Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Alcan Aluminum Aluminum Corp., In Re: (No. 95-269)
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95 +269 aus 15 199:
No. OEEICE OF IHE Gee
In the Supreme Court of the “'nited States
October Term, 1995
IN RE: ALCAN ALUMINUM CORPORATION
PETITION FOR WRIT OF MANDAMUS TO
THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT
LAWRENCE A. SALIBRA, I
Counsel of Record
JOHN C. TILLMAN
Alcan Aluminum Corporation
100 Erieview Plaza, 17th Floor
Cleveland, Ohio 44114
(216)253-6918
Attorneys for Petitioner
Alcan Aluminum Corporation
THE GATES LEGAL PUBLISHING CO. CLEVELAND, OHIO 216-621-5647
i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
Whether the United States Court of Appeal« “or the
Second Circuit usurped its non-discretionary &opellate
authority by denying Alcan Aluminum Corpwration's
Application for a Writ of Mandamus requesting the
appellate court to vac *te a remand order issued by the
Untied States District Court for the Northern District of
New York in direct contravention with the remand
instructions set forth in the Second Circuit's decision
entitled United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990
F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1997, and in a manner that has the
net affect of eliminating the notions of res judicat2 and
law of the case and creates an indefinite stream of
litigation designed to force capitulation of parties whose
actions did not cause or contribute to environmental
problems at a Superfund Site.
ii
RULE 29.1--STATEMENT
Petitioner, Alcan Aluminum Corporation, is a wholly-
owned subsidiary of Alcan Aluminium Limited, a
Canadian Company.
RULE 14.1.(b) STATEMENT
The parties to the proceedings before the United
States District Court for the Northern District of New
York and the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit include:
¢ The United States of America and the State of
New York, Plaintiffs
e Alcan Aluminum Corporation, Defendant/Third-
Party Plaintiff
e Cornell University, Third-Party Defendant
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
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RULE 14.1(b)--STATEMENT. ............sccccecccsceccsccess ii
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STATENS) GI TPE GAGE oovccccccccccccccaccveccccescece 3
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS ......ccccccccccsecccccccccees 4
A. Factual And Procedural History.................. 4
B. The Mandate Of The Second Circuit .......... 7
C. Post Remand Proceedings.................sssss+«: 8
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT OF
hs cir ica dic ddevecscenccsccennncosensecoeecs 14
A. Mandamus Is Appropriate To Review
Compliance With Non-Discretionary
Directives Set Forth In A Decision Of The
Ne IO 6 on ctimnnncmaticcevnndlpeopaddonegteye 14
B. The Remedy Of Mandamus Is Available To
Compel Compliance With The Mandate Of
The Second Circuit In A/can-PAS..............0.+ 14
C. The Procedural History Of This Case
Coupled With The Aj/can-PAS Decision
Mandates A Hearing On Divisibility Of Harm
And Apportionment Of Damages Relating
Solely To Below Background Metals............. 15
1. The Second Circuit Affirmed Liability
Based On Trace Metals And Ordered
A Narrow Remand Relating To The
Impact Of Metals, The Only Dispute
iv
Of Fact Precluding Summary
Judgment On The Divisibility Issue .......
2. This Case Was Decided On Cross-
Motions For Summary Judgment
Which Precludes The Lower Court
And Plaintiffs From Recharacterizing
The Alcan Emulsion..............cecceeeeees
3. The Decision Of The Second Circuit
Permits A Never-Ending Stream Of
Litigation Over The Same Essential
FORGED cnnrcvvesecssnsienscintvicdeboneseaianiniess
D. The District Courts' Procedure in
Handling The Alcan-Cornell Fair Share
Hearing Which Was Affirmed !n A/can-
PAS illustrates The Merit Of Alcan's
Petition For Mandamus .................sseeeeee:
E. Permitting The Introduction Of Additional
Evidence Places Alcan In A Worse
Position Than If The Lower Court Applied
The Correct Divisibility Standard In Its
Initial Memorandum-Decision And Order,
And The Second Circuit's Failure To
Correct The Lower Court Constitutes A
Failure To Follow Its Own Mandate ............
CONCEAL cccccccnccesesssccscevessnessrnaiaaussanmmdettins
APPENDIX:
Decision of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit, United States v. Alcan
Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1993) ...
Memorandum-Decision and Order of the United
States District Court for the Northern District
of New York, United States v. Alcan
Aluminum Corp., 755 F. Supp. 531
(N.DIEV. TRG TD cnccenscccsencsvecsctabscanss abaseen
Al
Vv
Order of the United States District Court,
Northern District of New York (September
9: BOD foc ited Kagivcvecdetteddaastsecsecscecseccceccsens
Order of the United States District Court,
Northern District of New York (December 28,
TO ah auen sands eusousnnnnoceoeee
Order of the United States Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit (May 17, 1995)..........++-++.
Summary of Plaintiff The United States of
America's discovery taken in connection with
United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp. et al,
United States District Court, Civil Action No.
87-CV-920 (Pollution Abatement Services)......
ws
s
'
a i
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES
Bankers Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland,
Bie Me e, Ft > SR ee ee eee 14
Bucolo v. Adkins, 424 U.S. 641 (1976) ...........006 14
City of Cleveland v. FPC,
561: F:26 at SE4 DG. Gees TOF) cvccvtdvccccncversscsts 16
Deen v. Hickman, 358 U.S. 57 (1968)...............6. 14
In Re: PCH Associates, 949 F.2d 585
C20E CW: TERED caccsccasicn teaiotinxecsdbleckotitbocnsedaanasraiaae 24
In Re: United States Steel Corp.,
479 F.2d 489 (6th Cir. 1973)................ dansewadiiies 16
Kerr.v. United States District Court for the Northern
District of California, 426 U.S. 394 (1976)........... 15
Munro v. Post, 102 F.2d 686 (2d Cir. 1939) ........ 16
Roche v. Evaporated Milk Assn.,
STS U.S. ZU TIS) ci cccncsisiessedssnavecsiniabtetenenl 14
Sea-Land Services, Inc., 414 U.S. 573 (1974)...... 24
S/otkin v. Citizens' Casualty Co.,
GES F.20 154.626 CW, TRS cvceseiecccssccciveavovavtens 7,28
United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp.,
755 F. Supp. 531 (N.D.N.Y. 1991).....ccccccccscesees 1,3,6,12
United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp.,
SO4 F228 BSS COS Cel. THe) ccscccnnsivedhecavessuseccses 8,13
United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp.,
O00 Fi 2e Fst 606 Cie. Fe vccassindlelcancovissstuns passim
United States v. E.!. DuPont deNumours & Co.,
366 U.S. 316 (1961) .........reccereceersccrressecrssreeeere 15
United States v. Lasker, 481 F.2d 229
E26 GW. FET? ocnccivccadcccocschecesesdiaaiiamabakeeaan 18
vii
United States v. Uccio, 940 F.2d 753
CBeh CH, SEI vcecccnccecveevoncsatsnenscevssescosccoecccccecees 18
Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90 (1967)........... 14,18
STATUTES AND OTHER AUTHORITY
2B U.S.C. STSOU(D) «2... cccccccccccccscsccccsccccscccscvcscvens 2
28 U.S.C. $1 GB 1a) ...crccvcccccccccocsrcccocecccceseoes 2,13,14
MB AFD GEE nsnceccscsccscsccsvessctcvtvetvercectesscecers 2,4
42 U.S.C. SOS TSO) . nose ccccscscccccccccccccccccccsseccceeses 2
Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure, Rule 21(a)... 2
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Rule 56(e) ........ 21,23
Rules of the Supreme Court of the
Lieriteds Seetes, NG ZO ... oc cscecccosececccecsccccscoccevsvess 2,138
OPINIONS BELOW
On April 6, 1993, the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit issued its decision granting, in
part, and reversing, in part, a Memorandum-Decision and
Order of the United States District Court for the Northern
District of New York. United States v. Alcan Aluminum
Corp., 990 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1993).' The decision of
the Second Circuit is reprinted in the Appendix at A1-40.
Thereafter, on September 10, 1994, the District
Court issued an Order concerning the scope of remand
which became effective on September 12, 1994 and is
reprinted in the Appendix at A78-82. The District Court
denied Alcan Aluminum Corporation's Motion for
Reconsideration by Order dated December 24, 1994, and
entered on December 28, 1994; reprinted in the
Appendix at A83-87.
Alcan Aluminum Corporation filed an Application for
Writ of Mandamus in the United States Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit, which was denied by Order dated
May 17, 1995, and is reprinted in the Appendix at A88.
‘The United States District Court for the Northern District of New
York's Memorandum-Decision and Order is entitied United States v.
Alcan Aluminum Corp., 755 F. Supp. 531 (N.D.N.Y. 1991) and is
reprinted in the Appendix at A41-77. The action, Case No. 87-CV-
920, is pending before the Honorable Thomas J. McAvoy, Chief
Judge, and has been consolidated with Case No. 91-CV-1132.
2
JURISDICTION
Subject matter jurisdiction in the United States
District Court for the Northern District of New York was
predicated or 28 U.S.C. 81391(b) and 42 U.S.C.
§9613(b).
Petitioner Alcan Aluminum Corporation timely filed an
Application for Writ of Mandamus with the United States
Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit pursuant to 28
U.S.C. §1651(a) and Rule 21(a) of the Federal Rules of
Appellate Procedure. The Court of Appeals denied the
Application by Order dated May 17, 1995.
The jurisdiction of the Supreme Court of the United
States is invoked pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1651(a) and in
accordance with Rule 20 of the Rules of the Supreme
Court of the United States.
Title 28, §1651(a) of the United States Code
provides:
The Supreme Court and all other courts established
by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or
appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdiction and
applicable to the usages and principles of law.
28 U.S.C. §1651(a) (West Publishing Co. 1995).
THE STATUE INVOLVED
Title 28, §1651(a) of the United States Code:
The Supreme Court and all other courts established
by Act of Congress may issue all writs necessary or
appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdiction and
applicable to the usages and principles of law.
28 U.S.C. §1651(a) (West Publishing Co. 1995).
3
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This case was filed by the United States and the
State of New York against Petitioner, Aican Aluminum
Corporation ("Alcan") under 8107 of the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act,
42 U.S.C. 89607 ("CERCLA"). Plaintiffs seek to hold
Alcan jointly and severally liable for costs stemming from
Alcan's disposal of a water-oil emulsion at the Pollution
Abatement Services ("PAS") in Oswego, New York.
The United States District Court for the Northern
District of New York issued a Memorandum-Decision and
Order holding Alcan jointly and severally liable for all
unreimbursed response costs incurred by plaintiffs.
United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 755 F. Supp.
531 (N.D.N.Y. 1991) (A41-77) Following a_ timely
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit reversed, in part, and granted, in part, the
lower court's decision, and held that the lower court
erred in failing to afford Alcan the opportunity to
demonstrate that the environmental harm to the PAS site
was divisible and capable of reasonable apportionment.
United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 990 F.2d 711,
721-23 (2d Cir. 1993) (A1-40) (hereinafter "A/can-
PAS"). The lower court's judgment was reversed and the
case remanded based on “differing contentions
supported by expert affidavits” concerning § the
environmental impact of the below background metal
constituents in the emulsion that subjected Alcan to
CERCLA liability. A/can-PAS, 990 F.2d at 722-23.
On September 10, 1994 the District Court issued an
Order in direct contravention to the remand instructions set
forth in Alcan-PAS (A78-82) (hereinafter "Remand Order”).
The Second Circuit mandate expressly directed the lower
court to hold a divisibility hearing and apportion damages
relating to the environmental impact of trace metal
constituents. The Remand Order, however, permits
4
plaintiffs’ to introduce additional evidence at the remand
hearing and to relitigate the liability phase of this case
which previously determined the nature of the Alcan
emulsion. The District Court denied Alcan's Motion for
Reconsideration on December 28, 1994. (A®2-87)
The result of the Remand Order was that the Second
Circuit's mandate was ignored and will go unenforced
since the lower court refused to confine the scope of the
remand hearing to the terms of the mandate, amounting
to an usurpation of appellate authority. Accordingly,
Alcan filed an Application for Writ of Mandamus in the
Second Circuit to vacate the Remand Order and to
compel compliance with the A/can-PAS Mandate. The
Writ was denied by the Second Circuit on May 17, 1995
without written decision. (A88)
Alcan respectfully requests that this Honorable Court
issue a Writ of Mandamus to the United States Court of
Appeals for the Second Circuit? to correct the lower
courts’ mistake in construction and misapplication of the
Alcan-PAS mandate, and to compel the Second Circuit to
comply with and enforce its mandate. The relief sought
in this Petition is not available in any court other than the
Supreme Court of the United States since the Second
Circuit declined to correct the misconstruction and
misapplication of the A/can-PAS mandate by denying
Alcan's Application for Writ of Mandamus. (A88)
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A. Factual And Procedural History
This is an action under 8107 the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act,
42 U.S.C. 89607 (“CERCLA”), filed by the United States
?The Second Circuit's May 17, 1995 Order was issued by the
Honorable Jon O. Newman, Chief Judge, the Honorable Richard J.
Cardamone, and the Honorable J. Daniel Mahoney. (A88)
5
and the State of New York (hereinafter "plaintiffs" or
"the government") against Alcan seeking the imposition
of joint a several liability for the disposal of a water-oil
emulsion at the Pollution Abatement Services site
(“PAS”) in Oswego, New York. Both parties to this
case completed discovery in the lower court and cross-
moved for summary judgment:
After discovery had been completed, the government
moved for summary judgment against Alcan
contending that Alcan’s disposal of hazardous
substances at PAS had been conceded. Alcan cross-
moved for summary judgment against the United
States and New York State, asserting principally that
CERCLA’s definition of “hazardous substances”
requires a minitnum concentration level of specific
compounds and that under the statute causation
needed to be demonstrated. Alcan also asserted that
the harm caused by its waste was divisible and that
the government claim improperly subjected it to joint
and several liability.
Alcan-PAS, 990 F.2d 711, 717.
The government moved for summary judgment on the
grounds that the Alcan emulsion was a “hazardous
substance” as defined by CERCLA based only on
detectable amounts of below background metals, and
that joint and several liability could therefore be imposed
on Alcan. The characterization of the emulsion as
containing trace levels of metal compounds was based
on nearly ten years of discovery, both administrative and
* The facts of this case are set forth in detail in the January 15, 1991
Memorandum-Decision and Order, United States v. Alcan Aluminum
Corp., 755 F.Supp. 531 (N.D.N.Y 1991) (hereafter “A/can") (A41-77),
and in A/can-PAS, 990 F.2d 711 {A1-40). Accordingly, only the facts
pertinent to this Petition will be recited herein.
6
judicial, in no less than three CERCLA actions against
Alcan.
Alcan disputed liability and cross-moved for summary
judgment arguing, inter alia, that below background
metals could not be “hazardous substances” under
CERCLA since they are ubiquitous in the environment,
and to deem them hazardous would render everything in
the universe a hazardous substance under the statute.
Alcan also argued that, even if trace metals were a
CERCLA hazardous substance, they could cause no harm
to the environment. Accordingly, Alcan argued that
causation had to be an element of liability under the
statute. /d. at 716-17. Finally, Alcan argued that, if the
metal compounds rendered the emulsion a hazardous
substance, it could not be held jointly and severally liable,
or liable at all, since the environmental problems at the
PAS site were caused by PCB’s and other constituents
that were not in the emulsion:
Alcan declares that the response actions at PAS were
attributable to substances such as PCB’s, nitro
benzene, phenol, dichlonoethone, toluene, and
benzene. It contends that no soil contamination due
to heavy metals was found there, and insists that the
metallic constituents of its oil emulsion are insoluble
compounds, submitting an affidavit supporting this
theory of divisibility.
id. at 722.
The government did not contest the fact that the oil
emulsion contained only below background metals and
never raised the possibility that the emulsion may contain
other hazardous substances. See, generally, Alcan-PAS.
The government did, however, place in dispute the issue
of whether the below background metals could have
caused or contributed to environmental harm at the Site:
7
The government submitted a declaration stating that
metal contaminants like those found in Alcan’s waste
emulsion were present in environmental media at
PAS, that the commingling of metallic and organic
hazardous substances resulted in indivisible harm, and
that though some forms of lead, cadmium and
chromium are insoluble, they may chemically react
with other substances and become water soluble.
Id. at 722.
The lower court granted the government’s summary
judgment motion and denied Alcan’s cross-motion.
Alcan, 755 F. Supp. at 537-39. The lower court rejected
Alcan’s causation and divisibility arguments and held
Alcan liable for all unreimbursed response costs incurred
by plaintiffs. /d. at 541-42.
B. The Mandate Of The Second Circuit
Alcan appealed the lower court’s ruling to the Second
Circuit Court of Appeals. On April 6, 1993, the Second
Circuit issued its decision affirming, in part, and
reversing, in part, the lower court’s ruling. A/can-PAS,
990 F.2d at 725. The Second Circuit affirmed liability
against Alcan, but based on the nature of the Alcan
emulsion, reversed the lower court’s imposition of joint
and severable liability and ordered the lower court to
conduct a divisibility hearing to assess the environmental
impact, if any, of trace metals. /d. at 722. The Second
Circuit expressly recognized that causation was a
required element of CERCLA for purposes. of
apportionment, and that Alcan was entitled to show that
the harm, if any, from trace metals was divisible and
capable of reasonable apportionment. /d. at 722.
