Opposition Brief — Cox v. Treadway

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JUL 16 1996

SUPREME COURT wT THE UNITED STATES —

October Term, 1995

JOSEPH WALTER COX,

BENNIE BURGAN, JR. - <- - - Petitioners

versus

GREGORY TREADWAY, ETAL. - - - Respondent

On Petition for Writ of Certiorari to the

United States Court of Appeals for the

Sixth Circuit

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

WINSTON E. KING

Counsel of Record for Respondents

Senior Attorney

City of Louisville

Rm. 200, City Hall

601 West Jefferson Street

Louisville, Ky. 40202

(502) 574-3511

July 17, 1996

WESTERFIELD-BONTE CO., 618 W. KENTUCKY-?.O. BOX 3251, LOUISVILLE, KY.

i

QUESTIONS PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

I. Whether, in Addition to Being Instructed on the

Use of Excessive Force During the Course of an Arrest, the

Jury Should Also Have Been Instructed That It Was a

Violation of the Fourth Amendment to the United States

Constitution for an Officer to Use Physical Force on a Citi-

zen Who Has Been Arrested and Restrained.

II. Whether the federal Appeals Court Erred When It

Held That It Was Not Error for the Trial Court to Fail to

Recognize That Statements Were Admissable on a Ground

Never Clearly Identified by Petitioners’ Counsel Either De-

scriptively or by Reference to the Appropriate Federal Rule

of Evidence. ;

ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS

PAGE

Questions Presented for Review ............ccsssssess0 i

"BOOS CE CGM aiivvcticiccccadsosesustincsaieadcioncestichidadssion ii

Table of Authorities iii

Sratemeans GE Cie CIS oi icocisiatscscssivsvinadiiiovntaniceores 1

Bas FR IG asia cottasessinteidadinse nesta ea 1

B. Correction of Misstatements in the Petition ... 7

Reasons for Denying the Wit ...................ccccccceees 7

I. The Petitioners Have Not Presented a

Special and Important Question. ................000+ 7

II. There Is No Conflict Between the Circuits

Concerning the Necessity of a Post-Restraint

Instruction in Addition to the Graham v.

Connor Excessive Force Instruction During

the Course of afi Arreat. cccccccccccssosssssecssoccoesescoee 8

III. This Court’s Supervisory Role Is Not Called

Into Question by The Appellate Court’s

Decision With Regard to the Statements

by the Police Informant ......ccccccccccscsessescoseseseees 11

CCeRROAIIIOGS, prcicccncevesicibecsentbiditacatenidecetig te ota. 12

iii

"ABLE OF AUTHORITIES

PAGE

Cases:

Braxton v. United States, 500 U.S. 344 (1991)...... 8

Cohen v. Coahoma County, Miss., 805 F.Supp.

SP EI, BINED cccncsnsnsercsspeusesnstecevosorsoevoces i)

Cox v. County of Suffolk, 780 F.Supp. 103

8 8 8 A) ARN 9

Cox v. Treadway, 75 F.3rd 230 (6th Cir. 1996) ..... 1

Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976) ...............0ceeeeees 12

Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641 (1987)................006 12

Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386 (19839) ........ 8, 9, 10, 11

Gray v. Spillman, 925 F.2d 90 (4th Cir. 1991)...... 9

James v. Kentucky, 466 U.S. 341 (1976)................ 12

Lewis v. Downs, 774 F.2d 711 (6th Cir. 1985)....... 10

McDowell v. Rogers, 863 F.2d 1302 (6th Cir.

RII hiietiocinatch tiintn shinee ante diatatipeseevecieeseoes 10

McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1943) ..... 12

Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery,

A Ie rs Fe a cxntcietnnveciweinvecvcsvecoseccees 7

Robins v, Harum, 773 F.2d 1004 (9th Cir. 1985).. 10

United States v. Hale, 422 U.S. 171 (1975) ........... 12

United States v. Payne, 447 U.S. 727 (1980).......... 11

Ware v. Reed, 709 F.2d 345 (5th Cir. 1983)........... 9

Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481

RSS SRS A ee 12

Rule Cited:

Supreme Court Rule 10(1)(a) ...........:::ccccseseseseeeeees 8

Supreme Court Rule 10(1)...............cccceeeseseeeeeeeeeenes 7

Supreme Court Rule 15(1)................sccccsssessessseseees 7

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No. 95-2028

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

October Term, 1995

JOSEPH WALTER Cox,

BENNIE BURGAN, JR. - - - - - - - Petitioners

v.

