Petition for Writ of Certiorari — Ventetoulo v. DeWitt

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Cypreme Court, U.S.

TLE D

9 31339 FEB 2 21994

No. _ofFick OF THE CLERK

In The

Supreme Court of thc United States

October Term, 1993

¢

DONALD VENTETOULO, ACTING DIRECTOR,

DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,

Petitioner,

VS.

FRED DEWITT,

Respondent.

4

Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The First Circuit

*

PETITION FOR WRIT OF CERTIORARI

¢

JerFReEY B. PINE

Attorney General of the

State of Rhode Island

ANNIE GOLDBERG*

Assistant Attorney General

72 Pine St.

Providence, RI 02903

(401) 274-4400

Attorneys for Petitioner

*Attorney of Record

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

7

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVI*}\%

WHERE A STATE TRIAL JUDGE HAS REDUCE#? A SEN-

TENCE IN VIOLATION OF STATE LAW, ANL* WHERE

THE ILLEGAL RI JUCTION IS LATER CORRECTED

PURSUANT TO A STATE PROCEDURAL RULE PERMIT-

TING CORRECTION OF AN ILLEGAL SENTENCE “AT

ANY TIME,” DID THE UNITED STATES COURT OF

APPEALS OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT ERR IN GRANTING

RELIEF PURSUANT “°O 28 U.S.C. § 2254 BASED UPON

THE CONCLUSION THAT THE STATE PRISONER HAD

ACQUIRED A “DUE PROCESS” RIGHT IN HIS ILLE-

GALLY REDUCED SENTENCE?

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ............ i

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES CITED.................. iii

CITATION TO ORINIONS BELOW................. l

oi le age 6) ie ere werrer Serer er reer se 1

CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVI-

SIONS. TIVO GFP 5s vo k. i008 Crh ds eee erins eres 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE «0. 00 ccccccecreacts cnes 3

Py esd) | Ae Premera ae ears ys a eae 7

A. THE DUE PROCESS RULE ANNOUNCED BY

THE FIRST CIRCUIT HAS NO BASIS IN LAW

AND REPRESENTS SUCH A DEPARTMENT

FROM ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES GOVERN-

ING CORRECTION OF VOID OR ILLEGAL

SENTENCES AS TO CALL FOR REVIEW. ... 9

B. IN OVERTURNING THE IMPOSITION OF A

LEGAL STATE SENTENCE THE COURT OF

APPEALS HAS TRANSGRESSED THE

BOUNDS OF PROPER JURISDICTION UNDER

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES CITED

Page

CONSTITUTIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES:

ice a's dle sn'e.s0 e060 nde Fe bes ba peas 19

een acaveveerescceucees, 1

ee ein eke de¥decedaurebepeer’ 1

NS ice. pve 's wiete «eh 4's a8. e's 1, 4 5, 16, 19, 22

et Es a sve sh cb ae be 6 ov.cencceKeves 3, 11, 20

ee Ss RUD OR BAP ROPER ee Acces cesevdewvcvebers sd

ee Os co resect veeserencenesseaxeh 5

Oh RED, css veces seeveveesvveteuess 5

ee a 0 EE CED ys tev ecacesyesdvendesede 5

Pee Sy Se GUS Bo OO oo vc nerve ecevecesveres 2, 4, 11

Ee a i 2, 14

TE EE MD Sy se ake hts tee eexevecessveaves 1,9

Eo oir 5s ek bso ¥ eso cackaeivieeae ows ]

UNiteD States SUPREME Court Cases:

Andrews v. United States, 373 U.S. 334 (1963) ........ 1]

Bozza v. United States, 330 U.S. 160 (1946)........... 10

Brecht v. Abrahamson, __ U.S. __, 113 S.Ct. 1710

ee ey oi ada es § 6s OOLNOO OEE Noe eee 18

Estelle v. McGuire, ___ U.S. __, 112 S.Ct. 475 (1991) .... 19

Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422 (1983)............ 18

Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359 (1983) .............. 21

Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97 (1934)........... 18

United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117 (1980) ..19, 20

iV

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES CITED — Continued

Unirep Strares Courts oF Arrears CAses:

9 #.2d 95, 101 (Ist Cir.), cert.

Breest v. Helgemoe, 5

eee re 7, 10,

7

denied, 439 U.S. 3

Burns v. United States, 552 F.2d 828 (8th Cir. 1977) ....

DeWitt v. Ventetoulo, 6 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 1993)... 1

Laycock v. State of New Mexico, 880 F.2d 1184 (10tn

Ct) SEs Sau vu ea ORO R TENOR eee ees

Llerena v. United States, 508 F.2d 78 (5th Cir. 1975) ....

McNutt v. Schneckloth, 421 F.2d 128 (9th Cir. 1957) ....

Safrit v. Garrison, 623 F.2d 330 (4th Cir. 1980) .......

Shields v. Beto, 370 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1967) .. 14,

Thompson v. United States, 495 F.2d 1304 (1st Cir.

fe) SS eee ee oe rer rere ee eT SE eee ee

United States v. Adair, 826 F.2d 104 (11th Cir. 1987) ....

United States v. Ames, 743 F.2d 46, 47 (1st Cir. 1984)

cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1165 (1985) ere Te eee eee ee

United States v. Arrellano-Rios, 799 F.2d 520 (9th

| rr errr ee rrr re rere ee

United States v. Becker, 536 F.2d 471 (1st Cir. 1976)....

United States v. Bentley, 850 F.2d 327 (7th Cir.) cert.

cM RB | Be en ee eae

United States v. Bynoe, 562 F.2d 126 (1st Cir. 1977) ....

Page

13,

, 7,

11

12

Vv

= i @

Pap.

we

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES CITED — Continued

~~

Page

United States v. Crawford, 769 F.2d 253 (5th Cir.

prea cree tity Sn REN per eran, sleet. Se ARB). 20

United States v. De Los Santos-Himitola, 924 F.2d

See Ce Ge CE casks sn ek oo eee eee 12

United States v. Fogel, 829 F.2d 77 (D.C. Cir. 1987) .... 12

Llnited States v. Guevremont, 829 F.2d 423 (3d Cir.

Ws Hh cide wines teehee vie 11, 20

United States v. Lewis, 862 F.2d 748 (9th Cir. 1988)

cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1032 (1989)... 00... cceccecce: 12

United States v. Lundien, 769 F.2d 981 (4th Cir.

Sa a tara en PEN aay PUPP SEL rey test Pet Digs. - of een (a 13

United States v. Ortega, 859 F.2d 327 (5th Cir. 1988) .... 13

United States v. Rico, 902 F.2d 1065 (2d Cir. 1990)

cert. denied, 498 U.S. 943 (1990)................ 3, 32

United States v. Villano, 816 F.2d 1448 (10th Cir.

OT Ba eek ve eels eked Oe de Eee 14

United States v. Welty, 426 F.2d 615 (3d Cir. 1970).... 11

Unitep States District Court Cases:

Clifton v. Beto, 298 F.Supp. 1384 (D.Tex. 1968) ....... 16

DeWitt v. Ventetoulo, 803 F.Supp. 580 (D.R.I.

PES «ik ok oe eee ore eee Choe eee 1, 7, 14

Lanier v. Williams, 361 F.Supp. 944 (D.N.C. 1973) .... 15

Sterling v. Maggio, 505 F.Supp. 1111 (D.La. 1981) .... 16

United States ex. rel. Hanrahan v. Bosse, 547 F.Supp.