The only evidence, according to the Second Circuit,
that precluded the entry of summary judgment on the
divisibility issue was the governments’ expert affidavit
implying that below background metals could cause
8
harm. /d. at 722-23. Based on that disputed fact, the
Second Circuit remanded this case to the district court
for resolution of the dispute as to the impact of metals,
since that issue alone precluded the grant of summary
judgment on the divisibility issue:
These differing contentions supported by expert
affidavits raise sufficient questions of fact to preclude
the granting of summary judgment on the divisibility
issue.
/d. Thus, on remand, the only dispute of fact remaining
to be resolved by the district court related to the
environmental impact of metals.
C. Post Remand Proceedings
After the Second Circuit issued its decision in A/can-
PAS, the lower court invited all parties to submit briefs
regarding the proper scope of remand mandated by the
Second Circuit.
Realizing that there was virtually no prospect that the
government could rebut the fact that below background
metals could not create an environmental problem, it
became imperative for the government to recharacterize the
Alcan emulsion, notwithstanding the fact that the Second
Circuit, as well as the Third Circuit in United States v. A/can
Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d 252 (3d Cir. 1992) (hereinafter
"Alcan-Butler”), remanded to the district court for the
explicit purpose of resolving those issues raised with
respect to trace metals. Accordingly, the government
requested the lower court to re-open discovery so it may
develop and present new evidence on new materials, and
alleviate the need for the divisibility hearing to which the
Second Circuit held Alcan was entitled.
Alcan argued that the governments’ request would
violate directly the A/can-PAS mandate, and would
undermine the authority of the Second Circuit. Alcan
a as
9
referred to the fact that the Second Circuit reversed the
district court’s holding that Alcan did not have the right
to demonstrate that background metals could not cause
or contribute to remedial costs at PAS.
Alcan also asserted that the law of the case doctrine
and res judicata principles precluded the district court
from revisiting the nature of Alcan’s emulsion, since to
do so would ignore the existence and legal effect of
Alcan’s cross-motion for summary judgment. Further,
Alcan pointed out that, in A/can-PAS, the Second Circuit
essentially mandated a damages remand similar to a
bifurcated case where the determination on liability was
completed and a second hearing was necessary for
apportionment of damages based on the liability as
established. A/can-PAS, 990 F.2d at 720.
The district court, refusing to acknowledge the fact
that Alcan filed a cross-motion and that its ruling with
respect to divisibility was reversed, characterized the
remand issues as follows:
The threshold question before the court is whether
evidence of the presence of additional pollutants in
Alcan’s wastestream, beyond the undisputed
background metals contained therein, is barred from
the apportionment divisibility hearing by the law of
the case doctrine. Specifically, this Court must
determine whether the Second Circuit’s affirmation of
the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the
issue of liability based on the presence of certain
metals’ in Alcan’s waste constitutes a finding that
the waste did not contain other hazardous
substances.
Alcan argues that it is not appropriate for the
plaintiffs to introduce further evidence as to the
character of ALCAN’s waste for two reasons. First,
the legal doctrine of the law of the case precludes
10
revisiting the issue of whether ALCAN’s waste
contained pollutants other than the below-background
level metals upon which the district court established
liability. Second, additional evidence should be
disallowed based upon the doctrine of res judicata.
The Court will address these arguments seriatim.
(Emphasis added.)
September 10, 1994 Remand Order. (A79-80)
On September 10, 1994, the Honorable Judge Thomas
J. McAvoy issued the Remand Order permitting the
“introduction of additional evidence regarding the issue of
whether Alcan’s waste stream contained PCBs, VOCs, or
other materials.” (Remand Order, A-81} The Remand
Order, in essence, adopted the government’s argument that
Alcan-PAS did not determine that the Alcan emulsion “did
not contain other hazardous substances,” and that the
government “only went as far as necessary to establish
liability on summary judgment.” (Remand Order, A-80)*
Alcan’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied by Order
dated December 24, 1994. (A83-87)
By virtue of the Remand Order issued by Judge
McAvoy, the government was now permitted to relitigate
the liability phase of this case which previously
determined the nature of the emulsion in an attempt to
impose response costs on Alcan based on separate and
distinct grounds never raised or preserved at the
summary judgment stage.
Accordingly, Alcan filed an application for Writ of
Mandamus with the Second Circuit requesting the
appellate court to compel the lower court to comply with
“The government’s assertion that, following years of discovery that
included testing and sampling of Aican’s emulsion, they decided to move
for summary judgment based on trace metals and ignore potential PCBs is
implausible and contrary to their position in A/can-Butler.
11
the directions of the April 6, 1993 mandate. The
Application was denied by Order dated May 17, 1995,
without written decision. (A88) Thus, the A/can-PAS
mandate continues to be ignored and _ remains
unenforced. The lower court refused to confine the
scope of the remand hearing to the terms of the A/can-
PAS mandate, and the Second Circuit failed to compel
the lower court to confine the scope of remand to the
terms of the mandate. This amounts to an usurpation of
appellate authority and Mandamus should issue to
correct the misconception of the scope and effect of the
appellate mandate, and to prevent relitigation of issues
already decided.
The Remand Order as unrestricted by the Second
Circuit fails to recognize that the remand was not based
on the affirmance of the lower court’s grant of summary
judgment on the liability issue, but instead, related to the
district court’s conclusion on divisibility. The lower
court’s findings on the divisibility issue were expressly
reversed. A/can-PAS, 990 F.2d at 721-23. The remand
stemmed only from a dispute of fact between Alcan’s
experts and those of the government as to the impact of
the below background metals as_ prerequisite to
determining whether Alcan’s motion for summary
judgment should be granted. /d. at 722-23.
The appellate court failed to give full effect to the
April 6, 1993 mandate by ignoring the fundamental
holding of Alcan-PAS, by ignoring the existence of
Alcan’s cross-motion, and by _ recharacterizing the
mandate as merely affirming the lower court's
Memorandum-Decision and Order. The Second Circuit
failed to correct this mistake and misapplication of the
Alcan-PAS mandate.
Confirmation that the remand hearing mandated by
the Second Circuit was intended to involve exclusively
the impact of metals is illustrated in the Third Circuit’s
12
decision in A/can-Butler explicitly adopted by the Second
Circuit:
[W]e think the tension may be resolved by aliowing a
responsible party, like Alcan, to pay nothing if it can
demonstrate that its pollutants, when mixed with
other hazardous wastes, did not contribute to the
release or the resulting response costs. In this respect
we essentially adopt the Third Circuit’s reasoning in
[A/can-Butler| . . . This approach is not intended to
provide an escape hatch for CERCLA defendant’s
rather, it will permit such a defendant to avoid liability
only when its pollutants contribute no more than
background contamination.
Alcan-PAS at 722. A review of the Third Circuit's
reasoning in A/can-Butler confirms that the mandated
divisibility hearing was to relate exclusively to the impact
of background metals:
Alcan maintains that there is no need for a hearing
because, not only is the harm divisible, but its relative
contribution to the injury to the Susquehanna River is
zero. According to Alcan “{[iJt is technically impossible to
have a release or threatened release such that a clean-
up would be authorized or justified under the National
Contingency Plan as a result of the addition of metal
compounds in the Alcan emulsion to the Butler Site.
When one adds two materials that have the same
concentrations of an element or compound, the net
result ig the same concentration. It can never result in a
higher concentration.”
Alcan-Butler, 964 F.2d at 269-70 (citations omitted).
The Third Circuit further noted that because the district
court believed that the lower court’s opinion in this case,
United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 755 F. Supp.
531 (N.D.N.Y. 1991) was dispositive, it “did not
specifically address this issue,” and since it noted “it is
13
not the proper forum to consider Alcan’s argument,” it
returned the case to the district court and specifically
directed it to “re-evaluate Alcan’s contention in light of
the facts developed in the hearing on this issue.” A/can-
Butler, 964 F.2d at 270 (emphasis added).
Moreover, the Second Circuit's refusal to enforce its
mandate exposes Alcan to an unending stream of
litigation in which the government can attempt to impose
liability upon Alcan for its emulsion element by element
and compound by compound. The exceptional
circumstances of this case, coupled with the fact that
adequate relief cannot be obtained in any other court,
warrant the exercise of this Court's discretionary powers
in accordance with 28 U.S.C. §1651(a) and Rule 20 of
the Rules of the Supreme Court of the United States. On
this basis, Alcan applies for a Writ of Mandamus.
i
14
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE WRIT OF MANDAMUS
A. Mandamus Is Appropriate To Review Compliance With
Non-Discretionary Directives Set Forth in A Decision Of
The Court Of Appeals
Title 28, §1651(a) of the United States Code
provides:
(a) The Supreme Court and all other courts
established by Act of Congress may issue all
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their
respective jurisdiction and agreeable to the
usages and principles of law.
(West Publishing Co. 1995)
The remedy of mandamus will lie to confine an inferior court
to a lawful exercise of its prescribed jurisdiction or to
compel it to exercise its authority when it is its duty to do
so. Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95 (1967); Bankers
Life & Cas. Co. v. Holland, 346 U.S. 379, 382 (1953);
Roche v. Evaporated Milk Assn., 319 U.S. 21, 26 (1943).
Mere error is not sufficient to invoke the mandamus
process. Wi//, 389 U.S. at 95. The application must
assert an action of the lower court by which it acted
beyond its inherent power. /d.
B. The Remedy Of Mandamus is Available To Compel
Compliance With The Mandate Of The Second Circuit In
Alcan-PAS
In this case, Alcan seeks mandamus requesting this
Honorable Court to review the lower court’s non-compliance
with the remand instructions of A/can-PAS. The United
States Supreme Court has recognized that a court of
appeals has the power to enforce its mandate, and that
mandamus is an appropriate remedy to enforce the
provisions of a previous judgment of an appellate court.
Bucclo v. Adkins, 424 U.S. 641 (1976) (per curium); Deen
15
v. Hickman, 358 U.S. 57 (1968) (per curium). In fact, the
Supreme Court has expressly noted that mandamus is
appropriate to “confine a lower court to the terms of an
appellate tribunal’s mandate.” Wil/, 389 U.S. at 95-96. See
also United States v. E./. DuPont deNumours & Co., 366
U.S. 316 (1961).
in Kerr v. United States District Court for the Northern
District of California, 426 U.S. 394 (1976), the Supreme
Court considered an application for writ of mandamus in a
case analogous to this matter. The petitioners in Kerr filed a
mandamus action in the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
requesting the appellate court to vacate an interlocutory
discovery order issued by the district court. The court of
appeals denied mandamus without opinion. /d. at Syllabus.
Petitioners then sought mandamus in the Supreme Court.
Although this Court denied mandamus, it considered
the orders of the district and appellate courts, and held
that “adequate alternatives to mandamus existed":
The Court of Appeals’ opinion did not foreclose in
camera review, but apparently left open the
opportunity for petitions through responsible officials
to assert the privilege more specifically and have their
request for in camera review considered. They thus
have an avenue far short of mandamus to achieve the
relief they seek... .
/d. at Syllabus (b).
In this case, mandamus is appropriate since Alcan's
Application for Writ of Mandamus was previously denied
by the Second Circuit, leaving no avenue to achieve the
requested relief--compliance with the A/can-PAS
mandate. The impact of the Second Circuit's Order is to
force Alcan into protracted and duplicative litigation with
no alternative other than mandamus.
C. The Procedural History Of This Case Coupled With The
16
Alcan-PAS Decision Mandates A Hearing On Divisibility
Of Harm And Apportionment Of Damages Relating
Solely To Below Background Metals
1. The Second Circuit Affirmed Liability Based On
Trace Metals And Ordered A Narrow Remand
Relating To The impact Of Metals, The Only Dispute
Of Fact Precluding Summary Judgment On The
Divisibility Issue
The primary issue presented to the Second Circuit in
Alcan-PAS was whether the emulsion as characterized in
the record on appeal, having been established as a
matter of undisputed fact by cross-motions of the
parties, subjected Alcan to joint and several liability
under CERCLA. Having accepted the nature and
characterization of the “hazardous substances” in the
emulsion, the Second Circuit expressly held that the
lower court erred by failing to provide Alcan the
opportunity to establish divisibility of harm based on
below background metal compounds. A/can-PAS, 990
F.2d at 722. That holding, based exclusively on metals,
becomes the law of the case which must be followed on
remand. City of Cleveland v. FPC, 561 F.2d at 344, 348
(D.C. Cir. 1977); In Re: United States Steel Corp., 479
F.2d 489, 493-94 (6th Cir. 1973). The law of the case
doctrine, when used to express the duty of a lower court
to follow what has been decided by an appellate court,
“applies to everything decided, either expressly or by
necessary implication.” Munro v. Post, 102 F.2d 686,
688 (2d Cir. 1939).
The rationale underlying remand of the case to the
district court involved the fact that the Second Circuit
recognized that Alcan was not entitled to summary
judgment on its cross-motion because a dispute of fact
existed concerning the impact of the metals. A/can-PAS,
990 F.2d at 722-23. The Second Circuit apparently
treated the case as though an express bifurcation had
17
occurred separating the case into two parts--liability and
damages. The Court reasoned that the liability inquiry
had been concluded, and that liability was properly
established on the basis of below background metals. /d.
at 717-21. However, the Second Circuit held that the
district court erred in not holding an apportionment
hearing on the response costs, if any, related to the
metals.” /d. at 722-23.
in so holding, the Second Circuit affirmed liability
based on metals, but ordered a remand hearing to permit
Aican to demonstrate that below background metals did
not cause or contribute to environmental harm. /d. The
key element of the reversal was based on affidavits
submitted by Alcan asserting that trace metal
compounds could not cause environmental harm or
response costs. The A/can-PAS decision concluded that
Alcan was not entitled to summary judgment on the
divisibility issue based on an affidavit submitted by the
government raising an issue relating only to harm
associated with metal compounds. /d. The Remand Order
ignored the mandate of the Second Circuit under the
mistaken assumption that its Memorandum-Decision and
Order was affirmed in total. The Second Circuit refused
to correct this oversight.
The lower court, under the Second Circuit's May 17,
1995 Order, is now permitted to relitigate the issues of
undisputed fact established by the cross-motions and
affirmed by the appellate court. The Remand Order permits
plaintiffs and the lower courts to undo that which the
Second Circuit had previously decided and, in fact, had to
decide in order to find Aican liable, leaving the A/can-PAS
® This inescapable conclusion is further supported by the fact that the
lower court as well as the Second Circuit expressly recognized that
discovery was completed, and that final resolution of the case was
proper. A/can, 777 F.Supp. at 534; A/can-PAS, 990 F.2d at 717.
18
mandate unenforced. Permitting remand under the Second
Circuit decision will render the A/can-PAS mandate void,
contrary to the firmly-established hierarchy within the
judicial system and contrary to the doctrine of law of the
case. Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 95-96 (1967);
United States v. Lasker, 481 F.2d 229, 235 (2d Cir. 1973);
United States v. Uccio, 940 F.2d 753, 758 (2d Cir. 1992).
The decision of the Second Circuit also allows
relitigation of issues previously decided and permits the
lower court to re-decide issues already decided and affirmed
in Alcan-PAS. For example, the lower court granted
judgment in favor of Alcan and against third-party defendant
Cornell University (hereinafter "Cornell"), and ordered a
hearing to determine the fair share amount of Cornell’s
liability. A/can, 755 F. Supp. 545. Judge McAvoy made
certain findings at the fair share hearing, and noted that:
indeed, the real dispute between the parties was not
whose waste was more toxic, but rather whose
waste was less non-toxic. Cornell contends that this
is a relevant factor to be examined by the Court.
December 27, 1991 Memorandum-Decision and Order, p. 7.
The preciusive nature of this issue was predicated on
the basis that, as the district court found, the on/y issue
of toxicity was the express finding:
{[T]hat neither the [Alcan] waste emulsion nor the
[Cornell] coal pile leachate contained metals in any
greater concentration than the soil itself.
December 27, 1991 Memorandum-Decision and Order at
11. The allocation based on that reasoning and those
express findings was affirmed by the Second Circuit in
Alcan-PAS, 990 F.2d at 723-25.
The Remand Order as affirmed by the appellate court
ignores the entire logic and fact finding of the fair share
hearing and allocation scheme. The government now
a a a A al
2 BOM NDIA A AE Soa We act ste a
19
proposes to change the nature of the Aican emulsion
which was the basis for the allocation, by both adding
new substances and claiming that the metal
concentrations were higher. Under the orders of the
lower court, Cornell would be entitled to a new allocation
based on this new material. Accordingly, Alcan would
then be entitled to reopen discovery, as the lower courts
permitted the government, in another attempt to
recharacterize the Cornell waste. The Second Circuit’s
affirmation of the allocation formula in A/can-PAS would
be rendered meaningless under such circumstances.