Grecory Treapway, Et Al - - - - Respondents

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

Respondents request that the Court deny the petition |

for writ of certiorari seeking review of an opinion of the

Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals. The court of appeals deci-

sion is reported at 75 F.3d 230 (6th Cir. 1996), petition for

cert filed, 64 U.S.L.W. 3856 (U.S. June 25, 1996) (No. 95-

2028).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

A. THE EVIDENCE

On the evening of June 20, 1990, Louisville narcoiics

officers were preparing to conclude an ongoing operation

which was meant to culminate with a drug buy, and the

arrest of, Plaintiff, Joseph Cox [R 124, TE III, pp. 19-20].

The plan was this: a police informant, Wayne Sprigg,

would meet Mr. Cox at a truck stop. There, Mr. Sprigg

would sell Mr. Cox some marijuana provided by the police.

2

The marijuana would be located in the trunk of Sprigg’s

car. Mr. Sprigg would give to Mr. Cox or Plaintiff, Bennie

Burgan, Jr. a key, supposedly to Sprigg’s car. This key,

however, would not actually start the car with the mari-

juana in it. After the deal, the officers would move in. [R

124, TE III, pp. 20-21, 152).

However, the police plan went awry. Mr. Burgan was

somehow able to start the Cutlass with the key. Both cars

— one driven by Mr. Burgan and one driven by Mr. Cox

with Mr. Sprigg — exited the parking lot and drove off in

different directions [R 124, TE III, pp. 153, 164]. The

officers in the parking lot, surprised, soon followed; they

drove out of the parking lot in different directions and

began to search for both cars [R 124, TE III, pp. 26, 50,

153, 164].

Defendant, Detective Robert O’Neil, in one car and De-

tectives Daniel Hyland and Russell Wilson in another soon

managed to find Cox’s car. Mr. Cox was unable to pass

Detective O’Neil, so he pulled over into a yard along the

side of the road and fled on foot [R 124, TE III, pp. 108-

109, 118]. The detectives pulled over and pursued Mr. Cox

[R 124, TE III, pp. 118,). It was dark, and they were

running at top speed [R 124, TE II, p. 192; TE III, pp. 109,

125). They came to a ravine and the three detectives fell

in, cutting and bruising themselves [R 124 , TE II, p. 194;

TE III, pp. 110-111,]. At this point the detectives thought

they had lost Cox, but they soon found him hiding nearby

[R 124, TE III, pp. 119-120]. Mr. Cox had likely fallen into

the ravine as well: although he later testified that he had

deliberately descended into the ditch [R 124, TE I, pp. 90-

91], it would have been impossible for him not to have

fallen into the ravine given the speed at which he was

running and the lack of light [R 124, TE III, p 110).

By the time they apprehended Mr. Cox, Defendant, De-

tective Jerry Warman, had arrived [R 124, TE III, p. 51],

3

and he helped pull Mr. Cox up out of the ravine [R 124, TE

Il, pp. 168, 194; TE III, pp. 54, 125). The area was by now

lighted by the headlights of a car which had arrived [R

124, TE III, pp. 124-125]. Detective Warman instructed

Mr. Cox to get on the ground and proceeded, with the

assistance of Defendant, Detective Michael Dossett, who

had also since arrived, to secure Cox’s hands behind his

back with a military whip belt [R 124, TE II, pp. 169; TE

III, pp. 54, 113, 125]. Mr. Cox was taken back to the road,

handcuffed, and put in Detective Dossett’s car [R 124, TE

II, p. 151; TE ITI, pp. 55, 57, 113).

According to the testimony of the police officers, at no

time during this entire episode did anyone strike or kick

Mr. Cox [R 124, TE II, pp. 151, 172, 187-188, 195; TE III,

pp. 56, 113-115, 120-121, 126, 166).

