Opposition Brief — Chrissy F. v. Dale

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No. 93-754

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1993

Curissy F., By Her Next Friend And Guardian

Ad Litem, DONNA MEDLEY,

: Petitioner,

SEBE DALE, Jr., Individually and as Chancellor for the

Tenth Chancery Court District of Mississippi, Gar-

LAND UPTON, Individually and as Referee of the

Marion County Youth Court, PHILLIP BROADHEAD and

FRED COOPER, Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

MIKE MOORE

Attorney General

State of Mississippi

JAMES F.. STEEL

Deputy Attorney General

ROBERT SANDERS *

Assistant Attorney General

Post Office Box 220

450 High Street, 5th Floor

Jackson, Mississippi 39205

(601) 359-3680

Counsel for Respondents

February 24, 1994 * Counsel of Record

WILSON - Eras PRINTING Co.,. INC. - 789-0096 - WASHINGTON, D.C. 20001

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Was the Court of Appeals consistent with well-

established precedent in dismising the Defendants claim

due to lack of subject matter jurisdiction?

(i)

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Ree ae Pe ee .............c.......--.2....-............. iv

lope 8 UN ot) ee Miliniibcdiduaueeee. 1

SaAcuaee INVOLVED ............................................... yr

STATEMENT OF THE CASE ._...... 2

REASONS WHY THE PETITION SHOULD BE

a OS a da oe 7

THE COURT OF APPEALS’ JUDGMENT DIS-

MISSING THE DEFENDANTS DUE TO LACK

OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION IS

CORRECT AND WAS CONSISTENT WITH

WELL-ESTABLISHED PRECEDENT ....____. 7

Rae SEAT ge 19

(iii)

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES Page

Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Locomotive Engi-

neers, 398 U.S. 281, 26 L.Ed.2d 234, 90 S.Ct.

PE ID idea occecinikci seit eee tee geal 8,17

Carbonell v. La. Dept .of Health and Human

Services, 772 F.2d 185 (1985) ..................... ET 8, 10

Centifanti v. Nix, 865 F.2d 1422 (8rd Cir. 1988) .. 17

Chrissy F. By Medley v. Mississippi Department

of Public Welfare et al., 780 F. Supp. 1104 (S.D.

ee nr ee ae 2

Czura v. Supreme Court of South Carolina, 813

We GR CA Ga, TID ances nes enerescsacetcen ees 17

District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,

460 U.S. 462, 75 L.Ed.2d 206, 103 S.Ct. 1303

I oes actng ean eee ek ee passim

Hagerty v. Succession of Clement, 749 F.2d 217

On ee ec ee ee ea 11

Hale v. Harney, 786 F.2d 688 (5th Cir. 1986) ....11, 12, 13

Krempp v. Dobbs, 775 F.2d 1319 (5th Cir.

| ERR INS aL REE LO ee RN OU TOE NA RONEN ER 11

Razatos v. Colorado Supreme Court, 746 F.2d

Be ee Gr ata ccc pene tasesienes 15

Reed v. Terrell, 759 F.2d 472 (5th Cir. 1985) ....10, 11, 12

Ritter v. Ross, 992 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1993) ....13, 14, 15

Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 68

L.Ed.2d 362, 44 S.Ct. 149 (1928) .....00000002l.... 8,10, 17

Schneider v. Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico, :

jive» € . Bol ae: Sy, | PAaeneeupernmnscemamrae 16, 17

Worldwide Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d

Re Re ae ence ener 18,19

STATUTES AND RULES ;

EE ccc ee Re FB |

af ted i |. "Fy SINR endita okg a ineens pi nueA irs Dior een tan paon 4

AA oN GE vines catnancnadenin cca nainapeuaaenieapmouteaanets 4

IN THE

Supreme Court of the United States

OCTOBER TERM, 1993

No. 93-754

Curissy F., By Her Next Friend And Guardian

Ad Litem, DONNA MEDLEY,

- Petitioner,

SEBE DALE, Jr., Individually and as Chancellor for the

Tenth Chancery Court District of Mississippi, GAR-

LAND UPTON, Individually and as Referee of the

Marion County Youth Court, PHILLIP BROADHEAD and

FRED COOPER,

RED Coo Respondents.

On Petition for a Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals

for the Fifth Circuit

BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

INTRODUCTION

Respondents State of Mississippi, et al., respectfully

request that this Court deny the petition for a writ of

certiorari, seeking review of the opinion of the United

States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. That opin-

ion is reported at 995 F.2d 595 (Sth Cir. 1993). The

Court of Appeals properly dismissed two Defendants

because it did not have jurisdiction to grant injunctive

relief.

