Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Alcan Aluminum Aluminum Corp., In Re: (No. 95-269)

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95 +269 aus 15 199:

No. OEEICE OF IHE Gee

In the Supreme Court of the “'nited States

October Term, 1995

IN RE: ALCAN ALUMINUM CORPORATION

PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS TO

THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

LAWRENCE A. SALIBRA, I

Counsel of Record

JOHN C. TILLMAN

Alcan Aluminum Corporation

100 Erieview Plaza, 17th Floor

Cleveland, Ohio 44114

(216)253-6918

Attorneys for Petitioner

Alcan Aluminum Corporation

THE GATES LEGAL PUBLISHING CO. CLEVELAND, OHIO 216-621-5647

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

Whether the United States Court of Appeal« “or the

Second Circuit usurped its non-discretionary &opellate

authority by denying Alcan Aluminum Corpwration's

Application for a Writ of Mandamus requesting the

appellate court to vac *te a remand order issued by the

Untied States District Court for the Northern District of

New York in direct contravention with the remand

instructions set forth in the Second Circuit's decision

entitled United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990

F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1997, and in a manner that has the

net affect of eliminating the notions of res judicat2 and

law of the case and creates an indefinite stream of

litigation designed to force capitulation of parties whose

actions did not cause or contribute to environmental

problems at a Superfund Site.

ii

RULE 29.1--STATEMENT

Petitioner, Alcan Aluminum Corporation, is a wholly-

owned subsidiary of Alcan Aluminium Limited, a

Canadian Company.

RULE 14.1.(b) STATEMENT

The parties to the proceedings before the United

States District Court for the Northern District of New

York and the United States Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit include:

¢ The United States of America and the State of

New York, Plaintiffs

e Alcan Aluminum Corporation, Defendant/Third-

Party Plaintiff

e Cornell University, Third-Party Defendant

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

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RULE 14.1(b)--STATEMENT. ............sccccecccsceccsccess ii

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STATENS) GI TPE GAGE oovccccccccccccccaccveccccescece 3

STATEMENT OF THE FACTS ......ccccccccccsecccccccccees 4

A. Factual And Procedural History.................. 4

B. The Mandate Of The Second Circuit .......... 7

C. Post Remand Proceedings.................sssss+«: 8

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT OF

hs cir ica dic ddevecscenccsccennncosensecoeecs 14

A. Mandamus Is Appropriate To Review

Compliance With Non-Discretionary

Directives Set Forth In A Decision Of The

Ne IO 6 on ctimnnncmaticcevnndlpeopaddonegteye 14

B. The Remedy Of Mandamus Is Available To

Compel Compliance With The Mandate Of

The Second Circuit In A/can-PAS..............0.+ 14

C. The Procedural History Of This Case

Coupled With The Aj/can-PAS Decision

Mandates A Hearing On Divisibility Of Harm

And Apportionment Of Damages Relating

Solely To Below Background Metals............. 15

1. The Second Circuit Affirmed Liability

Based On Trace Metals And Ordered

A Narrow Remand Relating To The

Impact Of Metals, The Only Dispute

iv

Of Fact Precluding Summary

Judgment On The Divisibility Issue .......

2. This Case Was Decided On Cross-

Motions For Summary Judgment

Which Precludes The Lower Court

And Plaintiffs From Recharacterizing

The Alcan Emulsion..............cecceeeeees

3. The Decision Of The Second Circuit

Permits A Never-Ending Stream Of

Litigation Over The Same Essential

FORGED cnnrcvvesecssnsienscintvicdeboneseaianiniess

D. The District Courts' Procedure in

Handling The Alcan-Cornell Fair Share

Hearing Which Was Affirmed !n A/can-

PAS illustrates The Merit Of Alcan's

Petition For Mandamus .................sseeeeee:

E. Permitting The Introduction Of Additional

Evidence Places Alcan In A Worse

Position Than If The Lower Court Applied

The Correct Divisibility Standard In Its

Initial Memorandum-Decision And Order,

And The Second Circuit's Failure To

Correct The Lower Court Constitutes A

Failure To Follow Its Own Mandate ............

CONCEAL cccccccnccesesssccscevessnessrnaiaaussanmmdettins

APPENDIX:

Decision of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Second Circuit, United States v. Alcan

Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1993) ...

Memorandum-Decision and Order of the United

States District Court for the Northern District

of New York, United States v. Alcan

Aluminum Corp., 755 F. Supp. 531

(N.DIEV. TRG TD cnccenscccsencsvecsctabscanss abaseen

Al

Vv

Order of the United States District Court,

Northern District of New York (September

9: BOD foc ited Kagivcvecdetteddaastsecsecscecseccceccsens

Order of the United States District Court,

Northern District of New York (December 28,

TO ah auen sands eusousnnnnoceoeee

Order of the United States Court of Appeals for

the Second Circuit (May 17, 1995)..........++-++.

Summary of Plaintiff The United States of

America's discovery taken in connection with

United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp. et al,

United States District Court, Civil Action No.

87-CV-920 (Pollution Abatement Services)......

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'

a i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland,

Bie Me e, Ft > SR ee ee eee 14

Bucolo v. Adkins, 424 U.S. 641 (1976) ...........006 14

City of Cleveland v. FPC,

561: F:26 at SE4 DG. Gees TOF) cvccvtdvccccncversscsts 16

Deen v. Hickman, 358 U.S. 57 (1968)...............6. 14

In Re: PCH Associates, 949 F.2d 585

C20E CW: TERED caccsccasicn teaiotinxecsdbleckotitbocnsedaanasraiaae 24

In Re: United States Steel Corp.,

479 F.2d 489 (6th Cir. 1973)................ dansewadiiies 16

Kerr.v. United States District Court for the Northern

District of California, 426 U.S. 394 (1976)........... 15

Munro v. Post, 102 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1939) ........ 16

Roche v. Evaporated Milk Assn.,

STS U.S. ZU TIS) ci cccncsisiessedssnavecsiniabtetenenl 14

Sea-Land Services, Inc., 414 U.S. 573 (1974)...... 24

S/otkin v. Citizens' Casualty Co.,

GES F.20 154.626 CW, TRS cvceseiecccssccciveavovavtens 7,28

United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp.,

755 F. Supp. 531 (N.D.N.Y. 1991).....ccccccccscesees 1,3,6,12

United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp.,

SO4 F228 BSS COS Cel. THe) ccscccnnsivedhecavessuseccses 8,13

United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp.,

O00 Fi 2e Fst 606 Cie. Fe vccassindlelcancovissstuns passim

United States v. E.!. DuPont deNumours & Co.,

366 U.S. 316 (1961) .........reccereceersccrressecrssreeeere 15

United States v. Lasker, 481 F.2d 229

E26 GW. FET? ocnccivccadcccocschecesesdiaaiiamabakeeaan 18

vii

United States v. Uccio, 940 F.2d 753

CBeh CH, SEI vcecccnccecveevoncsatsnenscevssescosccoecccccecees 18

Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90 (1967)........... 14,18

STATUTES AND OTHER AUTHORITY

2B U.S.C. STSOU(D) «2... cccccccccccccscsccccsccccscccscvcscvens 2

28 U.S.C. $1 GB 1a) ...crccvcccccccccocsrcccocecccceseoes 2,13,14

MB AFD GEE nsnceccscsccscsccsvessctcvtvetvercectesscecers 2,4

42 U.S.C. SOS TSO) . nose ccccscscccccccccccccccccccsseccceeses 2

Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 21(a)... 2

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 56(e) ........ 21,23

Rules of the Supreme Court of the

Lieriteds Seetes, NG ZO ... oc cscecccosececccecsccccscoccevsvess 2,138

OPINIONS BELOW

On April 6, 1993, the United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit issued its decision granting, in

part, and reversing, in part, a Memorandum-Decision and

Order of the United States District Court for the Northern

District of New York. United States v. Alcan Aluminum

Corp., 990 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1993).' The decision of

the Second Circuit is reprinted in the Appendix at A1-40.

Thereafter, on September 10, 1994, the District

Court issued an Order concerning the scope of remand

which became effective on September 12, 1994 and is

reprinted in the Appendix at A78-82. The District Court

denied Alcan Aluminum Corporation's Motion for

Reconsideration by Order dated December 24, 1994, and

entered on December 28, 1994; reprinted in the

Appendix at A83-87.

Alcan Aluminum Corporation filed an Application for

Writ of Mandamus in the United States Court of Appeals

for the Second Circuit, which was denied by Order dated

May 17, 1995, and is reprinted in the Appendix at A88.

‘The United States District Court for the Northern District of New

York's Memorandum-Decision and Order is entitied United States v.

Alcan Aluminum Corp., 755 F. Supp. 531 (N.D.N.Y. 1991) and is

reprinted in the Appendix at A41-77. The action, Case No. 87-CV-

920, is pending before the Honorable Thomas J. McAvoy, Chief

Judge, and has been consolidated with Case No. 91-CV-1132.

2

JURISDICTION

Subject matter jurisdiction in the United States

District Court for the Northern District of New York was

predicated or 28 U.S.C. 81391(b) and 42 U.S.C.

§9613(b).

Petitioner Alcan Aluminum Corporation timely filed an

Application for Writ of Mandamus with the United States

Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit pursuant to 28

U.S.C. §1651(a) and Rule 21(a) of the Federal Rules of

Appellate Procedure. The Court of Appeals denied the

Application by Order dated May 17, 1995.

The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United

States is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1651(a) and in

accordance with Rule 20 of the Rules of the Supreme

Court of the United States.

Title 28, §1651(a) of the United States Code

provides:

The Supreme Court and all other courts established

by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or

appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdiction and

applicable to the usages and principles of law.

28 U.S.C. §1651(a) (West Publishing Co. 1995).

THE STATUE INVOLVED

Title 28, §1651(a) of the United States Code:

The Supreme Court and all other courts established

by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or

appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdiction and

applicable to the usages and principles of law.

28 U.S.C. §1651(a) (West Publishing Co. 1995).

3

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This case was filed by the United States and the

State of New York against Petitioner, Aican Aluminum

Corporation ("Alcan") under 8107 of the Comprehensive

Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act,

42 U.S.C. 89607 ("CERCLA"). Plaintiffs seek to hold

Alcan jointly and severally liable for costs stemming from

Alcan's disposal of a water-oil emulsion at the Pollution

Abatement Services ("PAS") in Oswego, New York.

The United States District Court for the Northern

District of New York issued a Memorandum-Decision and

Order holding Alcan jointly and severally liable for all

unreimbursed response costs incurred by plaintiffs.

United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 755 F. Supp.

531 (N.D.N.Y. 1991) (A41-77) Following a_ timely

appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the

Second Circuit reversed, in part, and granted, in part, the

lower court's decision, and held that the lower court

erred in failing to afford Alcan the opportunity to

demonstrate that the environmental harm to the PAS site

was divisible and capable of reasonable apportionment.

United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711,

721-23 (2d Cir. 1993) (A1-40) (hereinafter "A/can-

PAS"). The lower court's judgment was reversed and the

case remanded based on “differing contentions

supported by expert affidavits” concerning § the

environmental impact of the below background metal

constituents in the emulsion that subjected Alcan to

CERCLA liability. A/can-PAS, 990 F.2d at 722-23.

On September 10, 1994 the District Court issued an

Order in direct contravention to the remand instructions set

forth in Alcan-PAS (A78-82) (hereinafter "Remand Order”).

The Second Circuit mandate expressly directed the lower

court to hold a divisibility hearing and apportion damages

relating to the environmental impact of trace metal

constituents. The Remand Order, however, permits

4

plaintiffs’ to introduce additional evidence at the remand

hearing and to relitigate the liability phase of this case

which previously determined the nature of the Alcan

emulsion. The District Court denied Alcan's Motion for

Reconsideration on December 28, 1994. (A®2-87)

The result of the Remand Order was that the Second

Circuit's mandate was ignored and will go unenforced

since the lower court refused to confine the scope of the

remand hearing to the terms of the mandate, amounting

to an usurpation of appellate authority. Accordingly,

Alcan filed an Application for Writ of Mandamus in the

Second Circuit to vacate the Remand Order and to

compel compliance with the A/can-PAS Mandate. The

Writ was denied by the Second Circuit on May 17, 1995

without written decision. (A88)

Alcan respectfully requests that this Honorable Court

issue a Writ of Mandamus to the United States Court of

Appeals for the Second Circuit? to correct the lower

courts’ mistake in construction and misapplication of the

Alcan-PAS mandate, and to compel the Second Circuit to

comply with and enforce its mandate. The relief sought

in this Petition is not available in any court other than the

Supreme Court of the United States since the Second

Circuit declined to correct the misconstruction and

misapplication of the A/can-PAS mandate by denying

Alcan's Application for Writ of Mandamus. (A88)

STATEMENT OF FACTS

A. Factual And Procedural History

This is an action under 8107 the Comprehensive

Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act,

42 U.S.C. 89607 (“CERCLA”), filed by the United States

?The Second Circuit's May 17, 1995 Order was issued by the

Honorable Jon O. Newman, Chief Judge, the Honorable Richard J.

Cardamone, and the Honorable J. Daniel Mahoney. (A88)

5

and the State of New York (hereinafter "plaintiffs" or

"the government") against Alcan seeking the imposition

of joint a several liability for the disposal of a water-oil

emulsion at the Pollution Abatement Services site

(“PAS”) in Oswego, New York. Both parties to this

case completed discovery in the lower court and cross-

moved for summary judgment:

After discovery had been completed, the government

moved for summary judgment against Alcan

contending that Alcan’s disposal of hazardous

substances at PAS had been conceded. Alcan cross-

moved for summary judgment against the United

States and New York State, asserting principally that

CERCLA’s definition of “hazardous substances”

requires a minitnum concentration level of specific

compounds and that under the statute causation

needed to be demonstrated. Alcan also asserted that

the harm caused by its waste was divisible and that

the government claim improperly subjected it to joint

and several liability.

Alcan-PAS, 990 F.2d 711, 717.

The government moved for summary judgment on the

grounds that the Alcan emulsion was a “hazardous

substance” as defined by CERCLA based only on

detectable amounts of below background metals, and

that joint and several liability could therefore be imposed

on Alcan. The characterization of the emulsion as

containing trace levels of metal compounds was based

on nearly ten years of discovery, both administrative and

* The facts of this case are set forth in detail in the January 15, 1991

Memorandum-Decision and Order, United States v. Alcan Aluminum

Corp., 755 F.Supp. 531 (N.D.N.Y 1991) (hereafter “A/can") (A41-77),

and in A/can-PAS, 990 F.2d 711 {A1-40). Accordingly, only the facts

pertinent to this Petition will be recited herein.

6

judicial, in no less than three CERCLA actions against

Alcan.

Alcan disputed liability and cross-moved for summary

judgment arguing, inter alia, that below background

metals could not be “hazardous substances” under

CERCLA since they are ubiquitous in the environment,

and to deem them hazardous would render everything in

the universe a hazardous substance under the statute.

Alcan also argued that, even if trace metals were a

CERCLA hazardous substance, they could cause no harm

to the environment. Accordingly, Alcan argued that

causation had to be an element of liability under the

statute. /d. at 716-17. Finally, Alcan argued that, if the

metal compounds rendered the emulsion a hazardous

substance, it could not be held jointly and severally liable,

or liable at all, since the environmental problems at the

PAS site were caused by PCB’s and other constituents

that were not in the emulsion:

Alcan declares that the response actions at PAS were

attributable to substances such as PCB’s, nitro

benzene, phenol, dichlonoethone, toluene, and

benzene. It contends that no soil contamination due

to heavy metals was found there, and insists that the

metallic constituents of its oil emulsion are insoluble

compounds, submitting an affidavit supporting this

theory of divisibility.

id. at 722.

The government did not contest the fact that the oil

emulsion contained only below background metals and

never raised the possibility that the emulsion may contain

other hazardous substances. See, generally, Alcan-PAS.

The government did, however, place in dispute the issue

of whether the below background metals could have

caused or contributed to environmental harm at the Site:

7

The government submitted a declaration stating that

metal contaminants like those found in Alcan’s waste

emulsion were present in environmental media at

PAS, that the commingling of metallic and organic

hazardous substances resulted in indivisible harm, and

that though some forms of lead, cadmium and

chromium are insoluble, they may chemically react

with other substances and become water soluble.

Id. at 722.

The lower court granted the government’s summary

judgment motion and denied Alcan’s cross-motion.

Alcan, 755 F. Supp. at 537-39. The lower court rejected

Alcan’s causation and divisibility arguments and held

Alcan liable for all unreimbursed response costs incurred

by plaintiffs. /d. at 541-42.