Except for Detective O’Neil, who had to stay with his

car which had hit a tree, the detectives, plus Mr. Cox and

Mr. Sprigg, then returned to the search at the truck stop

for Mr. Burgan [R 124, TE III, pp. 57, 114, 126, 166]. At

the truck stop, Mr. Burgan was spotted pulling into and

then leaving the parking lot.

Mr. Burgan eventually turned around and headed back.

[R 124, TE III, p. 143]. Defendant, Detective John

Winstead, saw him doing this and reported it on the radio

[R 124, TE III, pp. 58, 60, 128, 144, 168]. At this point,

Detective Dossett, driving the car with Mr. Cox and Detec-

tive Warman [R 124, TE II, pp. 152-153], decided to turn

around because he wanted to protect his prisoner by stay-

ing out of the way [R 124, TE III, pp. 60, 128-129]. As he

was trying to turn around in a driveway along the road,

the car driven by Mr. Burgan drove over a hill into view,

slowed down, then accelerated atid collided with Detective

Dossett’s vehicle [R 124, TE III, pp. 60, 91, 129]. Both

Detective Warman and Detective Dossett were thrown to

the windshield, but were not seriously injured [R 124, TE

III, pp. 60-61, 131].

4

Detective Warman immediately jumped out of the car

and ran over to Mr. Burgan’s driver door, which was some-

what jammed from the wreck, and tried to get it open [R

124, TE III, pp. 61,]. He eventually succeeded somewhat

in getting the door open and reached in to pull Mr. Burgan

out of the car [R 124, TE III, pp. 61,]. Mr. Burgan, mean-

while, was struggling, kicking, and trying to get out the

other door [R 124, TE II, pp. 174-175; TE III, p. 62]. After

Detective Warman succeeded in pulling Mr. Burgan out,

he instructed Mr. Burgan to get down on the ground, and

tried to push him down when Mr. Burgan struggled and

tried to push past him [R 124, TE II, pp. 161, 174-175; TE

Ill, p. 62]. Then Detective Warman got Mr. Burgan in a

bear hug, and with the assistance of Detective John

Winstead, who had since arrived at the collision acene,

handcuffs were put on him [R 124, TE II, p. 162; TE III,

pp. 62-63, 144-145]. Other officers were arriving at vari-

ous times after the collision [R 124, TE III, pp. 8-9, 27, 85,

153}.

Detective Warman leaned Mr. Burgan on the back of

the trunk and searched him for weapons and then placed

him in a car [R 124, TE III, pp. 63-64]. Detective Warman

had noticed blood on himself, and when he put Mr. Burgan

in a car he noticed that Mr. Burgan had a minor head

injury [R 124, TE II, p. 176; TE III, pp. 40, 66]. Mr.

Burgan told Defendant, Sergeant William P. Hanka, that

he was injured in the automobile collision [R 124, TE III,

p. 33). He also told Kentucky State Trooper Hess the

same thing [R 124, TE III, p. 95]. Detective Katherine

Felice of the Kentucky State Police noticed that Mr. Burgan

had blood on his head soon after he was taken out of the

Cutlass and before he was leaned on the rear of the car [R

124, TE III, pp. 94]. Also, Mr. Burgan would later tell

Detective Daniel Assef that he was injured in the collision

when he would be in his custody at Mr. Burgan’s residence

[R 124, TE III, p. 155], and he would likewise tell the

5

admitting nurse the same thing when ne would be taken

to a hospital to have his injury treated [R 124, TE II, p.

163; TE III, p. 175).

According to the testimony of the police officers, at no

time did any officer strike Mr. Burgan or Mr. Cox, nor did

any officer put a gun in Mr. Cox’s mouth [R 124, TE II, pp.

162-163; TE III, pp. 9, 37, 66, 74, 86, 96, 1384, 146-147, 154,

171-172, 176].

Mr. Burgan told the officers that he had taken the

marijuana out of the trunk and left it at this house, so that

was their next destination [R 124, TE III, pp. 34, 67, 146-

147, 171-172]. The officers searched the house and found

three of the five bags of marijuana in the kitchen [R 124,

TE II, pp. 35, 67, 147-148].

