Appendices — American Legion v. Brown
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APPENDIX A
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
Argued February 2, 1995 Decided April 25, 1995
[HE AMERICAN LEGION
{ ppellant
EDWARD DERWINSKI, SECRETARY.
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS:
DONNA E. SHALALA, SECRETARY.
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
WILLIAM L. Roper, M.D.. DIRECTOR.
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL:
VERNON N. Houk, Director, CENTER FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND
INJURY CONTROL CENTER:
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.
A ppellees
and Consolidated Case No. 94-50] 3
VIETNAM VETERANS O} AMERICA:
HAROLD A. BUTLER: CARO! RIDOLFI-DELANE}
MAREL J. MACKI: BEVERL\ NEHMER.
‘ Appellants
EDWARD DERWINSKI. SECRI TARY.
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS
DONNA E. SHALALA,. SECRI TARY,
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND Ht MAN SERVICES:
—_—_—_——_—-
2a
WILLIAM L. Roper, M.D., DIRECTOR,
CENTERS FOR DISEASE CONTROL;
VERNON N. HoukK, DIRECTOR, CENTER FOR
ENVIRONMENTAL HEALTH AND
INJURY CONTROL CENTER;
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Appellees
\ppeals from the United States District Court
for the District of Columbia
(90cv1808 )
Before EDWARDS, Chief Judge; RANDOLPH and
ROGERS, Circuit Judges.
Opinion for the court filed by Circuit Judge ROGERS.
ROGERS, Circuit Judge: The American Legion and
others appeal from the grant of summary judgment re-
jecting their challenge to the decision of the Secretary
of Veterans Affairs to abandon a congressionally man-
dated epidemiological study of the effects of exposure to
dioxin, a by-product of Agent Orange and other herbi-
cides, on Vietnam veterans.’ The district court ruled that
the Secretary had acted within his discretion in abandon-
ing the Agent Orange Study, which the Secretary had
commissioned the Centers for Disease Control to design
and conduct, after determining that sampling problems
made it unlikely that the investigation would yield scien-
'In 1988, Congress redesignated the Veterans Administration
as the Department of Veterans Affairs and named the Secretary
of Veterans Affairs (previously, the Administrator of Veterans’
Affairs) to head the department. Department of Veterans Affairs
Act, Pub. L. No. 100-527, 102 Stat. 2635 (1988). We use the
current title “Secretary” in this opinion whenever the statute or
record refers to the Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs.
+
3a
lifically valid results. American Legion vy. Derwinski, 827
F. Supp. 805, 812-14 (D.D.C. 1993). Appellants con
tend that the Secretary erroneously relied on a repealed
Standard as the basis for abandoning the study and violated
the statute by halting the study before submitting a man
dated report of health results to Congress; alternatively,
they challenge as arbitrary and capricious the Secretary’s
conclusion that a scientifically valid study was impossible
Finding these contentions unpersuasive, we affirm
As background to appellants’ contentions. we first out
line the statute and the Secretary’s efforts to implement
the statutory directive for an epidemiological study on
the effects of exposure to dioxins during the Vietnam
conflict.
A. The Statute. In enacting the Veterans’ Health Pro
grams Extension and Improvement Act of 1979, Pub. |
No. 96-151, 93 Stat. 1092 (codified as amended at 3%
U.S.C. § 219 note (1988) ). reprinted as amended in 38
U.S.C.A. § 527 note (1991) (the “1979 Act”), Con
gress sought to determine by means of an epidemiological
study the health effects of exposure to Agent Orange and
other herbicides on Vietnam veterans. Id. § 307: see
also §. REP. No 260. 96th Cong., Ist Sess. 36-40
(1979) (“1979 S. Rep.”). reprinted in relevant part in
1979 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1894, 1922-1926 These herbicides
which the United States military used during the Viet
nam conflict, contain varying amounts of dioxins—also
Epidemiology is “a branch of science and medicine [that ises
studies to ‘observe the effect of exposure to a single factor upo!
441, 945
re |
the incidence of disease in two otherwise identical] popul:
DeLuca Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals. In, 911 F.2d |
3d Cir. 1990 quoting Black & Lilienfeld Epidemiological P»
n Toxic Tort Litigation. 52 Fordham L. Rev. 732. 755 1984
ee also Affidavit of Dr. Zena A. Ste n, proffered by anne!
if 4
4a
referred to as TCDD “—which studies have suggested can
cause harmful health effects in laboratory animals and
consequently led to concern about similar effects in hu-
mans.* Congress sought to determine whether Vietnam
veterans had suffered such adverse health effects as a re-
sult of their military service and, if so, to compensate
them for their injuries. See 1979 S. REP. at 38-40.
The 1979 Act directed the Secretary to conduct an
epidemiological study pursuant to a protocol approved by
the director of the congressional Office of Technology As-
sessment (“OTA”). 1979 Act § 307(a)(2)(A)(i). The
statute also required the director of OTA to oversee the
conduct of the study and report its oversight activities
to the appropriate congressional committees. Jd. § 307
(a)(2). Further, as part of the effort to ensure that the
study was “sientifically valid and . . . conducted with
efficiency and objectivity,” the 1979 Act directed the
President to coordinate the Secretary’s study with any
other Federal governmental studies on the effects of
dioxins. /d. § 307(c). The 1979 Act expressly required,
however, that the Secretary continue the study only “for
as long after the submission of [his first] report [to Con-
gress on ‘the results thus far obtained under the study’]
as the [Secretary] may determine reasonable in light
of the possibility of developing through such study signifi-
cant new information on the long-term adverse health
effects of exposure to dioxins.” /d. § 307(a)(3), (b)(2)
The 1979 Act initially called for an epidemiological
study of veterans who “were exposed to” dioxins during
the Vietnam conflict. /d. § 307(a)(1) (amended 1981)
From the outset, a major obstacle to completion of the
study was the identification of veterans, other than
“Ranch Hands” who did the actual spraying, who had
TCDD stands for 2,3,7,8-Tetrachlorodibenzo-p-Dioxin, a by
roduct created during the manufacture of certain herbicides
ee 1979 S. REP. at 37-39; Health Study Protocol at 4-5
Wa
a
been exposed to Agent Orange during their service in
Vietnam. S. Rep. No. 89, 97th Cong., Ist Sess. 25
(1981) (“1981 S. Rep.”). To adress this problem, Con-
gress amended the statute in 1981 to require a study of
veterans’ health effects that “may result” from exposure
to dioxins. Veterans’ Health Care. Training, and Small
Business Loan Act of 1981, Pub. L. 97-72 § 401(a)(1),
9S Stat. 1061 (1981) (codified at 38 U.S.C. § 219 note
(1988)), reprinted in 38 U.S.C.A. $527 note (“1981
Amendments”). The 1981 Amendments also expanded
the scope of the study to examine health effects that may
have resulted from other factors in the overall Vietnam
experience, “including exposure to other herbicides. chem-
icals, medications, or environmental hazards or condi-
tions.” Jd. According to the Senate Report, the amend-
ments were intended to “allow the Secretary to begin
the study of the health status of these veterans by iden-
tifying a population of veterans who served in Vietnam,
without first having to determine whether each was, with-
Out question, exposed to Agent Orange in Vietnam.”
1981 S. Rep. at 26.
B. The Health Study Protocol and Pilot Study. Fol-
lowing enactment of the 1981 Amendments. the Secre-
tary entered into a contract with the Centers for Disease
Control (“the Center”) to design a protocol for the
epidemiological investigation. The Center’s Health Study
Protocol, completed in November 1983. proposed three
Studies to evaluate the health of Vietnam veterans, one
of which was the “Agent Orange” Study, designed to
examine the effects of exposure to Agent Orange and
other herbicides on veterans’ health. See United States
Department of Health and Human Services. Public Health
Service, Centers for Disease Control, Protocol for Epi-
demiologic Studies of the Health of Vietnam Veterans
(November 1983) at 1, 6-9 (“Health Study Protocol”).'
SS?
* The two other studies—the “Vietnam Experience” study, to
assess the “possible health effects of the general Vietnam experi-
ence,’ and the “Sarcoma Lymphoma” or “Selected Cancers” study
6a
To isolate the effects of dioxin exposure, the Center
needed to distinguish between groups of Vietnam vet-
erans who were similar except for their level of dioxin
exposure. See supra n.2. The Health Study Protocol pro-
posed to use military records to divide a sample of Viet-
nam veterans into those who were likely exposed to her-
bicides in Vietnam and those likely not exposed and then
to compare the health of the two cohorts. Health Study
Protocol at 6-7, 10-15. The Center planned to review
battalion journal files and morning reports to locate com-
panies at various times during the Vietnam conflict and
to determine the presence or absence of individuals within
the company. Utilizing herbicide usage reports such as
aircraft spraying records to estimate the location and
timing of herbicide applications, the Center planned to
fit veterans into the “likely exposed” or “likely not ex-
posed” cohort “according to the measure of their com-
pany’s distance in time and space from any herbicide
applications.” Jd. at 6. To measure the possible health
effects of dioxins, the Center would then compare the
medical histories of “likely exposed” and “likely not ex-
posed” veterans based on review of mortality records,
health interviews, medical examinations, and laboratory
tests. Jd. at 20-25.
The Health Study Protocol cautioned that certain “ob-
stacles” prevented the Center from adopting the “ideal”
design for an Agent Orange cohort study, which would
have compared one group free from all exposure to an-
other group subjected to “meaningful” exposure to herbi
cides. These obstacles included the difficulty of defining
“meaningful exposure” and the uncertainty about whether
exposed veterans were comparable to unexposed veterans
in other characteristics that might affect health. Most
significant for purposes of these appeals, the Protocol
to “evaluate the risk of contracting soft tissue sarcoma and
lymphoma among Vietnam veterans (and/or those exposed to
herbicides)’’—-have been completed and are not at issue in these
appeals.
noted that the “uneven quality” of the military records
including gaps in company records and errors in herbicide
usage records, meant that “the categorization of in
dividuals with respect to their potential for herbicide e»
posure will be uncertain and will forever remain so.”
ld. at 6. The Health Study Protocol concluded that
“[slince many of the proposed procedures are untested.
modification, indeed even a recommendation not to pro
ceed with an Agent Orange Study, may be required
Id. at 11
lhe Center’s initial review, conducted from 1983 to
1956, confirmed its concern that inadequacies in the
military documentation would likely make identification
Of appropriate cohorts impossible. Informed of these dif
ficulties, OTA advised Congress in September 1985 that
if the difficulties in evaluating exposure were not re
solved, OTA might conclude that the [sic] “it is impossible
to study the effects of Agent Orange.” OTA subsequently
suggested that the Center postpone any “major new
phase” of its Agent Orange Study until it had devised an
appropriate means of estimating exposure and recom
mend that instead of proceeding with the interviews of
Study subjects scheduled to begin in January 1986, the
Center conduct a pilot study to test the methods and
results of its initial exposure assessments. Accordingl\
the Environmental Support Group of the United States
Army and Joint Services developed a pilot study, at th
Center's request, to identify “heavily exposed personnel.”
Completed in mid-1986, the pilot study ranked veterans
based on their number of “hits,” or opportunities for ex
posure to Agent Orange; veterans with the largest number
of “hits” were classified as those most likely to have
faced heavy exposure.’
$a
In early 1986, the Agent Orange Working Group
(“Working Group”), formed by the President to carry
out his responsibilities under the 1979 Act, convened a
Science Subpanel on Exposure Assessment (“Science Sub-
panel”) to evaluate the Center’s exposure assessment
methods and review the results of the pilot study. In a
May 26, 1986, letter to the Working Group, the Sci-
ence Subpanel concluded that two problems jeopardized
the Center’s Agent Orange Study: first, the potential for
“considerable” misclassification because of unit dispersion
and incomplete records of spray operations; and second,
the fact that the Center’s records review showed that
most veterans had never been exposed to a “hit,” as de-
fined by the Center, and thus “the paucity of clearly
exposed combat veterans make it questionable whether
a sufficient number can be assembled to conduct an epi-
demiological study of the type originally designed.” The
Science Subpanel noted that recent scientific advances
might enable the Center more accurately to identify co-
horts of likely exposed and likely unexposed veterans,
but that given the problems with current identification
methods, “any study of ground troops, which is depend-
ent upon military records for the assessment of exposure
to herbicides, [should] not be conducted without an addi
tional method to verify exposure.”
C. The TCDD Validation Study. Responding to the
recommendations from OTA and the Science Subpanel
not to proceed with a military records-based study with-
out some independent verification, the Center developed
a protocol to compare current serum TCDD levels in
veterans’ blood. Assuming TCDD survived in the blood
for several years, the Center postulated that veterans who
faced “heavy” exposure could be expected to have higher
serum TCDD levels than lesser exposed veterans even
twenty years after their exposure to Agent Orange.’ The
’ Although the Center did not know the precise half-life of
TCDD at the time it developed its TCDD protocol, it determined
n the course of the study that TCDD has an average half-life of
9a
Center used both the pilot study’s “hit’-based exposure
indices and veterans’ self-reported exposure estimates to
divide a set of Vietnam veterans into “low hit,” “medium
hit,” and “high hit” subsets and, for comparison, also
examined a group of non-Vietnam veterans of the same
Cra.
The results of the TCDD study confirmed the Center’s
suspicions that neither military records nor self-reporting
could adequately differentiate between veterans who were
and were not likely exposed to Agent Orange in Vietnam.
U.S. Department of Health Human Services, Centers for
Disease Control, Comparison of Serum Levels of 2.3.7.8-
Tetrachlorodibenzo-p-Dioxin With Indirect Estimates of
Agent Orange Exposure Among Vietnam Veterans: Final
Report (August 1987) (“TCDD Report”). The Center
found “no meaningful association” between veterans’ cur
rent TCDD levels and the exposure indices developed
through either military records or self-reporting.” /d. at 1.