B. The Mandate Of The Second Circuit

Alcan appealed the lower court’s ruling to the Second

Circuit Court of Appeals. On April 6, 1993, the Second

Circuit issued its decision affirming, in part, and

reversing, in part, the lower court’s ruling. A/can-PAS,

990 F.2d at 725. The Second Circuit affirmed liability

against Alcan, but based on the nature of the Alcan

emulsion, reversed the lower court’s imposition of joint

and severable liability and ordered the lower court to

conduct a divisibility hearing to assess the environmental

impact, if any, of trace metals. /d. at 722. The Second

Circuit expressly recognized that causation was a

required element of CERCLA for purposes. of

apportionment, and that Alcan was entitled to show that

the harm, if any, from trace metals was divisible and

capable of reasonable apportionment. /d. at 722.

The only evidence, according to the Second Circuit,

that precluded the entry of summary judgment on the

divisibility issue was the governments’ expert affidavit

implying that below background metals could cause

8

harm. /d. at 722-23. Based on that disputed fact, the

Second Circuit remanded this case to the district court

for resolution of the dispute as to the impact of metals,

since that issue alone precluded the grant of summary

judgment on the divisibility issue:

These differing contentions supported by expert

affidavits raise sufficient questions of fact to preclude

the granting of summary judgment on the divisibility

issue.

/d. Thus, on remand, the only dispute of fact remaining

to be resolved by the district court related to the

environmental impact of metals.

C. Post Remand Proceedings

After the Second Circuit issued its decision in A/can-

PAS, the lower court invited all parties to submit briefs

regarding the proper scope of remand mandated by the

Second Circuit.

Realizing that there was virtually no prospect that the

government could rebut the fact that below background

metals could not create an environmental problem, it

became imperative for the government to recharacterize the

Alcan emulsion, notwithstanding the fact that the Second

Circuit, as well as the Third Circuit in United States v. A/can

Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1992) (hereinafter

"Alcan-Butler”), remanded to the district court for the

explicit purpose of resolving those issues raised with

respect to trace metals. Accordingly, the government

requested the lower court to re-open discovery so it may

develop and present new evidence on new materials, and

alleviate the need for the divisibility hearing to which the

Second Circuit held Alcan was entitled.

Alcan argued that the governments’ request would

violate directly the A/can-PAS mandate, and would

undermine the authority of the Second Circuit. Alcan

a as

9

referred to the fact that the Second Circuit reversed the

district court’s holding that Alcan did not have the right

to demonstrate that background metals could not cause

or contribute to remedial costs at PAS.

Alcan also asserted that the law of the case doctrine

and res judicata principles precluded the district court

from revisiting the nature of Alcan’s emulsion, since to

do so would ignore the existence and legal effect of

Alcan’s cross-motion for summary judgment. Further,

Alcan pointed out that, in A/can-PAS, the Second Circuit

essentially mandated a damages remand similar to a

bifurcated case where the determination on liability was

completed and a second hearing was necessary for

apportionment of damages based on the liability as

established. A/can-PAS, 990 F.2d at 720.

The district court, refusing to acknowledge the fact

that Alcan filed a cross-motion and that its ruling with

respect to divisibility was reversed, characterized the

remand issues as follows:

The threshold question before the court is whether

evidence of the presence of additional pollutants in

Alcan’s wastestream, beyond the undisputed

background metals contained therein, is barred from

the apportionment divisibility hearing by the law of

the case doctrine. Specifically, this Court must

determine whether the Second Circuit’s affirmation of

the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the

issue of liability based on the presence of certain

metals’ in Alcan’s waste constitutes a finding that

the waste did not contain other hazardous

substances.

Alcan argues that it is not appropriate for the

plaintiffs to introduce further evidence as to the

character of ALCAN’s waste for two reasons. First,

the legal doctrine of the law of the case precludes

10

revisiting the issue of whether ALCAN’s waste

contained pollutants other than the below-background

level metals upon which the district court established

liability. Second, additional evidence should be

disallowed based upon the doctrine of res judicata.

The Court will address these arguments seriatim.

(Emphasis added.)

September 10, 1994 Remand Order. (A79-80)

On September 10, 1994, the Honorable Judge Thomas

J. McAvoy issued the Remand Order permitting the

“introduction of additional evidence regarding the issue of

whether Alcan’s waste stream contained PCBs, VOCs, or

other materials.” (Remand Order, A-81} The Remand

Order, in essence, adopted the government’s argument that

Alcan-PAS did not determine that the Alcan emulsion “did

not contain other hazardous substances,” and that the

government “only went as far as necessary to establish

liability on summary judgment.” (Remand Order, A-80)*

Alcan’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by Order

dated December 24, 1994. (A83-87)

By virtue of the Remand Order issued by Judge

McAvoy, the government was now permitted to relitigate

the liability phase of this case which previously

determined the nature of the emulsion in an attempt to

impose response costs on Alcan based on separate and

distinct grounds never raised or preserved at the

summary judgment stage.

Accordingly, Alcan filed an application for Writ of

Mandamus with the Second Circuit requesting the

appellate court to compel the lower court to comply with

“The government’s assertion that, following years of discovery that

included testing and sampling of Aican’s emulsion, they decided to move

for summary judgment based on trace metals and ignore potential PCBs is

implausible and contrary to their position in A/can-Butler.

11

the directions of the April 6, 1993 mandate. The

Application was denied by Order dated May 17, 1995,

without written decision. (A88) Thus, the A/can-PAS

mandate continues to be ignored and _ remains

unenforced. The lower court refused to confine the

scope of the remand hearing to the terms of the A/can-

PAS mandate, and the Second Circuit failed to compel

the lower court to confine the scope of remand to the

terms of the mandate. This amounts to an usurpation of

appellate authority and Mandamus should issue to

correct the misconception of the scope and effect of the

appellate mandate, and to prevent relitigation of issues

already decided.

The Remand Order as unrestricted by the Second

Circuit fails to recognize that the remand was not based

on the affirmance of the lower court’s grant of summary

judgment on the liability issue, but instead, related to the

district court’s conclusion on divisibility. The lower

court’s findings on the divisibility issue were expressly

reversed. A/can-PAS, 990 F.2d at 721-23. The remand

stemmed only from a dispute of fact between Alcan’s

experts and those of the government as to the impact of

the below background metals as_ prerequisite to

determining whether Alcan’s motion for summary

judgment should be granted. /d. at 722-23.

The appellate court failed to give full effect to the

April 6, 1993 mandate by ignoring the fundamental

holding of Alcan-PAS, by ignoring the existence of

Alcan’s cross-motion, and by _ recharacterizing the

mandate as merely affirming the lower court's

Memorandum-Decision and Order. The Second Circuit

failed to correct this mistake and misapplication of the

Alcan-PAS mandate.

Confirmation that the remand hearing mandated by

the Second Circuit was intended to involve exclusively

the impact of metals is illustrated in the Third Circuit’s

12

decision in A/can-Butler explicitly adopted by the Second

Circuit:

[W]e think the tension may be resolved by aliowing a

responsible party, like Alcan, to pay nothing if it can

demonstrate that its pollutants, when mixed with

other hazardous wastes, did not contribute to the

release or the resulting response costs. In this respect

we essentially adopt the Third Circuit’s reasoning in

[A/can-Butler| . . . This approach is not intended to

provide an escape hatch for CERCLA defendant’s

rather, it will permit such a defendant to avoid liability

only when its pollutants contribute no more than

background contamination.

Alcan-PAS at 722. A review of the Third Circuit's

reasoning in A/can-Butler confirms that the mandated

divisibility hearing was to relate exclusively to the impact

of background metals:

Alcan maintains that there is no need for a hearing

because, not only is the harm divisible, but its relative

contribution to the injury to the Susquehanna River is

zero. According to Alcan “{[iJt is technically impossible to

have a release or threatened release such that a clean-

up would be authorized or justified under the National

Contingency Plan as a result of the addition of metal

compounds in the Alcan emulsion to the Butler Site.

When one adds two materials that have the same

concentrations of an element or compound, the net

result ig the same concentration. It can never result in a

higher concentration.”

Alcan-Butler, 964 F.2d at 269-70 (citations omitted).

The Third Circuit further noted that because the district

court believed that the lower court’s opinion in this case,

United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 755 F. Supp.

531 (N.D.N.Y. 1991) was dispositive, it “did not

specifically address this issue,” and since it noted “it is

13

not the proper forum to consider Alcan’s argument,” it

returned the case to the district court and specifically

directed it to “re-evaluate Alcan’s contention in light of

the facts developed in the hearing on this issue.” A/can-

Butler, 964 F.2d at 270 (emphasis added).

Moreover, the Second Circuit's refusal to enforce its

mandate exposes Alcan to an unending stream of

litigation in which the government can attempt to impose

liability upon Alcan for its emulsion element by element

and compound by compound. The exceptional

circumstances of this case, coupled with the fact that

adequate relief cannot be obtained in any other court,

warrant the exercise of this Court's discretionary powers

in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §1651(a) and Rule 20 of

the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States. On

this basis, Alcan applies for a Writ of Mandamus.

i

14

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT OF MANDAMUS

A. Mandamus Is Appropriate To Review Compliance With

Non-Discretionary Directives Set Forth in A Decision Of

The Court Of Appeals

Title 28, §1651(a) of the United States Code

provides:

(a) The Supreme Court and all other courts

established by Act of Congress may issue all

writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their

respective jurisdiction and agreeable to the

usages and principles of law.

(West Publishing Co. 1995)

The remedy of mandamus will lie to confine an inferior court

to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to

compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do

so. Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967); Bankers

Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 382 (1953);

Roche v. Evaporated Milk Assn., 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943).

Mere error is not sufficient to invoke the mandamus

process. Wi//, 389 U.S. at 95. The application must

assert an action of the lower court by which it acted

beyond its inherent power. /d.

B. The Remedy Of Mandamus is Available To Compel

Compliance With The Mandate Of The Second Circuit In

Alcan-PAS

In this case, Alcan seeks mandamus requesting this

Honorable Court to review the lower court’s non-compliance

with the remand instructions of A/can-PAS. The United

States Supreme Court has recognized that a court of

appeals has the power to enforce its mandate, and that

mandamus is an appropriate remedy to enforce the

provisions of a previous judgment of an appellate court.

Bucclo v. Adkins, 424 U.S. 641 (1976) (per curium); Deen

15

v. Hickman, 358 U.S. 57 (1968) (per curium). In fact, the

Supreme Court has expressly noted that mandamus is

appropriate to “confine a lower court to the terms of an

appellate tribunal’s mandate.” Wil/, 389 U.S. at 95-96. See

also United States v. E./. DuPont deNumours & Co., 366

U.S. 316 (1961).

in Kerr v. United States District Court for the Northern

District of California, 426 U.S. 394 (1976), the Supreme

Court considered an application for writ of mandamus in a

case analogous to this matter. The petitioners in Kerr filed a

mandamus action in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals

requesting the appellate court to vacate an interlocutory

discovery order issued by the district court. The court of

appeals denied mandamus without opinion. /d. at Syllabus.

Petitioners then sought mandamus in the Supreme Court.

Although this Court denied mandamus, it considered

the orders of the district and appellate courts, and held

that “adequate alternatives to mandamus existed":

The Court of Appeals’ opinion did not foreclose in

camera review, but apparently left open the

opportunity for petitions through responsible officials

to assert the privilege more specifically and have their

request for in camera review considered. They thus

have an avenue far short of mandamus to achieve the

relief they seek... .

/d. at Syllabus (b).

In this case, mandamus is appropriate since Alcan's

Application for Writ of Mandamus was previously denied

by the Second Circuit, leaving no avenue to achieve the

requested relief--compliance with the A/can-PAS

mandate. The impact of the Second Circuit's Order is to

force Alcan into protracted and duplicative litigation with

no alternative other than mandamus.

C. The Procedural History Of This Case Coupled With The

16

Alcan-PAS Decision Mandates A Hearing On Divisibility

Of Harm And Apportionment Of Damages Relating

Solely To Below Background Metals

1. The Second Circuit Affirmed Liability Based On

Trace Metals And Ordered A Narrow Remand

Relating To The impact Of Metals, The Only Dispute

Of Fact Precluding Summary Judgment On The

Divisibility Issue

The primary issue presented to the Second Circuit in

Alcan-PAS was whether the emulsion as characterized in

the record on appeal, having been established as a

matter of undisputed fact by cross-motions of the

parties, subjected Alcan to joint and several liability

under CERCLA. Having accepted the nature and

characterization of the “hazardous substances” in the

emulsion, the Second Circuit expressly held that the

lower court erred by failing to provide Alcan the

opportunity to establish divisibility of harm based on

below background metal compounds. A/can-PAS, 990

F.2d at 722. That holding, based exclusively on metals,

becomes the law of the case which must be followed on

remand. City of Cleveland v. FPC, 561 F.2d at 344, 348

(D.C. Cir. 1977); In Re: United States Steel Corp., 479

F.2d 489, 493-94 (6th Cir. 1973). The law of the case

doctrine, when used to express the duty of a lower court

to follow what has been decided by an appellate court,

“applies to everything decided, either expressly or by

necessary implication.” Munro v. Post, 102 F.2d 686,

688 (2d Cir. 1939).

The rationale underlying remand of the case to the

district court involved the fact that the Second Circuit

recognized that Alcan was not entitled to summary

judgment on its cross-motion because a dispute of fact

existed concerning the impact of the metals. A/can-PAS,

990 F.2d at 722-23. The Second Circuit apparently

treated the case as though an express bifurcation had

17

occurred separating the case into two parts--liability and

damages. The Court reasoned that the liability inquiry

had been concluded, and that liability was properly

established on the basis of below background metals. /d.

at 717-21. However, the Second Circuit held that the

district court erred in not holding an apportionment

hearing on the response costs, if any, related to the

metals.” /d. at 722-23.

in so holding, the Second Circuit affirmed liability

based on metals, but ordered a remand hearing to permit

Aican to demonstrate that below background metals did

not cause or contribute to environmental harm. /d. The

key element of the reversal was based on affidavits

submitted by Alcan asserting that trace metal

compounds could not cause environmental harm or

response costs. The A/can-PAS decision concluded that

Alcan was not entitled to summary judgment on the

divisibility issue based on an affidavit submitted by the

government raising an issue relating only to harm

associated with metal compounds. /d. The Remand Order

ignored the mandate of the Second Circuit under the

mistaken assumption that its Memorandum-Decision and

Order was affirmed in total. The Second Circuit refused

to correct this oversight.

The lower court, under the Second Circuit's May 17,

1995 Order, is now permitted to relitigate the issues of

undisputed fact established by the cross-motions and

affirmed by the appellate court. The Remand Order permits

plaintiffs and the lower courts to undo that which the

Second Circuit had previously decided and, in fact, had to

decide in order to find Aican liable, leaving the A/can-PAS

® This inescapable conclusion is further supported by the fact that the

lower court as well as the Second Circuit expressly recognized that

discovery was completed, and that final resolution of the case was

proper. A/can, 777 F.Supp. at 534; A/can-PAS, 990 F.2d at 717.

18

mandate unenforced. Permitting remand under the Second

Circuit decision will render the A/can-PAS mandate void,

contrary to the firmly-established hierarchy within the

judicial system and contrary to the doctrine of law of the

case. Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95-96 (1967);

United States v. Lasker, 481 F.2d 229, 235 (2d Cir. 1973);

United States v. Uccio, 940 F.2d 753, 758 (2d Cir. 1992).

The decision of the Second Circuit also allows

relitigation of issues previously decided and permits the

lower court to re-decide issues already decided and affirmed

in Alcan-PAS. For example, the lower court granted

judgment in favor of Alcan and against third-party defendant

Cornell University (hereinafter "Cornell"), and ordered a

hearing to determine the fair share amount of Cornell’s

liability. A/can, 755 F. Supp. 545. Judge McAvoy made

certain findings at the fair share hearing, and noted that:

indeed, the real dispute between the parties was not

whose waste was more toxic, but rather whose

waste was less non-toxic. Cornell contends that this

is a relevant factor to be examined by the Court.

December 27, 1991 Memorandum-Decision and Order, p. 7.

The preciusive nature of this issue was predicated on

the basis that, as the district court found, the on/y issue

of toxicity was the express finding:

{[T]hat neither the [Alcan] waste emulsion nor the

[Cornell] coal pile leachate contained metals in any

greater concentration than the soil itself.

December 27, 1991 Memorandum-Decision and Order at

11. The allocation based on that reasoning and those

express findings was affirmed by the Second Circuit in

Alcan-PAS, 990 F.2d at 723-25.

The Remand Order as affirmed by the appellate court

ignores the entire logic and fact finding of the fair share

hearing and allocation scheme. The government now

a a a A al

2 BOM NDIA A AE Soa We act ste a

19

proposes to change the nature of the Aican emulsion

which was the basis for the allocation, by both adding

new substances and claiming that the metal

concentrations were higher. Under the orders of the

lower court, Cornell would be entitled to a new allocation

based on this new material. Accordingly, Alcan would

then be entitled to reopen discovery, as the lower courts

permitted the government, in another attempt to

recharacterize the Cornell waste. The Second Circuit’s

affirmation of the allocation formula in A/can-PAS would

be rendered meaningless under such circumstances.

