Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Miller v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 692 (1994) (No. 93-734)

Supreme Court brief1994

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Text

No.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT FOR THE UNITED STATES OF

AMERICA

DANIEL T. MILLER, Petitioner

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Respondent

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

NINTH CIRCUIT

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

Sui Juris

Daniel T. Miller

C/o Box 115

Edwall Washington

509-236-2219

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Does a person (natural or artificial) still need to be a

“Taxpayer” for Title 26 United States Code, USC, and the

regulations implemented thereunder to impact his/her/its life?

Are natural born Americans, birthed within the geographical

area of one of the fifty States, subject to any of the

legislation codified under Title 26 USC and the regulations

promulgated thereunder at the time of birth and are they

“Taxpayers” from the first moment?

If not born "Taxpayers" as above does one become a

"Taxpayer" by proclamation of people within the executive

branch?

If born a "Taxpayer", what legislation/regulation is effective?

a .

If jurisdiction is challenged and no hearing is scheduled or

held to determine jurisdiction, do subsequent ex parte events

acted out within a branch of government or a governmental

agency make a natural born American a "Taxpayer'

Does a Social Security application submitted and a subse-

quent number issued in the name of, on behalf of, a minor or

any incompetent make a “Taxpayer” of that infant then

. 1/ ~ > ° y re ” wn 4 ; » | TTS )

and/or after competency is acquired’

Does a natural born American become a "Taxpayer" by con-

ane)

tract:

Is the Uniform Commercial Code, UCC, the controlling body

of law in V// above and if not controlling does UCC have

¢ _ are?

DD 7% ay a ‘cINnG he Y mral soh ayicTr ith lice ca

O€S €xercising the naturai mgnt to exist, without license,

make a natural person, born in one of the fifty States a

ed as a result

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of exercising a natural right?

Does being a commercial airline pilot, not licensed, but cer-

tified by the Federal Aviation Administration for the protec-

tion of the public, make a "Taxpayer"?

Did the one time signing of a "W-2" form claiming no ex-

emptions, for the purpose of gaining entrance into the work-

force of United Airlines without being an administrative

problem and causing immediate termination, cause Daniel T.

Miller to become a "Taxpayer"?

XII

Did the Appellee, United States of America, send a message

to the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in its Brief that Appel-

lant was a "Taxpayer" and therefore the Court was to rule

pursuant to an agreement worked out with the Executive de-

partment and the Judiciary dealing with certain types of

"Taxpayers", as reported by Mr. Homer O. Croasman, Re-

gional Commissioner, Western Region, Internal Revenue

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Written T aayD

rItten Law:

LIST OF PARTIES TO THE PROCEEDINGS IN THE

COURT BELOW

The caption of the case in this Court contains the names

of all parties to the proceedings in the United States Court of

Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.

Marsha L. Miller filed a petition in Bankruptcy which

was Joined with her husband Daniel T. Miller, Appellant,

herein petitioner as Bankruptcy Number 87-03919-K11.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

Question Presented for REVieW.e..ecccccccccccccccccecececccceccc. l

List of Parties to the Proceedings in the Court Below........ 6

De 8

CE 10

Statement Of Jurisdiction..........ccccceccsccccsscessccecscccececeseeees 1]

Constitutional Provisions, Treaties, Statutes, Rules and

eeuimtiOns INVOLVEM.....................00000.000..0000eee. 12

PU ic lsscnssevscencsencsscccceecccccccccccseccoeeees 14

Reasons for Granting Writ..................cc.ccccccssccoocccoccececeee. 21

os accsrccenssasccoececcocecescesoeeaeeess. 26

Appendix:

A. Opinion of Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals....... 28

B. Judgment, decree, or order of the District Court

For Eastern District of Washington

Se 33

Ne ciecssesscsseccssescsccceees. 37

C. Judgment, decree, or order of the

Bankruptcy Court For Eastern

District of Washington

Bs ae bd Oe 46

re se i | On Shae ne een 47

D. Order of Ninth Circuit Denying ReHearing...... 53

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Supreme Court

Federal Crop Ins. Co. v. Merrill, 332 US 381 .....cccccccccceee. 16

Griggs v. Provident Consumer Discount, 459 US 56... 24. 25

Lower Courts

In Re Crystal Sands Proproties, 84 BR 665.........cccccccc0005. 24

In Re M'Call, 145 Fed Rep 898.00... cccecccccssesecsessceeee 24, 25

BE Te SOeA, TOD Fk CSS ociiscssscassrsanccercsasectscaricsscoace, 20, 24

In Re Sweet Transfer & Storage Inc., 896 F.2d 1189....... 24

STATUTES

ES be, SC OATES A Tee ee eee eS 21

SE Bice aad home Lok 21

WOE Bt Rs BEIM tical anette en ee 12

RULES

tT) ) +

BR 20

mr _ s

BR /Q52

BR x00? as

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BR j 4

REGULATIONS

NONI

MISCELLANEOUS

Croasn

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1993

Daniel T. Miller, Petitioner,

United States of America, Respondent.

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

NINTH CIRCUIT

Daniel T. Miller, the petitioner herein, respectfully asks

that a writ of certiorari issue to review the judgment of the

United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, entered

in the case number 92-035503 on March 4, 1993 and

rehearing denied on August 11, 1993.

OPINIONS BELOW

The March 4, 1993 opinion of the Court of Appeals,

whose judgment is herein sought to be reviewed, is an un-

published case under number 92-35503, and is reprinted in

panini nendie tn thie Dearie: am 49 Tine Grficced

ic Separate Ap eNa1X to this I on, DI he ne ToOlOWINE

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nrmaAr Aninian ra ynnihliched ta the hace Lr rice vt

Prior Opinions are aisO unpuDil 1O Ine DeSt KNOWIeGZE Ol

Detits ner and re renrinted in the “mMorate App ny +f thea

rCuluOner and are Myriniead in tine Separate PPCNCIX at ine

" 2 moar ,. | ne nitard ; 2 | scrmrr ( mort ¢ er fing

PabSs SO Indicated The [ niiecad S Ss Dis Ou OT ine

MALL ah ak ‘

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mINncrnon entered 9 Mas 1OO mnoaer

PALL RAVE, Vilitatl 2d i ay i &é t

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Last TUTTIOCI CS-9] y | I > sith iS 3) i 95 {

Mittal Yao’ AALAASAL

12 5 ,% y } es lis . . ha } “@ ] 2 ]

May 13 1992 opinion also under case number CS-91-391-

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opinion issued 4 September 1991 reaffirming the order of

July 1991 dismissing Bankruptcy Petition Number 87-03919-

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ra ~ > — 4 rm > — : . - : :

K11 is found it, pp. 406 The Bankruptc. (ourts opinion

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Che MUL TICIIL OF Lie ( OUTIL OT pPpCdis Was enterec on

q L A 1002 Jatituan £ 2 ah _— ‘ >] 7 . , ,

March 4, 1993. A Petition for Rehearing was filed pursuant

to Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure 40 and a sug

c hearing was timely filed. The Court of Appeals

' +7 | » .

an order August 11, 1993 denying the petition for

sin, Gf

rehearing. The jurisdiction of this Court is invoked pursuant

to 28 USC § 1254(1).

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

This case involves the Constitution for the united States

of America and the doctrine of Separation of Powers as

embodied in Article I, II, and III; Article 1 Section 8 clause

4 and Article 1, Section 9, clause 3; Article IX and X of the

Bill of Rights; which follows:

Separation of Powers

The plain language is that members of the Executive

Branch do not meet with members of the Judicial branch

for the purpose of agreeing on how to handle people

labeled as "Tax Protesters".

I, § 8, c4

To establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization. and

uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout

the United States;

I,§ 9,¢3

No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be

passed. emphasis added

The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights,

Shall not be construed to deny or disparage others

retained by the people.

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POSE NESTLE LITO TR I! PONTE TE NTL NSD Fe I RENAN tps sameeren ane LF OREO IN AE oo a rw

The powers not delegated to the United States by the

Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are

reserved to the States respectively, or to the people.