__————n i

STATUTES INVOLVED

28 U.S.C. § 1257 State courts; certiorari

(a) Final judgments or decrees rendered by the

highest court of a State in which a decision could be

had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by

writ of certiorari where the validity of a treaty or |

statute of the United States is drawn in question or |

where the validity of a statute of any State is drawn

in question on the ground of its being repugnant to |

the Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United

States, or where any title, right, privilege, or im-

munity is specially set up or claimed under the Con-

stitution or treaties or statutes of, or any commis-

sion held or authority exercised under, the United

States.

(b) For the purposes of this section, the term

“highest court of a State” includes the District of

Columbia Court of Appeals.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A carefully detailed statement of the facts leading up

to this litigation can be found in the district court's

memorandum opinion and order in Chrissy F. By Medley

v. Mississippi Department of Public Welfare et al., 780

F. Supp. 1104 (S.D. Miss. 1991). The Fifth Circuit

adopted these facts in Chrissy F. By Medley v. MS. Dept.

of Public Welfare, et al., 995 F.2d 595 (Sth Cir. 1993).

A brief outline of the procedural history of this case

follows.

On July 8, 1988, Donna Medley, a California resident,

filed a Complaint in the United States District Court for

the Southern District of Mississippi on behalf of Chrissy

F., a Mississippi minor, alleging that the Defendants had

violated Chrissy F.’s substantive and procedural due

process rights. The complaint alleged violations of fed-

eral statutory rights as well as pendent state claims. The

Complaint requested that declaratory judgment be

iene ili

granted against defendants Mississippi Department of

Public Welfare (MDPW); Thomas H. Brittain, Commis-

sioner of MDPW; Mississippi Attorney General Mike

Moore; Sebe Dale, Jr., Chancellor of the Tenth Chan-

cery Court District of Mississippi; Richard Douglass, Dis-

trict Attorney for the Fifteenth Circuit Court District:

Sharon Whitt, Supervisor of the Marion County Welfare

Department; Jeanette Werbly, Supervisor of the Hancock

County Welfare Department; Angela Lacy, a caseworker

with the Marion County Welfare Department; Dr.

Franklin D. Jones; Dr. S$. Kimball Love; Timothy Charles

Foxworth, father of Chrissy F.; and Does 1-25, alleging

that these defendants had violated the minor’s right not

to be deprived of state and federally created benefits of

life, liberty and pursuit of happiness, rights of freedom

from harm in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment,

42 U.S.C. § 5103, et seg., and an order allegedly issued

by the Juvenile Court of the San Francisco Superior

Court of California.

At its heart the Complaint sought to have the United

States District Court set aside the custody rulings of

Chancellor Dale and award custody of Chrissy F. to the

San Francisco Department of Social Services (SFDSS)

or to place her in a neutral and stable setting, with no

maternal or paternal relatives, in cooperation with the

National Children’s Advisory Center in Huntsville, Ala-

bama. In addition, the Complaint sought an order re-

quiring all defendants to pay for a comprehensive phys-

ical, psychological and psychiatric evaluation of Chrissy

F., and to force them to file a petition in the Youth Court

of Hancock County, Mississippi, on behalf of the minor,

to immediately investigate and pursue reports of sexual

and psychological abuse. It requested the District Court

to order:

(1) Any investigation to include in-depth recorded

interviews of all professionals and relatives who

had known Chrissy F. since 1984;

(2) Regular visitation with her brothers, maternal

great-grandmother, and others, as arranged by |

the SFDSS or by the Huntsville Center;

(3) The permanent appointment of Donna Medley

as guardian ad litem and the retention of the |

Legal Services for Children, Inc., by Sheila

Brogna, as counsel, with arranged confidential

meetings and admittance pro hoc vice to repre-

sent Chrissy in all Youth Court proceedings;

(4) The recusal of Chancellor Dale and Marion

County Youth Court Referee Garland Upton

from any and all ‘future proceedings relating to

Chrissy F.; and

(5) Fred Cooper, Phillip Broadhead, Dr. Love, Dr.

Jones, and District Attorney Douglass not to be

parties to, actively involved in, or work to pre-

pare any subsequent state proceedings concern-

ing Chrissy.

