circuit

held:

[TJhe fact that this case is about paid benefits, and

not about benefits in the plan, does not take the Col-

orado statute out of ERISA 514(a). A statute relating

to benefits paid and received is a state law relating

to an employee benefit plan.

(1993 U.S. App. Lexis 28698, at *40.) But see Eickhoff

v. Eickhoff, 1993 Ga. Lexis 713 (Ga. October 25, 1993)

(benefits are not protected by ERISA once they are re-

ceived by the beneficiary).

The conflict between these two decisions is clear: while

the Tenth Circuit holds that a state garnishment exemp-

tion “relates to” ERISA plans and is preempted even

where benefits have already been paid to the participant,

the Oregon Court of Appeals holds that a state garnish-

ment exemption never “relates to” an ERISA plan. If

the Oregon interpretation is allowed to prevail, state law

olin

will effectively preempt federal law by eradicating ERISA’s

exclusive civil enforcement scheme, frustrating the at-

tempts of defrauded plans to satisfy judgments won pur-

suant to that scheme. This is exactly the result Congress

sought to avoid in enacting ERISA. Federal law, not state

law, was intended to be supreme. |

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the petition should be granted

and this Court should issue a writ of certiorari to review

the decision and judgment of the Court of Appeals of the

State of Oregon.

Respectfully submitted,

JAIME RUTH EBENSTEIN

Counsel of Record

MARK E. SCHMIDTKE

J R EBENSTEIN CONSULTANTS

17867 Foxborough Lane

Boca Raton, Florida 33496

(407) 451-4406

Attorneys for Petitioner

Standard Insurance Company

Of Counsel:

JEFFREY C. CAREY

STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY

900 S.W. Fifth Avenue

Portland, Oregon 97207

(503) 321-8871

November 18, 1993

APPENDICES

App. 1

APPENDIX A

Filed: March 31, 1993

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS

OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STANDARD INSURANCE COMPANY,

Respondent,

v.

JEROME W. SAKLAD,

” Appellant.

(9108-05506; CA A73687)

Appeal from Circuit Court, Multnomah County.

Lee Johnson, Judge. (April 2, 1992, Order)

Gerald R. Pullen, Judge pro tempore.

(January 27, 1992, Order)

Argued and submitted January 13, 1993.

Christopher F. McCracken, Portland, argued the cause

for appellant. With him on the briefs were Stuart

C. Harris and Davis Wright Tremaine, Portland.

James Ray Streinz, Portland, argued the cause for re-

spondent. With him on the brief were Russell B.

Weed and McEwen, Gisvold, Rankin & Stewart,

Portland.

Before Deits, Presiding Judge, and Riggs and

Durham, Judges.

RIGGS, J.

Defendant, judgment debtor, appeals from three orders

denying three claims that his disability benefits are exempt

from garnishment under ORS 23.160(1XjXC). At issue is

whether the Employee Retirement Income Security Act

(ERISA) preempts a state law which exempts proceeds

App. 2

of disability benefits from garnishment. 29 USC § 1144(a).

He also argues that his disability benefits are exempt

under ORS 743.050, which exempts from garnishment pro-

ceeds of a health insurance policy. Finally, he argues that

Standard engayed in a prohibited transaction under ERISA

by garnishing the benefits paid by an ERISA plan for

which it was also a fiduciary. We reverse and remand.

Defendant was a beneficiary of two disability policies

issued by plaintiff. He defrauded plaintiff of over $250,000

under the first policy but was entitled to benefits under

the second policy. After winning a judgment against de-

fendant for fraud, plaintiff sought to garnish the benefits

paid under the second policy. Plaintiff registered a judg-

ment against defendant and sought to satisfy that judg-

ment through a writ of continuing garnishment which gar-

nished defendant’s monthly disability payments under the

second policy. The second policy was administered by an

ERISA welfare plan for which plaintiff was a fiduciary.'

The ERISA welfare plan filed three certificates of gar-

nishee. In response to each certificate of garnishee, defen-

dant filed a claim of exemption under ORS 23.160(1XjXC),

which exempts from garnishment “payment in compensa-

tion of loss of future earnings.” The court denied all three

claims of exemption, holding that ORS 23.160(1XjXC) is

preempted by ERISA.

With certain exceptions not applicable to this case,

§ 514(a) of ERISA preempts all state laws that “relate

to any employee benefit plan.” 29 USC § 1144(a). The

1 “Welfare plans” refers to plans providing health and disability

insurance ad po benefits with + prohibits of pension benefits.