Besides failing to validate the use of military records as
exposure indicators, the TCDD study reinforced the con-
clusion that ground troops faced little likelihood of
“heavy” exposure to Agent Orange. /d. at 2. The Center
thus concluded that it could not conduct the cohort
Agent Orange Study that it had originally planned:
The findings of this study and the conclusion from
the Agent Orange Working Group Science Subpanel
seven years. The half-life of a substance is “the time required by
the body, tissue, or organ to metabolize or inactivate half the
amount of a substance taken in.” F.A. DAVIS. TABER’S CYCLOPEDIC
MEDICAL DICTIONARY at 717 (1985)
* The Center controlled for differences such as age, race, region
of current residence, body mass index, alcoho] use, smoking his-
tory, and self-reported civilian occupational and home exposure
to herbicides. Jd. at 23. The study also considered the impact
of other factors that might lead to study bias—group selection,
laboratory error or measurement bias, variability in half-life,
selection or participation bias, and sample size—and concluded that
ne of these factors likely influenced the results. Jd. at 27-30
1Oa
report on exposure assessment (June 1986) do not
identify any method for using military records of
self-reported exposure to distinguish between U.S.
Army ground combat troops who were and were not
exposed to Agent Orange in Vietnam, as would be
needed for a cohort study of possible health effects
ld at
In a review of the TCDD study, OTA agreed that “a
large-scale epidemiological study to look for effects of
Agent Orange in ground troops who served in Vietnam”
was currently impossible, and cautioned that any future
studies “should be narrowly focused on specific, testable
hypotheses, and cannot have the aim of generalizability
to all or most ground troops.” /d. at 9. On October 29,
1987, the director of the Center reported to the Secretary
the Center’s concurrence with OTA and the Working
Group that the Agent Orange Study “cannot be con-
ducted” and that the Center had begun “the close-out
process” for its Agent Orange Study.
D. The Secretary’s decision. In December 1987, the
Department of Medicine and Surgery in the Veterans Ad
ministration recommended a halt to all further studies of
the effects of Agent Orange (other than the Air Force’s
Ranch Hand study). Because the results of the TCDD
report “make it exceedingly unlikely that any method will
satisfactorily distinguish between exposed and unexposed
Vietnam veterans,” the Department of Medicine and Sur-
gery concluded that “a scientifically meaningful epidemio-
logical study of the possible health effects of Agent
Orange cannot be conducted.”
On February 9, 1988, the Secretary sent the TCDD
report, along with correspondence from OTA and the
Working Group, to the Chairman of the House Commit-
tee on Veterans’ Affairs. In a cover letter the Secretary
stated that:
eS new ne
lla
Despite our efforts, no one has successfully iden-
tified a large enough group of Vietnam veterans
known to have been exposed to Agent Orange or
other herbicides to allow the preparation of a proto-
col and the conduct of an epidemiological study as
required by Public Law 96-151."' I must, therefore.
advise you that no scientifically sound study can be
undertaken and request that the [Veterans Adminis-
tration} be relieved of the requirement to do this
research. This opinion coincides with that of the
Office of Technology Assessment, as expressed in
their comments of September 1987, and with the
June 3, 1987, comments of the interagency Agent
Orange Working Group.
A week later, the Secretary formally notified the Chair-
man of the decision to discontinue work on the Center’s
Agent Orange Study. On February 19, 1988, in his third
annual report to Congress on the status of the Center’s
three-part Health Study, the Secretary repeated his con-
clusion that “based on the results of the... TCDD Vali-
dation Study, . . . an [Agent Orange Study] cannot be
conducted so as to achieve a scientifically sound conclu-
sion regarding the possible adverse health effects of ex
posure of Vietnam veterans to Agent Orange.”
'The Secretary described tanch Hand veterans as “the sole
or i
¢
’
BAVUYP Ul
veterans available for the successi li epidemilologi
nvestigation envisaged by the Congress.”
[In accord with the Secretary’s recommendation that any allo-
cated but unexpended funds be reallocated to either “the U.S. Ai
Force’s Ranch Hand Study’s blood dioxin levels research or other
research on Agent Orange and closely related subjects,” Congress
in 1988 transferred $3,000,000 of the unexpended funds for blood
tests in the Ranch Hand study and $1,000,000 for “a survey of
lentific evidence, studies. and literature”’ regarding the health
effects of possible herbicide exposure in Vietnam, to be conducted
by an independent scientific entity under contract with the VA,
pursuant to a law enacted after the date of the enactment of this
Act.” See § 1201 of Pub. L. No 100-687, 102 Stat. 4105, 4125
1988 Subsequently, in 1991, Congress authorized the National
12a
Appellants thereafter filed suit, contending that the
Secretary unlawfully abandoned the Center's Agent
Orange Study based on the wrong legal standard, that the
Secretary lacked authority to terminate the Agent Orange
Study before submitting a health results report to Con-
gress, and that his decision was contrary to the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 706. Following the
district court’s grant of summary judgment for appellees,
appellants filed these consolidated appeals.
IT.
In addressing appellants’ challenges to the grant of
summary judgment in favor of appellees, our review is
de novo. Diamond vy. Atwood, 43 F.3d 1538, 1540
(D.C. Cir. 1995); Shields v. Eli Lilly & Co., 895 F.2d
1463, 1466 (D.C. Cir. 1990). Thus, the limited ques-
tions before the court are whether the Secretary adopted
a “permissible” interpretation of the 1979 and 1981 Acts,
see Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 841-42 (1984), and, if so,
whether, as a matter of law, the Secretary’s decision in
February 1988 to abandon the Center’s Agent Orange
Study was arbitrary and capricious, an abuse of discre-
tion, or otherwise contrary to law. 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)
(A); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe,
401 ‘U-S. 402, 416 (1971); Dr. Pepper’/Seven-Up Com-
panies, Inc. v. FTC, 991 F.2d 859, 862 (D.C. Cir.
1993). In reviewing the Secretary’s decision to abandon
the study, the court’s task is to determine whether the
Secretary “examine[d] the relevant data,” and made a
“rational connection between the facts found and the
Academy of Sciences to review and evaluate the available scientific
studies regarding the health effects of herbicide exposure and
required the Secretary to enact regulations establishing a presump-
tion that any malady correlated with herbicide exposure is service-
related. Agent Orange Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-4, 105 Stat. 11
(1991 codified as amended at 38 U.S.C. §1116 & note (Supp.
IV 1992
l3a
choice made.” Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n y. State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29. 43 (198’ ) (internal
quotations omitted); see also Citizens to Preserve Ove)
ton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. at 416. Given the nature of
the scientific expertise brought to bear on the issue of
whether to continue the Center's Agent Orange Study,
the court’s review is at its most deferential. Baltimore
Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983).
A. Reporting “results”, Appellants contend that the
Secretary violated the statute by abandoning the Center’s
Agent Orange Study before reporting actual health re-
sults to Congress. Section 307(b)(2) of the 1979 Act
provides:
Not later than twenty-four months after the date of
the approval of the protocol . . . and annually there-
after, the [Secretary] shall submit to the appropriate
committees of the Congress a report containing (A) a
description of the results thus far obtained under the
study conducted pursuant to this subsection. and (B)
such comments and recommendations as the [Secre-
tary] considers appropriate in light of such results.
[Emphasis added].
+
Appellants maintain that the word “results” in S 307
(b)(2) means substantive health results. and hence, that
the Secretary lacked authority to abandon the Center’s
Agent Orange Study before reporting to Congress the
Center’s conclusions about adverse health effects of Agent
Orange and other herbicides on Vietnam veterans. See
id. § 307(a)(3) as amended by 1981 Amendments § 401
(a)(2) (Secretary may discontinue the study “after the
submission of the first report under subsection (b)(2)”).
The Secretary interprets “results” under » 307(b)(2) to
include the progress made thus far to carry out the study
and maintains that he fulfilled § 307(b)(2)’s require-
ment when he provided Congress with a progress report
on February 13, 1986.
l4a
[In reviewing the Secretary’s interpretation of § 307
(b)(2), we apply the standard of review set forth in
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
cil, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 841-42 (1984). Because, con-
trary to appellants’ contentions, neither the plain language
nor the structure of the statute makes clear Congress’ in-
tent to confine “results” to “health results” in mandating
reports by the Secretary, the court must defer to the
Secretary’s interpretation if it “is based on a permissible
construction of the statute.” /d. The Secretary’s inter-
pretation accordingly invokes our deference.'" Because
the Secretary’s interpretation of “results” is consistent
with Congress’ use of that term in the statute, see 1979
Act § 307(b)(2), and appellants’ construction of con-
gressional intent would lead to absurd results, the Secre-
tary’s interpretation withstands scrutiny.
The Secretary’s interpretation that “results thus far
obtained under the study” means the results of the Secre-
tary’s efforts pursuant to the statute is not an impermis-
sible construction of § 307(b)(2). The word “results”
is hardly a technical term of art, but one of common par-
lance subject to multiple meanings. Thus, “results” may
include conclusions that the Secretary has reached in
the course of efforts to carry out the Center’s Agent
Orange Study and are not, as appellants suggest, neces-
sarily limited to “health results” produced by that study
The “result” of the TCDD study, for example, is the con-
clusion that current blood serum levels bear no relation
to military records-based exposure assessments. The “re-
sults” of the pilot study are the index of “hit’-based
Although Chevron deference would not apply if the Secretary
had adopted this interpretation solely for purposes of litigation,
see City of Kansas City, Mo. v. HUD, 923 F.2d 188, 192 (D.C. Cir.
1991), the interpretation at issue appeared in the Secretary’s
February 13, 1986, report to Congress, in which he stated: “As
required by Section 307 of Public Law 96-151 . I am sending
you and your committee the first status report and its appendices
on the Agent Orange Study.
lSa
eXposure assessments and the conclusion that most ground
troops did not have the Opportunity for heavy exposure to
Agent Orange. Both studies led. in one sense, to “results
obtained under the Study” since they followed the
Secretary’s approval of the Health Study Protocol and
represented efforts to develop data that would enable the
production of scientifically valid epidemiological conclu-
SIONS.
Put otherwise, an epidemiological] Study on long-term
health effects produces many types of “results” that the
Secretary could report to Congress. The fact that the
statute requires the Secretary to submit annual reports on
the “results thus far obtained under the study” comports
with the view that Congress wanted regular progress re-
ports on the results of the Secretary’s efforts, whether or
not such reports contained substantive health results.
See 1979 Act § 307(b)(2). Indeed, the Secretary’s sub-
mission of various reports to Congress between 1986 and
1988 alerted Congress that the development of scientifi-
cally valid health results depended on the identification
of reliable indices of cohort exposure. The language of
§ 307(a)(3) also supports the Secretary’s interpretation;
by allowing the Secretary to abandon the study after
submission of the first report if he finds it unlikely that
the study will yield “significant new information on the
long-term health effects of exposure to dioxins,” subsec-
tion (a)(3) appears to contemplate that the Secretary’s
first report may not itself contain information on adverse
health effects.’* Jd, § 307(a)}(3).
‘2 The fact that Congress directed the Secretary to consider
various administrative actions based on the “results” reported
under § 307(b) (2) does not make his interpretation of “results”
unreasonable. See id. § 307(b) (2); B), (b)(3). The statute re-
quires the Secretary to submit “comments and recommendations
that the Secretary considers appropriate in light of such results.”
id. § 307(b) (2) (B). and to give notice and comment of “actions,
f any,” that the Secretary proposes to take in. response to the
results. Id. § 307(b) (3 emphasis added). The Secretary fulfilled
l6a
Appellants’ contrary statutory arguments are unper-
suasive. First, appellants contend that because the statute
requires OTA to submit “updates” on the status of un-
approved protocols, id. § 307(a)(2)(B) (ii), Congress
must have intended “results” under § 307(b)(2) to mean
more than a progress report. Although courts generally
presume that “‘Congress acted intentionally and _ pur-
posely’” when particular language in one section of a
Statute is omitted in another section. Russello v. United
States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983) (quoting United States v.
Wong Kim Bo, 472 F.2d 720, 722 (Sth Cir. 1972)),
the statutory differences between the reporting require-
ments imposed on OTA and the Secretary are consistent
with the Secretary's interpretation of “results.” OTA’s
“updates” on the status of protocol revisions reflect only
the status of the Secretary’s plans to conduct the study;
because the Center’s Agent Orange Study has not yet
begun, the reports. cannot contain its “results.” The Sec-
retary’s reports, by contrast, reflect information gathered
in the process of conducting the study, which can fairly
be labeled “results thus far obtained under the study.”
Similarly unpersuasive is appellants’ second contention
that the differences between the Agent Orange statute and
a 1983 statute providing for an epidemiological study
of the health effects of radiation exposure, Veterans
Health Care Amendments of 1983, Pub. L. 98-160 § 601,
97 Stat. 1006-08 (1983) (codified as amended at 38
U.S.C. $219 note (1988)) (the “1983 Act”), demon-
the requirements of § 307(b)(2)(B) in his first and subsequent
progress reports, when he informed Congress of the proposed
TCDD study and its results, notified Congress of the Center’s
Agent Orange Study’s abandonment, and recommended that the
legislature reallocate unused funds. See supra n.10. Subsection
(b) (3) makes clear that the Secretary need not recommend any
“action” based on the study’s “results.” It is consistent with this
subsection for the Secretary to recommend no rulemaking action,
given the “result” that the effects of Agent Orange could not
presently be ascertained.
17a
Strate that Congress intended to require the Secretary
to provide “health results” in his reports pursuant to
§ 307(b)(2) of the 1979 Act. Although the 1983 Act
explicitly gives the Secretary discretion not to conduct a
Study if he finds a scientifically valid study infeasible, id.
§ 601 (a)(1)(B), the fact that the Secretary could not
abandon the epidemiological study without developing a
protocol and reporting some kind of results does not mean
that the “results” reported must be “health results.” Not
is the 1983 Act's requirement of reports on “the progress
and any results” of the radiation study, id. § 601
(a)(5)(A), inconsistent with interpreting “results” as
used in § 307(b)(2) of the 1979 Act to include data
and conclusions other than “health results.” Absent eithe:
a conflict between the 1983 Act and the Secretary’s inter-
pretation or a clear contrary meaning of the word “re
sults,” we will not read the 1983 Act to preclude the
reasonable interpretation adopted by the Secretary. Com
pare West Virginia University Hosp., Inc. v. Casey. 499
U.S. 83, 99-101 (1991).'