Additionally, the Complaint sought Fifty Thousand

Dollars ($50,000) in compensatory damages and One

Hundred Thousand Dollars ($100,000) in punitive dam-

ages against defendants Brittain, Douglass, Whitt, Werb-

ley, Lacy, Foxworth, Cooper, Broadhead, Jones, Love

and Does 1-25, jointly and severally.

The state defendants filed a Motion to Dismiss pur-

suant to F.R.C.P. 12 (b)(1), or in the alternative, Mo-

tion to Dismiss pursuant to F.R.C.P. 12 (b)(6). On

August 26, 1988, the United States District Court

granted the F.R.C.P. 12(b)(1) motion, finding that the

Complaint was “inextricably intertwined” with the state

court judgment. The United States Court of Appeals for

the Fifth Circuit reversed that ruling and directed the

District Court to appoint a guardian ad litem or “next

friend” for Chrissy or enter a finding that Chrissy’s in-

terests in these proceedings were adequately protected

without such an appointment. Chrissy F. v. MS. Dept of

Public Welfare, et al., 883 F.2d 25 (Sth Cir. 1989).

ha necensciencaimennsaeialiilll

The District Court conducted an evidentiary hearing and

appointed Ms. Medley as guardian for Chrissy F. Dr.

Franklin Jones, Dr. Kimble Love and Attorney General

Mike Moore were dismissed as defendants by agreement

with the plaintiff.

The remaining parties conducted extensive discovery

and depositions. The Defendants filed various motions

to dismiss and or for summary judgment on the grounds

of Eleventh Amendment immunity, qualified immunity,

absolute judicial immunity and absolute prosecutorial

immunity.

On April 27, 1990 the Defendants’ Motions were

granted in part and denied in part by the district court:

the State and all individual Defendants were immune

from damages in their official capacities, the Guardian

ad Litem had absolute immunity, the District Attorney

did not have absolute immunity, and the other state offi-

cials were not conclusively entitled to qualified immunity.

The Fifth Circuit affirmed this holding of the District

Court in all respects. Chrissy F. By Medley v. MS. De-

partment of Public Welfare, et al., 925 F.2d 844 (Sth

Cir. 1991).

On June 10, 1991 the District Court held a trial on

the merits. On December 6, 1991, the District Court

issued a sixty-four (64) page Memorandum Opinion and

Order. The opinion dismissed all remaining claims

against all Defendants except Chancellor Dale and Youth

Court Referee Upton. The Court found Cooper and

Broadhead (the Guardian Ad Litems) and Foxworth

(Chrissy F.’s father) were not acting under color of

State law, because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 only authorizes a

court to grant relief when a party’s federally protected

rights have been violated by a person acting under color

of state law, these Defendants were dismissed. Foxworth

was dismissed as a Defendant because he was not acting

under color of law. The Court further found: the Plain-

tiff failed to establish a deprivation of a liberty interest

in personal safety within the purview of the due process

clause by Defendants Dale, Douglas and Brittain; Plain-

tiffs right of access to the courts was not violated by

Dale or the Marion County Welfare Department or the

Hancock County Welfare Department via the failure to

transfer the proceeding from chancery to youth court

upon making of the initial allegation of abuse by Singley

in a custody hearing; the plaintiff failed to establish a

claim of deprivation of right of access to the courts based

on Defendants’ failure to act on Defendants’ affirmative

action except for two instances: 1) Judge Dale inter-

fered with Chrissy’s right to have her interests adjudi-

cated in a court of competent jurisdiction by continuing |

to act in light of the relinquishment of Chancery juris-

diction and ordering examinations of Chrissy which

served as the basis for a change in her legal and custodial

status or, in the alternative, that even if Judge Dale did

retain some form of jurisdiction which enabled him to

issue the custody orders which were forthcoming, he still

deprived Chrissy of her right of access to the court in

that her guardian ad litems were not informed of nor

present at the hearing and that no record was made of

this proceeding from which an adequate appeal could

have been made. 2) Defendant Upton violated Chrissy’s

right of access to the Courts with a proceeding which

lacked substance and deprived Chrissy F. of representa-

tion.

The District Court ordered that Defendant Upton, in

his capacity as Referee of the Marion County - Youth

Court, be enjoined to conduct a new youth court pro-

ceeding for the benefit of Chrissy F. regarding the allega-

tions of sexual abuse. Dale and Upton appealed the dis-

trict court decision and Medley cross appealed as to all

other Defendants. On July 7, 1993 in Chrissy F. By

Medley v. MS. Department of Public Welfare, et al., 995

F.2d 595 (Sth Cir. 1993), the Fifth Circuit held that the

District Court had no jurisdiction to grant injunctive re-

lief and otherwise affirmed as to the other five Uefendants.