29 USC § 1002(1). ERISA its garnishment of pen-

sion benefits, 29 USC § 1056(d), but iS silent concerning the gar-

nishment of welfare benefits.

EOE

App. 3

supreme Court has repeatedly stated that ERISA’s pre-

emptive reach is broad. See, e.g. Shaw v. Delta Air Lines,

Inc., 463 US 85, 97, 103 S Ct 2890, 77 L Ed 2d 490 (1983).

But that reach is not boundless.

Plaintiff argues that Oregon’s anti-garnishment law, ORS

23.160(1XjXC), is preempted by ERISA under Mackey v.

Lanier Collections Agency, 486 US 825, 100 L Ed 836,

108 S Ct 2182 (1988). Mackey involved two different

Georgia laws. The first law prohibited garnishment of the

benefits of ERISA welfare plans while permitting garnish-

ment of benefits from non-ERISA plans. The first law was

preempted because it gave differential treatment to ERISA

plans. Specific reference to ERISA in a state law invari-

ably leads to preemption. 486 US at 829. In contrast, ORS

23.160(1)GXC) does not treat ERISA plans differently from

non-ERISA plans and so is not automatically preempted.

The second law in Mackey was a general garnishment

statute which, once the first law was struck down, author-

ized garnishment of all employee welfare benefits. The

Supreme Court held that congressional silence concern-

ing garnishment of employee welfare plan benefits shows

that Congress “acknowledged and accepted” the practice

of garnishing ERISA welfare plan benefits under general

garnishment statutes. 486 US at 837. Plaintiff argues that

by “acknowledging and accepting the practice” Congress

intended ERISA plan benefits to be subject to garnish-

ment. Plaintiff misreads Mackey. It does not follow that

by acquiescing in garnishment Congress mandated that

practice. We understand Mackey to mean that the con-

gressional silence concerning garnishment of ERISA

welfare plans acknowledged and accepted various state

practices concerning garnishment, including the practice

of refusing garnishment. The only provision is that the

state garnishment law cannot single out ERISA plans for

special treatment.

App. 4

Plaintiff next argues that:

“preemption of ORS 23.160(1XjXC) provides for uni-

formity of treatment of ERISA benefits. If the Oregon

statute is not preempted, disability benefits paid pur-

suant to an ERISA plan would be exempt in Oregon,

but the same benefits would not be exempt in Georgia

based upon the Mackey case.”

Plaintiff incorrectly implies that ERISA mandates uniform

treatment of ERISA benefits. ERISA mandates uniform

treatment of ERISA plans.

“ERISA’s preemption provision does not refer to

state laws relating to ‘employee benefits’ but to state

laws relating to ‘employee benefit plans.’ * * * The

words ‘benefit’ and ‘plan’ are used separately through-

out ERISA, and nowhere iri the statute are they

treated as the equivalent of one another.” Fort Hali-

fax Packing Co. v. Coyne, 482 US 1, 7-8, 96 L Ed

2d 1, 107 S. Ct 2211 (1986).

“Benefit plans” refers to a set of administrative proce-

dures including claims processing, benefit calculation, and

pay out. 482 US at 9. Whether or not a check is garnished

after administrative procedures are complete has nothing

to do with a “plan” as that term was defined in Fort

Halifax. The benefit/plan distinction made in Fort Halifax

explains why Mackey v. Lanier Collection Agency, supra,

permitted Georgia to regulate garnishment of benefits

even though state regulation meant that ERISA benefits

would be garnished via procedures that vary from state

to state. If uniformity of garnishment procedures was a

central regulatory concern of ERISA, Mackey would not

have left garnishment of disability benefits up to the

states.

Due to our disposition of the preemption issue, we do

not reach defendant’s other assignments of error.

Reversed and remanded.

|

App. 5

APPENDIX B

IN THE SUPREME COURT

OF THE STATE OF OREGON

STANDARD INSURANCE

COMPANY

Respondent/Petitioner ORDER

DENYING REVIEW

v.

CA A73687

JEROME W SAKLAD SC §40211

Appellant/Respondent

AMERICAN COUNCIL OF

LIFE INS

Amicus Curiae

The Court has considered the petition for review and

orders that it be denied.

DATE: August 24, 1993.

/S/ WALLACE P. CARSON, JR.

WALLACE P. CARSON, JR.

CHIEF JUSTICE

App. 6

APPENDIX C

[Dated: January 27, 1992]

C{RCUIT COURT

OF THE STATE OF OREGON

FOR THE COUNTY OF MULTNOMAH

STANDARD INSURANCE Case No. 9108-05506

COMPANY,

Plaintiff, ORDER ON CLAIM OF

EXEMPTION TO

V. WRIT OF GARNISHMENT

JEROME W. SAKLAD,

Defendant.