Indeed, the reasonableness of the Secretary’s interpreta
tion is manifest in light of the implausibility of the alterna-
tive interpretation proposed by appellants. See United
States v. Wilson, 112 §. Ct. 1351, 1354 (1992). Under
their interpretation, Congress intended to require the Sec-
retary to proceed with the Center’s Agent Orange Study
and present its “results” to Congress even when the Secre-
tary knew that the inability to identify necessary data
'S Finally, while Congress’ failure to consider the possibility
that the study might not ultimately yield substantive healt}
results cannot form the basis for an interpretation contrary to
the plain meaning of a statute, see West V rginia Un Hosp., It
’. Casey, 499 U.S. at 100-01, where the Secretary’s interpretatio:
omports with the language of the statute and an alternative inte:
pretation would produce absurd results. the fact that Congress did
not specifically consider the issue is irrelevant. Se: d
Natural Resources Defense Cow? l Ine EPA 725 F
770 (D.C. Cir. 1984
l8a
would render the results scientifically useless. Not only do
the 1981 Amendments and the Secretary’s reports to Con-
gress make clear that Congress knew that the underlying
data was problematic, but the various reporting require-
ments in the statute highlight the unreasonableness of ap-
pellants’ unsupported assumption that Congress intended
the Secretary to devote resources to a study that the
Secretary, the Center, the congressional OTA, and the
President's Working Group had all concluded could not
yield the valid scientific results mandated by statute.
Other provisions in the statute also suggest that Congress
did not intend the Secretary to conduct a study unless it
was a scientifically valid one. Congress expressly required
the Secretary to conduct the study pursuant to a protocol
approved by the director of OTA. 1979 Act § 307(a)
(2)(A)(i). The director of the OTA was to assess scien-
tific validity in his approval or disapproval of the proposed
protocol. /d. § 307(a)(2)(B)(i). Also, Congress di-
rected the President to monitor the study for the purpose
of assuring that the study was scientifically valid. /d
S$ 307(c). Assuming the accuracy of the Secretary’s con
clusion that a scientifically valid Agent Orange study was
infeasible, in the absence of a clear statutory command,
the Secretary was not required to proceed with a study
that by all indications would not advance scientific knowl-
edge solely to fulfill the obligation to report “results.”
Because the language and purpose of the statute support
the Secretary’s interpretation of “results” as the progress
made thus far in the Center's Agent Orange Study, we
conclude that the Secretary satisfied his initial reporting
obligation under § 307(b)(2) of the 1979 Act when he
submitted a report to Congress on February 13, 1986,
describing the results of efforts to carry out the epide-
miological study.
B. The Standard. Appellants contend that the Secre-
tary acted contrary to law because he decided to abandon
19a
the study based on the repealed standard of the 1979 Act
(focusing on individual veterans who “were exposed to
. dioxins” )"* instead of the liberalized standard adopted
in the 1981 Amendments (examining health effects that
“May have resulted from exposure”).'* Appellants rely on
the fact that in his February 9, 1988, letter to the Chair-
man of the House Committee on Veterans’ Affairs, the
Secretary reported that he had not “successfully identified
a large enough group of Vietnam known to have been
exposed to Agent Orange or other herbicides to allow the
preparation of a protocol and the conduct of an epide-
miological study as required by Public Law 96-151.” They
also point to the beginning of the Secretary’s letter where
he referred to the repealed legal standard in discussing the
efforts made under the 1979 Act ‘ ‘[slince 1980.” Appel-
lants’ emphasis on this language, however, overlooks other
language in the Secretary’s letter that demonstrates that he
based his decision on concerns about scientific validity
rather than compliance with the pre-1981 Statutory man-
date, that the numerous reports before the Secretary
recommended abandoning the Center’s Agent Orange
Study because compliance with the 1981 mandate was not
scientifically possible, and that the TCDD study confirmed
that military records could not yield adequate exposure
indices.
As appellants point out, a reviewing court “must judge
the propriety of [agency] action solely by the grounds
invoked by the agency.” SEC v. Chenery Corp., 332
U.S. 194, 196 (1947). It is equally true, however, that
“we will uphold a decision of less than ideal cl: arity if the
agency's path may reasonably be discerned.” Bowman
Transp., Inc. v. Arkansas-Best Freight Sys.. Inc., 419
U.S. 281, 285-86 (1974). Hence, even if some of the
agency's remarks might appear erroneous when read in
14 1979 Act § 307 (a ] amended 198]
1981 Amendments & 401 (a ]
20a
isolation, the court will uphold agency action that, “|[c]on-
sidered in its entirety,” is based on appropriate considera-
tions and otherwise complies with relevant statutes and
the Administrative Procedures Act. District Lodge 64 v.
NLRB, 949 F.2d 441, 446 (D.C. Cir. 1991). Such con-
sideration here indicates that the Secretary did not base his
decision on the repealed statutory standard.
First, that the Secretary’s decision focused on problems
with the cohort study designed pursuant to the 1981
Amendments is evident from his letter’s reference to the
identification of a large enough group of veterans, as
distinct from the focus of the original 1979 Act on indl-
viduals who had been exposed. The Secretary expressly
incorporated by reference a separate statement by the
Veterans’ Administration’s Department of Medicine and
Surgery that refers to the 1981 standard and discusses the
efforts to “estimate the likelihood” of exposure to Agent
Orange. He noted, moreover, at the beginning of his letter
that completion of the TCDD study “enabled the V[eter
ans’] A[dministration] to complete an attempt to deter-
mine directly and specifically whether exposure to Agent
Orange had an adverse effect on the health of Vietnam
veterans,” thereby indicating that as addressed in the
TCDD study, verification of exposure data remained the
important factor under the 1981 standard. In context,
therefore, the Secretary's reference to exposure suggests
that the inability to distinguish exposure levels among
different groups of veterans meant that he could not estab-
lish the data base necessary for a scientifically valid study.
Second, the Secretary attached to his February 9, 1988,
letter to Congress OTA’s September 1987 report and the
Working Group’s comments of June 3, 1987; both docu-
ments recommended abandonment of the Center’s Agent
Orange Study, not because of an inability to ensure that
each study subject was exposed to Agent Orange, but
because current identification methods provided no scien-
tifically valid means of differentiating groups of veterans
2la
based on the degree of exposure, and thus the long-term
health effects of Agent Orange and other herbicides on the
study subjects could not be assessed. OTA and the Work
ing Group thus concluded that “no scientifically sound
study can be undertaken.”
Third, the Secretary also attached to his February 9,
1988, letter to Congress the TCDD validation study,
which confirmed that compliance with the 1981 statutory
mandate was not feasible because the Center was unable
to classify groups of veterans based on their degree of
exposure to Agent Orange and other herbicides. The Cer
ter compared individual hit scores as well as median
'CDD levels by company, by the company in which the
veteran spent the most time, and by the company in which
the veteran had the most “hits.” The Center conc
uded
that neither individuals with higher “hit” scores nor com
panies with predicted higher levels of exposure had, on
average, significantly higher TCDD levels in their blood.
and therefore that it could not develop the data base
needed for a cohort epidemiological Study.
Viewing the Secretary’s February 9, 1988, letter to
gether with the documents that the incorporated by refe1
ence thus makes clear that notwithstanding the Secretary’s
reference to the inability to identify veterans “known to
have been exposed” to Agent Orange and other herbicides.
his decision to abandon the Center’s Agent Orange Study
rested on the inability to identify study cohorts based on
the degree of exposure. Although Congress anticipated
that the 1981 Amendments would remove the threshold
problem of identifying individual veterans who were ex
posed to Agent Orange, 1981 S. REP. 26, 33. the amend
ments left in place the requirement that the study vield
scientifically valid results. Appellants appear to ignore o1
underestimate the significance of the fact that even under
the 1981 Amendments the epidemiological study depended
on exposure data, and that the Center’s Agent Orange
Study relied on the ability to determine the degree of ex-
ir
99
“La
posure experienced by different groups of veterans. Thus,
notwithstanding the Secretary’s unfortunate choice of some
words in his February 9 letter, the references noted by
appellants cannot be divorced from the Secretary’s refer-
ences to “a large enough group” and the enclosed state-
ment of the Department of Science and Medicine or fairly
understood without regard to the supporting materials on
which he relied in making his decision. For these reasons,
we conclude that the Secretary did not rely on an im-
proper iegal standard in deciding to abandon the Agent
Orange epidemiological study.
C. Abandoning the original Agent Orange Study. Be-
cause appellants’ other challenges fail, the success of their
appeals turns on whether, as a matter of law, the Secretary
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in determining in Febru-
ary 1988 that a scientifically valid epidemiological study
was infeasible. Appellants maintain that the “risk” of mis-
classification cannot alone make an epidemiological study
scientifically invalid and that the Secretary had no evidence
to support the conclusion that the degree of misclassifica-
tion was sufficiently high to make valid scientific results
unobtainable.
The statute vests the Secretary with broad discretion to
abandon the entire epidemiological study if, after his initial
report to Congress, the Secretary determines that the study
will yield no useful scientific results.
The study . . . shall be continued for as long after
the submission of the first report under subsection
(b)(2) as the [Secretary] may determine reasonable
in light of the possibility of developing through such
study significant new information on the long-term
adverse health effects of exposure to dioxins.
1979 Act § 307(a)(3) as amended by 1981 Amendments
§ 401(a)(2). Given this broad discretion, the scope of
our review of the Secretary’s decision to abandon one com-
ponent of the Health Study Protocol is particularly limited.
to
»
See Kreis v. Secretary of Air Force, 866 F.2d 1508, 1514
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (“[i]t is simply more difficult to Say
that the Secretary has acted arbitrarily if he is authorized
to act ‘when he considers it necessary . . .’ than it is if he
is required to act whenever a court determines that certain
objective conditions are met”) (emphasis in original). Ap-
plying this standard, we conclude that the Secretary did
not act arbitrarily and capriciously in abandoning the
Center’s Agent Orange Study after determining, in view of
the available reports, studies and recommendations, that it
was unlikely to produce scientifically valid conclusions
about the long-term effects of exposure to Agent Orange
and other herbicides on Vietnam veterans’ health. 1979
Act § 307(a)(3), (c).
The information available to the Secretary indicated
that from its inception, the Center’s Agent Orange Study
was confronted with identification difficulties that persisted
through an additional pilot study and completion of the
TCDD study. The Center’s Health Study Protocol antici-
pated that its records-based method of exposure assessment
might require “modification, indeed even a recommenda-
tion not to proceed with an Agent Orange study '
Health Study Protocol at 11. The initial review of mili-
tary records confirmed the Center’s concern that it might
not succeed in identifying cohorts of veterans who faced a
greater likelihood of exposure to Agent Orange and other
herbicides than comparable cohorts of their peers and thus
would have no way of distinguishing the health effects of
exposure to Agent Orange or other herbicides, as needed
for an epidemiological study. The congressional OTA and
the President’s Working Group Supported this assessment.
The pilot study, which the Center commissioned to evalu-
ate its exposure assessment methods, highlighted the in-
exactitude in the military records and revealed not only
that unit dispersion and inadequate spray records made
classification difficult, but also that most veterans (other
than the Ranch Hands) never had the opportunity for sig-
nificant Agent Orange exposure. The T¢
study. in turn. confirmed that the m1!
’
assessments bore no relationship to curre!
fore past) levels of Agent Orange tn vetera!
the evidence suggesting that the military
s blood
&recore
j
~
A
provide accurate exposure indices, and with no eviden
that an alternative method existed to identify ufiic
number of veterans who were likely exposed to Ag
Orange or other herbicides, the Secretary uld reasonat
conclude, in concurrence with the Center, OTA, and tl
Working Group, that the originally planned epidem
il Agent Orange Study was infeasible
he fact that the TCDD study left open the possibilit
that military cords might accurately identif |
veterans at low levels of exposure does not alter thi YI]
clusion. Because the purpose of the TCDD study
validate the records-based exposure il dices, the tudy
while not ruling out the possibility that military record
provided accurate *xposul indices at low lev ol \
posure, did not provide the verification of low-! | ex
posure indices that the Center, OTA. and the Work
Group had deemed necessary to justif short
ising military records
Appellants nevertheless fault the Secretary f s failu
to determine precisely how much misclassification inheres
in the military records According to appellants, the
Scien Subpanel licitl G i il ( ne ¢ pide Th ie
ical risk continuum” beyond which the degree of n
lassification made scientific validity unachievable Dhey
ee tat ' + ‘2
Subpanel report that it “felt that 7 et] '
‘ ine as re line T. ! iting that the secretal té
‘ ni e¢ ather tl} lence }
The Secret } evel ‘ his ! is
‘ ‘ ‘ , ’ et? a : ‘ ‘ ‘ ,
‘ I ane f os ’ OTA } ' | +}
e of ussification probler ' lepende! eth
J
maintain that Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1. 38-40
D.C. Cir. 1976), and other cases require the Secretary to
make this line explicit and to support his determination
with evidence in the record. Ethyl, which involved an
agency rule setting a particular numerical value for ac-
ceptable blood lead levels, 541 F.2d at 38, offers little
guidance here. Whereas Ethyl addressed whether the
agency had a rational basis for the chosen numerical
value, the question in these appeals is whether the Secre
tary had a rational basis for determining that no known
method existed to verify whether the military records
based assessments differentiated between exposed and non
exposed veterans in the way necessary for a cohort study.
[he TCDD study was designed, in part, to accomplish
what appellants charge the Secretary should have done
letermine the degree of correlation (and therefore the de
tree of misclassification) between military records and
'CDD exposure. As the TCDD study illustrates, the Sec
retary has no way of knowing the precise degree of mis
‘
classification. The Secretary knows only that inaccuracies
ind imprecision in the military records make it impossible
to determine whether a particular group of veterans is
re likely to have been exposed to Agent Orange and
other herbicides than a comparable cohort of their peers
[hat he did not pursue still other alternatives. at best
iguely identified by appellants, does not demonstrate
that the Secretary acted unreasonably in concluding in
February 1988 that the Center’s Agent Orange Study
should be abandoned.”
