Appendices — American Legion v. Brown

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APPENDIX A

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

Argued February 2, 1995 Decided April 25, 1995

[HE AMERICAN LEGION

{ ppellant

EDWARD DERWINSKI, SECRETARY.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS:

DONNA E. SHALALA, SECRETARY.

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

WILLIAM L. Roper, M.D.. DIRECTOR.

CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL:

VERNON N. Houk, Director, CENTER FOR

ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND

INJURY CONTROL CENTER:

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

A ppellees

and Consolidated Case No. 94-50] 3

VIETNAM VETERANS O} AMERICA:

HAROLD A. BUTLER: CARO! RIDOLFI-DELANE}

MAREL J. MACKI: BEVERL\ NEHMER.

‘ Appellants

EDWARD DERWINSKI. SECRI TARY.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS

DONNA E. SHALALA,. SECRI TARY,

DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND Ht MAN SERVICES:

—_—_—_——_—-

2a

WILLIAM L. Roper, M.D., DIRECTOR,

CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL;

VERNON N. HoukK, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR

ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND

INJURY CONTROL CENTER;

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

Appellees

\ppeals from the United States District Court

for the District of Columbia

(90cv1808 )

Before EDWARDS, Chief Judge; RANDOLPH and

ROGERS, Circuit Judges.

Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.

ROGERS, Circuit Judge: The American Legion and

others appeal from the grant of summary judgment re-

jecting their challenge to the decision of the Secretary

of Veterans Affairs to abandon a congressionally man-

dated epidemiological study of the effects of exposure to

dioxin, a by-product of Agent Orange and other herbi-

cides, on Vietnam veterans.’ The district court ruled that

the Secretary had acted within his discretion in abandon-

ing the Agent Orange Study, which the Secretary had

commissioned the Centers for Disease Control to design

and conduct, after determining that sampling problems

made it unlikely that the investigation would yield scien-

'In 1988, Congress redesignated the Veterans Administration

as the Department of Veterans Affairs and named the Secretary

of Veterans Affairs (previously, the Administrator of Veterans’

Affairs) to head the department. Department of Veterans Affairs

Act, Pub. L. No. 100-527, 102 Stat. 2635 (1988). We use the

current title “Secretary” in this opinion whenever the statute or

record refers to the Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs.

+

3a

lifically valid results. American Legion vy. Derwinski, 827

F. Supp. 805, 812-14 (D.D.C. 1993). Appellants con

tend that the Secretary erroneously relied on a repealed

Standard as the basis for abandoning the study and violated

the statute by halting the study before submitting a man

dated report of health results to Congress; alternatively,

they challenge as arbitrary and capricious the Secretary’s

conclusion that a scientifically valid study was impossible

Finding these contentions unpersuasive, we affirm

As background to appellants’ contentions. we first out

line the statute and the Secretary’s efforts to implement

the statutory directive for an epidemiological study on

the effects of exposure to dioxins during the Vietnam

conflict.

A. The Statute. In enacting the Veterans’ Health Pro

grams Extension and Improvement Act of 1979, Pub. |

No. 96-151, 93 Stat. 1092 (codified as amended at 3%

U.S.C. § 219 note (1988) ). reprinted as amended in 38

U.S.C.A. § 527 note (1991) (the “1979 Act”), Con

gress sought to determine by means of an epidemiological

study the health effects of exposure to Agent Orange and

other herbicides on Vietnam veterans. Id. § 307: see

also §. REP. No 260. 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 36-40

(1979) (“1979 S. Rep.”). reprinted in relevant part in

1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1894, 1922-1926 These herbicides

which the United States military used during the Viet

nam conflict, contain varying amounts of dioxins—also

Epidemiology is “a branch of science and medicine [that ises

studies to ‘observe the effect of exposure to a single factor upo!

441, 945

re |

the incidence of disease in two otherwise identical] popul:

DeLuca Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals. In, 911 F.2d |

3d Cir. 1990 quoting Black & Lilienfeld Epidemiological P»

n Toxic Tort Litigation. 52 Fordham L. Rev. 732. 755 1984

ee also Affidavit of Dr. Zena A. Ste n, proffered by anne!

if 4

4a

referred to as TCDD “—which studies have suggested can

cause harmful health effects in laboratory animals and

consequently led to concern about similar effects in hu-

mans.* Congress sought to determine whether Vietnam

veterans had suffered such adverse health effects as a re-

sult of their military service and, if so, to compensate

them for their injuries. See 1979 S. REP. at 38-40.

The 1979 Act directed the Secretary to conduct an

epidemiological study pursuant to a protocol approved by

the director of the congressional Office of Technology As-

sessment (“OTA”). 1979 Act § 307(a)(2)(A)(i). The

statute also required the director of OTA to oversee the

conduct of the study and report its oversight activities

to the appropriate congressional committees. Jd. § 307

(a)(2). Further, as part of the effort to ensure that the

study was “sientifically valid and . . . conducted with

efficiency and objectivity,” the 1979 Act directed the

President to coordinate the Secretary’s study with any

other Federal governmental studies on the effects of

dioxins. /d. § 307(c). The 1979 Act expressly required,

however, that the Secretary continue the study only “for

as long after the submission of [his first] report [to Con-

gress on ‘the results thus far obtained under the study’]

as the [Secretary] may determine reasonable in light

of the possibility of developing through such study signifi-

cant new information on the long-term adverse health

effects of exposure to dioxins.” /d. § 307(a)(3), (b)(2)

The 1979 Act initially called for an epidemiological

study of veterans who “were exposed to” dioxins during

the Vietnam conflict. /d. § 307(a)(1) (amended 1981)

From the outset, a major obstacle to completion of the

study was the identification of veterans, other than

“Ranch Hands” who did the actual spraying, who had

TCDD stands for 2,3,7,8-Tetrachlorodibenzo-p-Dioxin, a by

roduct created during the manufacture of certain herbicides

ee 1979 S. REP. at 37-39; Health Study Protocol at 4-5

Wa

a

been exposed to Agent Orange during their service in

Vietnam. S. Rep. No. 89, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 25

(1981) (“1981 S. Rep.”). To adress this problem, Con-

gress amended the statute in 1981 to require a study of

veterans’ health effects that “may result” from exposure

to dioxins. Veterans’ Health Care. Training, and Small

Business Loan Act of 1981, Pub. L. 97-72 § 401(a)(1),

9S Stat. 1061 (1981) (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 219 note

(1988)), reprinted in 38 U.S.C.A. $527 note (“1981

Amendments”). The 1981 Amendments also expanded

the scope of the study to examine health effects that may

have resulted from other factors in the overall Vietnam

experience, “including exposure to other herbicides. chem-

icals, medications, or environmental hazards or condi-

tions.” Jd. According to the Senate Report, the amend-

ments were intended to “allow the Secretary to begin

the study of the health status of these veterans by iden-

tifying a population of veterans who served in Vietnam,

without first having to determine whether each was, with-

Out question, exposed to Agent Orange in Vietnam.”

1981 S. Rep. at 26.

B. The Health Study Protocol and Pilot Study. Fol-

lowing enactment of the 1981 Amendments. the Secre-

tary entered into a contract with the Centers for Disease

Control (“the Center”) to design a protocol for the

epidemiological investigation. The Center’s Health Study

Protocol, completed in November 1983. proposed three

Studies to evaluate the health of Vietnam veterans, one

of which was the “Agent Orange” Study, designed to

examine the effects of exposure to Agent Orange and

other herbicides on veterans’ health. See United States

Department of Health and Human Services. Public Health

Service, Centers for Disease Control, Protocol for Epi-

demiologic Studies of the Health of Vietnam Veterans

(November 1983) at 1, 6-9 (“Health Study Protocol”).'

SS?

* The two other studies—the “Vietnam Experience” study, to

assess the “possible health effects of the general Vietnam experi-

ence,’ and the “Sarcoma Lymphoma” or “Selected Cancers” study

6a

To isolate the effects of dioxin exposure, the Center

needed to distinguish between groups of Vietnam vet-

erans who were similar except for their level of dioxin

exposure. See supra n.2. The Health Study Protocol pro-

posed to use military records to divide a sample of Viet-

nam veterans into those who were likely exposed to her-

bicides in Vietnam and those likely not exposed and then

to compare the health of the two cohorts. Health Study

Protocol at 6-7, 10-15. The Center planned to review

battalion journal files and morning reports to locate com-

panies at various times during the Vietnam conflict and

to determine the presence or absence of individuals within

the company. Utilizing herbicide usage reports such as

aircraft spraying records to estimate the location and

timing of herbicide applications, the Center planned to

fit veterans into the “likely exposed” or “likely not ex-

posed” cohort “according to the measure of their com-

pany’s distance in time and space from any herbicide

applications.” Jd. at 6. To measure the possible health

effects of dioxins, the Center would then compare the

medical histories of “likely exposed” and “likely not ex-

posed” veterans based on review of mortality records,

health interviews, medical examinations, and laboratory

tests. Jd. at 20-25.

The Health Study Protocol cautioned that certain “ob-

stacles” prevented the Center from adopting the “ideal”

design for an Agent Orange cohort study, which would

have compared one group free from all exposure to an-

other group subjected to “meaningful” exposure to herbi

cides. These obstacles included the difficulty of defining

“meaningful exposure” and the uncertainty about whether

exposed veterans were comparable to unexposed veterans

in other characteristics that might affect health. Most

significant for purposes of these appeals, the Protocol

to “evaluate the risk of contracting soft tissue sarcoma and

lymphoma among Vietnam veterans (and/or those exposed to

herbicides)’’—-have been completed and are not at issue in these

appeals.

noted that the “uneven quality” of the military records

including gaps in company records and errors in herbicide

usage records, meant that “the categorization of in

dividuals with respect to their potential for herbicide e»

posure will be uncertain and will forever remain so.”

ld. at 6. The Health Study Protocol concluded that

“[slince many of the proposed procedures are untested.

modification, indeed even a recommendation not to pro

ceed with an Agent Orange Study, may be required

Id. at 11

lhe Center’s initial review, conducted from 1983 to

1956, confirmed its concern that inadequacies in the

military documentation would likely make identification

Of appropriate cohorts impossible. Informed of these dif

ficulties, OTA advised Congress in September 1985 that

if the difficulties in evaluating exposure were not re

solved, OTA might conclude that the [sic] “it is impossible

to study the effects of Agent Orange.” OTA subsequently

suggested that the Center postpone any “major new

phase” of its Agent Orange Study until it had devised an

appropriate means of estimating exposure and recom

mend that instead of proceeding with the interviews of

Study subjects scheduled to begin in January 1986, the

Center conduct a pilot study to test the methods and

results of its initial exposure assessments. Accordingl\

the Environmental Support Group of the United States

Army and Joint Services developed a pilot study, at th

Center's request, to identify “heavily exposed personnel.”

Completed in mid-1986, the pilot study ranked veterans

based on their number of “hits,” or opportunities for ex

posure to Agent Orange; veterans with the largest number

of “hits” were classified as those most likely to have

faced heavy exposure.’

$a

In early 1986, the Agent Orange Working Group

(“Working Group”), formed by the President to carry

out his responsibilities under the 1979 Act, convened a

Science Subpanel on Exposure Assessment (“Science Sub-

panel”) to evaluate the Center’s exposure assessment

methods and review the results of the pilot study. In a

May 26, 1986, letter to the Working Group, the Sci-

ence Subpanel concluded that two problems jeopardized

the Center’s Agent Orange Study: first, the potential for

“considerable” misclassification because of unit dispersion

and incomplete records of spray operations; and second,

the fact that the Center’s records review showed that

most veterans had never been exposed to a “hit,” as de-

fined by the Center, and thus “the paucity of clearly

exposed combat veterans make it questionable whether

a sufficient number can be assembled to conduct an epi-

demiological study of the type originally designed.” The

Science Subpanel noted that recent scientific advances

might enable the Center more accurately to identify co-

horts of likely exposed and likely unexposed veterans,

but that given the problems with current identification

methods, “any study of ground troops, which is depend-

ent upon military records for the assessment of exposure

to herbicides, [should] not be conducted without an addi

tional method to verify exposure.”

C. The TCDD Validation Study. Responding to the

recommendations from OTA and the Science Subpanel

not to proceed with a military records-based study with-

out some independent verification, the Center developed

a protocol to compare current serum TCDD levels in

veterans’ blood. Assuming TCDD survived in the blood

for several years, the Center postulated that veterans who

faced “heavy” exposure could be expected to have higher

serum TCDD levels than lesser exposed veterans even

twenty years after their exposure to Agent Orange.’ The

’ Although the Center did not know the precise half-life of

TCDD at the time it developed its TCDD protocol, it determined

n the course of the study that TCDD has an average half-life of

9a

Center used both the pilot study’s “hit’-based exposure

indices and veterans’ self-reported exposure estimates to

divide a set of Vietnam veterans into “low hit,” “medium

hit,” and “high hit” subsets and, for comparison, also

examined a group of non-Vietnam veterans of the same

Cra.

The results of the TCDD study confirmed the Center’s

suspicions that neither military records nor self-reporting

could adequately differentiate between veterans who were

and were not likely exposed to Agent Orange in Vietnam.

U.S. Department of Health Human Services, Centers for

Disease Control, Comparison of Serum Levels of 2.3.7.8-

Tetrachlorodibenzo-p-Dioxin With Indirect Estimates of

Agent Orange Exposure Among Vietnam Veterans: Final

Report (August 1987) (“TCDD Report”). The Center

found “no meaningful association” between veterans’ cur

rent TCDD levels and the exposure indices developed

through either military records or self-reporting.” /d. at 1.