This matter having come before the Court on plaintiff's

Motion for Review of Defendant’s Claim of Exemption to

a garnishment by plaintiff of certain disability benefits be-

ing paid to defendant by Standard Insurance Company,

and the Court having reviewed the file and a letter from

the defendant dated January 6, 1991, and having heard

argument on behalf of plaintiff, it is hereby

ORDERED that defendant’s claim of exemption of the

entire amount of disability benefits is denied on the

grounds that any Oregon exemption for disability benefits

is pre-empted by federal law, specifically the Employee

Retirement Income Security Act of 1974; and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that the sum of $400 of the funds

garnished is exempt as a one-time exemption under ORS

23.160(1Xk), which will not be available to defendant on

any further garnishments by plaintiff; and it is

App. 7

FURTHER ORDERED that of the funds deposited into

Court by Standard Insurance Company pursuant to the

garnishment and the exemption claim thereon that the

Clerk of the Court is directed to pay $400 of these funds

to the defendant, Jerome W. Saklad, and to pay the rest

to plaintiff, Standard Insurance Company.

Dated this 27 day of January, 1992.

/S/ Gerald R. Pullen

CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE PRO TEM

Presented by:

James Ray Streinz, OSB 79410

App. 8

CIRCUIT COURT

OF THE STATE OF OREGON

FOR THE COUNTY OF MULTNOMAH

STANDARD INSURANCE Case No. 9108-05506

COMPANY,

ORDER ON SECOND

Plaintiff, CLAIM OF EXEMPTION

TO THE WRIT

vs. OF GARNISHMENT

JEROME W. SAKLAD,

Defendant.

This matter having come before the Court for hearing

on March 5, 1992, on defendant’s Claim of Exemption

from a garnishment filed by plaintiff, this being defen-

dant’s Second Claim of Exemption, and the Court hav-

ing reviewed the file, the Memorandum in Opposition to

Claim of Exemption filed by Standard Insurance Com-

pany, and having heard the arguments of counsel for

plaintiff and defendant, it is hereby

ORDERED that defendant’s Claim of Exemption, includ-

ing the claims based upon ORS 23.160(1XjXC) and ORS

743.050, is denied; and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that any funds deposited into

Court by Standard Insurance Company pursuant to the

- garnishment and the exemption claim shall be returned

to Standard Insurance Company as Plaintiff by the Clerk

of the Court.

Dated this 2 day of April, 1992.

/S/ Lee Johnson

CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE

Presented by:

James Ray Streinz, OSB 79410

App. 9

CIRCUIT COURT

OF THE STATE OF OREGON

FOR THE COUNTY OF MULTNOMAH

STANDARD INSURANCE Case No. 9108-05506

COMPANY,

ORDER ON THIRD

Plaintiff, CLAIM OF EXEMPTION TO

WRIT OF GARNISHMENT

Vs.

JEROME W. SAKLAD,

Defendant.

This matter having come before the Court for hearing

on May 1, 1992, on defendant’s claim of exemption from

a garnishment filed by plaintiff, this being defendant’s

Third Claim of Exemption, and the Court having reviewed

the file, the Memorandum in Opposition to Claim of Ex-

emption filed by Standard Insurance Company, the Memo-

randum in Support of Ciaim of Exemption filed by defen-

dant, and having heard the arguments of counsel for plain-

tiff and defendant, it is hereby

ORDERED that Defendant’s Claim of Exemption is

denied, specifically including each of the separate argu-

ments raised in Defendant’s Memorandum in Support of

Claim of Exemption; and it is

FURTHER ORDERED that any funds deposited into

Court by Standard Insurance Company pursuant to the

garnishment and the exemption claim shall be returned

to Standard Insurance Company as plaintiff by the Clerk

of the Court.

Dated this 1 day of May, 1992.

/S/ Lee Johnson

CIRCUIT COURT JUDGE

App. 10

APPENDIX D

[Dated: May 8, 1991]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STANDARD INSURANCE )

COMPANY, an Oregon ) CASE NO.

corporation ) CV89-4048 RG(Tx)

)

Plaintiff, )

Vv. ) FINDINGS OF FACT

) AND

JEROME W. SAKLAD, ) CONCLUSIONS

an individual, ) OF LAW

)

Defendant. )

After considering the testimony and documentary evi-

dence presented at trial, this Court enters the following

Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

FINDINGS OF FACT

1. Standard is, and at the time of the filing of this ac-

tion was, a corporation duly organized and existing under

and by virtue of the laws of the State of Oregon, with

its principal place of business in the State of Oregon.

