Reply Brief — Fernandes v. Rockaway Township Town Council
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| Supreme Court, <i
» oe ee
AUG 9 1996
a 95 ‘ 2076 CLERK
In The
SUPREME COURT
Of The
UNITED STATES
October Term, 1996
Nelson Fernandes,
Petitioner,
- VS -
Rockaway Township Town Council,
Township Engineer,
R.V.R.S.A. & Executive Director,
E.P.A. & Regional Administrator of Region II,
Dorsey and Bell
John Dorsey and Joseph Bell
Respondents.
REPLY TO BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
AND
SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF
Nelson Fernandes, Esq. (Pro-se)
9 Fox Run
Denville, New Jersey 07834
(201) 627 - 2138
TABLE OF CONTENTS
OPENING STATEMENT |
GRANT CONDITIONS NOT AUTHORIZED BY CWA 1
EPA MEMOS PROVES A CONTINUING VIOLATION 3
MR HARGROVE'S BAD FAITH & PERJURY 4
EVIDENCE OF FORBIDDEN PURPOSE 7
EPA IS LIABLE FOR DAMAGES 7
RESPONSE TO BRIEF IN OPPOSITION 8
TABLE OF CITATIONS
Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 266-267 (1953) 3
Ackley v. West. Conf. of Teamsters, 958 F.2d 1463 (1992) 4
Antilles Ind., Inc. v. Gov. of V.I., 388 F.Supp. 315 5
James B. Beam Dist. Co. v. Georgia, 111 S.Ct. 2439 (1991) 2
Cape May Greene, Inc. v. Warren, 698 F.2d 179 (3rd.Cir. 1983) 2
Chrysler Corp. v. Superior Dodge, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 179 9
7
7
2
Columbus Bd. of Ed. v. Pennick, 443 U.S. 449, 464 (1979)
Doe v. U.S.C.S.C., 483 F.Supp. 539 (D.C.N.Y. 1980)
Golden St. Trans. Corp. v. L.A., 493 U.S. 103, 112 (1989)
Hazel-Atlas Co.v. Hartford Co., 322 U.S. 238, 245 (1943) 10
Hecker v. Millburn, 538 F.2d 1241, 1245 6
Isreal Aircraft Ind. v. Standard Prec., 72 F.R.D. 456 (1976) 10
Jewett v. Inter. T. & T. Corp., 653 F.2d 89, 93 (3rd. Cir. 1981) 4
Jett v. Dallas Independent Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 742 (1968) 8
Luna v. Beto, 395 F.2d 35, 38 6
In re Melting Moments, Inc., Bkricy, 21 B.R. 173, 175 5
li
TABLE OF CITATIONS
Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U.S.426, 440 (1875)
Oneida Mot. Fr. Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414 (1988)
Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. at 17
Pettinaro Const. Co. v. Del.Auth. Reg. Tr., 500 F.Supp. 559
Purgess v. Sharrock, 33 F.3d 134, 144 (2d.Cir. 1994)
Rueth v. U.S.E.P.A., 13 F.3d 227, 229 (7th.Cir.1993)
Sec. Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1946)
So. Pines Assoc v. U.S., 912 F.2d 713, 715 (4th.Cir. 1990)
Springer v. Seamen, 821 F.2d 871 (1st.Cir. 1987) .
Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. at 38 (1915)
U.S. v. Leahy, 434 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1970)
U.S. v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26 (2d.Cir. 1984)
U.S. v. One Heckler-Koch Rifle, 629 F.2d 1250
Unpublished Case, 220 Ct. Cl. 605, 611 (4/6/79)
West v. Phil. Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 752 (3rd. Cir. 1995)
WOFAC Corp. v US, 269 F.Supp. 654 (1967)
STATUTES, REGULATIONS & RULES
Clean Water Act (CWA)
FRCP 56(g)
40 CFR Ch. I, Subpart F, §30.600 (E)
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OPENING STATEMENT
I appreciate the Solicitor General and RVRSA waiving their
right to respond since Mr. Hargrove's affidavit and 1979 memo,
as well as, Mr. Sullivan's memo proves the EPA Administrator
for Region II acted without authority of law and contrary to due
process. Petitioner thought EPA would admit its vse of Mr.
Hargrove's affidavit was an error since it appears intentionally
filed to violate FRCP 56(g). In the absence of that admission,
petitioner wishes to supplement his petition to show that affidavit
meets the criteria for perjury in order to prove the district court
abused its discretion by relying on that evidence.