Fe Biers cael eek Meera tae 21

vi

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES CITED - Continued

Page

RHODE IsLAND CAses:

State v. DeWitt, 423 A.2d 828 (R.I. 1980).............. 4

State v. DeWitt, 557 A.2d 845 (R.I. 1989)............ 1, 6

State v. O'Rourke, 463 A.2d 1328 (R.I. 1983). .4, 5, 11, 13

OTHER State Cases:

Bonner v. Brock, 610 P.2d 265 (Okl.Cr. 1980) ......... 15

People v. Cavelli, 50 N.Y.2d 919, 431 N.Y.S.2d 450,

Br Pee Se SIMRO) oceania seceesevestererbeees 16

State v. Acuna, 103 N.M. 279, 705 P.2d 685 (1985) .... 14

State v. Breest, 116 N.H. 734, 367 A.2d 1320 (1976) ...7, 8

State v. Delmondo, 67 Haw. 531, 696 P.2d 344 (1985) .... 14

State v. Sheehy, 115 N.H. 175, 337 A.2d 348 (1975) .... 17

OrHeER AUTHORITIES CITED:

Te AAR. GR C19 & Sapp.) ..0 ec entncevesveeeenns 12

:

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Now comes Donald Ventetuolo,! Former Acting

Director of the Rhode Island Department of Corrections

[hereinafter referred to as the State], by his attorneys, and

prays that this Honorable Court issue a Writ pf Certiorari

to review the decision of the United State# Court of

Appeals for the First Circuit entered October +1993.

*

CITATION TO OPINIONS BELOW

The decision of a three-judge panel of the Court of

Appeals is reported as DeWitt v. Ventetoulo, 6 F.3d 32 (1st

Cir. 1993), reproduced as Appendix A. The opinion of thé

District Court for the District of Rhode Island is reported

as DeWitt v. Ventetoulo, 803 F.Supp. 580 (D.R.I. 1992). The

opinion of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island is found in

State v. DeWitt, 557 A.2d 845 (R.I. 1989).

¢

JURISDICTION

The judgment of the United States Court of Appeals

entered on October 6, 1993. A petition for Rehearing and

Suggestion for Reconsideration En Banc was denied

November 22, 1993. The Order Denying Petition is repro-

duced as Appendix B. Jurisdiction is invoked under 28

U.S.C. §§ 1254(1), 1257, and 2254, and Sup. Ct. R. 10.1 (a)

and (c).

' The correct spelling of the surname. The caption and

citations retain the spelling maintained by the courts below.

CONSTITUTIONAL ANW STATUTORY

PROVISIONS INVOLVED

The constitutional issue in this case was decided

under the Due Process clause of Section 1 of the Four-

teenth Amendment to the United States Constitution,

which provides in pertinent part:

No State shall make or enforce any law

which shall abridge the privileges or immunities

of citizens of the United States; nor shall any

State deprive any person of life, liberty, or prop-

erty, without due process of law; nor deny to

any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-

tection of the laws.

The constitutional application of a state procedural

rule is called into question, R.I. Super. R. Crim. P. 35:

The court may correct an illegal sentence at

any time. The court may correct a sentence

imposed in an illegal manner and it may reduce

any sentence within one hundred twenty (120)

days after the sentence is imposed, or within

one hundred twenty (120) days after receipt by

the court of a mandate of the Supreme Court of

Rhode Island issued upon affirmance of the

judgment or dismissal of the appeal, or within

one hundred twenty (120) days after receipt by

the court of a mandate or order of the Supreme

Court of the United States issued upon affir-

mance of the judgment, dismissal of the appeal,

or denial of a writ of certiorari. Within twenty

(20) days after the filing of a motion to reduce a

sentence, the attorney general may file a motion

for an increase in said sentence. The court on its

own motion, after the filing of a motion to

reduce a sentence, may increase said sentence.

The court may reduce a sentence, the execution

of which has been suspended, upon revocation

of probation.

Also involved is a Rhode Island Statute, R.I. Gen.

Laws § 12-19-10:

Imprisonment pursuant to a sentence, once

commenced, shall not be subject to suspension

by the superior court.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

‘This case presents a decision apparently in conflict

with decisions of other United States courts of appeals

and other state courts, on a question not heretofore

directly addressed by this Honorable Court: whether cor-

rection of an illegal sentence under a state procedural

rule providing, like former Federal Rule 35,? for the cor-

rection of Such “at any time” may violate due process if

the prisoner has already attained his liberty.

The decision of the Court of Appeals for the First

Circuit, answering the question affirmatively, not only

declares the State’s rule in effect unconstitutional, but in

granting relief, negates a sentence upheld by the Supreme

Court of Rhode Island and orders the release of a state

prisoner according to an estimate of due process never

before recognized by this Court, and in — conflict

2 Until its revision in 1985, Fed. R. Crim. P. 35 provided in

pertinent part: “The court may correct an illegal sentence at any

time and may correct a sentence imposed in an illegal manner

within the time provided herein for the reduction of sentence.”

[Emphasis added.]

| | |

with decisions of this Court in cases arising under 28

U.S.C. § 2254.

Frederick DeWitt is a state prisoner sentenced origi-

nally to life imprisonment and concurrent lesser terms for

robbery, arson, and assault with intent to murder. The

convictions were affirmed on direct appeal, State v. DeW

itt. 423 A.2d 828 (R.1. 1980), and thereafter, DeWitt moved

for reduction of his sentence under Rule 35 of the Rhode

Island Rules of Criminal Procedure. The motion was

granted in 1981 and the sentence was reduced by sus-

pending all but fifteen years of the life sentence, with

twenty years’ probation to commence upon release.

DeWitt was by then already serving his sentences,

however; and according to Rhode Island statute, R.I.

Gen. Laws § 12-19-10, “|ijJmprisonment pursuant to a

sentence, once commenced,” is “not . . . subject to suspen-

sion by the superior court.”

The Rhode Island Rules of Criminal Procedure were

adopted after enactment of the statute. That the statutory

prohibition would be taken to limit the power of the

court under Rule 35 was not established until the

Supreme Court of Rhode Island decided State v. O'Rourke,

463 A.2d 1328 (R.1. 1983), two years after the reduction of

sentence in this case. With O'Rourke, the court held that

Rule 35 had no effect on the statute’s meaning or applica-

tion and that § 12-19-10 imposed a restriction “which, by

its plain language, absolutely prohibits suspension of a

sentence of imprisonment once it is commenced.” Id. at

1331 [emphasis added]. Attempt to reduce O’Rourke’s

sentence by suspending half was “invalid because, pur-

suant to § 12-19-10, the trial justice lacked the authority to

eee nen ks

suspend any part of defendant’s sentence once he began

serving the period of imprisonment.” Id. at 1332

[emphasis added]. The court ordered the ruling reducing

O’Rourke’s sentence vacated as “null and void” and

directed that the original senten-e be “reinstated with

credit for time already served.” Id.

O’Rourke’s effect was not widely realized, and DeWitt

continued to be viewed by the Parole Board and correc-

tional staff as eligible for parole on his reduced fifteen-

year sentence, not the original life sentence.* According

to this estimate DeWitt became eligible for parole in

August 1985, but the Parole Board denied his first appli-

cation. One year later, in September 1986, a majority of

the board voted for parole with release date in January

1987. DeWitt was released January 16, 1987, and was

rearrested July 20 of the same year.

On information submitted in the criminal complaints

against DeWitt in the circumstances leading to his arrest,

the Rhode Island Attorney General filed a notice of intent

under state procedural rules to present DeWitt as a viola-

tor of the terms of his probation and to revoke his sus-

pended sentence.* That action was withdrawn when it

> R.I. GEN. LAWS § 13-8-9 provides for parole of “any

prisoner whose sentence is subject to its control, unless such

prisoner be sentenced to imprisonment for life, and unless such

prisoner be confined as an habitual criminal” once he has

served “not less than one-third of the term for which he was

sentenced.” R.I. GEN. LAWS § 13-8-13 provides for parole eligi-

bility on a life sentence after ten years.

+ R.I. Super. R. Crim. P. 32 (f) provides: ” the court shall not

revoke probation or revoke a suspension of sentence or impose

a sentence previously deferred except after a hearing at which

was realized the suspension was invalid under O'Rourke.