A neighbor alerted the officers that she had seen some-

one running through a field behind the house with some

bags, and the officers found the other two bags of mari-

juana in the field [R 124, TE III, pp. 11, 69, 148]. Accord-

ing to the testimony of the police officers, at no time did

anyone strike or choke Mr. Burgan [R 124, TE III, pp. 37-

38, 75, 86, 149, 157, 173, 176].

Detectives Treadway and Winstead took Mr. Burgan

back to a hospital in Louisville for treatment of his head

injury [R 124, TE III, p. 149, 173]. Many hours later, they

took him to Jefferson County Jail [R 124, TE III, p. 175].

Detectives Assef and Warman returned to the automobile

collision scene to pick up Mr. Cox and took him back to

Jefferson County Jail [R 124, TE III, pp. 69-70, 158].

At trial, Mr. Cox entered into evidence a T-shirt with

footprints on it, which he claimed he was wearing the night

of his arrest [R 124, TE I, pp. 105-107]. On cross-examina-

tion it was shown that he had exclusive possession of the

shirt from June 20, 1990 until March or April of 1991 [R

124, TE I, p. 110]. In fact, he was not even wearing a shirt

6

that night [R 124, TE II, p. 152; TE III, pp. 72, 83, 125,

135).

On cross-examination, it was shown that Mr. Sprigg,

the informant, did in fact know why the police were inves-

tigating him, in contradiction to what he had claimed on

direct [R 124, TE II, p. 81]. It was also brought out that

Mr. Sprigg bore ill feelings towards the police and Detec-

tive Treadway in particular. He felt betrayed by the police

when they arrested his friend Jeff Elder; he felt that the

police had agreed not to arrest Mr. Elder [R 124, TE II, pp.

82-83]. Mr. Sprigg also felt that the prosecutors had prom-

ised he would get paid for his participation, yet he did not

get paid [R 124, TE II, pp. 84-85]. Furthermore, he be-

lieved that Detective Treadway had stolen from him [R

124, TE II, p. 91].

Detective Treadway, when being questioned at trial,

did not, as is asserted in appellants’ brief, admit to lying

before the grand jury in the criminal case. Rather, he

explained to counsel that when testifying before a grand

jury a witness is allowed to use hearsay. He explained

that the apparent discrepancy in his testimony was ex-

plained by this difference in evidentiary standards [R 124,

TE III, p. 13].

Mark Chandler and Keith Kamenish were called as

rebuttal witnesses. Mr. Chandler, who had been a Com-

monwealth Attorney associated with the criminal case, tes-

tified that Wayne Sprigg never complained to him about

excessive force [R 124, TE III, p. 183]. Mr. Sprigg had

claimed to have done so during his testimony [R 124, TE

II, p. 38]. Mr. Kamenish, the Commonwealth Attorney

who took over when Mr. Chandler left the criminal case,

testified that Mr. Sprigg never complained about excessive

force, but that he had expressed a hatred of Detective

Treadway [R 124, TE III, p. 188].

7

B. CORRECTION OF MISSTATEMENTS IN THE PETITION

Pursuant to United States Supreme Court Rule 15.1,

respondents bring the following misstatements of facts con-

tained in the petition to the Court’s attention.

In the Proceedings Below (Petition at 13), Petitioners

misrepresent to this Court the contents of the note signed

by some of the jurors. As they have done all through these

appellate proceedings, petitioners continue to selectively

quote from the note only that portion which appears to aid

their cause. The note reads in its entirety as follows:

To Judge Rubin,

Some jurors feel that something definitely happened

6-20-90. However, the preponderance of evidence was

not sufficient to render a decision for the plaintiff.

Petitioners also misrepresent (Petition at 14) that one

judge on the Court of Appeals would have reversed be-

cause of the refusal of the trial judge to instruct on unnec-

essary force. Judge Moore, in fact, would have required

what she termed the Fourth Amendment post-restraint

instruction in addition to the instruction actually given to

the jury.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

1.

THE PETITIONERS HAVE NOT PRESENTED A SPECIAL

AND IMPORTANT QUESTION.

