Petition for Writ of Certiorari — New York State Department of Environmental Conservation v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.
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mn 93128 5-55 4994
IN THE
OFFICE OF THE CLERK
Supreme Court of the United States
October Term, 1993
NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF El. "IRONMENTAL CONSERVA-
TION, COMMISSIONER THOMAS C. JORLING, and DEPUTY COMMIS-
SIONER AND GENERAL COUNSEL MARC S. GERSTMAN,
Petitioners,
against
NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE
STATE OF NEw YORK
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI
G. OLIVER KOPPELL
Attorney General of the State of New York
Attorney for Petitioners
The Capitol
Albany, NY 12224
(518) 474-4819
JERRY BOONE
Solicitor General
PETER H. SCHIFF
Deputy Selicitor General
KATHLEEN LiSTON MORRISON*
Assistant Attorney General
*Counse: of Record
THE Reporrer Company, Inc.—Walton, NY 13856—800-252-7181
Syracuse Office, University Building, Syracuse, NY 13202—315-426-1235
NYC Office—30 Vesey Si., New York, NY 10007—212-732-6978—800- 800-4264
(3725—1994)
Printed on Recycled Paper
eae
Question Presented
Whether the Denartment of Environmental Cnservation,
when evaluating h. droelectric projects under Section 401 of
the federal Clean Water Act, is limited to considering the
water quality standards approved by the United States Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency under § 303 of the Clean
Water Act.
Table of Contents
Page
Question Presented. ....ccccccctccsssctvsensceess i
Opinions Below .........ccccsccccccecscscvssese 2
PORIIGOD 6 vic tk cena ccepeentctst64ebercaneewen 3
Statutory Provisions Involved.............0+eeeeee 3
Statement of the Case ...cciccccscctcctscccvceces 3
Facts and Procedural Background ............. 3
Reasons for Granting the Petition
The Decision of the New York Court of Ap-
peals Conflicts With The Decision Issued By
The Supreme Court of Washington......... 5
1. The Plain Language And The Legislative His-
tory Of The Clean Water Act Support A
Broader View Of State Water Quality Re-
quirements Than Was Adopted By The New
York Court Of Appeals ............+-+-+- 7
2. The State Statutes Are Water Quality Related
And Come Within The Scope Of The Author-
ization Contained In Section 401 Of The
Ce WE AOS bv idccccacuvseevevnceas 9
Comes: 6 os ccccvctavascisesvacnis tines 19
Index to Appendix
APPENDIX A—Order of the New York State Court of
PE ei odbc a tadidederusseeretcdeddeucees
APPENDIX B—Opinion of New York State Court of
PL Ch cctebedbeddeneresdersdesoeeesesiac
APPENDIX C—Reported Opinion of Appellate Divi-
SION, ThiTd Department. 2... cc ccccsccscccess
APPENDIX D—Original Opinion and Order of Appel-
late Division, Third Department...............
APPENDIX E—Memorandum Decision of New York
Supreme Court, Albany County...............
APPENDIX F—Order of New York Supreme Court,
SE SOU y bev cvaddevarecesdvesiaceeees
APPENDIX G—Environmental Conservation Law §§
15-0501, 15-0503, 15-0505 and 15-0507 .......
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES:
Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. ___.,, 112 S.Ct. 1046
eae Or Ge ad ews coke Wiebe ous
Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-
ee i eee ew eens
Escondido Mutual Water Co. v. LaJolla Band of Mis-
sion Indians, 466 U.S. 765, 772-779 (1984).....
la
3a
14a
19a
25a
26a
34a
18
18
18
Page
PUD No. | of Jefferson County and City of Tacoma v.
State of Washington, Department of Ecology, De-
partment of Fisheries, and Department of
Wildlife, No. 92-1911, cert granted October 4,
1993, to be argued February 23, 1994, reported
below at 849 P.2d 646 (1993)............ 5, 16, 18
STATUTES:
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq........... 12
© CG er SR © Pik cv ks Kivcecucs 12, 16
SF PR ae es PEE we he d ovo cnsk wivkedcascns, 5
S Fureeey Oe Wee ROE OUED So kkk y vo bvcadcecene 14
£m ak Fe & , ” ) Re eee passim
§ 401(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) ............... 8
§ 401(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(2) ............... 8
§ 401(a)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(3) ............00- 8
§ 401(a)(4), 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(4) ............... 8
§ 401(a)(S), 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(5) ...........000. 8
FO ae i 8 NID ok his va ccs 8
‘
j
i
:
Page
S$ 401(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1S4U(E) 0c cccccscvccvcccces 8
§ 401(@), 33 USC. § TSAHG)e vcs ccccccccscass passim
Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 84 Stat.91,
Pub. L. No. 91-224, Section 21(b)............. 7
Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 797 et seq....... 6, 18
New York State Environmental Conservation Law
(“ECL”):
ECL Article 8 (State Environmental Quality Review
| reer er Pere rr Tere. A veteweshenqures 4
ECL Article 11 (Fish and Wildlife Act)........... 4,12
ide Ee RUOEE cake eee entasenabauk nes tacedaens 15
ECL Article 15, Title 5 (Protection of Water) ....... 4
ae SE oo 0555 PEAS bs ve ve wnds O8bee5 3, 4, 12
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ee Seats ccdewenedbavevenabivascus 3, 13
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ee SPT aa cockb kt eveses councebuesess 3, 13, 14
Ee BE 6. bee in oR bes Ooh 4e0ba anes 14
ECL Article 15, Title 8 (Reservoir Releases)........ 12
SO PEAS Kebcs ¥a suede donk taeceseneine 3
re EES b0:0.c'u¥-b 0b 40040) kdowR woh Re 14
A RSS R pene Meccan Ph eaRihee P maa 14
ECL Article 24 (Freshwater Wetlands Act)........ 4,12
eS Prien rr rh Raves wrth Or 15
Se I 60.0 6ns 8cdee Ku wis eneee ee 15
ROS PD os eee ie Coe eee 15
a ie PPE so bind Gc uss vod av deunw bik 15
Revised Code of Washington (‘‘RCW’’)
ott occeg a. SEO eT Te OUT ES eal ee ne 6
REGULATIONS:
Federal
40 C.FR.
Vii.
Page
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SR Se es ee or ae ere 2, 14
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New York State Code of Rules and Regulations, Title 6
(Conservation)
cg Sa IEE rae ee ene rear yne nar 15
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oe Page
Washington Administrative Code (‘‘WAC’’)
SiO TIONED oc vdsccccvcescveuseeves 6
MISCELLANEOUS:
S.R. Rep. No. 92-414, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted
in 2 U.S. Code Cong. and Admin. News 3735
GRRU See rk tobias ne seen eK Eee th 10
S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1236, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 2 U.S. Code Cong. and Admin. News
PU RAPT vase denna baw canes dense 11
2 Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972 p. 1204 (1973) ....... 9
No.
IN THE
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
OCTOBER TERM, 1993.
New YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CON-
SERVATION, COMMISSIONER THOMAS C. JORLING, and
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AND GENERAL COUNSEL MARC
S. GERSTMAN,
Petitioners,
against
NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION,
Respondent.
PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF
APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
Petition for a Writ of Certiorari
Petitioners, the New York State Department of Environ-
mental Conservation, its Commissioner, Thomas C. Jorling,
and Deputy Commissioner and General Counsel Marc S.
Gerstman (collectively, ‘the Department”) respectfully re-
quest that this Court issue a writ of certiorari to review the
2
November 11, 1993, order issued by the New York State
Court of Appeals. The order of the Court of Appeals is set
forth as Appendix “A”.
The Court of Appeals affirmed a January 7, 1993 order of
the Appellate Division, Third Department, which held that
the Department was limited to considering the water quality
standards approved by the United States Environmental Pro-
tection Agency under § 303 of the Clean Water Act when
evaluating applications for water quality certifications un-
der § 401 of the Clean Water Act for hydroelectric proj-
ects.! The Court of Appeals rejected the Department's argu-
ment that the State could also consider State statutes
protective of water quality.
Opinions Below
The Court of Appeals rendered its opinion on November
11, 1993. The opinion is reported at 82 NY 2d 191, 624 NE
2d 146, 604 NYS 2d 18. It is set forth as Appendix “B”.
The Appellate Division, Third Department, rendered its
opinion and order on January 7, 1993. The opinion is re-
ported at 187 AD 2d 7, 592 NYS 2d 141 (3d Dept. 1993). It
is set forth as Appendix ‘“‘C’’. The original opinion and
order of the Appellate Division, Third Department, is set
forth as Appendix “D”’.
Water quality standards consist of: (1) designated uses and (2)
criteria necessary to protect them, together with (3) an antidegradation
policy which protects: (a) existing instream uses and the level of water
quality necessary to protect them, and (b) high quality waters -- those
whose quality meets or exceeds the levels necessary to support the
propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and recreation in and on the
water. 40 C.F.R. §§ 131.2, 131.3, 131.6, 131.12, 131.12(a)(1),(2).
Ce Oe ee ee a Me. a ce
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BA OCS Oe Ot
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3
The Supreme Court, Albany County, rendered its opinion
on April 1, 1991. The opinion is not reported. It is set forth
as Appendix “‘E’’. The order and judgment of the Supreme
Court, Albany County, is set forth as Appendix “‘F’’.
Jurisdiction
The order of the Court of Appeals was entered on Novem-
ber 11, 1993. This petition for certiorari is filed within 90
days of November 11, 1993. The Court’s jurisdiction to
review the case rests upon 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).
Statutory Provisions Involved
Clean Water Act § 401, 33 U.S.C. § 1341; New York
Environmental Conservation Law (‘“‘ECL’’) Articles 8, 11,
24; ECL §§ 15-0501, 15-0503, 15-0505, 15-0507, 15-0801,
et seq., 15-2700 et seq. The full text of § 401 is set out in
Appendix “G’’. ECL §§ 15-0501, 15-0503, 15-0505, and
15-0507 are also set forth in Appendix “‘G”’.
Statement of the Case
Facts and Procedural Background
This case involves the scope of the State’s authority when
acting under Section 401 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1341. Under that provision, federal agencies are prohib-
ited from issuing licenses for activities which may discharge
into navigable waters unless a State has issued a certifica-
tion that the activity will not contravene State water quality
requirements. Respondent Niagara Mohawk Power Corpo-
ration (“‘Niagara Mohawk’”’) owns and operates a number of
4
hydroelectric projects licensed by the Federal Energy Regu-
latory Commission (‘“‘“FERC’’) and therefore subject to the
certification provision when renewal of the license is
sought. Niagara Mohawk filed « May 24, 1990, administra-
tive petition with the petitioner Dep»*tment of Environmen-
tal Conservation requesting a declaratory ruling under the
State Administrative Procedure Act whether the Department
would, when considering applications for certifications, ap-
ply the provisions of ECL Article 15, Title 5 (§§ 15-0501 et
seq.). Petitioner Marc S. Gerstman responded on behalf of
the Department on August 27, 1990, that the Department
would apply that statute as well as several others: ECL
Article 24, Article 11, and Article 8, because they were
protective of water quality.