2. Saklad is, and at the time of the filing of this action

was, a citizen of the United States domiciled in the State

of California, residing in the County of Ventura.

3. Effective February 1, 1974, Standard issued Group

Insurance Policy No. 330322 (the “IEE Policy’’) to Indus-

trial Electronics Engineers, Inc. (“IEE’’), providing long

term disability income insurance coverage to persons in-

sured thereunder.

App. 11

4. The IEE Policy provided benefits pursuant to an em-

ployee benefit plan established and maintained by IEE

subject to and governed by the terms of the Employee

Retirement Income and Security Act (“ERISA”) [29

U.S.C. Sections 1001 et seq.].

5. On May 1, 1978, Saklad became employed by Souriau,

Inc. (“Souriau”) as its marketing manager.

6. After becoming employed by Souriau, Saklad com-

pleted Standard’s Group Insurance Enrollment Card for

coverage under the IEE Policy.

7. Saklad became insured under the IEE Policy.

8. Under the IEE Policy, long term disability income

benefits were payable to those covered employees who

became totally disabled as defined in the IEE Policy and

who otherwise complied with the terms and provisions of

the IEE Policy.

9. Long term disability income benefits under the IEE

Policy were payable in the amount of 66%4% of the first

$3,000 of the covered employee’s basic monthly earnings,

reduced by defined “Deductible Benefits.”

10. The IEE Policy contained a one-month elimination

period during which no benefits accrued.

11. During the elimination period and for the first 24

months thereafter, long term disability income benefits

were payable under the IEE Policy only if the covered

employee was unable to perform the substantial and ma-

terial acts necessary to work with reasonable continuity

in his regular occupation. Thereafter, benefits were pay-

able only if the covered employee was unable to perform

the substantial and material acts necessary to work with

reasonable continuity in an occupation in which he might

be reasonably expected to engage in view of his physical

App. 12

capacity, his education, training or experience, and his

station in life.

12. Also under the IEE Policy, no long term disability

income benefits were payable for any period of time dur-

ing which the covered employee was engaged in any oc-

cupation, work or employment for wage or profit unless

such occupation, work or employment was part of an Ap-

proved Rehabilitation Program as defined under the IEE

Policy, and approved in writing by Standard.

13. Saklad submitted a claim for long term disability

income benefits under the IEE Policy, which was received

by Standard on October 29, 1979.

14. In connection with his claim for long term disability

income benefits under the IEE Policy, Saklad represented

to Standard that he was totally disabled under the terms

of the IEE Policy due to Legionnaires’ Disease and vari-

ous other health problems, including pericarditis.

15. In connection with his claim for long term disability

income benefits under the IEE Policy, Saklad further

represented to Standard that he was not engaged in any

occupation, work or employment. for wage or profit.

16. In the case of a claim for total disability, Section

6.B. of the IEE Policy required the covered employee to

furnish written proofs of continuance of total disability at

intervals reasonably required by Standard.

17. Saklad signed and submitted to Standard written

statements representing that he was disabled and not

working on or about the following dates: October 17, 1979;

February 5, 1980; June 27, 1980; August 22, 1980; January

6, 1981; February 25, 1981; June 1, 1981; September 6,

1981; and October 28, 1982.

App. 13

18. In addition, Saklad made other written representa-

tions to Standard representing that he remained disabled

and was not working on or about the following dates: Jan-

uary 3, 1981; August 6, 1981; December 9, 1981; Sep-

tember 20, 1982; November 1, 1982; September 19, 1983;

October 2, 1983; March 22, 1984; and November 10, 1984.

19. The representations made by Saklad as described

in paragraphs 14 through 18 above were false. The true

facts were that Saklad was not totally disabled as he was

engaged in an occupation, work or employment for wage

or profit.

20. Saklad made the representations described in para-

graphs 14 through 18 above with knowledge o: their falsity.

21. Saklad made the representations described in para-

graphs 14 through 18 above intending to induce Standard

to act in reliance thereon.

22. Standard approved Saklad’s claim for long term dis-

ability income benefits under the IEE Policy and paid

monthly benefits to Saklad for the period August 24, 1979,

through December 23, 1984.

23. Standard approved Saklad’s claim for long term dis-

ability income benefits under the IEE Policy and paid

monthly benefits to Saklad in the mistaken belief that

Saklad was totally disabled under the terms of the IEE

Policy due to Legionnaires’ Disease and various other

health problems and was not engaged in any occupation,

work or employment for wage or profit.