2. This Case Was Decided On Cross-Motions For
Summary Judgment Which Precludes The Lower
Court And Plaintiffs From Re-Characterizing The
Aican Emulsion
Alcan's liability for response costs in this case was
decided initially on cross-motions for summary judgment.
Alcan, 775 F. Supp. at 534; Alcan-PAS, 990 F.2d at 717.
Plaintiffs were therefore required, in response to Alcan’s
cross-motion, to identify the hazardous constituents of the
emulsion upon which CERCLA liability and response costs
could attach. The on/y hazardous substances identified by
plaintiffs were metal compounds. Plaintiffs never raised the
possibility of other hazardous constituents despite ample
opportunity to do so, and are precluded from doing so now.
A review of the discovery conducted in this case
illustrates that plaintiffs undertook extensive testing
relating directly to the nature and constituents of the
emulsion. In May, 1989, U.S. EPA representatives took
and analyzed numerous samples of the emulsion from
Alcan’s Rolled Products facility in Oswego, New York.
(Documented in Plaintiffs’ Memorandum in Support of
Motion of United States for Summary Judgment, pp. 12-
18 and fn. 8; and Declaration of Kate Donnelly and David
Dobb attached thereto ) Based on the emulsion sample
analysis, the EPA prepared a comprehensive document
20
entitled “Report and Data Presentation, Alcan Aluminum
Corporation, Scribia, New York, Sampling of Process
Waste Stream.” The objective of the report, according
to the EPA, was “to determine whether the oil emulsion
used in Alcan’s aluminum rolling process is hazardous per
either RCRA or CERCLA, and to assist EPA and the
Department of Justice in their current litigation against
Alcan.” /d.
The Report demonstrates that the EPA intensely
investigated the possibility of other hazardous
substances added to the emulsion, including volatile
organic carbons (“VOCs”), and were unable to establish
that any organics were added to the virgin oil° phase of
the emulsion. In fact, the Report concluded that “the
highest level of [organic] halides are found in the ‘virgin
oil’ before it is diluted and developed into an emulsion. .
ale
The government similarly investigated the presence of
PCBs in the emulsion. Extensive discovery relating to the
nature and constituents of the emulsion as well as the
existence of PCBs was conducted by the government.
This discovery included depositions of eight (8) Alcan
employees, ten (10) laboratory personnel from six (6)
independent testing laboratories, and depositions of
Alcan product suppliers.’
lf the government had probative evidence demonstrating
that VOCs or PCBs were added to the emulsion, it naturally
follows that they would have moved for summary judgment
®CERCLA expressly excludes “petroleum, including crude oil or any
fraction thereof” from its definition of hazardous substance. 42 U.S.C.
§9601(14).
” See Summary of the government's discovery in A/can-PAS relating to
the nature and constituents of Alcan’s rolling oil emulsion and PCB
contamination, submitted to the lower court on December 17, 1993,
reprinted in the Appendix at A89-98.
21
based on that evidence or they-would have introduced such
evidence in response to Alcan’s cross-motion.® They did
not. Rather, following nearly a decade of discovery relating
to the emulsion, plaintiffs moved to impose liability on Alcan
based on trace metallic constituents and not on the basis of
any other alleged “hazardous substance.” The evidence
plaintiffs are now permitted to introduce at the divisibility
hearing was available and, in fact, in their possession, yet
they moved for summary judgment on metals. Thus,
because liability was established based on metals, a hearing
on the impact of metals is all that the government is entitled
to under A/can-PAS.
Moreover, the issue of other hazardous constituents
in the emulsion was never raised by plaintiffs even in
response to Alcan’s assertions that the response actions
at the PAS site were attributable to PCBs and other
organic materials. A/can-PAS, 990 F.2d at 722. For
plaintiffs to now claim and be permitted to show that the
emulsion contained hazardous substances in addition to
the metals is disingenuous.
Nowhere in the record before the lower courts is
there any indication that other hazardous substances
were at issue. The A/can-PAS decision reflects that the
case was remanded for one reason and one reason only--
for a hearing as to whether any response costs are
attributable to trace metals. Pursuant to Rule 56(e) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a party responding to a
summary judgment motion must assert specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial or the
motion will be granted:
® The government, in Alcan’s view, did not raise these other materials as a
basis for liability (why try this case on below background metals rather
than PCBs) because the evidence did not support the claim and,
accordingly, they would have been unsuccessful against Alcan’s cross-
motion.
22
When a motion for summary judgment is made... . an
adverse party may not rest upon the mere allegations or
denials of the adverse party's pleading, but the adverse
party's response .. . must set forth specific facts
showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. If the
adverse party does not so respond, summary judgment,
if appropriate, shall be entered against the adverse
party.
F.R.C.P. 56(e). Here, plaintiffs only basis for establishing
that the emulsion was hazardous and for imposing liability
on Alcan was the presence of below background metal
compounds. Plaintiffs failed to raise the possibility of other
hazardous substances in the rolling oil emulsion in response
to Alcan's cross-motion despite years of discovery. In failing
to raise other grounds entitling it to judgment or in response
to Alcan’s cross-motions, plaintiffs waived the opportunity
to pursue liability and impose response costs on Alcan
based on those grounds.
In fact, absent affidavits from the government
relating to environmental harm at the PAS site potentially
associated with metals, the Second Circuit noted that it
would have granted Alcan's cross-motion:
[Alcan] contends that no soil contamination due to
heavy metals was found there, and insists that the
metallic constituents of its oil emulsion are insoluble
compounds, submitting an affidavit supporting this
theory of divisibility. The government submitted a
declaration stating that metal contaminants like those
found in Alcan's waste emulsion were present in
environmental media at PAS, that the commingling of
metallic and organic hazardous substances resulted in
indivisible harm, and that though some forms of lead,
cadmium and chromium are insoluble, they may
chemically react with other substances and become
water-soluble. These differing contentions supported by
expert affidavits raise sufficient questions of fact to
23
preclude the granting of summary judgment on the
divisibility issue.
Alcan-PAS, 990 F.2d at 722-23. (Emphasis added.)
But for the differing facts presented in accordance
with Rule 56(e), no genuine issues as to harm or
divisibility would remain for trial. In other words, the
Second Circuit found in A/can-PAS that genuine issues
of material fact as to whether the _ metallic
constituents in the emulsion were insoluble and
capabie of causing or contributing to environmental
harm precluded summary judgment on the divisibility
issue. /d. The only genuine issue preserved for trial
and/or hearing stems from the affidavits submitted by
the government relating to metals. Plaintiffs cannot
and should not be permitted under the decision of the
lower courts to present evidence of other hazardous
substances to serve as the basis for imposing
response costs on Alcan.
3. The Decision Of The Second Circuit Permits A
Never Ending Stream Of Litigation Over The Same
Essential Facts
The government, justifiably concerned the facts, logic
and scientific principles will not preserve liability against
Alcan based on below background, insoluble metal
compounds, wants to retry the phase of this case which
determined the nature of the emulsion in order to impose
liability on Alcan based on separate and distinct grounds
never raised or preserved at the summary judgment stage.
The Remand Order, as unrestricted by the appellate
court, adopts the flawed reasoning. of the government,
which is composed of two elements. First, that the Second
Circuit made “no finding that Alcan’s waste did not also
contain other hazardous substances, such as PCBs or
volatile organic compounds (VOCs).” (Remand Order, A80)
Second, that the government “only went as far as
24
necessary to establish liability on summary judgment.”
(Remand Order, A80) The problem with this logic is that, if
the government is allowed to relitigate the basis for liability,
then the lower courts have pronounced a doctrine that
allows a party to relitigate any issue arising out of a given
set of facts provided that the court, in rendering its
judgment, does not negate every potential basis for liability.
In the context of this case, than, if the government
had not created a dispute of fact on metals to be
resolved by the lower court by interposing affidavits and
as a result lost at the summary judgment stage, then the
government could have initiated another lawsuit involving
the same emulsion at the same site because the Second!
Circuit made no finding as to PCB’s or VOCs. In fact, the
Second Circuit made no explicit exclusions as to the
entire universe of toxic materials, so presumably the
government, under the lower courts’ logic, could file a
never-ending stream of cases focusing on each and every
one of those substances one at a time. Such a
conclusion defies logic and well established legal
principles of res judicata and law of the case. See Sea-
Land Services, Inc., 414 U.S. 573, 578-79 (1974); In
Re: PCH Associates, 949 F.2d 585, 594 (2d Cir. 1991).
Further, neither the governments’ briefs concerning the
scope of remand nor the decisions of the district or
appellate courts cite any case in which a court has, in
order to apply the doctrine of law of the case, been
required to explicitly find that the universe of potential
basis for liability have been excluded, even if they were
never issues raised by the parties.
The lower court decisions are not only inconsistent with
the law but essentially negate the underlying policy
objectives of res judicata and the law of the case doctrine
which require parties to resolve all issues of dispute at one
time and to adhere to issues previously decided. By
permitting this doctrine to be continued by the trial court,
25
the Second Circuit is condoning trial by “harassment”
where a party can be compelled into accepting
responsibility for environmental harm they did not cause
simply because it is less expensive than litigating the case
forever.
D. The District Courts’ Procedure In Handling The Alcan-
Cornell Fair Share Hearing Which Was Affirmed In
Alcan-PAS Wustrates The Merit Of Aican's Petition
For Mandamus
Alcan believes that the practical correctness of the
position it is advocating by this Petition is demonstrated
by the manner in which the lower court handled the
Alcan-Cornell fair share hearing. Again, returning to the
Alcan decision, the lower court stated:
[IJInsofar as the third-party is concerned, the court grants
Alican's motion to the extent of declaring that the third-
party defendant Cornell University is also liable for its
fair share of response costs incurred by the government
and the State of New York and accordingly denies the
motion of Cornell University. A hearing is necessary to
determine the amount of the fair share.
Alcan, 755 F.Supp. at 534. (Emphasis added.) The way in
which the district court handled the third-party claim is
instructive because the Cornell situation is procedurally an
exact duplicate of the government-Alcan case, and because
the procedure in the third-party action was affirmed by the
Second Circuit.
In Alcan-PAS, the Second Circuit remanded for a
divisibility and apportionment hearing, the same type of
hearing afforded to Alcan-Cornell. Like the case involving
the government, Alcan and Cornell filed cross-motions
for summary judgment. The lower court granted Alcan’s
motion and denied the Cornell motion. The only
difference between what the lower court did in the
government-Alcan case and the Alcan-Cornell third-party
26
action was that it held a hearing on apportioned harm
with respect to Cornell, and it denied Alcan that hearing
with respect to plaintiffs. in all other respects the two
situations are analogous.
At the fair share hearing, Alcan and Cornell presented
evidence obtained through discovery consistent with the
characterizations of the wastes as set forth in the A/can
decision, 755 F.Supp. 531. If Alcan appeared at the Cornell
apportionment hearing and requested to reopen discovery in
order to establish that other hazardous substances were in
the Cornell waste for the purposes of apportionment, the
lower court would have clearly and correctly denied that
request. Discovery was closed and that matter was
resolved in the liability phase. The Second Circuit affirmed
the lower court's handling of the third-party action in total.
Alcan-PAS, 990 F.2d at 723-25.
With respect to the government-Alcan portion of the
case, the only issue to which the Second Circuit took
exception was the failure to hold a hearing as to what, if
any, response costs were assignable to Alcan based on the
nature and constituents of the “hazardous substances” in
the emulsion—below background metals. The Second Circuit
did not reverse the finding on liability; on the contrary, over
Alcan's strenuous objection, it affirmed. The Second Circuit
remanded for a hearing on whether the metals caused harm
and response costs.
A final point in terms of practical impact demonstrates
the merit of Alcan's position. If the lower court holds a
hearing on the impact of metals as required under A/can-
PAS, the consequence of that hearing flows automatically
and logically to Cornell, since Cornell's share of liability was
derived on a comparative evaluation of the two wastes as
characterized for establishing liability. The Second Circuit's
expectation that this would occur is indicated by their
affirmation of the lower court's apportioned share of
responsibility. A/can-PAS, 990 F.2d at 725. If the Second
27
Circuit believed that liability could effectively be
recharacterized, it would have vacated the lower court's
apportioned liability finding with respect to Cornell,
expecting the issue to be _ redetermined upon a
recharacterization of the facts. The Second Circuit clearly
did not do that in A/can-PAS, yet now has failed to enforce
its prior mandate.
E. Permitting The Introduction Of Additional Evidence
Places Alcan in A Worse Position Than If The Lower
Court Applied The Correct Divisibility Standard In Its
Initial Memorandum-Decision And Order, And The
Second Circuit's Failure To Correct The Lower Court
Constitutes A Failure To Follow its Own Mandate
Alcan argued in its Motion for Reconsideration of the
Remand Order that, by operation of the September 12,
1994 Order, Alcan is put in a worse position on remand
than it would be had the correct divisibility and
apportionment standards been applied in the lower court's
January 15, 1991 Memorandum-Decision and Order.
Plaintiffs are asking for a retrial ab initio on remand, and the
Second Circuit has held that the trial court must follow its
express direction or otherwise it puts one of the parties in a
worse position. S/otkin v. Citizens’ Casualty Co., 689 F.2d
154 (2d Cir. 1983). The Second Circuit refused to compel
the lower court to follow the A/can-PAS mandate, which
amounts to a usurpation of appellate authority. The Second
Circuit's decision in S/otkin is instructive.
In S/otkin, the appellants sought to proceed on a
course of action on remand that was not expressly
provided for by the Second Circuit. In dismissing the
appellants’ action, the Second Circuit noted the
inappropriateness of putting a party in a worse position
on remand by not following its explicit direction as to
what was to occur and by working out their own
scenario for retrial:
28
Plaintiffs have, in fact, worked out their own scenario for
their proposed retrial . . . . However, this is not the way the
Second Circuit wrote the script.
Id. at 157.
Here, like the plaintiffs in S/otkin, the Second Circuit has
allowed the government to obtain an advantage by writing
their own scenario for the remand hearing. This, to use the
words of the Second Circuit, was not the way the Court
"wrote the script.” Nor did the Second Circuit compel the
lower court to comply with its mandate. The Second Circuit
explicitly directed the lower court to resolve any dispute of
fact concerning only the impact of below background
metals. A/can-PAS, 990 F.2d at 722. Indeed, the clarity of
Alcan's cross-motion as being based on a determination
that its emulsion contained exclusively metals is illustrated
by the Second Circuit’s recognition that Alcan attributed the
harm at the site from substances such as PCBs to other
parties. /d. at p. 722.
Moreover, the Second Circuit has placed Alcan in a
worse position on remand than it would be if the lower
court applied the correct divisibility and apportionment
principles in the first instance. The hearing would have
encompassed the only “hazardous substance” giving rise
to liability--below background metals--and the case would
have been resolved under the same logic and reasoning
as the Alcan-Cornell third-party claim. The Second Circuit
ordered a divisibility hearing based on metals and Alcan’s
cross-motion.
Alcan's cross-motion was predicated on the
undisputed assertion that the only hazardous substances
in the emulsion were insoluble metal compounds and,
therefore, it could not be held responsible for the
problems created by materials other than the metals.
This case was remanded to the lower court for the
resolution of that dispute and that dispute alone. Under
29
the Alcan-PAS mandate, the lower court is only
permitted to resolve the only issues preserved which
relate to harm, if any, associated with trace metals and
apportionment of damages.
Damages, if any, should be determined based on liability
as initially found. It would be fundamentally unfair and
contrary to the A/can-PAS mandate to allow damages to be
imposed for alleged harm which was not the basis for
liability in the first instance. Accordingly, Alcan requests
that this Honorable Court grant this Petition for Writ of
Mandamus to confine the inferior court to a lawful exercise
of its prescribed jurisdiction, and to compel the Second
Circuit to enforce the A/can-PAS mandate.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, Petitioner Alcan Aluminum
Corporation respectfully requests that this Honorable Court
issue an Order (a) vacating the May 15, 1995 Order of the
Second Circuit, (b) directing the Second Circuit to order the
lower court to vacate the September and December, 1994
Remand Orders, and (c) order the Second Circuit to compel
the lower court to conduct a divisibility hearing relating to
harm, if any, associated with below background metals and
apportion damages accordingly, consistent with the A/can-
PAS mandate.
Respectfully submitted,
Lawrence A. Salibra, |!
Counsel of Record
John C. Tillman
Alcan Aluminum Corporation
100 Erieview Plaza, 17th Fir.
Cleveland, Ohio 44114
(216) 523-6918
Attorneys for Petitioner Alcan
Aluminum Corporation
ee a ee ea
APPENDIX
7
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A-1
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
State of New York,
Plaintiffs-Appellees,
V.
ALCAN ALUMINUM CORPORATION,
Defendant-Third-Party-Plaintiff
Appellee-Cross-Appellant,
V.
CORNELL UNIVERSITY,
Third-Party-Defendant
Appellant-Cross-Appellee.
Nos. 403, 530, Dockets 92-6158, 92-6160.
United States Court of Appeals,
Second Circuit.
Argued Nov. 9, 1992.
Decided April 6, 1993.