GRANT CONDITIONS NOT AUTHORIZED BY CWA
Petitioner wishes to supplement his petition on the point that
the Clean Water Act (CWA) requires EPA to act by order, not by
grant condition (Pages 13-14 of petition). Petitioner has since
found cases that supports the unambiguous statute that was
reviewed. Southern Pines Assoc, by Goldmeier v. U.S., 912
F.2d 713, 715 (4th.Cir.1990) (Administrator can issue an order
or bring a civil action). See also; Rueth v. ULS.E.P.A., 13 F.3d
227, 229 (7th.Cir.1993). Southern Pines also found the CWA
requires a violation before the EPA can act, which further bars
the use of a grant condition. EPA admitted the denial of sewer
service was for the express purpose of preventing construction in
Cape May Greene @ 186-187, which led that court to find EPA
was trying to accomplish matters not included in the CWA. This
proves EPA violates the CWA and the holdings of both Cape
May Greene and Southern Pines in the case at bar.
The district court's decision also conflicts with the Supreme
Court holding that an administrative agency must be equipped to
act by general rule (regulation) or by individual order. Securities
Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1946). This
holding is pertinent since the EPA violated regulation 40 CFR
Ch. I, Subpart F, §30.600 (E) as was pointed out to the district
court in petitioner's brief ' and by proceeding by grant condition
contrary to a statute that requires action by order.
Petitioner previously showed the district court disregarded
the holdings of Cape May Greene, Inc, v, Warren, 698 F.2d 179
(3rd.Cir. 1983). That case found a denial of sewer service was not
authorized by the CWA, which creates an implied right to sewer
service. ? Since that holding precedes EPA imposing the same
condition on the RVRSA, the district court abused its discretion
by disregarding a legal ruling antedate to the grant condition that
> Therefore, the district court abused its
affects petitioner.
discretion by disregarding allegations and case law that was
before it, making its decision arbitrary and irrational. West v.
Phil. Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 752 (3rd. Cir. 1995).
Admissions in brief of party opposing motion for summary
judgment are funtionally equivelant admissions on file and, as such, may
be used in determining presence of a genuine issue of material fact. U.S.
y. One Heckler-Koch Rifle, 629 F.2d 1250.
. i , 493 U.S. 103, 112
Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles
(1989) (Violation of a federal right that has been found to be implicit in
a statute's language is a direct violation of the right as though it were set
forth in the text of the statute.)
‘ James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S.Ct. 2439
(1991) (court applies legal rules already decided antedate the events on
which the dispute turns).
ates hi
EPA MEMOS PROVE A CONTINUING VIOLATION
The district court had sufficient evidence that the EPA
imposed a grant condition without any authority of law based on
the holdings of Cape May Greene and the memos ‘ of Mr.
Hargrove and Mr. Sullivan. The court overlooked these material
facts. Pettinaro Const. Co. v. Del.Auth. Reg. Tr., 500 F.Supp.
559. Mr. Hargrove's memo shows an absence of federal law to
support the condition and clear reliance on contract law. While,
Mr. Sillivan's memo requires enforcement of the condition by
negotiating a denial of due process with the state. * These memos
and the terms of the grant condition support the application of a
continuing violation theory since it establishes the fact that the
EPA was following a pattern and practice of discrimination
extending into the statutory . . [limitations] period."
Jewett v. Inter, Tel, & Tel. Corp., 653 F.2d 89, 93 (3rd. Cir.
1981); West v. Phil. Elec. Co,, 45 F.3d 744, 752, 754 (3rd.
Cir. 1995). Therefore, the district court's refusal to apply a
continuing violation theory was an abuse of discretion and faulty.
Ackley _v,. Western Conference of Teamsters, 958 F.2d 1463
(1992). (Evidence that proves the district court findings were
erroneous warrants reversal).
. WOFAC Corp. vy US, 269 F.Supp. 654 (1967) (Documentary
exhibits would constitute matrices of opinion in lieu of findings of fact.)
: Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 266-267 (1953); United
States v. Leahy, 434 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1970); Springer v. Seamen, 821
F.2d 871 (1st.Cir. 1987).
MR HARGROVE'S BAD FAITH & PERJURY
The following comparison of Mr. Hargrove's affidavit as
compared to his 1979 memo as previously submitted, shows that
he committed perjury as petitioner claimed, since his 1979 memo
fails to present statutory authority, regulation, case law or facts
that could support a reasonable belief to support his affidavit.
That affidavit must go to the issue of his belief and knowledge in
1979, since his actions at that time are at issue in this case.
EPA claims the CWA as its sole authority to impose grant
conditions. Mr. Hargrove's certification states, "Protection of
these areas is mandated by federal statutes, regulations, and
policies." However, his 1979 memo that led to the grant
condition (App. K, p.48) states: "Protection of environmentally
sensitive areas is mandated by Federal policy." There was no
reliance on statute or regulation in 1979 when the grant condition
was instituted. In fact, his certification and his 1979 memo fails to
present any authority of law, or any construction of federal
authority ° to support a reasonable belief to avoid perjury. This
proves his condition was arbitrary and capricious.’ Mr.