24. Standard approved Saklad’s claim for long term dis-

ability income benefits under the IEE Policy and paid

monthly benefits to Saklad in justifiable reliance upon

Saklad’s representations that he was totally disabled

under the terms of the IEE Policy due to Legionnaires’

Disease and various other health problems and was not

App. 14

engaged in any occupation, work or employment for wage

or profit.

25. At the time Saklad made the representations that

he was totally disabled under the terms of the IEE Policy

due to Legionnaires’ Disease and various other health

problems and was not engaged in any occupation, work

or employment for wage or profit, and at the time Stan-

dard approved Saklad’s claim for long term disability in-

come benefits under the IEE Policy and paid monthly

benefits to Saklad, Standard believed Saklad’s represen-

tations to be true. Had Standard known of the falsity of

Saklad’s representations, Standard would not have ap-

proved Saklad’s claim for long term disability income

benefits under the IEE policy nor would it have paid

monthly benefits to Saklad.

26. The total amount of monthly benefits paid by Stan-

dard to Saklad for the period January 1, 1980, through

December 23, 1984, was $117,234.

27. On September 20, 1982, Saklad wrote to Standard

indicating that his doctors had advised him to leave the

Southern California area for a warm, dry climate with

clean air. In that letter, Saklad raised the subject of

settling his claim for long term disability income benefits

under the IEE Policy for a lump sum settlement.

28. On November 1, 1982, Saklad wrote to Standard

indicating that at that time he no longer desired a lump

sum settlement.

29. On September 19, 1983, Saklad wrote to Standard,

again raising the possibility of a lump sum settlement and

his desire to relocate to a different climate.

30. Standard responded to Saklad’s requests for a lump

sum settlement by discouraging settlement and advising

Saklad to obtain the advice of counsel.

App. 15

31. On October 2, 1983, Saklad wrote to Standard indi-

cating that he had obtained the advice of counsel and that

he desired a lump sum settlement.

32. On March 22, 1984, Saklad again wrote to Standard

reiterating his request for a lump sum settlement and

stating, “My doctors admit there will not be a reversal

of my problems. My damage is permanent, so is my dis-

ability.”

33. In connection with his request for a lump sum settle-

ment of all future long term disability income benefits

under the IEE Policy, Saklad represented to Standard

that he was totally disabled under the terms of the IEE

Policy.

34. In connection with his request for a lump sum set-

tlement of all future long term disability income benefits

under the IEE Policy, Saklad further represented to Stan-

dard that his total disability was on-going.

35. In connection with his request for a lump sum settle-

ment of all future long term disability income benefits

under the IEE Policy, Saklad further represented to Stan-

dard that he was not engaged in any occupation, work

or employment for wage or profit.

36. In connection with his request for a lump sum

settlement of all future long term disability income

benefits under the IEE Policy, Saklad further represented

to Standard that he did not intend to engage in any oc-

cupation, work or employment for wage or profit in the

future.

37. The representations made by Saklad as described

in paragraphs 33 through 36 above were false. The true

facts were that Saklad was not totally disabled as he had

been, was and was planning to continue to be engaged

in an occupation, work or employment for wage or profit.

App. 16

38. Saklad made the representations described in para-

graphs 33 through 36 above with knowledge of their

falsity.

39. Saklad made the representations described in para-

graphs 33 through 36 above intending to induce Standard

to act in reliance thereon.

40. On or about December 7, 1984, Standard and Sak-

lad entered into an Accord and Satisfaction Agreement

in final settlement of Saklad’s claim for disability benefits

under the IEE Policy.

41. On December 24, 1984, Standard paid to Saklad the

sum of $80,000 pursuant to the Accord and Satisfaction

Agreement.

42. Standard entered into the Accord and Satisfaction

Agreement with Saklad and paid to Saklad the sum of

$80,000 pursuant to the Accord and Satisfaction Agree-

ment in the mistaken belief that Saklad was totally dis-

abled under the terms of the IEE Policy, that Saklad’s

total disability was ongoing, that Saklad was not engaged

and had not been engaged in any occupation, work or em-

ployment for wage or profit, and that Saklad did not in-

tend to engage in any occupation, work or employment

for wage or profit in the future.

43. Standard would not have entered into the Accord

and Satisfaction Agreement with Saklad and paid to Sak-

lad the sum of $80,000 pursuant to the Accord and Satis-

faction Agreement except for Standard’s mistaken belief

that Saklad was totally disabled under the terms of the

IEE Policy, that Saklad’s total disability was ongoing, that

Saklad was not engaged and had not been engaged in any

occupation, work or employment for wage or profit, and

that Saklad did not intend to engage in any occupation,

work or employment for wage or profit in the future.