United States and state of New York filed
CERCLA action against company which disposed of
hazardous wastes at contaminated site. Company
filed third-party complaint against university which
disposed of neutralized runoff water from coal fire at
site seeking contribution. United States District Court
for the Northern District of New York, Thomas J.
McAvoy, J., 755 F.Supp. 531, granted summary
judgment in favor of United States and State of New
A-2
York holding company jointly and severally liable for
cleanup of site and allowing company to obtain
contribution from university under CERCLA.
Company and university appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Cardamone, Circuit Judge, held that: (1)
Northern District of New York was entitled to enter
final judgment based on its earlier liability ruling and
was not obliged to give estoppel effect to any rulings
entered in Pennsylvania district courts after date of
its ruling; (2) CERCLA does not impose quantitative
requirements with respect to hazardous substances;
(3) reportable quantities of substances (RQs) and
chemical abstracts service registry numbers (CASRNs)
did not address issue of CERCLA liability; and (4)
choice as to when to address divisibility and
apportionment issues were questions best left to
sound discretion of trial court in handling of individual
case.
Affirmed in part; reversed in part and remanded.
[1] JUDGMENT k540
Res judicata, or claim preclusion, means simply
that when judgment is rendered on merits, it bars
second suit between same parties or their privies
based on same cause of action or claims.
[2] JUDGMENT k720
Under collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion,
second suit is upon different claim or cause of action,
and doctrine’s fundamental notion is that issue of fact
or law actually litigated and decided by court of
competent jurisdiction in prior action may not be
relitigated in subsequent suit between same parties or
their privies.
A-3
[3] JUDGMENT k634
Collateral estoppel saves parties and courts from
waste and burden of relitigating stale issues and, by
discouraging inconsistent results, forwards public
policy favoring establishment of certainty in legal
relations.
[4] JUDGMENT k739
Court should decline to give preclusive effect to
prior judgment if there have been changes either in
applicable legal rules or factual predicates essential to
that prior judgment.
[5] JUDGMENT k634
Where pure questions of law, unmixed with any
particular set of facts, are presented to court, interests
of finality and judicial economy may be outweighed by
| other substantive policies.
[6] JUDGMENT k650
Liability ruling made by New York federal district
court granting summary judgment for government
against polluter in CERCLA action and for polluter
against university on contribution claim was
sufficiently final to be entitled to estoppel effect in
Pennsylvania federal district court, even though, by
time New York district court entered final judgment,
Pennsylvania district court had made its rulings in
another CERCLA action against same polluter in
reliance on New York district court’s ruling and Third
Circuit had affirmed those rulings in part and
remanded on issue of divisibility; New York district
court was entitled to enter final judgment based on its
earlier liability ruling and was not obliged to give
A-4
estoppel effect to any rulings entered in Pennsylvania
district court after date of its ruling.
[7] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)
In bringing action under CERCLA, government
must establish that: defendant is one of four
categories of covered persons listed in CERCLA as
liable for costs of remedial action; site of cleanup is
"facility" under CERCLA; there is release or
threatened release of hazardous substances at facility;
as result of release or threatened release, government
has incurred response costs; and costs incurred
conform to national contingency plan as administered
by Environmental Protection Agency (EPA).
Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, §§ 101(9),
107(a)(4)(A), (b), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601(9),
9607(a)(4)(A), (b).
[8] FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE k2481
If government establishes in CERCLA action each
element on undisputed facts, and defendant is unable
to demonstrate by preponderance of evidence
existence of one of three affirmative defenses set forth
in CERCLA, then government is entitled to summary
judgment on issue of liability, even when genuine
issues of material fact remain as to appropriate
damages. Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, §§ 101(9),
107(a)(4)(A), (b), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601(9),
9607(a)(4)(A), (b).
4 Cea Di i St Ml tl le eT a eel
A-5
[9] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)
Liability under CERCLA may be decided first
before more complicated questions implicated in
cleanup measures, which includes fixing proportionate
fault of liable parties. Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,
§§ 101(9), 107(a)(4)(A), (b), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 9601(9), 9607(a)(4)(A), (b).
[10] FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE k1954.1, 2481
Bifurcation and summary judgment provide
powerful legal tools which, by effectively isolating
issues to be resolved, avoid lengthy and perhaps
needless litigation in CERCLA actions; existence of
those procedural tools aids Congress’ purposes of
encouraging settlement discussion and speeding up
remedial action. Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980,
§ § 101(9), 107(a)(4)(A), (b), as amended, 42 U\S.C.A.
§§ 9601(9), 9607(a)(4)(A), (b).
(11] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)
CERCLA, on its face, applies to any "hazardous
substance," and does not impose quantitative
requirements. Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, § §
101(14), 102, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601(14),
9602; Solid Waste Disposal Act, § 3001, as amended,
42 U.S.C.A. § 6921; Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972 (Clean Water Act), § 307(A),
33 U.S.C.A. § 1317(A); Clean Air Act, § 112, 42
U.S.C.A. § 7412.
See publication Words and Phrases for other
judicial constructions and definitions.
A-6
[12] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)
"Hazardous substance," under CERCLA, includes
even minimal amounts of pollution. Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980, §§ 101(14), 102, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ § 9601(14), 9602; Solid Waste Disposal Act, § 3001, as
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6921; Federal Water Pollution
Control Act Amendments of 1972 § 307(A), 33
U.S.C.A. § 1317(A); Clean Air Act, § 112, 42 U.S.C.A.
§ 7412
[13] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)
Specific reportable quantities (RQs) of substances
and chemical abstracts service registry numbers
(CASRNs) designated by Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) for certain hazardous substances go
only to reporting requirements, and do not address
issue of CERCLA liability. Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980, § 102(a), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §
9602(a).
[14] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)
To impose strict liability under CERCLA,
government need only prove: (1) there was release or
threatened release, (2) which caused incurrence of
response costs, and that (3) defendant generated
hazardous waste at cleanup site; government is not
required to show that specific defendant’s waste
caused incurrence of cleanup costs. Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980, § 102(a), as amended, 42 US.C.A. §
9602(a).
A-7
(15) HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)
There are only three defenses to imposition of
CERCLA liability on generator of hazardous waste:
act of God, act of war, and act or omission of third
party. Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, § 107 (a, b),
(a)(3, 4), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a, b), (a)(3,
4).
(16] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)
In addition to imposing strict liability scheme,
CERCLA does away with causation requirement.
Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, § 107(a, b),
as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a, b).
[17] FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE k2481
Genuine issue of material fact as to whether
metallic constituents of polluter’s oil emulsions were
insoluble or soluble compounds, given conflicting
expert affidavits, precluded summary judgment for
government on divisibility issue in CERCLA action
against polluter. Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, §§
101(14), 102, 107(a), (a)(3), (b), as amended, 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 9601(14), 9602, 9607(a), (a)(3), (b).
[18] TORTS k22
Where two or more joint tort-feasors act
independently and cause distinct or single harm, for
which there is reasonable basis for division according
to contribution of each, then each is liable for
damages only for its own portion of harm; but where
each tort-feasor causes single indivisible harm, the
damages are not apportioned and each is liable for
damages for entire harm.
A-8
[19] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)
Under common law, polluter could escape any
liability for response costs under CERCLA if it
succeeded in proving that its oil emulsion, when
mixed with other hazardous waste, either did not
contribute to release and cleanup costs that followed,
or contributed at most to only divisible portion of
harm. Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, §§ 101(14),
102, 107(a), (a)(3), (b), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§
9601(14), 9602, 9607(a), (a)(3), (b).
[20] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)
Polluter bears ultimate burden of establishing
reasonable basis for apportioning liability for response
costs in CERCLA action. Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980, §§ 101(14), 102, 107(a), (a)(3), (b), as
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601(14), 9602, 9607(a),
(a)(3), (b).
[21] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)
Government has no burden of proof with respect
to what caused release of hazardous waste and
triggered response costs in action under CERCLA; it
is defendant that bears that burden. Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980, §§ 101(14), 102, 107(a), (a)(3), (b), as
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601(14), 9602, 9607(a),
(a)(3), (b).
wa ee ee
A-9
[22] FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE k2481
To defeat government’s motion for summary
judgment in CERCLA action on issue of divisibility of
harm, polluter need only show that there are genuine
issues of material fact regarding reasonable basis for
apportionment of liability. Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980, §§ 101(14), 102, 107(a), (a)(3), (b), as
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601(14), 9602, 9607(a),
(a)(3), (b).
[23] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)
Apportionment of liability is intensely factual
determination in CERCLA action. Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980, §§ 101(14), 102, 107(a), (a)(3), (b), as
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601(14), 9602, 9607(a),
(a)(3), (b).
(24) HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)
Causation, with burden on defendant, is
reintroduced at apportionment stage in CERCLA
action only to permit defendant to escape payment
where its pollutants did not contribute more than
background contamination and also cannot
concentrate; this special exception to usual absence of
causation requirement is applicable only to claims
where background levels are not exceeded and limited
exception will be recognized only in absence of any
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) thresholds.
Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, ss 101(14),
102, 107(a), (a)(3), (b), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§
9601(14), 9602, 9607(a), (a)(3), (b).
A-10
[25] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)
Commingling of metallic and organic hazardous
substances was not synonymous with indivisible harm,
and polluter was entitled to opportunity to show that
harm caused at contaminated site was capable of
reasonable apportionment; polluter could present
evidence relevant to establishing divisibility of harm,
such as, proof disclosing relative toxicity,
migratory potential, degree of migration, and
synergistic capacities of hazardous substances at site.
Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, §§ 101(14),
102, 107(a), (a)(3), (b), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§
9601(14), 9602, 9607(a), (a)(3), (b); Solid Waste
Disposal Act, § 3001, as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 6921;
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of
1972, § 307(A), 33 U.S.C.A. § 1317(A); Clean Air Act,
§ 112, 42 U.S.C.A. § 7412.
[26] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)
Although language of CERCLA and Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act (SARA) in their
legislative histories appeared to demonstrate that
liability should be fixed first and immediately for
enforcement purposes and litigation should be
conducted later to sort out what contribution is owed
and by whom as result of remediation effort, choice as
to when to address divisibility and apportionment are
questions best left to sound discretion of trial court in
handling of individual case. Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980, §§ 107(a, b), 113(f)(1), as amended, 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 9607(a, b), 9613(f)(1)
2 ai
_
A-11
[27] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)
University which sent 551,000 gallons of
neutralized runoff water to contaminated site
following fire in stock pile of coal on campus was
‘potentially liable" party under CERCLA.
Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, §§ 107,
107(a), (a)(3), 113(f)(1), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§
9607, 9607(a), (a)(3), 9613(f)(1).
See publication Words and Phrases for other
judicial constructions and definitions.
[28] CONTRIBUTION k5(6.1)
Federal common-law principles in effect prior to
Superfund Amendments (SARA) to CERCLA
rendered university liable for contribution to cleanup
costs of contaminated site due to its disposal at site of
neutralized runoff water following fire in stock pile of
coal on campus, and court was not required to apply
Superfund Amendments retroactively in order to hold
university liable for contribution. Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980, §§ 113, 113(f), (f)(2), as amended, 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 9613, 9613(f), (f)(2).
[29] STATUTES k263
There is strong presumption against retroactive
application of statute.
[30] STATUTES k263
No law should be construed retrospectively unless
Congress’ purpose can be satisfied in no other way or
unless statutory language admits of no other
meaning.
A-12
[31] STATUTES k263
Court should apply law existing at time of its
decision unless to do so is contrary to plain meaning
of statute or would cause manifest injustice.
[32] COMPROMISE AND SETTLEMENT k3
Negotiations between Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) and university which resulted in
university being removed from list of those potentially
responsible parties for cleanup of contaminated site
did not amount to "administrative settlement," for
purposes of CERCLA, so as to preclude university’s
liability for contribution for cleanup of site at which it
disposed of neutralized runoff water following fire in
stockpile of coal on campus, where procedural steps
necessary to effectuate settlement under CERCLA
were not followed. Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, §§
113, 113(f), (f)(2), 122, 122(g)(4), (i)(1), as amended, 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 9613, 9613(f), (f)(2), 9622, 9622(g)(4),
(i)(1).
See publication Words and Phrases for other
judicial constructions and definitions
[33] COMPROMISE AND SETTLEMENT k5(1)
Only when settlement procedures set forth in
CERCLA are followed, including publishing notice of
such in Federal Register and obtaining prior written
approval of settlement by Attorney General, is party
shielded from contribution claim under CERCLA.
Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, §§ 113,
113(f), (f)(2), 122, 122(g)(4), @)(1), as amended, 42
US.C.A. §§ 9613, 9613(f), (f)(2), 9622, 9622(g)(4),
(i)(1).
A-13
[34] CONTRIBUTION k5(6.1)
University which disposed of neutralized runoff
water at contaminated site following fire in stockpile
of coal on campus was not insulated from requirement
to contribute in CERCLA action under federal
common law due to its removal by Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) from list of potentially
responsible parties, where EPA merely advised
university that it was removing university from list
and EPA and university did not enter into release,
covenant not to sue, or any other similar, legally
binding agreement. Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, §§
104(a)(3), 107(a), 113(f)(1), 122, 122(g)(4), (i)(1), as
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9604(a)(3), 9607(a),
9613(f)(1), 9622, 9622(g)(4), (i)(1).
Lawrence A. Salibra, II, Cleveland, OH (John C.
Tillman, of counsel), for defendant third party plaintiff
appellee cross appellant Alcan Aluminum Corp.
Thomas Mead Santoro, Ithaca, NY (Patricia A.
McClary, on the brief), for third party defendant
appellant cross appellee Cornell University.
John T. Stahr, Washington, DC (Anne S. Almy,
Henry Friedman, Dept. of Justice, Environment and
Natural Resources Division, Bernice Corman, Carol
Berns, Joan Gillespie, Charles De Saillan, Charles
Breece, U.S. E.P.A., David A. Munro, Asst. Atty. Gen.,
Vicki A. O’Meara, Acting Asst. Atty. Gen., State of
New York, of counsel), for plaintiffs-appellees U.S.,
State of NY.
A-14
O. Peter Sherwood, Corp. Counsel, New York
City (Peter H. Lehner, Christopher A. Amato,
Environmental Law Div., of counsel), filed a brief on
behalf of the City of New York as amicus curiae.
Norman W. Bernstein, Washington, DC (Donald
B. Mitchell, Jr., Lawrence E. Blatnik, Arent Fox
Kintner Plotkin & Kahn, of counsel), filed a brief on
behalf of Exxon Chemical Co., Ford Motor Co.,
Allied-Signal, Inc., Carrier Corp., General Motors
Corp., Pratt & Whitney, and USX Corp. as amicus
curiae. Robert B. Weintraub, New York City (Michael
Stanley, Oswego, NY, of counsel), filed a brief on
behalf of the Greater Oswego Chamber of Commerce,
Inc. as amicus curiae.
Robert B. Weintraub, New York City (Robin S.
Conrad, National Chamber Litigation Center, Inc.,
Washington, DC, of counsel), filed a brief on behalf of
the Chamber of Commerce of the U.S. of America as
amicus curiae.
Robert B. Weintraub, New York City, filed a brief
on behalf of New York State Ins. Ass’n as amicus
curiae.
Austin V. Campriello, Werner & Kennedy, New
York City (Mahlon C. Schneider, Austin, MN, Kevin
Montano, Bethesda, MD, of counsel), filed a brief on
behalf of Geo. A. Hormel & Co., Marriott
Corporation’s Food Service Div., The National Food
Processors Ass’n and Burger King Corp. as amici
curiae.
|
;
.
}
A-15
Doren P. Norfleet, Oswego, NY, filed a brief on
behalf of Operation Oswego County, Inc. as amicus
curiae.
Thomas O’Brien, Jeffrey & O’Brien, P.C., Clinton,
NY, filed a brief on behalf of Various Individuals Who
Represent a Cross-Section of the Metropolitan Area of
Utica, New York as amicus curiae.
James R. Griffith, Felt, Hubbard & Bogan, Utica,
NY, filed a brief on behalf of New York State
Conference of Mayors and Mun. Officials as amicus
curiae.
Alan S. Burstein, Scolaro, Shulman, Cohen,
Lawler & Burstein, P.C., Syracuse, NY, filed a brief on
behalf of School Districts as amici curiae.
Robert B. Weintraub, New York City (Gay
Williams, Sullivan & Williams, Oswego, NY, of
counsel), filed a brief on behalf of City of Oswego as
amicus curiae.
Robert B. Weintraub, New York City (Bruce N.
Clark, Oswego, NY, of counsel), filed a brief on behalf
of County of Oswego as amicus curiae.
Before NEWMAN, CARDAMONE, and
MAHONEY, Circuit Judges.
CARDAMONE, Circuit Judge:
Alcan Aluminum Corporation (Alcan) and Cornell
University appeal from an order of the United States
A- 16
District Court for the Northern District of New York,
(McAvoy, J.), granting summary judgment in favor of
appellees, United States and New York State, holding
Alcan jointly and severally liable for cleanup of a
hazardous waste site, and allowing Alcan to obtain
contribution from Cornell. United States v. Alcan
Aluminum Corp., 755 F.Supp. 531 (N.D.N.Y.1991).