On December 21, 1990, Niagara Mohawk commenced
this lawsuit challenging the Department’s August 27, 1990
determination. The Department answered and interposed
objections. In a decision dated April 1, 1991, Supreme
Court, Albany County, granted Niagara Mohawk’s judicial
petition and annulled the Department’s determination. The
court held that the Department can consider only the water
chemistry standards set forth in Title 6 of the New York
Code of Rules and Regulations (““NYCRR’’), § 701.19 and
§ 704.22, but not the substantive provisions of various water
quality-related sections of the ECL.
On July 30, 1991, the Department served and filed a
timely notice of appeal. The Appellate Division, Third De-
partment, affirmed the lower court, holding that the Depart-
ment’s review of 401 certifications was limited to consider-
2The material then contained in § 701.19 is now contained in 701.1
through 701.9 and 703.1 through 703.5.
5
ing the water quality standards approved by the United
States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) under
Section 303 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1313.
On December 15, 1993, the Department filed a timely
motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals. On May
11, 1993, the Court of Appeals granted that motion. On
November 11, 1993, the Court of Appeals unanimously
affirmed the order issued previously by the Appellate Divi-
sion, Third Department.
REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION
The Decision Of The New York Ccurt Of Appeals
Conflicts With The Decision Issued By The Supreme
Court of Washington
The decision issued by New York’s court of last resort,
the New York Court of Appeals, conflicts with the decision
issued by the State of Washington’s court of last resort, the
Supreme Court, in PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County and City
of Tacoma v. State of Washington, Department of Ecology,
Department of Fisheries, and Department of Wildlife, No.
92-1911, cert. pet. granted October 4, 1993, awaiting argu-
ment before this Court on February 23. In that case, in an
alternative holding, the Washington court upheld the State’s
reliance on a State statute, not included within the State’s
water quality standards approved by EPA, to support the
State’s imposition of a minimum streamflow condition in a
6
water quality certification for a hydroelectric project.? The
Washington statute mandated retention of a base flow in a
river in order to protect the water’s “‘uses and values ae
propagation of fish and wildlife, recreational purposes .. .
and [its] use for navigation’. Revised Code of Washington
(“RCW”) 90.54.020(3)(a). The State’s designated use of
the river, under Washington’s EPA-approved water quality
standards, was fish migration, rearing, spawning, and har-
vesting. Washington Administrative Code (‘‘WAC’’)
173-201-045(1)(b)(iii). Washington issued the certification
but imposed a condition, authorized by Clean Water Act
§ 401(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d), requiring a minimum
streamflow. The hydroelectric project applicant sued, argu-
ing that Washington exceeded its authority under the Clean
Water Act because the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 797
et seq., gave FERC exclusive jurisdiction over streamflow
regulation.
In contrast to Washington’s highest court, New York’s
highest court held that the State cannot rely on a State
statute not approved by EPA and therefore not a water
quality standard when evaluating applications for water
quality certifications. This Court should grant the writ and
resolve the conflict.
3In its primary holding, the Washington court upheld the State’s
imposition of a minimum streamflow requirement because it was neces-
sary to assure compliance with Washington's EPA-approved water qual-
ity standards. Washington’s EPA-approved water quality standards in-
cluded an antidegradation policy which prohibited degradation of
existing instream uses and, in the absence of a minimum streamflow
requirement, the existing fisheries use would be degraded. 849 P. 2d
646, 650.
7
The New York Court of Appeals erred in limiting the
State to considering water quality standards because Clean
Water Act § 401, as amended in 1972, authorizes States to
assure compliance with water quality requirements, not just
EPA-approved water quality standards. The State statutes on
which New York wishes to rely are water quality require-
ments because they are protective of water quality. In addi-
tion, § 401(d) expressly authorizes States (and EPA when it
acts in place of a State or in certain interstate situations) to
impose conditions on certifications based on “any other
appropriate requirements of State law’’, and the State stat-
utes are such “‘appropriate requirements of State law”’.
1. The Plain Language And The Legislative History Of The
Clean Water Act Support A Broader View Of State Water
Quality Requirements Than Was Adopted By The New
York Court Of Appeals
State water quality-protective statutes are “‘water quality
requirements” within the meaning of Section 401 of the
Clean Water Act, as amended in 1972. Consequently, a State
may look to and rely on such a statute when evaluating an
application for a water quality certification.
Originally enacted as Section 21(b) of the Water Quality
Improvement Act of 1970 and limited to water quality
standards, the certification requirement was amended by the
Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972
to change the operative language from “standards” to “‘re-
quirements” and thus broaden the State’s authority. Water
Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224,
§ 21(b), 84 Stat. 91 (1970); Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816
(1972). Furthermore, the amended Section 401 contains a
provision for which there was no precedent in Section 21,
8
Section 401(d), and that provision is not only not limited to
water quality standards, a term it does not mention, but
contains the broadest language of all. See, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1341(d).