REASONS WHY THE PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED

THE COURT OF APPEALS’ JUDGMENT DISMISS-

ING THE DEFENDANTS DUE TO LACK OF SUB-

JECT MATTER JURISDICTION IS CORRECT AND

WAS CONSISTENT WITH WELL-ESTABLISHED

PRECEDENT.

Petitioner argues that the U.S. Supreme Court should

hear this case because. there is a conflict among the courts

of appeal as to the application and scope of the Rooker-

Feldman Doctrine. The Respondents respectfully dis-

agree.

The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine finds its origin in 28

U.S.C. § 1257. As the commentary following the statute

points out, this “section governs the routing of cases from

the highest state courts to the U.S. Supreme Court.” 28

U.S.C. § 1257 states:

28 USC § 1257 State courts; certiorari

(a) Final judgments of decrees rendered by the

highest court of a State in which a decision could be

had, may be reviewed by the Supreme Court by writ

of certiorari where the validity of a treaty or statute

of the United States is drawn in question or where

the validity of a statute of any State is drawn in

question on the ground of its being repugnant to the

Constitution, treaties, or laws of the United States,

or where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is

specially set up or claimed under the Constitution or

treaties or statutes of, or any commission held or

authority exercised under, the United States.

(b) For the purposes of this section, the term

“highest court of a State” includes the District of

Columbia Court of Appeals.

The Rooker-Feldman Doctrine stands for the proposi-

tion that 28 U.S.C. § 1257 bars direct review in the

lower federal courts of a decision reached by the highest

State court because such authority is vested solely in the

United States Supreme Court. District of Columbia Court

of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 75 L.Ed.2d 206,

103 S.Ct. 1303 (1983); Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v.

Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S. 281, 296, 26 L.Ed.2d

234, 90 S.Ct. 1739 (1970); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust

Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-416, 68 L.Ed.2d 362, 44 S.Ct.

149 (1923).

In Chrissy F. By Medley v. MS. Department of Public

Welfare, et al., 995 F.2d 595 (Sth Cir. 1993), the Court

of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit held that the Federal

District Court did not have jurisdiction to grant injunc-

tive relief. The Court held:

The record in this case reveals that the plaintiff’s

suit is ‘patently an attempt to collaterally attack the

validity of [the state court judgment].’ Almon v.

Sandlin, 603 F.2d 503, 506 (Sth Cir. 1979). As

the district court originally believed, this suit, insofar

as it seeks a new adjudication of Chrissy’s alleged

abuse and custody, is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with

the state court’s rulings against the appellants. Feld-

man, 460 U.S. at 483 n.16.

Chrissy F. By Medley v. MS. Department of Public Wel-

fare, et al., 995 F.2d 595 (Sth Cir. 1993), citing District

of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462,

75 L.Ed.2d 206, 103 S.Ct. 1303 (1983).

The federal district court, as a court of limited original

jurisdiction, has no authority to entertain a plaintiff's col-

lateral attack upon state court orders or decrees. The

Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals stated in Carbonell v. La.

Dept. of Health and Human Services, 772 F.2d 185, 188

(1985):

The district court lacks jurisdiction to conduct that

exercise. As we held in Kimball v. The Florida Bar,

632 F.2d 1283, 1284 (Sth Cir. 1980):

Stripped to its essentials, Kimball’s petition for

declaratory and injunctive relief asks the fed-

eral district court to reverse a final, definitive

state court order. As we stated in Lampkin-

Asam v. Supreme Court of Florida, 601 F.2d

760 (Sth Cir. 1979): “This Court has held on

numerous occasions that federal district courts

do not have jurisdiction under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

or any other theory to reverse or modify the

judgments of state courts.” We echo that it “is

axiomatic that a federal district court, as a

court of original jurisdiction, lacks appellate

jurisdiction to review, modify, or nullify a final

order of a state court. 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3).”

Id. The proper forum for the relief Kimball

now seeks was the United States Supreme Court.