Alcan and a host of amicus briefs have presented
us with a parade of horribles predicated on their view
that under the district court opinion, hazardous
substances include breakfast cereal, the soil, and
nearly everything else upon which life depends, and
that such an approach will make liable for response
costs the butcher, the baker and the candlestick
maker. They posit that to avoid such an absurd
result, liability under the Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability
Act of 1980 (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601 et seq.
(1988, Supp. I 1989 & Supp. II 1990), should not be
imposed unless a responsible party has contributed
some minimum concentration of a hazardous element
or compound.
Admittedly, there is some force to this argument;
yet, the government’s response is also compelling. It
notes that were we to limit liability in the manner
Alcan and amici suggest, each potential defendant in
a multi-defendant CERCLA case would be able to
escape liability simply by relying on the low
concentration of hazardous substances in its wastes,
and the government would be left to absorb the
clean-up costs. Several cuurts have already held such
was not the aim of Congress
A-17
In passing CERCLA Congress faced the
unenviable choice of enacting a legislative scheme that
would be somewhat unfair to generators of hazardous
substances or one that would unfairly burden the
taxpaying public. The financial burdens of toxic
clean-up had been vastly underestimated--in 1980
when CERCLA was enacted $1.8 billion was thought
to be enough. In 1986 when the Superfund
Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA),
Pub.L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613 (1986), was passed,
$100 billion was held to be needed. It may well be
more today. It is of course the public-at-large that is
already bearing the economic brunt of this enormous
national problem. There may be unfairness in the
legislative plan, but we think Congress imposed
responsibility on generators of hazardous substances
advisedly. And, even were it not advisedly, we still
must take this statute as it is.
Having assessed CERCLA’s plain meaning, its
legislative history, and the case law construing it, we
think the tension may be resolved by allowing a
responsible party, like Alcan, to pay nothing if it
can demonstrate that its pollutants, when mixed with
other hazardous wastes, did not contribute to the
release or the resulting response costs. In this respect
we essentially adopt the Third Circuit’s reasoning in
United States v. Alcan Aluminum Corp., 964 F.2d
252, 267-71 (3d Cir.1992) (Alcan-Butler ). This
approach is not intended to provide an escape hatch
for CERCLA defendants; rather, it will permit such a
defendant to avoid liability only when its pollutants
contribute no more than background contamination.
A- 18
BACKGROUND
A. Facts
From 1970 to 1977 Pollution Abatement Services
(PAS) operated a waste disposal and treatment center
on 15 acres of land in Oswego County, New York.
The PAS facility there stored, processed, and disposed
of chemical wastes from a number of sources; as a
result the site became contaminated with hazardous
substances. In 1977 the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) and New York State undertook
response and clean-up measures and spent over $12
million in the ensuing ten years on remedial actions.
Alcan used PAS during the 1970s and arranged
for disposal or treatment there of 4.6 million gallons
of oil emulsion. This emulsion--used in Alcan’s
manufacturing process--consisted mostly of water and
mineral oil, along with small aluminum ingot shavings
containing lead, copper, chromium, zinc, and cadmium
compounds.
In 1974, a stock-pile of coal caught fire at
Cornell University’s Ithaca, New York campus. The
local fire department extinguished it with water, and
some of the run-off from the coal pile flowed into area
streams. After consultation with New York
environmental officials, Cornell collected this coal
run-off water and neutralized it. For two years
following the fire, Cornell sent 551,000 gallons of the
neutralized run-off water to the Oswego PAS site.
When in 1983 Cornell was notified of hazardous waste
problems at the PAS site, it explained to the EPA
what waste it had sent there for disposal. In March
|
A-19
1986 Cornell purportedly resolved any question of its
liability with the EPA, which thereupon removed the
University from its list of those parties potentially
responsible for response costs at PAS.
B. Present Suit
Ten years after the 1977 commencement of
clean-up efforts, in 1987 the United States and New
York (collectively the government) brought a CERCLA
s 107(a), 42 U.S.C. s 9607(a), action to recover
response costs against 83 of the parties potentially
responsible for the environmental problems at the
Oswego site. The government entered into a consent
decree with 82 of these defendants, recovering 74
percent or $9.1 million of the clean-up costs it had
incurred. Alcan was the lone holdout. The
government sued it for the $3.2 million of unrecovered
costs. In 1988 Alcan served a third-party complaint
against Cornell seeking contribution from it for a
share of the clean-up costs.
After discovery had been completed, the
government moved for summary judgment against
Alcan contending that Alcan’s disposal of hazardous
substances at PAS had been conceded. Alcan
cross-moved for summary judgment against the
United States and New York State, asserting
principally that CERCLA’s definition of "hazardous
substance" requires a minimum concentration level of
specific compounds and that under the statute
causation needed to be demonstrated. Alcan also
asserted that the harm caused by its waste was
divisible and that the government claim improperly
subjected it to joint and several liability. Alcan also
A - 20
moved for summary judgment against Cornell
University, as a third-party defendant, and Cornell
cross-moved in turn for summary judgment against
Alcan.
The district court granted summary judgment for
the government against Alcan, and for Alcan against
Cornell on January 15, 1991. It rejected Alcan’s
arguments concerning minimum _ concentration
requirements and causation. It further held Alcan
had failed to meet its burden to show that the harm
at PAS was divisible, and awarded the government
approximately $4 million in accumulated response
costs. With respect to Cornell, the district court
stated that the University was responsible to Alcan for
its "fair share" of the clean-up costs and refused to
shield the university from liability on the basis of its
removal by the EPA from the list of potentially
responsible parties. See 755 F.Supp. at 543-45.
On November 19 and 20, 1991 the trial court held
a "fair share" hearing to determine the extent of
Cornell’s liability to Alcan. Adopting a six-factor fair
share allocation test from United States v. R.W. Meyer,
Inc., 932 F.2d 568 (6th Cir.1991), it ruled Cornell was
responsible for six percent of the response cost
recovered by the government from Alcan
and therefore awarded Alcan $310,540.92. The final
judgment against Alcan was more than $5 million, due
to additional clean-up costs and prejudgment interest.
Alcan and Cornell appeal from an amended final
judgment of the district court entered May 29, 1992,
and Cornell also appeals from its January 15, 1991
order.
;
}
} .
'
A- 21
DISCUSSION
I Collateral Estoppel
Before considering the merits of the appeal, it is
necessary to rule on a collateral estoppel argument
raised by the government against Alcan’s appeal
arising from similar litigation the government brought
in Pennsylvania against Alcan.
A. The Alcan-Butler Litigation
In November 1989--two years after the institution
of the instant litigation--the United States brought an
identical cause of action against Alcan under the same
provision, CERCLA § 107(a), to recover costs incurred
in the clean-up of Butler Tunnel, a waste disposal
facility located on the banks of the Susquehanna River
in Pennsylvania. The United States District Court for
the Middle District of Pennsylvania on May 8, 1991
granted the United States’ motion for summary
judgment against Alcan, relying entirely on the
reasons set forth in Judge McAvoy’s decision handed
down on January 15, 1991 in the case we are now
reviewing.
Alcan appealed to the Third Circuit arguing that
(1) CERCLA contains a minimum quantitative
requirement for "hazardous substance," (2) Alcan’s
emulsion falls within CERCLA’s petroleum exception,
(3) the decision of the District Court for the Middle
District of Pennsylvania is inconsistent with EPA
regulations under CERCLA, (4) CERCLA requires a
specific causal relationship, and (5) CERCLA fails to
give fair notice of what is considered a hazardous
substance to potential defendants. On May 14, 1992
A - 22
the Third Circuit rejected each of these arguments.
See Alcan-Butler, 964 F.2d at 259-67. But it vacated
the Middle District Court’s judgment and remanded
the case to that court for a hearing on divisibility. Id.
at 271. Rehearing in banc was denied in July 1992.
See id.
The government now insists that Alcan has
presented to us the precise issues that were raised,
litigated, and decided against it in Alcan-Butler. To
make its point, it itemizes the arguments in Alcan’s
brief before us and demonstrates that they mirror the
recited issues addressed in Alcan-Butler.
B. Collateral Estoppel No Bar
[1-3] We analyze the collateral estoppel doctrine
as it pertains to this appeal. Res judicata, or claim
preclusion, means simply that when a judgment is
rendered on the merits, it bars a second suit between
the same parties or their privies based on the same
cause of action or claims. See 1B J.W. Moore, Moore’s
Federal Practice q 0.405[1] (2d ed. 1992). Under
collateral estoppel, or issue preclusion, the second suit
is upon a different claim or cause of action. This
doctrine’s fundamental notion is that an issue of law
or fact actually litigated and decided by a court of
competent jurisdiction in a prior action may not be
relitigated in a subsequent suit between the same
parties or their privies, see Montana v. United States,
440 U.S. 147, 153, 99 S.Ct. 970, 973, 59 L.Ed.2d 210
(1979). Collateral estoppel saves parties and the
courts from the waste and burden of relitigating stale
issues, see 1B Moore, supra q 0.441[2], and, by
discouraging inconsistent results, forwards public
TE mE ee
A - 23
policy favoring the establishment of certainty in legal
relations. See United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464
U.S. 165, 176-77, 104 S.Ct. 575, 581-82, 78 L.Ed.2d
388 (1984) (White, J., concurring in result); Allen v.
McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94, 101 S.Ct. 411, 414, 66
L.Ed.2d 308 (1980).
[4, 5] There are exceptions to the use of collateral
estoppel. For example, a court should decline to give
preclusive effect to a prior judgment if there have
been changes either in the applicable legal rules or
the factual predicates essential to that prior judgment.
See Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary, 969 F.2d
1350, 1356 (2d Cir.), cert. granted, --- US. ----, 113
S.Ct. 52, 121 L.Ed.2d 22 (1992). In addition, where
pure questions of law--unmixed with any particular
set of facts--are presented to a court, the "interests of
finality and judicial economy may be outweighed by
other substantive policies." Id.; accord 18 Charles A.
Wright et al., Federal Practice & Procedure § 4425
(1981 & Supp.1992). The government insists the
various recognized exceptions to the use of collateral
estoppel are inapplicable, while Alcan attempts to
bring itself within one or more of these exclusions to
the estoppel doctrine.
[6] The issue posed is whether the Pennsylvania
courts should have given estoppel effect to the rulings
of the Northern District or whether the Northern
District should have given estoppel effect to the
rulings of the Pennsylvania courts. The matter is
complicated by the procedural facts. The Northern
District’s ruling of January 15, 1991 preceded any of
the Pennsylvania rulings. But by the time the
Northern District entered a final judgment, the
sw
A - 24
Pennsylvania district court had made its rulings and
the Third Circuit had affirmed those rulings in part
and remanded on the issue of divisibility. We have
taken a broad view of the application of collateral
estoppel to rulings made at an interim stage of
litigation. Estoppel is applied when "the litigation of
a particular issue has reached such a stage that a
court sees no really good reason for permitting it to
be litigated again." Lummus Co. v. Commonwealth
Oil Ref. Co., 297 F.2d 80, 89 (2d Cir.1961), cert. denied,
368 U.S. 986, 82 S.Ct. 601, 7 L.Ed.2d 524 (1962);
accord Sherman v. Jacobson, 247 F.Supp. 261, 268
(S.D.N.Y.1965); see also Stauffer Chem., 464 U.S. at
180, 104 S.Ct. at 583 (White, J., concurring in result)
(estoppel is a “flexible, judge-made doctrine").
In this case, we are satisfied that the liability
ruling made by the Northern District was sufficiently
final to be entitled to estoppel effect. Of course, it is
not up to us to determine whether the district court
of another circuit was obliged to give such effect to
the Northern District ruling. We have no authority to
review the rulings of the Pennsylvania district court.
We are nonetheless entitled to decide that we think
the Northern District’s ruling deserves preclusive
| effect and, that being so, it follows, at least for
purposes of litigation in this Circuit, that the
Northern District was entitled to enter a final
judgment based on its earlier liability ruling and was
not obliged to give estoppel effect to any rulings
entered in the Pennsylvania courts after the date of
its January 15, 1991 ruling. Cf Laaman v. United
States, 973 F.2d 107, 112-13 (2d Cir.1992), cert. denied,
--- US. ----, 113 S.Ct. 1368, 122 L.Ed.2d 746 (1993).
a errmaaeaaaaaraacaeaaaaaamamamaata eel
A - 25
II Liability Under CERCLA
A. Chronology
(7][8] Before entering upon an analysis of the
merits of this appeal it will be helpful to set forth an
overview of CERCLA. In bringing an action under
this Act, the government must establish that: (1)
defendant is one of the four categories of covered
persons listed under § 9607(a) as liable for the costs
of remedial action, (2) the site of the clean-up is a
facility under § 9601(9), (3) there is a release or
threatened release of hazardous substances at the
facility, (4) as a result of which plaintiff has incurred
response costs, and (5) the costs incurred conform to
the national contingency plan under § 9607 (a)(4)(A) as
administered by the EPA. See B.F. Goodrich Co. v,
Murtha, 958 F.2d 1192, 1198 (2d Cir.1992). If the
government establishes each of these elements on
undisputed facts, and the defendant is unable to
demonstrate by a preponderance of the evidence the
existence of one of the three affirmative defenses set
forth in § 9607(b), then plaintiff is entitled to
summary judgment on the issue of liability, even
when genuine issues of material fact remain as to
appropriate damages. See Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden,
Inc., 889 F.2d 664, 668 (5th Cir.1989),
(9, 10] Liability may be decided first before the
more complicated questions implicated in clean-up
measures, which includes fixing the proportionate
fault of liable parties. Jd. at 667. Bifurcation and
summary judgment provide powerful legal tools which,
by effectively isolating the issues to be resolved, avoid
A - 26
lengthy and perhaps needless litigation. The
existence of those procedural tools aids Congress’
purpose by encouraging settlement discussions and
speeding up remedial action. See id. at 668.
B. Liability Issues
Alcan attempts to interpose a number of
additional defenses to prevent the imposition of
liability. It argues that a polluter should not be held
liable unless: a) the concentration of hazardous
substances in its wastes exceeds some minimum
threshold; b) its wastes fall within certain EPA
reporting requirements; and c) its wastes caused the
government to incur response costs. Under the
present reading of CERCLA none of these issues may
be considered in imposing liability.
1. Quantitative Thresholds for Hazardous
Substances
[11] CERCLA § 9601(14) defines “hazardous
substance” by cross-referencing several other
environmental statutes. The term includes: "(A) any
substance" designated under the Clean Water Act, "(B)
any element, compound, mixture, solution, or
substance” under CERCLA § 9602, "(C) any hazardous
waste" listed in § 3001 of the Solid Waste Disposal
Act, "(D) any toxic pollutant" listed in § 307(A) of the
Clean Water Act, "(E) any hazardous air pollutant
listed under" § 112 of the Clean Air Act, and "(F) any
imminently hazardous chemical substance or mixture"
with respect to which the EPA has taken action. 42
U.S.C. § 9601(14) (emphasis added). The statute on
its face applies to "any" hazardous substance, and it
does not impose quantitative requirements.
a eceealillaeaaeiaiaiiinalalll
A - 27
[12] The breadth of § 9601(14) cannot be easily
escaped, and we have expressly held that "[q]uantity
or concentration is not a factor." Murtha, 958 F.2d at
1200; accord Alcan-Butler, 964 F.2d at 259-61. We
have also reasoned that "when Congress wanted to
draw distinctions based on concentration or quantity,
it expressly provided as much." Murtha, 958 F.2d at
1200; accord Alcan-Butler, 964 F.2d at 261 (same).
The absence of such quantity requirements in
CERCLA leads inevitably to the conclusion that
Congress planned for the "hazardous substance"
definition to include even minimal amounts of
pollution. See Eagle-Picher Indus., Inc. v. United
States E.PA., 759 F.2d 922, 927-28 (D.C.Cir.1985).
2. EPA Definition of Hazardous Substances under
CERCLA
[13] Pursuant to § 9602(a), the EPA has
designated certain substances as hazardous in 40
C.F.R. § 302.4 (1992) and the accompanying table.
This regulation sets out broad headings of elements,
within which are established specific reportable
quantities ("RQs") of substances and chemical
abstracts service registry numbers ("CASRNs"). Alcan
admits that the elements in its oil emulsion fall
within the broad categories listed by the EPA, but it
notes that these elements are not given RQs and
CASRNs. Thus, it argues that these elements should
not be classified as hazardous under CERCLA, as all
hazardous elements must have RQs and CASRNs.
According to Alcan, a contrary interpretation renders
the EPA regulation meaningless.
A - 28
We need not dwell long on this argument.
Besides the district court in this case, see Alcan, 755
F.Supp. at 538, two other courts have assessed and
rejected this proposition. See Alcan-Butler, 964 F.2d
at 262-63; City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 766
F.Supp. 177, 181-83 (S.D.N.Y.1991) (also involving
Alcan). Each of these courts has essentially
determined that the RQs and CASRNs are irrelevant
for CERCLA liability purposes. The EPA draws a
vital distinction that makes this plain: RQs and
CASRNs only go to reporting requirements, they do
not address the issue of CERCLA liability. See Exxon,
766 F.Supp. at 182-83 (citing and quoting EPA
interpretation in 50 Fed.Reg. 13,456, 13,461,
13,472-73 (April 5, 1985)). We believe this reasoning
correct and therefore adopt it.