The 1972 amendments, incorporating Congress’ moving
away from focussing on water quality standards and taking a
broader view of water pollution, substituted the term “water
quality requirements” for the term “water quality stand-
ards” found in Section 21(b). Compare, former 33 U.S.C.
§ 1171(b), referred to as “Section 21(b)”, with existing 33
U.S.C. § 1341, referred to as “Section 401”. With changes
in the language from “water quality standards’’ to “water
quality requirements”’, Section 21(b)(1) corresponds to Sec-
tion 401(a)(1); Section 21(b)(2) corresponds to Section
401(a)(2); Section 21(b)(3) corresponds to Section
401(a)(3); Section 21(b)(4) corresponds to Section
401(a)(4); Section 21(b)(5) corresponds to Section
401(a)(5); Section 21(c) corresponds to Section 401(b);
Section 21(d) corresponds to Section 401(c).
The term ‘“‘water quality requirement” is not defined in
the Clean Water Act. A request that it be defined narrowly
was rejected. Then-EPA Administrator William
Ruckelshaus, in a 1971 statement to the House Committee
on Public Works, suggested that the term “applicable water
quality requirement” (the phrase then contained in the ver-
sion previously passed by the Senate) be defined to mean:
any applicable effluent limitations under Section 301
or 302 of this Act, or prohibition, effluent standard,
or pretreatment standard under Section 307 of this
Act, or any more stringent water quality requirement
9
under State law as provided in Section 510 of this
Act.4
2 Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act
Amendments of 1972 p. 1204 (1973). The Committee chose
not to adopt the definition. In addition, after consultations
between both houses, Congress agreed to pass the House
version, which substituted the broad phrase, ‘“‘any other
appropriate requirement of State law’’ for the phrase ‘any
applicable water quality requirement’’. bid. Rejection of
the suggestion that a narrow definition be codified and
adoption of even broader language is evidence that Con-
gress did not intend such a narrow construction.
2. The State Statutes Are Water Quality Related And Come
Within The Scope Of The Authorization Contained In
Section 401 Of The Clean Water Act
Section 401(d) authorizes imposition of conditions on
certifications based on “‘any other appropriate requirements
of State law’’. In addition to being water quality require-
ments, the water quality protective statutes upon which New
York relies are also “appropriate requirements of State
law”. Section 401(d) provides:
Any certification provided under this section shall
set forth any effluent limitations and other limita-
tions, and monitoring requirements necessary to as-
“Section 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370, provides that nothing in the Clean
Water Act “shall (1) preclude or deny the right of any State...to adopt or
enforce...any requirement respecting control or abatement of pollu-
tion...or (2) be construed as impairing or in any manner affecting any
right or jurisdiction of the states with respect to the waters...of such
States.”
10
sure that any applicant for a Federal license or permit
will comply with any applicable effluent limitation
and other limitations, under section 301 or 302 of
this Act, standard of performance under section 306
of this Act, or prohibition, effluent standard, or pre-
treatment standard under section 307 of this Act, and
with any other,appropriate requirement of State law
set forth in such certification, and shall become a
condition on any Federal license or permit subject to
the provisions of this section.
The 1972 Senate Committee Report described the enact-
ment of § 401(d) as follows:
[T]he provision makes clear that any water quality
requirements established under State law, more strin-
gent than those requirements established under this
Act, also shall through certification become condi-
tions on any Federal license or permit. The purpose
of the certification mechanism provided in this law
is to assure that Federal licensing or permitting agen-
cies cannot override State water quality
requirements.
S. R. Rep. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 2
U.S. Code Cong. and Admin. News 3735 (1972) (emphasis
added). The Senate Conference Report also stated:
Subsection (d), which requires a certification to set
forth effluent limitations, other limitations, and
monitoring requirements necessary to insure compli-
ance with sections 301, 302, 306, and 307, of this
Act, has been expanded to also require compliance
11
with any other appropriate requirement of State law
which is set forth in the certification.
S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1236, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess., re-
printed in 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3815 (1972)
(emphasis added).
Unlike Congress, the New York Court of Appeals failed
to recognize that water quality is broader than mere water
quality standards alone. Water quality standards alone, no
matter how broadly drafted, do not provide sufficient pro-
tection for the State’s water resources and the uses of those
resources when hydroelectric facilities are involved. Dis-
solved oxygen and bacteria content, for example, by them-
selves are only technical measurements and only indirectly
reflect the fundamental values of water quality protection.
The Clean Water Act’s purpose of improving and maintain-
ing the quality of the nation’s waters is not fulfilled by a
State simply applying its water quality standards to a hydro-
electric project. Adoption of the narrow view expressed by
the court below reduces the State’s involvement in the water
quality certification process to that of a laboratory techni-
cian. This is not what Congress had in mind when it enacted
the Clean Water Act to protect and improve water quality.
The objective of this Act is to restore and maintain
the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the
Nation’s waters. In order to achieve this objective, it
is hereby declared that, consistent with the provi-
sions of this Act...
12
(2) it is the national goal that whenever attain-
able, an interim goal of water quality which pro-
vides for the protection and propagation of fish,
shellfish and wildlife and provides for recreation
in and on the water be achieved by July 1, 1983
33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (emphasis added).