The State then moved to correct the illegal sentence. The

motion was granted. DeWitt appealed to the Supreme

Court, claiming among other peirts that it was “funda-

mentally unfair” to allow his ea:’y freedom, “only to

have it taken away due to a misconception which was

nobody’s fault,” and arguing that the mistake should

have been discovered and rectified sooner, or else

allowed to stand, because by then he had developed an

“expectation in the finality of that sentence,” valid or not.

The Supreme Court of Rhode Island rejected those

arguments, but remanded the case for reconsideration of

the Rule 35 motion to reduce the life sentence by lawful

means. State v. DeWitt, 557 A.2d 845 (R.I. 1989). The

sentencing justice refused to reduce the life sentence. No

appeal was taken from that decision.

Some twenty months later, DeWitt filed a pro se peti-

tion in the United States District Court for the District of

Rhode Island, seeking habeas corpus relief under 28

U.S.C. § 2254. The District Court initially dismissed the

petition under Rule 4 of the Rules Governing Section 2254

Cases in the United States District Courts, and a certifi-

cate of probable cause to appeal was denied February 5,

1991. The Court of Appeals for the First Circuit reversed

and remanded the case March 14, 1991. The District Court

the defendant shall be afforded the opportunity to be present

and apprised of the grounds on which such action is proposed.

The defendant may be admitted to bail pending such hearing.

Prior to the hearing the State shall furnish the defendant and the

court with a written statement specifying the grounds upon

which action is sought under this subdivision.”

directed the Attorney General of Rhode Island to answer

as designated party respondent. A hearing was con-

ducted in May 1992, and the petition was granted Octo-

ber 20, 1992. DeWitt v. Ventetoulo, 803 F. Supp. 580 (D.R.I.

1992). The State appealed. The Court of Appeals affirmed.

DeWitt v. Ventetoulo, 6 F.3d 32 (1st Cir. 1993). A petition

for rehearing and for hearing en banc was denied

November 22, 1993. App. A. Mandate issued on Novem-

ber 30, 1993.

ARGUMENT

With this case the First Circuit declares as a rule,

what at first it merely mused in Breest v. Helgemoe, 579

F.2d 95, 101 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 933 (1978), that

After a substantial period of time, . . . it might

be fundamentally unfair, and thus violative of

due process for a court to alter even an illegal

sentence in a way which frustrates a prisoner’s

expectations. . .

Breest involved a state defendant sentenced to life

imprisonment without certification by the court that the

murder was psycho-sexual in nature, which under state

law carried a mandatory minimum term of forty years;

his minimum sentence as pronounced would have made

him parole-eligible after eighteen. State v. Breest, 116 N.H.

734, 753, 367 A.2d 1320, 1335 (1976). The error was dis-

covered within days and the sentence was corrected with

certification some three weeks later on motion of the

State. Id. Breest attacked the resentencing unsuccessfully

on appeal, Id. at 753-54, 367 A.2d at 1335-36, and then

sought federal habeas corpus relief, 579 F.2d at 97. The

District Court ruled that application of the enhancement

statute “violated neither the double jeopardy nor the ex

post facto clauses” but that due process required a hear-

ing to establish that the murder was in fact psycho-sexual

in nature, a ruling the State did not contest. Id. at 97-98.

The Court of Appeals affirmed, agreeing that the sen-

tence as pronounced was statutorily invalid, id. at 99,

even though Breest “could have been lawfully

imprisoned under a life sentence imposed without refer-

ence to” the statute, because the law imposed a duty to

determine whether the crime was psycho-sexual “and if it

was, to so certify.” Id. at 99-100. The omission “left the

sentence incomplete and .. . potentially more lenient than

the statute permitted.” Id. [footnote omitted].

Although nothing more was required to decide the

case, the First Circuit undertook “[bJjefore leaving this

question” to remark its “concern that the power of a sentenc-

ing court to correct even a statutorily invalid sentence

must be subject to some temporal limit.” Id. at 101.

[Emphasis added.] It found it “need not decide, however,

how long or under what circumstances” a State or sen-

tencing court “constitutionally can wait to enhance an

invalid sentence”, as it found the “short period of time

involved” there clearly “permissible.” Id.

The First Circuit apparently believes it has answered

here, the question it reserved in Breest —- even though in

this case, the original sentence was neither invalid nor

enhanced, but merely reinstated, upon vacatur of a subse-

quent sentence reduced without authority.

A. THE DUE PROCESS RULE ANNOUNCED BY

THE FIRST CIRCUIT HAS NO BASIS IN LAW

AND REPRESENTS SUCH A DEPARTURE

FROM ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES GOVERN-

ING CORRECTION OF VOID OR ILLEGAL

SENTENCES AS TO CALL FOR REVIEW.

Review on Petition for a writ of certiorari will be

granted “only when there are special and important rea-

sons therefor”, as when a United States court .of appeals

has rendered a decision in conflict with that of another on

the same matter, or has decided a federal question in a

way in conflict with a state court of last resort, or has so

far departed from the accepted and usual course of judi-

cial proceedings as to call for an exercise of this Court's

power of supervision. Sup. Ct. R. 10.1 (a).

The decision of the United States Court of Appeals

for the First Circuit granting habeas corpus relief in this

case not only directly overrules a decision of the Supreme

Court of Rhode Island in a matter involving application

of its own procedural rule to correct a void sentence, but

is in conflict as well with its own prior decisions and

those of other United States courts of appeals and other

state courts of last resort respecting the correction of

illegal sentences. The court bases this decision on an

announced standard of due process which it concedes

“cannot be calibrated precisely,” 6 F.3d at 36, “drawing on

considerations mentioned by cases like Breest and sug-

gested by common sense,” Id. at 35, which find no basis

in any other decision of a court of law. The result requires

Rhode Island to release its prisoner based on an illegal

sentence.

10

A void sentence is recognized to be of no legal effect

and to require correction. In Bozza v. United States, 330

U.S. 160 (1946), amendment of a sentence to add “mini-

mum mandatory fines and penalties” required by statute

in addition to imprisonment was attacked as constituting

“double jeopardy forbidden by the Federal Constitution.”

Id. at 165-66. This Court rejected the contention, observ-

ing, “It is well established that a sentence which does not

comply with the letter of the criminal statute which

authorizes it is so erroneous that it may be set aside”, “at

least during the term of court in which the invalid sen-

tence was imposed”, “even though the prisoner had

already served part of his term[.]” Id. at 166. Declared the

Court: “The Constitution does not require that sentencing

should be a game in which a wrong move by the judge

means immunity for the prisoner.” Id. at 166-67.

The First Circuit interpreted Bozza in Thompson v.

United States, 495 F.2d 1304, 1306 (1974), as follows:

The full import of Bozza is that a trial court not

only can alter a statutorily-invalid sentence in a

way which might increase its severity, but must

do so when that statute so provides. [Emphasis

by court.]

Likewise, in Breest, the Court repeated its under-

standing that Bozza “stands for the proposition” stated in

Thompson, adding:

Even after the defendant has commenced to

serve his sentence, that power and that obliga-

tion. continue.

579 F.2d at 99.

1]

Rule 35 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure

was adopted to abolish the “term rule” at common law

that left a court “in general without power to set aside or

modify its criminal judgment after the expiration of the

term at which it was entered.” United States v. Welty, 426

F.2d 615, 617 & nn.8 & 9 (3d Cir. 1970) (citing Linited States

v. Mayer, 235 U.S. 55, 67-69 (1914), and Heflin v. United

States, 358 U.S. 415, 421 (1959) (Stewart, J., concurring)).

Until its revision in 1985, Rule 35 “provide[d] in pertinent

part as follows: ‘The court may correct an illegal sentence

at any time.’ ” Andrews v. United States, 373 U.S. 334, 337

n.4 (1963). [Emphasis added.] Rhode Island’s Rule 35 “is

essentially the same as its federal counterpart,” State v.

O'Rourke, 463 A.2d at 1331, providing for correction of an

illegal sentence “at any time.”