Besides failing to validate the use of military records as

exposure indicators, the TCDD study reinforced the con-

clusion that ground troops faced little likelihood of

“heavy” exposure to Agent Orange. /d. at 2. The Center

thus concluded that it could not conduct the cohort

Agent Orange Study that it had originally planned:

The findings of this study and the conclusion from

the Agent Orange Working Group Science Subpanel

seven years. The half-life of a substance is “the time required by

the body, tissue, or organ to metabolize or inactivate half the

amount of a substance taken in.” F.A. DAVIS. TABER’S CYCLOPEDIC

MEDICAL DICTIONARY at 717 (1985)

* The Center controlled for differences such as age, race, region

of current residence, body mass index, alcoho] use, smoking his-

tory, and self-reported civilian occupational and home exposure

to herbicides. Jd. at 23. The study also considered the impact

of other factors that might lead to study bias—group selection,

laboratory error or measurement bias, variability in half-life,

selection or participation bias, and sample size—and concluded that

ne of these factors likely influenced the results. Jd. at 27-30

1Oa

report on exposure assessment (June 1986) do not

identify any method for using military records of

self-reported exposure to distinguish between U.S.

Army ground combat troops who were and were not

exposed to Agent Orange in Vietnam, as would be

needed for a cohort study of possible health effects

ld at

In a review of the TCDD study, OTA agreed that “a

large-scale epidemiological study to look for effects of

Agent Orange in ground troops who served in Vietnam”

was currently impossible, and cautioned that any future

studies “should be narrowly focused on specific, testable

hypotheses, and cannot have the aim of generalizability

to all or most ground troops.” /d. at 9. On October 29,

1987, the director of the Center reported to the Secretary

the Center’s concurrence with OTA and the Working

Group that the Agent Orange Study “cannot be con-

ducted” and that the Center had begun “the close-out

process” for its Agent Orange Study.

D. The Secretary’s decision. In December 1987, the

Department of Medicine and Surgery in the Veterans Ad

ministration recommended a halt to all further studies of

the effects of Agent Orange (other than the Air Force’s

Ranch Hand study). Because the results of the TCDD

report “make it exceedingly unlikely that any method will

satisfactorily distinguish between exposed and unexposed

Vietnam veterans,” the Department of Medicine and Sur-

gery concluded that “a scientifically meaningful epidemio-

logical study of the possible health effects of Agent

Orange cannot be conducted.”

On February 9, 1988, the Secretary sent the TCDD

report, along with correspondence from OTA and the

Working Group, to the Chairman of the House Commit-

tee on Veterans’ Affairs. In a cover letter the Secretary

stated that:

eS new ne

lla

Despite our efforts, no one has successfully iden-

tified a large enough group of Vietnam veterans

known to have been exposed to Agent Orange or

other herbicides to allow the preparation of a proto-

col and the conduct of an epidemiological study as

required by Public Law 96-151."' I must, therefore.

advise you that no scientifically sound study can be

undertaken and request that the [Veterans Adminis-

tration} be relieved of the requirement to do this

research. This opinion coincides with that of the

Office of Technology Assessment, as expressed in

their comments of September 1987, and with the

June 3, 1987, comments of the interagency Agent

Orange Working Group.

A week later, the Secretary formally notified the Chair-

man of the decision to discontinue work on the Center’s

Agent Orange Study. On February 19, 1988, in his third

annual report to Congress on the status of the Center’s

three-part Health Study, the Secretary repeated his con-

clusion that “based on the results of the... TCDD Vali-

dation Study, . . . an [Agent Orange Study] cannot be

conducted so as to achieve a scientifically sound conclu-

sion regarding the possible adverse health effects of ex

posure of Vietnam veterans to Agent Orange.”

'The Secretary described tanch Hand veterans as “the sole

or i

¢

’

BAVUYP Ul

veterans available for the successi li epidemilologi

nvestigation envisaged by the Congress.”

[In accord with the Secretary’s recommendation that any allo-

cated but unexpended funds be reallocated to either “the U.S. Ai

Force’s Ranch Hand Study’s blood dioxin levels research or other

research on Agent Orange and closely related subjects,” Congress

in 1988 transferred $3,000,000 of the unexpended funds for blood

tests in the Ranch Hand study and $1,000,000 for “a survey of

lentific evidence, studies. and literature”’ regarding the health

effects of possible herbicide exposure in Vietnam, to be conducted

by an independent scientific entity under contract with the VA,

pursuant to a law enacted after the date of the enactment of this

Act.” See § 1201 of Pub. L. No 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105, 4125

1988 Subsequently, in 1991, Congress authorized the National

12a

Appellants thereafter filed suit, contending that the

Secretary unlawfully abandoned the Center's Agent

Orange Study based on the wrong legal standard, that the

Secretary lacked authority to terminate the Agent Orange

Study before submitting a health results report to Con-

gress, and that his decision was contrary to the Adminis-

trative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706. Following the

district court’s grant of summary judgment for appellees,

appellants filed these consolidated appeals.

IT.

In addressing appellants’ challenges to the grant of

summary judgment in favor of appellees, our review is

de novo. Diamond vy. Atwood, 43 F.3d 1538, 1540

(D.C. Cir. 1995); Shields v. Eli Lilly & Co., 895 F.2d

1463, 1466 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Thus, the limited ques-

tions before the court are whether the Secretary adopted

a “permissible” interpretation of the 1979 and 1981 Acts,

see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense

Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 841-42 (1984), and, if so,

whether, as a matter of law, the Secretary’s decision in

February 1988 to abandon the Center’s Agent Orange

Study was arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discre-

tion, or otherwise contrary to law. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)

(A); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,

401 ‘U-S. 402, 416 (1971); Dr. Pepper’/Seven-Up Com-

panies, Inc. v. FTC, 991 F.2d 859, 862 (D.C. Cir.

1993). In reviewing the Secretary’s decision to abandon

the study, the court’s task is to determine whether the

Secretary “examine[d] the relevant data,” and made a

“rational connection between the facts found and the

Academy of Sciences to review and evaluate the available scientific

studies regarding the health effects of herbicide exposure and

required the Secretary to enact regulations establishing a presump-

tion that any malady correlated with herbicide exposure is service-

related. Agent Orange Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-4, 105 Stat. 11

(1991 codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. §1116 & note (Supp.

IV 1992

l3a

choice made.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n y. State Farm

Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29. 43 (198’ ) (internal

quotations omitted); see also Citizens to Preserve Ove)

ton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. at 416. Given the nature of

the scientific expertise brought to bear on the issue of

whether to continue the Center's Agent Orange Study,

the court’s review is at its most deferential. Baltimore

Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-

cil, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983).

A. Reporting “results”, Appellants contend that the

Secretary violated the statute by abandoning the Center’s

Agent Orange Study before reporting actual health re-

sults to Congress. Section 307(b)(2) of the 1979 Act

provides:

Not later than twenty-four months after the date of

the approval of the protocol . . . and annually there-

after, the [Secretary] shall submit to the appropriate

committees of the Congress a report containing (A) a

description of the results thus far obtained under the

study conducted pursuant to this subsection. and (B)

such comments and recommendations as the [Secre-

tary] considers appropriate in light of such results.

[Emphasis added].

+

Appellants maintain that the word “results” in S 307

(b)(2) means substantive health results. and hence, that

the Secretary lacked authority to abandon the Center’s

Agent Orange Study before reporting to Congress the

Center’s conclusions about adverse health effects of Agent

Orange and other herbicides on Vietnam veterans. See

id. § 307(a)(3) as amended by 1981 Amendments § 401

(a)(2) (Secretary may discontinue the study “after the

submission of the first report under subsection (b)(2)”).

The Secretary interprets “results” under » 307(b)(2) to

include the progress made thus far to carry out the study

and maintains that he fulfilled § 307(b)(2)’s require-

ment when he provided Congress with a progress report

on February 13, 1986.

l4a

[In reviewing the Secretary’s interpretation of § 307

(b)(2), we apply the standard of review set forth in

Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-

cil, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 841-42 (1984). Because, con-

trary to appellants’ contentions, neither the plain language

nor the structure of the statute makes clear Congress’ in-

tent to confine “results” to “health results” in mandating

reports by the Secretary, the court must defer to the

Secretary’s interpretation if it “is based on a permissible

construction of the statute.” /d. The Secretary’s inter-

pretation accordingly invokes our deference.'" Because

the Secretary’s interpretation of “results” is consistent

with Congress’ use of that term in the statute, see 1979

Act § 307(b)(2), and appellants’ construction of con-

gressional intent would lead to absurd results, the Secre-

tary’s interpretation withstands scrutiny.

The Secretary’s interpretation that “results thus far

obtained under the study” means the results of the Secre-

tary’s efforts pursuant to the statute is not an impermis-

sible construction of § 307(b)(2). The word “results”

is hardly a technical term of art, but one of common par-

lance subject to multiple meanings. Thus, “results” may

include conclusions that the Secretary has reached in

the course of efforts to carry out the Center’s Agent

Orange Study and are not, as appellants suggest, neces-

sarily limited to “health results” produced by that study

The “result” of the TCDD study, for example, is the con-

clusion that current blood serum levels bear no relation

to military records-based exposure assessments. The “re-

sults” of the pilot study are the index of “hit’-based

Although Chevron deference would not apply if the Secretary

had adopted this interpretation solely for purposes of litigation,

see City of Kansas City, Mo. v. HUD, 923 F.2d 188, 192 (D.C. Cir.

1991), the interpretation at issue appeared in the Secretary’s

February 13, 1986, report to Congress, in which he stated: “As

required by Section 307 of Public Law 96-151 . I am sending

you and your committee the first status report and its appendices

on the Agent Orange Study.

lSa

eXposure assessments and the conclusion that most ground

troops did not have the Opportunity for heavy exposure to

Agent Orange. Both studies led. in one sense, to “results

obtained under the Study” since they followed the

Secretary’s approval of the Health Study Protocol and

represented efforts to develop data that would enable the

production of scientifically valid epidemiological conclu-

SIONS.

Put otherwise, an epidemiological] Study on long-term

health effects produces many types of “results” that the

Secretary could report to Congress. The fact that the

statute requires the Secretary to submit annual reports on

the “results thus far obtained under the study” comports

with the view that Congress wanted regular progress re-

ports on the results of the Secretary’s efforts, whether or

not such reports contained substantive health results.

See 1979 Act § 307(b)(2). Indeed, the Secretary’s sub-

mission of various reports to Congress between 1986 and

1988 alerted Congress that the development of scientifi-

cally valid health results depended on the identification

of reliable indices of cohort exposure. The language of

§ 307(a)(3) also supports the Secretary’s interpretation;

by allowing the Secretary to abandon the study after

submission of the first report if he finds it unlikely that

the study will yield “significant new information on the

long-term health effects of exposure to dioxins,” subsec-

tion (a)(3) appears to contemplate that the Secretary’s

first report may not itself contain information on adverse

health effects.’* Jd, § 307(a)}(3).

‘2 The fact that Congress directed the Secretary to consider

various administrative actions based on the “results” reported

under § 307(b) (2) does not make his interpretation of “results”

unreasonable. See id. § 307(b) (2); B), (b)(3). The statute re-

quires the Secretary to submit “comments and recommendations

that the Secretary considers appropriate in light of such results.”

id. § 307(b) (2) (B). and to give notice and comment of “actions,

f any,” that the Secretary proposes to take in. response to the

results. Id. § 307(b) (3 emphasis added). The Secretary fulfilled

l6a

Appellants’ contrary statutory arguments are unper-

suasive. First, appellants contend that because the statute

requires OTA to submit “updates” on the status of un-

approved protocols, id. § 307(a)(2)(B) (ii), Congress

must have intended “results” under § 307(b)(2) to mean

more than a progress report. Although courts generally

presume that “‘Congress acted intentionally and _ pur-

posely’” when particular language in one section of a

Statute is omitted in another section. Russello v. United

States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (quoting United States v.

Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (Sth Cir. 1972)),

the statutory differences between the reporting require-

ments imposed on OTA and the Secretary are consistent

with the Secretary's interpretation of “results.” OTA’s

“updates” on the status of protocol revisions reflect only

the status of the Secretary’s plans to conduct the study;

because the Center’s Agent Orange Study has not yet

begun, the reports. cannot contain its “results.” The Sec-

retary’s reports, by contrast, reflect information gathered

in the process of conducting the study, which can fairly

be labeled “results thus far obtained under the study.”

Similarly unpersuasive is appellants’ second contention

that the differences between the Agent Orange statute and

a 1983 statute providing for an epidemiological study

of the health effects of radiation exposure, Veterans

Health Care Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. 98-160 § 601,

97 Stat. 1006-08 (1983) (codified as amended at 38

U.S.C. $219 note (1988)) (the “1983 Act”), demon-

the requirements of § 307(b)(2)(B) in his first and subsequent

progress reports, when he informed Congress of the proposed

TCDD study and its results, notified Congress of the Center’s

Agent Orange Study’s abandonment, and recommended that the

legislature reallocate unused funds. See supra n.10. Subsection

(b) (3) makes clear that the Secretary need not recommend any

“action” based on the study’s “results.” It is consistent with this

subsection for the Secretary to recommend no rulemaking action,

given the “result” that the effects of Agent Orange could not

presently be ascertained.

17a

Strate that Congress intended to require the Secretary

to provide “health results” in his reports pursuant to

§ 307(b)(2) of the 1979 Act. Although the 1983 Act

explicitly gives the Secretary discretion not to conduct a

Study if he finds a scientifically valid study infeasible, id.

§ 601 (a)(1)(B), the fact that the Secretary could not

abandon the epidemiological study without developing a

protocol and reporting some kind of results does not mean

that the “results” reported must be “health results.” Not

is the 1983 Act's requirement of reports on “the progress

and any results” of the radiation study, id. § 601

(a)(5)(A), inconsistent with interpreting “results” as

used in § 307(b)(2) of the 1979 Act to include data

and conclusions other than “health results.” Absent eithe:

a conflict between the 1983 Act and the Secretary’s inter-

pretation or a clear contrary meaning of the word “re

sults,” we will not read the 1983 Act to preclude the

reasonable interpretation adopted by the Secretary. Com

pare West Virginia University Hosp., Inc. v. Casey. 499

U.S. 83, 99-101 (1991).'