¢ ire issessment me neé ns erit ng the red roa.t gard
ire est tes ee l¢ | it at I I tne rcDD st
vhich post-dated the Science Subpanel ré rt, confirmed that
’ ré rida | ? T e re it é f nates of xposure
Agent Orange ind troops and that most ground tr
nad never faced meaningful exposure t Agent Orange or othe
rt} les
Appellant roft the affid t f Dr. Zena A. Steir vi
na Ca ¢ S ke those at sus y the
26a
For these reasons we conclude that appellants have
failed to show that when the Secretary made his decision,
after extensive efforts to identify and classify the data re-
quired for an epidemiological study that focused-solely on
the long-term health effects of dioxin exposure, the Secre-
tary acted unreasonably or contrary to law in abandoning
the Ce:ter’s Agent Orange Study. To the extent that
Vietnam veterans as a group faced higher exposure to
Agent Orange and other herbicides than other groups of
veterans, the Center’s Vietnam Experience and Selected
Cancers Studies were designed, in part, to detect health
effects that may have resulted from such exposure. In
addition, the Air Force’s Ranch Hands study was examin-
ing the one group of veterans who faced heavy exposure
to Agent Orange and other herbicides. Based on the data
[Center’s] exposure study ... do not necessarily invalidate any
justification of the study.” Affidavit at 6-7. Dr. Stein, however,
concedes that “a valid study must meet a minimum threshold of
probability and comparability” between exposed and unexposed
cohorts with respect to the fact of exposure, amount and duration
of exposure, and other personal characteristics and influences
that might affect individuals’ health. /d. at 2-4. Significantly,
Dr. Stein does not criticize the methodology used by the Center
in reviewing the military records, and she acknowledges that mis-
classification might preclude a valid Agent Orange Study if “the
misclassification problems were much greater than anticipated and
outlined in” the Health Study Protocol. /d. at 7.
Nor does appellants’ assertion that the National Academy of
Sciences has now proposed to conduct an Agent Orange Study
based on military records discredit the Secretary’s decision, which
was made several years before the Academy issued its preliminary
proposal. Moreover, in the single page from the proposal that
appears in the record, the Academy acknowledges that it ‘“‘does not
know whether the approach it proposes will prove valid or whether
new methods will identify a sufficient number of highly exposed
Vietnam veterans for an epidemiologic study.” National Academy
of Sciences, Institute of Medicine, Veterans and Agent Orange:
Health Effects of Herbicides Used in Vietnam (1993). This is
hardly a criticism of the Secretary’s approach, let alone the identi-
fication of a fundamental flaw in the studies and conclusions on
which the Secretary relied.
Sess sSNA cee an
——-—
available to the Secretary in February 1988, however, the
Secretary could reasonably conclude that it was impossible
to identify groups of Vietnam veterans who were similar
except for their levels of dioxin exposure, as required for
the cohort tests necessary to ascertain the health effects
of dioxins through a scientifically valid Agent Orange
Study.
Accordingly, because appellants have failed to present
a material issue of fact or to demonstrate that appellees
were not entitled to judgment as a matter of law as to
whether the Secretary’s decision was arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise contrary to law, we
affirm the grant of summary judgment to appellees.
[Filed Jun. 7, 1995]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 93-5404
PHE AMERICAN LEGION.
Appellant
EDWARD DERWINSKI, SECRETARY.
DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS, ef
‘ ad
4 ppe llee
ind consolidated case No. 94-5013
Before Edwards. ( hief Judge Randolt
Circuit Judges
ORDER
It is ORDERED. sua sponte, that the opinion filed
33°
herein on April 25, 1995 is amended, as follows
In the caption of the consolidated case
de
as
ete
“Vietnam Veterans of America: Harold A. Butl
Carol Ridolfi-Delaney; Marel J. Macki; Beverly
Nehmer,”
substitute
“William (Bill) Atwell: Harold A. Butler: Carol
Delaney-Ridolfi; Julio Gonzales; Marel J. Macki
me ee eee
29a
Beverly Nehmer; Daniel Orta; Paul Sutton,”
the listing of appellants
Per Curiam
FOR THE COURT
MARK J. LANGER
Clerk
legible
Deputy Clerk
30a
APPENDIX B
[Filed Jul. 19, 1993]
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
Civil Actions
No. 90-1808 SSH
No. 90-1809 SSH
(consolidated )
THE AMERICAN LEGION,
Plaintiffs.
EDWARD J. DERWINSKI, Secretary,
United States Department of Veterans Affairs, et al.,
Defendants.
VIETNAM VETERANS OF AMERICA, et al..
laintiffs.
EDWARD J. DERWINSKI, Secretary,
United States Department of Veterans Affairs, et al.,
Defendants.
OPINION
Before the Court are defendants’ motion to dismiss or,
in the alternative, for summary judgment; plaintiffs’ mo-
tion to supplement the record; plaintiffs’ second motion
to supplement the record; plaintiffs’ motion for discovery;
defendants’ motion for a protective order staying dis-
3la
covery pending a ruling on defendants’ dispositive mo
tion; and the motion by certain members of Congress to
reconsider the Magistrate Judge’s order denying leave to
file a memorandum as amici curiae.’ Upon consideration
of the motions, the Court grants defendants’ motion for
summary judgment, grants in part plaintiffs’ motion to
supplement the record, and denies the remaining motions
Summary judgment may be granted only if the plead-
ings and evidence “show that there is no genuine issue
as to any material fact and that the moving party is en-
titled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P
56(c). In considering a summary judgment motion, all
evidence and the inferences to be drawn from it must be
considered in a light most favorable to the nonmoving
party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio
Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). Summary judgment
cannot be granted “if the evidence is such that a reason
able jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242. 248
(1986). Although findings of fact and conclusions of law
are unnecessary in ruling on a summary judgment motion.
the Court sets forth its reasoning. See Fed. R. Civ. P
52(a)
Background
Plaintiffs are The American Legion, Vietnam Veterans
of America, and nine individually-named Vietnam vet
erans and widows of veterans.* Defendants are the Sec
retaries of the Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) and
the Department of Health and Human Services (HHS)
'On September 3, 1992, the Magistrate Judge issued a Rer
and Recommendation that resolved seven of the 11 pending no!
dispositive motions. The Magistrate Judge recommended that th:
Court resolve the remaining four nondispositive motions in
junction with the dispositive motion. Both sides agree with this
recommendation, as does the Court
‘The individual plaintiffs are Bill Atwell. Harold A Butler
Carol Delaney-Ridolfi, Julio Gonzales, Marel J. Macki. Beve:
Nehmer, Laura O'Callaghan. Danie Urta, and P
T
A
au
29.
how &
the Directors of the Centers for Disease Control (CDC)
and its Center for Environmental Health and Injury Con
trol, and the United States. Plaintiffs challenge defend-
ants’ action terminating a congressionally-mandated study
to investigate any long-term health effects in Vietnam
veterans that may have resulted from exposure to phenoxy
herbicides, including Agent Orange. See Pub. L. No.
96-151, 93 Stat. 1097 (1979) (amended 1981, 1984),
38 U.S.C. § 219 note.” Plaintiffs seek a declatory judg
ment that defendants’ decision to cancel the study vio-
lated the authorizing statute and the Administrative Pro
cedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. § 706. Plaintiffs also seek
an injunctive order directing defendants to conduct th
‘iis
study ,
For two years following enactment of the authorizing
statute, the VA’s contractor for the study encountered
significant difficulties identifying veterans who had
tua
al
ly been exposed to herbicides. As a result, in 1981
Congress loosened the requirement of actual exposure t
allow the study to commence. See Pub. L. 97-/2, 95
Stat. 1061 (1981). In January 1983, the VA entered
into a contract with the CDC to design and execute the
tudy. The CDC developed a protocol intended to iden
i | i I [ t { >) ‘
‘4 :
‘ I u I I i j na AT f at
. te a erse healt! fer 5 \ etl ete
g r neaitr effects resu tT! y exposure T ner!
el ies I iding the herbicide know! s Age Ural
1 tne iss hemica KNOW as tne Kil rot
tne I Bi ture f sucn herbicides
8 U.S. zivd note A l \
‘In addition, plaintiffs seek an order requiring the VA,
eting ne stud t revit an amen sab ul Ul
mpensation reguiatior s the stud results wa nt ind
I 1d judicate eterans i nat ! pee 1e! a i
ght raise issues ir nt tr s results f
a ee Oe = a
33a
tify discrete cohorts of veterans who were and were not
likely to have been exposed to Agent Orange in Vietnam.
The CDC planned to determine whether those likely to
have been exposed suffered from any distinct health ef-
fects. By early 1984 the congressional Office of Tech-
nology Assessment (OTA) had approved the CDC’s pro-
tocol as required by the authorizing statute. 38 U.S.C.
) 219 note (a)(2)(A) (i).
lhe CDC had qualified the study’s potential within the
protocol, noting that “[sJince many of the proposed pro-
cedures are untested, modifications, indeed even a recom
mendation not to proceed with the Agent Orange study,
may be required after pilot assessments.” Erickson Decl.
Ex. A at 11. Working with the United States Army and
Joint Services Environmental Support Group to match
military records of troop locations and herbicide spray-
ing, the CDC found that the records were more deficient
than it had anticipated. The data indicated that troops
were Often dispersed 20 kilometers from the main com-
panys location records. In addition, records contained
gaps of company locations for various days. Eventually,
the CDC sought to adjust the original protocol in 1985.
In response to the CDC’s proposed changes, the OTA
demanded a revised protocol. Furthering the OTA posi-
tion, in January 1986, the chairmen of the House Vet
erans’ Affairs Committee and the Senate Committee on
Veterans Affairs requested the CDC to suspend activity
on the principal study until after the OTA approved a
new protocol
In addition to the mandated OTA oversight, the au-
thorizing statute charged the President with monitoring the
\gent Orange exposure study to assure its scientific va-
lidity. 38 U.S.C. $219 note (c). As a result. an inter-
agency council of Cabinet and subcabinet level officers
Known as the White House Domestic Policy Council
(DPC) had organized a subgroup, the Agent Orange
Working Group (AOWG). In early 1986, following the
Ne ne EI a
34a
OTA’s demand for a new protocol, the AOWG’s Science
panel convened a Subpanel on Exposure Assessment (Sub
panel) to review the status of the study. The June 1986
Subpanel report and a companion pilot assessment dis
closed a considerable potential for misclassification of ex
posed and non-exposed veterans. The study confirmed the
difficulty of identifying reliable cohorts to examine. Sub
sequently, the AOWG Science panel concluded that an
exposure study based on military records alone was not
scientifically valid. The AOWG Science panel recom
mended that the CDC develop an independent verification
method to determine the likelihood of veterans’ exposure
to Agent Orange.
Adopting the AOWG Science panel’s recommendation
in the summer of 1986, the CDC developed a validation
study to verify the accuracy of exposure estimates based on
military records. By measuring the 2,3,7,8-TCDD (di
oxin) level in blood serum, the CDC could reasonably
determine previous exposures to phenoxy herbicides. The
study results showed no correlation between the military
records’ estimates of exposure to Agent Orange and t!
veterans’ blood dioxin levels
Based on the recommendation of the AOWG Science
panel and the results of the blood dioxin verification
study, the CDC concluded that a scientifically valid ex
posure study could not be performed. In August 1987,
after reviewing these findings, the OTA Agent Orange
Advisory Panel, the AOWG Science panel, and the
AOWG all recommended that the Agent Orange exposure
study be cancelled. On October 9, 1987, the AOWG ini
tiated the process for terminating the contracts of the CD¢
study. The DPC approved the AOWG recommendation on
November 5, 1987. The AOWG informed the congre:
sional committees that the study had “proved scientifi
cally impossible to do.” Beach Decl. Exs. G and H at |
Subsequently, on November 24, 1987, the VA requested
a written report from the CDC regarding the recommenda
tion that no scientifically valid study could be performed
In December 1987, the VA Department of Medicine and
Surgery conducted an independent review of the CDC's
findings and endorsed the recommendation. The VA Ad
ministrator notified the House Veterans’ Affairs Committee
and the Senate Committee on Veterans’ Affairs in a Febru
Y, 1988, letter that
no one has successfully identified a large enough
roup of Vietnam veterans known to have been ex
posed to Agent Orange or other herbicides to allow
the preparation of a protocol and the conduct of an
epidemiological study as required by Public Law 96
151. I must, therefore, advise you that no scientifi
cally sound study can be undertaken and request that
the VA be relieved of the requirement to do this
research
Hobson Decl. Ex. E at 1-2. On February 17, 1988, the
VA notified the congressional committees that funds previ
ously appropriated for the Agent Orange study would
revert to the Treasury Department. Subsequently, Cor
gress ordered those funds shifted to other veterans’ studies
‘upon cancellation of that contract.” Pub. L. No. 100
AR7 120] 102 Stat. 4105. 4125 (1988)
i
D ‘CUSSION
7" } il tiff ial | ntestil ina
| I tud j | lant I ad tf il tf at ‘
J 1 rmat a 1¢ e that the VA
te incel the st e Defendants’ Ri
tiffs Me i 1u Upp t t Defe lant M t
] i ludg ent at ¢ Hov el r iteria 1O* !
pea ‘ the istrative reco! it tted b efendant
tne e! i exhibit wl n ne : f Rathe tl
itior Ss present P ntiffs’ Ex) t 2e he ¢ irt, I
‘ ent t} ‘ i t} Pla tite Fy -
36a
to summary judgment on two grounds.” First, defendants
claim that Congress ratified the decision to cancel the
study. Second, they argue that their actions were rational
and otherwise in accordance with law, and therefore did
not violate the APA. The Court first addresses defendants’
ratification claim and then examines the alleged APA
violations
l Congressional Ratification
Defendants claim that they are entitled to summary
judgment because Congress approved the decision to can-
cel the exposure study in 1988. Defendants contend that
Congress ratified the cancellation when it transferred the
funds originally appropriated for the Agent Orange ex
posure study to other veterans’ studies. Plaintiffs assert
that defendants have failed to satisfy the heavy burden
required to demonstrate ratification by appropriation.
In Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc. v. Morton,
this Circuit held that “ratification by appropriation will not
be found unless prior knowledge of the specific disputed
action can be clearly demonstrated and the appropriation
plainly shows ‘a purpose to bestow the precise authority
which is claimed’.” Associated Elec. Coop. Inc. v. Morton,
507 F.2d 1167, 1174 (D.C. Cir. 1974) (citations omit-
ted), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 830 (1975). When Congress
reappropriated the funds from the Agent Orange study, it
made no reference to repealing the authorizing statute
Pub. L. No. 100-687, § 1201, 102 Stat. 4105, 4125
(1988). Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable
®* Defendants also move to dismiss, claiming that the CD«¢
lesign and methodology choices are committed to agency discre
and not subiect to judicial review See 5 U.S ~( S$ 7Ol(a 2
Plaintiffs deny that they challenge the legality of the CDC’s action
Although the Court finds that piaintiffs do challenge the CDC’
actions, they do so only in an effort to establish that defendants
acted arbitrarily and capriciously in concluding that no Agent
Uranwge study could be scientifically valid Therefore. the Court
‘ lefendant tion ft lismiss
37a
to plaintiffs, the Court finds that there is a genuine issue
of material fact in dispute as to whether Congress had the
requisite purpose to repeal the substantive law which au
thorized the study. Thus, the Court concludes that sum
mary judgment on the basis of defendants’ congressional
ratification argument Is inappropriate. '
i Alleged Violations of the APA
Under the APA, reviewing courts generally must ex
amine “final agency action.” 5 U.S.C. § 704. Deferring
judicial intervention until after the agency's final action
permits the full exercise of the administrative process.
{T]he task of the reviewing court is to apply the ap
propriate APA standard of review, 5 U.S.C. § 706. to the
igency decision based on the record the agency presents to
reviewing court.” Florida Power & Light Co. vy.
+}
729, 744 (1985). The final agency
Le
Lorion, 470 U.S
action in this case may be characterized as an informal
one, and the Court will set it aside only if it is “ ‘arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in
iccordance with law’ or if the action failed to meet statu
tory, procedural, or constitutional requirements.” Citizens
lo Pre serve Overton Park. Inc. \ Volpe, 40] U S 402.
U.S.C. § 706(2)(A), (B), (C).
+14 (1971) (citine § .
(D)). This standard is highly deferential. See, e.g., Motor
onsideration of the motion by certain members of (
é reconsider the Magistrate Judge’s order denying leave
a memorandum as an ‘riae, the Court upholds the order
e it is not “clearly erroneous or contrary to law.” See Fed
I ( P. 72(a
Because neither the authorizing statute no: legislative histor.
ite any congressional intent to create a private caus
lier the Avent Orange exposure study statute, the Court
es not recognize such a right. See Middlesex County Seweraas
i Nat ea Clamme? 1 n, 458 U.S 13-15 (198] \
. 3 intiffs’ claims that defendants Violated the authorizing
the APA > US ¢ (06 (2 A
yr:
38a
Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983). Moreover, reviewing courts
are to defer to reasonable agency interpretations of statu-
tory schemes when the authorizing language is silent or
ambiguous. See Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. National Re-
sources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984).
As a threshold matter, the Court examines the parties’
dispute regarding which governmental body made the final
decision to cancel the Agent Orange exposure study. The
Court then addresses the parties’ conflict over the ade-
quacy of the administrative record. Finally, the Court
considers whether the decision to cancel the study was
arbitrary, capricious, or otherwise not in accordance with
law.
4A. Final Agency Action
First, plaintiffs contend that determining which body
made the decision to cancel the study, the DPC or the VA,
is a genuine issue of material fact that precludes sum-
mary judgment. In their initial statement of material
facts, defendants claimed that the DPC made the decision
to cancel the study. In their amended statement of ma-
terial facts, however, defendants withdrew this contention.
Instead, they assert that the VA Administrator’s decision
to terminate the study was the final agency action review-
able by this Court.’ Plaintiffs, however, claim that during
® The Court rejects plaintiffs’ attempt to estop defendants from
amending their statement of facts. Plaintiffs argue that if de-
fendants recant earlier statements they thereby create a material
issue of fact. See Pyramid Sec. Ltd. v. IB Resolution, Inc., 924
F.2d 1114, 1123 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“Courts have long held that a
party may not create a material issue of fact simply by contradict-
ing its prior sworn testimony.” (citation omitted) ), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 85 (1991). Defendants claim that their misstatements
do not contradict sworn declarations but were “arguments con-
tained in defendants’ legal memoranda” that “resulted from honest
error” on counsel’s part. See Defendants’ Opposition to Plaintiffs’
Motion to Estop Defendants at 15. It is undisputed that the VA
39a
a meeting on November 5, 1987, the DPC made the
decision to cancel the Agent Orange exposure study. This
DPC decision, plaintiffs assert, violates the statutory au-
thority which restricts cancellation of the study to the VA
Administrator. See 38 U.S.C. § 219 note (a)(3).% At
the least, they claim that defendants’ reversal regarding
the finality of the DPC action is sufficient to create a
genuine issue of material fact.
It is well settled that courts generally review final
agency action which is the last, legal administrative ac-
tion. See, e.g., Lujan v. Nat'l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 US.
871, 882 (1990). Courts are averse to reviewing action
prior to agency completion. Viewing the facts in the light
most favorable to the plaintiffs, the Court assumes that
the DPC made a decision to cancel the CDC study and
to notify Congress thereof. However, this action by the
DPC is not inconsistent with the VA’s retention and ex-
ecution of the final, legal authority to cancel the Agent
Administrator had the sole statutory authority to cancel the study
and that his letter of February 9, 1988, was the final action taken
in announcing the cancellation. As such, defendants “offer persua-
sive reasons for believing the supposed correction.” Pyramid.
924 F.2d at 1123. Therefore, the Court permits defendants’ pro-
posed amendments.
Even if the Court were to estop defendants from amending
their statement of facts, the Court would still find that there is
no genuine issue of material fact in dispute. The Court finds that,
regardless of what the Beach declaration states that the DPC
decided to tell Congress or how the Hobson declaration character-
izes the VA’s action, the VA nevertheless ultimately exercised its
sole legal authority to cancel the study.
Plaintiffs also raise other facts purportedly in dispute, but the
Court finds that they are likewise not material.
©The cancellation provision reads in part: “The study .
shall be continued for as long .. . as the Administrator may
determine reasonable in light of the possibility of developing
through such study significant new information on the long-term
adverse health effects of exposure to dioxins.” 38 U.S.C. § 219
note (a) (3).
40a
Orange exposure study. Following the DPC decision, on
November 24, 1987, the VA requested a written report
from the CDC with all data recommending cancellation
of the study."* In December 1987, the VA Department
of Medicine and Surgery conducted an independent study
of the CDC’s findings and concluded that no Agent
Orange exposure study could be performed in a scien-
tifically valid manner. The VA Administrator informed
Congress in a February 9, 1988, letter of the decision
that no scientifically valid study could be performed.
Had the VA not acted following the DPC decision to
cancel, plaintiffs might have had a valid claim that the
DPC made the final decision to cancel the study. How-
ever, the record demonstrates that the VA exercised the
ultimate, binding decision to cancel the Agent Orange
exposure study in February 1988. As plaintiffs and de-
fendants recognize, the VA had the sole legal authority
to terminate the Agent Orange exposure study. At the
time that he chose to cancel the study, the VA Ad-
ministrator could have used his power to continue the
study regardless of the DPC finding. Moreover, even
assuming that the DPC cancelled the CDC study, the
VA could have~—initiated a new round of protocols to
pursue the Agent Orange exposure study. Thus, the VA
decision terminating the study was the final agency ac-
tion, and it is reviewable by this Court. See 5 U.S.C.
§ 704.
B. Adequacy of the Administrative Record
Secondly, plaintiffs claim that even if the VA made
the final agency action, the administrative record is in-
sufficient for effective judicial review and they seek to
amend it. Plaintiffs seek to augment the record with
supplemental documents and declarations which they
claim demonstrate that defendants acted arbitrarily and
11 See supra note 5.
2 A EE A TE RN cS
4la
Capriciously in concluding that no scientifically valid
study could be conducted. Plaintiffs also assert that some
of the proposed supplemental exhibits reveal defendants’
failure to consider relevant factors. Others, they con-
tend, demonstrate that defendants relied on irrelevant
considerations. Still others, according to the plaintiffs,
provide important background information for the Court
Additionally, plaintiffs seek discovery primarily to inquire
into any possibly improper DPC or White House pres-
sures on the VA decision to cancel. Defendants contend,
however, that the administrative record before the Court
is adequate for effective judicial review.”
It is well established that courts are generally to review
agency action based solely on the administrative record
provided by the agency. See, e.g., Camp v. Pitts, 411
U.S. 138, 142 (1973) (“The focal point for judicial
review should be the administrative record already in ex-
istence, not some new record made initially in the review-
ing court.”); Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Costle.
657 F.2d 275, 286 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (“There is no oc-
casion for a judicial probe beyond the confines of a rec-
ord which affords enough explanation to indicate whether
the agency considered all relevant factors.”). In addition,
that record must be the one that was before the decision-
maker. See, e.g., Walter O. Boswell Memorial Hosp. v.
Heckler, 749 F.2d 788, 792 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (“If a
court is to review an agency’s action fairly, it should
have before it neither more nor less information than
did the agency when it made its decision.” ).
Courts have identified certain limited occasions that
may allow .the addition of supplemental information to
the record. Among other reasons, the record may be
supplemented:
12 Asserting that some documents were inadvertently omitted
from the original record, defendants supplemented the record with
five (Plaintiffs’ Exhibits 14, 16, 23, 25, and 27) of the 29 docu-
ments plaintiffs seek to admit as well as two other documents.
42a
(1) when agency action is not adequately explained
in the record before the court; (2) when the agency
failed to consider factors which are relevant to its
final decision; (3) when an agency considered evi-
dence which it failed to include in the record; (4)
when a case is so complex that a court needs more
evidence to enable it to understand the issues clearly.
Esch v. Yeutter, 876 F.2d 976, 991 (D.C. Cir. 1989)
(footnote omitted). Moreover, the Ninth Circuit has
found that the record may be supplemented when addi-
tional information “fully explicate[s] [the agency’s] course
of conduct” in reaching its decision. Asarco, Inc. v.
EPA, 616 F.2d 1153, 1160 (9th Cir. 1980).
The Court finds that the approximately 2,000-page
administrative record contains the VA Administrator’s ar-
ticulated explanation for his decision to cancel the ex-
posure study. The record also includes the respective rec-
ommendations of the VA Department of Medicine and
Surgery, the CDC, the OTA, and the AOWG Science
Subpanel which were before the VA Administrator when
he chose to terminate the study. The record includes,
but is not limited to, evidence that defendants consid-
ered the relevant factors in selecting which veterans to
study and in choosing the geographical area and time pe-
riod to examine. It also contains defendants’ reasoning
for the necessity and relevance of the blood dioxin veri-
fication study. Plaintiffs’ supplemental documents and
declarations primarily challenge the scientific merits of the
decision to cancel. Plaintiffs’ other exhibits fail to contrib-
ute information pertinent to defendants’ action or pro-
vide only peripheral background information. Accord-
ingly, plaintiffs’ motion to add documents to the record
is largely denied.
The Court does, however, grant in part plaintiffs’ mo-
tion to supplement the record. Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 28 pro-
vides relevant information regarding the chain of events
43a
in the VA’s decision to terminate the study. The decision
to terminate the Agent Orange exposure study involved
numerous agencies and much interagency communication.
Included in Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 28 is the VA’s request for
a written report containing the CDC’s data, which aids
in fully explicating the VA’s “course of conduct.” See
Asarco, Inc., 616 F.2d at 1160. No other exhibit offered
by plaintiffs yields information not already in the record
regarding central steps in the VA’s decisional process.
Thus, for the limited purpose of more fully explicating
the VA’s decision, the Court supplements the administra-
tive record only with Plaintiffs’ Exhibit 28.'"* The Court
therefore grants in part and denies in part plaintiffs’ mo-
tion to supplement the record and denies plaintiffs’ sec-
ond motion to supplement the record.
Courts may grant discovery in agency review cases
when, for example, there is a “strong showing of bad
faith or improper behavior.” Citizens To Preserve Over-
ton Park, 401 U.S. at 420. Plaintiffs, however, submit
no evidence that the VA Administrator relied on irrele-
vant factors in cancelling the study. They proffer only
speculation that the DPC or the White House exerted
pressure on the VA Administrator. Accordingly, the
Court denies plaintiffs’ motion for discovery.
C. Defendants’ Actions Were Not Arbitrary and Ca-
pricious Nor in Violation of the Law
Plaintiffs claim that defendants violated the APA by
acting arbitrarily and capriciously and not in accordance
with law. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A). The Court dis-
agrees. As noted, Rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure specifically makes findings and conclu-
sions unnecessary in ruling on a motion for summary
13 Even without Exhibit 28 in the administrative record, the
Court would still hold that the VA made the final decision to
cancel the Agent Orange study.
44a
judgment, but the Court elects to address plaintiffs’ more
meritorious arguments.
1. Not Arbitrary and Capricious
Among the actions which plaintiffs challenge is defend-
ants’ determination that a scientifically valid study would
require independent verification to corroborate the ex-
posure estimates based on military records. Addition-
ally, plaintiffs challenge defendants’ finding, based on the
blood dioxin study, that no scientifically valid study could
be performed. Finally, plaintiffs challenge the decision
to cancel the study. Defendants argue that the scientific
conclusions and the VA’s decision to cancel the study
were rational and reasoned.
The scope of review is “narrow” under the arbitrary
and capricious standard. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n, Inc.,
463 U.S. at 43. The reviewing court presumes agency
action to be valid. Citizens To Preserve Overton Park,
401 U.S. at 415 (“Certainly, the [agency’s] decision is
entitled to a presumption of regularity.”). Moreover, a
court may not substitute its judgment for that of the
agency. Id. at 416. Indeed, the Court need not decide
if the decision to cancel the study is supported by a pre-
ponderance of the evidence or even whether it is sup-
ported by substantial evidence. Rather, the Court must
sustain the decision if it has a rational basis in the evi-
dence. See Ethyl Corp. v. EPA, 541 F.2d 1, 37 (D.C.
Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 941 (1976).
In addition, under the APA a reviewing court must not
only consider the final agency action but also “prelimi-
nary” and “intermediate” agency actions. 5 U.S.C. § 704.