Like other United States courts of appeals,® the First

Circuit has acknowledged the literal effect of the rule in

© See, e.g., United States v. Rico, 902 F.2d 1065, 1067 (2d Cir.

1990) (“As reflected in former Rule 35(a), under common law a

district court was free at any time to correct sentences when the

judgment was ‘void,’ because these sentences were invalid and

not final dispositions”), cert. denied sub nom. Baron v. United

States, 498 U.S. 943 (1990); United States v. Guevremont, 829 F.2d

423, 427 (3d Cir. 1987) (reduced sentence was illegal and “may

be corrected by the district court at any time”); Safrit v. Garrison,

623 F.2d 330, 332 (4th Cir. 1980) (citing Breest: “It is clear, of

course, that a void or illegal sentence may be corrected, even

though the correction may result in an increase”); Llerena v.

United States, 508 F.2d 78, 81 (5th Cir. 1975) (when court dis-

covers it has entered a sentence that does not conform to statute,

it has a duty to correct the sentence even though service of

sentence has begun); United States v. Bentley, 850 F.2d 327, 328

(7th Cir.) (nothing prevented district court from correcting ille-

gal sentence under version of Rule 35(a) then in effect, by resen-

tencing), cert. denied, 488 U.S. 970 (1988); Burns v. United States,

12

~

its prior decisions. See, e.g., United States v. Ames, 743 F.2d

46, 47 (1984) (per curiam) (“sentencing court may correct

an ‘illegal sentence’ at any time”), cert. denied, 469 U.S.

1165 (1985); United States v. De Los Santos-Himitola, 924

F.2d 380, 382 (1991) (applicable version of Rule 35

empowered district court “ ‘at any time’ to correct ille-

galities in sentences” for offenses committed during cov-

ered period); United States v. Bynoe, 562 F.2d 126, 129

(1977) (“A court may always correct an illegal sentence”

[emphasis added]); United States v. Becker, 536 F.2d 471,

472 (1976) (“an ‘illegal sentence’ is correctable by a court

‘at any time’ ”).

552 F.2d 828, 831 (8th Cir. 1977) (when sentence does not con-

form to statute, “it is a nullity, and, as such, may be corrected at

any time” in such case, “the district court has the duty to set

aside what it had no authority to do and to correct the sentence

so as to comply with the statute, even though service of the

sentence originally imposed has begun and the correct sentence

is regarded to be more onerous”); United States v. Lewis, 862 F.2d

748, 750 (9th Cir. 1988) (“Under Rule 35, the district court can

‘correct an illegal sentence at any time.’ ”), cert. denied, 489 U.S.

1032 (1989); Laycock v. State of New Mexico, 880 F.2d 1184, 1188

(10th Cir. 1989) (amending sentence to conform to statutory

requirement proper under state law); United States v. Adair, 826

F.2d 1040, 1041 (11th Cir. 1987) (per curiam) (sentence illegally

reduced under initial Rule 35 motion properly corrected on

revocation of probation); United States v. Fogel, 829 F.2d 77, 90

(D.C. Cir. 1987) (on discovering defect, court was free to correct

sentence to extent necessary to bring the sentence into compli-

ance with statute). See also McNutt v. Schneckloth, 241 F.2d 128,

129 (9th Cir. 1957) (per curiam) (agreeing with state supreme

court “that when a sentence has been imposed for which there is

no authority in law, the trial court has the power and the duty to

expunge the void sentence and pronounce legal sentence, when-

ever the defect is discovered.”); Annot., 28 A.L.R.4th 147-74

(1984 & Supp.).

13

In holding otherwise in this case, DeWitt v. Ven-

tetoulo, 6 F.3d 32, the First Circuit has chosen to disregard

Rhode Island’s statute and rule and to pronounce instead

that Rhode Island could not constitutionally correct its

illegal sentence under its rule permitting correction at

any time, because: (1) the State “took no appeal from” the

1981 decision reducing DeWitt’s life sentence, id. at 35; (2)

“there is no sign that Rhode Island had undertaken any

wide-scale program to identify and resentence those

whose earlier sentences were suspended in violation of

O'Rourke”, id.; and (3) the prisoner in this case “was

actually released” and “remained free” for seven months,

until his rearrest, before the suspension was recognized

to be void and was vacated. Id. Though the court

acknowledges “a number of cases including Breest itself”

where a corrected sentence has “been upheld against

constitutional or other challenges,” id. at 34 & n.3, and

though it concedes that, “in principle, there is no differ-

ence between such cases and a case like this one in which

a sentence is reduced and later, finding the reduction to

be unlawful, the court reinstates the original sentence”,

id., the First Circuit pronounces that the correction in

DeWitt’s case “is so unfair that it must be deemed incon-

sistent with fundamental notions of fairness embodied in

the Due Process Clause.” Id. at 35.

While a few courts, state and federal, have ques-

tioned, with the First Circuit, whether it “might” not be

“fundamentally unfair, and thus violative of due process”

in some circumstances, Breest, 579 F.2d at 101, for a court

to alter the status of a prisoner, see United States v. Lun-

dien, 769 F.2d 981, 987 (4th Cir. 1985); United States v. Rico,

902 F.2d 1065, 1068 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Ortega,

14

859 F.2d 327, 335 (5th Cir. 1988); United States v. Villano,

816 F.2d 1448, 1459 (10th Cir. 1987) (Logan, J., concur-

ring); State v. Delmondo, 67 Haw. 531, 533, 696 P.2d 344,

346 (1985); and State v. Acuna, 103 N.M. 279, 281, 705 P.2d

685, 687 (1985), cited in DeWitt v. Ventetoulo, 803 F.Supp. at

583; see also United States v. Arrellano-Rios, 799 F.2d 520,

525 n.3 (9th Cir. 1986) (“We note that courts have stated

that enhancement of a sentence after the defendant's

expectations in its length have ‘crystallized’ might be a

denial of due process.”), in none of these cases has a

court overturned the reinstatement of an original, legal,

sentence, on the ground that a prisoner had a due process

right to rely on the subsequent, void, reduction.

Courts considering due process in the context of a

change of status after passage of time have tended to look

for waiver on the part of the government that would bar

resumption of custody. For example, in Shields v. Beto, 370

F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1967), habeas corpus was granted after

the Court of Appeals found “more than 28 years of inac-

tion on the part of the State of Texas relative to the

unexpired term” of a defendant extradited to Louisiana

and released without a Texas detainer, who remained at

large from 1944 until 1960 when he was convicted in a

Tennessee federal court and transferred to Texas for trial

of a new felony. Id. at 1004. The court found Texas’s “lack

of interest” in Shields for 28 years “equivalent to a par-

don or commutation of his sentence and a waiver of

jurisdiction.” Id. at 1006. It held Texas therefore “lacked

authority to require Shields to complete service of the

sentences under the old 1933 convictions, which action

constituted a denial of due process under the Fourteenth

Amendment to the United States Constitution.” Id.

15

Lanier v. Williams, 361 F.Supp. 944 (D.N.C. 1973),

involved a prisoner mistakenly released in 1967, id. at

948, who remained free and in contact with the local

sheriff for nearly five years before being returned to

custody to complete service of sentences imposed in 1964,

id. at 946. In granting his petition for habeas corpus, the

District Court remarked that “|dl]iligent research” had

“vielded scant authorities on the issues presented”, id. at

947, but adopted “the waiver theory” of Shields v. Beto as

consistent with “the principle that a prisoner cannot be

required to serve his sentence in installments.” Id. Said

the court:

Once the state, through acts or omissions of its

officials, has led a person, through no fault of

his own, to believe that he is free of a prison

sentence, and makes no attempt for a prolonged

period of years to reacquire custody over him,

that person should be able to rely on the state’s

action or inaction and assume that further ser-

vice of the sentence will not be exacted of him.