3. Causation under CERCLA
[14] CERCLA § 9607(a) imposes strict liability on
“any person who by contract, agreement, or otherwise
arranged for disposal or treatment” of hazardous
substances "from which there is a release, or a
threatened release which causes the incurrence of
response costs." § 9607(a)(3) and (4). The plain
meaning of this language dictates that the
government need only prove: (1) there was a release
or threatened release, which (2) caused incurrence of
response costs, and (3) that the defendant generated
hazardous waste at the clean-up site. What is not
required is that the government show that a specific
defendant’s waste caused incurrence of clean-up costs.
A - 29
(15][16] As earlier noted, there are "only" three
defenses to imposition of liability on a generator: an
act of God, an act of war, and an act or omission of a
third party. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b). In State of New
York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1044 (2d
Cir.1985), we held that the owner of a facility was
liable under CERCLA without a finding of causation
of the release because "including a causation
requirement makes superfluous the affirmative
defenses provided in section 9607(b)." Id. Our
reading drew additional support from CERCLA’s
legislative history, from which we concluded that
"Congress specifically rejected including a causation
requirement" in this section. Jd. Other circuits have
reached the same conclusion. See Alcan-Butler, 964
F.2d at 265; Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms
Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d 1146, 1152-54 (1st Cir.1989);
United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 170 (4th
Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106, 109 S.Ct. 3156,
104 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1989). Hence, it seems plain that
in addition to imposing a strict liability scheme, -
CERCLA does away with a causation requirement.
Alcan argues to the contrary, primarily relying
upon the Fifth Circuit’s decision in Amoco Oil Co., 889
F.2d at 670, which it interprets as establishing a
causal nexus requirement. Alcan further presses that
in order for a causal connection to exist, there must
be levels of hazardous substance above ambient or
background. The Third Circuit assessed and rejected
this assertion, noting that the Fifth Circuit did not
hold that the factual inquiry concerning whether a
release has caused response costs would implicate
whether an alleged polluter’s waste caused response
costs. Alcan-Butler, 964 F.2d at 266. We agree with
the Third Circuit that Amoco Oil is distinguishable.
A-30
III Divisibility
A. General Principles
[17}{18] Having rejected Alcan’s proffered
defenses to liability, one would suppose there is no
limit to the scope of CERCLA liability. To avoid such
a harsh result courts have added a common law gloss
onto the statutory framework. They have at once
adopted a scheme of joint and several liability but at
the same time have limited somewhat the availability
of such liability against multiple defendants charged
with adding hazardous substances to a Superfund site.
See, e.g., O’Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178-79 (1st
Cir.1989), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1071, 110 S.Ct. 1115,
107 L.Ed.2d 1022 (1990); United States uv.
Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F.Supp. 802, 808 (S.D.Ohio
1983). The Restatement (Second) of Torts § 433A
(1965) has been relied upon in determining whether
a party should be held jointly and severally liable, for
the entire cost of remediating environmental harm at
the site. See,eg., Alcan-Butler, 964 F.2d at 268-69;
O’Neil, 883 F.2d at 178; Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 171-73;
see also United States v. R.W. Meyer, 889 F.2d 1497,
1506-08 (6th Cir.1989). Under § 433A of the
Restatement where two or more joint tortfeasors act
independently and cause a distinct or single harm, for
which there is a reasonable basis for division
according to the contribution of each, then each is
liable for damages only for its own portion of the
harm. In other words, the damages are apportioned.
But where each tortfeasor causes a single indivisible
harm, then damages are not apportioned and each is
liable in damages for the entire harm.
A-3l
[19-23] Based on these common law principles, Alcan
may escape any liability for response costs if it either
succeeds in proving that its oil emulsion, when mixed with
other hazardous wastes, did not contribute to the release
and the clean-up costs that followed, or contributed at most
to only a divisible portion of the harm. See Alcan-Butler,
964 F.2d at 270. Alcan as the polluter bears the ultimate
burden of establishing a reasonable basis for apportioning
liability. See Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 172; Chem-Dyne, 572
F.Supp. at 810. The government has no burden of proof
with respect to what caused the release of hazardous waste
and triggered response costs. It is the defendant that bears
that burden. To defeat the government’s motion for
summary judgment on the issue of divisibility, Alcan need
only show that there are genuine issues of material fact
regarding a reasonable basis for apportionment of liability.
As other courts have noted, apportionment itself is an
intensely factual determination. See, e.g., Chem-Dyne, 572
F.Supp. at 811.
[24] In so ruling we candidly admit that causation is
being brought back into the case--through the backdoor,
after being denied entry at the frontdoor--at the
apportionment stage. We hasten to add nonetheless that
causation--with the burden on defendant--is reintroduced
only to permit a defendant to escape payment where its
pollutants did not contribute more than background
contamination and also cannot concentrate. To state this
standard in other words, we adopt a special exception to
the usual absence of a causation requirement, but the
exception is applicable only to claims, like Alcan’s, where
background levels are not exceeded. And, we recognize
this limited exception only in the absence of any EPA
thresholds.
A - 32
[25] Contrary to the government’s position,
commingling is not synonymous with indivisible harm,
and Alcan should have the opportunity to show that
the harm caused at PAS was capable of reasonable
apportionment. It may present evidence relevant to
establishing divisibility of harm, such as, proof
disclosing the relative toxicity, migratory potential,
degree of migration, and synergistic capacities of the
hazardous substances at the site. See Alcan-Butler,
964 F.2d at 270 n. 29, 271; Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 172
n. 26.
Alcan declares that the response actions at PAS
were attributable to substances such as PCB’s, nitro
benzene, phenol, dichlonoethone, toluene, and
benzene. It contends that no soil contamination due
to heavy metals was found there, and insists that the
metallic constituents of its oil emulsion are insoluble
compounds, submitting an affidavit supporting this
theory of divisibility. The government submitted a
declaration stating that metal contaminants like those
found in Alcan’s waste emulsion were present in
environmental media at PAS, that the commingling of
metallic and organic hazardous substances resulted in
indivisible harm, and that though some forms of lead,
cadmium and chromium are insoluble, they may
chemically react with substances and become
water-soluble. These differing contentions supported
by expert affidavits raise sufficient questions of fact to
preclude the granting of summary judgment on the
divisibility issue.
A - 33
B. Timing of the Divisibility Issue
[26] The Third Circuit concluded that a
divisibility inquiry is one "best resolved at the initial
liability phase" because it involves "relative degrees of
liability." See Alcan-Butler, 964 F.2d at 270, n. 29
(emphasis in original). Although we prefer this
common sense approach, it may be contrary to the
statutory dictates of CERCLA. In Shore Realty Corp.,
759 F.2d at 1032, we reviewed CERCLA’s language
and legislative history and concluded that the federal
government through the EPA responds to releases or
threatened releases of hazardous substances
immediately and later attempts to collect the
remediation costs from others. See id. at 1041. We
also determined, as previously stated, that importing
a causation requirement into the strict liability of §
9607(a) would render the affirmative defenses in §
9607(b) superfluous. Jd. at 1044-45. Legislative
support for that view is found in House Report No.
96-1016’s statement of the purpose of the original bill.
It envisioned that the EPA would "pursue rapid
recovery of the costs" incurred in clean-up. H.R.Rep.
No. 96-1016, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 17, reprinted in 1980
U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119, 6120.
A similar review of the legislative history of
CERCLA and the SARA amendments of 1986 was
undertaken in Murtha, which construes the Act and
its amendments to enable the EPA to respond
"efficiently and expeditiously" to environmental
threats and to hold the parties responsible liable for
the cleanup costs in an action by the EPA to recoup
them. See Murtha, 958 F.2d at 1198. In those cases
A - 34
where this burden of recoupment costs is unfair or
disproportionate, such may be alleviated under §
9613(f)(1) after the response costs are fixed. Id. at
1206. Again, we are told in the Judicial Review
portion of House Report No. 99-253(I) that "[t]o avoid
delay of cleanups and to minimize litigation,
responsible parties would be allowed to challenge the
cleanup remedy after acknowledging liability for the
hazardous waste site." H.R.Rep. No. 99-253(1), 99th
Cong., 2d Sess. 59, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.AN.
2835, 2841 (emphasis added). The administrator of
the EPA, who was primarily responsible for drafting
the SARA amendments, at the time of their
enactment declared they would "[e]xpedite civil
actions by requiring that separate suits be brought
against other potentially liable parties for contribution
after judgment or settlement in enforcement actions."
Id. at 124, 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 2906 (emphasis
added).
Consequently, the language of CERCLA and
SARA and their legislative histories appear to
demonstrate the following chronology: liability is
fixed first and immediately for enforcement purposes;
litigation later to sort out what contribution is owed
and by whom as a result of the remediation effort.
But we do not rule that this chronology be followed or
that the Alcan-Butler approach of deciding divisibility
at the initial liability phase of the case is the best way
for the district court to proceed. Instead, the choice
as to when to address divisibility and apportionment
are questions best left to the sound discretion of the
trial court in the handling of an individual case.
==
ee ne ee
A - 35
IV Cornell
A. Potentially Liable Party under CERCLA
[27] Cornell believes it should be shielded from
liability for contribution by virtue of having resolved
its liability to the United States and the State of New
York. We discuss first whether Cornell is a
potentially liable party under CERCLA § 9607.
CERCLA § 9613(f)(1) provides that "[aJny person may
seek contribution from any other person who is liable
or potentially liable under section [9607(a) ]." §
9613(f)(1). Of the four classes of individuals subject to
liability under § 9607(a), Cornell submits that only
the third--any person who by contract, agreement or
otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment of
hazardous substances--is relevant because it
contracted to have its coal run-off sent to PAS. But,
it continues, because the EPA removed the University
from the list of those potentially responsible parties,
a fortiori, it may not be a potentially liable party
under § 9607(a). Alcan responds that Cornell’s coal
waste water was essentially the same as Alcan’s oil
emulsion, and that there is no principled basis under
the statute for treating Cornell differently.
The statutory language imposes liability and
contribution upon “any person" who arranges for
disposal of waste at a facility. Under the plain
meaning of this language it is difficult to see how
Cornell could avoid being included. Cornell points to
no cases that in fact have drawn the distinction it
urges us_ to adopt. Hence, Cornell is a potentially
liable party under s 9607(a)(3)
A - 36
B. Retroactive Application of SARA
[28] Cornell was removed by the EPA in March
1986 from the list of potentially responsible parties
before the SARA amendments’ proceedings for
contribution under s 9613 became effective on October
17, 1986. Compelled contribution, in its view, could
therefore only occur as a result of retroactive
application of SARA.
[29-31] If that statement reflected the whole
matter, we would agree. There is a_ strong
presumption against the retrospective application of a
statute. It is familiar law, the Supreme Court
instructs, that while judicial decisions operate
retrospectively, statutes look only to the future. See
United States v. Security Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 79,
103 S.Ct. 407, 413, 74 L.Ed.2d 235 (1982). No law,
including SARA, should be construed retrospectively
unless Congress’ purpose can be satisfied in no other
way or unless the statutory language admits of no
other meaning. See United States Fidelity & Guar.
Co. v. Struthers Wells Co., 209 U.S. 306, 314, 28 S.Ct.
537, 539, 52 L.Ed. 804 (1908). Yet, in apparent
conflict with this rule there is another principle: that
a court should apply law existing at the time of its
decision unless to do so is contrary to the plain
meaning of a statute or would cause manifest
injustice. See Bradley v. Richmond Sch. Bd., 416 U.S.
696, 711, 94 S.Ct. 2006, 2016, 40 L.Ed.2d 476 (1974).
Fortunately, we need not choose between these
conflicting precedents, see Kaiser Aluminum & Chem.
Corp. v. Bonjorno, 494 U.S. 827, 836-37, 110 S.Ct.
a
A - 37
1570, 1576-77, 108 L.Ed.2d 842 (1990), because in the
case at hand the outcome is the same under either
rule. Cf. Litton Sys., Inc. v. American Tel. & Tel. Co.,
746 F.2d 168, 170-71 (2d Cir.1984) (Bradley rule
applies only to cases pending on direct appeal at time
change in law occurs).
Prior to the 1986 SARA amendments to
CERCLA, federal common law principles applied, and
these rules did not shield Cornell from having
contribution sought from it. See United States v.
Conservation Chem. Co., 628 F.Supp. 391, 402
(W.D.Mo.1985) (invoking 1977 Uniform Comparative
Fault Act as to pre-SARA settlement). SARA’s 1986
provision in s 9613(f) for a statutory cause of action
for contribution codifies what had been generally held
implicit under the 1980 Act. See H.R.Rep. No.
99-253(1), 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 79, reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2861 (SARA “confirms” federal
right of contribution under CERCLA). In that Act
courts are granted implicit authority, using
appropriate equitable factors, to "allocate response
costs among liable parties." O’Neil, 883 F.2d at 179.
Hence, we are not applying SARA retroactively in
order to hold Cornell liable for contribution as the
University asserts; rather, we are relying on common
law principles that predated SARA.
C. Required to Contribute
(32) The last point Cornell raises is that since it
resolved its liability in an administratively approved
settlement, it should be insulated from any
requirement to contribute. CERCLA § 9613(f)(2)
provides that a “person who has resolved its liability
A - 38
to the United States or a State in an administrative or
judicially approved settlement shall not be liable for
claims for contribution." § 9613(f)(2).
The district court thought § 9613 was
inapplicable and that the EPA and Cornell did not
settle any question of liability. Rather, it believed the
government--employing prosecutorial
discretion--simmply chose not to sue Cornell. The
University naturally views the situation quite
differently. Itasserts this is not a case of prosecutorial
discretion. We are told instead that the government
entered into negotiations with the University,
requested and received technical studies from it, and
ultimately decided not to hold it liable. This
interaction, according to Cornell, constitutes an
“administrative settlement."
[33] Although this argument appears at first
blush to be compelling, upon closer examination it
does not carry the day. First, if the SARA
amendments were to be applied retrospectively, the
negotiations between Cornell and the EPA did not
amount to an "administrative settlement" because
those procedural steps necessary to effectuate a
settlement under CERCLA s 9622 were not followed.
Section 9622, which deals in part with de minimis
settlements, states that a settlement "shall be entered
as a consent decree or embodied in an administrative
order setting forth the terms of the settlement," and
where the total response costs exceed $500,000, as
they do here, such an order may only be issued "with
the prior written approval of the Attorney General."
42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(4). Further settlement procedures
i anes ae ceiiameaaendieaaal
A - 39
procedures set forth in § 9622(i)(1) include notice of
such being published in the Federal Register, which
concededly did not take place in the instant case.
Only when these procedures are followed is a party
shielded from a contribution claim.
[34] Second, applying the SARA amendments
prospectively, Cornell has not met the requirements
for protection from contribution under federal
common law. Under § 6 of the Uniform Comparative
Fault Act, "[a] release, covenant not to sue, or similar
agreement entered into by a claimant and a person
liable discharges that person from all liability for
contribution." See Conservation Chem. Co., 628
F.Supp. at 402 (principles of 1977 Uniform
Comparative Fault Act are "the most consistent with,
and do the most to implement" congressional intent
underlying CERCLA). The EPA merely advised
Cornell that it was removing Cornell from the list of
potentially responsible parties. The EPA and Cornell
did not enter into a release, covenant not to sue, or
any other similar, legally binding agreement.
We are satisfied therefore that the district court
properly found Cornell liable or potentially liable
under § 9607(a) of the Act and that federal common
law rules under § 9613(f)(1) made Cornell liable to a
suit for contribution. Having said this, we note that
if at the directed hearing Alcan succeeds on any issue
and has its contribution reduced, Cornell’s share
should also be reduced since it has been determined
that its contribution is fixed at six percent of Alcan’s.
As an equitable consideration, the University should
also be given an opportunity to have its waste water
A - 40
claim evaluated in the same light as Alcan’s similar
claim. If indeed, as Cornell claims, it can show that
the University’s wastes did not, when mixed with
other wastes, contribute to the release or resultant
response costs, then Cornell should succeed on this §
9604(a){3) issue, and it would of course avoid any
liability or contribution.
CONCLUSION
After careful consideration of all the other
arguments raised by the parties, we find they do not
need to be addressed as our opinion fully disposes of
them. Accordingly, for the reasons stated the district
court’s amended final judgment of May 29, 1992 is
affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part, and remanded
for further proceedings, and the order of January 15,
1991 is also remanded for further proceedings, both
consistent with this opinion.
A- 41
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA and
State of New York,
Plaintiffs,
Vv.
ALCAN ALUMINUM CORP., et al.,
Defendants.
ALCAN ALUMINUM CORP.,
Third-Party Plaintiff,
Vv.
CORNELL UNIVERSITY,
Third-Party Defendant.
No. 87-CV-920.
United States District Court,
N.D. New York.
Jan. 15, 1991.