2. This Case Was Decided On Cross-Motions For

Summary Judgment Which Precludes The Lower

Court And Plaintiffs From Re-Characterizing The

Aican Emulsion

Alcan's liability for response costs in this case was

decided initially on cross-motions for summary judgment.

Alcan, 775 F. Supp. at 534; Alcan-PAS, 990 F.2d at 717.

Plaintiffs were therefore required, in response to Alcan’s

cross-motion, to identify the hazardous constituents of the

emulsion upon which CERCLA liability and response costs

could attach. The on/y hazardous substances identified by

plaintiffs were metal compounds. Plaintiffs never raised the

possibility of other hazardous constituents despite ample

opportunity to do so, and are precluded from doing so now.

A review of the discovery conducted in this case

illustrates that plaintiffs undertook extensive testing

relating directly to the nature and constituents of the

emulsion. In May, 1989, U.S. EPA representatives took

and analyzed numerous samples of the emulsion from

Alcan’s Rolled Products facility in Oswego, New York.

(Documented in Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of

Motion of United States for Summary Judgment, pp. 12-

18 and fn. 8; and Declaration of Kate Donnelly and David

Dobb attached thereto ) Based on the emulsion sample

analysis, the EPA prepared a comprehensive document

20

entitled “Report and Data Presentation, Alcan Aluminum

Corporation, Scribia, New York, Sampling of Process

Waste Stream.” The objective of the report, according

to the EPA, was “to determine whether the oil emulsion

used in Alcan’s aluminum rolling process is hazardous per

either RCRA or CERCLA, and to assist EPA and the

Department of Justice in their current litigation against

Alcan.” /d.

The Report demonstrates that the EPA intensely

investigated the possibility of other hazardous

substances added to the emulsion, including volatile

organic carbons (“VOCs”), and were unable to establish

that any organics were added to the virgin oil° phase of

the emulsion. In fact, the Report concluded that “the

highest level of [organic] halides are found in the ‘virgin

oil’ before it is diluted and developed into an emulsion. .

ale

The government similarly investigated the presence of

PCBs in the emulsion. Extensive discovery relating to the

nature and constituents of the emulsion as well as the

existence of PCBs was conducted by the government.

This discovery included depositions of eight (8) Alcan

employees, ten (10) laboratory personnel from six (6)

independent testing laboratories, and depositions of

Alcan product suppliers.’

lf the government had probative evidence demonstrating

that VOCs or PCBs were added to the emulsion, it naturally

follows that they would have moved for summary judgment

®CERCLA expressly excludes “petroleum, including crude oil or any

fraction thereof” from its definition of hazardous substance. 42 U.S.C.

§9601(14).

” See Summary of the government's discovery in A/can-PAS relating to

the nature and constituents of Alcan’s rolling oil emulsion and PCB

contamination, submitted to the lower court on December 17, 1993,

reprinted in the Appendix at A89-98.

21

based on that evidence or they-would have introduced such

evidence in response to Alcan’s cross-motion.® They did

not. Rather, following nearly a decade of discovery relating

to the emulsion, plaintiffs moved to impose liability on Alcan

based on trace metallic constituents and not on the basis of

any other alleged “hazardous substance.” The evidence

plaintiffs are now permitted to introduce at the divisibility

hearing was available and, in fact, in their possession, yet

they moved for summary judgment on metals. Thus,

because liability was established based on metals, a hearing

on the impact of metals is all that the government is entitled

to under A/can-PAS.

Moreover, the issue of other hazardous constituents

in the emulsion was never raised by plaintiffs even in

response to Alcan’s assertions that the response actions

at the PAS site were attributable to PCBs and other

organic materials. A/can-PAS, 990 F.2d at 722. For

plaintiffs to now claim and be permitted to show that the

emulsion contained hazardous substances in addition to

the metals is disingenuous.

Nowhere in the record before the lower courts is

there any indication that other hazardous substances

were at issue. The A/can-PAS decision reflects that the

case was remanded for one reason and one reason only--

for a hearing as to whether any response costs are

attributable to trace metals. Pursuant to Rule 56(e) of the

Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party responding to a

summary judgment motion must assert specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial or the

motion will be granted:

® The government, in Alcan’s view, did not raise these other materials as a

basis for liability (why try this case on below background metals rather

than PCBs) because the evidence did not support the claim and,

accordingly, they would have been unsuccessful against Alcan’s cross-

motion.

22

When a motion for summary judgment is made... . an

adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or

denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse

party's response .. . must set forth specific facts

showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the

adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment,

if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse

party.

F.R.C.P. 56(e). Here, plaintiffs only basis for establishing

that the emulsion was hazardous and for imposing liability

on Alcan was the presence of below background metal

compounds. Plaintiffs failed to raise the possibility of other

hazardous substances in the rolling oil emulsion in response

to Alcan's cross-motion despite years of discovery. In failing

to raise other grounds entitling it to judgment or in response

to Alcan’s cross-motions, plaintiffs waived the opportunity

to pursue liability and impose response costs on Alcan

based on those grounds.

In fact, absent affidavits from the government

relating to environmental harm at the PAS site potentially

associated with metals, the Second Circuit noted that it

would have granted Alcan's cross-motion:

[Alcan] contends that no soil contamination due to

heavy metals was found there, and insists that the

metallic constituents of its oil emulsion are insoluble

compounds, submitting an affidavit supporting this

theory of divisibility. The government submitted a

declaration stating that metal contaminants like those

found in Alcan's waste emulsion were present in

environmental media at PAS, that the commingling of

metallic and organic hazardous substances resulted in

indivisible harm, and that though some forms of lead,

cadmium and chromium are insoluble, they may

chemically react with other substances and become

water-soluble. These differing contentions supported by

expert affidavits raise sufficient questions of fact to

23

preclude the granting of summary judgment on the

divisibility issue.

Alcan-PAS, 990 F.2d at 722-23. (Emphasis added.)

But for the differing facts presented in accordance

with Rule 56(e), no genuine issues as to harm or

divisibility would remain for trial. In other words, the

Second Circuit found in A/can-PAS that genuine issues

of material fact as to whether the _ metallic

constituents in the emulsion were insoluble and

capabie of causing or contributing to environmental

harm precluded summary judgment on the divisibility

issue. /d. The only genuine issue preserved for trial

and/or hearing stems from the affidavits submitted by

the government relating to metals. Plaintiffs cannot

and should not be permitted under the decision of the

lower courts to present evidence of other hazardous

substances to serve as the basis for imposing

response costs on Alcan.

3. The Decision Of The Second Circuit Permits A

Never Ending Stream Of Litigation Over The Same

Essential Facts

The government, justifiably concerned the facts, logic

and scientific principles will not preserve liability against

Alcan based on below background, insoluble metal

compounds, wants to retry the phase of this case which

determined the nature of the emulsion in order to impose

liability on Alcan based on separate and distinct grounds

never raised or preserved at the summary judgment stage.

The Remand Order, as unrestricted by the appellate

court, adopts the flawed reasoning. of the government,

which is composed of two elements. First, that the Second

Circuit made “no finding that Alcan’s waste did not also

contain other hazardous substances, such as PCBs or

volatile organic compounds (VOCs).” (Remand Order, A80)

Second, that the government “only went as far as

24

necessary to establish liability on summary judgment.”

(Remand Order, A80) The problem with this logic is that, if

the government is allowed to relitigate the basis for liability,

then the lower courts have pronounced a doctrine that

allows a party to relitigate any issue arising out of a given

set of facts provided that the court, in rendering its

judgment, does not negate every potential basis for liability.

In the context of this case, than, if the government

had not created a dispute of fact on metals to be

resolved by the lower court by interposing affidavits and

as a result lost at the summary judgment stage, then the

government could have initiated another lawsuit involving

the same emulsion at the same site because the Second!

Circuit made no finding as to PCB’s or VOCs. In fact, the

Second Circuit made no explicit exclusions as to the

entire universe of toxic materials, so presumably the

government, under the lower courts’ logic, could file a

never-ending stream of cases focusing on each and every

one of those substances one at a time. Such a

conclusion defies logic and well established legal

principles of res judicata and law of the case. See Sea-

Land Services, Inc., 414 U.S. 573, 578-79 (1974); In

Re: PCH Associates, 949 F.2d 585, 594 (2d Cir. 1991).

Further, neither the governments’ briefs concerning the

scope of remand nor the decisions of the district or

appellate courts cite any case in which a court has, in

order to apply the doctrine of law of the case, been

required to explicitly find that the universe of potential

basis for liability have been excluded, even if they were

never issues raised by the parties.

The lower court decisions are not only inconsistent with

the law but essentially negate the underlying policy

objectives of res judicata and the law of the case doctrine

which require parties to resolve all issues of dispute at one

time and to adhere to issues previously decided. By

permitting this doctrine to be continued by the trial court,

25

the Second Circuit is condoning trial by “harassment”

where a party can be compelled into accepting

responsibility for environmental harm they did not cause

simply because it is less expensive than litigating the case

forever.

D. The District Courts’ Procedure In Handling The Alcan-

Cornell Fair Share Hearing Which Was Affirmed In

Alcan-PAS Wustrates The Merit Of Aican's Petition

For Mandamus

Alcan believes that the practical correctness of the

position it is advocating by this Petition is demonstrated

by the manner in which the lower court handled the

Alcan-Cornell fair share hearing. Again, returning to the

Alcan decision, the lower court stated:

[IJInsofar as the third-party is concerned, the court grants

Alican's motion to the extent of declaring that the third-

party defendant Cornell University is also liable for its

fair share of response costs incurred by the government

and the State of New York and accordingly denies the

motion of Cornell University. A hearing is necessary to

determine the amount of the fair share.

Alcan, 755 F.Supp. at 534. (Emphasis added.) The way in

which the district court handled the third-party claim is

instructive because the Cornell situation is procedurally an

exact duplicate of the government-Alcan case, and because

the procedure in the third-party action was affirmed by the

Second Circuit.

In Alcan-PAS, the Second Circuit remanded for a

divisibility and apportionment hearing, the same type of

hearing afforded to Alcan-Cornell. Like the case involving

the government, Alcan and Cornell filed cross-motions

for summary judgment. The lower court granted Alcan’s

motion and denied the Cornell motion. The only

difference between what the lower court did in the

government-Alcan case and the Alcan-Cornell third-party

26

action was that it held a hearing on apportioned harm

with respect to Cornell, and it denied Alcan that hearing

with respect to plaintiffs. in all other respects the two

situations are analogous.

At the fair share hearing, Alcan and Cornell presented

evidence obtained through discovery consistent with the

characterizations of the wastes as set forth in the A/can

decision, 755 F.Supp. 531. If Alcan appeared at the Cornell

apportionment hearing and requested to reopen discovery in

order to establish that other hazardous substances were in

the Cornell waste for the purposes of apportionment, the

lower court would have clearly and correctly denied that

request. Discovery was closed and that matter was

resolved in the liability phase. The Second Circuit affirmed

the lower court's handling of the third-party action in total.

Alcan-PAS, 990 F.2d at 723-25.

With respect to the government-Alcan portion of the

case, the only issue to which the Second Circuit took

exception was the failure to hold a hearing as to what, if

any, response costs were assignable to Alcan based on the

nature and constituents of the “hazardous substances” in

the emulsion—below background metals. The Second Circuit

did not reverse the finding on liability; on the contrary, over

Alcan's strenuous objection, it affirmed. The Second Circuit

remanded for a hearing on whether the metals caused harm

and response costs.

A final point in terms of practical impact demonstrates

the merit of Alcan's position. If the lower court holds a

hearing on the impact of metals as required under A/can-

PAS, the consequence of that hearing flows automatically

and logically to Cornell, since Cornell's share of liability was

derived on a comparative evaluation of the two wastes as

characterized for establishing liability. The Second Circuit's

expectation that this would occur is indicated by their

affirmation of the lower court's apportioned share of

responsibility. A/can-PAS, 990 F.2d at 725. If the Second

27

Circuit believed that liability could effectively be

recharacterized, it would have vacated the lower court's

apportioned liability finding with respect to Cornell,

expecting the issue to be _ redetermined upon a

recharacterization of the facts. The Second Circuit clearly

did not do that in A/can-PAS, yet now has failed to enforce

its prior mandate.

E. Permitting The Introduction Of Additional Evidence

Places Alcan in A Worse Position Than If The Lower

Court Applied The Correct Divisibility Standard In Its

Initial Memorandum-Decision And Order, And The

Second Circuit's Failure To Correct The Lower Court

Constitutes A Failure To Follow its Own Mandate

Alcan argued in its Motion for Reconsideration of the

Remand Order that, by operation of the September 12,

1994 Order, Alcan is put in a worse position on remand

than it would be had the correct divisibility and

apportionment standards been applied in the lower court's

January 15, 1991 Memorandum-Decision and Order.

Plaintiffs are asking for a retrial ab initio on remand, and the

Second Circuit has held that the trial court must follow its

express direction or otherwise it puts one of the parties in a

worse position. S/otkin v. Citizens’ Casualty Co., 689 F.2d

154 (2d Cir. 1983). The Second Circuit refused to compel

the lower court to follow the A/can-PAS mandate, which

amounts to a usurpation of appellate authority. The Second

Circuit's decision in S/otkin is instructive.

In S/otkin, the appellants sought to proceed on a

course of action on remand that was not expressly

provided for by the Second Circuit. In dismissing the

appellants’ action, the Second Circuit noted the

inappropriateness of putting a party in a worse position

on remand by not following its explicit direction as to

what was to occur and by working out their own

scenario for retrial:

28

Plaintiffs have, in fact, worked out their own scenario for

their proposed retrial . . . . However, this is not the way the

Second Circuit wrote the script.

Id. at 157.

Here, like the plaintiffs in S/otkin, the Second Circuit has

allowed the government to obtain an advantage by writing

their own scenario for the remand hearing. This, to use the

words of the Second Circuit, was not the way the Court

"wrote the script.” Nor did the Second Circuit compel the

lower court to comply with its mandate. The Second Circuit

explicitly directed the lower court to resolve any dispute of

fact concerning only the impact of below background

metals. A/can-PAS, 990 F.2d at 722. Indeed, the clarity of

Alcan's cross-motion as being based on a determination

that its emulsion contained exclusively metals is illustrated

by the Second Circuit’s recognition that Alcan attributed the

harm at the site from substances such as PCBs to other

parties. /d. at p. 722.

Moreover, the Second Circuit has placed Alcan in a

worse position on remand than it would be if the lower

court applied the correct divisibility and apportionment

principles in the first instance. The hearing would have

encompassed the only “hazardous substance” giving rise

to liability--below background metals--and the case would

have been resolved under the same logic and reasoning

as the Alcan-Cornell third-party claim. The Second Circuit

ordered a divisibility hearing based on metals and Alcan’s

cross-motion.

Alcan's cross-motion was predicated on the

undisputed assertion that the only hazardous substances

in the emulsion were insoluble metal compounds and,

therefore, it could not be held responsible for the

problems created by materials other than the metals.

This case was remanded to the lower court for the

resolution of that dispute and that dispute alone. Under

29

the Alcan-PAS mandate, the lower court is only

permitted to resolve the only issues preserved which

relate to harm, if any, associated with trace metals and

apportionment of damages.

Damages, if any, should be determined based on liability

as initially found. It would be fundamentally unfair and

contrary to the A/can-PAS mandate to allow damages to be

imposed for alleged harm which was not the basis for

liability in the first instance. Accordingly, Alcan requests

that this Honorable Court grant this Petition for Writ of

Mandamus to confine the inferior court to a lawful exercise

of its prescribed jurisdiction, and to compel the Second

Circuit to enforce the A/can-PAS mandate.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner Alcan Aluminum

Corporation respectfully requests that this Honorable Court

issue an Order (a) vacating the May 15, 1995 Order of the

Second Circuit, (b) directing the Second Circuit to order the

lower court to vacate the September and December, 1994

Remand Orders, and (c) order the Second Circuit to compel

the lower court to conduct a divisibility hearing relating to

harm, if any, associated with below background metals and

apportion damages accordingly, consistent with the A/can-

PAS mandate.

Respectfully submitted,

Lawrence A. Salibra, |!

Counsel of Record

John C. Tillman

Alcan Aluminum Corporation

100 Erieview Plaza, 17th Fir.

Cleveland, Ohio 44114

(216) 523-6918

Attorneys for Petitioner Alcan

Aluminum Corporation

ee a ee ea

APPENDIX

7

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A-1

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA

State of New York,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

V.

ALCAN ALUMINUM CORPORATION,

Defendant-Third-Party-Plaintiff

Appellee-Cross-Appellant,

V.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY,

Third-Party-Defendant

Appellant-Cross-Appellee.

Nos. 403, 530, Dockets 92-6158, 92-6160.

United States Court of Appeals,

Second Circuit.