It is hornbook law that § 1983 does not create a

federal cause of action but, rather, a remedy for the

vindication of other federal statutory or constitu-

tional rights. That those rights have been adjudicated

in a state court under concurrent § 1983 jurisdiction

or under a state cause of action is of no moment: once

a determination has been made by a state court

relative to the existence or nonexistence of a federal

right, and any possible infringement of that right,

the only avenue of review is to the United States

Supreme Court via 28 U.S.C. § 1257(3). As a panel

of this court observed:

A federal district court, as a court of limited

original jurisdiction, lacks power to review, mod-

ify or nullify a final order of a state court. Nor

can a party, aggrieved by a judicial decision of

a Sstate’s highest court, invest a lower federal

court with such jurisdiction by clothing his or

her grievance in the garb of § 1983 and alleg-

ing that the decision of the state court deprived

him or her of constitutionally protected rights

or interests . . . A party seeking relief from

such an allegedly unconstitutional action by a

State court may seek review in only one federal

court—the United States Supreme Court.

Dasher v. Supreme Court of Texas, 650 F.2d 711,

714-15 (Sth Cir. 1981), rev’d on other grounds,

658 F.2d 1045 (Sth Cir. 1981) (on reh’g), reh’g

opinion disapproved, District of Columbia Court of

Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482 n.16 (1983).

See also, Brown. vy. Chastain, 416 F.2d 1012 (Sth

Cir. 1969); Gresham Park Community Organization

v. Howell, 652 F.2d 1227 (Sth Cir. 1981).

The Respondents respectfully maintain that the Fifth

Circuit Court of Appeals properly ruled that the Federal

District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to enter-

tain the Plaintiffs complaint in this action because the

only relief granted by the District Court was reversal of

state court decisions and remdnd of the case for a new

trial.

In her petition for writ of certiorari, the petitioner

alleges that the District Court has subject matter jurisdic-

tion of this action based upon 42 U.S.C. $§$ 1983, 1985,

the Fourteenth Amendment, 28 U.S.C. §$ 1331 and

1343(3).

Neither §$ 1331 nor § 1343 grant the District Court

subject matter jurisdiction over the Plaintiffs Complaint.

Both of these sections refer to the “original jurisdiction”

of the District Court. It is, of course, well settled that

the District Courts have no appellate jurisdiction; there-

fore, the district courts are not empowered to review

decisions by the state courts. Rooker vy. Fidelity Trust

Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S.Ct. 149, 68 L.Ed.2d 362 (1923);

District of Columbia Court of Appeals, et al. v. Feldman,

460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983);

Carbonell, supra (Sth Cir. 1985).

In its original August 26, 1989 dismissal of this action,

the District Court found that it had no authority to review

the earlicr determinations of the Mississippi state courts.

Citing Reed v. Terrell, 759 F.2d 472 (Sth Cir. 1985),

and District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman,

460 U.S. 462, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983),

the District Court found that the relief sought by plaintiff

was “inextricably intertwined” with the state court deci-

sions in the case.

On at least six occasions since 1984, the Fifth Circuit

Court of Appeals has reiterated the clear principle that a

federal district court has no Original jurisdiction to enter-

tain a plaintiff’s collateral attack upon state court orders

or decrees and has repeatedly admonished litigants by

penalty of sanction for filing and pursuing such actions.

Hagerty v. Succession of Clement, 749 F.2d 217, 220

(Sth Cir. 1984); Reed y. Terrell, supra; Carbonell y.

Louisiana Department of Health & Human Resources,

772 supra; Krempp v. Dobbs, 775 F.2d 1319, 1322 (Sth

Cir. 1985); Hale v. Harney, 786 F.2d 688 (Sth Cir.

1986); Corpus Christi Taxpayers v. City of Corpus

Christi, 858 F.2d 973, 976-977 (5th Cir. 1988).

In reaching its conclusion in Chrissy F. By Medley vy.

MS. Department of Public Welfare, et al., 995 F.2d 595

(Sth Cir. 1993), the Fifth Circuit relied heavily on the

factually analogous case of Reed vy. Terrell, 759 F.2d

472 (Sth Cir. 1985). Reed stands for the proposition

that a Federal District Court has no Original jurisdiction

to entertain a plaintiff's collateral attack upon a final

State court judgment. An excellent Summary of the ap-

plicable law in this regard is set forth in Reed, where

Parties in state court custody proceedings brought a § 1983

action in federal court against the state court judge and

clerk and claimed that an order awarding fees in the

State court proceeding deprived them of federa! consti-

tutional rights. The Fifth Cirewit Court of Appeals stated:

In dismissing the plaintiffs’ actions, the district court

did not err. It is well-settled principle that a plaintiff

may not seek a reversal in federal court of a state

court judgment simply by casting his complaint in

the form of a civil rights action Hagerty v. Succession

of Clement, 749 F.2d 217, 220 (Sth Cir. 1984) (no

jurisdiction to review state court judgment where

appeal taken through state court system; Sawyer v.

