Reply Brief — Fernandes v. Rockaway Township Town Council

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| Supreme Court, <i

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AUG 9 1996

a 95 ‘ 2076 CLERK

In The

SUPREME COURT

Of The

UNITED STATES

October Term, 1996

Nelson Fernandes,

Petitioner,

- VS -

Rockaway Township Town Council,

Township Engineer,

R.V.R.S.A. & Executive Director,

E.P.A. & Regional Administrator of Region II,

Dorsey and Bell

John Dorsey and Joseph Bell

Respondents.

REPLY TO BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

AND

SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEF

Nelson Fernandes, Esq. (Pro-se)

9 Fox Run

Denville, New Jersey 07834

(201) 627 - 2138

TABLE OF CONTENTS

OPENING STATEMENT |

GRANT CONDITIONS NOT AUTHORIZED BY CWA 1

EPA MEMOS PROVES A CONTINUING VIOLATION 3

MR HARGROVE'S BAD FAITH & PERJURY 4

EVIDENCE OF FORBIDDEN PURPOSE 7

EPA IS LIABLE FOR DAMAGES 7

RESPONSE TO BRIEF IN OPPOSITION 8

TABLE OF CITATIONS

Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 266-267 (1953) 3

Ackley v. West. Conf. of Teamsters, 958 F.2d 1463 (1992) 4

Antilles Ind., Inc. v. Gov. of V.I., 388 F.Supp. 315 5

James B. Beam Dist. Co. v. Georgia, 111 S.Ct. 2439 (1991) 2

Cape May Greene, Inc. v. Warren, 698 F.2d 179 (3rd.Cir. 1983) 2

Chrysler Corp. v. Superior Dodge, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 179 9

7

7

2

Columbus Bd. of Ed. v. Pennick, 443 U.S. 449, 464 (1979)

Doe v. U.S.C.S.C., 483 F.Supp. 539 (D.C.N.Y. 1980)

Golden St. Trans. Corp. v. L.A., 493 U.S. 103, 112 (1989)

Hazel-Atlas Co.v. Hartford Co., 322 U.S. 238, 245 (1943) 10

Hecker v. Millburn, 538 F.2d 1241, 1245 6

Isreal Aircraft Ind. v. Standard Prec., 72 F.R.D. 456 (1976) 10

Jewett v. Inter. T. & T. Corp., 653 F.2d 89, 93 (3rd. Cir. 1981) 4

Jett v. Dallas Independent Sch. Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 742 (1968) 8

Luna v. Beto, 395 F.2d 35, 38 6

In re Melting Moments, Inc., Bkricy, 21 B.R. 173, 175 5

li

TABLE OF CITATIONS

Nudd v. Burrows, 91 U.S.426, 440 (1875)

Oneida Mot. Fr. Inc. v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414 (1988)

Pennhurst State School & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. at 17

Pettinaro Const. Co. v. Del.Auth. Reg. Tr., 500 F.Supp. 559

Purgess v. Sharrock, 33 F.3d 134, 144 (2d.Cir. 1994)

Rueth v. U.S.E.P.A., 13 F.3d 227, 229 (7th.Cir.1993)

Sec. Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1946)

So. Pines Assoc v. U.S., 912 F.2d 713, 715 (4th.Cir. 1990)

Springer v. Seamen, 821 F.2d 871 (1st.Cir. 1987) .

Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Rigsby, 241 U.S. at 38 (1915)

U.S. v. Leahy, 434 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1970)

U.S. v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26 (2d.Cir. 1984)

U.S. v. One Heckler-Koch Rifle, 629 F.2d 1250

Unpublished Case, 220 Ct. Cl. 605, 611 (4/6/79)

West v. Phil. Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 752 (3rd. Cir. 1995)

WOFAC Corp. v US, 269 F.Supp. 654 (1967)

STATUTES, REGULATIONS & RULES

Clean Water Act (CWA)

FRCP 56(g)

40 CFR Ch. I, Subpart F, §30.600 (E)

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OPENING STATEMENT

I appreciate the Solicitor General and RVRSA waiving their

right to respond since Mr. Hargrove's affidavit and 1979 memo,

as well as, Mr. Sullivan's memo proves the EPA Administrator

for Region II acted without authority of law and contrary to due

process. Petitioner thought EPA would admit its vse of Mr.