United States and State of New York sought to
recover response costs for cleanup of hazardous waste
site. The District Court, McAvoy, J., held that: (1)
party whose wastes were deposited at the site and
whose waste contained hazardous materials was liable
despite claim that the hazardous substances were
present in the waste at less than normal background
levels; (2) there is no requirement in CERCLA that
an element or compound have a reportable quantity in
order for it to be hazardous; (3) particular substance
A - 42
need not be in a specific chemical form in order to be
hazardous; but (4) responsible party was entitled to
contribution from another party.
Ordered accordingly.
[1] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)
Liability under CERCLA is strict, and is joint and
severable unless the defendant demonstrates that the
harm is indivisible. Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, §
107(a), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a).
[2] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)
Liability under CERCLA in a cost recovery action
presents an issue separate and distinct from that
posed by the issue regarding which incurred response
cost the defendant is obligated to pay.
Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, § 107(a), as
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a).
[3] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)
Hazardous substances under CERCLA include all
substances so designated under other statutes
pursuant to the grant of authority contained therein,
in addition to substances so designated by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) pursuant to
the grant of authority in CERCLA. Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980, § 101(14), 102(a), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A.
§§ 9601(14), 9602(a).
[4] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)
CERCLA does not impose any quantitative
A - 43
requirement on the term “hazardous substance," and
the mere listing of an element, compound, or
hazardous waste establishes that a substance is
hazardous as a matter of law. Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980, §§ 101(14), 102(a), as amended, 42
U.S.C.A. §§ 9601(14), 9602(a).
[5] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)
Substance need not be in a specific chemical
form, such as one making it water soluble, in order to
be hazardous for purposes of CERCLA, and a
compound containing a listed element found in the
released matter need not itself be specifically and
separably listed in order to be a hazardous substance
for purposes of CERCLA. Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of §1980, §§ 101(14), 102(a), as amended, 42
U.S.C.A.§ § 9601(14), 9602(a).
[6] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)
There is no requirement in the CERCLA
statutory or regulatory scheme that an element or
compound have a reportable quantity in order for it to
be hazardous. Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, §§
101(14), 102(a), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 9601(14),
9602(a).
(7] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)
Fact that emulsion which had been deposited at
hazardous waste site contained level of metals
designated as hazardous substances well below that
found in virgin oil did not bring that waste within the
A- 44
petroleum exception to CERCLA. Comprehensive
Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability
Act of 1980, § 101(14), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. §
9601(14).
[8] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)
Petroleum exception to CERCLA does not include
oil which has become contaminated with hazardous
substances through use; that which comes within the
ambit of the petroleum exception is oil or oil fraction
which naturally contains the hazardous substances.
Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, § 101(14), as
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9601(14).
[9] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(2)
CERCLA is not void for vagueness.
Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, § 107, as
amended, 42 U.S.C.A.§ 9607.
[10] STATUTES k47
To withstand void for vagueness challenge, it is
sufficient if the meaning of the statutory or regulatory
language is discoverable from its context.
[11] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(10)
Party which had produced emulsion which had
been deposited at hazardous waste site did not show
selective prosecution under CERCLA in view of fact
that it was one of 83 named defendants with respect
to that site. Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, § 107, as
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607.
ee ed a ee eee ee
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(12) HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)
Costs which may be covered under CERCLA
include those for such activities as investigations,
monitoring, and testing to identify the extent of
danger to the public health or welfare or the
environment, or to identify the extent of the release
of hazardous substances, and planning and
implementation of a response action; also recoverable
are indirect costs associated with those items and with
the enforcement of CERCLA provisions, including
administrative costs incurred by the staffs of the
regulatory agencies involved and by the Department
of Justice. Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, §§
101(23-25), 107(a), as amended, 42 US.CAs55§
9601(23-25), 9607(a).
[13] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.15(5.1)
Party from whom response costs are sought
under CERCLA bears the burden of proof on the issue
of severability. Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, s
107(a), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A.§ 9607(a).
[14] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)
Environmental harm inflicted at hazardous waste
site was indivisible, so that responsible party was
jointly and severably liable for recovery costs, where
contaminants found in the soil and water were
commingled. Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, §
107(a), as amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a).
A - 46
[15] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)
All that is required for the recovery of CERCLA
cleanup costs is that there be a release or a
threatened release of a hazardous substance which
causes the incurrence of response costs.
Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, § 107(a), as
amended, 42 U.S.C.A.§ 9607(a).
[16] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)
There is no requirement that plaintiff seeking to
recover response costs under CERCLA demonstrate a
causal nexus between defendant’s conduct and the
contamination of the property involved; what is
required, at most, is that the plaintiff demonstrate
some relationship between the release and a response.
Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, § 107(a), as
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9607(a).
[17] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)
Government seeking to recover response costs
under CERCLA need not trace releases of hazardous
substances to a particular responsible party; it is
sufficient if the site contains hazardous substances
found in that party’s waste which were dumped at
that site. Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, § 107(a), as
amended, 42 U.S.C.A.§ 9607(a).
[18] HEALTH AND ENVIRONMENT k25.5(5.5)
Party whose wastes were dumped at hazardous
waste site and which contained hazardous substances
found at the site could not avoid liability under
A - 47
CERCLA on the grounds that the contaminants were
not in a sufficiently high concentration to warrant the
response. Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, § 107(a), as
amended, 42 U.S.C.A.§ 9607(a).
[19] CONTRIBUTION k5(6)
Where no settlement was entered into at the
administrative or judicial level between potentially
responsible party and the United States with respect
to response costs and the party was merely dropped as
a potentially responsible party, it could be held liable
for contribution to another responsible party.
Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, § 122(g), as
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9622(g).
[20] CONTRIBUTION ks
Party which had been dropped as a potentially
responsible party during administrative proceedings
could not avoid contribution to responsible party for
CERCLA response costs on the grounds that it had
never had the opportunity to participate in the judicial
settlement to establish its de minimus status.
Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, § 122(g), as
amended, 42 U.S.C.A. § 9622(g).
Frederick J. Scullin, Jr., U.S. Atty. (Craig A. Benedict,
of counsel), Syracuse, N.Y., and Richard B. Stewart,
Asst. Atty. Gen. Land and Natural Resources Div.,
Environmental Enforcement Section (Michael Bardee,
Henry Friedman, of counsel), Washington, D.C., for
plaintiff U.S.
A - 48
Robert Abrams, Atty. Gen. State of N.Y. (David A.
Munro, Karen Kimball, of counsel), Albany, N.Y., for
plaintiff State of N.Y.
Lawrence A. Salibra, II, Cleveland, Ohio, for defendant
Alcan Aluminum Corp.
Thomas Mead Santoro, Patricia McClary, Cornell
University, Office of University Counsel, Ithaca, N.Y.,
for third-party defendant Cornell University.
MEMORANDUM-DECISION AND ORDER
McAVOY, District Judge.
Introduction
By this action, the United States of America and
the State of New York initially sought to recover from
some 83 business entities response costs under section
107 of the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C.
§ 9607 (as amended), in connection with the clean-up
of an inactive hazardous waste site formerly owned by
Pollution Abatement Services of Oswego, Inc. (PAS)
and currently owned by the County of Oswego. At the
time the action was commenced, those costs exceeded
$12 million. Shortly after commencement, plaintiffs
entered into a consent decree with 82 of the
defendants recovering some $9,105,308.17; Alcan
Aluminum Corp. was the lone holdout and the suit
continued as against it for the difference between the
stipulated amount of incurred costs ($12,319,551.04)
and the amount recovered in the partial settlement.
Additional costs have been incurred since then and
A- 49
currently total in excess of $13 million. Discovery
having been concluded, the parties’ dispute (in the
main action) is before the court on cross motions for
summary judgment. The third-party action is also
before the court on cross motions for summary
judgment. For the reasons that follow, the court
grants the motions of the United States and the State
of New York as against Alcan Aluminum Corp. in their
entirety in the main action and thereby denies Alcan’s
motion; insofar as the third-party action is concerned,
_ the court grants Alcan’s motion to the extent of
declaring that third-party defendant Cornell
University is also liable for its fair share of response
costs incurred by the United States and the State of
New York and accordingly denies the motion of
Cornell University. A hearing is necessary to
determine the amount of that fair share.
Background
A. Historical
From approximately 1970 until 1977, various
chemical waste materials were received for disposal or
treatment at the PAS site. As a result of PAS
operations, the site’s surface became contaminated by
hazardous substances because of wastes leaching from
drums, lagoons being overtopped and surface runoff.
During the 1970 through 1977 period, Alcan, by
contract, agreement or otherwise, arranged for the
disposal or treatment at the PAS facility 4,607,380
gallons of an emulsion generated at its plant in
Oswego, New York in conjunction with the hot rolling
of aluminum ingots. (In addition to aluminum, the
ingots used by Alcan contained chromium, copper, lead
A - 50
and zinc.) The Alcan emulsion, basically a mixture of
water (primarily) and mineral oil, was circulated and
recirculated through the rolls, picking up fragments of
ingots containing aluminum, chromium, copper, lead
and zinc in the process, until removed from the
manufacturing process and sent to the PAS facility.
(In addition to aluminum, chromium, copper, lead and
zinc, defendant concedes that its emulsion contained
cadmium.) During this period, Alcan, by contract,
agreement or otherwise also arranged for the disposal
at the PAS facility of 200 gallons of polychlorinated
biphenyls.
In 1976 and 1977, the United States began
undertaking response measures at the PAS site; in
1978, the State, in conjunction with the United States,
conducted a surficial cleanup which included removing
4,000 drums from the site; in 1982, the United States
and the State entered into a formal cooperative
agreement to address the environmental problem
posed by the PAS site. This lawsuit followed.
B. Statutory
Through CERCLA, enacted in 1980 as a
comprehensive response to the environmental threat
posed by the disposal of hazardous substances,
Congress has provided the federal government and
the States, through cooperative agreements with the
Environmental Protection Agency, with an effective
means to clean up toxic waste sites around the
country and with the authority to force those persons
responsible for creating the hazardous conditions to
bear the cost of the cleanups. See United States v.
Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d 160, 167 and n. 8 (4th
A-65l
Cir.1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1106, 109 S.Ct. 3156,
104 L.Ed.2d 1019 (1989); Dedham Water Co. v.
Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081
(1st Cir.1986); State of New York v. Shore Realty, 759
F.2d 1032, 1040-1041 (2d Cir.1985); 42 U.S.C. §§
9604(d)(1) and 9607(a) (1983 and Supp.1990). In
pertinent part, CERCLA provides as _ follows:
Notwithstanding any other provision or rule of
law, and subject only to the defenses set forth in
subsection (b) of this section--
(3) any person who by contract, agreement, or
otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment ... of
hazardous substances owned or possessed by such
person ... at any facility ... owned or operated by
another party or entity and containing such
hazardous substances
.. from which there is a release, or threatened
release which causes the incurrence of response
costs, of a hazardous substance, shall be liable
for--
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action
incurred by the United States Government or a
State ... not inconsistent with the national
contingency plan{.) 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(3)
(Supp.1990); see also Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at
1043, 1043 n. 16 (commenting on the correct
construction of section 9607(a)).
(1, 2] As various courts have noted, liability under
CERCLA, which is strict, Shore Realty, 759 F.2d at
1044, and joint and several unless the defendant
A - 52
demonstrates that the harm is divisible, O’Neil v.
Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178-179 (1st Cir.1989), cert.
denied sub nom. American Cyanamid Co. v. O’Neil, ---
US. ----, 110 S.Ct. 1115, 107 L.Ed.2d 1022 (1990),
would be established in this "cost recovery" action if
the plaintiffs prove each of the following:
1) the PAS site is a “facility” within the meaning
of 42 U.S.C.§ 9601(9)(B);
2) a "release", see 42 U.S.C. § 9601(22), or
"threatened release" of hazardous substances, see
42 U.S.C. § 9601(14), has occurred at the PAS
site;
3) the release or threatened release has caused
the United States and the State of New York to
incur response costs, see 42 U.S.C. § 9607; and
4) Alcan falls with at least one of the four classes
of responsible persons described in 42 U.S.C. §
9607(a), see United States v. Aceto Agricultural
Chemicals Corp., 872 F.2d 1373, 1378-1379 (8th
Cir.1989); see also Amoco Oil Co. v. Borden, Inc.,
889 F.2d 664, 668 (5th Cir.1989); Dedham Water
Co. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d
1146, 1150 (1st Cir.1989); Shore Realty, 759 F.2d
at 1043-1045, and if Alcan fails to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence one of the three
narrow defenses provided by 42 U.S.C. § 9607(b),
Amoco Oil, 889 F.2d at 668; Shore Realty, 759
F.2d at 1042, 1044. Liability under CERCLA in
a "cost recovery” action presents an issue separate
and distinct from that posed by the issue
regarding which incurred response costs
defendant is obligated to pay. Amoco Oil, 889
F.2d at 668.
A - 53
Discussion
A. Alcan’s liability
Much of what plaintiffs need to prove in order for
liability to be imposed on Alcan is not in dispute. In
its attempt to resist liability, Alcan argues essentially
that the concentrations of cadmium, chromium,
copper, lead and zinc in its emulsion are less than
background levels and, therefore, do not constitute
hazardous substances under CERCLA. Slightly more
specifically, Alcan seeks to have this court read into
the statutory and regulatory scheme (1) a
requirement that in order for the listed substances to
be deemed "hazardous" these substances must be
present in a certain amount or concentration and (2)
a requirement that the listed substance be present in
a "harmful" form, after all, defendant argues, several
of these substances and many listed by the EPA occur
naturally and are even essential to the continued
existence of life. Underlying defendant’s position,
however, is, perhaps, the more fundamental
argument, related to its argument that substances
must be in a specific form in order to be deemed
"hazardous," that its waste oil emulsion and the
substances it concedes were contained therein are not
specifically listed in the 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 Table of
Hazardous Substances and, therefore, the court must
apply the provisions of 40 C.F.R. s 302.4(b) pertaining
to unlisted substances in order to determine whether
its waste oil emv'sion and the cadmium, chromium,
copper, lead and zinc contained therein are "hazardous
substances” under CERCLA. This is so, defendant
argues, because the “generic headings” in the Table
302.4 list do not have a Chemical Abstract Service
Registry Number, a Reportable Quantity or a
A - 54
Resource Conservation and Recovery Act number.
For the reasons that follow, defendant’s position is
rejected as meritless; suffice it to say that the court
will not rewrite the statutory and regulatory scheme
to suit defendant’s needs and desires. Congress and
the EPA, through a congressional grant of authority,
have spoken; the court’s task is to apply the law in as
straightforward a manner as possible, consistent with
the dictates of the Constitution, so as to give full
effect to the policy underlying CERCLA.
[3] A "hazardous substance” is defined in CERCLA
by reference to its provisions and to that of other
environmenta! statutes. Specifically, Congress has
provided that
[t]he term “hazardous substance” means (A) any
substance designated pursuant to section
1321(b)(2)(A) of Title 33, (B) any element,
compound, mixture, solution, or [t]he term
“hazardous substance” means (A) any substance
designated pursuant to section 1321(b)(2)(A) of
Title 33, (B) any element, compound, mixture,
solution, or substance designated pursuant to
section 9602 of this title, (C) any hazardous waste
having the characteristics identified under or
listed pursuant to section 3001 of the Solid Waste
Disposal Act (but not including any waste the
regulation of which under the Solid Waste
Disposal Act has been suspended by Act of
Congress), (D) any toxic pollutant listed under
section 1317(a) of Title 33, (E) any hazardous air
pollutant listed under section 112 of the Clean
Air Act, and (F) any imminently hazardous
chemical substance or mixture with respect to
A - 55
which the Administrator has taken action
pursuant to section 2606 of Title 15. The term
does not include petroleum, including crude oil
or any fraction thereof which is not otherwise
specifically listed or designated as a hazardous
substance under subparagraphs (A) through (F)
of this paragraph, and the term does not include
natural gas, natural gas liquids, liquified natural
gas, or synthetic gas usable for fuel (or mixtures
of natural gas and such synthetic gas).
42 U.S.C. § 9601(14) (Supp.1990); see also id.§ 9602(a)
(Supp.1990) (authorizing the Administrator to
designate additional substances which, when released
into the environment, may present substantial danger
to the public health or welfare or the environment).