Indeed, the reasonableness of the Secretary’s interpreta

tion is manifest in light of the implausibility of the alterna-

tive interpretation proposed by appellants. See United

States v. Wilson, 112 §. Ct. 1351, 1354 (1992). Under

their interpretation, Congress intended to require the Sec-

retary to proceed with the Center’s Agent Orange Study

and present its “results” to Congress even when the Secre-

tary knew that the inability to identify necessary data

'S Finally, while Congress’ failure to consider the possibility

that the study might not ultimately yield substantive healt}

results cannot form the basis for an interpretation contrary to

the plain meaning of a statute, see West V rginia Un Hosp., It

’. Casey, 499 U.S. at 100-01, where the Secretary’s interpretatio:

omports with the language of the statute and an alternative inte:

pretation would produce absurd results. the fact that Congress did

not specifically consider the issue is irrelevant. Se: d

Natural Resources Defense Cow? l Ine EPA 725 F

770 (D.C. Cir. 1984

l8a

would render the results scientifically useless. Not only do

the 1981 Amendments and the Secretary’s reports to Con-

gress make clear that Congress knew that the underlying

data was problematic, but the various reporting require-

ments in the statute highlight the unreasonableness of ap-

pellants’ unsupported assumption that Congress intended

the Secretary to devote resources to a study that the

Secretary, the Center, the congressional OTA, and the

President's Working Group had all concluded could not

yield the valid scientific results mandated by statute.

Other provisions in the statute also suggest that Congress

did not intend the Secretary to conduct a study unless it

was a scientifically valid one. Congress expressly required

the Secretary to conduct the study pursuant to a protocol

approved by the director of OTA. 1979 Act § 307(a)

(2)(A)(i). The director of the OTA was to assess scien-

tific validity in his approval or disapproval of the proposed

protocol. /d. § 307(a)(2)(B)(i). Also, Congress di-

rected the President to monitor the study for the purpose

of assuring that the study was scientifically valid. /d

S$ 307(c). Assuming the accuracy of the Secretary’s con

clusion that a scientifically valid Agent Orange study was

infeasible, in the absence of a clear statutory command,

the Secretary was not required to proceed with a study

that by all indications would not advance scientific knowl-

edge solely to fulfill the obligation to report “results.”

Because the language and purpose of the statute support

the Secretary’s interpretation of “results” as the progress

made thus far in the Center's Agent Orange Study, we

conclude that the Secretary satisfied his initial reporting

obligation under § 307(b)(2) of the 1979 Act when he

submitted a report to Congress on February 13, 1986,

describing the results of efforts to carry out the epide-

miological study.

B. The Standard. Appellants contend that the Secre-

tary acted contrary to law because he decided to abandon

19a

the study based on the repealed standard of the 1979 Act

(focusing on individual veterans who “were exposed to

. dioxins” )"* instead of the liberalized standard adopted

in the 1981 Amendments (examining health effects that

“May have resulted from exposure”).'* Appellants rely on

the fact that in his February 9, 1988, letter to the Chair-

man of the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, the

Secretary reported that he had not “successfully identified

a large enough group of Vietnam known to have been

exposed to Agent Orange or other herbicides to allow the

preparation of a protocol and the conduct of an epide-

miological study as required by Public Law 96-151.” They

also point to the beginning of the Secretary’s letter where

he referred to the repealed legal standard in discussing the

efforts made under the 1979 Act ‘ ‘[slince 1980.” Appel-

lants’ emphasis on this language, however, overlooks other

language in the Secretary’s letter that demonstrates that he

based his decision on concerns about scientific validity

rather than compliance with the pre-1981 Statutory man-

date, that the numerous reports before the Secretary

recommended abandoning the Center’s Agent Orange

Study because compliance with the 1981 mandate was not

scientifically possible, and that the TCDD study confirmed

that military records could not yield adequate exposure

indices.

As appellants point out, a reviewing court “must judge

the propriety of [agency] action solely by the grounds

invoked by the agency.” SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332

U.S. 194, 196 (1947). It is equally true, however, that

“we will uphold a decision of less than ideal cl: arity if the

agency's path may reasonably be discerned.” Bowman

Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys.. Inc., 419

U.S. 281, 285-86 (1974). Hence, even if some of the

agency's remarks might appear erroneous when read in

14 1979 Act § 307 (a ] amended 198]

1981 Amendments & 401 (a ]

20a

isolation, the court will uphold agency action that, “|[c]on-

sidered in its entirety,” is based on appropriate considera-

tions and otherwise complies with relevant statutes and

the Administrative Procedures Act. District Lodge 64 v.

NLRB, 949 F.2d 441, 446 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Such con-

sideration here indicates that the Secretary did not base his

decision on the repealed statutory standard.

First, that the Secretary’s decision focused on problems

with the cohort study designed pursuant to the 1981

Amendments is evident from his letter’s reference to the

identification of a large enough group of veterans, as

distinct from the focus of the original 1979 Act on indl-

viduals who had been exposed. The Secretary expressly

incorporated by reference a separate statement by the

Veterans’ Administration’s Department of Medicine and

Surgery that refers to the 1981 standard and discusses the

efforts to “estimate the likelihood” of exposure to Agent

Orange. He noted, moreover, at the beginning of his letter

that completion of the TCDD study “enabled the V[eter

ans’] A[dministration] to complete an attempt to deter-

mine directly and specifically whether exposure to Agent

Orange had an adverse effect on the health of Vietnam

veterans,” thereby indicating that as addressed in the

TCDD study, verification of exposure data remained the

important factor under the 1981 standard. In context,

therefore, the Secretary's reference to exposure suggests

that the inability to distinguish exposure levels among

different groups of veterans meant that he could not estab-

lish the data base necessary for a scientifically valid study.

Second, the Secretary attached to his February 9, 1988,

letter to Congress OTA’s September 1987 report and the

Working Group’s comments of June 3, 1987; both docu-

ments recommended abandonment of the Center’s Agent

Orange Study, not because of an inability to ensure that

each study subject was exposed to Agent Orange, but

because current identification methods provided no scien-

tifically valid means of differentiating groups of veterans

2la

based on the degree of exposure, and thus the long-term

health effects of Agent Orange and other herbicides on the

study subjects could not be assessed. OTA and the Work

ing Group thus concluded that “no scientifically sound

study can be undertaken.”

Third, the Secretary also attached to his February 9,

1988, letter to Congress the TCDD validation study,

which confirmed that compliance with the 1981 statutory

mandate was not feasible because the Center was unable

to classify groups of veterans based on their degree of

exposure to Agent Orange and other herbicides. The Cer

ter compared individual hit scores as well as median

'CDD levels by company, by the company in which the

veteran spent the most time, and by the company in which

the veteran had the most “hits.” The Center conc

uded

that neither individuals with higher “hit” scores nor com

panies with predicted higher levels of exposure had, on

average, significantly higher TCDD levels in their blood.

and therefore that it could not develop the data base

needed for a cohort epidemiological Study.

Viewing the Secretary’s February 9, 1988, letter to

gether with the documents that the incorporated by refe1

ence thus makes clear that notwithstanding the Secretary’s

reference to the inability to identify veterans “known to

have been exposed” to Agent Orange and other herbicides.

his decision to abandon the Center’s Agent Orange Study

rested on the inability to identify study cohorts based on

the degree of exposure. Although Congress anticipated

that the 1981 Amendments would remove the threshold

problem of identifying individual veterans who were ex

posed to Agent Orange, 1981 S. REP. 26, 33. the amend

ments left in place the requirement that the study vield

scientifically valid results. Appellants appear to ignore o1

underestimate the significance of the fact that even under

the 1981 Amendments the epidemiological study depended

on exposure data, and that the Center’s Agent Orange

Study relied on the ability to determine the degree of ex-

ir

99

“La

posure experienced by different groups of veterans. Thus,

notwithstanding the Secretary’s unfortunate choice of some

words in his February 9 letter, the references noted by

appellants cannot be divorced from the Secretary’s refer-

ences to “a large enough group” and the enclosed state-

ment of the Department of Science and Medicine or fairly

understood without regard to the supporting materials on

which he relied in making his decision. For these reasons,

we conclude that the Secretary did not rely on an im-

proper iegal standard in deciding to abandon the Agent

Orange epidemiological study.

C. Abandoning the original Agent Orange Study. Be-

cause appellants’ other challenges fail, the success of their

appeals turns on whether, as a matter of law, the Secretary

acted arbitrarily and capriciously in determining in Febru-

ary 1988 that a scientifically valid epidemiological study

was infeasible. Appellants maintain that the “risk” of mis-

classification cannot alone make an epidemiological study

scientifically invalid and that the Secretary had no evidence

to support the conclusion that the degree of misclassifica-

tion was sufficiently high to make valid scientific results

unobtainable.

The statute vests the Secretary with broad discretion to

abandon the entire epidemiological study if, after his initial

report to Congress, the Secretary determines that the study

will yield no useful scientific results.

The study . . . shall be continued for as long after

the submission of the first report under subsection

(b)(2) as the [Secretary] may determine reasonable

in light of the possibility of developing through such

study significant new information on the long-term

adverse health effects of exposure to dioxins.

1979 Act § 307(a)(3) as amended by 1981 Amendments

§ 401(a)(2). Given this broad discretion, the scope of

our review of the Secretary’s decision to abandon one com-

ponent of the Health Study Protocol is particularly limited.

to

»

See Kreis v. Secretary of Air Force, 866 F.2d 1508, 1514

(D.C. Cir. 1989) (“[i]t is simply more difficult to Say

that the Secretary has acted arbitrarily if he is authorized

to act ‘when he considers it necessary . . .’ than it is if he

is required to act whenever a court determines that certain

objective conditions are met”) (emphasis in original). Ap-

plying this standard, we conclude that the Secretary did

not act arbitrarily and capriciously in abandoning the

Center’s Agent Orange Study after determining, in view of

the available reports, studies and recommendations, that it

was unlikely to produce scientifically valid conclusions

about the long-term effects of exposure to Agent Orange

and other herbicides on Vietnam veterans’ health. 1979

Act § 307(a)(3), (c).

The information available to the Secretary indicated

that from its inception, the Center’s Agent Orange Study

was confronted with identification difficulties that persisted

through an additional pilot study and completion of the

TCDD study. The Center’s Health Study Protocol antici-

pated that its records-based method of exposure assessment

might require “modification, indeed even a recommenda-

tion not to proceed with an Agent Orange study '

Health Study Protocol at 11. The initial review of mili-

tary records confirmed the Center’s concern that it might

not succeed in identifying cohorts of veterans who faced a

greater likelihood of exposure to Agent Orange and other

herbicides than comparable cohorts of their peers and thus

would have no way of distinguishing the health effects of

exposure to Agent Orange or other herbicides, as needed

for an epidemiological study. The congressional OTA and

the President’s Working Group Supported this assessment.

The pilot study, which the Center commissioned to evalu-

ate its exposure assessment methods, highlighted the in-

exactitude in the military records and revealed not only

that unit dispersion and inadequate spray records made

classification difficult, but also that most veterans (other

than the Ranch Hands) never had the opportunity for sig-

nificant Agent Orange exposure. The T¢

study. in turn. confirmed that the m1!

’

assessments bore no relationship to curre!

fore past) levels of Agent Orange tn vetera!

the evidence suggesting that the military

s blood

&recore

j

~

A

provide accurate exposure indices, and with no eviden

that an alternative method existed to identify ufiic

number of veterans who were likely exposed to Ag

Orange or other herbicides, the Secretary uld reasonat

conclude, in concurrence with the Center, OTA, and tl

Working Group, that the originally planned epidem

il Agent Orange Study was infeasible

he fact that the TCDD study left open the possibilit

that military cords might accurately identif |

veterans at low levels of exposure does not alter thi YI]

clusion. Because the purpose of the TCDD study

validate the records-based exposure il dices, the tudy

while not ruling out the possibility that military record

provided accurate *xposul indices at low lev ol \

posure, did not provide the verification of low-! | ex

posure indices that the Center, OTA. and the Work

Group had deemed necessary to justif short

ising military records

Appellants nevertheless fault the Secretary f s failu

to determine precisely how much misclassification inheres

in the military records According to appellants, the

Scien Subpanel licitl G i il ( ne ¢ pide Th ie

ical risk continuum” beyond which the degree of n

lassification made scientific validity unachievable Dhey

ee tat ' + ‘2

Subpanel report that it “felt that 7 et] '

‘ ine as re line T. ! iting that the secretal té

‘ ni e¢ ather tl} lence }

The Secret } evel ‘ his ! is

‘ ‘ ‘ , ’ et? a : ‘ ‘ ‘ ,

‘ I ane f os ’ OTA } ' | +}

e of ussification probler ' lepende! eth

J

maintain that Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1. 38-40

D.C. Cir. 1976), and other cases require the Secretary to

make this line explicit and to support his determination

with evidence in the record. Ethyl, which involved an

agency rule setting a particular numerical value for ac-

ceptable blood lead levels, 541 F.2d at 38, offers little

guidance here. Whereas Ethyl addressed whether the

agency had a rational basis for the chosen numerical

value, the question in these appeals is whether the Secre

tary had a rational basis for determining that no known

method existed to verify whether the military records

based assessments differentiated between exposed and non

exposed veterans in the way necessary for a cohort study.

[he TCDD study was designed, in part, to accomplish

what appellants charge the Secretary should have done

letermine the degree of correlation (and therefore the de

tree of misclassification) between military records and

'CDD exposure. As the TCDD study illustrates, the Sec

retary has no way of knowing the precise degree of mis

‘

classification. The Secretary knows only that inaccuracies

ind imprecision in the military records make it impossible

to determine whether a particular group of veterans is

re likely to have been exposed to Agent Orange and

other herbicides than a comparable cohort of their peers

[hat he did not pursue still other alternatives. at best

iguely identified by appellants, does not demonstrate

that the Secretary acted unreasonably in concluding in

February 1988 that the Center’s Agent Orange Study

should be abandoned.”