Hargrove's affidavit was an error since it appears intentionally

filed to violate FRCP 56(g). In the absence of that admission,

petitioner wishes to supplement his petition to show that affidavit

meets the criteria for perjury in order to prove the district court

abused its discretion by relying on that evidence.

GRANT CONDITIONS NOT AUTHORIZED BY CWA

Petitioner wishes to supplement his petition on the point that

the Clean Water Act (CWA) requires EPA to act by order, not by

grant condition (Pages 13-14 of petition). Petitioner has since

found cases that supports the unambiguous statute that was

reviewed. Southern Pines Assoc, by Goldmeier v. U.S., 912

F.2d 713, 715 (4th.Cir.1990) (Administrator can issue an order

or bring a civil action). See also; Rueth v. ULS.E.P.A., 13 F.3d

227, 229 (7th.Cir.1993). Southern Pines also found the CWA

requires a violation before the EPA can act, which further bars

the use of a grant condition. EPA admitted the denial of sewer

service was for the express purpose of preventing construction in

Cape May Greene @ 186-187, which led that court to find EPA

was trying to accomplish matters not included in the CWA. This

proves EPA violates the CWA and the holdings of both Cape

May Greene and Southern Pines in the case at bar.

The district court's decision also conflicts with the Supreme

Court holding that an administrative agency must be equipped to

act by general rule (regulation) or by individual order. Securities

Comm'n v. Chenery Corp., 332 U.S. 194, 202 (1946). This

holding is pertinent since the EPA violated regulation 40 CFR

Ch. I, Subpart F, §30.600 (E) as was pointed out to the district

court in petitioner's brief ' and by proceeding by grant condition

contrary to a statute that requires action by order.

Petitioner previously showed the district court disregarded

the holdings of Cape May Greene, Inc, v, Warren, 698 F.2d 179

(3rd.Cir. 1983). That case found a denial of sewer service was not

authorized by the CWA, which creates an implied right to sewer

service. ? Since that holding precedes EPA imposing the same

condition on the RVRSA, the district court abused its discretion

by disregarding a legal ruling antedate to the grant condition that

> Therefore, the district court abused its

affects petitioner.

discretion by disregarding allegations and case law that was

before it, making its decision arbitrary and irrational. West v.

Phil. Elec. Co., 45 F.3d 744, 752 (3rd. Cir. 1995).

Admissions in brief of party opposing motion for summary

judgment are funtionally equivelant admissions on file and, as such, may

be used in determining presence of a genuine issue of material fact. U.S.

y. One Heckler-Koch Rifle, 629 F.2d 1250.

. i , 493 U.S. 103, 112

Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles

(1989) (Violation of a federal right that has been found to be implicit in

a statute's language is a direct violation of the right as though it were set

forth in the text of the statute.)

‘ James B. Beam Distilling Co. v. Georgia, 111 S.Ct. 2439

(1991) (court applies legal rules already decided antedate the events on

which the dispute turns).

ates hi

EPA MEMOS PROVE A CONTINUING VIOLATION

The district court had sufficient evidence that the EPA

imposed a grant condition without any authority of law based on

the holdings of Cape May Greene and the memos ‘ of Mr.

Hargrove and Mr. Sullivan. The court overlooked these material

facts. Pettinaro Const. Co. v. Del.Auth. Reg. Tr., 500 F.Supp.

559. Mr. Hargrove's memo shows an absence of federal law to

support the condition and clear reliance on contract law. While,

Mr. Sillivan's memo requires enforcement of the condition by

negotiating a denial of due process with the state. * These memos

and the terms of the grant condition support the application of a

continuing violation theory since it establishes the fact that the

EPA was following a pattern and practice of discrimination

extending into the statutory . . [limitations] period."