The state should not later be heard to assert a

right of custody over the person whom it has so

misled, and to permit the state to do so offends

the Due Process Clause of the Constitution.

Id.

Lanier was relied on in Bonner v. Brock, 610 P.2d 265,

267-68 (Okl.Cr. 1980), where “five years passed without

the State’s showing any interest” in enforcing a three-

year sentence that the prisoner believed to have been

concluded pursuant to agreement with the district attor-

ney that a successor sought to nullify. Id. at 267. The court

concluded, “To fimda that the three year prison sentence

16

should be administered at this late date offends notions

of fundamental fairness and due process.” Id.

Courts following that analysis in other cases have

reached a contrary conclusion, depending on the facts. In

Clifton v. Beto, 298 F.Supp. 1384 (D.Tex. 1968), for exam-

ple, the district court distinguished Shields to hold that

although Texas, which in 1946 conditionally pardoned

defendant convicted in 1931 and 1932, had made no effort

to place a detainer against him on being notified in 1947

that he was to begin serving a federal sentence in

Arkansas, its inaction did not constitute a commutation

of sentence or waiver of jurisdiction, and did not render

its insistence in 1964 that he serve the remainder of his

1932 and 1933 sentences violative of due process. 298

F.Supp. at 1388. In affirming, 411 F.2d 1226, 1226 (5th Cir.

1969) (per curiam), the Court of Appeals found the Clifton

“a

facts “materially different” from those of Shields, noting:

“Texas did not surrender [Clifton] to another jurisdiction

and thereafter ‘lose interest in him’. To the contrary,

[Clifton] violated his Texas parole. . . . Thus he, not Texas,

was the efficient, moving cause of the delay now sought

to be invoked.” Id. See also Sterling v. Maggio, 505 F.Supp.

1111, 1113 (D.La. 1981) (mem.) (where prisoner was mis-

takenly released and state regained custody less than 18

months later, state did not waive jurisdiction nor show

such a lack of interest that it would be inconsistent with

fundamental principles of liberty and justice to require

him to serve sentence); People v. Cavelli, 50 N.Y.2d 919,

921, 431 N.Y.S.2d 450, 451, 409 N.E.2d 924, 925 (1980)

(mem.) (while court in certain cases may, as a matter of

due process, lose jurisdiction over a defendant either

because his sentence has been interrupted for a lengthy

17

period or because he has otherwise been subjected to

significant prejudice, it was not unreasonable as a matter

of law to require a defendant inadvertently released to

serve the balance of one-year sentence); State v. Sheehy,

115 N.H. 175, 337 A.2d 348 (1975) (while State cannot,

consistent with fundamental principles of justice pro-

tected by due process clause of the fourteenth amend-

ment, compel a parolee to serve out his sentence after the

State has manifested a gross disinterest in him, defendant

paroled in 1960 with express awareness that parole would

not terminate until 1985 could be required to serve 1945

sentence where facts surrounding parole and subsequent

arrests indicated New Hampshire maintained constant

interest).

The District Court in this case, as the First Circuit

court recognized, 6 F.3d at 34, “relied directly upon the

Due Process Clause as construed by this Court in Breest v.

Helgemoe {citations omitted].” “In Breest,” the court recal-

led, 6 F.3d at 35, “we said that notions of fundamental

fairness do place some temporal limit on later increases

in sentence, [citation omitted,] and the Fourth Circuit, in

Lundien, has endorsed this view.” Id.

The State submits the First Circuit has erred in this

case: (1) in viewing reinstatement of the original sen-

tence, after a void reduction, as a “later increase[] in

sentence”; (2) in interpreting due process in these circum-

stances to bar vacatur of the nullity; and (3) in creating

conflict among the Circuits, based solely on its own deci-

sion in Breest and its view of the Fourth Circuit decision

in Lundien, 769 F.2d at 987, by imposing a “temporal

limit” in this case on the power of a court to vacate a void

or illegal sentence.

ANON ne TN ee

18

B. IN OVERTURNING THE IMPOSITION OF A

LEGAL STATE SENTENCE THE COURT OF

APPEALS HAS TRANSGRESSED THE

BOUNDS OF PROPER JURISDICTION

UNDER § 2254.

As this Court has stated, “The role of habeas pro-

ceedings, while important in assuring that constitutional

rights are observed, is secondary and limited.” Brecht v.

Abrahamson, __ U.S. __, __, 113 S.Ct. 1710, 1719 (1993).

As it has also observed, “|A] state rule of law ‘does not

run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment because another

method may seem to our thinking to be fairer or wiser or

to give a surer promise of protection to the prisoner at the

bar.’ ” Marshall v. Lonberger, 459 U.S. 422, 438 n.6 (1983)

(quoting “the remark of Justice Cardozo in Snyder v.

Massachusetts,” 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1934)).

With its decision in this case, the First Circuit has

overturned a life sentence legally imposed by the State of

Rhode Island and affirmed by the State’s highest court,

and has ordered instead, that the prisoner serve a fifteen-

year sentence the Rhode Island Supreme Court has

declared a nullity because of its imposition in violation of

state law.

The First Circuit has decreed this, notwithstanding a

state procedural rule permitting the correction of an ille-

gal sentence “at any time”, because it has concluded that

the correction was not timely for purposes of the Due

Process Clause of the United States Constitution.

In reaching this conclusion, the court has disregarded

both the factual findings of the Supreme Court of Rhode

Island, and the stated intent of the sentencing judge, and

19

substituted its own view that the prisoner’s early release

on parole and remaining at large for seven months before

his rearrest worked him such prejudice that vacatur of his

illegal suspension was fundamentally unfair.

While it candidly admits to reaching this conclusion

“with diffidence because federal judges have no monop-

oly on wisdom in deciding what is unfair,” 6 F.3d at 36,

and though it acknowledges that no case brought to its

attention has reached the same result, id. at 34-36 & nn.3

& 5, the court expresses “confiden{ce] that this case is

very unusual and that our decision imposes no serious

constraint on state authorities who, unlike federal judges,

have the direct responsibility for the law-enforcement

and prosecutorial tasks at hand.” Id. at 36.

The jurisdiction of a federal court to countermand a

State in matters of state punishment is not broad enough

under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 to countenance such a result.

This Court has “ ‘defined the category of infractions

that violate “fundamental fairness” very narrowly.’ ”

Estelle v. McGuire, __ U.S. __, __, 112 S.Ct. 475, 482

(1991) (quoting Dowling v. United States, 493 US. 342, 32

(1990)). It has also held that, “ ‘Beyond the specific guar-

antees enumerated in the Bill of Rights, the Due Process

Clause has limited operation.’ ” Id.

If this Court could hold, in United States v. DiFran-

cesco, 449 U.S. 117, 136 (1980), that a federal defendant

whose sentence is contested by the government under 18

U.S.C. § 3576, “of course, is charged with knowledge of

the statute and its appeal provisions, and has no expecta-

tion of finality in his sentence until the appeal is con-

cluded or the time to appeal has expired” [emphasis

20

added], then it is submitted the defendant in this case

could not have had an expectation of finality in a sen-

tence subject to correction “at any time” if illegal. See

United States v. Crawford, 769 F.2d 253, 257 (5th Cir. 1985)

(“While DiFrancesco did not involve correction of an ille-

gal sentence within the meaning of Rule 35, its rationale,

in the constitutional sense, is applicable here. Defendant is

charged with knowledge that his sentence, if illegally imposed,

is subject to correction under Fed.R.Crim.P. 35(a).”

[Emphasis added.]})

Clearly this was not the kind of “extreme case” the

State “conceded at oral argument” would implicate the

Due Process Clause, 6 F.3d at 34, as where a defendant

released and allowed to remain at large for years with

nothing but “gross disinterest” by the State was snatched

back unexpectedly to serve an old sentence, see Shields v:

Beto. Nor is it the kind of “exceptional circumstance[]”

referred to by the court in United States v. Guevremont, 829

F.2d 423, 429 n.8 (3d Cir. 1987), “as where the defendant

has already completed service of the illegal sentence.”