;

:

;

App. 17

44. Saklad was aware, or should reasonably have been

aware, of Standard’s mistaken belief that Saklad was

totally disabled under the IEE Policy, that Saklad’s total

disability was ongoing, that Saklad was not engaged and

had not been engaged in any occupation, work or employ-

ment for wage or profit, and that Saklad did not intend

to engage in any occupation, work or employment for

wage or profit in the future.

45. Standard entered into the Accord and Satisfaction

Agreement with Saklad and paid to Saklad the sum of

$80,000 pursuant to the Accord and Satisfaction Agree-

ment in justifiable reliance on Saklad’s representations

that he was totally disabled under the terms of the IEE

Policy, that Saklad’s total disability was ongoing, that

Saklad was not engaged and had not been engaged in any

occupation, work or employment for wage or profit, and

that Saklad did not intend to engage in any occupation,

work or employment for wage or profit in the future.

46. On August 24, 1987, Standard received from Saklad

a claim for long term disability income benefits under an-

other policy of group long term disability income insur-

ance, this one issued to The Master Plating, Inc. (the

“Master Plating Policy”).

47. Master Plating was a family business, owned and

operated by members of the Saklad family.

48. On a Long Term Disability Claim Employer’s State-

ment signed by Saklad on August 17, 1987, and submitted

by Saklad to Standard in connection with his 1987 claim

for benefits under the Master Plating Policy, Saklad gave

January 1980 as the date he was employed by Master

Plating.

49. Also in connection with his 1987 claim for benefits

under the Master Plating Policy, on August 18, 1987,

App. 18

Saklad signed and submitted to Standard a Long Term

Disability Claim Employee’s Statement indicating that

during the period January 1980, through November 1985,

Saklad was employed as a sales and marketing vice presi-

dent, with duties of outside sales and product marketing

at a salary of $650 per week.

50. In 1988, Saklad submitted another claim for long

term disability income benefits under the Master Plating

Policy.

51. In connection with Saklad’s 1988 claim for benefits

under the Master Plating Policy, on February 11, 1988,

Saklad signed and submitted to Standard a Long Term

Disability Claim Employee’s Statement that stated that

he was employed as vice president of sales and marketing

from November 1980, through November 1985, with duties

of outside sales and marketing at a salary of $650 per

week.

52. In connection with Saklad’s 1988 claim for benefits

under the Master Plating Policy, Standard contacted Max

Van daaleen Wetters, vice president of Master Plating,

who confirmed in a telephone conversation that Saklad

was employed by Master Plating in January 1980.

53. Also in connection with his 1988 claim for benefits

under the Master Plating Policy, Saklad provided Stan-

dard with a copy of his resume which stated that he was

employed from 1980 to 1985 as vice president, sales at

Master Plating at a salary of $24,000 to $36,000 per year.

54. Also in connection with his 1988 claim for bene-

fits under the Master Plating Policy, Saklad submitted

to Standard a Long Term Disability Claim Employer’s

Statement signed by Claudette LeMay, Office Manager

of Master Plating, that indicated that Saklad was em-

ployed by Master Plating in January 1980.

App. 19

55. In February 1989, Saklad made another claim for

long term disability income benefits under the Master

Plating Policy.

56. In connection with his 1989 claim for benefits under

the Master Plating Policy, on February 11, 1989, Saklad

signed and submitted to Standard a Long Term Disabil-

ity Claim Employee’s Statement that indicated that he

was employed from November 1980, through November

1985, as a vice president of sales and marketing, with

duties of outside sales and marketing at a salary of $650

per week.

57. In connection with his 1989 claim for benefits under

the Master Plating Policy, Saklad submitted a Long Term

Disability Claim Employer’s Statement indicating that

Saklad was employed by Master Plating on January 1,

1980.

58. In light of this new information, Standard commenced

an investigation to determine whether any false state-

ments, misrepresentations or omissions had been made by

Saklad in connection with his claim for long term disability

income benefits under the IEE Policy or the Accord and

Satisfaction Agreement.

59. Saklad was engaged in an occupation, work or em-

ployment for wage or profit during the period that Stan-

dard paid him benefits under the IEE Policy.

60. Saklad performed sales and marketing, management

and various other services for Master Plating from at least

January 1, 1980, through 1984 and beyond.

61. Saklad was compensated for services he performed

for Master Plating during the period that Standard paid

him benefits under the IEE Policy.

App. 20

62. At times, Saklad was compensated for the services

he performed for Master Plating in the form of a weekly

check payable to Saklad personally.