Hargrove's certification claims it is supported by regulation,
which is refuted by 40 CFR Ch. I, Subpart F, §30.600 (EB), a
regulation that imposed an affirmative duty to provide the benefit
of the program to any person, which was not refuted.
’ A claim is not in bad faith if it has some legal and factual
support, considered in light of reasonable belief of individual making
claim. In re Melting Moments, Inc., Bkricy, 21 B.R. 173, 175
‘Administrative action is "arbitrary" if it is taken without any
authority of law or upon a misconstruction of the statutory authority
under which it purports to be taken. Antilles Industries, Inc, v, Gov, of
Vir, Is., 388 F.Supp. 315, 321, (D.C. Vir.Isl.).
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Mr. Hargrove's 1979 memo also contains passages that
prove he did not rely on the CWA by using the word
“theoretically” in the following, which Webster's ninth collegiate
dictionary defines to mean "confined to theory or speculation":
"since passage of the Clean Water Act, most of the
design and construction of wastewater treatment
facilities are financed by Federal grants. The
remainder comes from state grants and bond issues
which are recovered through user charges.
Theoretically, facilities built using such financial
backing could limit sewer hook-ups."
Mr. Hargrove's speculates instead of presenting law and
facts, thus proving he lacked a basis for a reasonable belief
before recommending the denial of a public benefit. His actions
in 1979 also violates the regulation that specifically requires
service be provided to any person, thus proving his memo and
affidavit to be recklessly given for the purpose of misleading the
court, * and to deny petitioner his clear legal rights. °
Other comments in his 1979 memo that prove he was
conducting himself in a reckless fashion, include:
"The question of allowing hook-ups rests with
both the authority and the municipalities. The
authority is free to reasonably fix the terms and
conditions of service.
Perjury is giving an affidavit recklessly for the purpose of
having it believed. Com, v. Leitch, 137 A.2d 909, 912.
. "Bad faith” may be demonstrated in the conduct which
necessitated the action or in the conduct occurring during the course of
the litigation; bad faith may be demonstrated by showing that a
defendant's obstancy in granting a plaintiff his clear legal rights. Hecker
y. Millburn, 538 F.2d 1241, 1245.
It implies the right to impose the grant condition contrary to
the EPA regulation. Another comment by him, says:
"State law does give to the authority the
ability to enter into contracts. These contracts are
primarily with municipalities for sewage collection
municipalities." (emphasis added)
Mr. Hargrove relies on a construction of state law as giving
a sewer authority the right to accept grant conditions, rather then
providing preemptive federal authority to establish a statutory
mandate. No statutory or regulatory authority was ever presented
to support his belief. '° Since Mr. Hargrove was a Soil
Conservationist, his opinion on the law could not be considered
what Webster's ninth collegiate dictionary defines as advise by
expert in order for the EPA to rely on that opinion in support of a
policy to override a federal regulation. Therefore, his affidavit
was tendered in bad faith in order to achieve summary judgment,
thus avoiding a trial on the merits.
The regional administrator relied on these memos to impose
grant condition 4(b) though they fail to present federal authority
and violate due process. Hence, administrator violated the
holding that "[I]f Congress intends to impose a condition on the
grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously."
Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. at 17.
- "Perjury" is the willful assertion as to a matter of fact, opinion,
belief, or knowledge, made by a witness in judicial proceeding upon
oath and such assertion is material to the issue of inquiry and known to
such witness to be false. Luna vy. Beto, 395 F.2d 35, 38.
EVIDENCE OF FORBIDDEN PURPOSE
Mr. Hargrove's 1979 memo evinces a forbidden purpose.
Furinermore, Mr. Suilivan's implementing the grant condition by
negotiating a denial of due process with the state provides
additional evidence of that forbidden purpose. Doe vy,
US.C.S.C,, 483 F.Supp. 539 (D.C.N.Y. 1980).
Mr. Hargrove's memo reviewed a N.J. regulation that
prevents building a septic system on a lot that is within 100’ of a
sewer line. Therefore, Mr. Hargrove was fully aware that
denying sewer service would prevent all construction, proving an
intent to take private property by deceptive means in order to
avoid paying compensation. The grant condition created an
anomaly that interferes with a regulation intended to protect the
public by creating a condition precedent that was conceived to
improve the protection of public health, not to deny fundamental
property rights. Therefore, Mr. Hargrove foresaw that his
condition would prevent development contrary to the intent of the
state regulation, which is relevant evidence to prove the ultimate
fact, forbidden purpose. Columbus Board of Education y.
Pennick, 443 U.S. 449, 464 (1979).