Jewett v. Inter, Tel, & Tel. Corp., 653 F.2d 89, 93 (3rd. Cir.

1981); West v. Phil. Elec. Co,, 45 F.3d 744, 752, 754 (3rd.

Cir. 1995). Therefore, the district court's refusal to apply a

continuing violation theory was an abuse of discretion and faulty.

Ackley _v,. Western Conference of Teamsters, 958 F.2d 1463

(1992). (Evidence that proves the district court findings were

erroneous warrants reversal).

. WOFAC Corp. vy US, 269 F.Supp. 654 (1967) (Documentary

exhibits would constitute matrices of opinion in lieu of findings of fact.)

: Accardi v. Shaughnessy, 347 U.S. 260, 266-267 (1953); United

States v. Leahy, 434 F.2d 7 (1st Cir. 1970); Springer v. Seamen, 821

F.2d 871 (1st.Cir. 1987).

MR HARGROVE'S BAD FAITH & PERJURY

The following comparison of Mr. Hargrove's affidavit as

compared to his 1979 memo as previously submitted, shows that

he committed perjury as petitioner claimed, since his 1979 memo

fails to present statutory authority, regulation, case law or facts

that could support a reasonable belief to support his affidavit.

That affidavit must go to the issue of his belief and knowledge in

1979, since his actions at that time are at issue in this case.

EPA claims the CWA as its sole authority to impose grant

conditions. Mr. Hargrove's certification states, "Protection of

these areas is mandated by federal statutes, regulations, and

policies." However, his 1979 memo that led to the grant

condition (App. K, p.48) states: "Protection of environmentally

sensitive areas is mandated by Federal policy." There was no

reliance on statute or regulation in 1979 when the grant condition

was instituted. In fact, his certification and his 1979 memo fails to

present any authority of law, or any construction of federal

authority ° to support a reasonable belief to avoid perjury. This

proves his condition was arbitrary and capricious.’ Mr.

Hargrove's certification claims it is supported by regulation,

which is refuted by 40 CFR Ch. I, Subpart F, §30.600 (EB), a

regulation that imposed an affirmative duty to provide the benefit

of the program to any person, which was not refuted.

’ A claim is not in bad faith if it has some legal and factual

support, considered in light of reasonable belief of individual making

claim. In re Melting Moments, Inc., Bkricy, 21 B.R. 173, 175

‘Administrative action is "arbitrary" if it is taken without any

authority of law or upon a misconstruction of the statutory authority

under which it purports to be taken. Antilles Industries, Inc, v, Gov, of

Vir, Is., 388 F.Supp. 315, 321, (D.C. Vir.Isl.).

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Mr. Hargrove's 1979 memo also contains passages that

prove he did not rely on the CWA by using the word

“theoretically” in the following, which Webster's ninth collegiate

dictionary defines to mean "confined to theory or speculation":

"since passage of the Clean Water Act, most of the

design and construction of wastewater treatment

facilities are financed by Federal grants. The

remainder comes from state grants and bond issues

which are recovered through user charges.

Theoretically, facilities built using such financial

backing could limit sewer hook-ups."

Mr. Hargrove's speculates instead of presenting law and

facts, thus proving he lacked a basis for a reasonable belief

before recommending the denial of a public benefit. His actions

in 1979 also violates the regulation that specifically requires

service be provided to any person, thus proving his memo and

affidavit to be recklessly given for the purpose of misleading the

court, * and to deny petitioner his clear legal rights. °

Other comments in his 1979 memo that prove he was

conducting himself in a reckless fashion, include:

"The question of allowing hook-ups rests with

both the authority and the municipalities. The

authority is free to reasonably fix the terms and

conditions of service.