Argued Nov. 9, 1992.

Decided April 6, 1993.

United States and state of New York filed

CERCLA action against company which disposed of

hazardous wastes at contaminated site. Company

filed third-party complaint against university which

disposed of neutralized runoff water from coal fire at

site seeking contribution. United States District Court

for the Northern District of New York, Thomas J.

McAvoy, J., 755 F.Supp. 531, granted summary

judgment in favor of United States and State of New

A-2

York holding company jointly and severally liable for

cleanup of site and allowing company to obtain

contribution from university under CERCLA.

Company and university appealed. The Court of

Appeals, Cardamone, Circuit Judge, held that: (1)

Northern District of New York was entitled to enter

final judgment based on its earlier liability ruling and

was not obliged to give estoppel effect to any rulings

entered in Pennsylvania district courts after date of

its ruling; (2) CERCLA does not impose quantitative

requirements with respect to hazardous substances;

(3) reportable quantities of substances (RQs) and

chemical abstracts service registry numbers (CASRNs)

did not address issue of CERCLA liability; and (4)

choice as to when to address divisibility and

apportionment issues were questions best left to

sound discretion of trial court in handling of individual

case.

Affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded.

[1] JUDGMENT k540

Res judicata, or claim preclusion, means simply

that when judgment is rendered on merits, it bars

second suit between same parties or their privies

based on same cause of action or claims.

[2] JUDGMENT k720

Under collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion,

second suit is upon different claim or cause of action,

and doctrine’s fundamental notion is that issue of fact

or law actually litigated and decided by court of

competent jurisdiction in prior action may not be

relitigated in subsequent suit between same parties or

their privies.

A-3

[3] JUDGMENT k634

Collateral estoppel saves parties and courts from

waste and burden of relitigating stale issues and, by

discouraging inconsistent results, forwards public

policy favoring establishment of certainty in legal

relations.

[4] JUDGMENT k739

Court should decline to give preclusive effect to

prior judgment if there have been changes either in

applicable legal rules or factual predicates essential to

that prior judgment.

[5] JUDGMENT k634

Where pure questions of law, unmixed with any

particular set of facts, are presented to court, interests

of finality and judicial economy may be outweighed by

| other substantive policies.

[6] JUDGMENT k650

Liability ruling made by New York federal district

court granting summary judgment for government

against polluter in CERCLA action and for polluter

against university on contribution claim was

sufficiently final to be entitled to estoppel effect in

Pennsylvania federal district court, even though, by

time New York district court entered final judgment,

Pennsylvania district court had made its rulings in

another CERCLA action against same polluter in

reliance on New York district court’s ruling and Third

Circuit had affirmed those rulings in part and

remanded on issue of divisibility; New York district

court was entitled to enter final judgment based on its

earlier liability ruling and was not obliged to give

A-4

estoppel effect to any rulings entered in Pennsylvania

district court after date of its ruling.

[7] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)

In bringing action under CERCLA, government

must establish that: defendant is one of four

categories of covered persons listed in CERCLA as

liable for costs of remedial action; site of cleanup is

"facility" under CERCLA; there is release or

threatened release of hazardous substances at facility;

as result of release or threatened release, government

has incurred response costs; and costs incurred

conform to national contingency plan as administered

by Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).

Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, §§ 101(9),

107(a)(4)(A), (b), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601(9),

9607(a)(4)(A), (b).

[8] FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE k2481

If government establishes in CERCLA action each

element on undisputed facts, and defendant is unable

to demonstrate by preponderance of evidence

existence of one of three affirmative defenses set forth

in CERCLA, then government is entitled to summary

judgment on issue of liability, even when genuine

issues of material fact remain as to appropriate

damages. Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, §§ 101(9),

107(a)(4)(A), (b), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601(9),

9607(a)(4)(A), (b).

4 Cea Di i St Ml tl le eT a eel

A-5

[9] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)

Liability under CERCLA may be decided first

before more complicated questions implicated in

cleanup measures, which includes fixing proportionate

fault of liable parties. Comprehensive Environmental

Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,

§§ 101(9), 107(a)(4)(A), (b), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A.

§§ 9601(9), 9607(a)(4)(A), (b).

[10] FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE k1954.1, 2481

Bifurcation and summary judgment provide

powerful legal tools which, by effectively isolating

issues to be resolved, avoid lengthy and perhaps

needless litigation in CERCLA actions; existence of

those procedural tools aids Congress’ purposes of

encouraging settlement discussion and speeding up

remedial action. Comprehensive Environmental

Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,

§ § 101(9), 107(a)(4)(A), (b), as amended, 42 U\S.C.A.

§§ 9601(9), 9607(a)(4)(A), (b).

(11] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)

CERCLA, on its face, applies to any "hazardous

substance," and does not impose quantitative

requirements. Comprehensive Environmental

Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, § §

101(14), 102, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601(14),

9602; Solid Waste Disposal Act, § 3001, as amended,

42 U.S.C.A. § 6921; Federal Water Pollution Control

Act Amendments of 1972 (Clean Water Act), § 307(A),

33 U.S.C.A. § 1317(A); Clean Air Act, § 112, 42

U.S.C.A. § 7412.

See publication Words and Phrases for other

judicial constructions and definitions.

A-6

[12] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)

"Hazardous substance," under CERCLA, includes

even minimal amounts of pollution. Comprehensive

Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability

Act of 1980, §§ 101(14), 102, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A.

§ § 9601(14), 9602; Solid Waste Disposal Act, § 3001, as

amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6921; Federal Water Pollution

Control Act Amendments of 1972 § 307(A), 33

U.S.C.A. § 1317(A); Clean Air Act, § 112, 42 U.S.C.A.

§ 7412

[13] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)

Specific reportable quantities (RQs) of substances

and chemical abstracts service registry numbers

(CASRNs) designated by Environmental Protection

Agency (EPA) for certain hazardous substances go

only to reporting requirements, and do not address

issue of CERCLA liability. Comprehensive

Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability

Act of 1980, § 102(a), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §

9602(a).

[14] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)

To impose strict liability under CERCLA,

government need only prove: (1) there was release or

threatened release, (2) which caused incurrence of

response costs, and that (3) defendant generated

hazardous waste at cleanup site; government is not

required to show that specific defendant’s waste

caused incurrence of cleanup costs. Comprehensive

Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability

Act of 1980, § 102(a), as amended, 42 US.C.A. §

9602(a).

A-7

(15) HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)

There are only three defenses to imposition of

CERCLA liability on generator of hazardous waste:

act of God, act of war, and act or omission of third

party. Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, § 107 (a, b),

(a)(3, 4), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a, b), (a)(3,

4).

(16] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)

In addition to imposing strict liability scheme,

CERCLA does away with causation requirement.

Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, § 107(a, b),

as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a, b).

[17] FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE k2481

Genuine issue of material fact as to whether

metallic constituents of polluter’s oil emulsions were

insoluble or soluble compounds, given conflicting

expert affidavits, precluded summary judgment for

government on divisibility issue in CERCLA action

against polluter. Comprehensive Environmental

Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, §§

101(14), 102, 107(a), (a)(3), (b), as amended, 42

U.S.C.A. §§ 9601(14), 9602, 9607(a), (a)(3), (b).

[18] TORTS k22

Where two or more joint tort-feasors act

independently and cause distinct or single harm, for

which there is reasonable basis for division according

to contribution of each, then each is liable for

damages only for its own portion of harm; but where

each tort-feasor causes single indivisible harm, the

damages are not apportioned and each is liable for

damages for entire harm.

A-8

[19] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)

Under common law, polluter could escape any

liability for response costs under CERCLA if it

succeeded in proving that its oil emulsion, when

mixed with other hazardous waste, either did not

contribute to release and cleanup costs that followed,

or contributed at most to only divisible portion of

harm. Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, §§ 101(14),

102, 107(a), (a)(3), (b), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§

9601(14), 9602, 9607(a), (a)(3), (b).

[20] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)

Polluter bears ultimate burden of establishing

reasonable basis for apportioning liability for response

costs in CERCLA action. Comprehensive

Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability

Act of 1980, §§ 101(14), 102, 107(a), (a)(3), (b), as

amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601(14), 9602, 9607(a),

(a)(3), (b).

[21] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)

Government has no burden of proof with respect

to what caused release of hazardous waste and

triggered response costs in action under CERCLA; it

is defendant that bears that burden. Comprehensive

Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability

Act of 1980, §§ 101(14), 102, 107(a), (a)(3), (b), as

amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601(14), 9602, 9607(a),

(a)(3), (b).

wa ee ee

A-9

[22] FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE k2481

To defeat government’s motion for summary

judgment in CERCLA action on issue of divisibility of

harm, polluter need only show that there are genuine

issues of material fact regarding reasonable basis for

apportionment of liability. Comprehensive

Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability

Act of 1980, §§ 101(14), 102, 107(a), (a)(3), (b), as

amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601(14), 9602, 9607(a),

(a)(3), (b).

[23] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)

Apportionment of liability is intensely factual

determination in CERCLA action. Comprehensive

Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability

Act of 1980, §§ 101(14), 102, 107(a), (a)(3), (b), as

amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601(14), 9602, 9607(a),

(a)(3), (b).

(24) HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)

Causation, with burden on defendant, is

reintroduced at apportionment stage in CERCLA

action only to permit defendant to escape payment

where its pollutants did not contribute more than

background contamination and also cannot

concentrate; this special exception to usual absence of

causation requirement is applicable only to claims

where background levels are not exceeded and limited

exception will be recognized only in absence of any

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) thresholds.

Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, ss 101(14),

102, 107(a), (a)(3), (b), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§

9601(14), 9602, 9607(a), (a)(3), (b).

A-10

[25] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)

Commingling of metallic and organic hazardous

substances was not synonymous with indivisible harm,

and polluter was entitled to opportunity to show that

harm caused at contaminated site was capable of

reasonable apportionment; polluter could present

evidence relevant to establishing divisibility of harm,

such as, proof disclosing relative toxicity,

migratory potential, degree of migration, and

synergistic capacities of hazardous substances at site.

Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, §§ 101(14),

102, 107(a), (a)(3), (b), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§

9601(14), 9602, 9607(a), (a)(3), (b); Solid Waste

Disposal Act, § 3001, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6921;

Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of

1972, § 307(A), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1317(A); Clean Air Act,

§ 112, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412.

[26] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)

Although language of CERCLA and Superfund

Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) in their

legislative histories appeared to demonstrate that

liability should be fixed first and immediately for

enforcement purposes and litigation should be

conducted later to sort out what contribution is owed

and by whom as result of remediation effort, choice as

to when to address divisibility and apportionment are

questions best left to sound discretion of trial court in

handling of individual case. Comprehensive

Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability

Act of 1980, §§ 107(a, b), 113(f)(1), as amended, 42

U.S.C.A. §§ 9607(a, b), 9613(f)(1)

2 ai

_

A-11

[27] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)

University which sent 551,000 gallons of

neutralized runoff water to contaminated site

following fire in stock pile of coal on campus was

‘potentially liable" party under CERCLA.

Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, §§ 107,

107(a), (a)(3), 113(f)(1), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§

9607, 9607(a), (a)(3), 9613(f)(1).

See publication Words and Phrases for other

judicial constructions and definitions.

[28] CONTRIBUTION k5(6.1)

Federal common-law principles in effect prior to

Superfund Amendments (SARA) to CERCLA

rendered university liable for contribution to cleanup

costs of contaminated site due to its disposal at site of

neutralized runoff water following fire in stock pile of

coal on campus, and court was not required to apply

Superfund Amendments retroactively in order to hold

university liable for contribution. Comprehensive

Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability

Act of 1980, §§ 113, 113(f), (f)(2), as amended, 42

U.S.C.A. §§ 9613, 9613(f), (f)(2).

[29] STATUTES k263

There is strong presumption against retroactive

application of statute.

[30] STATUTES k263

No law should be construed retrospectively unless

Congress’ purpose can be satisfied in no other way or

unless statutory language admits of no other

meaning.

A-12

[31] STATUTES k263

Court should apply law existing at time of its

decision unless to do so is contrary to plain meaning

of statute or would cause manifest injustice.

[32] COMPROMISE AND SETTLEMENT k3

Negotiations between Environmental Protection

Agency (EPA) and university which resulted in

university being removed from list of those potentially

responsible parties for cleanup of contaminated site

did not amount to "administrative settlement," for

purposes of CERCLA, so as to preclude university’s

liability for contribution for cleanup of site at which it

disposed of neutralized runoff water following fire in

stockpile of coal on campus, where procedural steps

necessary to effectuate settlement under CERCLA

were not followed. Comprehensive Environmental

Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, §§

113, 113(f), (f)(2), 122, 122(g)(4), (i)(1), as amended, 42

U.S.C.A. §§ 9613, 9613(f), (f)(2), 9622, 9622(g)(4),

(i)(1).

See publication Words and Phrases for other

judicial constructions and definitions

[33] COMPROMISE AND SETTLEMENT k5(1)

Only when settlement procedures set forth in

CERCLA are followed, including publishing notice of

such in Federal Register and obtaining prior written

approval of settlement by Attorney General, is party

shielded from contribution claim under CERCLA.

Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, §§ 113,

113(f), (f)(2), 122, 122(g)(4), @)(1), as amended, 42

US.C.A. §§ 9613, 9613(f), (f)(2), 9622, 9622(g)(4),

(i)(1).

A-13

[34] CONTRIBUTION k5(6.1)

University which disposed of neutralized runoff

water at contaminated site following fire in stockpile

of coal on campus was not insulated from requirement

to contribute in CERCLA action under federal

common law due to its removal by Environmental

Protection Agency (EPA) from list of potentially

responsible parties, where EPA merely advised

university that it was removing university from list

and EPA and university did not enter into release,

covenant not to sue, or any other similar, legally

binding agreement. Comprehensive Environmental

Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, §§

104(a)(3), 107(a), 113(f)(1), 122, 122(g)(4), (i)(1), as

amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9604(a)(3), 9607(a),

9613(f)(1), 9622, 9622(g)(4), (i)(1).

Lawrence A. Salibra, II, Cleveland, OH (John C.

Tillman, of counsel), for defendant third party plaintiff

appellee cross appellant Alcan Aluminum Corp.

Thomas Mead Santoro, Ithaca, NY (Patricia A.

McClary, on the brief), for third party defendant

appellant cross appellee Cornell University.

John T. Stahr, Washington, DC (Anne S. Almy,

Henry Friedman, Dept. of Justice, Environment and

Natural Resources Division, Bernice Corman, Carol

Berns, Joan Gillespie, Charles De Saillan, Charles

Breece, U.S. E.P.A., David A. Munro, Asst. Atty. Gen.,

Vicki A. O’Meara, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., State of

New York, of counsel), for plaintiffs-appellees U.S.,

State of NY.

A-14

O. Peter Sherwood, Corp. Counsel, New York

City (Peter H. Lehner, Christopher A. Amato,

Environmental Law Div., of counsel), filed a brief on

behalf of the City of New York as amicus curiae.

Norman W. Bernstein, Washington, DC (Donald

B. Mitchell, Jr., Lawrence E. Blatnik, Arent Fox

Kintner Plotkin & Kahn, of counsel), filed a brief on

behalf of Exxon Chemical Co., Ford Motor Co.,

Allied-Signal, Inc., Carrier Corp., General Motors

Corp., Pratt & Whitney, and USX Corp. as amicus

curiae. Robert B. Weintraub, New York City (Michael

Stanley, Oswego, NY, of counsel), filed a brief on

behalf of the Greater Oswego Chamber of Commerce,

Inc. as amicus curiae.

Robert B. Weintraub, New York City (Robin S.

Conrad, National Chamber Litigation Center, Inc.,

Washington, DC, of counsel), filed a brief on behalf of

the Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. of America as

amicus curiae.

Robert B. Weintraub, New York City, filed a brief

on behalf of New York State Ins. Ass’n as amicus

curiae.

Austin V. Campriello, Werner & Kennedy, New

York City (Mahlon C. Schneider, Austin, MN, Kevin

Montano, Bethesda, MD, of counsel), filed a brief on

behalf of Geo. A. Hormel & Co., Marriott

Corporation’s Food Service Div., The National Food

Processors Ass’n and Burger King Corp. as amici

curiae.

|

;

.

}

A-15

Doren P. Norfleet, Oswego, NY, filed a brief on

behalf of Operation Oswego County, Inc. as amicus

curiae.

Thomas O’Brien, Jeffrey & O’Brien, P.C., Clinton,

NY, filed a brief on behalf of Various Individuals Who

Represent a Cross-Section of the Metropolitan Area of

Utica, New York as amicus curiae.

James R. Griffith, Felt, Hubbard & Bogan, Utica,

NY, filed a brief on behalf of New York State

Conference of Mayors and Mun. Officials as amicus

curiae.

Alan S. Burstein, Scolaro, Shulman, Cohen,

Lawler & Burstein, P.C., Syracuse, NY, filed a brief on

behalf of School Districts as amici curiae.