This case involves the Bankruptcy Rule, BR 2002(b) and

8002(b) which provides as follows:

2002(b) TWENTY FIVE DAYS NOTICE TO

PARTIES IN INTEREST.

Except as provided in subdivision (h),(i) and (k) of this

tule, the clerk, or some other person as the court may

direct, shall give the debtor, the trustee, all creditors and

indenture trustees not less than 25 days notice by mail of

(1) the time fixed for filing objections to and the hearing

to consider approval of a disclosure statement; and (2)

the time fixed for filing objections to and the hearing to

consider confirmation of a plan.

8002(b) Effect of Motion on Time for Appeal. If a

timely motion is filed in the bankruptcy court by any

party: (2) under Rule 7052(b) to amend or make

additional findings of fact, whether or not an alteration

of the judgment would be required if the motion is

granted; (3) under Rule 9023 to alter or amend the

judgment; or (4) under Rule 9023 for new trial, the time

for appeal for all parties shall run from the entry of the

order denying a new trial or granting or denying any

other such motion. A notice of appeal filed before the

disposition of any of the above motions shall have no

effect; a new notice of appeal must be filed. emphasis

added. Bankruptcy Code, Rules and Official Forms,

1987 Law School Edition, West Publishing Co..

SAY SARE AE NRF TN SER aE eae aes

atenal . TE MON ORR RTE Net A ORE

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This is a case initially holding Only one question before

the Court of Appeals.

"WAS DANIEL T. MILLER'S APPEAL, FILED 1S MAY

1992, TIMELY AS AN APPEAL OF THE BANKRUPTCY

COURTS ORDER, ENTERED 24 JULY 1991.

DISMISSING BANKRUPTCY PETITION NO. 87-03919-

K11.

The Attorney for the United States made a special effort

in his brief to the Court of Appeals to Classify Mr. Miller as a

“Taxpayer”. Petitioner feels very strongly that this

classification has influenced the Appeals Court. Two

hundred years ago the classification of a person was often

done and was known as Bill of Attainder.|. The form may

have been different but the effect was to deprive a person,

with out due process. It is true that the Constitution forbids

Congress but it is even truer that people in the other branches

are also forbidden To Touch someone. The Classification of

a person is To Touch or place a Bill of Attainder upon that

! From the French term meaning To Point or To Touch with the

finger of accusation.

body thereby depriving of due process. In 1984 Petitioner

demanded a jurisdictional hearing but could not gain a

hearing. Instead Petitioner was classified as a "Tax

Protester" after speaking at a local meeting held by Senator

Symms.

The Petitioner does not grab at the constitution for the

serving of “Rights” because he knows well that his Rights are

Natural Rights from birth and available when he was able to

claim them. People in the United States government are

Supposed to take an oath to uphold the Constitution for the

united States of America. There is a difference.

Petitioner has spent over six and three fourths years

combined in the U.S. Army and Air Force and another three

and a half years overseas. He experienced attempts to

influence military reports that he was responsible for. He did

not recognize that the Major was trying to place a Bill of

Attainder on the Private under investigation when the written

rules said otherwise. The Majors efforts were in vain.

Petitioner knows that the easy way to stop this Bill of

Altainder is to simply go back overseas. Yes there is a

freedom overseas that Petitioner does not enjoy here in

America. But, I was borne here in America and believe in

the Written Law and not the law of men. None of the lower

courts Or agencies want to address the Law as Written.

[It is my duty to determine that a person holding to be

acting for the government is operating with authority.2, Any

acts orchestrated without authority are a nullity.

This government as written is incapable of acting

illegally but agents for the government have in the past. This

case is evidence of the foregoing.

Had a hearing been held in 1984 as demanded in a Letter

to Internal Revenue Service Agent Mr. James Quam this

Petition would not be before this Court. In pertinent part on

So, to recapitulate; I have been and am a person who

feels that he should pay his way and contribute to my

government's support. I want nothing from my government

in the form of gratuity. I can do no more than is in my

2 Whatever the form in which the Government functions, anyone

entering into an arrangement with the Government takes the risk

of having accurately ascertained that he who purports to act for

the Government stays within the bounds of his authori ty. Federal

Crop Ins. Co. v. Merrill, 332 US 381, 384.

capacity, which is limited.3 Unless _ this economy "turns

around” [ will have to reduce my contributions.