The substantive water quality requirements of ECL Arti-
cles 11, 15, and 24 are important factors for the Depart-
ment’s determination a hydroelectric project will comply
with State water quality requirements. Each of these statutes
contains provisions protective of water quality and contrib-
utes to the fulfillment of the Department’s responsibility to
protect the State’s water quality. They protect the State’s
water quality by providing a basis for the Department to
review proposed projects that may affect water quality in a
variety of ways.
ECL § 15-0501, entitled, “Protection of Waters: Stream
Disturbance”, generally regulates projects which will dis-
turb stream beds and thereby affect the water quality of the
stream. Where an application for a Section 401 certification
for a hydroelectric project is involved, the substantive pro-
visions of the statute enable the Department to review an
applicant’s plans so as to minimize the disturbance of a
stream and prevent erosion and increased turbidity of the
waters. See, ECL § 15-0501(3)(b). Each is a water quality
concern.
Dam construction, repair, or reconstruction activities may
affect the waters of the State through the discharge of
13
pollutants into the water, including materials used-during
the construction, repair, or reconstruction. These activities
also have the potential to affect aspects of the State’s water
quality by causing turbidity, erosion, temperature change,
and the destruction of wetlands which improve and maintain
water quality by cleansing the waters.5 Because these are
water quality concerns, the Department considers the sub-
stantive provisions of ECL § 15-0503, entitled “Protection
of Waters: Dam Construction, Repair, or Reconstruction”
when reviewing Section 401 certification requests.®
Hydroelectric projects usually require excavation and/or
fill as a part of construction, repair, or reconstruction activi-
ties. Excavation and fill may affect the waters of the State
through the discharge of pollutants into the waters, the
creation of turbidity, erosion, and temperature changes, and
the impact on protected freshwater wetlands. These are
water quality concerns. Consequently, the Department con-
siders the substantive provisions of ECL § 15-0505, entitled
‘Protection of Waters: Excavation and Fill”’.
ECL § 15-0507, entitled ‘‘Structures Impounding Waters;
Inspection’’, empowers the Department to inspect dams and
order repair or reconstruction activities in order to “protect
5As discussed below, destruction of wetlands can affect water
quality.
“Turbidity and temperature change are the only categories for
which specific water chemistry standards have been promulgated. 6
NYCRR § 703.3; 6 NYCRR Part 704. The other concerns would thus
go unaddressed, even though they are valid water quality concerns, if
the Department's review were limited to applying the water chemistry
standards. They would thereby be excluded under the holding of the
court below, leaving a void rather than a framework for addressing
legitimate and serious water quality concerns.
14
the natural resources of the State”, including the waters of
the State. ECL § 15-0507(4). Remedial action undertaken
pursuant to this section can affect the waters of the State
through the discharge of pollutants, the creation of turbidity,
erosion, and temperature change, and the destruction of
wetlands. The Department, therefore, considers the substan-
tive provisions of ECL § 15-0507 when reviewing 401 cer-
tification applications because that section addresses water
quality concerns and protection of the waters of the State.
ECL § 15-0805, entitled “Regulation of Reservoir Re-
leases”, authorizes the Department to regulate reservoir
releases (i.e., the release of water from reservoirs) in order
to protect recreational uses of water and to insure sufficient
water supplies for drinking and power production uses. ECL
§ 15-0801(2). Since hydroelectric projects can affect the
safety of a water supply, the Department properly considers
the substantive provisions of ECL § 15-0805, entitled “*Res-
ervoir Releases’ when reviewing 401 certification applica-
tions. A reservoir is a designated protected use under the
system established by Congress in the Clean Water Act, the
regulations interpreting that statute by the United States
Environmental Protection Agency, and the Department’s
regulations. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2); 40 C.FR. § 131.10,
§ 131.11, and § 131.12; 6 NYCRR §§ 701.2-701.6.
The regulations promulgated to implement the Wild, Sce-
nic, and Recreational Rivers system under ECL § 15-2701
et seq., entitled “Wild, Scenic, and Recreational Rivers
Systems”, are designed to protect “outstanding natural,
scenic, ecological, recreational, aesthetic, botanical, geolog-
ical, hydrological, fish and wildlife, historical, cultural, ar-
chaeological and scientific values” by preserving the free
flowing condition of such rivers and protecting their imme-
15
diate environs for the benefit and enjoyment of present and
future generations. ECL § 15-2701; See also, 6 NYCRR
§ 666.1. The construction of hydroelectric projects on rivers
included in the Wild, Scenic, and Recreational Rivers Sys-
tem may result in unmitigatable adverse environmental im-
pacts to the very attributes that contribute to the protected
designation.
The construction of hydroelectric projects may have an
impact on protected freshwater wetlands and therefore may
result in the degradation of water quality. ECL § 24-0101 er
seq., the State’s Freshwater Wetlands Law, has as its express
purpose the preservation and protection of freshwater wet-
lands and the benefits derived from them. See, ECL
§ 24-0103. In enacting that statute, the Legislature stated
that freshwater wetlands are ‘“‘an invaluable resource for
flood protection, wildlife habitat, open space and water
resources”. ECL § 24-0105(1) (emphasis supplied.) The
Statute expressly recognizes that any loss of wetlands will
also result in the loss of subsurface water resources, envi-
ronmental provisions for watersheds, recharging areas for
ground water supplies, pollution treatment basins, erosion
control sedimentation areas, filtering basins, absorption
areas for silt and organic matters, sources of nutrients for
fish and wildlife, and wildlife habitat. ECL
§ 24-0105(7)(a)(i). Because loss of any of these may adver-
sely affect water quality, the Department takes the water
quality aspects of this statute into consideration.