Robert B. Weintraub, New York City (Gay

Williams, Sullivan & Williams, Oswego, NY, of

counsel), filed a brief on behalf of City of Oswego as

amicus curiae.

Robert B. Weintraub, New York City (Bruce N.

Clark, Oswego, NY, of counsel), filed a brief on behalf

of County of Oswego as amicus curiae.

Before NEWMAN, CARDAMONE, and

MAHONEY, Circuit Judges.

CARDAMONE, Circuit Judge:

Alcan Aluminum Corporation (Alcan) and Cornell

University appeal from an order of the United States

A- 16

District Court for the Northern District of New York,

(McAvoy, J.), granting summary judgment in favor of

appellees, United States and New York State, holding

Alcan jointly and severally liable for cleanup of a

hazardous waste site, and allowing Alcan to obtain

contribution from Cornell. United States v. Alcan

Aluminum Corp., 755 F.Supp. 531 (N.D.N.Y.1991).

Alcan and a host of amicus briefs have presented

us with a parade of horribles predicated on their view

that under the district court opinion, hazardous

substances include breakfast cereal, the soil, and

nearly everything else upon which life depends, and

that such an approach will make liable for response

costs the butcher, the baker and the candlestick

maker. They posit that to avoid such an absurd

result, liability under the Comprehensive

Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability

Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 et seq.

(1988, Supp. I 1989 & Supp. II 1990), should not be

imposed unless a responsible party has contributed

some minimum concentration of a hazardous element

or compound.

Admittedly, there is some force to this argument;

yet, the government’s response is also compelling. It

notes that were we to limit liability in the manner

Alcan and amici suggest, each potential defendant in

a multi-defendant CERCLA case would be able to

escape liability simply by relying on the low

concentration of hazardous substances in its wastes,

and the government would be left to absorb the

clean-up costs. Several cuurts have already held such

was not the aim of Congress

A-17

In passing CERCLA Congress faced the

unenviable choice of enacting a legislative scheme that

would be somewhat unfair to generators of hazardous

substances or one that would unfairly burden the

taxpaying public. The financial burdens of toxic

clean-up had been vastly underestimated--in 1980

when CERCLA was enacted $1.8 billion was thought

to be enough. In 1986 when the Superfund

Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA),

Pub.L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986), was passed,

$100 billion was held to be needed. It may well be

more today. It is of course the public-at-large that is

already bearing the economic brunt of this enormous

national problem. There may be unfairness in the

legislative plan, but we think Congress imposed

responsibility on generators of hazardous substances

advisedly. And, even were it not advisedly, we still

must take this statute as it is.

Having assessed CERCLA’s plain meaning, its

legislative history, and the case law construing it, we

think the tension may be resolved by allowing a

responsible party, like Alcan, to pay nothing if it

can demonstrate that its pollutants, when mixed with

other hazardous wastes, did not contribute to the

release or the resulting response costs. In this respect

we essentially adopt the Third Circuit’s reasoning in

United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d

252, 267-71 (3d Cir.1992) (Alcan-Butler ). This

approach is not intended to provide an escape hatch

for CERCLA defendants; rather, it will permit such a

defendant to avoid liability only when its pollutants

contribute no more than background contamination.

A- 18

BACKGROUND

A. Facts

From 1970 to 1977 Pollution Abatement Services

(PAS) operated a waste disposal and treatment center

on 15 acres of land in Oswego County, New York.

The PAS facility there stored, processed, and disposed

of chemical wastes from a number of sources; as a

result the site became contaminated with hazardous

substances. In 1977 the Environmental Protection

Agency (EPA) and New York State undertook

response and clean-up measures and spent over $12

million in the ensuing ten years on remedial actions.

Alcan used PAS during the 1970s and arranged

for disposal or treatment there of 4.6 million gallons

of oil emulsion. This emulsion--used in Alcan’s

manufacturing process--consisted mostly of water and

mineral oil, along with small aluminum ingot shavings

containing lead, copper, chromium, zinc, and cadmium

compounds.

In 1974, a stock-pile of coal caught fire at

Cornell University’s Ithaca, New York campus. The

local fire department extinguished it with water, and

some of the run-off from the coal pile flowed into area

streams. After consultation with New York

environmental officials, Cornell collected this coal

run-off water and neutralized it. For two years

following the fire, Cornell sent 551,000 gallons of the

neutralized run-off water to the Oswego PAS site.

When in 1983 Cornell was notified of hazardous waste

problems at the PAS site, it explained to the EPA

what waste it had sent there for disposal. In March

|

A-19

1986 Cornell purportedly resolved any question of its

liability with the EPA, which thereupon removed the

University from its list of those parties potentially

responsible for response costs at PAS.

B. Present Suit

Ten years after the 1977 commencement of

clean-up efforts, in 1987 the United States and New

York (collectively the government) brought a CERCLA

s 107(a), 42 U.S.C. s 9607(a), action to recover

response costs against 83 of the parties potentially

responsible for the environmental problems at the

Oswego site. The government entered into a consent

decree with 82 of these defendants, recovering 74

percent or $9.1 million of the clean-up costs it had

incurred. Alcan was the lone holdout. The

government sued it for the $3.2 million of unrecovered

costs. In 1988 Alcan served a third-party complaint

against Cornell seeking contribution from it for a

share of the clean-up costs.

After discovery had been completed, the

government moved for summary judgment against

Alcan contending that Alcan’s disposal of hazardous

substances at PAS had been conceded. Alcan

cross-moved for summary judgment against the

United States and New York State, asserting

principally that CERCLA’s definition of "hazardous

substance" requires a minimum concentration level of

specific compounds and that under the statute

causation needed to be demonstrated. Alcan also

asserted that the harm caused by its waste was

divisible and that the government claim improperly

subjected it to joint and several liability. Alcan also

A - 20

moved for summary judgment against Cornell

University, as a third-party defendant, and Cornell

cross-moved in turn for summary judgment against

Alcan.

The district court granted summary judgment for

the government against Alcan, and for Alcan against

Cornell on January 15, 1991. It rejected Alcan’s

arguments concerning minimum _ concentration

requirements and causation. It further held Alcan

had failed to meet its burden to show that the harm

at PAS was divisible, and awarded the government

approximately $4 million in accumulated response

costs. With respect to Cornell, the district court

stated that the University was responsible to Alcan for

its "fair share" of the clean-up costs and refused to

shield the university from liability on the basis of its

removal by the EPA from the list of potentially

responsible parties. See 755 F.Supp. at 543-45.

On November 19 and 20, 1991 the trial court held

a "fair share" hearing to determine the extent of

Cornell’s liability to Alcan. Adopting a six-factor fair

share allocation test from United States v. R.W. Meyer,

Inc., 932 F.2d 568 (6th Cir.1991), it ruled Cornell was

responsible for six percent of the response cost

recovered by the government from Alcan

and therefore awarded Alcan $310,540.92. The final

judgment against Alcan was more than $5 million, due

to additional clean-up costs and prejudgment interest.

Alcan and Cornell appeal from an amended final

judgment of the district court entered May 29, 1992,

and Cornell also appeals from its January 15, 1991

order.

;

}

} .

'

A- 21

DISCUSSION

I Collateral Estoppel

Before considering the merits of the appeal, it is

necessary to rule on a collateral estoppel argument

raised by the government against Alcan’s appeal

arising from similar litigation the government brought

in Pennsylvania against Alcan.

A. The Alcan-Butler Litigation

In November 1989--two years after the institution

of the instant litigation--the United States brought an

identical cause of action against Alcan under the same

provision, CERCLA § 107(a), to recover costs incurred

in the clean-up of Butler Tunnel, a waste disposal

facility located on the banks of the Susquehanna River

in Pennsylvania. The United States District Court for

the Middle District of Pennsylvania on May 8, 1991

granted the United States’ motion for summary

judgment against Alcan, relying entirely on the

reasons set forth in Judge McAvoy’s decision handed

down on January 15, 1991 in the case we are now

reviewing.

Alcan appealed to the Third Circuit arguing that

(1) CERCLA contains a minimum quantitative

requirement for "hazardous substance," (2) Alcan’s

emulsion falls within CERCLA’s petroleum exception,

(3) the decision of the District Court for the Middle

District of Pennsylvania is inconsistent with EPA

regulations under CERCLA, (4) CERCLA requires a

specific causal relationship, and (5) CERCLA fails to

give fair notice of what is considered a hazardous

substance to potential defendants. On May 14, 1992

A - 22

the Third Circuit rejected each of these arguments.

See Alcan-Butler, 964 F.2d at 259-67. But it vacated

the Middle District Court’s judgment and remanded

the case to that court for a hearing on divisibility. Id.

at 271. Rehearing in banc was denied in July 1992.

See id.

The government now insists that Alcan has

presented to us the precise issues that were raised,

litigated, and decided against it in Alcan-Butler. To

make its point, it itemizes the arguments in Alcan’s

brief before us and demonstrates that they mirror the

recited issues addressed in Alcan-Butler.

B. Collateral Estoppel No Bar

[1-3] We analyze the collateral estoppel doctrine

as it pertains to this appeal. Res judicata, or claim

preclusion, means simply that when a judgment is

rendered on the merits, it bars a second suit between

the same parties or their privies based on the same

cause of action or claims. See 1B J.W. Moore, Moore’s

Federal Practice q 0.405[1] (2d ed. 1992). Under

collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, the second suit

is upon a different claim or cause of action. This

doctrine’s fundamental notion is that an issue of law

or fact actually litigated and decided by a court of

competent jurisdiction in a prior action may not be

relitigated in a subsequent suit between the same

parties or their privies, see Montana v. United States,

440 U.S. 147, 153, 99 S.Ct. 970, 973, 59 L.Ed.2d 210

(1979). Collateral estoppel saves parties and the

courts from the waste and burden of relitigating stale

issues, see 1B Moore, supra q 0.441[2], and, by

discouraging inconsistent results, forwards public

TE mE ee

A - 23

policy favoring the establishment of certainty in legal

relations. See United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464

U.S. 165, 176-77, 104 S.Ct. 575, 581-82, 78 L.Ed.2d

388 (1984) (White, J., concurring in result); Allen v.

McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct. 411, 414, 66

L.Ed.2d 308 (1980).

[4, 5] There are exceptions to the use of collateral

estoppel. For example, a court should decline to give

preclusive effect to a prior judgment if there have

been changes either in the applicable legal rules or

the factual predicates essential to that prior judgment.

See Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d

1350, 1356 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, --- US. ----, 113

S.Ct. 52, 121 L.Ed.2d 22 (1992). In addition, where

pure questions of law--unmixed with any particular

set of facts--are presented to a court, the "interests of

finality and judicial economy may be outweighed by

other substantive policies." Id.; accord 18 Charles A.

Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 4425

(1981 & Supp.1992). The government insists the

various recognized exceptions to the use of collateral

estoppel are inapplicable, while Alcan attempts to

bring itself within one or more of these exclusions to

the estoppel doctrine.

[6] The issue posed is whether the Pennsylvania

courts should have given estoppel effect to the rulings

of the Northern District or whether the Northern

District should have given estoppel effect to the

rulings of the Pennsylvania courts. The matter is

complicated by the procedural facts. The Northern

District’s ruling of January 15, 1991 preceded any of

the Pennsylvania rulings. But by the time the

Northern District entered a final judgment, the

sw

A - 24

Pennsylvania district court had made its rulings and

the Third Circuit had affirmed those rulings in part

and remanded on the issue of divisibility. We have

taken a broad view of the application of collateral

estoppel to rulings made at an interim stage of

litigation. Estoppel is applied when "the litigation of

a particular issue has reached such a stage that a

court sees no really good reason for permitting it to

be litigated again." Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth

Oil Ref. Co., 297 F.2d 80, 89 (2d Cir.1961), cert. denied,

368 U.S. 986, 82 S.Ct. 601, 7 L.Ed.2d 524 (1962);

accord Sherman v. Jacobson, 247 F.Supp. 261, 268

(S.D.N.Y.1965); see also Stauffer Chem., 464 U.S. at

180, 104 S.Ct. at 583 (White, J., concurring in result)

(estoppel is a “flexible, judge-made doctrine").

In this case, we are satisfied that the liability

ruling made by the Northern District was sufficiently

final to be entitled to estoppel effect. Of course, it is

not up to us to determine whether the district court

of another circuit was obliged to give such effect to

the Northern District ruling. We have no authority to

review the rulings of the Pennsylvania district court.

We are nonetheless entitled to decide that we think

the Northern District’s ruling deserves preclusive

| effect and, that being so, it follows, at least for

purposes of litigation in this Circuit, that the

Northern District was entitled to enter a final

judgment based on its earlier liability ruling and was

not obliged to give estoppel effect to any rulings

entered in the Pennsylvania courts after the date of

its January 15, 1991 ruling. Cf Laaman v. United

States, 973 F.2d 107, 112-13 (2d Cir.1992), cert. denied,

--- US. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1368, 122 L.Ed.2d 746 (1993).

a errmaaeaaaaaraacaeaaaaaamamamaata eel

A - 25

II Liability Under CERCLA

A. Chronology

(7][8] Before entering upon an analysis of the

merits of this appeal it will be helpful to set forth an

overview of CERCLA. In bringing an action under

this Act, the government must establish that: (1)

defendant is one of the four categories of covered

persons listed under § 9607(a) as liable for the costs

of remedial action, (2) the site of the clean-up is a

facility under § 9601(9), (3) there is a release or

threatened release of hazardous substances at the

facility, (4) as a result of which plaintiff has incurred

response costs, and (5) the costs incurred conform to

the national contingency plan under § 9607 (a)(4)(A) as

administered by the EPA. See B.F. Goodrich Co. v,

Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1198 (2d Cir.1992). If the

government establishes each of these elements on

undisputed facts, and the defendant is unable to

demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence the

existence of one of the three affirmative defenses set

forth in § 9607(b), then plaintiff is entitled to

summary judgment on the issue of liability, even

when genuine issues of material fact remain as to

appropriate damages. See Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden,

Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 668 (5th Cir.1989),

(9, 10] Liability may be decided first before the

more complicated questions implicated in clean-up

measures, which includes fixing the proportionate

fault of liable parties. Jd. at 667. Bifurcation and

summary judgment provide powerful legal tools which,

by effectively isolating the issues to be resolved, avoid

A - 26

lengthy and perhaps needless litigation. The

existence of those procedural tools aids Congress’

purpose by encouraging settlement discussions and

speeding up remedial action. See id. at 668.

B. Liability Issues

Alcan attempts to interpose a number of

additional defenses to prevent the imposition of

liability. It argues that a polluter should not be held

liable unless: a) the concentration of hazardous

substances in its wastes exceeds some minimum

threshold; b) its wastes fall within certain EPA

reporting requirements; and c) its wastes caused the

government to incur response costs. Under the

present reading of CERCLA none of these issues may

be considered in imposing liability.

1. Quantitative Thresholds for Hazardous

Substances

[11] CERCLA § 9601(14) defines “hazardous

substance” by cross-referencing several other

environmental statutes. The term includes: "(A) any

substance" designated under the Clean Water Act, "(B)

any element, compound, mixture, solution, or

substance” under CERCLA § 9602, "(C) any hazardous

waste" listed in § 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal

Act, "(D) any toxic pollutant" listed in § 307(A) of the

Clean Water Act, "(E) any hazardous air pollutant

listed under" § 112 of the Clean Air Act, and "(F) any

imminently hazardous chemical substance or mixture"

with respect to which the EPA has taken action. 42

U.S.C. § 9601(14) (emphasis added). The statute on

its face applies to "any" hazardous substance, and it

does not impose quantitative requirements.

a eceealillaeaaeiaiaiiinalalll

A - 27

[12] The breadth of § 9601(14) cannot be easily

escaped, and we have expressly held that "[q]uantity

or concentration is not a factor." Murtha, 958 F.2d at

1200; accord Alcan-Butler, 964 F.2d at 259-61. We

have also reasoned that "when Congress wanted to

draw distinctions based on concentration or quantity,

it expressly provided as much." Murtha, 958 F.2d at

1200; accord Alcan-Butler, 964 F.2d at 261 (same).

The absence of such quantity requirements in

CERCLA leads inevitably to the conclusion that

Congress planned for the "hazardous substance"

definition to include even minimal amounts of

pollution. See Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. United

States E.PA., 759 F.2d 922, 927-28 (D.C.Cir.1985).

2. EPA Definition of Hazardous Substances under

CERCLA

[13] Pursuant to § 9602(a), the EPA has

designated certain substances as hazardous in 40

C.F.R. § 302.4 (1992) and the accompanying table.

This regulation sets out broad headings of elements,

within which are established specific reportable

quantities ("RQs") of substances and chemical

abstracts service registry numbers ("CASRNs"). Alcan

admits that the elements in its oil emulsion fall

within the broad categories listed by the EPA, but it

notes that these elements are not given RQs and

CASRNs. Thus, it argues that these elements should

not be classified as hazardous under CERCLA, as all

hazardous elements must have RQs and CASRNs.