The defendant in this case was still under the active

supervision of the Parole Board and was serving twenty

years’ probation imposed by the sentencing judge at the

time of reduction, as the First Circuit court acknowl-

edged. 6 F.3d at 36-37. Nothing in the record supports the

court’s remark that “DeWitt appears to have been singled

out primarily to relieve the state of the trouble of con-

ducting a parole revocation hearing.” Id. at 35. On the

contrary, revocation of parole in Rhode Island is not the

province of the courts, but solely of the Parole Board,

which did in fact revoke DeWitt’s parole. For the First

Circuit to hold that the superior court had no power to

vacate its own illegal fifteen-year sentence, leaving in

place the original, valid, life sentence — an action the

Court of Appeals calls “a judgment unlawfully reimposed

on DeWitt in violation of the Constitution”, id. at 37 — is

clearly to transgress the bounds of jurisdiction granted it

under § 2254. See Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368

(1983) (Where state supreme court construed its statutes

and recognized intent of its legislature, Court is “bound

to accept” state court’s “construction of that State’s stat-

utes.” “Legislatures, not courts, prescribe the scope of

punishments.” [Footnote omitted.]). See also United States

ex rel. Hanrahan v. Bosse, 547 F.Supp. 718, 720-21 (D.IIIL.

1982) (where habeas corpus petitioner had moved state

trial court to reduce sentence under state statute which

allowed reduction or modification not later than 30 days

after sentence imposed, and state supreme court held

circuit court had power to reduce sentence only within 30

days after actual imposition, which was not stayed by

appeal, petitioner could not escape limitation on federal

court's authority to interpret state law by claiming due

process violation).

————$ $$$ * EE

CONCLUSION

The decision of the First Circuit Court of Appeals

overrules the State’s court of last resort and conflicts with

prior decisions of this Court and other Circuits in estab-

lishing a “temporal limit” for the correction of an illegal

sentence, based on an unsupported interpretation of the

Due Process Clause as it applies to the States.

The Petition for Certiorari should be granted to

restore the State’s legal sentence, to,resolve this apparent

conflict, and to clarify what latitude is extended to fed-

eral courts in reviewing matters of state sentencing and

procedure by way of habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C.

§ 2254.

Respectfully submitted,

JerrREY B. Pint

Attorney General of the

State of Rhode Island

ANNIE GOLDBERG

Assistant Attorney General

Appellate Division

72 Pine Street

Providence, Rhode Island 02903

(401) 274-4400, x.2289

Attorneys for Petitioner

1A

APPENDIX A

Fred DeWITT, Petitioner, Appellee,

v.

Donald VENTETOULO, Acting Director,

Adult Correctional Institution, et al.,

Respondents, Appellees.

Attorney General of Rhode

Island, Appellant.

No. 93-1002.

United States Court of Appeals,

First Circuit.

Heard June 11, 1993.

Decided Oct. 6, 1993.

After conviction for robbery, assault with intent to

murder, and arson was affirmed on appeal, 429 A.2d 628,

state court revoked parole and reimposed original life

sentence on ground that early relief suspending all but 15

years of his life sentence was mistaken, 657 A.2d 845.

Petition was then filed for writ of habeas corpus. The

United States District Court for the District of Rhode

Island, Francis J. Boyle, Chief Judge, 803 F.Supp. 580,

granted writ. Appeal was taken. The Court of Appeals,

Boudin, Circuit Judge, held that petitioner’s due process

rights were violated when, six years after suspending all

but 15 years of life sentence, state court reimposed origi-

nal life sentence on ground that earlier relief was mis-

taken.

Affirmed.

2A

Annie Goldberg, Asst. Atty. Gen., Appellate Div. with

whom Jeffrey B. Pine, Atty. Gen., was on brief for appel-

lant.

David A. Schechter with whom Margaret-Mary Hov-

arth was on brief, for appellee.

Before SELYA, CYR and BOUDIN, Circuit Judges.

BOUDIN, Circuit Judge.

The district court granted a writ of habeas corpus,

which it stayed pending this appeal, ordering the release

from state imprisonment of Fred E. DeWitt, 603 F.Supp.

580. The basis for the writ was the district court’s deci-

sion that Rhode Island had acted unconstitutionally in

increasing DeWitt’s sentence and reimprisoned him after

his release on parole. We agree with the district court’s

decision and affirm.

I.

The constitutional issue in this case arises under the

Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In

some areas, such as search and seizure, due process has

been reduced to detailed and nearly mechanical rules. In

other areas, the precepts are very general, and everything

turns upon the circumstances. The issue here is of this

latter type, and so we begin with a complete account of

the procedural history of this case.

On March 17, 1978, after a trial by jury, DeWitt was

convicted in Rhode Island Superior Court of robbery,

assault with intent to murder, and arson. These menacing

labels do not convey the full measure of De Witt’s evil

conduct. According to testimony given by the victim, a

3A

woman then about 67, DeWitt broke into her home while

carrying a knife, struck her with his hand and with a

hammer, engaged in one brutal act after another, and then

bound and gagged the victim and set fire to her apart-

ment.

The superior court imposed on DeWitt a life sentence

which meant under Rhode Island law that parole was

possible but not for a minimum of 10 years. DeWitt began

serving his sentence in 1978 and in 1980 his conviction

was affirmed by the Rhode Island Supreme Court. State v.

DeWitt, 423 A.2d 828 (R.1.1980). Then, in the following

year. DeWitt came to the aid of a prison guard who was

being assaulted by an inmate, and DeWitt later testified

for the state in the prosecution of the inmate. There is

some suggestion. that DeWitt, not surprisingly, may have

suffered at the hands of other inmates on account of his

rescue efforts.

In recognition of these efforts, the superior court on

June 25, 1981, held a hearing and entered an order sus-

pending all but 15 years of DeWitt’s life sentence and

providing that he would be placed on probation for 20

years from the time of his future release, whenever that

occurred.! This shortened the minimum period before

DeWitt could seek parole, but six years remained before

DeWitt’s parole application was granted. In the mean-

time, in mid-1983, the Rhode Island Supreme Court

! This lessened sentence was imposed under Rule 35 of the

Rhode Island Rules of Criminal Procedure which permitted the

court to correct illegal sentences at any time and to reduce

sentences within 120 days of either conviction or receipt of

mandate affirming the conviction.

4A

decided State v. O'Rourke, 463 A.2d 1328 (R.1.1983), hold-

ing that the superior court could not “suspend” a sen-

tence once a defendant had begun to serve it.?

Between 1983 and 1987, the state apparently made no

effort to have the superior court undo its partial suspen-

sion of DeWitt’s life sentence. Instead DeWitt continued

to serve his sentence, pursued education and training

courses in prison, and applied several times for parole.

Finally, in January 1987, DeWitt was granted parole and

released from prison. We are told by the state that this

occurred about 16 months before the earliest date on

which DeWitt would have been eligible for parole if held

under a life sentence. Thus, despite O'Rourke the prison

and parole authorities continued to treat DeWitt as if the

order suspending his sentence in part was still in force.

During the eight months following his release in

January 1987, DeWitt obtained work, beginning a paint-

ing business and then a siding business. He resumed his

relationship with family members and his girlfriend. He

also rented an apartment but moved out after a disagree-

ment, DeWitt believing that the landlord was billing the

entire building’s utilities to DeWitt’s meter. It was this

latter occurrence that began the chain of events leading to

this appeal. According to DeWitt, he later returned to his

old neighborhood to visit a friend, was invited in by his

2 The court ruled that a state statute, R.I.Gen. Laws

§ 12-19-10, forbad such suspensions and had not been modified

in this regard by Rule 35. O'Rourke, 463 A.2d at 1331. It appears

that the superior court judge in DeWitt’s case was not alone in

assuming, prior to O'Rourke, that a suspension power did exist

under Rule 35.

e

i

5A

former landlord, and was then attacked by the allegedly

drunken landlord and his wife with knives. In the tur-

moil, the landlord and his wife were injured.