63. At other times, Saklad was compensated for the

services he performed for Master Plating in the form of

a weekly check payable to an entity known as the Marilyn

Morgan Company.

64. Marilyn Morgan is a name that has been used by

Saklad’s present wife.

65. It is most probable that Marilyn Morgan Company

never provided any services to Master Plating, and the

checks made payable to Marilyn Morgan Company by

Master Plating were for the purpose of compensating

Saklad for services he performed for Master Plating.

66. Saklad also participated in other work and employ-

ment, including activities connected with an entity known

as The Palma Properties, during the period that. Standard

paid him long term disability income benefits under the

IEE Policy.

67. Even though Saklad represented to Standard that

he was not working during the period that Standard paid

him long term disability income benefits under the IEE

Policy, Saklad represented to others, including health and

life insurers, that he was working during that period in

order to obtain insurance coverage and benefits.

68. Saklad did not tell Standard that he was engaged

in any occupation, work or employment for wage or profit

during the period that Standard paid long term disabil-

ity income benefits to Saklad under the IEE Policy.

69. Saklad did not tell Standard that he was perform-

ing services for Master Plating during the period that

App. 21

Standard paid him long term disability income benefits

under the IEE Policy.

70. Saklad did not tell Standard that he was compen-

sated for the services he performed for Master Plating

during the period that Standard paid him benefits under

the IEE Policy.

71. Saklad did not tell Standard that he was engaged

in other-work and employment, including activities con-

nected with an entity known as The Palma Properties,

during the period that Standard paid him long term dis-

ability income benefits under the IEE Policy.

72. None of Saklad’s activities was ever approved by

Standard in writing or otherwise as an Approved Reha-

bilitation Program under the IEE Policy.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

1. Any and all findings of fact included in the Conclu-

sions of Law are hereby adopted as part of the Findings

of Fact. Any and all conclusions of law included in the

Findings of Fact are hereby adopted as part of the Con-

clusions of Law.

2. This action arises under the provisions of ERISA,

29 U.S.C. Sections 1001 et seg., and is subject to the

jurisdiction of this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section

1331.

3. In addition, the matter in controversy exceeds the

sum of $50,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and this

action therefore is further subject to the jurisdiction of

this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(aX1).

4. Venue properly lies in the Central District of Califor-

nia pursuant to 28 U.S.C. Sections 1391(a) and (b).

:

App. 22

5. Under the IEE Policy, Saklad was not entitled to

the long term disability income benefits paid to Saklad

by Standard during the period January 1, 1980, through

December 23, 1984.

6. Standard has been damaged in the sum of $117,234

in that Standard paid long term disability income benefits

to Saklad during the period January 1, 1980, through

December 23, 1984, under a mistake of fact.

7. Standard has been damaged in the sum of $117,234

in that Standard paid long term disability income benefits

to Saklad during the period January 1, 1980, through De-

cember 23, 1984, in justifiable reliance upon fraudulent

misrepresentations made by Saklad.

8. It would be unjust and inequitable to allow Saklad

to retain the long term disability income benefits paid to

Saklad by Standard during the period January 1, 1980,

through December 23, 1984.

9. Standard is entitled to the return of all benefits paid

to Saklad under the IEE Policy during the period January

1, 1980, through December 23, 1984, in the amount of

$117,234, plus interest at the legal rate.

10. Prejudgment interest on said sum of $117,234 through

April 19, 1991, is in the amount of $124,043.

11. Saklad was not entitled to the $80,000 paid to him

by Standard under the Accord and Satisfaction Agree-

ment.

12. Standard has been damaged in the sum of $80,000

in that Standard entered into the Accord and Satisfac-

- tion Agreement with Saklad and paid to Saklad the sum

of $80,000 pursuant to the Accord and Satisfaction Agree-

ment under a mistake of fact.

App. 23

13. Standard has been damaged in the sum of $80,000

in that Standard entered into the Accord and Satisfaction

Agreement with Saklad and paid to Saklad the sum of

$80,000 pursuant to the Accord and Satisfaction Agree-

ment in justifiable reliance upon fraudulent misrepresen-

tations made by Saklad.

14. It would be unjust and inequitable to allow Saklad

to retain the $80,000 paid by Standard pursuant to the

Accord and Satisfaction Agreement.

15. Standard is entitled to rescind the Accord and

Satisfaction Agreement.

16. Standard is entitled to the return of the $80,000

paid to Saklad pursuant to the Accord and Satisfaction

Agreement, plus interest at the legal rate from and after

December 24, 1984.

17. Prejudgment interest on said sum cf $80,000 through

April 19, 1991, is in the amount of $45,881.