A Writ of Certiorari is not a matter of right, but of

sound judicial discretion, and will be granted only where

there are special and important reasons therefor. SCR

10(1). “Special and important reasons” within this Rule

relate to problems beyond the academic or episodic, espe-

cially where the issues involved reach constitutional pro-

portions. Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Iowa,

349 US 70 (1955). The principal reason for the Supreme

8

Court to use certiorari jurisdiction is to resolve conflicts

among circuit courts of appeals concerning the meaning of

provisions of federal law. Braxton v. United States, 500

US 344 (1991).

The issues presented by the petitioners do not rise to

this standard. The first concerns the writing of an instruc-

tion, and the second soncerns whether specific evidence

was admissible as a prior consistnet statement. In order

for the Sixth Circuit’s decision in this case to rise to “a

special and important reason”, there must be either a con-

flict with the decision of another federal court, or a situa-

tion where the circuit court has so far departed from the

accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings as to call

for an exercise of this Court’s power of supervision. SCR

10(1)(a). As discussed below, neither of petitioners’ pro-

posed issues involves matters in conflict with the federal

circuits, nor matters in which the Sixth Circuit has so far

departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial

proceedings.

Il.

THERE IS NO CONFLICT BETWEEN THE CIRCUITS

CONCERNING THE NECESSITY OF A POST-

RESTRAINT INSTRUCTION IN ADDITION TO THE

GRAHAM V. CONNOR EXCESSIVE FORCE

INSTRUCTION DURING THE COURSE OF AN

ARREST.

There is no conflict between the circuits on this issue

because the case was resolved by application of United

States Supreme Court case law.

In Graham v. Connor, 490 US 386 (1989), this Court

made it clear that “all claims that law enforcement officers

have used excessive force — deadly or not — in the course

of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other ‘seizure’ of a free

citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth Amendment

and its ‘reasonableness’ standard.”

9

l

What Petitioners are now attempting to do, is to trans-

form their claims from one involving their apprehension,

detention and arrest into a cla... solely of custodial inter-

rogation. While Petitioners assert that their claims are

most closely analogous to those of plaintiffs who allege

that their civil rights have been violated by physical abuse

during custodial interrogation, the facts of this case do not

support such an assertion.

All of the alleged acts by the Respondents occurred in a

continuous incident during the early morning hours of 20

June, 1990 in rural Henry County, Kentucky and before

the Petitioners were transported to either the hospital or

jail by some of the arresting officers.

Of the cases cited by petitioners in support of their

assertion, four are clearly distinguishable by their facts to

Petitioners situation. Ware v. Reed, 709 F.2d 345 (5th Cir

1983) involved the interrogation of the plaintiff at the po-

lice station; Gray v. Spillman, 925 F.2d 90 (4th Cir 1991)

involved plaintiffs interrogation while confined in jail; Cox

v. County of Suffolk, 780 F.Supp. 103 (E.D.N.Y. 1991) in-

volved questioning of the plaintiff at the police station;

and Cohen v. Coahoma County, Miss., 805 F.Supp. 398

(N.D.Miss. 1992) involved interrogation of plaintiff by the

sheriff while a prisoner in jail.

Even Petitioners must admit that their claims do not

arise out of facts even remotely similar to those in the

“ted cases. The whole of the events alleged by Petitioners

ocurred in the early morning hours in rural Henry County,

Keatucky during the course of the pursuit, apprehension

am arrest of the petitioners, and not in the controlled

asmmosphere of a jail or police station.

Two other cases cited by petitioners were decided be-

fore Graham, but both use “reasonableness”, as later

adopted by Graham, as the deciding standard.

10

In Lewis v. Downs, 774 F.2d 711 (6th Cir 1985), the

Sixth Circuit, analyzing the case under the due process

provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment, held that the

unprovoked and unnecessary striking of a handcuffed indi-

vidual, who was of no danger whatsoever, was unreason-

able and clearly excessive.

In McDowell v. Rogers, 863 F.2d 1302 (6th Cir. 1988),

the Sixth Circuit, citing to Robins v. Harum, 773 F.2d

1004 (9th Cir 1985), held:

“the seizure that occurs when a person is arrested

continues throughout the time the person remains in

the custody of the arresting officers, and therefore,

there was no need to look beyond the Fourth Amend-

ment in determining whether the plaintiff made out a

jury case.”

As Judge Ryan said in this case:

“Any claim alleging a violation of the Fourth Amend-

ment must include an inquiry into the reasonableness

of the action taken.