EPA IS LIABLE FOR DAMAGES
The Court of Claims held that a denial of sewer
service or an interference with the right to contract for
sewer services was a taking. It was part of its holdings in a
matter involving a federal grant provided in support of the
CWA. Unpublished Case, 220 Ct. Cl. 605, 611 (4/6/79). A
grant that both protects the waters of this country while
providing a benefit to the public in the form of sewer
services. Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S.
103, 112 (1989) (Violation of a federal right that has been found
to be implicit in a statute's language is a direct violation of the
right as though it were set forth in the text of the statute.)
Therefore, EPA's efforts to deny the benefit to those
entitled to receive it, violates the holding that:
"A disregard of the command of the
statute is a wrongful act, and where it results
in damage to one of the class for whose especial
benefit the statute was enacted, the right to
recover the damages from the party in default
is implied, according to a doctrine of the
common law." Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Rigsby,
241 U.S. at 38 (1915); Jett v. Dallas Independent
School Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 742 (1968)
RESPONSE TO BRIEF IN OPPOSITION
Respondents brief in opposition argues that petitioner
presented issues that were decided in an earlier petition. The
respondents position is subject to judicial estoppel, '' since
Mr. Cabana now argues a position contrary to the one he took
in the former case, on page 15 of that brief, to-wit:
"Petitioner now raises a jurisdictional claim
under 42 U.S.C § 2000d, a claim that was not
raised before the state courts."
2 Judicial estoppel precludes a party from 3 assuming a position i in
a legal proceeding inconsistent with one previously asserted. Oneida
Motor Freight. Inc, v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414 (3rd.Cir. 1988)
The respondent now claims this issue was decided
though he originally claimed that it was never raised.
As to Mr. Bell's fraud, Mr. Cabana formerly claimed:
"Petitioner fails to set forth any error
committed by the state courts in their
determination which would indicate a result
being repugnant to the Constitution or any law
of the United States or New Jersey."
He now claims the fraud was reviewed, having claimed
that it was not shown to be a court error. Their defense
requires a judicial estoppel since they now claim the flip side
of the same argument that was formerly presented.
Since fraud destroys the validity of any judgment, " it
provides grounds for relief in accordance with Rule 60(b). "
Therefore, petitioner filed this action seeking relief from that
judgment by proving Mr. Bell's fraud can be used to bar res
judicata. Purgess v. Sharrock, 33 F.3d 134, 144 (2d.Cir.1994);
U.S. v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26 (2d.Cir. 1984). The court having
erred by overlooking Mr. Bell's fraud before Judge Harper.
The respondents do not refute the events, the order of
their occurrence, the evidence that is admissible at trial, or the
allegations in the petition, thus leaving these matters in tact
for this Court's review. Their former argument even admits
Mr. Bell's fraud was never considered in the former case. '
-: Meld y, See 91 US. 426, 440 (1875)
a "And in cases where courts have exercised the power, the relief
granted has taken several forms: setting aside the judgment to permit a
new irial, altering the terms of the judgment, or restraining the
beneficiaries of the judgment from taking any benefit whatever from
it. Hazel-Atlas Co.v, Hartford Co., 322 U.S. 238, 245 (1943).
“ Chrysler Corp, vy. Superior Dodge, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 179
10
Respondents review the case history and the district
court opinion to dissuade you from reviewing the allegation
that '° Mr. Bell withheld material facts of personal knowledge
from petitioner and the court. '° He later admits the town's
fraud and his knowledge of it to a different judge, but never
disclosed his misrepresentation to the former judge
Dismissing Rockaway from the case would be
inappropriate since ordinance § 54-100L continues to violate
the same federal regulation violated by the other defendants.
Furthermore, Mr. Bell's fraud was in support of a policy to
sell lots affected by EPA's violation, which resulted in a
scheme to injure a different segment of the public because of
the loss in revenue that resulted. To disregard Mr. Bell's
admission of the town's fraud after obtaining a bar of
limitations by fraudulent means only undermines the legal
process and petitioner's right to rely on a fair hearing.
Respectfully submitted,
Nelson Fernandes, Pro-se
9 Fox Run
Denville, New Jersey 07834
(D.C. Md. 1979) (A fraud thet was coatieett in the judgment senate’
bars action under Rule 60 (b))
Admissions in brief of party opposing motion for summary
judgment are funtionally equivelant admissions on file and, as such, may
be used in determining presence of a genuine issue of material fact. U.S.
vy. One Heckler-Koch Rifle, 629 F.2d 1250.
ns "knowingly and fraudulently withheld from the defendant's, the
court and the jury, matters material to the fair disposition of claims
presented in this lawsuit which were known by no one but themselves.
This constituted a serious inte.ference with the judicial process” Isreal
Aircraft Industries v. Standard Precision, 72 F.R.D. 456, 463 (1976).
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.