Mr. Quam, I want you to set a date for a HEARING

during which you will have the Opportunity to share with me

your rules, regulations, United States Code, United States

Positive Law, and United States Constitution Sections and

phrases which have given you JURISDICTION over my and

any of my families "persons, houses, papers, and effects,

against unreasonable searches and seizures, ....". Once you

have established your jurisdiction then you can proceed to by

establishing with-out reasonable doubt that you have

probable cause to believe that I have done something wrong

against the United States of America. You will need to

provide a true and accurate copy of my file and any and all

accusers against me.

If when all legal and just proceedings have transpired

and it has been shown to me that with out reasonable doubt I

do in fact owe the United States of America: I do pledge my

interest in the Social Security Fund, or by what ever name

that would be more proper, to the full extent of what ever

legal debt that is due and owing by me and my wife to the

United States Government. Two, in the alternative, I do

pledge to work my and my wife's debt off by cleaning the

Pocatello IRS office at Room 106, 250 S. 4th Street.

Since the hearing has still not, almost nine years later,

been held all of the ex parte events, Classifications, and

claimed debts are a nullity.

> Mr. Miller was mostly unable to find work from Nov. 1980 to

Jun. 1985 except for about 3 months a year and usually overseas

when working.

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the concert is reflected in the orders and memorandums

attached in the Appendix. A few highlights are to follow:

The Bankruptcy Court claims to have held a

confirmation hearing; but could not have held such hearing

when the day before an amended plain was filed, thereby

becoming the Plan, requiring time and notice pursuant to the

Bankruptcy Rules.

The District Court supported the myth of a confirmation

hearing buy its footnote of the May 13 1992 order which was

a statement about the docket. Not only was the reference to

Bankruptcy Docket number 84 a reference to an erroneous

entry, 7/25/91 verses the correct entry of 6/25/91 (the date of

the dismissal and supposed confirmation hearing) but had

there been a hearing on 7/25/91 it would not have conformed

to Bankruptcy Rules, when the Bankruptcy Court Clerk sent

a notice dated 07/19/91 fixing the time for objections to the

amended plan's disclosure statement as August 26, 1991.

The Bankruptcy Court could not hold a hearing pursuant to

the Bankruptcy Rules, 2002(b), the day following the filing

OREN NRE NN ig Re ei,

2 NE Oren tw mm TRIO an

of the Amended Disclosure Statement and Amended Plan

which became the Plan.

The District Court erred by not recognizing that the

finality of the Bankruptcy Courts order denying amended

findings etc., was not determined until this Court ruled or the

time to petition had expired along the way. This question

has not been presented to this Court heretofore

The Circuit Court of Appeals has not addressed the

question before it but says:

The time to appeal, however, was tolled only until

September 3, 1991, when the bankruptcy court entered

the order denying Miller's motion to amend. See Bankr.

R. 8002(b); see also In Re Souza, 795 F. 2d at 857

Petitioner does not come to this Court with eagerness but

has in the past avoided this road. To wit: the United States

Trustee, UST, filed a motion to dismiss the Subject

Bankruptcy Petition and was sued by Mr. Miller.4 who

subsequently stipulated to dismiss knowing that if the UST

* The system is not Geographically Uniform and therefore

patently Unconstitutional. Therefore the UST does not have

capacity. Note: Not a question brought by this petition; raised

here because of mention by lower courts.

——

eter reteset Se eCPM: UREN MaeE SRO RIOR eer “ee

attempted to act as a party in interest the suit could be

refilled. Of course that was the last heard from the UST.

The basis for federal jurisdiction is pursuant to the

Constitution for the united States of America Article 1 §8 c4

in that congress has enacted a bankruptcy law and the

States are estopped from enacting their own. This

American had no other recourse but in the federal

arena. Title 28 and Title 11 USC provide jurisdiction to

the lower courts.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals for the

Ninth Circuit should be reviewed by this Court for the

following reasons:

1. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has so far

departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial

proceedings and has sanctioned by it's affirmation the

departure by the lower courts and agencies, as to call for an

exercise of this Court's power of supervision.