Perjury is giving an affidavit recklessly for the purpose of

having it believed. Com, v. Leitch, 137 A.2d 909, 912.

. "Bad faith” may be demonstrated in the conduct which

necessitated the action or in the conduct occurring during the course of

the litigation; bad faith may be demonstrated by showing that a

defendant's obstancy in granting a plaintiff his clear legal rights. Hecker

y. Millburn, 538 F.2d 1241, 1245.

It implies the right to impose the grant condition contrary to

the EPA regulation. Another comment by him, says:

"State law does give to the authority the

ability to enter into contracts. These contracts are

primarily with municipalities for sewage collection

municipalities." (emphasis added)

Mr. Hargrove relies on a construction of state law as giving

a sewer authority the right to accept grant conditions, rather then

providing preemptive federal authority to establish a statutory

mandate. No statutory or regulatory authority was ever presented

to support his belief. '° Since Mr. Hargrove was a Soil

Conservationist, his opinion on the law could not be considered

what Webster's ninth collegiate dictionary defines as advise by

expert in order for the EPA to rely on that opinion in support of a

policy to override a federal regulation. Therefore, his affidavit

was tendered in bad faith in order to achieve summary judgment,

thus avoiding a trial on the merits.

The regional administrator relied on these memos to impose

grant condition 4(b) though they fail to present federal authority

and violate due process. Hence, administrator violated the

holding that "[I]f Congress intends to impose a condition on the

grant of federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously."

Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. at 17.

- "Perjury" is the willful assertion as to a matter of fact, opinion,

belief, or knowledge, made by a witness in judicial proceeding upon

oath and such assertion is material to the issue of inquiry and known to

such witness to be false. Luna vy. Beto, 395 F.2d 35, 38.

EVIDENCE OF FORBIDDEN PURPOSE

Mr. Hargrove's 1979 memo evinces a forbidden purpose.

Furinermore, Mr. Suilivan's implementing the grant condition by

negotiating a denial of due process with the state provides

additional evidence of that forbidden purpose. Doe vy,

US.C.S.C,, 483 F.Supp. 539 (D.C.N.Y. 1980).

Mr. Hargrove's memo reviewed a N.J. regulation that

prevents building a septic system on a lot that is within 100’ of a

sewer line. Therefore, Mr. Hargrove was fully aware that

denying sewer service would prevent all construction, proving an

intent to take private property by deceptive means in order to

avoid paying compensation. The grant condition created an

anomaly that interferes with a regulation intended to protect the

public by creating a condition precedent that was conceived to

improve the protection of public health, not to deny fundamental

property rights. Therefore, Mr. Hargrove foresaw that his

condition would prevent development contrary to the intent of the

state regulation, which is relevant evidence to prove the ultimate

fact, forbidden purpose. Columbus Board of Education y.

Pennick, 443 U.S. 449, 464 (1979).

EPA IS LIABLE FOR DAMAGES

The Court of Claims held that a denial of sewer

service or an interference with the right to contract for

sewer services was a taking. It was part of its holdings in a

matter involving a federal grant provided in support of the

CWA. Unpublished Case, 220 Ct. Cl. 605, 611 (4/6/79). A

grant that both protects the waters of this country while

providing a benefit to the public in the form of sewer

services. Golden State Transit Corp. v. Los Angeles, 493 U.S.

103, 112 (1989) (Violation of a federal right that has been found

to be implicit in a statute's language is a direct violation of the

right as though it were set forth in the text of the statute.)

Therefore, EPA's efforts to deny the benefit to those

entitled to receive it, violates the holding that:

"A disregard of the command of the

statute is a wrongful act, and where it results

in damage to one of the class for whose especial

benefit the statute was enacted, the right to

recover the damages from the party in default

is implied, according to a doctrine of the

common law." Texas & Pacific Ry. v. Rigsby,

241 U.S. at 38 (1915); Jett v. Dallas Independent

School Dist., 491 U.S. 701, 742 (1968)

RESPONSE TO BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

Respondents brief in opposition argues that petitioner

presented issues that were decided in an earlier petition. The

respondents position is subject to judicial estoppel, '' since

Mr. Cabana now argues a position contrary to the one he took

in the former case, on page 15 of that brief, to-wit:

"Petitioner now raises a jurisdictional claim

under 42 U.S.C § 2000d, a claim that was not

raised before the state courts."