18. Judgment on the Complaint shall be entered in

Standard’s favor and against Saklad.

19. Standard shall be awarded the sum of $367,158,

plus post judgment interest at the legal rate.

20. Standard shall recover its costs of suit herein.

21. Judgment shall be entered as provided herein.

/S/ Richard A. Gadbois, Jr.

RICHARD A. GADBOIS, JR.

United States District Judge

DATED: May 8, 1991

App. 24

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

STANDARD INSURANCE

COMPANY, an Oregon CASE NO.

corporation CV 89-4048 RG (Tx)

Plaintiff, JUDGMENT

THIS CONSTITUTES NOTICE

OF ENTRY AS

REQUIRED BY

FRCP, RULE 77(d)

JEROME W. SAKLAD,

an individual,

)

)

)

)

)

Vv. )

)

)

)

)

)

Defendant.

This action came on for trial before the Court, the Honor-

able Richard A. Gadbois, Jr., District Judge, Presiding,

on April 25 and 30, and on May 1 and 2, 1991. The issues

having been duly tried, findings of fact and conclusions

of law and an Order for Judgment having been filed on

May 8, 1991,

IT IS ORDERED AND ADJUDGED that the plaintiff

Standard Insurance Company recover of the defendant

Jerome W. Saklad the sum of $367,158, with interest

thereon at the rate of 6.07% as provided by law from the

date of this Judgment, and its costs of suit in the amount

of $ ,

DATED: May 28, 1991

/S/ Richard A. Gadbois, Jr.

Honorable Richard A. Gadbois, Jr.

Judge of the United States District Court

App. 25

APPENDIX E

ERISA, § 502(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a)

(a) Persons empowered to bring a civil action

A civil action may be brought—

(1)

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5)

(6)

by a participant or beneficiary—

(A) for the relief provided for in subsection (c) of

this section, or

(B) to recover benefits due to him under the

terms of his plan, to enforce his rights under

the terms of the plan, or to clarify his rights

to future benefits under the terms of the plan;

by the Secretary, or by a participant, beneficiary

or fiduciary for appropriate relief under section 1109

of this title;

by a participant, beneficiary, or fiduciary (A) to en-

join any act or practice which violates any provi-

sion of this subchapter or the terms of the plan,

or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable relief

(i) to redress such violations or (ii) to enforce any

provisions of this subchapter or the terms of the

plan;

by the Secretary, or by a participant, or benefici-

ary for appropriate relief in the case of a violation

of 1025(c) of this title;

except as otherwise provided in subsection (B) of

this section, by the Secretary (A) to enjoin any act

or practice which violates any provision of this sub-

chapter, or (B) to obtain other appropriate equitable

relief (i) to redress such violation or (ii) to enforce

any provision of this subchapter; or

by the Secretary to collect any civil penalty under

subsection (cX2) or (i) or (1) of this section.

App. 26

APPENDIX F

ERISA, § 514(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1144(a)

(a) Supersedure; effective date

Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the

provisions of this subchapter and subchapter III of this

chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as

they may now or hereafter relate to any employee benefit

plan described in section 1003(a) of this title and not ex-

empt under section 1003(b) of this title. This section shall

take effect on January 1, 1975.

App. 27

APPENDIX G

Or. Rev. Stat. § 23.160(1)(j)(C)

23.160 Leviable property generally; selectable exemp-

tions. (1) All property, including franchises, or rights or

interest therein, of the judgment debtor, shall be liable

to an execution, except as provided in this section and

in other statutes granting exemptions from execution. If

selected and reserved by the judgment debtor or the

agent of the judgment debtor at the time of the levy, or

as soon thereafter before sale thereof as the same shall

be known to the judgment debtor, the following property,

or rights or interest therein of the judgment debtor,

except as provided in ORS 23.220, shall be exempt from

execution:

QG) The debtor’s right to receive, or property that

is traceable to:

(C) A payment in compensation of loss of future earn-

ings of the debtor or an individual of whom the

debtor is or was a dependent, to the extent

reasonably necessary for the support of the debtor

and any dependent of the debtor.

App. 28

APPENDIX H

Or. Rev. Stat. 743.050

Exemption of proceeds, health insurance.

Except as may otherwise be expressly provided by the

policy, the proceeds or avails of all health insurance

policies and of provisions providing benefits on account

of the insured’s disability which are supplemental to life

insurance policies, issued before, on or after June 8, 1967,

shall be exempt from all liability for any debt of the in-

sured, and from any debt of the beneficiary existing at

the time the proceeds are made available for the use of

the beneficiary.

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