¢ ire issessment me neé ns erit ng the red roa.t gard

ire est tes ee l¢ | it at I I tne rcDD st

vhich post-dated the Science Subpanel ré rt, confirmed that

’ ré rida | ? T e re it é f nates of xposure

Agent Orange ind troops and that most ground tr

nad never faced meaningful exposure t Agent Orange or othe

rt} les

Appellant roft the affid t f Dr. Zena A. Steir vi

na Ca ¢ S ke those at sus y the

26a

For these reasons we conclude that appellants have

failed to show that when the Secretary made his decision,

after extensive efforts to identify and classify the data re-

quired for an epidemiological study that focused-solely on

the long-term health effects of dioxin exposure, the Secre-

tary acted unreasonably or contrary to law in abandoning

the Ce:ter’s Agent Orange Study. To the extent that

Vietnam veterans as a group faced higher exposure to

Agent Orange and other herbicides than other groups of

veterans, the Center’s Vietnam Experience and Selected

Cancers Studies were designed, in part, to detect health

effects that may have resulted from such exposure. In

addition, the Air Force’s Ranch Hands study was examin-

ing the one group of veterans who faced heavy exposure

to Agent Orange and other herbicides. Based on the data

[Center’s] exposure study ... do not necessarily invalidate any

justification of the study.” Affidavit at 6-7. Dr. Stein, however,

concedes that “a valid study must meet a minimum threshold of

probability and comparability” between exposed and unexposed

cohorts with respect to the fact of exposure, amount and duration

of exposure, and other personal characteristics and influences

that might affect individuals’ health. /d. at 2-4. Significantly,

Dr. Stein does not criticize the methodology used by the Center

in reviewing the military records, and she acknowledges that mis-

classification might preclude a valid Agent Orange Study if “the

misclassification problems were much greater than anticipated and

outlined in” the Health Study Protocol. /d. at 7.

Nor does appellants’ assertion that the National Academy of

Sciences has now proposed to conduct an Agent Orange Study

based on military records discredit the Secretary’s decision, which

was made several years before the Academy issued its preliminary

proposal. Moreover, in the single page from the proposal that

appears in the record, the Academy acknowledges that it ‘“‘does not

know whether the approach it proposes will prove valid or whether

new methods will identify a sufficient number of highly exposed

Vietnam veterans for an epidemiologic study.” National Academy

of Sciences, Institute of Medicine, Veterans and Agent Orange:

Health Effects of Herbicides Used in Vietnam (1993). This is

hardly a criticism of the Secretary’s approach, let alone the identi-

fication of a fundamental flaw in the studies and conclusions on

which the Secretary relied.

Sess sSNA cee an

——-—

available to the Secretary in February 1988, however, the

Secretary could reasonably conclude that it was impossible

to identify groups of Vietnam veterans who were similar

except for their levels of dioxin exposure, as required for

the cohort tests necessary to ascertain the health effects

of dioxins through a scientifically valid Agent Orange

Study.

Accordingly, because appellants have failed to present

a material issue of fact or to demonstrate that appellees

were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to

whether the Secretary’s decision was arbitrary, capricious,

an abuse of discretion, or otherwise contrary to law, we

affirm the grant of summary judgment to appellees.

[Filed Jun. 7, 1995]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 93-5404

PHE AMERICAN LEGION.

Appellant

EDWARD DERWINSKI, SECRETARY.

DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, ef

‘ ad

4 ppe llee

ind consolidated case No. 94-5013

Before Edwards. ( hief Judge Randolt

Circuit Judges

ORDER

It is ORDERED. sua sponte, that the opinion filed

33°

herein on April 25, 1995 is amended, as follows

In the caption of the consolidated case

de

as

ete

“Vietnam Veterans of America: Harold A. Butl

Carol Ridolfi-Delaney; Marel J. Macki; Beverly

Nehmer,”

substitute

“William (Bill) Atwell: Harold A. Butler: Carol

Delaney-Ridolfi; Julio Gonzales; Marel J. Macki

me ee eee

29a

Beverly Nehmer; Daniel Orta; Paul Sutton,”

the listing of appellants

Per Curiam

FOR THE COURT

MARK J. LANGER

Clerk

legible

Deputy Clerk

30a

APPENDIX B

[Filed Jul. 19, 1993]

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

Civil Actions

No. 90-1808 SSH

No. 90-1809 SSH

(consolidated )

THE AMERICAN LEGION,

Plaintiffs.

EDWARD J. DERWINSKI, Secretary,

United States Department of Veterans Affairs, et al.,

Defendants.

VIETNAM VETERANS OF AMERICA, et al..

laintiffs.

EDWARD J. DERWINSKI, Secretary,

United States Department of Veterans Affairs, et al.,

Defendants.

OPINION

Before the Court are defendants’ motion to dismiss or,

in the alternative, for summary judgment; plaintiffs’ mo-

tion to supplement the record; plaintiffs’ second motion

to supplement the record; plaintiffs’ motion for discovery;

defendants’ motion for a protective order staying dis-

3la

covery pending a ruling on defendants’ dispositive mo

tion; and the motion by certain members of Congress to

reconsider the Magistrate Judge’s order denying leave to

file a memorandum as amici curiae.’ Upon consideration

of the motions, the Court grants defendants’ motion for

summary judgment, grants in part plaintiffs’ motion to

supplement the record, and denies the remaining motions

Summary judgment may be granted only if the plead-

ings and evidence “show that there is no genuine issue

as to any material fact and that the moving party is en-

titled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P

56(c). In considering a summary judgment motion, all

evidence and the inferences to be drawn from it must be

considered in a light most favorable to the nonmoving

party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio

Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Summary judgment

cannot be granted “if the evidence is such that a reason

able jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242. 248

(1986). Although findings of fact and conclusions of law

are unnecessary in ruling on a summary judgment motion.

the Court sets forth its reasoning. See Fed. R. Civ. P

52(a)

Background

Plaintiffs are The American Legion, Vietnam Veterans

of America, and nine individually-named Vietnam vet

erans and widows of veterans.* Defendants are the Sec

retaries of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and

the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)

'On September 3, 1992, the Magistrate Judge issued a Rer

and Recommendation that resolved seven of the 11 pending no!

dispositive motions. The Magistrate Judge recommended that th:

Court resolve the remaining four nondispositive motions in

junction with the dispositive motion. Both sides agree with this

recommendation, as does the Court

‘The individual plaintiffs are Bill Atwell. Harold A Butler

Carol Delaney-Ridolfi, Julio Gonzales, Marel J. Macki. Beve:

Nehmer, Laura O'Callaghan. Danie Urta, and P

T

A

au

29.

how &

the Directors of the Centers for Disease Control (CDC)

and its Center for Environmental Health and Injury Con

trol, and the United States. Plaintiffs challenge defend-

ants’ action terminating a congressionally-mandated study

to investigate any long-term health effects in Vietnam

veterans that may have resulted from exposure to phenoxy

herbicides, including Agent Orange. See Pub. L. No.

96-151, 93 Stat. 1097 (1979) (amended 1981, 1984),

38 U.S.C. § 219 note.” Plaintiffs seek a declatory judg

ment that defendants’ decision to cancel the study vio-

lated the authorizing statute and the Administrative Pro

cedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706. Plaintiffs also seek

an injunctive order directing defendants to conduct th

‘iis

study ,

For two years following enactment of the authorizing

statute, the VA’s contractor for the study encountered

significant difficulties identifying veterans who had

tua

al

ly been exposed to herbicides. As a result, in 1981

Congress loosened the requirement of actual exposure t

allow the study to commence. See Pub. L. 97-/2, 95

Stat. 1061 (1981). In January 1983, the VA entered

into a contract with the CDC to design and execute the

tudy. The CDC developed a protocol intended to iden

i | i I [ t { >) ‘

‘4 :

‘ I u I I i j na AT f at

. te a erse healt! fer 5 \ etl ete

g r neaitr effects resu tT! y exposure T ner!

el ies I iding the herbicide know! s Age Ural

1 tne iss hemica KNOW as tne Kil rot

tne I Bi ture f sucn herbicides

8 U.S. zivd note A l \

‘In addition, plaintiffs seek an order requiring the VA,

eting ne stud t revit an amen sab ul Ul

mpensation reguiatior s the stud results wa nt ind

I 1d judicate eterans i nat ! pee 1e! a i

ght raise issues ir nt tr s results f

a ee Oe = a

33a

tify discrete cohorts of veterans who were and were not

likely to have been exposed to Agent Orange in Vietnam.

The CDC planned to determine whether those likely to

have been exposed suffered from any distinct health ef-

fects. By early 1984 the congressional Office of Tech-

nology Assessment (OTA) had approved the CDC’s pro-

tocol as required by the authorizing statute. 38 U.S.C.

) 219 note (a)(2)(A) (i).

lhe CDC had qualified the study’s potential within the

protocol, noting that “[sJince many of the proposed pro-

cedures are untested, modifications, indeed even a recom

mendation not to proceed with the Agent Orange study,

may be required after pilot assessments.” Erickson Decl.

Ex. A at 11. Working with the United States Army and

Joint Services Environmental Support Group to match

military records of troop locations and herbicide spray-

ing, the CDC found that the records were more deficient

than it had anticipated. The data indicated that troops

were Often dispersed 20 kilometers from the main com-

panys location records. In addition, records contained

gaps of company locations for various days. Eventually,

the CDC sought to adjust the original protocol in 1985.

In response to the CDC’s proposed changes, the OTA

demanded a revised protocol. Furthering the OTA posi-

tion, in January 1986, the chairmen of the House Vet

erans’ Affairs Committee and the Senate Committee on

Veterans Affairs requested the CDC to suspend activity

on the principal study until after the OTA approved a

new protocol

In addition to the mandated OTA oversight, the au-

thorizing statute charged the President with monitoring the

\gent Orange exposure study to assure its scientific va-

lidity. 38 U.S.C. $219 note (c). As a result. an inter-

agency council of Cabinet and subcabinet level officers

Known as the White House Domestic Policy Council

(DPC) had organized a subgroup, the Agent Orange

Working Group (AOWG). In early 1986, following the

Ne ne EI a

34a

OTA’s demand for a new protocol, the AOWG’s Science

panel convened a Subpanel on Exposure Assessment (Sub

panel) to review the status of the study. The June 1986

Subpanel report and a companion pilot assessment dis

closed a considerable potential for misclassification of ex

posed and non-exposed veterans. The study confirmed the

difficulty of identifying reliable cohorts to examine. Sub

sequently, the AOWG Science panel concluded that an

exposure study based on military records alone was not

scientifically valid. The AOWG Science panel recom

mended that the CDC develop an independent verification

method to determine the likelihood of veterans’ exposure

to Agent Orange.

Adopting the AOWG Science panel’s recommendation

in the summer of 1986, the CDC developed a validation

study to verify the accuracy of exposure estimates based on

military records. By measuring the 2,3,7,8-TCDD (di

oxin) level in blood serum, the CDC could reasonably

determine previous exposures to phenoxy herbicides. The

study results showed no correlation between the military

records’ estimates of exposure to Agent Orange and t!

veterans’ blood dioxin levels

Based on the recommendation of the AOWG Science

panel and the results of the blood dioxin verification

study, the CDC concluded that a scientifically valid ex

posure study could not be performed. In August 1987,

after reviewing these findings, the OTA Agent Orange

Advisory Panel, the AOWG Science panel, and the

AOWG all recommended that the Agent Orange exposure

study be cancelled. On October 9, 1987, the AOWG ini

tiated the process for terminating the contracts of the CD¢

study. The DPC approved the AOWG recommendation on

November 5, 1987. The AOWG informed the congre:

sional committees that the study had “proved scientifi

cally impossible to do.” Beach Decl. Exs. G and H at |

Subsequently, on November 24, 1987, the VA requested

a written report from the CDC regarding the recommenda

tion that no scientifically valid study could be performed

In December 1987, the VA Department of Medicine and

Surgery conducted an independent review of the CDC's

findings and endorsed the recommendation. The VA Ad

ministrator notified the House Veterans’ Affairs Committee

and the Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs in a Febru

Y, 1988, letter that

no one has successfully identified a large enough

roup of Vietnam veterans known to have been ex

posed to Agent Orange or other herbicides to allow

the preparation of a protocol and the conduct of an

epidemiological study as required by Public Law 96

151. I must, therefore, advise you that no scientifi

cally sound study can be undertaken and request that

the VA be relieved of the requirement to do this

research

Hobson Decl. Ex. E at 1-2. On February 17, 1988, the

VA notified the congressional committees that funds previ

ously appropriated for the Agent Orange study would

revert to the Treasury Department. Subsequently, Cor

gress ordered those funds shifted to other veterans’ studies

‘upon cancellation of that contract.” Pub. L. No. 100

AR7 120] 102 Stat. 4105. 4125 (1988)

i

D ‘CUSSION

7" } il tiff ial | ntestil ina

| I tud j | lant I ad tf il tf at ‘

J 1 rmat a 1¢ e that the VA

te incel the st e Defendants’ Ri

tiffs Me i 1u Upp t t Defe lant M t

] i ludg ent at ¢ Hov el r iteria 1O* !

pea ‘ the istrative reco! it tted b efendant

tne e! i exhibit wl n ne : f Rathe tl

itior Ss present P ntiffs’ Ex) t 2e he ¢ irt, I

‘ ent t} ‘ i t} Pla tite Fy -

36a

to summary judgment on two grounds.” First, defendants

claim that Congress ratified the decision to cancel the

study. Second, they argue that their actions were rational

and otherwise in accordance with law, and therefore did

not violate the APA. The Court first addresses defendants’

ratification claim and then examines the alleged APA

violations

l Congressional Ratification

Defendants claim that they are entitled to summary

judgment because Congress approved the decision to can-

cel the exposure study in 1988. Defendants contend that

Congress ratified the cancellation when it transferred the

funds originally appropriated for the Agent Orange ex

posure study to other veterans’ studies. Plaintiffs assert

that defendants have failed to satisfy the heavy burden

required to demonstrate ratification by appropriation.

In Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Morton,

this Circuit held that “ratification by appropriation will not

be found unless prior knowledge of the specific disputed

action can be clearly demonstrated and the appropriation

plainly shows ‘a purpose to bestow the precise authority

which is claimed’.” Associated Elec. Coop. Inc. v. Morton,

507 F.2d 1167, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (citations omit-

ted), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 830 (1975). When Congress

reappropriated the funds from the Agent Orange study, it

made no reference to repealing the authorizing statute

Pub. L. No. 100-687, § 1201, 102 Stat. 4105, 4125

(1988). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable

®* Defendants also move to dismiss, claiming that the CD«¢

lesign and methodology choices are committed to agency discre

and not subiect to judicial review See 5 U.S ~( S$ 7Ol(a 2

Plaintiffs deny that they challenge the legality of the CDC’s action

Although the Court finds that piaintiffs do challenge the CDC’

actions, they do so only in an effort to establish that defendants

acted arbitrarily and capriciously in concluding that no Agent

Uranwge study could be scientifically valid Therefore. the Court

‘ lefendant tion ft lismiss

37a

to plaintiffs, the Court finds that there is a genuine issue

of material fact in dispute as to whether Congress had the

requisite purpose to repeal the substantive law which au

thorized the study. Thus, the Court concludes that sum

mary judgment on the basis of defendants’ congressional

ratification argument Is inappropriate. '

i Alleged Violations of the APA

Under the APA, reviewing courts generally must ex

amine “final agency action.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. Deferring

judicial intervention until after the agency's final action

permits the full exercise of the administrative process.

{T]he task of the reviewing court is to apply the ap

propriate APA standard of review, 5 U.S.C. § 706. to the

igency decision based on the record the agency presents to

reviewing court.” Florida Power & Light Co. vy.

+}

729, 744 (1985). The final agency

Le

Lorion, 470 U.S

action in this case may be characterized as an informal

one, and the Court will set it aside only if it is “ ‘arbitrary,

capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in

iccordance with law’ or if the action failed to meet statu

tory, procedural, or constitutional requirements.” Citizens

lo Pre serve Overton Park. Inc. \ Volpe, 40] U S 402.

U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (B), (C).

+14 (1971) (citine § .

(D)). This standard is highly deferential. See, e.g., Motor

onsideration of the motion by certain members of (

é reconsider the Magistrate Judge’s order denying leave

a memorandum as an ‘riae, the Court upholds the order

e it is not “clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” See Fed

I ( P. 72(a

Because neither the authorizing statute no: legislative histor.

ite any congressional intent to create a private caus

lier the Avent Orange exposure study statute, the Court

es not recognize such a right. See Middlesex County Seweraas

i Nat ea Clamme? 1 n, 458 U.S 13-15 (198] \

. 3 intiffs’ claims that defendants Violated the authorizing

the APA > US ¢ (06 (2 A

yr:

38a

Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.

Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). Moreover, reviewing courts

are to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of statu-

tory schemes when the authorizing language is silent or

ambiguous. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. National Re-

sources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).

As a threshold matter, the Court examines the parties’

dispute regarding which governmental body made the final

decision to cancel the Agent Orange exposure study. The

Court then addresses the parties’ conflict over the ade-

quacy of the administrative record. Finally, the Court

considers whether the decision to cancel the study was

arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with

law.

4A. Final Agency Action

First, plaintiffs contend that determining which body

made the decision to cancel the study, the DPC or the VA,

is a genuine issue of material fact that precludes sum-

mary judgment. In their initial statement of material

facts, defendants claimed that the DPC made the decision

to cancel the study. In their amended statement of ma-

terial facts, however, defendants withdrew this contention.

Instead, they assert that the VA Administrator’s decision

to terminate the study was the final agency action review-

able by this Court.’ Plaintiffs, however, claim that during

® The Court rejects plaintiffs’ attempt to estop defendants from

amending their statement of facts. Plaintiffs argue that if de-

fendants recant earlier statements they thereby create a material

issue of fact. See Pyramid Sec. Ltd. v. IB Resolution, Inc., 924

F.2d 1114, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“Courts have long held that a

party may not create a material issue of fact simply by contradict-

ing its prior sworn testimony.” (citation omitted) ), cert. denied,

112 S. Ct. 85 (1991). Defendants claim that their misstatements

do not contradict sworn declarations but were “arguments con-

tained in defendants’ legal memoranda” that “resulted from honest

error” on counsel’s part. See Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’

Motion to Estop Defendants at 15. It is undisputed that the VA

39a

a meeting on November 5, 1987, the DPC made the

decision to cancel the Agent Orange exposure study. This

DPC decision, plaintiffs assert, violates the statutory au-

thority which restricts cancellation of the study to the VA

Administrator. See 38 U.S.C. § 219 note (a)(3).% At

the least, they claim that defendants’ reversal regarding

the finality of the DPC action is sufficient to create a

genuine issue of material fact.

It is well settled that courts generally review final

agency action which is the last, legal administrative ac-

tion. See, e.g., Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 US.

871, 882 (1990). Courts are averse to reviewing action

prior to agency completion. Viewing the facts in the light

most favorable to the plaintiffs, the Court assumes that

the DPC made a decision to cancel the CDC study and

to notify Congress thereof. However, this action by the

DPC is not inconsistent with the VA’s retention and ex-

ecution of the final, legal authority to cancel the Agent

Administrator had the sole statutory authority to cancel the study

and that his letter of February 9, 1988, was the final action taken

in announcing the cancellation. As such, defendants “offer persua-

sive reasons for believing the supposed correction.” Pyramid.

924 F.2d at 1123. Therefore, the Court permits defendants’ pro-

posed amendments.

Even if the Court were to estop defendants from amending

their statement of facts, the Court would still find that there is

no genuine issue of material fact in dispute. The Court finds that,

regardless of what the Beach declaration states that the DPC

decided to tell Congress or how the Hobson declaration character-

izes the VA’s action, the VA nevertheless ultimately exercised its

sole legal authority to cancel the study.

Plaintiffs also raise other facts purportedly in dispute, but the

Court finds that they are likewise not material.

©The cancellation provision reads in part: “The study .

shall be continued for as long .. . as the Administrator may

determine reasonable in light of the possibility of developing

through such study significant new information on the long-term

adverse health effects of exposure to dioxins.” 38 U.S.C. § 219

note (a) (3).

40a

Orange exposure study. Following the DPC decision, on

November 24, 1987, the VA requested a written report

from the CDC with all data recommending cancellation

of the study."* In December 1987, the VA Department

of Medicine and Surgery conducted an independent study

of the CDC’s findings and concluded that no Agent

Orange exposure study could be performed in a scien-

tifically valid manner. The VA Administrator informed

Congress in a February 9, 1988, letter of the decision

that no scientifically valid study could be performed.

Had the VA not acted following the DPC decision to

cancel, plaintiffs might have had a valid claim that the

DPC made the final decision to cancel the study. How-

ever, the record demonstrates that the VA exercised the

ultimate, binding decision to cancel the Agent Orange

exposure study in February 1988. As plaintiffs and de-

fendants recognize, the VA had the sole legal authority

to terminate the Agent Orange exposure study. At the

time that he chose to cancel the study, the VA Ad-

ministrator could have used his power to continue the

study regardless of the DPC finding. Moreover, even

assuming that the DPC cancelled the CDC study, the

VA could have~—initiated a new round of protocols to

pursue the Agent Orange exposure study. Thus, the VA

decision terminating the study was the final agency ac-

tion, and it is reviewable by this Court. See 5 U.S.C.

§ 704.

B. Adequacy of the Administrative Record

Secondly, plaintiffs claim that even if the VA made

the final agency action, the administrative record is in-

sufficient for effective judicial review and they seek to

amend it. Plaintiffs seek to augment the record with

supplemental documents and declarations which they

claim demonstrate that defendants acted arbitrarily and

11 See supra note 5.

2 A EE A TE RN cS

4la

Capriciously in concluding that no scientifically valid

study could be conducted. Plaintiffs also assert that some

of the proposed supplemental exhibits reveal defendants’

failure to consider relevant factors. Others, they con-

tend, demonstrate that defendants relied on irrelevant

considerations. Still others, according to the plaintiffs,

provide important background information for the Court

Additionally, plaintiffs seek discovery primarily to inquire

into any possibly improper DPC or White House pres-

sures on the VA decision to cancel. Defendants contend,

however, that the administrative record before the Court

is adequate for effective judicial review.”

It is well established that courts are generally to review

agency action based solely on the administrative record

provided by the agency. See, e.g., Camp v. Pitts, 411

U.S. 138, 142 (1973) (“The focal point for judicial

review should be the administrative record already in ex-

istence, not some new record made initially in the review-

ing court.”); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle.

657 F.2d 275, 286 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“There is no oc-

casion for a judicial probe beyond the confines of a rec-

ord which affords enough explanation to indicate whether

the agency considered all relevant factors.”). In addition,

that record must be the one that was before the decision-

maker. See, e.g., Walter O. Boswell Memorial Hosp. v.

Heckler, 749 F.2d 788, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“If a

court is to review an agency’s action fairly, it should

have before it neither more nor less information than

did the agency when it made its decision.” ).

Courts have identified certain limited occasions that

may allow .the addition of supplemental information to

the record. Among other reasons, the record may be

supplemented:

12 Asserting that some documents were inadvertently omitted

from the original record, defendants supplemented the record with

five (Plaintiffs’ Exhibits 14, 16, 23, 25, and 27) of the 29 docu-

ments plaintiffs seek to admit as well as two other documents.

42a

(1) when agency action is not adequately explained

in the record before the court; (2) when the agency

failed to consider factors which are relevant to its

final decision; (3) when an agency considered evi-

dence which it failed to include in the record; (4)

when a case is so complex that a court needs more

evidence to enable it to understand the issues clearly.

Esch v. Yeutter, 876 F.2d 976, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1989)

(footnote omitted). Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has

found that the record may be supplemented when addi-

tional information “fully explicate[s] [the agency’s] course

of conduct” in reaching its decision. Asarco, Inc. v.

EPA, 616 F.2d 1153, 1160 (9th Cir. 1980).

The Court finds that the approximately 2,000-page

administrative record contains the VA Administrator’s ar-

ticulated explanation for his decision to cancel the ex-

posure study. The record also includes the respective rec-

ommendations of the VA Department of Medicine and

Surgery, the CDC, the OTA, and the AOWG Science

Subpanel which were before the VA Administrator when

he chose to terminate the study. The record includes,

but is not limited to, evidence that defendants consid-

ered the relevant factors in selecting which veterans to

study and in choosing the geographical area and time pe-

riod to examine. It also contains defendants’ reasoning

for the necessity and relevance of the blood dioxin veri-

fication study. Plaintiffs’ supplemental documents and

declarations primarily challenge the scientific merits of the

decision to cancel. Plaintiffs’ other exhibits fail to contrib-

ute information pertinent to defendants’ action or pro-

vide only peripheral background information. Accord-

ingly, plaintiffs’ motion to add documents to the record

is largely denied.

The Court does, however, grant in part plaintiffs’ mo-

tion to supplement the record. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 28 pro-

vides relevant information regarding the chain of events

43a

in the VA’s decision to terminate the study. The decision

to terminate the Agent Orange exposure study involved

numerous agencies and much interagency communication.

Included in Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 28 is the VA’s request for

a written report containing the CDC’s data, which aids

in fully explicating the VA’s “course of conduct.” See

Asarco, Inc., 616 F.2d at 1160. No other exhibit offered

by plaintiffs yields information not already in the record

regarding central steps in the VA’s decisional process.

Thus, for the limited purpose of more fully explicating

the VA’s decision, the Court supplements the administra-

tive record only with Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 28.'"* The Court

therefore grants in part and denies in part plaintiffs’ mo-

tion to supplement the record and denies plaintiffs’ sec-

ond motion to supplement the record.

Courts may grant discovery in agency review cases

when, for example, there is a “strong showing of bad

faith or improper behavior.” Citizens To Preserve Over-

ton Park, 401 U.S. at 420. Plaintiffs, however, submit

no evidence that the VA Administrator relied on irrele-

vant factors in cancelling the study. They proffer only

speculation that the DPC or the White House exerted

pressure on the VA Administrator. Accordingly, the

Court denies plaintiffs’ motion for discovery.

C. Defendants’ Actions Were Not Arbitrary and Ca-

pricious Nor in Violation of the Law

Plaintiffs claim that defendants violated the APA by

acting arbitrarily and capriciously and not in accordance

with law. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). The Court dis-

agrees. As noted, Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure specifically makes findings and conclu-

sions unnecessary in ruling on a motion for summary

13 Even without Exhibit 28 in the administrative record, the

Court would still hold that the VA made the final decision to

cancel the Agent Orange study.

44a

judgment, but the Court elects to address plaintiffs’ more

meritorious arguments.

1. Not Arbitrary and Capricious

Among the actions which plaintiffs challenge is defend-

ants’ determination that a scientifically valid study would

require independent verification to corroborate the ex-

posure estimates based on military records. Addition-

ally, plaintiffs challenge defendants’ finding, based on the

blood dioxin study, that no scientifically valid study could

be performed. Finally, plaintiffs challenge the decision

to cancel the study. Defendants argue that the scientific

conclusions and the VA’s decision to cancel the study

were rational and reasoned.

The scope of review is “narrow” under the arbitrary

and capricious standard. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc.,

463 U.S. at 43. The reviewing court presumes agency

action to be valid. Citizens To Preserve Overton Park,

401 U.S. at 415 (“Certainly, the [agency’s] decision is

entitled to a presumption of regularity.”). Moreover, a

court may not substitute its judgment for that of the

agency. Id. at 416. Indeed, the Court need not decide

if the decision to cancel the study is supported by a pre-

ponderance of the evidence or even whether it is sup-

ported by substantial evidence. Rather, the Court must

sustain the decision if it has a rational basis in the evi-

dence. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 37 (D.C.

Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).

In addition, under the APA a reviewing court must not

only consider the final agency action but also “prelimi-

nary” and “intermediate” agency actions. 5 U.S.C. § 704.