According to Alcan, a contrary interpretation renders

the EPA regulation meaningless.

A - 28

We need not dwell long on this argument.

Besides the district court in this case, see Alcan, 755

F.Supp. at 538, two other courts have assessed and

rejected this proposition. See Alcan-Butler, 964 F.2d

at 262-63; City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 766

F.Supp. 177, 181-83 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (also involving

Alcan). Each of these courts has essentially

determined that the RQs and CASRNs are irrelevant

for CERCLA liability purposes. The EPA draws a

vital distinction that makes this plain: RQs and

CASRNs only go to reporting requirements, they do

not address the issue of CERCLA liability. See Exxon,

766 F.Supp. at 182-83 (citing and quoting EPA

interpretation in 50 Fed.Reg. 13,456, 13,461,

13,472-73 (April 5, 1985)). We believe this reasoning

correct and therefore adopt it.

3. Causation under CERCLA

[14] CERCLA § 9607(a) imposes strict liability on

“any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise

arranged for disposal or treatment” of hazardous

substances "from which there is a release, or a

threatened release which causes the incurrence of

response costs." § 9607(a)(3) and (4). The plain

meaning of this language dictates that the

government need only prove: (1) there was a release

or threatened release, which (2) caused incurrence of

response costs, and (3) that the defendant generated

hazardous waste at the clean-up site. What is not

required is that the government show that a specific

defendant’s waste caused incurrence of clean-up costs.

A - 29

(15][16] As earlier noted, there are "only" three

defenses to imposition of liability on a generator: an

act of God, an act of war, and an act or omission of a

third party. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). In State of New

York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d

Cir.1985), we held that the owner of a facility was

liable under CERCLA without a finding of causation

of the release because "including a causation

requirement makes superfluous the affirmative

defenses provided in section 9607(b)." Id. Our

reading drew additional support from CERCLA’s

legislative history, from which we concluded that

"Congress specifically rejected including a causation

requirement" in this section. Jd. Other circuits have

reached the same conclusion. See Alcan-Butler, 964

F.2d at 265; Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms

Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d 1146, 1152-54 (1st Cir.1989);

United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 170 (4th

Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106, 109 S.Ct. 3156,

104 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1989). Hence, it seems plain that

in addition to imposing a strict liability scheme, -

CERCLA does away with a causation requirement.

Alcan argues to the contrary, primarily relying

upon the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Amoco Oil Co., 889

F.2d at 670, which it interprets as establishing a

causal nexus requirement. Alcan further presses that

in order for a causal connection to exist, there must

be levels of hazardous substance above ambient or

background. The Third Circuit assessed and rejected

this assertion, noting that the Fifth Circuit did not

hold that the factual inquiry concerning whether a

release has caused response costs would implicate

whether an alleged polluter’s waste caused response

costs. Alcan-Butler, 964 F.2d at 266. We agree with

the Third Circuit that Amoco Oil is distinguishable.

A-30

III Divisibility

A. General Principles

[17}{18] Having rejected Alcan’s proffered

defenses to liability, one would suppose there is no

limit to the scope of CERCLA liability. To avoid such

a harsh result courts have added a common law gloss

onto the statutory framework. They have at once

adopted a scheme of joint and several liability but at

the same time have limited somewhat the availability

of such liability against multiple defendants charged

with adding hazardous substances to a Superfund site.

See, e.g., O’Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178-79 (1st

Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071, 110 S.Ct. 1115,

107 L.Ed.2d 1022 (1990); United States uv.

Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F.Supp. 802, 808 (S.D.Ohio

1983). The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A

(1965) has been relied upon in determining whether

a party should be held jointly and severally liable, for

the entire cost of remediating environmental harm at

the site. See,eg., Alcan-Butler, 964 F.2d at 268-69;

O’Neil, 883 F.2d at 178; Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 171-73;

see also United States v. R.W. Meyer, 889 F.2d 1497,

1506-08 (6th Cir.1989). Under § 433A of the

Restatement where two or more joint tortfeasors act

independently and cause a distinct or single harm, for

which there is a reasonable basis for division

according to the contribution of each, then each is

liable for damages only for its own portion of the

harm. In other words, the damages are apportioned.

But where each tortfeasor causes a single indivisible

harm, then damages are not apportioned and each is

liable in damages for the entire harm.

A-3l

[19-23] Based on these common law principles, Alcan

may escape any liability for response costs if it either

succeeds in proving that its oil emulsion, when mixed with

other hazardous wastes, did not contribute to the release

and the clean-up costs that followed, or contributed at most

to only a divisible portion of the harm. See Alcan-Butler,

964 F.2d at 270. Alcan as the polluter bears the ultimate

burden of establishing a reasonable basis for apportioning

liability. See Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 172; Chem-Dyne, 572

F.Supp. at 810. The government has no burden of proof

with respect to what caused the release of hazardous waste

and triggered response costs. It is the defendant that bears

that burden. To defeat the government’s motion for

summary judgment on the issue of divisibility, Alcan need

only show that there are genuine issues of material fact

regarding a reasonable basis for apportionment of liability.

As other courts have noted, apportionment itself is an

intensely factual determination. See, e.g., Chem-Dyne, 572

F.Supp. at 811.

[24] In so ruling we candidly admit that causation is

being brought back into the case--through the backdoor,

after being denied entry at the frontdoor--at the

apportionment stage. We hasten to add nonetheless that

causation--with the burden on defendant--is reintroduced

only to permit a defendant to escape payment where its

pollutants did not contribute more than background

contamination and also cannot concentrate. To state this

standard in other words, we adopt a special exception to

the usual absence of a causation requirement, but the

exception is applicable only to claims, like Alcan’s, where

background levels are not exceeded. And, we recognize

this limited exception only in the absence of any EPA

thresholds.

A - 32

[25] Contrary to the government’s position,

commingling is not synonymous with indivisible harm,

and Alcan should have the opportunity to show that

the harm caused at PAS was capable of reasonable

apportionment. It may present evidence relevant to

establishing divisibility of harm, such as, proof

disclosing the relative toxicity, migratory potential,

degree of migration, and synergistic capacities of the

hazardous substances at the site. See Alcan-Butler,

964 F.2d at 270 n. 29, 271; Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 172

n. 26.

Alcan declares that the response actions at PAS

were attributable to substances such as PCB’s, nitro

benzene, phenol, dichlonoethone, toluene, and

benzene. It contends that no soil contamination due

to heavy metals was found there, and insists that the

metallic constituents of its oil emulsion are insoluble

compounds, submitting an affidavit supporting this

theory of divisibility. The government submitted a

declaration stating that metal contaminants like those

found in Alcan’s waste emulsion were present in

environmental media at PAS, that the commingling of

metallic and organic hazardous substances resulted in

indivisible harm, and that though some forms of lead,

cadmium and chromium are insoluble, they may

chemically react with substances and become

water-soluble. These differing contentions supported

by expert affidavits raise sufficient questions of fact to

preclude the granting of summary judgment on the

divisibility issue.

A - 33

B. Timing of the Divisibility Issue

[26] The Third Circuit concluded that a

divisibility inquiry is one "best resolved at the initial

liability phase" because it involves "relative degrees of

liability." See Alcan-Butler, 964 F.2d at 270, n. 29

(emphasis in original). Although we prefer this

common sense approach, it may be contrary to the

statutory dictates of CERCLA. In Shore Realty Corp.,

759 F.2d at 1032, we reviewed CERCLA’s language

and legislative history and concluded that the federal

government through the EPA responds to releases or

threatened releases of hazardous substances

immediately and later attempts to collect the

remediation costs from others. See id. at 1041. We

also determined, as previously stated, that importing

a causation requirement into the strict liability of §

9607(a) would render the affirmative defenses in §

9607(b) superfluous. Jd. at 1044-45. Legislative

support for that view is found in House Report No.

96-1016’s statement of the purpose of the original bill.

It envisioned that the EPA would "pursue rapid

recovery of the costs" incurred in clean-up. H.R.Rep.

No. 96-1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in 1980

U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120.

A similar review of the legislative history of

CERCLA and the SARA amendments of 1986 was

undertaken in Murtha, which construes the Act and

its amendments to enable the EPA to respond

"efficiently and expeditiously" to environmental

threats and to hold the parties responsible liable for

the cleanup costs in an action by the EPA to recoup

them. See Murtha, 958 F.2d at 1198. In those cases

A - 34

where this burden of recoupment costs is unfair or

disproportionate, such may be alleviated under §

9613(f)(1) after the response costs are fixed. Id. at

1206. Again, we are told in the Judicial Review

portion of House Report No. 99-253(I) that "[t]o avoid

delay of cleanups and to minimize litigation,

responsible parties would be allowed to challenge the

cleanup remedy after acknowledging liability for the

hazardous waste site." H.R.Rep. No. 99-253(1), 99th

Cong., 2d Sess. 59, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.AN.

2835, 2841 (emphasis added). The administrator of

the EPA, who was primarily responsible for drafting

the SARA amendments, at the time of their

enactment declared they would "[e]xpedite civil

actions by requiring that separate suits be brought

against other potentially liable parties for contribution

after judgment or settlement in enforcement actions."

Id. at 124, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2906 (emphasis

added).

Consequently, the language of CERCLA and

SARA and their legislative histories appear to

demonstrate the following chronology: liability is

fixed first and immediately for enforcement purposes;

litigation later to sort out what contribution is owed

and by whom as a result of the remediation effort.

But we do not rule that this chronology be followed or

that the Alcan-Butler approach of deciding divisibility

at the initial liability phase of the case is the best way

for the district court to proceed. Instead, the choice

as to when to address divisibility and apportionment

are questions best left to the sound discretion of the

trial court in the handling of an individual case.

==

ee ne ee

A - 35

IV Cornell

A. Potentially Liable Party under CERCLA

[27] Cornell believes it should be shielded from

liability for contribution by virtue of having resolved

its liability to the United States and the State of New

York. We discuss first whether Cornell is a

potentially liable party under CERCLA § 9607.

CERCLA § 9613(f)(1) provides that "[aJny person may

seek contribution from any other person who is liable

or potentially liable under section [9607(a) ]." §

9613(f)(1). Of the four classes of individuals subject to

liability under § 9607(a), Cornell submits that only

the third--any person who by contract, agreement or

otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment of

hazardous substances--is relevant because it

contracted to have its coal run-off sent to PAS. But,

it continues, because the EPA removed the University

from the list of those potentially responsible parties,

a fortiori, it may not be a potentially liable party

under § 9607(a). Alcan responds that Cornell’s coal

waste water was essentially the same as Alcan’s oil

emulsion, and that there is no principled basis under

the statute for treating Cornell differently.

The statutory language imposes liability and

contribution upon “any person" who arranges for

disposal of waste at a facility. Under the plain

meaning of this language it is difficult to see how

Cornell could avoid being included. Cornell points to

no cases that in fact have drawn the distinction it

urges us_ to adopt. Hence, Cornell is a potentially

liable party under s 9607(a)(3)

A - 36

B. Retroactive Application of SARA

[28] Cornell was removed by the EPA in March

1986 from the list of potentially responsible parties

before the SARA amendments’ proceedings for

contribution under s 9613 became effective on October

17, 1986. Compelled contribution, in its view, could

therefore only occur as a result of retroactive

application of SARA.

[29-31] If that statement reflected the whole

matter, we would agree. There is a_ strong

presumption against the retrospective application of a

statute. It is familiar law, the Supreme Court

instructs, that while judicial decisions operate

retrospectively, statutes look only to the future. See

United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 79,

103 S.Ct. 407, 413, 74 L.Ed.2d 235 (1982). No law,

including SARA, should be construed retrospectively

unless Congress’ purpose can be satisfied in no other

way or unless the statutory language admits of no

other meaning. See United States Fidelity & Guar.

Co. v. Struthers Wells Co., 209 U.S. 306, 314, 28 S.Ct.

537, 539, 52 L.Ed. 804 (1908). Yet, in apparent

conflict with this rule there is another principle: that

a court should apply law existing at the time of its

decision unless to do so is contrary to the plain

meaning of a statute or would cause manifest

injustice. See Bradley v. Richmond Sch. Bd., 416 U.S.

696, 711, 94 S.Ct. 2006, 2016, 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974).

Fortunately, we need not choose between these

conflicting precedents, see Kaiser Aluminum & Chem.

Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 836-37, 110 S.Ct.

a

A - 37

1570, 1576-77, 108 L.Ed.2d 842 (1990), because in the

case at hand the outcome is the same under either

rule. Cf. Litton Sys., Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,

746 F.2d 168, 170-71 (2d Cir.1984) (Bradley rule

applies only to cases pending on direct appeal at time

change in law occurs).

Prior to the 1986 SARA amendments to

CERCLA, federal common law principles applied, and

these rules did not shield Cornell from having

contribution sought from it. See United States v.

Conservation Chem. Co., 628 F.Supp. 391, 402

(W.D.Mo.1985) (invoking 1977 Uniform Comparative

Fault Act as to pre-SARA settlement). SARA’s 1986

provision in s 9613(f) for a statutory cause of action

for contribution codifies what had been generally held

implicit under the 1980 Act. See H.R.Rep. No.

99-253(1), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 79, reprinted in 1986

U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2861 (SARA “confirms” federal

right of contribution under CERCLA). In that Act

courts are granted implicit authority, using

appropriate equitable factors, to "allocate response

costs among liable parties." O’Neil, 883 F.2d at 179.

Hence, we are not applying SARA retroactively in

order to hold Cornell liable for contribution as the

University asserts; rather, we are relying on common

law principles that predated SARA.

C. Required to Contribute

(32) The last point Cornell raises is that since it

resolved its liability in an administratively approved

settlement, it should be insulated from any

requirement to contribute. CERCLA § 9613(f)(2)

provides that a “person who has resolved its liability

A - 38

to the United States or a State in an administrative or

judicially approved settlement shall not be liable for

claims for contribution." § 9613(f)(2).

The district court thought § 9613 was

inapplicable and that the EPA and Cornell did not

settle any question of liability. Rather, it believed the

government--employing prosecutorial

discretion--simmply chose not to sue Cornell. The

University naturally views the situation quite

differently. Itasserts this is not a case of prosecutorial

discretion. We are told instead that the government

entered into negotiations with the University,

requested and received technical studies from it, and

ultimately decided not to hold it liable. This

interaction, according to Cornell, constitutes an

“administrative settlement."

[33] Although this argument appears at first

blush to be compelling, upon closer examination it

does not carry the day. First, if the SARA

amendments were to be applied retrospectively, the

negotiations between Cornell and the EPA did not

amount to an "administrative settlement" because

those procedural steps necessary to effectuate a

settlement under CERCLA s 9622 were not followed.

Section 9622, which deals in part with de minimis

settlements, states that a settlement "shall be entered

as a consent decree or embodied in an administrative

order setting forth the terms of the settlement," and

where the total response costs exceed $500,000, as

they do here, such an order may only be issued "with

the prior written approval of the Attorney General."

42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(4). Further settlement procedures

i anes ae ceiiameaaendieaaal

A - 39

procedures set forth in § 9622(i)(1) include notice of

such being published in the Federal Register, which

concededly did not take place in the instant case.

Only when these procedures are followed is a party

shielded from a contribution claim.

[34] Second, applying the SARA amendments

prospectively, Cornell has not met the requirements

for protection from contribution under federal

common law. Under § 6 of the Uniform Comparative

Fault Act, "[a] release, covenant not to sue, or similar

agreement entered into by a claimant and a person

liable discharges that person from all liability for

contribution." See Conservation Chem. Co., 628

F.Supp. at 402 (principles of 1977 Uniform

Comparative Fault Act are "the most consistent with,

and do the most to implement" congressional intent

underlying CERCLA). The EPA merely advised

Cornell that it was removing Cornell from the list of

potentially responsible parties. The EPA and Cornell

did not enter into a release, covenant not to sue, or

any other similar, legally binding agreement.

We are satisfied therefore that the district court

properly found Cornell liable or potentially liable

under § 9607(a) of the Act and that federal common

law rules under § 9613(f)(1) made Cornell liable to a

suit for contribution. Having said this, we note that

if at the directed hearing Alcan succeeds on any issue

and has its contribution reduced, Cornell’s share

should also be reduced since it has been determined

that its contribution is fixed at six percent of Alcan’s.

As an equitable consideration, the University should

also be given an opportunity to have its waste water

A - 40

claim evaluated in the same light as Alcan’s similar

claim. If indeed, as Cornell claims, it can show that

the University’s wastes did not, when mixed with

other wastes, contribute to the release or resultant

response costs, then Cornell should succeed on this §

9604(a){3) issue, and it would of course avoid any

liability or contribution.