As a result, the Court examines challenges to the scien-
tific conclusions on which the VA relied. In examining
such challenges to decisions involving an agency’s area
of special expertise at the frontiers of science, “a reviewing
court must generally be at its most deferential.” Balti-
more Gas & Elec. Co. v. National Resources Defense
45a
Council, 462 U.S. 87, 103 (1983); see also Ethyl Corp.,
541 F.2d at 36 (“We must look at the [agency’s]} deci-
sion not as the chemist, biologist or statistician that we
are qualified neither by training nor experience to be, but
as a reviewing court exercising our narrowly defined duty
of holding agencies to certain minimal standards of ra-
tionality.” ).
One of the scientific conclusions that the plaintiffs
challenge is the CDC’s 1986 rejection of the scientific
validity of exposure estimates based on military records.
Plaintiffs contend that this conclusion is an arbitrary
reversal from the CDC’s original protocol. However, in
concluding against sole reliance on the military records,
the CDC considered the results of the June 1986 Sub-
panel report. The Subpanel report delineated three years
of new data compiled by abstracting military records in
an effort to match troop locations with herbicide spraying.
This additional evidence on the unreliability of the mili-
tary records established a rational basis for the CDC's
1986 decision that exposure estimates based on such rec-
ords would not create scientifically valid exposure cohorts.
Plaintiffs also challenge the CDC’s blood dioxin veri-
fication method and its finding that the study results
indicated no scientifically valid exposure study could be
performed. At the heart of plaintiffs’ arguments, however,
is a challenge to the scientific merit of the CDC’s research
rather than the rationality of its conclusion. Assuming,
but not deciding, that plaintiffs may challenge the scien-
tific merit, see supra note 6, the Court finds that the
CDC’s methodology and research exhibit reasoned deci-
sionmaking and provide a rational basis for defendants’
conclusion that a meaningful scientific study could not
be performed.
In addition, plaintiffs also challenge the VA’s decision
to cancel the study. As noted, the authorizing statute
provides that “[t]he study . . . shall be continued for as
long . . . as the Administrator may determine reasonable
46a
in light of the possibility of developing through such study
significant new information on the long-term health effects
of exposure to dioxins.” 38 U.S.C, § 219 note (a)(3).
Having considered the evidence and recommendations of
the AOWG, the CDC, the OTA Agent Orange Advisory
Panel, and the VA’s Department of Medicine and Surgery,
the Administrator concluded that no scientifically valid
study could be performed. The Court finds that this deci-
sion to cancel was reasoned and rational. Thus the Court
finds that neither the scientific conclusions leading up to
the VA’s decision to terminate the study nor the Adminis-
trator’s final decision were “arbitrary and capricious.” ™
2. Not Otherwise in Violation of Law
Plaintiffs also assert that defendants’ interpretation of
the statutory scheme violates the authorizing statute and
consequently the APA’s requirement that agency action
be in accordance with law. See 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
They contend that defendants’ failure to submit an initial
report to Congress explaining the “results thus far ob-
tained under the study” is one such violation. 38 U.S.C.
§ 219 note (a)(3), (b)(2). Defendants claim that in
mandating such a report, Congress did not intend to re-
quire commencement of the study if no such study could
be conducted with scientific validity. Instead, defendants
argue that Congress required the report as a progress
account, which defendants submitted.
“[I]f the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to
the specific issue, the question for the court is whether
the agency’s answer is based on a permissible construc-
tion of the statute.” Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843. The
Court finds that defendants’ construction of the statute
was a “reasonable interpretation” of the provision. 7d.
at 844. The statute requires the President to assure the
study's scientific validity. 38 U.S.C. § 219 note (c). In
14The Court rejects as meritless plaintiffs’ other claims that
defendants acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner.
47a
light of this requirement, defendants’ interpretation of the
mandated report as a program update is reasonable.
Thus, the Court finds that defendants committed no statu-
tory violation that would breach the APA."’ Accordingly
the Court grants defendants’ motion for summary
judgment.”
Conclusion
For the reasons stated, the Court grants in part plain-
tiffs’ motion to supplement the record as to Plaintiffs’
Exhibit 28 and denies the remainder of the motion. The
Court also denies plaintiffs’ second motion to supplement
the record, plaintiffs’ motion for discovery, and the mo-
tion by certain members of Congress to reconsider the
Magistrate Judge’s order denying leave to file a memo-
randum as amici curiae. However, finding no genuine
issue of material fact in dispute and finding in favor of
defendants as a matter of law, the Court grants defend-
ants’ motion for summary judgment. An appropriate
Order accompanies this Opinion.
s/ Stanley S. Harris
STANLEY S. HARRIS
United States District Judge
Date: Jul. 19, 1993
'° The Court rejects plaintiffs’ other statutory violation claims.
16 As the Court grants defendants’ motion for summary judg-
ment, it denies as moot defendants’ motion for a protective order
staying discovery pending a ruling on the dispositive motion.
+3a
APPENDIX C
[Filed Jul. 19,
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT QF COLUMBIA
Civil Actions
No. 90-1808 SSH
No. 90-1809 SSH
(consolidated )
THE AMERICAN LEGION, ef al..
Piaintitis
EDWARD J. DERWINSKI, Secretary, United States
Department of Veterans Affairs, et al.,
Detendants
VIETNAM VETERANS OF AMERICA, ef ai..,
Plaintiffs.
EDWARD J. DERWINSKI, Secretary, United States
Department of Veterans Affairs, et ai.,
Defendants.
ORDER
1993}
For the reasons stated in the Court’s accompanying
Opinion, it hereby is
ORDERED, that plaintiffs’ motion to supplement the
record is granted in part and denied in part, and the ad-
I
49a
ministrative record is supplemented with Plaintiffs’ Ex
hibit 28. It hereby further is
ORDERED, that plaintiffs’ second motion to supple
ment the record is denied. It hereby further is
ORDERED, that plaintiffs’ motion for discovery is
denied. It hereby further is
ORDERED, that the motion by certain members of
Congress to reconsider the Magistrate Judge’s order deny
ing leave to file a memorandum as amici curiae is denied
It hereby further is
ORDERED, that defendants’ motion for a protective
order staying discovery pending a ruling on defendants
dispositive motion is denied as moot. It hereby further is
ORDERED, that defendants’ motion for summary
judgment is granted and the case is dismissed
SO ORDERED
s' Stanley S. Harris
STANLEY S. HARRIS
United States District Jud;
Date: Jul. 19, 1993
50a
APPENDIX D
[Filed Apr. 25, 1995]
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA CIRCUIT
No. 93-5404
THE AMERICAN LEGION
Appellant
EDWARD DERWINSKI, Sec retary,
Department of Veterans Affairs, ef ai.,
1 ppellees
And ( onsolidated ( ase 94-50] ,
ORDER
[It is ORDERED on the Court’s own motion, that the
Clerk shall withhold issuance of the mandate herein until
seven days after disposition of any timely petition for
rehearing. See D.C. Cir. R. 41(a) (January 1, 1994)
This instruction to the Clerk is without prejudice to the
right of any party at any time to move for expedited
issuance of the mandate for good cause shown.
FOR THE COURT:
MARK J. LANGER
Clerk
By: /s/ Eva Brown
Deputy Clerk
Sla
APPENDIX E
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
Washington, DC 20543
WILLIAM K. SUTER
Clerk of the Court
Area Code 202 479-3011
June 19, 1995
Mr. Gershon M. Ratner
National Veterans Legal
2001 S Street, Suite 610
Washington, DC 20009
Re: American Legion
v. Jesse Brown, Secretary of
Veterans Affairs, et al.
Application No. A-959
Dear Mr. Ratner:
The application for an extension of time within which
to file a petition for a writ of certiorari in the above-
entitled case has been presented to the Chief Justice,
who on June 19, 1995, extended the time to and includ-
ing August 23, 1995.
Sincerely,
WILLIAM K. SUTER
Clerk
By /s’ Troy D. Cahill
Troy D. CAHILL
Assistant Clerk
ee 8 ee
52a
ow
APPENDIX F
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Veterans’ Health Programs Extension and Improve-
ment Act of 1979, Pub. L. 96-151, § 307 (as amended):
38 U.S.C.A. § 527 Note
“(a)(1)(A) The Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs
shall design a protocol for and conduct an epidemiolog-
ical study of any long-term adverse health effects in
humans of service in the Armed Forces of the United
States in the Republic of Vietnam during the period of
the Vietnam conflict as such health effects may result from
exposure to phenoxy herbicides (including the herbicide
known as Agent Orange) and the class of chemicals
known as the dioxins produced during the manufacture
of such herbicides. In conducting such study, the Admin-
istrator may expand the scope of the study to include an
evaluation of any long-term adverse health effects in
humans of such service as such health effects may iesult
from other factors involved in such service, including ex-
posure to other herbicides, chemicals, medications, or
environmental hazards or conditions. The Administrator
may also include in the study an evaluation of the means
of detecting and treating adverse health effects found
through the study.
“(B) The Administrator shall also conduct a compre-
hensive review and scientific analysis of the literature
covering other studies relating to whether there may be
long-term adverse health effects in humans from exposure
to phenoxy herbicides (including the herbicide known as
Agent Orange) and the class of chemicals known as the
dioxins produced during the manufacture of such herbi-
cides. In conducting such review and analysis, the Ad-
ministrator may expand the scope of such review and
analysis to include a review and analysis of the literature
covering other studies relating to whether there may be
53a
long-term adverse health effects in humans from other
factors involved in service in the Armed Forces of the
United States in the Republic of Vietnam during the
period of the Vietnam conflict or in other comparable
situations involving one or more of the factors described
in the second sentence of subparagraph (A). The Ad-
ministrator may also include a review and analysis of the
means of detecting and treating adverse health effects
found through any study covered by either such review
and analysis.
“(2)(A)(i) The study conducted pursuant to para-
graph (1) shali be conducted in accordance with a proto-
col approved by the Director of the Office of Technology
Assessment.
(ii) The Director shall monitor the conduct of such
study in order to assure compliance with such protocol.
“(B)(i) Concurrent with the approval or disapproval
of any protocol under subparagraph (A)(i), the Director
of the Office of Technology Assessment shall submit to
the appropriate committees of the Congress a report ex-
plaining the basis for the Director’s action in approving
or disapproving such protocol and providing the Direc-
tor’s conclusions regarding the scientific validity and ob-
jectivity of such protocol.
“(ii) In the event that the Director has not approved
such protocol during the one hundred and eighty days
following the date of the enactment of this Act [Dec. 20,
1979], the Director shall (1) submit to the appropriate
committees of the Congress a report describing the rea-
sons why the Director has not given such approval, and
(II) submit an update report on such initial report each
sixty days thereafter until such protocol is approved.
“(C) The Director shall submit to the appropriate
committees of the Congress, at each of the times specified
in the second sentence of this subparagraph, a report on
the Director’s monitoring of the conduct of such study
54a
pursuant to subparagraph (A)(ii). A report under the
preceding sentence shall be submitted before the end of
the six-month period beginning on the date of the ap-
proval of such protocol by the Director, before the end
of the twelve-month period beginning on such date, and
annually thereafter until such study is completed or
terminated.
(3) The study conducted pursuant to paragraph (1)
shall be continued for as long after the submission of the
first report under subsection (b)(2) as the Administra-
tor may determine reasonable in light of the possibility of
developing through such study significant new informa-
tion on the long-term adverse health effects of exposure
to dioxins.
“(b)(1) Not later than twelve months after the date
of the enactment of this Act [Dec. 20, 1979], the Admin-
istrator shall submit to the appropriate committees of the
Congress a report on the literature review and analysis
conducted under subsection (a)(1).
“(2) Not later than twenty-four months after the date
of the approval of the protocol pursuant to subsection
(a)(2)(A)(i) and annually thereafter, the Administra-
tor shall submit to the appropriate committees of the
Congress a report containing (A) a description of the
results thus far obtained under the study conducted pur-
Suant to such subsection, and (B) such comments and
recommendations for administrative or legislative action,
or both, as the Administrator considers appropriate in
light of such results.
“(3) Immediately after the submission of each report
under paragraph (2), the Administrator, based on the
results described in such report and the comments and
recommendations included therein and any other avail-
able pertinent information, shall evaluate the need for any
amendments to regulations, prescribed pursuant to sec-
tion 5 of the Veterans’ Dioxin and Radiation Exposure
55a
Compensation Standards Act, [section 5 of Pub.L. 98-
342, set out as a note under section 1154 of this title]
for the resolution of claims for service connectior based
or the exposure specified in subsection (a)(1)(A) of
such section. To the extent that the Administrator deter-
mines that any amendments to such regulations are
needed, the Administrator, not later than 90 days after
such submission, shall develop and publish in the Fed-
eral Register, for public review and comment, proposed
amendments to such regulations.
“(4) The first report submitted under paragraph (2)
Shall include the Administrator’s recommendation, and
reasons therefor, with respect to whether the authority to
provide care and services under and by virtue of section
610(a)(5) of title 38, United States Code [now section
1710(a)(5) of this title], should be extended beyond the
expiration period specified by section 610(e)(3) of such
title [now section 1710(e) (3) of this title].
“(c) For the purpose of assuring that any study car-
ried out by the Federal Government with respect to the
adverse health effects in humans of exposure to dioxins
is scientifically valid and is conducted with efficiency and
objectivity, the President shall assure that—
“(1) the study conducted pursuant to subsection
(a) is fully coordinated with studies which are
planned, are being conducted, or have been com-
pleted by other departments, agencies, and instru-
mentalities of the Federal Government and which
pertain to the .dverse health effects in humans of
exposure to dioxins; and
“(2) all app: priate coordination and consulta-
tion is accompi: hed between and among the Ad-
ministrator anc. te heads of such departments, agen-
cies, and instrumentalities that may be engaged,
during the conduct of the study carried out pursuant
to subsection (a), in a design, conduct, monitoring,
or evaluation of such dioxin-exposure studies.