As a result, the Court examines challenges to the scien-

tific conclusions on which the VA relied. In examining

such challenges to decisions involving an agency’s area

of special expertise at the frontiers of science, “a reviewing

court must generally be at its most deferential.” Balti-

more Gas & Elec. Co. v. National Resources Defense

45a

Council, 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983); see also Ethyl Corp.,

541 F.2d at 36 (“We must look at the [agency’s]} deci-

sion not as the chemist, biologist or statistician that we

are qualified neither by training nor experience to be, but

as a reviewing court exercising our narrowly defined duty

of holding agencies to certain minimal standards of ra-

tionality.” ).

One of the scientific conclusions that the plaintiffs

challenge is the CDC’s 1986 rejection of the scientific

validity of exposure estimates based on military records.

Plaintiffs contend that this conclusion is an arbitrary

reversal from the CDC’s original protocol. However, in

concluding against sole reliance on the military records,

the CDC considered the results of the June 1986 Sub-

panel report. The Subpanel report delineated three years

of new data compiled by abstracting military records in

an effort to match troop locations with herbicide spraying.

This additional evidence on the unreliability of the mili-

tary records established a rational basis for the CDC's

1986 decision that exposure estimates based on such rec-

ords would not create scientifically valid exposure cohorts.

Plaintiffs also challenge the CDC’s blood dioxin veri-

fication method and its finding that the study results

indicated no scientifically valid exposure study could be

performed. At the heart of plaintiffs’ arguments, however,

is a challenge to the scientific merit of the CDC’s research

rather than the rationality of its conclusion. Assuming,

but not deciding, that plaintiffs may challenge the scien-

tific merit, see supra note 6, the Court finds that the

CDC’s methodology and research exhibit reasoned deci-

sionmaking and provide a rational basis for defendants’

conclusion that a meaningful scientific study could not

be performed.

In addition, plaintiffs also challenge the VA’s decision

to cancel the study. As noted, the authorizing statute

provides that “[t]he study . . . shall be continued for as

long . . . as the Administrator may determine reasonable

46a

in light of the possibility of developing through such study

significant new information on the long-term health effects

of exposure to dioxins.” 38 U.S.C, § 219 note (a)(3).

Having considered the evidence and recommendations of

the AOWG, the CDC, the OTA Agent Orange Advisory

Panel, and the VA’s Department of Medicine and Surgery,

the Administrator concluded that no scientifically valid

study could be performed. The Court finds that this deci-

sion to cancel was reasoned and rational. Thus the Court

finds that neither the scientific conclusions leading up to

the VA’s decision to terminate the study nor the Adminis-

trator’s final decision were “arbitrary and capricious.” ™

2. Not Otherwise in Violation of Law

Plaintiffs also assert that defendants’ interpretation of

the statutory scheme violates the authorizing statute and

consequently the APA’s requirement that agency action

be in accordance with law. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).

They contend that defendants’ failure to submit an initial

report to Congress explaining the “results thus far ob-

tained under the study” is one such violation. 38 U.S.C.

§ 219 note (a)(3), (b)(2). Defendants claim that in

mandating such a report, Congress did not intend to re-

quire commencement of the study if no such study could

be conducted with scientific validity. Instead, defendants

argue that Congress required the report as a progress

account, which defendants submitted.

“[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to

the specific issue, the question for the court is whether

the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construc-

tion of the statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. The

Court finds that defendants’ construction of the statute

was a “reasonable interpretation” of the provision. 7d.

at 844. The statute requires the President to assure the

study's scientific validity. 38 U.S.C. § 219 note (c). In

14The Court rejects as meritless plaintiffs’ other claims that

defendants acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.

47a

light of this requirement, defendants’ interpretation of the

mandated report as a program update is reasonable.

Thus, the Court finds that defendants committed no statu-

tory violation that would breach the APA."’ Accordingly

the Court grants defendants’ motion for summary

judgment.”

Conclusion

For the reasons stated, the Court grants in part plain-

tiffs’ motion to supplement the record as to Plaintiffs’

Exhibit 28 and denies the remainder of the motion. The

Court also denies plaintiffs’ second motion to supplement

the record, plaintiffs’ motion for discovery, and the mo-

tion by certain members of Congress to reconsider the

Magistrate Judge’s order denying leave to file a memo-

randum as amici curiae. However, finding no genuine

issue of material fact in dispute and finding in favor of

defendants as a matter of law, the Court grants defend-

ants’ motion for summary judgment. An appropriate

Order accompanies this Opinion.

s/ Stanley S. Harris

STANLEY S. HARRIS

United States District Judge

Date: Jul. 19, 1993

'° The Court rejects plaintiffs’ other statutory violation claims.

16 As the Court grants defendants’ motion for summary judg-

ment, it denies as moot defendants’ motion for a protective order

staying discovery pending a ruling on the dispositive motion.

+3a

APPENDIX C

[Filed Jul. 19,

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT QF COLUMBIA

Civil Actions

No. 90-1808 SSH

No. 90-1809 SSH

(consolidated )

THE AMERICAN LEGION, ef al..

Piaintitis

EDWARD J. DERWINSKI, Secretary, United States

Department of Veterans Affairs, et al.,

Detendants

VIETNAM VETERANS OF AMERICA, ef ai..,

Plaintiffs.

EDWARD J. DERWINSKI, Secretary, United States

Department of Veterans Affairs, et ai.,

Defendants.

ORDER

1993}

For the reasons stated in the Court’s accompanying

Opinion, it hereby is

ORDERED, that plaintiffs’ motion to supplement the

record is granted in part and denied in part, and the ad-

I

49a

ministrative record is supplemented with Plaintiffs’ Ex

hibit 28. It hereby further is

ORDERED, that plaintiffs’ second motion to supple

ment the record is denied. It hereby further is

ORDERED, that plaintiffs’ motion for discovery is

denied. It hereby further is

ORDERED, that the motion by certain members of

Congress to reconsider the Magistrate Judge’s order deny

ing leave to file a memorandum as amici curiae is denied

It hereby further is

ORDERED, that defendants’ motion for a protective

order staying discovery pending a ruling on defendants

dispositive motion is denied as moot. It hereby further is

ORDERED, that defendants’ motion for summary

judgment is granted and the case is dismissed

SO ORDERED

s' Stanley S. Harris

STANLEY S. HARRIS

United States District Jud;

Date: Jul. 19, 1993

50a

APPENDIX D

[Filed Apr. 25, 1995]

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT

No. 93-5404

THE AMERICAN LEGION

Appellant

EDWARD DERWINSKI, Sec retary,

Department of Veterans Affairs, ef ai.,

1 ppellees

And ( onsolidated ( ase 94-50] ,

ORDER

[It is ORDERED on the Court’s own motion, that the

Clerk shall withhold issuance of the mandate herein until

seven days after disposition of any timely petition for

rehearing. See D.C. Cir. R. 41(a) (January 1, 1994)

This instruction to the Clerk is without prejudice to the

right of any party at any time to move for expedited

issuance of the mandate for good cause shown.

FOR THE COURT:

MARK J. LANGER

Clerk

By: /s/ Eva Brown

Deputy Clerk

Sla

APPENDIX E

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Washington, DC 20543

WILLIAM K. SUTER

Clerk of the Court

Area Code 202 479-3011

June 19, 1995

Mr. Gershon M. Ratner

National Veterans Legal

2001 S Street, Suite 610

Washington, DC 20009

Re: American Legion

v. Jesse Brown, Secretary of

Veterans Affairs, et al.

Application No. A-959

Dear Mr. Ratner:

The application for an extension of time within which

to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the above-

entitled case has been presented to the Chief Justice,

who on June 19, 1995, extended the time to and includ-

ing August 23, 1995.

Sincerely,

WILLIAM K. SUTER

Clerk

By /s’ Troy D. Cahill

Troy D. CAHILL

Assistant Clerk

ee 8 ee

52a

ow

APPENDIX F

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Veterans’ Health Programs Extension and Improve-

ment Act of 1979, Pub. L. 96-151, § 307 (as amended):

38 U.S.C.A. § 527 Note

“(a)(1)(A) The Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs

shall design a protocol for and conduct an epidemiolog-

ical study of any long-term adverse health effects in

humans of service in the Armed Forces of the United

States in the Republic of Vietnam during the period of

the Vietnam conflict as such health effects may result from

exposure to phenoxy herbicides (including the herbicide

known as Agent Orange) and the class of chemicals

known as the dioxins produced during the manufacture

of such herbicides. In conducting such study, the Admin-

istrator may expand the scope of the study to include an

evaluation of any long-term adverse health effects in

humans of such service as such health effects may iesult

from other factors involved in such service, including ex-

posure to other herbicides, chemicals, medications, or

environmental hazards or conditions. The Administrator

may also include in the study an evaluation of the means

of detecting and treating adverse health effects found

through the study.

“(B) The Administrator shall also conduct a compre-

hensive review and scientific analysis of the literature

covering other studies relating to whether there may be

long-term adverse health effects in humans from exposure

to phenoxy herbicides (including the herbicide known as

Agent Orange) and the class of chemicals known as the

dioxins produced during the manufacture of such herbi-

cides. In conducting such review and analysis, the Ad-

ministrator may expand the scope of such review and

analysis to include a review and analysis of the literature

covering other studies relating to whether there may be

53a

long-term adverse health effects in humans from other

factors involved in service in the Armed Forces of the

United States in the Republic of Vietnam during the

period of the Vietnam conflict or in other comparable

situations involving one or more of the factors described

in the second sentence of subparagraph (A). The Ad-

ministrator may also include a review and analysis of the

means of detecting and treating adverse health effects

found through any study covered by either such review

and analysis.

“(2)(A)(i) The study conducted pursuant to para-

graph (1) shali be conducted in accordance with a proto-

col approved by the Director of the Office of Technology

Assessment.

(ii) The Director shall monitor the conduct of such

study in order to assure compliance with such protocol.

“(B)(i) Concurrent with the approval or disapproval

of any protocol under subparagraph (A)(i), the Director

of the Office of Technology Assessment shall submit to

the appropriate committees of the Congress a report ex-

plaining the basis for the Director’s action in approving

or disapproving such protocol and providing the Direc-

tor’s conclusions regarding the scientific validity and ob-

jectivity of such protocol.

“(ii) In the event that the Director has not approved

such protocol during the one hundred and eighty days

following the date of the enactment of this Act [Dec. 20,

1979], the Director shall (1) submit to the appropriate

committees of the Congress a report describing the rea-

sons why the Director has not given such approval, and

(II) submit an update report on such initial report each

sixty days thereafter until such protocol is approved.

“(C) The Director shall submit to the appropriate

committees of the Congress, at each of the times specified

in the second sentence of this subparagraph, a report on

the Director’s monitoring of the conduct of such study

54a

pursuant to subparagraph (A)(ii). A report under the

preceding sentence shall be submitted before the end of

the six-month period beginning on the date of the ap-

proval of such protocol by the Director, before the end

of the twelve-month period beginning on such date, and

annually thereafter until such study is completed or

terminated.

(3) The study conducted pursuant to paragraph (1)

shall be continued for as long after the submission of the

first report under subsection (b)(2) as the Administra-

tor may determine reasonable in light of the possibility of

developing through such study significant new informa-

tion on the long-term adverse health effects of exposure

to dioxins.

“(b)(1) Not later than twelve months after the date

of the enactment of this Act [Dec. 20, 1979], the Admin-

istrator shall submit to the appropriate committees of the

Congress a report on the literature review and analysis

conducted under subsection (a)(1).

“(2) Not later than twenty-four months after the date

of the approval of the protocol pursuant to subsection

(a)(2)(A)(i) and annually thereafter, the Administra-

tor shall submit to the appropriate committees of the

Congress a report containing (A) a description of the

results thus far obtained under the study conducted pur-

Suant to such subsection, and (B) such comments and

recommendations for administrative or legislative action,

or both, as the Administrator considers appropriate in

light of such results.

“(3) Immediately after the submission of each report

under paragraph (2), the Administrator, based on the

results described in such report and the comments and

recommendations included therein and any other avail-

able pertinent information, shall evaluate the need for any

amendments to regulations, prescribed pursuant to sec-

tion 5 of the Veterans’ Dioxin and Radiation Exposure

55a

Compensation Standards Act, [section 5 of Pub.L. 98-

342, set out as a note under section 1154 of this title]

for the resolution of claims for service connectior based

or the exposure specified in subsection (a)(1)(A) of

such section. To the extent that the Administrator deter-

mines that any amendments to such regulations are

needed, the Administrator, not later than 90 days after

such submission, shall develop and publish in the Fed-

eral Register, for public review and comment, proposed

amendments to such regulations.

“(4) The first report submitted under paragraph (2)

Shall include the Administrator’s recommendation, and

reasons therefor, with respect to whether the authority to

provide care and services under and by virtue of section

610(a)(5) of title 38, United States Code [now section

1710(a)(5) of this title], should be extended beyond the

expiration period specified by section 610(e)(3) of such

title [now section 1710(e) (3) of this title].

“(c) For the purpose of assuring that any study car-

ried out by the Federal Government with respect to the

adverse health effects in humans of exposure to dioxins

is scientifically valid and is conducted with efficiency and

objectivity, the President shall assure that—

“(1) the study conducted pursuant to subsection

(a) is fully coordinated with studies which are

planned, are being conducted, or have been com-

pleted by other departments, agencies, and instru-

mentalities of the Federal Government and which

pertain to the .dverse health effects in humans of

exposure to dioxins; and

“(2) all app: priate coordination and consulta-

tion is accompi: hed between and among the Ad-

ministrator anc. te heads of such departments, agen-

cies, and instrumentalities that may be engaged,

during the conduct of the study carried out pursuant

to subsection (a), in a design, conduct, monitoring,

or evaluation of such dioxin-exposure studies.