Overton, 595 F.2d 252 (Sth Cir. 1979). Moreover,

the Supreme Court has stated that a “United States

District Court has no authority to review final judg-

ments of a state court in judicial proceedings.” Dis-

trict of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460

U.S. 462, 482, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 1315, 75 L.Ed.2d

206 (1983). While a losing party in state court

proceedings may be able in some instances to sue in

federal court to “mount a general challenge to the

constitutionality” of a state statute or rule, Feldman,

460 U.S. at 483, 103 S.Ct. at 1316, no such situation

is presented in the instant case. As the federal dis-

trict court in the instant case noted, the “essential

relief” sought by the plaintiffs is reversal of the state

court award of attorney’s fees against them. District

Court op., at 1. Indeed, this Court’s review of the

record in the instant case reveals that the plaintiffs’

Suit is “patently an attempt to collaterally attack the

validity of the [state court judgment].” Almon v.

Sandlin, 603 F.2d 503, 506 (Sth Cir. 1979). See

also Kimball v. Florida Bar, 632 F.2d 1283, 1284

& n.3 (Sth Cir. 1980) (federal complaint, in es-

sence, sought reversal of state court judgment al-

though cast in form or general constitutional attack ).

A review of the plaintiffs’ pleadings and arguments

in the instant case reveals that this suit is “inextrica-

bly intertwined” with the state court’s awards against

the plaintiffs. Feldman, 460 U.S. at 483, n.16, 103

S.Ct. at 1315, n.16. Thus, the district court did not

err in dismissing the instant suit for want of juris-

diction.

Reed, 759 F.2d at 473-474 (footnotes omitted).

Similarly, in Hale v. Harney, 786 F.2d 688 (Sth Cir.

1986) the court reiterated:

vudicial errors committed in state courts are for

correction in the state court system, at the head

of which stands the United States Supreme Court;

such errors are no business of ours.

We hold no warrant to review even final judgments

of state courts, let alone those which may never take

final effect because they remain subject to revision

in the state appellate system. Constitutional ques-

tions as these are, to employ the Supreme Court’s

phrase in Feldman, “inextricably intertwined” with

questions of the validity of the state court’s decree,

questions reviewable in the state system; and the

district court correctly dismissed the complaint con-

taining them as beyond its jurisdiction.

Hale, 786 F.2d at 691.

The rule against collateral attacks applies to federal

actions “which candidly seek review of the state court

decree” as well as to rulings of those courts which are

closely related to such decree, and are thus “inextricably

intertwined” with same. J/d., District of Columbia Court

of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 482, 75 L.Ed.2d

206 (1983).

Respondents do not agree with the petitioner that there

are conflicting decisions and applications of the Rooker-

Feldman Doctrine by the Courts of Appeal. While there

may be no bright line rule that determines when a federal

claim is so “inextricably intertwined” with a state court

judgment this does not mean that the Courts of Appeal

have acted in a non-uniform fashion. The Courts of

Appeal have consistently applied the same test to deter-

mine whether or not a federal claim is so “inextricably

intertwined” with a state court judgment that the Federal

District Court would lack subject matter jurisdiction. The

test used to determine this is to whether the federal court

is actually reviewing a state court decision. Ritter v.

Ross, 992 F.2d 750 (7th Cir. 1993), is a good illustra-

tion of this point. It states:

[t]here is, unfortunately, no bright line that sep-

arates a federal claim that is “inextricably inter-

twined” with a state court judgment from a claim

that is not so intertwined. The crucial point is

whether “the district court is in essence being called

upon to review the state-court decision.” Feldman,

460 U.S. at 483-484 n.16, 103 S.Ct. at 1316 n.16.

Id. at 754.

That there is no bright line rule does not mean that

there is an inconsistency in the use or application of the

Rooker-Feldman Doctrine. While the Seventh Circuit

Court of Appeals admitted in Ritter that there was no

bright line rule, it went on to apply the test that is always

used in analyzing whether a federal claim is “inextricably

intertwined” with a state court judgment so that the Fed-

eral District Court would lack subject matter jurisdic-

tion. In Ritter the Court stated:

[i]t is settled that “a plaintiff may not seek a

reversal of a state court judgment simply by casting

his complaint in the form of a civil rights action.”