The Circuit Court has gone along with the classification

of this Petitioner as a Taxpayer with out a hearing or calling

for the United States to present evidence to support it's claim

and classification that this Petitioner is a Taxpayer in spit of

and over the objection of Petitioner. If this Court will

consider the lengthy questions presented> then the Court

Should have doubts that the Petitioner is a “Taxpayer”.

Maybe in the lower courts secrete arena worked out by Mr.

Croasmun® Taxpayer is a euphemism for Tax Protester.

After reading the Respondent's classification of Petitioner as

a Taxpayer and having read how the Regional Commissioner

for the Western Region is able to discuss with Judge Crocker

> Petitioner apologies for the number but knew of no other way

to present them in light of "if not asked in Petition -not answered."

® "Mr. Croasmun reported on his discussions with Assistant U.S.

Attorney Couris and Judge Crocker, Fresno, and of their interest

in enforcement of the law in tax rebel cases. Mr. Hansen

commented on the problem of federal judges appearing to be anti-

IRS based on a belief that IRS is 'highhanded.’ Mr.Howard

reported on a change of attitude in federal judges in San Francisco

after he met with a number of them and discussed the gravity of

the Tax Rebellion Movement and the importance of giving prison

sentences as deterrents." Minutes of February 9, 1973 Conference on

Tax Rebellion Movement in California as sent by memorandum by

Regional Commissioner, Western Region, Homer O. Croasmun, Feb 26,

1973. emphasis added

how he (Why he?) should be interested in enforcing the law

(before it is enforced upon him?) by Commissioner

Croasmun and what exactly did Mr. Howard say to change

the attitude of the San Francisco judges. Did it Stop there?

Or has Petitioner been exercised upon by Mr. Croasmun 20

years later?

2. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has decided an

important question of federal law which has not been, but

should be settled by this Court. Petitioner could not find any

case that was parallel to the events in his case. Petitioner has

filed motions and appeals with in the specified time each

time. He reasons that the finality or final disposition of an

order does not transpire until one of two things happen: i)

the time expires for action or; ii) the decision is rendered by

the court of last resort, this supreme Court. The cases that

have been found always have untimely filings for various

reasons. This Case brought before the Ninth Circuit was not

such a case.

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3. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has decided this

case in a way that is in conflict with its own cases and those

of other Circuits.

The Ninth Circuit in its 4 March 1993 ruling cites In Re

Souza, 795 F.2d 855 as reason that this Petitioners appeal

was not timely, but, Souza at 857 provides the very Opposite

language:

The ten day period is subject to extension should a

timely motion be made for, inter alia. amendment or

alteration of the findings of fact. Bankruptcy Rule

8002(b)(2). But Greene filed no such motions in the

bankruptcy court, emphasis added.

The Ninth Circuit completely ignores it's own BAP case

In Re Crystal Sands Properties, 84 BR 665 (9th Cir BAP

1988) or it's own case citing the lower courts Crystal Sands

In Re Sweet Transfer & Storage. Inc., 896 F. 2d 1189 (9th

Cir. 1990) in which this Courts Griggs is cited as authority.

The Sixth Circuit in 1904, In Re M'Call, 145 Federal]

Reporter 898, 899:

..the relators filed a written petition praying for a

rehearing in the matter of the confirmation of the

composition. The effect of such a motion, when fil

seasonably, is to suspend the finality of the order or

judgment sought to be reheard until disposed of, and the

time limit for an Bare or writ of error does not begin to

run until it is disposed of.

It is disposed of when either this Court disposes of it or

no appeals are sought in the lower courts and the time

expires. But as a question is headed towards this court there

IS no final disposition

4. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has decided a

federal question in a way that conflicts with applicable

decisions of this Cou

The best example of a conflict with this Court is the

lebrated Griggs v Provident Consumer Discount. 459 US

56. Though Griggs does not talk about a Motion to amend

appealed all the way up to this Court and then the original

court amending its order by direction from this Court and

then the appeal of the lower court's decision being appealed

it does suggest that the Ninth Circuit is wrong in it's March

4th 1993 order.

aaa acacia ia

—

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the Petitioner respectfully

asks that his petition for a writ of certiorari be granted.