ECL § 11-0101 et seq., the State’s Fish and Wildlife Law,
authorizes the Department to protect and manage fish and
wildlife resources within the State. A primary purpose be-
hind enactment of the Clean Water Act was restoration of
the quality of the nation’s waters so that they would be
16
‘““ishable, swimmable waters’’ by 1983. See, 33 U.S.C.
§ 1251(a)(2), where § 101(a)(2) of the Clean Water Act
states that its objective is to “restore and maintain the
chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s
waters”’. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). In its regulations interpreting
the Clean Water Act, and specifically interpreting the
“‘water quality standards’’ portion of the Clean Water Act,
EPA has taken the position, on which New York relies, that
the standards provide for the protection and propagation of
fish. 40 C.F.R. § 131.2; 6 NYCRR §§ 701.3-701.8. Hydro-
electric projects have the potential to disrupt not only fish
and wildlife habitats, but the ““minimum flows” or quantity
of water needed for fish and wildlife survival. Water passing
through a particular river reach can be greatly affected
because of the diversion of water into turbines to create
power. Wildlife habitat and endangered species can be de-
stroyed if insufficient flow protection for fish and wildlife
are not included in a hydroelectric project design plan.
Consequently, depending upon the particular factual record
developed in a particular case, New York may wish, for
example, to impose conditions regulating flow levels in its
certifications where necessary to attain or prevent impair-
ment of the designated uses for waters whose designated
uses include the survival and propagation of fish, as did the
State of Washington in the PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County
and City of Tacoma v. State of Washington Department of
Ecology, Department of Fisheries, and Department of
Wildlife case now awaiting argument before this Court.
The Department’s approach to Section 401 certification is
consistent with the position taken by the EPA that the pro-
tection of water quality involves more than just addressing
the water quality standards contained in 6 NYCRR Parts
701-704, and that States should address ‘‘aquatic life,
17
wildlife, wetlands and other aquatic habitat, vegetation and
hydrology required to maintain the aquatic system...toxicity
and bioaccumulation of pollutants, diversity and composi-
tion of aquatic species, entrapment of pollutants in sedi-
ment, stormwater and nonpoint source impacts, habitat loss,
and hydrologic changes”’. See also, 40 C.F.R. §§ 130, 131,
and especially § 130.3, wherein EPA describes “water qual-
ity standards” as defining the water quality goals of a water
body, or portion thereof, by designating the use or uses to be
made of the water and by setting criteria necessary to pro-
tect the uses’’.
In a letter to FERC, EPA has noted that:
protection of water quality involves far more than
just addressing water chemistry. Rather, protection
of water quality includes protection of multiple ele-
ments which together make up aquatic systems in-
cluding the aquatic life, wildlife, wetlands and other
aquatic habitat, vegetation, and hydrology required
to maintain the aquatic system. Relevant water qual-
ity issues include the toxicity and bioaccumulation of
pollutants, the diversity and composition of the
aquatic species, entrapment of pollutants in sedi-
ment, stormwater and nonpoint source impacts, hab-
itat loss, and hydrologic changes. A State may need
to address any one or combination of these factors in
particular circumstances in order to meet the man-
dates of the Clean Water Act articulated in section
101(a) ‘to restore and maintain the chemical, physi-
cal, and biological integrity of the nation’s waters’ .
(emphasis added). EPA’s interpretation, as the agency re-
sponsible for administration of the Clean Water Act, is
18
entitled to deference. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. —_,
112 S.Ct. 1046, 1060 (1992); Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1983).
Finally, the New York Court of Appeals’ opinion turned
on the court’s belief that the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C.
§ 797 et seq., preempts the State from applying its State
water quality statutes during the water quality certification
process for hydroelectric facilities licensed by the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission. The Court was wrong in
finding preemption because the Commission has not acted.
Thus, any finding of preemption is not ripe. See, brief filed
for the United States as amicus curiae supporting affirm-
ance in PUD No. | of Jefferson County and City of Tacoma
v. State of Washington, Department of Ecology, Department
of Fisheries, and Department of Wildlife, No. 92-1911, pp.
22-29, to be argued February 23, 1994. Once the Commis-
sion has acted, assuming its determination conflicts with
that of the State, its “‘determination can be judicially re-
viewed based on a full administrative record and a concrete
controversy. Compare, Escondido Mutual Water Co. v. La-
Jolla Band of Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765, 772-779
(1984).” Br. for the United States as amicus curiae, p. 29.
19
Conclusion
This case raises an important issue which was wrongly
decided by New York’s highest court. The Court of Ap-
peals’ construction of Section 401 of the Clean Water Act
conflicts with the construction given that statute by the State
of Washington’s highest court, the Supreme Court. For the
reasons stated, this Court should grant the writ.
Respectfully submitted,
G. OLIVER KOPPELL
Attorney General of the State
of New York
Attorney for Petitioner
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224
(518) 474-4819
JERRY BOONE
Solicitor General
PETER H. SCHIFF
Deputy Solicitor General
KATHLEEN LISTON MORRISON*
Assistant Attorney General
*Counsel of Record
la
APPENDIX A—Order of the New York State Court of
Appeals.
COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF NEW YORK
The Hon. Judith S. Kaye, Chief Judge, Presiding
3 No. 214
a
In the Matter of
NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION,
Respondent,
Vv.
NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
CONSERVATION, ef al.,
Appellants.
The appellants in the above entitled appeal appeared by
Hon. Robert Abrams, Attorney General of the State of New
York; the respondent appeared by Hiscock & Barclay, Esqs.,
Brian K. Billinson, Esq., Senior Counsel, Niagara Mohawk
2a
and Swidler & Berlin; and amicus curiae appeared by Rich-
ard Roos-Collins, Esq.
The Court, after due deliberation, orders and adjudges
that the order is affirmed, with costs. Opinion by Judge
Bellacosa. Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Simons, Titone,
Smith and Levine concur. Judge Hancock took no part.
The Court further orders that this record of the proceed-
ings in this Court be remitted to the Supreme Court, Albany
County, there to be proceeded upon according to law.
I certify that the preceding contains a correct record of
the proceedings in this appeal in the Court of Appeals and
that the papers required to be filed are attached.
/s/DONALD M. SHERAW
Clerk of the Court
Court of Appeals, Clerk’s Office, Albany, November 11,
1993.
3a
APPENDIX B—Opinion of New York State Court of
Appeals.
In the Matter of NiaAGARA MonHawk Power CORPORATION,
Respondent, v New York State DEPARTMENT OF ENVI-
RONMENTAL CONSERVATION et al., Appellants.
Argued October 7, 1993; decided November 11, 1993
SUMMARY
APPEAL, by permission of the Court of Appeals, from an
order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the
Third Judicial Department, entered January 7, 1993, which
affirmed a judgment of the Supreme Court (Harold J. Hughes,
Jr., J.), entered in Albany County in a combined proceeding
pursuant to CPLR article 78 and action for a declaratory
judgment, denying a motion by respondents to dismiss the
petition on objections in point of law, converting the CPLR
article 78 proceeding to a declaratory judgment action, annull-
ing a ruling of respondent New York State Department of
Environmental Conservation that certain provisions of ECL
article 15 are applicable in assessing issuance of a Clean
Water Act § 401 certification, preempting respondents from
applying those provisions of ECL article 15 as well as ECL
articles 8, 11 and 24 in assessing such certification applica-
tions, and limiting respondents to considering only the water
quality standards set forth in 6 NYCRR 701.19 and 704.2 in
assessing such applications.
Matter of Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v New York State
Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 187 AD2d 7, affirmed. .
HEADNOTE
Environmental Conservation — Water Quality Certification — Hydroe-
lectric Power Projects — Federal Preemption — Scope of Review
of Department of Environmental Conservation
For purposes of issuance of a Clean Water Act § 401 (33 USC § 1341) State
certification that any discharge into navigable waters will comply with the
applicable provisions of the Clean Water Act, the New York State Depart-
ment of Environmental Conservation (DEC) is limited to considering the
water quality standards set forth by the State and approved by the United
States Environmental Protection Agency under section 303 of the Clean
Water Act (33 USC § 1313), which are found only in 6 NYCRR parts 701-
704. Accordingly, with respect to section 401 certification of certain hydroe-
lectric facilities, DEC may not broaden its scope of review under the Clean
Water Act to include aspects of ECL article 15.
4a
TOTAL CLIENT-SERVICE LIBRARY® REFERENCES
: By the Publisher's Editorial Staff
AM JuR 2d, Pollution Control, §§ 141, 154.
CLS, ECL art 15.
33 USCS §§ 1313, 1341.
NY Jur 2d, Environmental Rights and Remedies, §§ 106-
120.
ANNOTATION REFERENCE
See ALR Index under Federal Water Pollution Control
Act; Water Pollution.
POINTS OF COUNSEL
Robert Abrams, Attorney-General, Albany (Kathleen Liston
Morrison, Jerry Boone and Peter H. Schiff of counsel), for
appellants. The Department has the power to consider water
quality impacts beyond water chemistry standards when eval-
uating applications for water quality certifications under sec-
tion 401 of the Clean Water Act. (Monongahela Power Co. v
Marsh, 809 F2d 41, 484 US 816; Keating v Federal Energy
Regulatory Commn., 927 F2d 616; United States v Marathon
Dev. Corp., 867 F2d 96; Matter of Long Lake Energy Corp. v
New York State Dept. of Enutl. Conservation, 164 AD2d 396;
Lake Erie Alliance for Protection of Coastal Corridor v U. S.
Army Corps of Engrs., 526 F Supp 1063, 707 F2d 1392, 464 US
915; Roosevelt Campobello Intl. Park Commn. v United States
Envtl. Protection Agency, 684 F2d 1041; United States Dept. of
Interior v Federal Energy Regulatory Commn., 952 F2d 538.)
Brian K. Billinson, Syracuse, Hiscock & Barclay, Albany
(Timothy P. Sheehan of counsel), and Swidler & Berlin (Ken-
neth G. Jaffe and Joel deJesus of counsel, of the District of
Columbia Bar, admitted pro hac vice), for respondent. I. The
Court below correctly held that the Federal Power Act estab-
lishes a comprehensive scheme of Federal regulation of hy-
.droelectric. projects that, with limited exceptions, preempts
State regulation of hydroelectric facilities within the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission’s jurisdiction. (First Iowa v
Power Commn., 328 US 152; Udall v Federal Power Commn.,
387 US 428; Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm. v United
States Atomic Energy Commn., 449 F2d 1109; California v
Sa
Federal Energy Regulatory Commn., 495 US 490; Sayles Hydro
Assocs. vu Maughan, 985 F2d 451; Matter of Power Auth. v
Williams, 60 NY2d 315.) II. The Court below correctly held
that the “very limited” authority delegated to the States
under section 401 of the Clean Water Act does not extend the
myriad State law provisions that DEC has sought to apply.