The landlord’s version clearly differed, for the state

began criminal proceedings against DeWitt based on the

incident. The state also took steps to re-imprison DeWitt

based on his 1978 conviction, but it did not use the

customary method of seeking to revoke his parole for

violation of the good behavior conditions. Instead, after a

hearing on September 21, 1987, the superior court vacated

its earlier June 1981 order that had suspended in part

DeWitt’s original life sentence; the court’s ruling was that

O’Rourke showed that the original suspension order had

been improper. DeWitt is currently being held in prison

pursuant to that reimposed life sentence.

The rest of the procedural story can be briefly told.

At some point after September 1987 DeWitt was tried on

state charges growing out of the knife incident with his

landlord, and DeWitt was acquitted by the jury. In Janu-

ary 1988, DeWitt made a new motion under Rule 35 to

alter his life sentence. The superior court denied the

motion as untimely. An appeal followed, challenging both

the reimposition of the life sentence and the denial of the

new Rule 35 motion. The Rhode Island Supreme Court

rejected the first challenge, including DeWitt’S express

claim that the reimposed sentence violated the Due Pro-

cess Clause. State v. DeWitt, 657 A.2d 845 (R.I.1989). The

court ruled that the Rule 35 claim was timely, but, on

remand, the superior court denied the Rule 35 motion on

the merits and no appeal was taken.

re

6A

On December 11, 1990, DeWitt filed his habeas peti-

tion in the district court. The district court conducted an

evidentiary hearing, adducing many of the facts set forth

above. On October 20, 1992, the district court issued a

memorandum and order granting the habeas petition.

The district court’s judgment, which is stayed pending

this appeal, was entered on December 10, 1992.

Judge Boyle’s decision granting DeWitt’s habeas peti-

tion relied directly upon the Due Process Clause as con-

strued by this court in Breest v. Helgemos, 579 F.2d 95 (Ist

Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 933, 99 S.Ct. 327, 58 L.Ed.2d 229

(1978). There, this court stated that “the power of a sen-

tencing court to correct [upward] even a statutorily

invalid sentence must be subject to some temporai limit”

and that in some circumstances such a correction “might

be fundamentally unfair, and thus violative of due pro-

cess... . ” Id. at 101. After a careful analyses of the

present facts, Judge Boyle concluded that fundamental

unfairness did exist here, especially given the state’s fail-

ure to take any steps to reimpose the life sentence in the

four years after O’Rourke and prior to DeWitt’s release.

The state then brought this appeal.

II.

There is no surer recipe for confusion than to answer

two different questions at the same time. Thus, in assess-

ing DeWitt’s due process claim, we put to one side for the

moment the fact that DeWitt may have violated the good

behavior conditions attached to his parole. Instead, we

ask whether — assuming arguendo that no parole violation

occurred - the superior court was nevertheless entitled

7A

six years after the event to correct its earlier mistaken

grant of Rule 35 relief and to reimpose the original life

sentence.

The Constitution contains no general rule that pro-

hibits a court from increasing an earlier sentence where

the court finds that it was erroneous and that a higher

sentence was required by law. On the contrary, this has

occurred, and been upheld against constitutional or other

challenges, in a number of cases included Breest itself.>

And in principal, there is no difference between such

cases and a case like this one in which a sentence is

reduced and later, finding the reduction to be unlawful,

the court reinstates the original sentence.

But in law what is true for the usual case is often not

true in the extreme case. Even the state conceded at oral

argument that due process must impose some outer limit

on the power to revise sentences upward after the fact.

We are concerned here not with the substantive grounds

of a state’s decision to reduce or increase a sentence, but

rather with the inherently procedural issue of whether

> See, e.g., United States v. DiFrancesco, 449 U.S. 117, 133-34,

101 S.Ct. 420, 435-36, 66 L.Ed.2d 328 (1980). United States v. Rico,

902 F.2d 1065, 1068-69 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 492 U.S. 943, 111

S.Ct. 352, 112 L.Ed.2d 316 (1990). United States v. Cook, 890 F.2d

672, 673 (4th Cir. 1989). Lintefield v. Caton, 856 F.2d 344, 348-49

(1st Cir. 1988). United States v. Osage, 859 F.2d 327, 334 (5th Cir.

1988), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1027, 109 S.Ct. 1157, 103 L.Ed.2d 216

(1989). United States v. Villano, 816 F.2d 1446, 1458 (10th Cir.

1987). Lerner v. Giff, 751 F.2d 450, 458 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 472

U.S. 1010, 105 S.Ct. 2709, 86 L.Ed.2d 724 (1985). United States v.

Lundien, 769 F.2d 981, 986-87 (4th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 474 U.S.

1064, 106 S.Ct. 815, 88 L.Ed.2d 789 (1986). Burns v. United States,

552 F.2d 828, 831 (5th Cir. 1977).

KA

and when a state can reopen a matter after a final unap

pealed decision, after a substantial lapse in time during

which the state had actual knowledge of the error, and

after a significant change in circumstances. In short, the

question we face is one Of process

In Breest we said that notions of fundamental fairness

do place some temporal limit on later increases in sen

tence, 579 F.2d at 101, and the Fourth Circuit, in Lundien,

has endorsed this view. 769 F.2d at 987. See also Villano,

$16 F.2d at 1458 (Logan, J. concurring). It is quite true that

the cases following Breest generally found, as did Breest

itself, that the particular upward revision in question did

not violate due process. A convicted defendant does not

automatically acquire a vested interest ina mistakenly

low sentence. Only in the extreme case can a court prop-

erly say that the later upward revision of a sentence,

made to correct an earlier mistake, is so unfair that it

must be deemed inconsistent with fundamental notions

of fairness embodied in the Due Process Clause. Accord

Lundien, 769 F.2d at 987.

In our view, there is no single touchstone for making

this judgment, nor any multi-part formula. Rather, draw-

ing on considerations mentioned by cases like Breest and

suggested by common sense, we think that attention must

be given — our list is not exclusive — to the lapse of time

between the mistake and the attempted increase in sen-

tence, to whether or not the defendant contributed to the

mistake and the reasonableness of his intervening expec-

tations, to the prejudice worked by a later change, and to

the diligence exercised by the state in seeking the change.

To be sure, doctrine should evolve toward yardsticks and

formulas, making law more predictable and reducing the

QA

need for ad hoc decisions by judyes. But that is the end

y juay

point of the journey, and we are at the beginning

We start with the central and singular fact that the

state, which was represented at the hearing in) which

DeWitt’s sentence was suspended in 1983, took no appeal

from that decision, even though an appeal is the ordinary

and expected way in which errors are to be corrected. The

state had a second chance also to correct the error in 1983

after the Rhode Island Supreme Court held in O'Rourke

that the suspension power could not be used after a

prisoner had begun to serve his sentence; once again, the

state made no effort (so far as the record reveals) to apply

to the trial court to undo the suspension of DeWitt’s

sentence error. The process that DeWitt received, there

fore, begins with a remarkable double default by the

state. It is not a matter of the state being estopped; rather,

in deciding what is fundamentally unfair we cannot

ignore the fact that with due diligence the state could

have challenged the suspension long before DeWitt’s

release.

Following the state’s double default, circumstances

changed substantially. In contrast to cases like Breest,

DeWitt not only continued for a number of years in

prison reasonably believing that his sentence had been

reduced, but he was actually released. He remained free

from January 1987 to September 1987 arid laid down new

roots in society, acquiring a job and reestablishing family

ties. Only at this point, did the superior court correct its

original mistake and reimprison him. The lengthy delay

and change of circumstances are not decisive but they

LOA

contribute to the judgment whether due process was

aftorded by the belated reopening.