2 Judicial estoppel precludes a party from 3 assuming a position i in

a legal proceeding inconsistent with one previously asserted. Oneida

Motor Freight. Inc, v. United Jersey Bank, 848 F.2d 414 (3rd.Cir. 1988)

The respondent now claims this issue was decided

though he originally claimed that it was never raised.

As to Mr. Bell's fraud, Mr. Cabana formerly claimed:

"Petitioner fails to set forth any error

committed by the state courts in their

determination which would indicate a result

being repugnant to the Constitution or any law

of the United States or New Jersey."

He now claims the fraud was reviewed, having claimed

that it was not shown to be a court error. Their defense

requires a judicial estoppel since they now claim the flip side

of the same argument that was formerly presented.

Since fraud destroys the validity of any judgment, " it

provides grounds for relief in accordance with Rule 60(b). "

Therefore, petitioner filed this action seeking relief from that

judgment by proving Mr. Bell's fraud can be used to bar res

judicata. Purgess v. Sharrock, 33 F.3d 134, 144 (2d.Cir.1994);

U.S. v. McKeon, 738 F.2d 26 (2d.Cir. 1984). The court having

erred by overlooking Mr. Bell's fraud before Judge Harper.

The respondents do not refute the events, the order of

their occurrence, the evidence that is admissible at trial, or the

allegations in the petition, thus leaving these matters in tact

for this Court's review. Their former argument even admits

Mr. Bell's fraud was never considered in the former case. '

-: Meld y, See 91 US. 426, 440 (1875)

a "And in cases where courts have exercised the power, the relief

granted has taken several forms: setting aside the judgment to permit a

new irial, altering the terms of the judgment, or restraining the

beneficiaries of the judgment from taking any benefit whatever from

it. Hazel-Atlas Co.v, Hartford Co., 322 U.S. 238, 245 (1943).

“ Chrysler Corp, vy. Superior Dodge, Inc., 83 F.R.D. 179

10

Respondents review the case history and the district

court opinion to dissuade you from reviewing the allegation

that '° Mr. Bell withheld material facts of personal knowledge

from petitioner and the court. '° He later admits the town's

fraud and his knowledge of it to a different judge, but never

disclosed his misrepresentation to the former judge

Dismissing Rockaway from the case would be

inappropriate since ordinance § 54-100L continues to violate

the same federal regulation violated by the other defendants.

Furthermore, Mr. Bell's fraud was in support of a policy to

sell lots affected by EPA's violation, which resulted in a

scheme to injure a different segment of the public because of

the loss in revenue that resulted. To disregard Mr. Bell's

admission of the town's fraud after obtaining a bar of

limitations by fraudulent means only undermines the legal

process and petitioner's right to rely on a fair hearing.

Respectfully submitted,

Nelson Fernandes, Pro-se

9 Fox Run

Denville, New Jersey 07834

(D.C. Md. 1979) (A fraud thet was coatieett in the judgment senate’

bars action under Rule 60 (b))

Admissions in brief of party opposing motion for summary

judgment are funtionally equivelant admissions on file and, as such, may

be used in determining presence of a genuine issue of material fact. U.S.

vy. One Heckler-Koch Rifle, 629 F.2d 1250.

ns "knowingly and fraudulently withheld from the defendant's, the

court and the jury, matters material to the fair disposition of claims

presented in this lawsuit which were known by no one but themselves.

This constituted a serious inte.ference with the judicial process” Isreal

Aircraft Industries v. Standard Precision, 72 F.R.D. 456, 463 (1976).

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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