S6a
“(d
) There are authorized to be appropriated
such sums as may be necessary for the conduct of
the study required by subsection (a).”
ee RE et at eee — Se en = meet. a et eter
eee o_o RR a
57a
Pub. L. 96-151, § 307, Dec. 20, 1979, 93 Stat. 1097:
AGENT ORANGE STUDY
SEC. 307. (a)(1) The Administr: ‘or of Veterans’ Af-
fairs shall design a protocol for and conduct an epidemi-
ological study of persons who, while serving in the
Armed Forces of the United States during the period of
the Vietnam conflict, were exposed to any of the class of
chemicals known as “the dioxins” produced during the
manufacture of the various phenoxy hezbicides (including
the herbicide known as “Agent Orange”) to determine if
there may be long-term adverse health effects in such
persons from such exposure. The Administrator shall
also conduct a comprehensive review and scientific analy-
sis of the literature covering other studies relating to
whether there may be long-term adverse health effects in
humans from exposure to such dioxins or other dioxins.
(2)(A)(i) The study conducted pursuant to para-
graph (1) shall be conducted in accordance with a proto-
col approved by the Director of the Office of Technology
Assessment.
(ii) The Director shall monitor the conduct of such
study in order to assure compliance with such protocol.
(B)(i) Concurrent with the approval or disapproval
of any protocol under subparagraph (A)(i), the Director
of the Office of Technology Assessment shall submit to
the appropriate committees of the Congress a report ex-
plaining the basis for the Directoy’s action in approving
or disapproving such protocol and providing the Direc-
tor’s conclusions regarding the scientific validity and ob-
jectivity of such protocol.
(11) In the event that the Director has not approved
such protocol during the one hundred and eighty days
following the date of the enactment of this Act, the Direc-
tor shall (I) submit to the appropriate committees of
the Congress a report describing the reasons why the
Director has not given such approval, and (II) submit
ed eR EE te PT CE TIA ACI tt TT tee encanta tlt rs all EE a ee ee TT eS
58a
an update report on such initial report each sixty days
thereafter until such protocol is approved.
(C) The Director shall submit to the appropriate com-
mittees of the Congress, at each of the times specified in
the second sentence of this subparagraph, a report on the
Director’s monitoring of the conduct of such study pur-
suant to subparagraph (A)(ii). A report under the pre-
ceding sentence shall be submitted before the end of the
six-month period beginning on the date of the approval
of such protocol by the Director, before the end of the
twelve-month period beginning on such date, and annually
thereafter until such study is completed or terminated.
(3) The study conducted pursuant to paragraph (1)
shall be continued for as long after the submission of
the report under subsection (b)(2) as the Administrator
may determine reasonable in light of the possibility of
developing through such study significant new informa-
tion on the long-term adverse health effects of exposure
to dioxins.
(b)(1) Not later than twelve months after the date of
the enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall submit
to the appropriate committees of the Congress a report
on the literature review and analysis conducted under
subsection (a)(1).
(2) Not later than twenty-four months after the date
of the approval of the protocol pursuant to subsection
(a)(2)(A)(i) and annually thereafter, the Administra-
tor shall submit to the appropriate committees of the
Congress a report containing (A) a description of the
results thus far obtained under the study conducted pur-
suant to such subsection, and (B) such comments and
recommendations as the Administrator considers appro-
priate in light of such results.
(c) For the purpose of assuring that any study carried
out by the Federal Government with respect to the ad-
verse health effects in humans of exposure to dioxins is
scientifically valid and is conducted with efficiency and
objectivity, the President shall assure that—
. - ” ae -_- _- cote =
a
59a
(1) the study conducted pursuant to subsection
(a) is fully coordinated with studies which are
planned, are being conducted, or have been com-
pleted by other departments, agencies, and instru-
mentalities of the Federal Government and which
pertain to the adverse health effects in humans of
exposure to dioxins; and
(2) all appropriate coordination and consultation
is accomplished between and among the Administra-
tor and the heads of such departments, agencies,
and instrumentalities that may be engaged, during
the conduct of the study carried out pursuant to
subsection (a), in the design, conduct, monitoring,
or evaluation of such dioxin-exposure studies.
(d) There are authorized to be appropriated such
sums as may be necessary for the conduct of the study
required by subsection (a).
Approved December 20, 1979
ee er ee me ee ee
60a
Pub. L. 97-72, § 401, Nov. 3, 1981, 95 Stat. 1061:
TITLE IV—MISCELLANEOUS PROVISIONS
EXPANSION OF SCOPE OF
AGENT ORANGE STUDY
Sec. 401. (a)(1) Paragraph (1) of section 307(a)
of the Veterans Health Programs Extension and Improve-
ment Act of 1979 (Public Law 96-151; 93 Stat. 1097)
is amended to read as follows:
“(1)(A) The Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs shall
design a protocol for and conduct an epidemiological
study of any long-term adverse health effects in humans
of service in the Armed Forces of the United States in
the Republic of Vietnam during the period of the Viet-
nam conflict as such health effects may result from ex-
posure to phenoxy herbicides (including the herbicide
known as Agent Orange) and the class of chemicals
known as the dioxins produced during the manufacture
gf such herbicides. In conducting such study, the Ad-
ministrator may expand the scope of the study to include
an evaluation of any long-term adverse health effects in
humans of such service as such health effects may result
from other factors involved in such service, including ex-
posure to other herbicides, chemicals, medications, or
environmental hazards or conditions. The Administrator
may also include in the study an evaluation of the means
of detecting and treating adverse health effects found
through the study.
“(B) The Administrator shall also conduct a compre-
hensive review and scientific analysis of the literature
covering other studies relating to whether there may be
long-term adverse health effects in humans from exposure
to phenoxy herbicides (including the herbicide known as
Agent Orange) and the class of chemicals known as the
dioxins produced during the manufacture of such herbi-
cides. In conducting such review and analysis, the Ad-
6la
ministrator may expand the scope of such review and analy-
sis to include a review and analysis of the literature cover-
ing other studies relating to whether there may be long-
term adverse health effects in humans from other factors
involved in service in the Armed Forces of the United
States in the Republic of Vietnam during the period of
the Vietnam conflict or in other comparable situations
involving one or more of the factors described in the
second sentence of subparagraph (A). The Administra-
tor may also include a review and analysis of the means
of detecting and treating adverse health effects found
through any study covered by either such review and
analysis.”.
(2) Paragraph (3) of such section is amended by
inserting “first” after “submission of the”.
(b) Section 307(b) of such Act is amended—
(1) by inserting “for administrative or legislative
action, or both,” in paragraph (2) after “recommen-
dations”; and
(2) by adding at the end the following new para-
graphs:
“(3) Not later than ninety days after the submission
of each report under paragraph (2), the Administrator
shall, based on the results described in such report and
the comments and recommendations thereon and any
other available pertinent information, publish in the Fed-
eral Register, for public review and comments, a descrip-
tion of actions, if any, that the Administrator proposes
to take with respect to programs administered by the
Veterans’ Administration. Each such description shall in-
clude a justification or rationale for any such action the
Administrator proposes to take.
(“(4) The first report submitted under paragraph (2)
Shall include the Administrator’s recommendation, and
reasons therefor, with respect to whether the authority
62a
to provide care and services under and by virtue of sec-
tion 610(a)(5) of title 38, United States Code, should
be extended beyond the expiration period specified by
section 610(e)(3) of such title.”.
63a
Pub. L. 97-72, § 102, Nov. 3, 1981, 95 Stat. 1047:
VETERANS’ HEALTH CARE, TRAINING, AND
SMALL BUSINESS LOAN ACT OF 1981
MEDICAL CARE FOR DISABILITIES THAT MAY
BE RELATED TO EXPOSURE TO AGENT
ORANGE, CERTAIN OTHER HAZARDOUS SUB-
STANCES, OR NUCLEAR RADIATION
SEC. 102. (a) Section 610 is amended—
(1) in subsection (a)—
(A) by striking out “and” at the end of the
clause (4);
(B) by redesignating clause (5
(6); and
as clause
(C) by inserting after clause (4) the follow-
ing new clause (5):
“(3) a veteran who meets the conditions of sub-
section (e) of this section: and”: and
(2) by adding at the end the following new sub-
section:
“(e)(1)(A) Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3) of
this subsection, a veteran—
“(1) who served on active duty in the Republic
of Vietnam during the Vietnam era, and
“(i1) who the Administrator finds may have been
exposed during such service to dioxin or was ex-
posed during such service to a toxic substance found
in a herbicide or defoliant used in connection with
military purposes during such era.
may be furnished hospital care or nursing home care
under subsection (a)(5) of this section for any disability,
notwithstanding that there is insufficient medical evidence
64a
to conclude that such disability may be associated with
such exposure.
“(B) Subject to paragraphs (2) and (3) of this sub-
section, a veteran who the Administrator finds was ex-
posed while serving on active duty to ionizing radiation
from the detonation of a nuclear device in connection
with such veteran’s participation in the test of such a
device or with the American occupation of Hiroshima
and Nagasaki, Japan, during the period beginning on
September 11, 1945, and ending on July 1, 1946, may
be furnished hospital care or nursing home care under
subsection (a)(5) of this section for any disability, not-
withstanding that there is insufficient medical evidence to
conclude that such disability may be associated with such
exposure.
“(2) Hospital and nursing home care may not be pro-
vided under subsection (a)(5) of this section with respect
:0 a disability that is found, in accordance with guide-
lines issued by the Chief Medical Director, to have re-
sulted from a cause other than an exposure described in
subparagraph (A) or (B) of paragraph (1) of this sub-
section.
“(3) Hospital and nursing home care and medical
services may not be provided under or by virtue of sub-
section (a)(5) of this section after the end of the one-
year period beginning on the date the Administrator sub-
mits to the appropriate committees of Congress the first
report required by section 307(b)(2) of the Veterans
Health Programs Extension and Improvement Act of
1979 (Public Law 96-151; 93 Stat. 1098).”.
(b) Clause (4) of section 612(i) is amended to read
as follows:
“(4) To any veteran (A) who is a former pris-
oner of war, or (B) who is eligible for care under
section 610(a)(5) of this title.”
65a
Pub. L. 98-160, § 601, Nov. 21, 1983, 97 Stat. 1006:
TITLE VI—RADIATION EXPOSURE
STUDY AND GUIDE
RADIATION EXPOSURE STUDY AND GUIDE
Sec. 601. (a)(1)(A) Subject to subparagraphs (B)
and (C), the Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs, through
contracts or agreements with private or public agencies
or persons and in consultation with the Director of the
Office of Technology Assessment, shall provide for the
conduct of epidemiological study of the long-term adverse
health effects of exposure to ionizing radiation from the
detonation of nuclear devices in connection with the test
of such devices or in connection with the American oc-
cupation of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, Japan, during the
period beginning on September 11, 1945, and ending on
July 1, 1946, in persons who, while serving in the Armed
Forces of the United States, were exposed to such radia-
tion. Such study shall include, but not necessarily be
limited to, a study of identifiable prevalent illnesses, in-
cluding malignancies, in the persons exposed.
(B) If the Administrator, in consultation with the
Director of the Office of Technology Assessment, deter-
mines that it is not feasible to conduct scientifically valid
study of any or all of the matters required under sub-
paragraph (A) to be studied—
(i) the Administrator shall promptly submit to
the appropriate committees of the Congress notice
of that determination and the reasons therefor; and
(11) the Director, not later than 60 days after
such notice is provided, shall submit to such com-
mittees a report evaluating and commenting on such
determination.
(C) If the Administrator notifies the Congress of a
determination or determinations made pursuant to sub-
paragraph (B), the matter or matters required unde!
subparagraph (A) to be studied to which such determina
tion or determinations apply shall not be required to |
studied. If the Administrator notifies the Congress ol
determination made pursuant to subparagraph (B) tha
taken as a whole, study under subparagraph (A) 1s ni
’
’
scientifically feasible, the requirement in subparagraph
(A) that the Administrator provide for the conduct ol
itect
epidemiological study shall cease to have
repealed by law
(2) Not later than one year after the date of tl
enactment of this Act. the Administrator shall submit t
the appropriate committees of the Congress a report
the development of a protocol O! protocols for stud’
inder paragraph (1)(A). With respect to any such proto
ol under consideration for development, or in the proc
of development, that has not been completed by tl
end of such year, the report shall include an estimate
the completion date for such protocol and an estimat
of the cost to be incurred in developing such protocol
(3)(A) The Director of the Office of Technology As
sessment shall monitor the development of the protocol
or protocols for, and the conduct of, study under para
graph (1)(A) and shall submit to the appropriate com
mittees of the Congress, at each of the times specified
the next sentence. a report on such monitoring. Report
under the preceding sentence shall be submitted within 6
months after the date of the enactment of this Act, with
12 months after such date, within 25 months after such
date, and annually thereafter until such study 1s
pleted
(B) If any protocol to which paragraph (2) applies
(or any part of such protocol) 1s not completed by th
end of the |2-month period beginning on the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Director shall periodical
submit to such committees reports on th tat f th
development of such proocol
6/a
(4) When the Administrator has entered into a con-
tract or agreement with an agency or person for the
conduct of a study under paragraph (1)(A), the Admin-
istrator and such agency or person shall submit to the
appropriate committees of the Congress a joint report
containing a copy of the contract and an estimate f the
total cost of such study.
(5)(A) Not later than 24 months after the date of
the enactment of this Act, and annually thereafter, the
\dministrator shall submit to the appropriate committees
of the Congress a report on the status of study under
paragraph (1)(A). Such report shall contain (1) a de-
scription of the progress on and any results obtained
under such study, and (ii) such comments, and such
commendations for administrative and legislative a
tion, as the Administrator considers appropriate in light
of such progress and results.
(B) The requirement in subparagraph (A) for the
submission of annual reports shall expire upon the sub
mission of a report after the completion of study under
paragraph (1)(A).
(6) A contract to carry out study under paragraph
1)(A) may not be entered into unless (A) appropria-
tions for payments under the contract have been provided
in advance, or (B) the contract provides that the obliga-
tion of the United States to make payments under the
contract is contingent upon the availability of funds ap-
propriated for the making of such payments
>
(7) There are authorized to be appropriated such
sums as may be necessary for the conduct of study under
subsection (a)(1)(A).