S6a

“(d

) There are authorized to be appropriated

such sums as may be necessary for the conduct of

the study required by subsection (a).”

ee RE et at eee — Se en = meet. a et eter

eee o_o RR a

57a

Pub. L. 96-151, § 307, Dec. 20, 1979, 93 Stat. 1097:

AGENT ORANGE STUDY

SEC. 307. (a)(1) The Administr: ‘or of Veterans’ Af-

fairs shall design a protocol for and conduct an epidemi-

ological study of persons who, while serving in the

Armed Forces of the United States during the period of

the Vietnam conflict, were exposed to any of the class of

chemicals known as “the dioxins” produced during the

manufacture of the various phenoxy hezbicides (including

the herbicide known as “Agent Orange”) to determine if

there may be long-term adverse health effects in such

persons from such exposure. The Administrator shall

also conduct a comprehensive review and scientific analy-

sis of the literature covering other studies relating to

whether there may be long-term adverse health effects in

humans from exposure to such dioxins or other dioxins.

(2)(A)(i) The study conducted pursuant to para-

graph (1) shall be conducted in accordance with a proto-

col approved by the Director of the Office of Technology

Assessment.

(ii) The Director shall monitor the conduct of such

study in order to assure compliance with such protocol.

(B)(i) Concurrent with the approval or disapproval

of any protocol under subparagraph (A)(i), the Director

of the Office of Technology Assessment shall submit to

the appropriate committees of the Congress a report ex-

plaining the basis for the Directoy’s action in approving

or disapproving such protocol and providing the Direc-

tor’s conclusions regarding the scientific validity and ob-

jectivity of such protocol.

(11) In the event that the Director has not approved

such protocol during the one hundred and eighty days

following the date of the enactment of this Act, the Direc-

tor shall (I) submit to the appropriate committees of

the Congress a report describing the reasons why the

Director has not given such approval, and (II) submit

ed eR EE te PT CE TIA ACI tt TT tee encanta tlt rs all EE a ee ee TT eS

58a

an update report on such initial report each sixty days

thereafter until such protocol is approved.

(C) The Director shall submit to the appropriate com-

mittees of the Congress, at each of the times specified in

the second sentence of this subparagraph, a report on the

Director’s monitoring of the conduct of such study pur-

suant to subparagraph (A)(ii). A report under the pre-

ceding sentence shall be submitted before the end of the

six-month period beginning on the date of the approval

of such protocol by the Director, before the end of the

twelve-month period beginning on such date, and annually

thereafter until such study is completed or terminated.

(3) The study conducted pursuant to paragraph (1)

shall be continued for as long after the submission of

the report under subsection (b)(2) as the Administrator

may determine reasonable in light of the possibility of

developing through such study significant new informa-

tion on the long-term adverse health effects of exposure

to dioxins.

(b)(1) Not later than twelve months after the date of

the enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall submit

to the appropriate committees of the Congress a report

on the literature review and analysis conducted under

subsection (a)(1).

(2) Not later than twenty-four months after the date

of the approval of the protocol pursuant to subsection

(a)(2)(A)(i) and annually thereafter, the Administra-

tor shall submit to the appropriate committees of the

Congress a report containing (A) a description of the

results thus far obtained under the study conducted pur-

suant to such subsection, and (B) such comments and

recommendations as the Administrator considers appro-

priate in light of such results.

(c) For the purpose of assuring that any study carried

out by the Federal Government with respect to the ad-

verse health effects in humans of exposure to dioxins is

scientifically valid and is conducted with efficiency and

objectivity, the President shall assure that—

. - ” ae -_- _- cote =

a

59a

(1) the study conducted pursuant to subsection

(a) is fully coordinated with studies which are

planned, are being conducted, or have been com-

pleted by other departments, agencies, and instru-

mentalities of the Federal Government and which

pertain to the adverse health effects in humans of

exposure to dioxins; and

(2) all appropriate coordination and consultation

is accomplished between and among the Administra-

tor and the heads of such departments, agencies,

and instrumentalities that may be engaged, during

the conduct of the study carried out pursuant to

subsection (a), in the design, conduct, monitoring,

or evaluation of such dioxin-exposure studies.

(d) There are authorized to be appropriated such

sums as may be necessary for the conduct of the study

required by subsection (a).

Approved December 20, 1979

ee er ee me ee ee

60a

Pub. L. 97-72, § 401, Nov. 3, 1981, 95 Stat. 1061:

TITLE IV—MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS

EXPANSION OF SCOPE OF

AGENT ORANGE STUDY

Sec. 401. (a)(1) Paragraph (1) of section 307(a)

of the Veterans Health Programs Extension and Improve-

ment Act of 1979 (Public Law 96-151; 93 Stat. 1097)

is amended to read as follows:

“(1)(A) The Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs shall

design a protocol for and conduct an epidemiological

study of any long-term adverse health effects in humans

of service in the Armed Forces of the United States in

the Republic of Vietnam during the period of the Viet-

nam conflict as such health effects may result from ex-

posure to phenoxy herbicides (including the herbicide

known as Agent Orange) and the class of chemicals

known as the dioxins produced during the manufacture

gf such herbicides. In conducting such study, the Ad-

ministrator may expand the scope of the study to include

an evaluation of any long-term adverse health effects in

humans of such service as such health effects may result

from other factors involved in such service, including ex-

posure to other herbicides, chemicals, medications, or

environmental hazards or conditions. The Administrator

may also include in the study an evaluation of the means

of detecting and treating adverse health effects found

through the study.

“(B) The Administrator shall also conduct a compre-

hensive review and scientific analysis of the literature

covering other studies relating to whether there may be

long-term adverse health effects in humans from exposure

to phenoxy herbicides (including the herbicide known as

Agent Orange) and the class of chemicals known as the

dioxins produced during the manufacture of such herbi-

cides. In conducting such review and analysis, the Ad-

6la

ministrator may expand the scope of such review and analy-

sis to include a review and analysis of the literature cover-

ing other studies relating to whether there may be long-

term adverse health effects in humans from other factors

involved in service in the Armed Forces of the United

States in the Republic of Vietnam during the period of

the Vietnam conflict or in other comparable situations

involving one or more of the factors described in the

second sentence of subparagraph (A). The Administra-

tor may also include a review and analysis of the means

of detecting and treating adverse health effects found

through any study covered by either such review and

analysis.”.

(2) Paragraph (3) of such section is amended by

inserting “first” after “submission of the”.

(b) Section 307(b) of such Act is amended—

(1) by inserting “for administrative or legislative

action, or both,” in paragraph (2) after “recommen-

dations”; and

(2) by adding at the end the following new para-

graphs:

“(3) Not later than ninety days after the submission

of each report under paragraph (2), the Administrator

shall, based on the results described in such report and

the comments and recommendations thereon and any

other available pertinent information, publish in the Fed-

eral Register, for public review and comments, a descrip-

tion of actions, if any, that the Administrator proposes

to take with respect to programs administered by the

Veterans’ Administration. Each such description shall in-

clude a justification or rationale for any such action the

Administrator proposes to take.

(“(4) The first report submitted under paragraph (2)

Shall include the Administrator’s recommendation, and

reasons therefor, with respect to whether the authority

62a

to provide care and services under and by virtue of sec-

tion 610(a)(5) of title 38, United States Code, should

be extended beyond the expiration period specified by

section 610(e)(3) of such title.”.

63a

Pub. L. 97-72, § 102, Nov. 3, 1981, 95 Stat. 1047:

VETERANS’ HEALTH CARE, TRAINING, AND

SMALL BUSINESS LOAN ACT OF 1981

MEDICAL CARE FOR DISABILITIES THAT MAY

BE RELATED TO EXPOSURE TO AGENT

ORANGE, CERTAIN OTHER HAZARDOUS SUB-

STANCES, OR NUCLEAR RADIATION

SEC. 102. (a) Section 610 is amended—

(1) in subsection (a)—

(A) by striking out “and” at the end of the

clause (4);

(B) by redesignating clause (5

(6); and

as clause

(C) by inserting after clause (4) the follow-

ing new clause (5):

“(3) a veteran who meets the conditions of sub-

section (e) of this section: and”: and

(2) by adding at the end the following new sub-

section:

“(e)(1)(A) Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3) of

this subsection, a veteran—

“(1) who served on active duty in the Republic

of Vietnam during the Vietnam era, and

“(i1) who the Administrator finds may have been

exposed during such service to dioxin or was ex-

posed during such service to a toxic substance found

in a herbicide or defoliant used in connection with

military purposes during such era.

may be furnished hospital care or nursing home care

under subsection (a)(5) of this section for any disability,

notwithstanding that there is insufficient medical evidence

64a

to conclude that such disability may be associated with

such exposure.

“(B) Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3) of this sub-

section, a veteran who the Administrator finds was ex-

posed while serving on active duty to ionizing radiation

from the detonation of a nuclear device in connection

with such veteran’s participation in the test of such a

device or with the American occupation of Hiroshima

and Nagasaki, Japan, during the period beginning on

September 11, 1945, and ending on July 1, 1946, may

be furnished hospital care or nursing home care under

subsection (a)(5) of this section for any disability, not-

withstanding that there is insufficient medical evidence to

conclude that such disability may be associated with such

exposure.

“(2) Hospital and nursing home care may not be pro-

vided under subsection (a)(5) of this section with respect

:0 a disability that is found, in accordance with guide-

lines issued by the Chief Medical Director, to have re-

sulted from a cause other than an exposure described in

subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1) of this sub-

section.

“(3) Hospital and nursing home care and medical

services may not be provided under or by virtue of sub-

section (a)(5) of this section after the end of the one-

year period beginning on the date the Administrator sub-

mits to the appropriate committees of Congress the first

report required by section 307(b)(2) of the Veterans

Health Programs Extension and Improvement Act of

1979 (Public Law 96-151; 93 Stat. 1098).”.

(b) Clause (4) of section 612(i) is amended to read

as follows:

“(4) To any veteran (A) who is a former pris-

oner of war, or (B) who is eligible for care under

section 610(a)(5) of this title.”

65a

Pub. L. 98-160, § 601, Nov. 21, 1983, 97 Stat. 1006:

TITLE VI—RADIATION EXPOSURE

STUDY AND GUIDE

RADIATION EXPOSURE STUDY AND GUIDE

Sec. 601. (a)(1)(A) Subject to subparagraphs (B)

and (C), the Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs, through

contracts or agreements with private or public agencies

or persons and in consultation with the Director of the

Office of Technology Assessment, shall provide for the

conduct of epidemiological study of the long-term adverse

health effects of exposure to ionizing radiation from the

detonation of nuclear devices in connection with the test

of such devices or in connection with the American oc-

cupation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, during the

period beginning on September 11, 1945, and ending on

July 1, 1946, in persons who, while serving in the Armed

Forces of the United States, were exposed to such radia-

tion. Such study shall include, but not necessarily be

limited to, a study of identifiable prevalent illnesses, in-

cluding malignancies, in the persons exposed.

(B) If the Administrator, in consultation with the

Director of the Office of Technology Assessment, deter-

mines that it is not feasible to conduct scientifically valid

study of any or all of the matters required under sub-

paragraph (A) to be studied—

(i) the Administrator shall promptly submit to

the appropriate committees of the Congress notice

of that determination and the reasons therefor; and

(11) the Director, not later than 60 days after

such notice is provided, shall submit to such com-

mittees a report evaluating and commenting on such

determination.

(C) If the Administrator notifies the Congress of a

determination or determinations made pursuant to sub-

paragraph (B), the matter or matters required unde!

subparagraph (A) to be studied to which such determina

tion or determinations apply shall not be required to |

studied. If the Administrator notifies the Congress ol

determination made pursuant to subparagraph (B) tha

taken as a whole, study under subparagraph (A) 1s ni

’

’

scientifically feasible, the requirement in subparagraph

(A) that the Administrator provide for the conduct ol

itect

epidemiological study shall cease to have

repealed by law

(2) Not later than one year after the date of tl

enactment of this Act. the Administrator shall submit t

the appropriate committees of the Congress a report

the development of a protocol O! protocols for stud’

inder paragraph (1)(A). With respect to any such proto

ol under consideration for development, or in the proc

of development, that has not been completed by tl

end of such year, the report shall include an estimate

the completion date for such protocol and an estimat

of the cost to be incurred in developing such protocol

(3)(A) The Director of the Office of Technology As

sessment shall monitor the development of the protocol

or protocols for, and the conduct of, study under para

graph (1)(A) and shall submit to the appropriate com

mittees of the Congress, at each of the times specified

the next sentence. a report on such monitoring. Report

under the preceding sentence shall be submitted within 6

months after the date of the enactment of this Act, with

12 months after such date, within 25 months after such

date, and annually thereafter until such study 1s

pleted

(B) If any protocol to which paragraph (2) applies

(or any part of such protocol) 1s not completed by th

end of the |2-month period beginning on the date of the

enactment of this Act, the Director shall periodical

submit to such committees reports on th tat f th

development of such proocol

6/a

(4) When the Administrator has entered into a con-

tract or agreement with an agency or person for the

conduct of a study under paragraph (1)(A), the Admin-

istrator and such agency or person shall submit to the

appropriate committees of the Congress a joint report

containing a copy of the contract and an estimate f the

total cost of such study.

(5)(A) Not later than 24 months after the date of

the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the

\dministrator shall submit to the appropriate committees

of the Congress a report on the status of study under

paragraph (1)(A). Such report shall contain (1) a de-

scription of the progress on and any results obtained

under such study, and (ii) such comments, and such

commendations for administrative and legislative a

tion, as the Administrator considers appropriate in light

of such progress and results.

(B) The requirement in subparagraph (A) for the

submission of annual reports shall expire upon the sub

mission of a report after the completion of study under

paragraph (1)(A).

(6) A contract to carry out study under paragraph

1)(A) may not be entered into unless (A) appropria-

tions for payments under the contract have been provided

in advance, or (B) the contract provides that the obliga-

tion of the United States to make payments under the

contract is contingent upon the availability of funds ap-

propriated for the making of such payments

>

(7) There are authorized to be appropriated such

sums as may be necessary for the conduct of study under

subsection (a)(1)(A).

(b) Not later than one year after the date of the

enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall develop

and distribute to appropriate Veterans’ Administration

]

personn

an indexed reference guide, derived from exist-

ing pertinent research-result compilations, designed to

Osa

provide Veterans’ Administration personnel who either

furnish health care or adjudicate claims for benefits under

title 38, United States Code, with readily usable informa-

tion regarding the state of medical and other scientific

information on any long-term adverse heaith effects in

humans of exposure to ionizing radiation, ine™:ding nu-

clear-device exposure, medical exposure, and occupational

exposure.