Hazardous substances under CERCLA, then, include
all substances so designated under other statutes
pursuant to the grant of authority contained therein
in addition to sutances so designated by the EPA
pursuant to the grant of authority under 42 U.S.C. §
9602(a). See United States v. Monsanto Co., 858 F.2d
at 165 n. 4. Accordingly, pursuant to the various
grants of authority under other environmental laws,
the EPA has promulgated a list of “hazardous
substances" under section 311(b)(2)(A) of the Clean
Water Act (codified at 40 C.F.R. Table 116.4 (1990)),
a list of "toxic pollutants" under section 307(a) of the
Clean Water Act (codified at 40 C.F.R. § 401.15
(1990)), a list of "hazardous wastes" under section
3001 of the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(appearing at 40 C.F.R. §§ 261.30-261.33 (1990)), and
a list of "hazardous air pollutants" pursuant to section
112 of the Clean Air Act (codified at 40 C.F.R. s
61.01(a) (1989)). Additionally, pertinent CERCLA
A - 56
regulations provide that " "[hJazardous substance’
means any substance designated pursuant to 40 CFR
Part 302," 40 C.F.R. § 302.3 (1989), and that "[t]he
elements and compounds and hazardous wastes
appearing in Table 302.4 are designated as hazardous
substances under section 102(a) of the Act [i.e., 42
U.S.C. § 9602(a) ]," 40 C.F.R. § 302.4 (1989). It bears
noting, however, that each of the elements,
compounds and hazardous wastes appear on the Table
302.4 List of Hazardous Substances by virtue of one or
more of four statutory sources--to wit, sections 307(a)
and 311(b)(4) of the Clean Water Act, section 112 of
the Clean Air Act and section 3001 of the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act. See 40 C.F.R. § 302.4
note and Table 302.4 footnotes. Table 302.4, then,
appears to be nothing more than a compilation of
hazardous substances so designated already under the
Clean Water Act, the Clean Air Act and the Resource
Conservation and Recovery Act.
[4-6] In response to defendant’s argument, suffice
it to say that "[t]he plain statutory language fails to
impose any quantitative requirement on the term
hazardous substance," Amoco Oil, 889 F.2d at 669, and,
as noted in Amoco Oil, that the mere listing of an
element, compound or hazardous waste establishes
that a substance is hazardous as a matter of law is a
holding supported by courts that have considered the
definitional requirements of the term and the
congressional comments contained in the legislative
history, id. (citing Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland
Farms Dairy, Inc., 889 F.2d at 1151-1152; Eagle-Picher
Indus. v. United States, 759 F.2d 922, 927
(D.C.Cir.1985); City of New York v. Exxon Corporation,
fe
se
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Bs
Z
?
5
3
ARERR RIAL AN OP RIT HORAN tHE IDE oD iS REE mo tant Nini LAND
A - 57
744 F.Supp. 474, 483-487 (S.D.N.Y.1990); United
States v. Metate Asbestos Corp., 584 F.Supp. 1143,
1147 (D.Ariz.1984)); United States v. ‘arolawn Co., 21
Env’t Rep.Cas. (BNA) 2124, 2125, 2126 (D.S.C.1984);
see also United States v. Western Processing Co., Inc.,
734 F.Supp. 930, 936 (W.D.Wash.1990) (government
need not prove that the release was above background
levels; the principle that the law does not concern
itself with trifles is not a defense to CERCLA
liability); United States v. Nicolet, Inc., 712 F.Supp.
1205, 1207 (E.D.Pa.1989) (noting that, "as long as a
substance is on one or more of the lists identified at
42 U.S.C. § 9601(14), it is a hazardous substance
irrespective of the volume or concentration of the
substance found at the site in question"). In the
court’s view, there is no principled basis upon which
to deviate from the foregoing rule that the mere
listing of a substance by EPA renders that substance
hazardous. That various listed substances are
naturally found in the environment (i.e., in the normal
course of events) does not stand in the way of
imposing liability against a generator of that
substance--the corporate generator, a non-natural
person, has added to what nature has already seen fit
to provide for the continued existence of various life
forms on this planet; that Congress has enacted laws
to limit, and perhaps limit quite severely, additions to
nature »r the sake of the environment and of life on
this plaret seems eminently reasonable. Similarly,
there is simply nothing in the statute or the
regulat:: 1s which supports the view that a particular
substance is "hazardous" only if it is in a specific
chemical form, that is, in a form that makes the
substance water-soluble. Also, the compound
A - 58
containing a listed element found in the released
matter need not itself be specifically and separately
listed--such compounds are hazardous substances
under CERCLA by virtue of their inclusion, insofar as
is pertinent here, in the specifically listed generic or
broad class of elements and compounds designated
under section 307(a)(1) of the Clean Water Act:
“chromium and compounds," "copper and compounds,"
"lead and compounds," and "zinc and compounds" are
expressly so included in "the list of toxic pollutants
designated pursuant to section 307(a)(1) of the [Clean
Water] Act,” 40 C.F.R. § 401.15 (1990), thereby
rendering all of these elements and their compounds
"hazardous substances” under CERCLA; this list was
expressly made a_ part of the Table 302.4 List of
Hazardous Substances. That the generic or broad
class of hazardous elements and compounds does not
itself have a "Chemical Abstract Service Registry
Number" (CASRN) is immaterial inasmuch as that
number appears only for the convenience of the user.
See 40 C.F.R.§ 116.4. That the generic or broad class
of hazardous ¢!sments and compounds was not
assigned a fina’ {Q (Reportab‘:; Quantity), a quantity
of the hazardous substar:e ine release of which
requires notification, see 40 C.F.R. §§302.3, 302.5 and
302.6, although it has been assigned a statutory RQ,
is also immaterial inasmuch as a substance is deemed
hazardous presumably because of the unacceptable
risks it poses to human health and to the
environment. There is simply no requirement in the
statutory or regulatory scheme that an element or
compound have an RQ in order for it to be
"hazardous," and, in fact, the statutory scheme reveals
otherwise. The term “hazardous substance" includes
A - 59
any toxic pollutant listed under section 307(#.’ uf the
Clean Water Act, see 42 U.S.C. § 9601(14)(%), yet
these listed toxic pollutants do not have a fival RQ
(nor do they have : CASRN, for that matter)
The court notes in passing its disagreement with
the court in City of New York v. Exxon Corporition to
the extent that that court appears to have held, at
least preliminarily, that 40 C.F.R. § 302(b) and not
section 302(a) is appiicable to determining whether
Alcan’s waste oil emulsion or the specific compounds
in it are hazardous substances under CERCLA
because the waste oil emulsion and the specific
compounds found therein are not squarely listed in
Table 302.4. See 744 F.Supp. at 487-488. Suffice it to
say, first, that Alcan has conceded that its waste oil
emulsion contained cadmium, chromium, copper, lead
and zinc and, second, that these elements and all their
respective compounds are hazardous substances
under CERCLA by virtue of their designation as toxic
pollutants under the Clean Water Act which list was,
as has already been noted, included, pursuant to 42
U.S.C. § 9601(14)(B) and perhaps reduntantly so, in
the Table 302.4 List of Hazardous Substances and
Reportable Qantities; as such, the court need not
ever consider the pertinence of 40 C.F.R. § 302.4(b)
(and the regulations--40 C.F.R. §§ 261.2, .4(b) and
.20-.24--referenced therein) and therefore it is
unnecessary for the court to engage in any discussion
of ignitability, corrosivity, reactivity or EP (Extract
Procedures) toxicity to determine whether a
substance is to be deemded "hazardous."
The court also notes its disagreement with the
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court in Amoco Oil to the extent that that court has
seemingly read into the language of 42 U.S.C.§
9607(a)(4) the requirement *539 that, in order for a
release of a hazardous substance to have caused (and
justified) the incurrence of response costs, and hence
in order for there to be liability, the release violate
some applicable State or Federal standard imposing a
threshold quantity or concentration requirement. See
889 F.2d at 669-672. In essence, that court, while
recognizing that the "plain statutory language fails to
impose any quantitative requirement on the term
hazardous substance," id. at 669, has imposed such a
requirement on the imposition of liability in the
attempt to limit the scope thereof. Suffice it to say
that such an interpretation (which the Amoco
Oil court conceded necessitated the "ent[ry] of
unexplored territory," id. at 670) is not warranted by
the plain language of the statute and in fact appears
to conflict with that language. See United States v.
Western Processing Co., 734 F.Supp. at 936-937 and
941-942 (concluding that Amoco Oil should be confined
to its facts and implicitly calling that court’s reasoning
into doubt).
[7][8] As part of its effort to resist liability,
defendant also argues that the "petroleum exception"
to the term "hazardous substance" is applicable here.
The pertinent CERCLA provision, 42 U.S.C. §
9601(14) (defining "hazardous substance") (quoted
above), states that "[hazardous substance] does not
include petroleum, including crude oil or any fraction
thereof which is not otherwise specifically listed or
designated as a hazardous substance under
subparagraphs (A) through (F) of this paragraph..."
|
iB aera es.
2 ent ght peaageHmati
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Specifically, defendant argues that its emulsion
contains levels of metals designated as hazardous
substances well below that found in virgin oil and,
therefore, its "waste is clearly within the petroleum
exclusion." Defendant’s Memo of Law at 11.
Disposing of this argument need not detain the court
for long.
Suffice it to say that a plain reading of this
"exclusionary" provision does not warrant inclusion of
oil which has become contaminated with hazardous
substances through use; rather, what does come
within the ambit of the “petroleum exclusion" is the
oil or oil fraction which naturally contains the
hazardous substance(s) unless the fraction itself is
specifically listed or designated as a hazardous
substance. This interpretation of the “petroleum
exclusion" appears to be in line with the legislative
history, scant as it is, which indicates that the
"petroleum exclusion" is an exclusion from CERCLA
for “oil spills" themselves and not for releases of oil
which through use has become contaminated with
(hazardous) substances not naturally found in oil. See,
e.g., S.Rep. No. 848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 30-31 (1980);
126 Cong.Rec. H11787, H11790, H11792, H11793,
H11795, H11796, H11798 (daily ed. December 3,
1980); 126 Cong.Rec. S10578 (daily ed. August 1,
1980); id. at S10845 (daily ed. August 5, 1980); id. at
$14963, S14967, S14974, S14980 (daily ed. November
24, 1980).
Lastly, defendant advances two constitutional
challenges to imposition of liability: first, that the
statute is void for vagueness because it does not
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adequately define "hazardous substance"; second, that
the "selective" enforcement of CERCLA against it, the
government choosing not to name other, allegedly
more culpable entities--e.g., Cornell University--as
defendants, violates the principle of equal protection
of the laws.
[9][10] Neither challenge has merit. The void for
vagueness challenge fails because, in the court’s view,
the statute and regulations do not fail to give a person
of ordinary intelligence fair notice of what is required
and forbidden. See Papachristou v. City of
Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 162, 92 S.Ct. 839, 843, 31
L.Ed.2d 110 (1972); see also United States v. McElroy,
910 F.2d 1016, 1021 (2d Cir.1990) (observing that a
penal statute is not unconstitutionally vague if it
"define[s] the criminal offense with sufficient
definiteness that ordinary people can understand what
conduct is prohibited and that does not encourage
arbitrary and _ discriminatory enforcement.").
Moreover, it has been observed that "[t]he degree of
vagueness that the Constitution tolerates
‘depend[s] in part on the nature of the enactment[,]"
Village of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman
Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 498, 102 S.Ct. 1186, 1193,
71 L.Ed.2d 362 (1982), and that with respect to
"regulatory statutes governing business activities,
greater leeway is allowed," Papachristou, 405 U.S. at
165, 92 S.Ct. at 845. All the more is this so when
matters of public health and safety are concerned.
See West Virginia Manufacturers Ass’n v. State of
West Virginia, 714 F.2d 308, 314 (4th Cir.1983). To
withstand a void for vagueness challenge, it is
sufficient if the meaning of the statutory or regulatory
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language is discoverable from its context. See id. In
this regard, the court notes that a plain reading of the
statutory and regulatory scheme reveals that a
substance is hazardous if it has been listed, i.e., so
designated, by the EPA pursuant to authority granted
it by Congress.
[11] As for defendant’s other constitutional
challenge, putting aside the broad discretion the
government has regarding the exercise of its power to
prosecute, see Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598,
607-608, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 1530-1531, 84 L.Ed.2d 547
(1985), defendant has not established a prima facie
case of selective enforcement. Simply stated,
defendant has not shown that it has been singled out
for civil prosecution for an improper purpose. See
University Club v. City of New York, 655 F.Supp. 1323,
1328 (S.D.N.Y.1987), aff'd on other grounds, 842 F.2d
37 (2nd Cir.1988); see also United States v. Garth, 773
F.2d 1469, 1476 (5th Cir.), cert. denied 476 U.S. 1140,
106 S.Ct. 2246, 90 L.Ed.2d 693 (1986); United States v.
Berrios, 501 F.2d 1207, 1211 (2d Cir.1974). The court
notes, in passing, that Alcan was one of 83 named
defendants.
In sum, the cadmium, chromium, copper, lead
and zine which defendant admits were in its emulsion
are hazardous substances under CERCLA--regardless
of the form in which these metals were present and
notwithstanding the very low levels of
concentration--by virtue of their designation as toxic
pollutants under the Clean Water Act and their
appearance on the Table 302.4 List of Hazardous
Substances. In the court’s view, the statutory
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language is clear, rendering resort to legislative
history, which in any way comports with the court’s
understanding of the statutory scheme, see S.Rep. No.
848, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 24-27 (1980) ("[S]ubstances
listed as hazardous or toxic under certain other
Federal laws are incorporated by reference and upon
enactment of this bill such substances become
statutorily defined as hazardous substances for the
purposes of this bill. And the release of any of them
or any constituent of them invokes the ... response
provisions and any costs of removal or remedial action
or any damages are subject to the liability provision of
the bill."), entirely unnecessary, see United States v.
Monsanto, 858 F.2d at 167 n. 10. Needless to say the
court agrees with the overwhelming body of case law
that has confronted the issue presented here.
Hazardous substances, released by defendant,
were present at the PAS site, and the government
responded by cleaning up the site, see Declaration of
Raymond E. Lupe with RI/FS attached as exhibit
(establishing a nexus between defendant’s release of
the hazardous substances at the PAS site and the
government’s response thereto); defendant has not
established any of the limited statutory defenses and
its constitutional challenges are without merit.
Accordingly, plaintiffs are entitled to summary
judgment as to defendants’ liability. The court now
turns its attention to the matter of recovery of
response costs.
B. Recovery of incurred costs
Under section 9607(a), Alcan is liable for "all costs
of removal or remedial action incurred by the United
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States Government or a State ... not inconsistent with
the national contingency plan[.)" 42 US.C. §
9607(a)(4)(A); 40 C.F.R. §§ 300.1-300.71 (1989)
(national contingency plan) (promulgated pursuant to
42 U.S.C. § 9605). The burden lies with the
defendant to demonstrate that the costs incurred by
the respective governments were inconsistent with
the national contingency plan. See United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical & Chemical Co., Inc.,
810 F.2d 726, 746 (8th Cir.1986), cert. denied, 484 U.S.
848, 108 S.Ct. 146, 98 L.Ed.2d 102 (1987); City of
Philadelphia v. Stepan Chemical Co., 713 F.Supp.
1484, 1486 (E.D.Pa.1989). In the present case,
plaintiffs seek to recover the difference between the
stipulated amount of costs incurred through April 1,
1987 ($12,319,551.04) and the amount already
recovered pursuant to the partial consent decree
($9,105,308.17) plus costs incurred since April 1, 1987
(some $710,635.17 by the United States and a net
figure of $124,174 by the State of New York).
Additionally, plaintiffs seek a declaration that Alcan is
liable to both plaintiffs for future response costs
associated with the PAS site and for prejudgment
interest.
[12] In view of the statutory provisions defining
the terms "remove" and "removal," see 42 U.S.C. §
9601(23), "remedy" and "remedial action," see id. §
9601(24), "respond" and "response," see id. § 9601(25),
remedial or removal action, for which the federal and
state governments are entitled to recover from the
party found liable, necessarily includes such activities
as (a) investigations, monitoring and testing to
identify the extent of danger to public health or
V1 Dare tomer te ap anya
]
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welfare or the environment, (b) investigations,
monitoring and testing to identify the extent of the
release of hazardous substances, and (c) planning and
implementation of a response action; also recoverable
are "indirect" costs associated with the foregoing and
with enforcement of the provisions of CERCLA,
including administrative costs incurred by the staffs of
the regulatory agencies involved and for the
Department of Justice. See United States v.
Northeastern Pharmaceutical and Chemical Co., 579
F.Supp. 823, 850 (W.D.Mo.1984), aff'd in part and
rev'd in part on other grounds, 810 F.2d 726 (8th
Cir.1986); see also United States v. R.W. Meyer, Inc.,
889 F.2d 1497, 1501-1504 (6th Cir.1989) (litigation and
administrative costs recoverable including a
proportionate share of indirect costs associated with
cleanup operations), cert. denied, --- U.S. ----, 110 S.Ct.
1527, 108 L.Ed.2d 767 (1990); State of New York v.
Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d at 1043 (response costs
include costs in assessing the conditions of the site);
United States v. Hardage, 733 F.Supp. 1424, 1431-1432
(W.D.Okla.1989); City of New York v. Exxon Corp., 633
F.Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y.1986) (recoverable costs include
costs of collecting and analyzing ground water
samples, hydrogeological studies and remediation
study); State of New York v. General Electric Co., 592
F.Supp. 291, 298 (N.D.N.Y.1984); United States v.
Wade, 577 F.Supp. 1326, 1333 n. 4 (E.D.Pa.1983).
Defendant does not challenge the legality of any
of the costs plaintiffs seek to recover; that is,
defendant does not argue that the costs which
plaintiff seeks to recover are not within the scope of
the pertinent statutory provisions. And, ample
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documentation of the costs, direct and indirect,
in
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