CONCLUSION

After careful consideration of all the other

arguments raised by the parties, we find they do not

need to be addressed as our opinion fully disposes of

them. Accordingly, for the reasons stated the district

court’s amended final judgment of May 29, 1992 is

affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part, and remanded

for further proceedings, and the order of January 15,

1991 is also remanded for further proceedings, both

consistent with this opinion.

A- 41

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and

State of New York,

Plaintiffs,

Vv.

ALCAN ALUMINUM CORP., et al.,

Defendants.

ALCAN ALUMINUM CORP.,

Third-Party Plaintiff,

Vv.

CORNELL UNIVERSITY,

Third-Party Defendant.

No. 87-CV-920.

United States District Court,

N.D. New York.

Jan. 15, 1991.

United States and State of New York sought to

recover response costs for cleanup of hazardous waste

site. The District Court, McAvoy, J., held that: (1)

party whose wastes were deposited at the site and

whose waste contained hazardous materials was liable

despite claim that the hazardous substances were

present in the waste at less than normal background

levels; (2) there is no requirement in CERCLA that

an element or compound have a reportable quantity in

order for it to be hazardous; (3) particular substance

A - 42

need not be in a specific chemical form in order to be

hazardous; but (4) responsible party was entitled to

contribution from another party.

Ordered accordingly.

[1] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)

Liability under CERCLA is strict, and is joint and

severable unless the defendant demonstrates that the

harm is indivisible. Comprehensive Environmental

Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, §

107(a), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a).

[2] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)

Liability under CERCLA in a cost recovery action

presents an issue separate and distinct from that

posed by the issue regarding which incurred response

cost the defendant is obligated to pay.

Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, § 107(a), as

amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a).

[3] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)

Hazardous substances under CERCLA include all

substances so designated under other statutes

pursuant to the grant of authority contained therein,

in addition to substances so designated by the

Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) pursuant to

the grant of authority in CERCLA. Comprehensive

Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability

Act of 1980, § 101(14), 102(a), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A.

§§ 9601(14), 9602(a).

[4] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)

CERCLA does not impose any quantitative

A - 43

requirement on the term “hazardous substance," and

the mere listing of an element, compound, or

hazardous waste establishes that a substance is

hazardous as a matter of law. Comprehensive

Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability

Act of 1980, §§ 101(14), 102(a), as amended, 42

U.S.C.A. §§ 9601(14), 9602(a).

[5] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)

Substance need not be in a specific chemical

form, such as one making it water soluble, in order to

be hazardous for purposes of CERCLA, and a

compound containing a listed element found in the

released matter need not itself be specifically and

separably listed in order to be a hazardous substance

for purposes of CERCLA. Comprehensive

Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability

Act of §1980, §§ 101(14), 102(a), as amended, 42

U.S.C.A.§ § 9601(14), 9602(a).

[6] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)

There is no requirement in the CERCLA

statutory or regulatory scheme that an element or

compound have a reportable quantity in order for it to

be hazardous. Comprehensive Environmental

Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, §§

101(14), 102(a), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601(14),

9602(a).

(7] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)

Fact that emulsion which had been deposited at

hazardous waste site contained level of metals

designated as hazardous substances well below that

found in virgin oil did not bring that waste within the

A- 44

petroleum exception to CERCLA. Comprehensive

Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability

Act of 1980, § 101(14), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §

9601(14).

[8] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)

Petroleum exception to CERCLA does not include

oil which has become contaminated with hazardous

substances through use; that which comes within the

ambit of the petroleum exception is oil or oil fraction

which naturally contains the hazardous substances.

Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, § 101(14), as

amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(14).

[9] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(2)

CERCLA is not void for vagueness.

Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, § 107, as

amended, 42 U.S.C.A.§ 9607.

[10] STATUTES k47

To withstand void for vagueness challenge, it is

sufficient if the meaning of the statutory or regulatory

language is discoverable from its context.

[11] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(10)

Party which had produced emulsion which had

been deposited at hazardous waste site did not show

selective prosecution under CERCLA in view of fact

that it was one of 83 named defendants with respect

to that site. Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, § 107, as

amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607.

ee ed a ee eee ee

A - 45

(12) HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)

Costs which may be covered under CERCLA

include those for such activities as investigations,

monitoring, and testing to identify the extent of

danger to the public health or welfare or the

environment, or to identify the extent of the release

of hazardous substances, and planning and

implementation of a response action; also recoverable

are indirect costs associated with those items and with

the enforcement of CERCLA provisions, including

administrative costs incurred by the staffs of the

regulatory agencies involved and by the Department

of Justice. Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, §§

101(23-25), 107(a), as amended, 42 US.CAs55§

9601(23-25), 9607(a).

[13] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.15(5.1)

Party from whom response costs are sought

under CERCLA bears the burden of proof on the issue

of severability. Comprehensive Environmental

Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, s

107(a), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A.§ 9607(a).

[14] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)

Environmental harm inflicted at hazardous waste

site was indivisible, so that responsible party was

jointly and severably liable for recovery costs, where

contaminants found in the soil and water were

commingled. Comprehensive Environmental

Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, §

107(a), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a).

A - 46

[15] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)

All that is required for the recovery of CERCLA

cleanup costs is that there be a release or a

threatened release of a hazardous substance which

causes the incurrence of response costs.

Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, § 107(a), as

amended, 42 U.S.C.A.§ 9607(a).

[16] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)

There is no requirement that plaintiff seeking to

recover response costs under CERCLA demonstrate a

causal nexus between defendant’s conduct and the

contamination of the property involved; what is

required, at most, is that the plaintiff demonstrate

some relationship between the release and a response.

Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, § 107(a), as

amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a).

[17] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)

Government seeking to recover response costs

under CERCLA need not trace releases of hazardous

substances to a particular responsible party; it is

sufficient if the site contains hazardous substances

found in that party’s waste which were dumped at

that site. Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, § 107(a), as

amended, 42 U.S.C.A.§ 9607(a).

[18] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)

Party whose wastes were dumped at hazardous

waste site and which contained hazardous substances

found at the site could not avoid liability under

A - 47

CERCLA on the grounds that the contaminants were

not in a sufficiently high concentration to warrant the

response. Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, § 107(a), as

amended, 42 U.S.C.A.§ 9607(a).

[19] CONTRIBUTION k5(6)

Where no settlement was entered into at the

administrative or judicial level between potentially

responsible party and the United States with respect

to response costs and the party was merely dropped as

a potentially responsible party, it could be held liable

for contribution to another responsible party.

Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, § 122(g), as

amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9622(g).

[20] CONTRIBUTION ks

Party which had been dropped as a potentially

responsible party during administrative proceedings

could not avoid contribution to responsible party for

CERCLA response costs on the grounds that it had

never had the opportunity to participate in the judicial

settlement to establish its de minimus status.

Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, § 122(g), as

amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9622(g).

Frederick J. Scullin, Jr., U.S. Atty. (Craig A. Benedict,

of counsel), Syracuse, N.Y., and Richard B. Stewart,

Asst. Atty. Gen. Land and Natural Resources Div.,

Environmental Enforcement Section (Michael Bardee,

Henry Friedman, of counsel), Washington, D.C., for

plaintiff U.S.

A - 48

Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen. State of N.Y. (David A.

Munro, Karen Kimball, of counsel), Albany, N.Y., for

plaintiff State of N.Y.

Lawrence A. Salibra, II, Cleveland, Ohio, for defendant

Alcan Aluminum Corp.

Thomas Mead Santoro, Patricia McClary, Cornell

University, Office of University Counsel, Ithaca, N.Y.,

for third-party defendant Cornell University.

MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER

McAVOY, District Judge.

Introduction

By this action, the United States of America and

the State of New York initially sought to recover from

some 83 business entities response costs under section

107 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,

Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C.

§ 9607 (as amended), in connection with the clean-up

of an inactive hazardous waste site formerly owned by

Pollution Abatement Services of Oswego, Inc. (PAS)

and currently owned by the County of Oswego. At the

time the action was commenced, those costs exceeded

$12 million. Shortly after commencement, plaintiffs

entered into a consent decree with 82 of the

defendants recovering some $9,105,308.17; Alcan

Aluminum Corp. was the lone holdout and the suit

continued as against it for the difference between the

stipulated amount of incurred costs ($12,319,551.04)

and the amount recovered in the partial settlement.

Additional costs have been incurred since then and

A- 49

currently total in excess of $13 million. Discovery

having been concluded, the parties’ dispute (in the

main action) is before the court on cross motions for

summary judgment. The third-party action is also

before the court on cross motions for summary

judgment. For the reasons that follow, the court

grants the motions of the United States and the State

of New York as against Alcan Aluminum Corp. in their

entirety in the main action and thereby denies Alcan’s

motion; insofar as the third-party action is concerned,

_ the court grants Alcan’s motion to the extent of

declaring that third-party defendant Cornell

University is also liable for its fair share of response

costs incurred by the United States and the State of

New York and accordingly denies the motion of

Cornell University. A hearing is necessary to

determine the amount of that fair share.

Background

A. Historical

From approximately 1970 until 1977, various

chemical waste materials were received for disposal or

treatment at the PAS site. As a result of PAS

operations, the site’s surface became contaminated by

hazardous substances because of wastes leaching from

drums, lagoons being overtopped and surface runoff.

During the 1970 through 1977 period, Alcan, by

contract, agreement or otherwise, arranged for the

disposal or treatment at the PAS facility 4,607,380

gallons of an emulsion generated at its plant in

Oswego, New York in conjunction with the hot rolling

of aluminum ingots. (In addition to aluminum, the

ingots used by Alcan contained chromium, copper, lead

A - 50

and zinc.) The Alcan emulsion, basically a mixture of

water (primarily) and mineral oil, was circulated and

recirculated through the rolls, picking up fragments of

ingots containing aluminum, chromium, copper, lead

and zinc in the process, until removed from the

manufacturing process and sent to the PAS facility.

(In addition to aluminum, chromium, copper, lead and

zinc, defendant concedes that its emulsion contained

cadmium.) During this period, Alcan, by contract,

agreement or otherwise also arranged for the disposal

at the PAS facility of 200 gallons of polychlorinated

biphenyls.

In 1976 and 1977, the United States began

undertaking response measures at the PAS site; in

1978, the State, in conjunction with the United States,

conducted a surficial cleanup which included removing

4,000 drums from the site; in 1982, the United States

and the State entered into a formal cooperative

agreement to address the environmental problem

posed by the PAS site. This lawsuit followed.

B. Statutory

Through CERCLA, enacted in 1980 as a

comprehensive response to the environmental threat

posed by the disposal of hazardous substances,

Congress has provided the federal government and

the States, through cooperative agreements with the

Environmental Protection Agency, with an effective

means to clean up toxic waste sites around the

country and with the authority to force those persons

responsible for creating the hazardous conditions to

bear the cost of the cleanups. See United States v.

Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167 and n. 8 (4th

A-65l

Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106, 109 S.Ct. 3156,

104 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1989); Dedham Water Co. v.

Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081

(1st Cir.1986); State of New York v. Shore Realty, 759

F.2d 1032, 1040-1041 (2d Cir.1985); 42 U.S.C. §§

9604(d)(1) and 9607(a) (1983 and Supp.1990). In

pertinent part, CERCLA provides as _ follows:

Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of

law, and subject only to the defenses set forth in

subsection (b) of this section--

(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or

otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment ... of

hazardous substances owned or possessed by such

person ... at any facility ... owned or operated by

another party or entity and containing such

hazardous substances

.. from which there is a release, or threatened

release which causes the incurrence of response

costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable

for--

(A) all costs of removal or remedial action

incurred by the United States Government or a

State ... not inconsistent with the national

contingency plan{.) 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3)

(Supp.1990); see also Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at

1043, 1043 n. 16 (commenting on the correct

construction of section 9607(a)).

(1, 2] As various courts have noted, liability under

CERCLA, which is strict, Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at

1044, and joint and several unless the defendant

A - 52

demonstrates that the harm is divisible, O’Neil v.

Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178-179 (1st Cir.1989), cert.

denied sub nom. American Cyanamid Co. v. O’Neil, ---

US. ----, 110 S.Ct. 1115, 107 L.Ed.2d 1022 (1990),

would be established in this "cost recovery" action if

the plaintiffs prove each of the following:

1) the PAS site is a “facility” within the meaning

of 42 U.S.C.§ 9601(9)(B);

2) a "release", see 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22), or

"threatened release" of hazardous substances, see

42 U.S.C. § 9601(14), has occurred at the PAS

site;

3) the release or threatened release has caused

the United States and the State of New York to

incur response costs, see 42 U.S.C. § 9607; and

4) Alcan falls with at least one of the four classes

of responsible persons described in 42 U.S.C. §

9607(a), see United States v. Aceto Agricultural

Chemicals Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1378-1379 (8th

Cir.1989); see also Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc.,

889 F.2d 664, 668 (5th Cir.1989); Dedham Water

Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d

1146, 1150 (1st Cir.1989); Shore Realty, 759 F.2d

at 1043-1045, and if Alcan fails to establish by a

preponderance of the evidence one of the three

narrow defenses provided by 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b),

Amoco Oil, 889 F.2d at 668; Shore Realty, 759

F.2d at 1042, 1044. Liability under CERCLA in

a "cost recovery” action presents an issue separate

and distinct from that posed by the issue

regarding which incurred response costs

defendant is obligated to pay. Amoco Oil, 889

F.2d at 668.

A - 53

Discussion

A. Alcan’s liability

Much of what plaintiffs need to prove in order for

liability to be imposed on Alcan is not in dispute. In

its attempt to resist liability, Alcan argues essentially

that the concentrations of cadmium, chromium,

copper, lead and zinc in its emulsion are less than

background levels and, therefore, do not constitute

hazardous substances under CERCLA. Slightly more

specifically, Alcan seeks to have this court read into

the statutory and regulatory scheme (1) a

requirement that in order for the listed substances to

be deemed "hazardous" these substances must be

present in a certain amount or concentration and (2)

a requirement that the listed substance be present in

a "harmful" form, after all, defendant argues, several

of these substances and many listed by the EPA occur

naturally and are even essential to the continued

existence of life. Underlying defendant’s position,

however, is, perhaps, the more fundamental

argument, related to its argument that substances

must be in a specific form in order to be deemed

"hazardous," that its waste oil emulsion and the

substances it concedes were contained therein are not

specifically listed in the 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 Table of

Hazardous Substances and, therefore, the court must

apply the provisions of 40 C.F.R. s 302.4(b) pertaining

to unlisted substances in order to determine whether

its waste oil emv'sion and the cadmium, chromium,

copper, lead and zinc contained therein are "hazardous

substances” under CERCLA. This is so, defendant

argues, because the “generic headings” in the Table

302.4 list do not have a Chemical Abstract Service

Registry Number, a Reportable Quantity or a

A - 54

Resource Conservation and Recovery Act number.

For the reasons that follow, defendant’s position is

rejected as meritless; suffice it to say that the court

will not rewrite the statutory and regulatory scheme

to suit defendant’s needs and desires. Congress and

the EPA, through a congressional grant of authority,

have spoken; the court’s task is to apply the law in as

straightforward a manner as possible, consistent with

the dictates of the Constitution, so as to give full

effect to the policy underlying CERCLA.

[3] A "hazardous substance” is defined in CERCLA

by reference to its provisions and to that of other

environmenta! statutes. Specifically, Congress has

provided that

[t]he term “hazardous substance” means (A) any

substance designated pursuant to section

1321(b)(2)(A) of Title 33, (B) any element,

compound, mixture, solution, or [t]he term

“hazardous substance” means (A) any substance

designated pursuant to section 1321(b)(2)(A) of

Title 33, (B) any element, compound, mixture,

solution, or substance designated pursuant to

section 9602 of this title, (C) any hazardous waste

having the characteristics identified under or

listed pursuant to section 3001 of the Solid Waste

Disposal Act (but not including any waste the

regulation of which under the Solid Waste

Disposal Act has been suspended by Act of

Congress), (D) any toxic pollutant listed under

section 1317(a) of Title 33, (E) any hazardous air

pollutant listed under section 112 of the Clean

Air Act, and (F) any imminently hazardous

chemical substance or mixture with respect to

A - 55

which the Administrator has taken action

pursuant to section 2606 of Title 15. The term

does not include petroleum, including crude oil

or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise

specifically listed or designated as a hazardous

substance under subparagraphs (A) through (F)

of this paragraph, and the term does not include

natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquified natural

gas, or synthetic gas usable for fuel (or mixtures

of natural gas and such synthetic gas).

42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (Supp.1990); see also id.§ 9602(a)

(Supp.1990) (authorizing the Administrator to

designate additional substances which, when released

into the environment, may present substantial danger

to the public health or welfare or the environment).