(c)(1) For the purpose of ensuring that any study,

research, or other activity carried out by the Federal

Government with respect to adverse health effecfs in

humans from exposure to ionizing radiation is scientifi-

cally valid and is conducted with efficiency and objectiv-

ity, the President shall ensure that—

(A) activities of the Veterans’ Administration

in connection with (1) study under subsection

(a)(1)(A), (ii) the development of the guide re-

quired by subsection (b), and (ili) such additional

research as may be identified, as a result of such

study or the development of such guide or otherwise,

as necessary for the resolution of questions regarding

such effects are fully coordinated with studies and

other activities which are planned, are being con-

ducted, or have been completed by other depart-

ments, agencies, and instrumentalities of the Federal

Government and which pertain to such effects, in-

cluding the radioepidemiological tables mandated by

section 7 of the Orphan Drug Act (Public Law 97-

414; 96 Stat. 2059); and

(B) appropriate coordination and _ consultation

occurs between and among the Administrator and

the heads of such departments, agencies, and instru-

mentalities that may be engaged, during the conduct

of study under subsection (a)(1)(A), in the design,

conduct, monitoring, or evaluation of such radia-

tion-exposure studies or related activities.

69a

(2) Not later than 90 days after the date of the en

actment of this Act, the President shall submit to the

appropriate committees of the Congress a report contain

ing a description of the steps taken and plans made to

ensure the coordination and consultation required by

paragraph (1).

1IOX4. YS Stat

542 % Oct

AMENDMENTS TO REGULATIONS

3) Immediately after the submissi f each

ler paragraph (2), tl Administrator, based

sults described in such report and the comments a!

ymmendations included therein and any other aval

ible pertinent information, shall evaluate the need |

imendments to regulations, prescribed pursuant

tion 5 of the Veterans’ Dioxin and Radiation Exp

Compensation Standards Act. for the resolution of

for ser onnection based on the exposure specified

' } ' : 7. tT. '

[ sl I rulall yn I needed the Adminis to

' '

{ than 9O days after suc! ubmiss hall d

] . : | . | [ | » ‘

tii pub ISI I) tn a 4 Re stel i | t \

| [1}¢ I prt eo d me dn | [

b) Pa ipn (od) section 601(a f the Vet

97 Stat. 1007) is amended by redesignating subparagrap

B) as subparagraph (C) and inserting after subpar

iph (A) the following new subparagraph (B)

B) Immediately after the submission of each rept

under subparagraph (A), the Administrator, based

the results described in such report and the comment

and recommendations included therein and any othe

vailable pertinent information, shall evaluate the nee

for any amendments to regulations, prescribed pursuant

to section 5 of the Veterans’ Dioxin and Radiation Ex

posure Compensation Standards Act, for the resoluti

4 | y ‘ art ' rote n ; .

I CialMsS IO! SCT VICS COnMNeCCtUON DOasead ¢

specified in subsection (a)(1)(B) of such section. To

the extent that the Administrator determines that any

amendments to such regulations are needed, the Admin

istrator, not later than 90 days after such submission.

shall develop and publish in the Federal Register, fo!

public review and comment, proposed amendments to

such regulations.”

INTERIM BENEFITS FOR DISABILITY

OR DEATH IN CERTAIN CASES

SEC. 9. (a)(1) In the case of a veteran

\) who served in the active military, naval, o1

air service in the Republic of Vietnam during the

Vietnam era; and

(B) who has a disease described in subsection

b) that became manifest within one year alter the

date of the veteran’s most recent departure from

the Republic of Vietnam during that service,

|

the Administrator shall (except as provided in subsection

(C)) pay a monthly disability benefit to the veteran in

iccordance with this section

(2) If a veteran described in paragraph (1) dies from

the disease, the Administrator shall pay a monthly death

benefit to the survivors of the veteran in accordance with

this section

(b) The diseases referred to in subsection (a) are

chloracne and porphyria cutanea tarda

(c) Benefits may not be paid under this section with

respect to a disease occurring in a veteran

(1) where there is affirmative evidence that the

disease was not incurred by the veteran during serv-

ice in the Republic of Vietnam during the Vietnam

Ctra

(2) where there is affirmative evidence to estab-

lish that an intercurrent injury or disease which is a

>

aa

recognized cause of the disease was suffered by the

veteran between the date of the veteran’s most recent

departure from the Republic of Vietnam during ac-

tive military, naval, or air service and the onset of

the disease; or

(3) if the Administrator determines, based on

evidence in the veteran’s service records and other

records of the Department of Defense, that the vet-

eran was not exposed to dioxin during active mill-

tary, naval, or air service in the Republic of Vietnam

during the Vietnam era.

(d)(1) A disability benefit payable to a veteran under

this section for a disease described in subsection (b) shall

be paid at the rate at which compensation would be pay-

able under chapter 11 of title 38, United States Code,

to that veteran for the disability resulting from that dis-

ease if the disability were determined to be _ service-

connected.

(2) A death benefit payable under this section to the

survivors of a veteran shall be paid to such survivors

based upon the eligibility requirements (other than the

requirement that death be the result of a service-connected

or compensable disability) and at the rates that are ap-

plicable to dependency and indemnity compensation

under chapter 13 of that title.

(e) A benefit may not be paid under this section with

respect to a disease or the death of a veteran for any

month for which compensation is payable to that veteran

for that disease under chapter 11 of title 38, United

States Code, or for which dependency and indemnity

compensation is payable for that death under chapter 13

of such title.

(f) A disease establishing eligibility for a disability or

death benefit under this section shall be treated for pur-

poses of all other laws of the United States (other than

chapters 11 and 13 of title 38, United States Code) as

if such disease were service connected. The receipt of a

disability benefit under this section shall be treated for

purposes of all other laws of the United States as if such

benefit were compensation under chapter 11 of such title,

and the receipt of a death benefit under this section shall

be treated for purposes of all other laws of the United

States as if such benefit were dependency and indemnity

compensation under chapter 13 of title 38, United States

Code.

(g) For the purposes of this section

(1) The term “Administrator” means the Admin

istrator of Veterans’ Affairs.

(2) The term “Vietnam era” means the period

beginning on August 5, 1964, and ending on May

7, 1975.

(3) The term “veteran” has the meaning given

that term in paragraph (2) of section 101 of title

38, United States Code, and includes a person who

died in the active military, naval, or air service.

(4) The terms “service-connected” and “active

military, naval, or air service” have the meanings

given those terms in paragraphs (16) and (24),

respectively, of section IQ] of title 38, United States

Code

Pub. | 8-549 ) §. Oct. 24. 1984. O& Stat. 2727

VETERANS’ DIOXIN AND RADIATION EXPOSURI

COMPENSATION STANDARDS ACT

FINDINGS

) | i] : re +

SE‘ y l ( ongress makes the following finding

Veterans who served in the Republic of Viet-

during the Vietnam era and veterans who pat

‘

pated in atmospheric nuclear tests or the Amer!

occupation of Hiroshima or Nagasaki, Japan,

deeply concerned about possible long-term health

s of exposure to herbicides containing dioxin

or to 10n1zIng radiation

) There is scientific and medical uncertal

ng such long-term adverse health effects

+) In section 102 of Public Law 97-22, the Con

gress responded to that uncertainty by authorizing

priority medical care at Veterans Administration

facilities for any disability of a veteran who may

have been so exposed (even though there ts insuffi

ient medical evidence linking such disability with

such exposure) unless disability is found to have

sulted from a cause other than the exposure.

(4) The Congress has further responded to that

iedical and scientific uncertainty by requiring, in

tion 307 of Public Law 96-151 and section 601

of Public Law 98-160. the conduct of thorough

epidemiological studies of the health effects exper!

‘nced by veterans in connection with exposure both

to herbicides containing dioxin and (if not deter

ined to be scientifically infeasible) to radiation, and

by requiring in Public Law 97-414, the developing of

radioepidemiological tables setting forth the proba

_— '

bilities Of Causation betw Pen Various Cancers and ex

posure to radiation

REQUIREMENT FOR AND CONTENT OI!

REGULATIONS

SEC. 5.(a) In carrying out the responsibilities of the

\dministrator of Veterans’ Affairs under section 354

(a)(2) of title 38, United States Code, and in order to

promote consistency in claims processing and decisions

the Administrator shall prescribe regulations to

(1) establish guidelines and (where appropriate)

standards and criteria for the resolution of claims

for benefits under laws administered by the Veterans’

\dministration where the criteria for eligibility for a

benefit include a requirement that a death or dis-

ability be service connected and the claim of service

connection is based on a veteran’s exposure during

Service-

(A) in the Republic of Vietnam during the

Vietnam era to a herbicide containing dioxin, or

(B) in connection with such veteran’s partici-

pation in atmospheric nuclear tests or with the

American occupation of Hiroshima or Nagasaki,

Japan, prior to July 1, 1946, to ionizing radia-

tion from the detonation of a nuclear device; and

(2) ensure that, with respect to those claims, the

policy of the United States described in section 2(13)

is carried out.

(b)(1)(A) The guidelines required to be established

in regulations prescribed under this section shall include

guidelines governing the evaluation of the findings of sci-

entific studies relating to the possible increased risk of

adverse health effects of exposure to herbicides containing

dioxin or of exposure to ionizing radiation. Those guide-

lines shall require that, in the evaluation of those studies.

the Administrator shall take into account whether the

results are statistically significant, are capable of replica-

tion, and withstand peer review.

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(B) The evaluations described in subparagraph (A)

shall be made by the Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs

after receiving the advice of the appropriate panel of the

Scientific Council of the Veterans’ Advisory Committee on

Environmental Hazards (established under section 6)

Those evaluations shall be published in the notice section

of the Federal Register

(C) The standards and criteria required to be estab

lished in regulations prescribed under this section shall

include provisions governing the use in the adjudication of

individual claims of the Administrator’s evaluations made

under subparagraph (B).

(2)(A)(i) In prescribing regulations under this sec-

tion, the Administrator (after receiving the advice of the

Advisory Committee and of the appropriate panel of the

Scientific Council of the Veterans’ Advisory Committee on

Environmental Hazards regarding the diseases described

in subparagraph (B)) shall make determinations, based

on sound medical and scientific evidence, with respect to

each disease described in subparagraph (B) as to whether

service connection shall, subject to division (ii) of this

subparagraph, be granted in the adjudication of individual

cases. In making determinations regarding such diseases,

the Administrator shall give due regard to the need to

maintain the policy of the United States with respect to

the resolution of contested issues as set forth in section

2(13). The Administrator shall set forth in such regula-

tions such determinations, with any specification (relating

to exposure or other relevant matter) of limitations on the

circumstances under which service connection shall be

granted, and shall implement such determinations in ac

cordance with such regulations.

(11) If the Administrator makes a determination, pur-

suant to this subparagraph, that service connection shall

be granted in the case of a disease described in subpara-

graph (B), the Administrator shall specify in such regu

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lations that, in the adjudication of individual cases, service

connection shall not be granted where there is sufficient

affirmative evidence to the contrary or evidence to estab-

lish that an intercurrent injury or disease which is a rec

ognized cause of the described disease has been suffered

between the date of separation from service and the onset

of such disease or that the disability is due to the veteran’s

own willful misconduct.

(111) With regard to each disease described in subpara-

graph (B), the Administrator shall include in the regula-

tions prescribed under this section provisions specifying

the factors to be considered in adjudicating issues relating

to whether or not service connection should be granted in

individual cases and the circumstances governing the grant-

ing of service connection for such disease.

(B) The diseases referred to in subparagraph (A) are

those specified in section 2(5) and any other disease with

respect to which the Administrator finds (after receiving

and considering the advice of the appropriate panel of

the Scientific Council established under section 6(d)(2) )

that there is sound scientific or medical evidence indicat-

ing

(1) a connection to exposure to a herbicide con

taining dioxin, in the case of a veteran who was ex

posed to that herbicide during such veteran’s service

in the Republic of Vietnam during the Vietnam era,

OT

(11) a connection to exposure to ionizing radiation,

in the case of a veteran who was exposed to ionizing

radiation in connection with such veteran’s participa

tion in an atmospheric nuclear test or with the

American occupation of Hiroshima or Nagasaki.

Japan, before July 1, 1946

(3) The regulations prescribed under this section shall

include

i

78a

(A) specification of the maximum period of time

after exposure to such herbicide or ionizing radiation

for the development of those diseases; and

(B) a requirement that a claimant filing a claim

based upon a veteran’s exposure to a herbicide con

taining dioxin or to ionizing radiation from the

detonation of a nuclear device may not be required

to produce evidence substantiating the veteran’s ex

posure during active military, naval, or air service

if the information in the veteran’s service records

and other records of the Department of Defense is

not inconsistent with the claim that the veteran was

present where and when the claimed exposure

occurred.

(c)(1) The Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs shall

develop the regulations required by this section (and any

imendment to those regulations) through a public review

and comment process in accordance with the provisions

of section 553 of title 5, United States Code. That pro-

cess may include consideration by the Administrator of

the recommendations of the Veterans’ Advisory Commit-

tee on Environmnetal Hazards and the Scientific Council

thereof (established under section 6) with respect to the

proposed regulations, and that process shall include con

ideration by the Administrator of the recommendations

of the Committee and the Council with respect to the

final regulations and proposed and final amendments to

such regulations. The period for public review and com

ment shall be completed not later than ninety days afte

the proposed regulations or proposed amendments are

published in the Federal Register.

(2)(A) Not later than one hundred and eighty days

ifter the date of the enactment of this Act. the Adminis

trator shall develop and publish in the Federal Register

a proposed version of the regulations required to be pre

scribed by this section

79a

,

(B) Not later than three hundred days after the date

of the enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall pub

lish in the Federal Register the final regulations together

with explanations of the bases for the guidelines, stand

ards, and criteria contained therein required to be pre

ribed by this section

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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