Petitioner asks that the judgment of the Court below be

reversed, that the cause be remanded with direction that the

Bankruptcy Court shall hold a complete review with strict

emphasis on Respondent providing the Law, or Contract that

makes Petitioner a Taxpayer and thereby places Liability

upon Petitioner; that all claimed debts by Respondent be

varified under penalty of perjury.

Further, that all property heretofore seized, taken o1

acquired by whatever means by Responedent without

authorization by the Petitioner be returned with interest.

Respectfully submitted, Pg Be, Dated 5 November, 1993

war ah oe PY Lp».

Daniel T. Miller, Sui Juris

C/o Box 115

Edwall Washington

509 236 2219

~ x

nmr anne Sor OP RENO th SG

A I ENOL A BEETS A SINE EE ES WY PERE EEN these MN PRR

208 AREER tea oo IM St 0

APPENDIX A

————<—< lll

Filed

MAR 4 1993

NOT FOR PUBLICATION

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE

NINTH CIRCUIT

DANIEL T. MILLER, Husband,

) No.92-35503

Appellant )

) Appellant,

) D.C. No.

) CV-91-391-FVS

) Eastern District of

Vv ) Washington (Spokane)

)

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, ) MEMORANDUM’

Appelice. )

ES Ee a )

Appeal from the United States District Court for the

Eastern District of Washington

Fred L. Van Sickle, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted February 22, 1993 ”

Before: GOODWIN, SCHROEDER, and CANBY, Circuit

Judges.

This disposition is not appropriate for publication and may not be

cited to or by the courts of this circuit except as provided by 9th Cir. R.

36-3.

The panel unanimously finds this case suitable for decision

without oral argument. Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); 9th Cir. R. 34-4.

Daniel T. Miller appeals pro se the district court's dis-

missal of his appeal as untimely from a bankruptcy court's

order. The bankruptcy court denied Miller's motion to

amend its order dismissing his petition for relief under

Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code. We have jurisdiction

under 28 U.S.C. 158(d), and we affirm.

A “notice of appeal shall be filed with the clerk of the

bankruptcy court within 10 days of the date of the entry of

the judgment appealed from." Bankr. R. 8002(a); see

Slimick v. Silva (In re Slimick), 928 F.2d 304, 306 (9th Cir.

1990). The timely filiiig of a notice of appeal to the district

court is jurisdictional. Greene v, United States (In Re

Souza), 795 F.2d 855, 857 (9th Cir. 1986). A timely motion

to amend or make additional findings of fact under Rule

7052(b), or to alter or amend the judgment or for a new trial

under Rule 9023, tolls the time for appeal until entry of the

order denying such motion. Bankr. R. 8002(b).

On June 24, 1991, Miller filed an amended plan of reor-

ganization. On July 24, 1991, the bankruptcy court denied

Miller's motion for confirmation of the amended plan and

’

entered an order dismissing the case. On August 1, 1991,

Miller filed a motion to amend the bankruptcy court's order

of July 24, 1991 under Rules 7052(b), 9023 and 9024. On

September 3, 1991, the bankruptcy court denied Miller's mo-

tion to amend. On September 13, 1991, Miller appealed the

order denying his motion to amend to the district court.

On May 13, 1992, the district court affirmed the bank-

ruptcy court's order denying Miller's motion to amend. On

May 15, 1992, Miller filed a second notice of appeal to the

district court challenging the bankruptcy court's July 24,

1991 order dismissing his bankruptcy case. On May 22,

1992, the district court dismissed Miller's notice of appeal as

untimely.

Miller argues that his August 1, 1991 motion to amend

the July 24, 1991 order tolled the time to file his notice of

appeal until there was a final disposition by the district court

on his motion to amend.

The time to appeal, however, was tolled only until Sep-

tember 3, 1991, when the bankruptcy court entered the order

= = — _anee ——e aS a

denying Miller's motion to amend. See Bankr. R. 8002(b);