(b) Not later than one year after the date of the
enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall develop
and distribute to appropriate Veterans’ Administration
]
personn
an indexed reference guide, derived from exist-
ing pertinent research-result compilations, designed to
Osa
provide Veterans’ Administration personnel who either
furnish health care or adjudicate claims for benefits under
title 38, United States Code, with readily usable informa-
tion regarding the state of medical and other scientific
information on any long-term adverse heaith effects in
humans of exposure to ionizing radiation, ine™:ding nu-
clear-device exposure, medical exposure, and occupational
exposure.
(c)(1) For the purpose of ensuring that any study,
research, or other activity carried out by the Federal
Government with respect to adverse health effecfs in
humans from exposure to ionizing radiation is scientifi-
cally valid and is conducted with efficiency and objectiv-
ity, the President shall ensure that—
(A) activities of the Veterans’ Administration
in connection with (1) study under subsection
(a)(1)(A), (ii) the development of the guide re-
quired by subsection (b), and (ili) such additional
research as may be identified, as a result of such
study or the development of such guide or otherwise,
as necessary for the resolution of questions regarding
such effects are fully coordinated with studies and
other activities which are planned, are being con-
ducted, or have been completed by other depart-
ments, agencies, and instrumentalities of the Federal
Government and which pertain to such effects, in-
cluding the radioepidemiological tables mandated by
section 7 of the Orphan Drug Act (Public Law 97-
414; 96 Stat. 2059); and
(B) appropriate coordination and _ consultation
occurs between and among the Administrator and
the heads of such departments, agencies, and instru-
mentalities that may be engaged, during the conduct
of study under subsection (a)(1)(A), in the design,
conduct, monitoring, or evaluation of such radia-
tion-exposure studies or related activities.
69a
(2) Not later than 90 days after the date of the en
actment of this Act, the President shall submit to the
appropriate committees of the Congress a report contain
ing a description of the steps taken and plans made to
ensure the coordination and consultation required by
paragraph (1).
1IOX4. YS Stat
542 % Oct
AMENDMENTS TO REGULATIONS
3) Immediately after the submissi f each
ler paragraph (2), tl Administrator, based
sults described in such report and the comments a!
ymmendations included therein and any other aval
ible pertinent information, shall evaluate the need |
imendments to regulations, prescribed pursuant
tion 5 of the Veterans’ Dioxin and Radiation Exp
Compensation Standards Act. for the resolution of
for ser onnection based on the exposure specified
' } ' : 7. tT. '
[ sl I rulall yn I needed the Adminis to
' '
{ than 9O days after suc! ubmiss hall d
] . : | . | [ | » ‘
tii pub ISI I) tn a 4 Re stel i | t \
| [1}¢ I prt eo d me dn | [
b) Pa ipn (od) section 601(a f the Vet
97 Stat. 1007) is amended by redesignating subparagrap
B) as subparagraph (C) and inserting after subpar
iph (A) the following new subparagraph (B)
B) Immediately after the submission of each rept
under subparagraph (A), the Administrator, based
the results described in such report and the comment
and recommendations included therein and any othe
vailable pertinent information, shall evaluate the nee
for any amendments to regulations, prescribed pursuant
to section 5 of the Veterans’ Dioxin and Radiation Ex
posure Compensation Standards Act, for the resoluti
4 | y ‘ art ' rote n ; .
I CialMsS IO! SCT VICS COnMNeCCtUON DOasead ¢
specified in subsection (a)(1)(B) of such section. To
the extent that the Administrator determines that any
amendments to such regulations are needed, the Admin
istrator, not later than 90 days after such submission.
shall develop and publish in the Federal Register, fo!
public review and comment, proposed amendments to
such regulations.”
INTERIM BENEFITS FOR DISABILITY
OR DEATH IN CERTAIN CASES
SEC. 9. (a)(1) In the case of a veteran
\) who served in the active military, naval, o1
air service in the Republic of Vietnam during the
Vietnam era; and
(B) who has a disease described in subsection
b) that became manifest within one year alter the
date of the veteran’s most recent departure from
the Republic of Vietnam during that service,
|
the Administrator shall (except as provided in subsection
(C)) pay a monthly disability benefit to the veteran in
iccordance with this section
(2) If a veteran described in paragraph (1) dies from
the disease, the Administrator shall pay a monthly death
benefit to the survivors of the veteran in accordance with
this section
(b) The diseases referred to in subsection (a) are
chloracne and porphyria cutanea tarda
(c) Benefits may not be paid under this section with
respect to a disease occurring in a veteran
(1) where there is affirmative evidence that the
disease was not incurred by the veteran during serv-
ice in the Republic of Vietnam during the Vietnam
Ctra
(2) where there is affirmative evidence to estab-
lish that an intercurrent injury or disease which is a
>
aa
recognized cause of the disease was suffered by the
veteran between the date of the veteran’s most recent
departure from the Republic of Vietnam during ac-
tive military, naval, or air service and the onset of
the disease; or
(3) if the Administrator determines, based on
evidence in the veteran’s service records and other
records of the Department of Defense, that the vet-
eran was not exposed to dioxin during active mill-
tary, naval, or air service in the Republic of Vietnam
during the Vietnam era.
(d)(1) A disability benefit payable to a veteran under
this section for a disease described in subsection (b) shall
be paid at the rate at which compensation would be pay-
able under chapter 11 of title 38, United States Code,
to that veteran for the disability resulting from that dis-
ease if the disability were determined to be _ service-
connected.
(2) A death benefit payable under this section to the
survivors of a veteran shall be paid to such survivors
based upon the eligibility requirements (other than the
requirement that death be the result of a service-connected
or compensable disability) and at the rates that are ap-
plicable to dependency and indemnity compensation
under chapter 13 of that title.
(e) A benefit may not be paid under this section with
respect to a disease or the death of a veteran for any
month for which compensation is payable to that veteran
for that disease under chapter 11 of title 38, United
States Code, or for which dependency and indemnity
compensation is payable for that death under chapter 13
of such title.
(f) A disease establishing eligibility for a disability or
death benefit under this section shall be treated for pur-
poses of all other laws of the United States (other than
chapters 11 and 13 of title 38, United States Code) as
if such disease were service connected. The receipt of a
disability benefit under this section shall be treated for
purposes of all other laws of the United States as if such
benefit were compensation under chapter 11 of such title,
and the receipt of a death benefit under this section shall
be treated for purposes of all other laws of the United
States as if such benefit were dependency and indemnity
compensation under chapter 13 of title 38, United States
Code.
(g) For the purposes of this section
(1) The term “Administrator” means the Admin
istrator of Veterans’ Affairs.
(2) The term “Vietnam era” means the period
beginning on August 5, 1964, and ending on May
7, 1975.
(3) The term “veteran” has the meaning given
that term in paragraph (2) of section 101 of title
38, United States Code, and includes a person who
died in the active military, naval, or air service.
(4) The terms “service-connected” and “active
military, naval, or air service” have the meanings
given those terms in paragraphs (16) and (24),
respectively, of section IQ] of title 38, United States
Code
Pub. | 8-549 ) §. Oct. 24. 1984. O& Stat. 2727
VETERANS’ DIOXIN AND RADIATION EXPOSURI
COMPENSATION STANDARDS ACT
FINDINGS
) | i] : re +
SE‘ y l ( ongress makes the following finding
Veterans who served in the Republic of Viet-
during the Vietnam era and veterans who pat
‘
pated in atmospheric nuclear tests or the Amer!
occupation of Hiroshima or Nagasaki, Japan,
deeply concerned about possible long-term health
s of exposure to herbicides containing dioxin
or to 10n1zIng radiation
) There is scientific and medical uncertal
ng such long-term adverse health effects
+) In section 102 of Public Law 97-22, the Con
gress responded to that uncertainty by authorizing
priority medical care at Veterans Administration
facilities for any disability of a veteran who may
have been so exposed (even though there ts insuffi
ient medical evidence linking such disability with
such exposure) unless disability is found to have
sulted from a cause other than the exposure.
(4) The Congress has further responded to that
iedical and scientific uncertainty by requiring, in
tion 307 of Public Law 96-151 and section 601
of Public Law 98-160. the conduct of thorough
epidemiological studies of the health effects exper!
‘nced by veterans in connection with exposure both
to herbicides containing dioxin and (if not deter
ined to be scientifically infeasible) to radiation, and
by requiring in Public Law 97-414, the developing of
radioepidemiological tables setting forth the proba
_— '
bilities Of Causation betw Pen Various Cancers and ex
posure to radiation
REQUIREMENT FOR AND CONTENT OI!
REGULATIONS
SEC. 5.(a) In carrying out the responsibilities of the
\dministrator of Veterans’ Affairs under section 354
(a)(2) of title 38, United States Code, and in order to
promote consistency in claims processing and decisions
the Administrator shall prescribe regulations to
(1) establish guidelines and (where appropriate)
standards and criteria for the resolution of claims
for benefits under laws administered by the Veterans’
\dministration where the criteria for eligibility for a
benefit include a requirement that a death or dis-
ability be service connected and the claim of service
connection is based on a veteran’s exposure during
Service-
(A) in the Republic of Vietnam during the
Vietnam era to a herbicide containing dioxin, or
(B) in connection with such veteran’s partici-
pation in atmospheric nuclear tests or with the
American occupation of Hiroshima or Nagasaki,
Japan, prior to July 1, 1946, to ionizing radia-
tion from the detonation of a nuclear device; and
(2) ensure that, with respect to those claims, the
policy of the United States described in section 2(13)
is carried out.
(b)(1)(A) The guidelines required to be established
in regulations prescribed under this section shall include
guidelines governing the evaluation of the findings of sci-
entific studies relating to the possible increased risk of
adverse health effects of exposure to herbicides containing
dioxin or of exposure to ionizing radiation. Those guide-
lines shall require that, in the evaluation of those studies.
the Administrator shall take into account whether the
results are statistically significant, are capable of replica-
tion, and withstand peer review.
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(B) The evaluations described in subparagraph (A)
shall be made by the Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs
after receiving the advice of the appropriate panel of the
Scientific Council of the Veterans’ Advisory Committee on
Environmental Hazards (established under section 6)
Those evaluations shall be published in the notice section
of the Federal Register
(C) The standards and criteria required to be estab
lished in regulations prescribed under this section shall
include provisions governing the use in the adjudication of
individual claims of the Administrator’s evaluations made
under subparagraph (B).
(2)(A)(i) In prescribing regulations under this sec-
tion, the Administrator (after receiving the advice of the
Advisory Committee and of the appropriate panel of the
Scientific Council of the Veterans’ Advisory Committee on
Environmental Hazards regarding the diseases described
in subparagraph (B)) shall make determinations, based
on sound medical and scientific evidence, with respect to
each disease described in subparagraph (B) as to whether
service connection shall, subject to division (ii) of this
subparagraph, be granted in the adjudication of individual
cases. In making determinations regarding such diseases,
the Administrator shall give due regard to the need to
maintain the policy of the United States with respect to
the resolution of contested issues as set forth in section
2(13). The Administrator shall set forth in such regula-
tions such determinations, with any specification (relating
to exposure or other relevant matter) of limitations on the
circumstances under which service connection shall be
granted, and shall implement such determinations in ac
cordance with such regulations.
(11) If the Administrator makes a determination, pur-
suant to this subparagraph, that service connection shall
be granted in the case of a disease described in subpara-
graph (B), the Administrator shall specify in such regu
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lations that, in the adjudication of individual cases, service
connection shall not be granted where there is sufficient
affirmative evidence to the contrary or evidence to estab-
lish that an intercurrent injury or disease which is a rec
ognized cause of the described disease has been suffered
between the date of separation from service and the onset
of such disease or that the disability is due to the veteran’s
own willful misconduct.
(111) With regard to each disease described in subpara-
graph (B), the Administrator shall include in the regula-
tions prescribed under this section provisions specifying
the factors to be considered in adjudicating issues relating
to whether or not service connection should be granted in
individual cases and the circumstances governing the grant-
ing of service connection for such disease.
(B) The diseases referred to in subparagraph (A) are
those specified in section 2(5) and any other disease with
respect to which the Administrator finds (after receiving
and considering the advice of the appropriate panel of
the Scientific Council established under section 6(d)(2) )
that there is sound scientific or medical evidence indicat-
ing
(1) a connection to exposure to a herbicide con
taining dioxin, in the case of a veteran who was ex
posed to that herbicide during such veteran’s service
in the Republic of Vietnam during the Vietnam era,
OT
(11) a connection to exposure to ionizing radiation,
in the case of a veteran who was exposed to ionizing
radiation in connection with such veteran’s participa
tion in an atmospheric nuclear test or with the
American occupation of Hiroshima or Nagasaki.
Japan, before July 1, 1946
(3) The regulations prescribed under this section shall
include
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(A) specification of the maximum period of time
after exposure to such herbicide or ionizing radiation
for the development of those diseases; and
(B) a requirement that a claimant filing a claim
based upon a veteran’s exposure to a herbicide con
taining dioxin or to ionizing radiation from the
detonation of a nuclear device may not be required
to produce evidence substantiating the veteran’s ex
posure during active military, naval, or air service
if the information in the veteran’s service records
and other records of the Department of Defense is
not inconsistent with the claim that the veteran was
present where and when the claimed exposure
occurred.
(c)(1) The Administrator of Veterans’ Affairs shall
develop the regulations required by this section (and any
imendment to those regulations) through a public review
and comment process in accordance with the provisions
of section 553 of title 5, United States Code. That pro-
cess may include consideration by the Administrator of
the recommendations of the Veterans’ Advisory Commit-
tee on Environmnetal Hazards and the Scientific Council
thereof (established under section 6) with respect to the
proposed regulations, and that process shall include con
ideration by the Administrator of the recommendations
of the Committee and the Council with respect to the
final regulations and proposed and final amendments to
such regulations. The period for public review and com
ment shall be completed not later than ninety days afte
the proposed regulations or proposed amendments are
published in the Federal Register.
(2)(A) Not later than one hundred and eighty days
ifter the date of the enactment of this Act. the Adminis
trator shall develop and publish in the Federal Register
a proposed version of the regulations required to be pre
scribed by this section
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,
(B) Not later than three hundred days after the date
of the enactment of this Act, the Administrator shall pub
lish in the Federal Register the final regulations together
with explanations of the bases for the guidelines, stand
ards, and criteria contained therein required to be pre
ribed by this section
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.