Hagerty v. Successions of Clement, 749 F.2d 217,

220 (Sth Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 474 U.S. 968,

106 S.Ct. 333, 88 L.Ed.2d 317 (1985); accord

Guess v. Board of Medical Examiners, 967 F.2d

998, 1005 (4th Cir. 1992) (“Artificial attempt to

redefine the relief sought are not sufficient to over-

come the requirements of Feldman.”); Owens-Corn-

ing Fiberglass Corp. v. Moran, 959 F.2d 634, 635

(7th Cir. 1992) (section 1983 does not automat-

ically permit federal court to review state judicial

decision); Worldwide Church of God v. McNair,

805 F.2d 888, 893 (9th Cir. 1986) (Feldman ap-

plies in § 1983 context); Lynk v. LaPorte Superior

Court, 789 F.2d 554, 563 (7th Cir. 1986) (federal

courts rebuff efforts to retry state suite in federal

courts under section 1983).

We must distinguish whether the Ritters are ask-

ing a federal court to review the state court judg-

ment through use of their section 1983 action or

instead are mounting a general challenge to the Wis-

consin statute which authorized the foreclosure of

the tax lien.

[emphasis added].

Id. at 754.

Not surprisingly, regarding the Rooker-Feldman Doc-

‘rine, the Fifth Circuit has held just as the Seventh Cir-

cuit Court of Appeals held in Ritter. In a case involving

litigation over a disputed foreclosure judgment, where

the landowners commenced a § 1983 action against the

county and appropriate officials, the Fifth Circuit found

that the landowners,

like the plaintiff in Rooker, are essentially seeking a

federal district court appeilate review of a state

judicial proceeding; their claim against Defendants

are inextricably intertwined with the merits of that

proceeding. As in Rooker, the lower federal courts

have no jurisdiction over this complaint.” See Leaf

v. Supreme Court of Wisconsin, 979 F.2d 589, 598

(7th Cir. 1992); See also Guess, 967 F.2d at

1003-04 (“A plaintiff may not relitigate in federal

court a particularized challenged to an adjudication

against him in state court.”).

Id. at 755.

Petitioner cites Razatos v. Colorado Supreme Court,

746 F.2d 1429, 1433 (10th Cir. 1984) in support of her

proposition that the Rooker-Feldman Doctrine has been

inconsistently applied. Again, the Respondents take issue

with this assertion. In Razatos the Tenth Circuit Court

of Appeals followed the dictates of District of Columbia

Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U‘S. 462, 103 S.Ct.

1303, 75 L.Ed.2d 206 (1983), to the tee. Citing Feld-

man and relying almost exclusively on that holding, the

Tenth Circuit found that the District Court lacked juris-

diction over the Colorado Supreme Court’s suspension of

Razatos, but had jurisdiction over Razatos’ constitutional

challenge to Colorado’s procedure for disciplining at-

torneys. Regarding the finding that the District Court had

jurisdiction over the latter, the Tenth Circuit did not

compromise this Court’s pronouncement in Feldman:

[w]e have recognized that state supreme courts may

act in a nonjudicial capacity in promulgating rules

regulating the bar . . . . Challenges to the constitu-

tionality of state bar rules, therefore, do not neces-

sarily require a United States District Court to re-

view a final state-court judgment in a judicial pro-

ceeding. Instead, the District Court may simply be

asked to assess the validity of a rule promulgated

in a nonjudicial proceeding. If this is the case, the

District Court is not reviewing a state-court judicial

decision.

Id. at 485-486.

The exact same factual situation appeared in the United

States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in Schneider

v. Colegio de Abogados de Puerto Rico, 917 F.2d 620,

629 (1st Cir. 1990), cert. denied, U.S. 112

S.Ct. 865 (1992). The United States Court of Appeals

for the First Circuit wrote:

[i]t is well-established that lower federal courts have

no jurisdiction to hear appeals from state court deci-

sions, even if the state judgment is challenged as un-

constitutional. Review of state decisions may be

obtained only in the United States Supreme Court.

See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 US.

462, 476, 103 S.Ct. 1303, 1311, 75 L.Ed.2d 206

(1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413,

416, 44 S.Ct. 149, 150, 68 L.Ed.2d 362 (1923).