Hazardous substances under CERCLA, then, include

all substances so designated under other statutes

pursuant to the grant of authority contained therein

in addition to sutances so designated by the EPA

pursuant to the grant of authority under 42 U.S.C. §

9602(a). See United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d

at 165 n. 4. Accordingly, pursuant to the various

grants of authority under other environmental laws,

the EPA has promulgated a list of “hazardous

substances" under section 311(b)(2)(A) of the Clean

Water Act (codified at 40 C.F.R. Table 116.4 (1990)),

a list of "toxic pollutants" under section 307(a) of the

Clean Water Act (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 401.15

(1990)), a list of "hazardous wastes" under section

3001 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act

(appearing at 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.30-261.33 (1990)), and

a list of "hazardous air pollutants" pursuant to section

112 of the Clean Air Act (codified at 40 C.F.R. s

61.01(a) (1989)). Additionally, pertinent CERCLA

A - 56

regulations provide that " "[hJazardous substance’

means any substance designated pursuant to 40 CFR

Part 302," 40 C.F.R. § 302.3 (1989), and that "[t]he

elements and compounds and hazardous wastes

appearing in Table 302.4 are designated as hazardous

substances under section 102(a) of the Act [i.e., 42

U.S.C. § 9602(a) ]," 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 (1989). It bears

noting, however, that each of the elements,

compounds and hazardous wastes appear on the Table

302.4 List of Hazardous Substances by virtue of one or

more of four statutory sources--to wit, sections 307(a)

and 311(b)(4) of the Clean Water Act, section 112 of

the Clean Air Act and section 3001 of the Resource

Conservation and Recovery Act. See 40 C.F.R. § 302.4

note and Table 302.4 footnotes. Table 302.4, then,

appears to be nothing more than a compilation of

hazardous substances so designated already under the

Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act and the Resource

Conservation and Recovery Act.

[4-6] In response to defendant’s argument, suffice

it to say that "[t]he plain statutory language fails to

impose any quantitative requirement on the term

hazardous substance," Amoco Oil, 889 F.2d at 669, and,

as noted in Amoco Oil, that the mere listing of an

element, compound or hazardous waste establishes

that a substance is hazardous as a matter of law is a

holding supported by courts that have considered the

definitional requirements of the term and the

congressional comments contained in the legislative

history, id. (citing Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland

Farms Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d at 1151-1152; Eagle-Picher

Indus. v. United States, 759 F.2d 922, 927

(D.C.Cir.1985); City of New York v. Exxon Corporation,

fe

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Bs

Z

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5

3

ARERR RIAL AN OP RIT HORAN tHE IDE oD iS REE mo tant Nini LAND

A - 57

744 F.Supp. 474, 483-487 (S.D.N.Y.1990); United

States v. Metate Asbestos Corp., 584 F.Supp. 1143,

1147 (D.Ariz.1984)); United States v. ‘arolawn Co., 21

Env’t Rep.Cas. (BNA) 2124, 2125, 2126 (D.S.C.1984);

see also United States v. Western Processing Co., Inc.,

734 F.Supp. 930, 936 (W.D.Wash.1990) (government

need not prove that the release was above background

levels; the principle that the law does not concern

itself with trifles is not a defense to CERCLA

liability); United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F.Supp.

1205, 1207 (E.D.Pa.1989) (noting that, "as long as a

substance is on one or more of the lists identified at

42 U.S.C. § 9601(14), it is a hazardous substance

irrespective of the volume or concentration of the

substance found at the site in question"). In the

court’s view, there is no principled basis upon which

to deviate from the foregoing rule that the mere

listing of a substance by EPA renders that substance

hazardous. That various listed substances are

naturally found in the environment (i.e., in the normal

course of events) does not stand in the way of

imposing liability against a generator of that

substance--the corporate generator, a non-natural

person, has added to what nature has already seen fit

to provide for the continued existence of various life

forms on this planet; that Congress has enacted laws

to limit, and perhaps limit quite severely, additions to

nature »r the sake of the environment and of life on

this plaret seems eminently reasonable. Similarly,

there is simply nothing in the statute or the

regulat:: 1s which supports the view that a particular

substance is "hazardous" only if it is in a specific

chemical form, that is, in a form that makes the

substance water-soluble. Also, the compound

A - 58

containing a listed element found in the released

matter need not itself be specifically and separately

listed--such compounds are hazardous substances

under CERCLA by virtue of their inclusion, insofar as

is pertinent here, in the specifically listed generic or

broad class of elements and compounds designated

under section 307(a)(1) of the Clean Water Act:

“chromium and compounds," "copper and compounds,"

"lead and compounds," and "zinc and compounds" are

expressly so included in "the list of toxic pollutants

designated pursuant to section 307(a)(1) of the [Clean

Water] Act,” 40 C.F.R. § 401.15 (1990), thereby

rendering all of these elements and their compounds

"hazardous substances” under CERCLA; this list was

expressly made a_ part of the Table 302.4 List of

Hazardous Substances. That the generic or broad

class of hazardous elements and compounds does not

itself have a "Chemical Abstract Service Registry

Number" (CASRN) is immaterial inasmuch as that

number appears only for the convenience of the user.

See 40 C.F.R.§ 116.4. That the generic or broad class

of hazardous ¢!sments and compounds was not

assigned a fina’ {Q (Reportab‘:; Quantity), a quantity

of the hazardous substar:e ine release of which

requires notification, see 40 C.F.R. §§302.3, 302.5 and

302.6, although it has been assigned a statutory RQ,

is also immaterial inasmuch as a substance is deemed

hazardous presumably because of the unacceptable

risks it poses to human health and to the

environment. There is simply no requirement in the

statutory or regulatory scheme that an element or

compound have an RQ in order for it to be

"hazardous," and, in fact, the statutory scheme reveals

otherwise. The term “hazardous substance" includes

A - 59

any toxic pollutant listed under section 307(#.’ uf the

Clean Water Act, see 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14)(%), yet

these listed toxic pollutants do not have a fival RQ

(nor do they have : CASRN, for that matter)

The court notes in passing its disagreement with

the court in City of New York v. Exxon Corporition to

the extent that that court appears to have held, at

least preliminarily, that 40 C.F.R. § 302(b) and not

section 302(a) is appiicable to determining whether

Alcan’s waste oil emulsion or the specific compounds

in it are hazardous substances under CERCLA

because the waste oil emulsion and the specific

compounds found therein are not squarely listed in

Table 302.4. See 744 F.Supp. at 487-488. Suffice it to

say, first, that Alcan has conceded that its waste oil

emulsion contained cadmium, chromium, copper, lead

and zinc and, second, that these elements and all their

respective compounds are hazardous substances

under CERCLA by virtue of their designation as toxic

pollutants under the Clean Water Act which list was,

as has already been noted, included, pursuant to 42

U.S.C. § 9601(14)(B) and perhaps reduntantly so, in

the Table 302.4 List of Hazardous Substances and

Reportable Qantities; as such, the court need not

ever consider the pertinence of 40 C.F.R. § 302.4(b)

(and the regulations--40 C.F.R. §§ 261.2, .4(b) and

.20-.24--referenced therein) and therefore it is

unnecessary for the court to engage in any discussion

of ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity or EP (Extract

Procedures) toxicity to determine whether a

substance is to be deemded "hazardous."

The court also notes its disagreement with the

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court in Amoco Oil to the extent that that court has

seemingly read into the language of 42 U.S.C.§

9607(a)(4) the requirement *539 that, in order for a

release of a hazardous substance to have caused (and

justified) the incurrence of response costs, and hence

in order for there to be liability, the release violate

some applicable State or Federal standard imposing a

threshold quantity or concentration requirement. See

889 F.2d at 669-672. In essence, that court, while

recognizing that the "plain statutory language fails to

impose any quantitative requirement on the term

hazardous substance," id. at 669, has imposed such a

requirement on the imposition of liability in the

attempt to limit the scope thereof. Suffice it to say

that such an interpretation (which the Amoco

Oil court conceded necessitated the "ent[ry] of

unexplored territory," id. at 670) is not warranted by

the plain language of the statute and in fact appears

to conflict with that language. See United States v.

Western Processing Co., 734 F.Supp. at 936-937 and

941-942 (concluding that Amoco Oil should be confined

to its facts and implicitly calling that court’s reasoning

into doubt).

[7][8] As part of its effort to resist liability,

defendant also argues that the "petroleum exception"

to the term "hazardous substance" is applicable here.

The pertinent CERCLA provision, 42 U.S.C. §

9601(14) (defining "hazardous substance") (quoted

above), states that "[hazardous substance] does not

include petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction

thereof which is not otherwise specifically listed or

designated as a hazardous substance under

subparagraphs (A) through (F) of this paragraph..."

|

iB aera es.

2 ent ght peaageHmati

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Specifically, defendant argues that its emulsion

contains levels of metals designated as hazardous

substances well below that found in virgin oil and,

therefore, its "waste is clearly within the petroleum

exclusion." Defendant’s Memo of Law at 11.

Disposing of this argument need not detain the court

for long.

Suffice it to say that a plain reading of this

"exclusionary" provision does not warrant inclusion of

oil which has become contaminated with hazardous

substances through use; rather, what does come

within the ambit of the “petroleum exclusion" is the

oil or oil fraction which naturally contains the

hazardous substance(s) unless the fraction itself is

specifically listed or designated as a hazardous

substance. This interpretation of the “petroleum

exclusion" appears to be in line with the legislative

history, scant as it is, which indicates that the

"petroleum exclusion" is an exclusion from CERCLA

for “oil spills" themselves and not for releases of oil

which through use has become contaminated with

(hazardous) substances not naturally found in oil. See,

e.g., S.Rep. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 30-31 (1980);

126 Cong.Rec. H11787, H11790, H11792, H11793,

H11795, H11796, H11798 (daily ed. December 3,

1980); 126 Cong.Rec. S10578 (daily ed. August 1,

1980); id. at S10845 (daily ed. August 5, 1980); id. at

$14963, S14967, S14974, S14980 (daily ed. November

24, 1980).

Lastly, defendant advances two constitutional

challenges to imposition of liability: first, that the

statute is void for vagueness because it does not

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adequately define "hazardous substance"; second, that

the "selective" enforcement of CERCLA against it, the

government choosing not to name other, allegedly

more culpable entities--e.g., Cornell University--as

defendants, violates the principle of equal protection

of the laws.

[9][10] Neither challenge has merit. The void for

vagueness challenge fails because, in the court’s view,

the statute and regulations do not fail to give a person

of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is required

and forbidden. See Papachristou v. City of

Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162, 92 S.Ct. 839, 843, 31

L.Ed.2d 110 (1972); see also United States v. McElroy,

910 F.2d 1016, 1021 (2d Cir.1990) (observing that a

penal statute is not unconstitutionally vague if it

"define[s] the criminal offense with sufficient

definiteness that ordinary people can understand what

conduct is prohibited and that does not encourage

arbitrary and _ discriminatory enforcement.").

Moreover, it has been observed that "[t]he degree of

vagueness that the Constitution tolerates

‘depend[s] in part on the nature of the enactment[,]"

Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman

Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1193,

71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982), and that with respect to

"regulatory statutes governing business activities,

greater leeway is allowed," Papachristou, 405 U.S. at

165, 92 S.Ct. at 845. All the more is this so when

matters of public health and safety are concerned.

See West Virginia Manufacturers Ass’n v. State of

West Virginia, 714 F.2d 308, 314 (4th Cir.1983). To

withstand a void for vagueness challenge, it is

sufficient if the meaning of the statutory or regulatory

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language is discoverable from its context. See id. In

this regard, the court notes that a plain reading of the

statutory and regulatory scheme reveals that a

substance is hazardous if it has been listed, i.e., so

designated, by the EPA pursuant to authority granted

it by Congress.

[11] As for defendant’s other constitutional

challenge, putting aside the broad discretion the

government has regarding the exercise of its power to

prosecute, see Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598,

607-608, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 1530-1531, 84 L.Ed.2d 547

(1985), defendant has not established a prima facie

case of selective enforcement. Simply stated,

defendant has not shown that it has been singled out

for civil prosecution for an improper purpose. See

University Club v. City of New York, 655 F.Supp. 1323,

1328 (S.D.N.Y.1987), aff'd on other grounds, 842 F.2d

37 (2nd Cir.1988); see also United States v. Garth, 773

F.2d 1469, 1476 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 476 U.S. 1140,

106 S.Ct. 2246, 90 L.Ed.2d 693 (1986); United States v.

Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir.1974). The court

notes, in passing, that Alcan was one of 83 named

defendants.

In sum, the cadmium, chromium, copper, lead

and zine which defendant admits were in its emulsion

are hazardous substances under CERCLA--regardless

of the form in which these metals were present and

notwithstanding the very low levels of

concentration--by virtue of their designation as toxic

pollutants under the Clean Water Act and their

appearance on the Table 302.4 List of Hazardous

Substances. In the court’s view, the statutory

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language is clear, rendering resort to legislative

history, which in any way comports with the court’s

understanding of the statutory scheme, see S.Rep. No.

848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 24-27 (1980) ("[S]ubstances

listed as hazardous or toxic under certain other

Federal laws are incorporated by reference and upon

enactment of this bill such substances become

statutorily defined as hazardous substances for the

purposes of this bill. And the release of any of them

or any constituent of them invokes the ... response

provisions and any costs of removal or remedial action

or any damages are subject to the liability provision of

the bill."), entirely unnecessary, see United States v.

Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 167 n. 10. Needless to say the

court agrees with the overwhelming body of case law

that has confronted the issue presented here.

Hazardous substances, released by defendant,

were present at the PAS site, and the government

responded by cleaning up the site, see Declaration of

Raymond E. Lupe with RI/FS attached as exhibit

(establishing a nexus between defendant’s release of

the hazardous substances at the PAS site and the

government’s response thereto); defendant has not

established any of the limited statutory defenses and

its constitutional challenges are without merit.

Accordingly, plaintiffs are entitled to summary

judgment as to defendants’ liability. The court now

turns its attention to the matter of recovery of

response costs.

B. Recovery of incurred costs

Under section 9607(a), Alcan is liable for "all costs

of removal or remedial action incurred by the United

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States Government or a State ... not inconsistent with

the national contingency plan[.)" 42 US.C. §

9607(a)(4)(A); 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.1-300.71 (1989)

(national contingency plan) (promulgated pursuant to

42 U.S.C. § 9605). The burden lies with the

defendant to demonstrate that the costs incurred by

the respective governments were inconsistent with

the national contingency plan. See United States v.

Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., Inc.,

810 F.2d 726, 746 (8th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S.

848, 108 S.Ct. 146, 98 L.Ed.2d 102 (1987); City of

Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co., 713 F.Supp.

1484, 1486 (E.D.Pa.1989). In the present case,

plaintiffs seek to recover the difference between the

stipulated amount of costs incurred through April 1,

1987 ($12,319,551.04) and the amount already

recovered pursuant to the partial consent decree

($9,105,308.17) plus costs incurred since April 1, 1987

(some $710,635.17 by the United States and a net

figure of $124,174 by the State of New York).

Additionally, plaintiffs seek a declaration that Alcan is

liable to both plaintiffs for future response costs

associated with the PAS site and for prejudgment

interest.

[12] In view of the statutory provisions defining

the terms "remove" and "removal," see 42 U.S.C. §

9601(23), "remedy" and "remedial action," see id. §

9601(24), "respond" and "response," see id. § 9601(25),

remedial or removal action, for which the federal and

state governments are entitled to recover from the

party found liable, necessarily includes such activities

as (a) investigations, monitoring and testing to

identify the extent of danger to public health or

V1 Dare tomer te ap anya

]

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welfare or the environment, (b) investigations,

monitoring and testing to identify the extent of the

release of hazardous substances, and (c) planning and

implementation of a response action; also recoverable

are "indirect" costs associated with the foregoing and

with enforcement of the provisions of CERCLA,

including administrative costs incurred by the staffs of

the regulatory agencies involved and for the

Department of Justice. See United States v.

Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical Co., 579

F.Supp. 823, 850 (W.D.Mo.1984), aff'd in part and

rev'd in part on other grounds, 810 F.2d 726 (8th

Cir.1986); see also United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc.,

889 F.2d 1497, 1501-1504 (6th Cir.1989) (litigation and

administrative costs recoverable including a

proportionate share of indirect costs associated with

cleanup operations), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct.

1527, 108 L.Ed.2d 767 (1990); State of New York v.

Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at 1043 (response costs

include costs in assessing the conditions of the site);

United States v. Hardage, 733 F.Supp. 1424, 1431-1432

(W.D.Okla.1989); City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 633

F.Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (recoverable costs include

costs of collecting and analyzing ground water

samples, hydrogeological studies and remediation

study); State of New York v. General Electric Co., 592

F.Supp. 291, 298 (N.D.N.Y.1984); United States v.

Wade, 577 F.Supp. 1326, 1333 n. 4 (E.D.Pa.1983).

Defendant does not challenge the legality of any

of the costs plaintiffs seek to recover; that is,

defendant does not argue that the costs which

plaintiff seeks to recover are not within the scope of

the pertinent statutory provisions. And, ample

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documentation of the costs, direct and indirect,

in

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Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Alcan Aluminum Aluminum Corp., In Re: (No. 95-269) | Frix