And, contrary to petitioners’ assertion in their petition at

page 19 that there is a “bright line” between the process of

arrest, w! ‘ch eds with a susrect being handcuffed and

subdued, and tlie post-restra*’: stage, Judge Ryan went.

on to say:

Graham’s “in the course of an arrest” requirement

does not have an inherent ending point. The determi-

nation when an arrest ends and “custody” begins is a

question that must be answered by looking at the to-

tality of the circumstances of each case.”

Speaking of McDowell, Judge Ryan said:

“However, the court in McDowell was not crystallizing

the facts of that case to transform them into a per se

Fourth Amendment rule. Rather, the court explicitly

engaged in a “reasonableness” inquiry and determined

that the force applied in that particular case was un-

reasonable.”

11

While Judge Moore would have givey:, :a addition to

the Graham excessive force instruction, 4 post-restraint

instruction based upon her determination ‘nat this case

involved both »re-arrest and post-restrair: conduct, the

majority of ise ,ane! held that the course of arrest had not

ended and, thus, only the Graham excessive force instruc-

tion was required.

In any event, given the evidence and instructions pre-

sented to the jury’, the petitioners could have argued their

theory of the case; and distinguished between the alleged

pre-arrest and post-arrest events. Had the jury believed

that petitioners had produced a preponderance of evidence

to support any portion of their case, it could have found for

the petitioners.

The court having held that the course of arrest contin-

ued throughout the events complained of by petitioners,

there is no conflict between the holding of the appellate

court in this case and the holdings in other circuits; and

the petition herein should be denied.

Il.

THIS COURT’S SUPERVISORY ROLE IS NOT CALLED

INTO QUESTION BY THE APPELLATE COURT'S

DECISION WITH REGARD TO THE STATEMENTS

BY THE -“.XLICE INFORMANT.

Petitioners’ second offered ground for granting their

petition is net one which is subject to this Court’s exercise

of its supervisory authority over the lower federal courts.

The supervisory power of this Court serves the two-fold

purpose of deterring illegality and protecting judicial in-

tegrity. United State v. Payne, 447 US 727 (1980). Nei-

ther of these purposes is served by petitioners’ offered

ground.

Petitioners do not contend that either the trial court or

appellate court acted illegally, nor do they contend that

the integrity of the judiciary is at stake by the evidentiary

12

ruling of the trial court. They simply contend that the

trial court’s ruling was erroneous [Petition at 27].

As in James v. Keniucky, 466 US 341 (1984), the super-

visory power of this Court has been exercised in those

cases involving evidence issues when the constitutional

rights of a party are involved. See Doyle v. Ohio, 426 US

610 (1976) and United States v. Hale, 422 US 171 (1975),

in which this Court held that a defendant’s exercise of this

Fifth Amendment right to remain silent could not be used

to impeach his trial testimony; and McNabb v. United

States, 318 US 332 (1943), in which it was held that fed-

eral courts may use their supervisory power to exclude

evidence taken by “willful disobedience of law’.

The supervisory power of this Court has also been ex-

ercised in those instances involving the practices and pro-

cedures of the lower federal courts.

In Frazier v. Heebe, 482 US 641 (1987), this Court used

its supervisory powers to hold invalid a federal district

court rule relating to admission to district court bar to

insure that local rules are consistent with principles of

right and justice; and in Young v. U.S. ex rel. Vuitton et

Fils S.A., 481 US 787 (1987) held that the supervisory

power of this Court is especially appropriate in determina-

tion of procedures to be used by courts to enforce orders, a

subject that directly concerns functioning of the judiciary.

The issue sought to be raised by petitioners in this case

is not one that impacts the constitutional rights of the

petitioners, nor does it go to the practices and procedures

of the lower federal courts. Petitioners are simply com-

plaining of a fact specific evidentiary ruling that went

against them; and the petition herein should be denied.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons set forth above, the writ of certiorari |

should be denied.

nd

13

Respectfully submitted,

WinsTOon E. KING

Counsel of record for Respondents

Senior Attorney

City of Louisville

Rm. 200, City Hall

601 West Jefferson Street

Louisville, KY 40202

(502) 574-3511