See also 28 U.S.C. § 1257. In Feldman, the Supreme

Court considered the so-called Rooker doctrine spe-

cifically in the context of attorney challenges to rules

and regulations governing the bar, in that instance

relating to bar admission. The Court carefully dis-

tinguished between “general challenges to state bar

rules, promulgated by state courts in nonjudicial pro-

ceedings”—for which there is jurisdiction in the

lower federal courts—and “challenges to state-court

decisions in particular cases arising out of judicial

proceedings,” 460 U.S. 486, 103 S.Ct. at 1317—

for which there is not.

Id. at 628.

The Schneider court held that the plaintiffs challenged

the general system of mandatory bar membership as pre-

scribed by “the 1986 Rule,” rather than the outcome of

the specific case, allowing the district court subject matter

jurisdiction pursuant to Feldman.

In Centifanti v. Nix, 865 F.2d 1422 (3rd Cir. 1988),

the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit

held that the federal district court had subject matter

jurisdiction where there was a “general challenge[] to

[a] state bar rule[].” In so holding the Court specifically

quoted the general rule in Feldman: that 28 U.S.C. § 1257

bars direct review in the lower federal courts of a decision

reached by the highest state court because such authority

is vested solely in the United States Supreme Court. Dis-

trict of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.

462, 75 L.Ed.2d 206, 103 S.Ct. 1303 (1983); Atlantic

Coast Line R. Co. v. Locomotive Engineers, 398 U.S

281, 296, 26 L.Ed.2d 234, 90 S.Ct. 1739 (1970); Rooker

v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-416, 68 L.Ed.2d

362, 44 S.Ct. 149 (1923). The Third Circuit went on to

quote the important qualification found in Feldman, also

employed in Schneider, which affords jurisdiction to the

United States district courts over general challenges to

state bar rules. Feldman at 486.

Likewise, in Czura v. Supreme Court of South Caro-

lina, 813 F.2d 644 (4th Cir. 1987), the United States

Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit found that despite

the plaintiffs contention that he was attacking the con-

Sstitutionality of a disbarment rule, the action was prop-

erly dismissed by the federal district court under Feld-

man because he did not even refer to such a rule-in his

complaint. In reaching their decision in Czura, the

Fourth Circuit utilized the Feldman analysis consistently

applied in the other circuits. Jd. at 646.

The Ninth Circuit explored this issue in Worldwide

Church of God v. McNair, 805 F.2d 888 (9th Cir. 1986).

Here the plaintiff brought a § 1983 action against state

officials contending that a state court jury verdict against

them for defamation, infliction of emotional distress, and

conspiracy was unconstitutional. The plaintiff requested

that the district court declare the state trial court verdict

unconstitutional and to enjoin state court enforcement of

the judgment. The District Court dismissed the case and

its dismissal was aflirmed by the Ninth Circuit Court of

Appeals who held that the district court lacked subject

matter jurisdictven over this case. In reaching this con-

clusion, the Ninth Circuit went through the now familiar

analysis, consistently used throughout the country. In

Worldwide Church of God v. McNair the Ninth Circuit

stated:

The United States District Court, as a court of orig-

inal jurisdiction, has no authority to review the final

determinations of a state court in judicial proceed-

ings. 28 U.S.C. § 1257 provides that the proper

court in which to obtain such review is the United

States Supreme Court. 7d. at 890.

The Court, citing Feldman, went on to say:

This doctrine applies even when the challenge to

the state court decision involves federal constitutional

issues. /d. at 891.

Finally the Ninth Circuit said:

Although the federal district court may not exer-

cise appellate jurisdiction over the judgment of a

state court, a district court does have jurisdiction

over a “general” constitutional challenge that does

not require review of a final state court decision in

a particular case. Jd. at 891.

———ee

Counsel opposite footnotes Worldwide Church of God

v. McNair at the end of a sentence which states: “as

numerous courts and scholars have acknowledged, the

precise meaning of ‘inextricably intertwined’ remains un-

clear, and this has resulted in conflict and inconsistencies.”

This case merely states that drawing a distinction between

1) general constitutional challenges that do not require

review of a final state court decision in a particular case

and 2) challenges to a particular judgment of a state

court over which a federal district court may not exercise

appellate jurisdiction, is a difficult task. Jd. at 891. The

fact that the analysis required is difficult, subtle, complex

or time consuming does not make its application incon-

sistent—it just means sometimes it’s hard.

CONCLUSION

Because the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals properly

dismissed the defendants claim due to lack of subject mat-

ter jurisdiction, consistent with well established precedent,

the petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,