Finally, due process requires a weighing not only of

the defendant’s interest in finality, but of the state’s inter-

est in correcting error. Yet there is no sign that Rhode

Island has undertaken any wide-scale program to identify

and resentence those whose earlier sentences were sus-

pended in violation of O’Rourke. Rather, DeWitt appears

to have been singled out primarily to relieve the state of

the trouble of conducting a parole revocation hearing.

[he impression is hard to avoid that the resentencing

here primarily serves only to skirt the minimal due pro-

cess obligations that attach to parole revocations, that the

state could conduct such a proceeding at minimal cost,

and that the state’s own self-proclaimed interest in vin-

dicating O'Rourke is limited to this case.

As we have said, there are numerous cases allowing a

sentence to be increased after it was initially imposed in

error. In virtually all that we have discovered, there has

been some distinguishing circumstance that separates

that case from DeWitt’s, for example, because (as is often

true) the defendant was still in prison, or the interval

between the original sentence and its correction was

brief, or because the defendant almost certainly knew or

should have known that an error had been made.4

4 Compare Lerner, 751 F.2d at 458 (mistake corrected after

three years but while defendant still in prison); Cook, 890 F.2d at

674 (mistake corrected after three weeks while defendant await-

ing a report date for community confinement), and Rico, 902

F.2d at 1068-69 mistake — of which defendant must have known

- discovered three days after defendant erroneously sentenced

to time served and released).

L1A

Conversely, we are completely satisfied, as Breest and

Lundieu said in dicta, that due process must in principle

impose an outer limit on the ability to correct a sentence

after the event.

[hus we face here the familiar due process problem

of deciding how much is too much. In concluding that

DeWitt’s case crosses the line, we have taken into account

a range of considerations: the multi-year period between

the suspension and the reimposition of sentence, the rea-

sonableness of DeWitt’s reliance, his release from prison

and formation of new roots, the unusual tardiness of the

State in failing to correct the error from 1983 onward, and

the existence of an alternative parole revocation remedy.

[hese elements cannot be calibrated precisely, nor can

they be taken in isolation. The outcome here is the result

of the combined weight of the elements.

We reach our conclusion with diffidence because fed-

eral judges have no monopoly on wisdom in deciding

what is unfair, and even harsh decisions by state authori-

ties usually raise no constitutional issue. But we are con-

tident that this case is very unusual and that our decision

imposes no serious constraint on state authorities who,

unlike federal judges, have the direct responsibility for

the law-enforcement and prosecutorial tasks at hand. In

sum, this case is the very rare exception to the general

rule that courts can, after sentence, revise sentences

upward to correct errors.

II]

We turn now to Rhode Island’s counter arguments

and, in particular, to the issue we earlier reserved con-

cerning DeWitt’s supposed parole violation. The state has

tought earnestly for its position that the district court

erred in granting the writ, but in our view the arguments

on which the state lays most stress are not very compel-

ling

(he state argues broadly that the original suspension

of DeWitt’s life sentence was a matter of discretion, and

the decision to parole him before the end of his new 15-

year sentence was likewise discretionary. From these

premises the state concludes that DeWitt cannot have an

interest In remaining at large that is protectable under the

Due Process Clause. But it is one thing to say that DeWitt

could not have compelled the suspension of sentence or

the grant of parole; it is quite another to ignore the reality

that the discretion was exercised in his favor and the state

is noW trying to withdraw what it has bestowed.

Rhode Island is not required to give away its prop-

erty but if it gave away its state house as a gift, it is

unlikely it could get it back without paying just compen-

sation to the new owner. More closely on point, the state

is not obliged by the Constitution to parole its prisoners,

but having done so, it is obliged to afford them due

process — what process is due is another matter — when it

revokes paroles. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481, 92

S.Ct. 2593, 2600, 33 L.Ed.2d 484 (1972). The case relied

upon by the state for its discretion argument, Greenhots v.

Nebraska Penal Inmates, 442 U.S. 1, 99 S.Ct. 2100, 60

L.Ed.2d 668 (1979), involved the very different question

,

ISA

whether the state is obliged to provide due process in

deciding whether to grant parole.

[he state’s main arguments in this case are narrower

and center upon DeWitt’s fight with his former landlord

DeWitt was warned, the state points out, that his parole

could be revoked if he got himself into trouble. That he

was acquitted by a jury of causing the trouble, says the

state, means nothing; the burden of proof in that trial was

beyond a reasonable doubt, while in parole revocation,

state law requires only evidence that would “reasonably

satisfy” the decision-maker that a violation occurred.

Walker v. Langlois, 104 R.I. 274, 243 A.2d 733, 737 (1968)

Quoting from DeWitt’s own testimony about the incident,

the state suggests that DeWitt’s version of the struggle

with the landlord is contradictory and improbable.

[hese arguments remind one of a boxer leading with

his chin. No one doubts that the state couid at the outset

have conducted a proceeding to revoke DeWitt’s parole.

DeWitt’s story that he was attacked without provocation

by the landlord and his wife, both armed with knives, is

one that any parole board lawyer might enjoy testing on

cross-examination. The Constitution has not been read to

require proof beyond a reasonable doubt in a parole

revocation proceeding. E.g., Whitehead v. U.S. Parole Com

mission, 755 F.2d 1536, 1537 (11th Cir.1985). If the state

found that DeWitt had misbehaved, it could have surely

cancelled his parole.

But this is not what happened. There has been no

official determination of wrongdoing by DeWitt, and he

has not been returned to prison to serve a 15-year sen-

tence. The state can hardly expect that this court will

oo acini elaine

14A

determine, based on the state’s selection of transcript

excerpts, that DeWitt was at fault. It may well be that

under Rhode Island law the state can still revoke De-

Witt’s parole on account of the knifing incident. We have

no competence to revoke the parole, and no occasion to

consider any federal claims that DeWitt might make

against such a remedy.° But as matters now stand, DeWitt

is being held pursuant to a judgment sentencing him to

life imprisonment, a judgment unlawfully reimposed on

DeWitt in violation of the Constitution.

In the concluding section of its brief, the state asserts

in one sentence that DeWitt’s claim in this court is fore-

closed by his failure to appeal to the Rhode Island

Supreme Court after the superior court on remand denied

his new Rule 36 motion. When that motion was denied,

DeWitt had already presented to the Rhode Island

Supreme Court the due process claim on which we pass

today, and that court had already rejected that claim on

the merits. DeWitt had thus fully exhausted his state

remedies to vindicate his due process claim, and the

state’s exhaustion objection is meritless.

Affirmed.

> Possibly DeWitt would argue that due process precluded

revoking his parole for misconduct after the jury acquittal

However, like most circuits, we have sustained the use of

“acquitted conduct” to increase sentences under the Sentencing

Guidelines, based on the same distinction as to burden of proof

urged by Rhode Island in this case. E.g., United States v. Moor

sola, 891 F.2d 13, 16-17 (1st Cir.1989)

L5A

APPENDIX B

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

FOR THE FIRST CIRCUIT

No. 93-1002.

FRED DEWITT,

Petitioner, Appellee,

.

DONALD VENTETOULO, ACTING DIREC TOR,

ADULT CORRECTIONAL INSTITUTION. FT. a...

Respondents, Appellees.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OF RHODE ISI AND,

Appellant.

Before

sreyer, Chief Judge

forruella, Selya, Cyr, Boudin and Stahl, Circuit Judges.

ORDER OF THE COURT

Entered: November 22, 1993

[he panel of judges that rendered the decision in this

case having voted to deny the petition for rehearing and

the suggestion for the holding of a rehearing en banc

having been carefully considered by the judges of the

Court in regular active service and a majority of said

judges not having voted to order that the appeal be heard

or reheard by the Court en banc,

a

L6A

It is ordered that the petition for rehearing and the

suggestion for rehearing en banc be denied.

By The Court:

FRANCIS P. SCIGLIANO

Clerk

[cc:Mr. Schechter and Ms. Goldberg]

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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