(Matter of Power Auth. v Williams, 60 NY2d 315; Cleveland v
United States, 329 US 14; People v Shapiro, 50 NY2d 747;
Matter of de Rham v Diamond, 32 NY2d 34; Fourth Branch
Assocs. v Department of Envtl. Conservation, “146 Misc 2d 334;
Matter of Long Lake Energy Corp. v Department of Envtl.
Conservation, 164 AD2d 396.) III. The panoply of statutes and
regulations that DEC seeks to apply are not water quality
standards under section 303 of the Federal Water Pollution
Control Act and, therefore, are outside the scope of section
401. (Matter of Power Auth. v Williams, 60 NY2d 315; Califor-
nia vu Federal Energy Regulatory Commn., 495 US 490; Matter
of Jackson v New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 67 NY2d 400;
National Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v Public Serv. Commn., 894
F2d 571, 497 US 1004.)
Richard Roos-Collins and Jessica Notini, of the California
Bar, admitted pro hac vice, for New York Rivers United and
others, amici curiae. I. The Federal Power Act does not
preempt DEC’s enforcement of water quality standards. II.
The Court below erred in holding that fish, ‘wildlife, and
recreation are not regulated under the Clean Water Act.
(Matter of de Rham v Diamond, 32 NY2d 34; Fourth Branch
Assocs. v Department of Envtl. Conservation, 146 Misc 2d 334;
Matter of Long Lake Energy Corp. v New York State Depart-
ment of Envtl. Conservation, 164 AD2d 396; Matter of Power
Auth. v Williams, 60 NY2d 315.) II. The Co:>-t below erred in
holding that section 401 (d) conditions ow certification are
limited to Federally approved State laws.
OPINION OF THE COURT
BELLACOSA, J.
The New York State Department of Environmental Conser-
vation (DEC) appeals by leave granted from this Court to
review the Appellate Division’s order affirming Supreme
Court’s judgment in favor of Niagara Mohawk Power Corpora-
tion. We agree with both courts that the DEC’s effort to
broaden its scope of review under the Clean Water Act to
include aspects of ECL article 15 is unfounded. For purposes
6a
of issuance of a Clean Water Act § 401 (833 USC § 1341) State
certification, DEC is limited to considering the water quality
standards set forth by the State and approved by the United
States Environmental Protection Agency under section 303 of
the Clean Water Act (33 USC § 1313). We are satisfied that
Federal preemption principles and policies along with settled
precedents interpreting the complementary statutory scheme
of Federal-State regulatory authority support an affirmance of
the Appellate Division order.
I.
Niagara Mohawk, a private investor-owned utility company
licensed under the Federal Power Act, owns and operates
hydroelectric facilities throughout the State. It applied to the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) for a license
to approve construction of several new facilities, dam repair
and reconstruction work on existing dams and anticipates
filing similar applications in the future.
Under section 401 of the Federal Clean Water Act, before
‘approval of a Federal license, a facility must obtain a “certifi-
cation” from the State regulatory entity—in this case, the
DEC—that the discharge from the new or altered facility
meets with relevant State water quality standards. Basically,
water quality standards are provisions of State and Federal
law, which define the quality goals of a water body or some
portion of it, by designating the use or uses to be made of the
water, by setting criteria necessary to protect the uses, and by
incorporating an antidegradation policy designed to prevent
the gradual deterioration of the quality of the water body.
These criteria are elements of State water quality standards,
expressed as constituent levels or narrative statements, repre-
senting a quality of water that supports a particular use.
States adopt a broad array of water quality standards to
protect the public health or welfare, enhance the quality of
water and serve the purposes of the Clean Water Act, which,
in turn, serve to protect fish, wildlife, recreational use and,
ultimately, aid in the use of the water for public water supply.
Niagara Mohawk did not apply for a State section 401
certification and, instead, initiated a threshold challenge alleg-
ing that DEC has officially declared its intent and jurisdiction
to review Niagara Mohawk’s applications under ECL article
15 in super arrogation of the Federal Power Act. Niagara
Mohawk proceeded by application to DEC in May 1990 pursu-
7a
ant to section 204 of the State Administrative Procedure Act
for a declaratory ruling that ECL article 15, title 5 is not
applicable to a section 401 certification, and that the Federal
Power Act (16 USC § 791a et seq.) preempts and limits DEC’s
reviewing scrutiny to specific-State provisions as they pertain
to the question of whether the project will affect the State’s
water quality as prescribed in 6 NYCRR parts 701 to 704.
By letter opinion dated August 27, 1990, DEC declared that
projects proposed by Niagara Mohawk must also satisfy multi-
ple provisions of the Environmental Conservation Law, includ-
ing the regulatory requirements of the State Environmental
Quality Review Act (ECL art 8) before it will issue the
requisite Clean Water Act § 401 certification.
DEC opined that by enacting section 401, Congress intended
the States to have authority to exact compliance with all
State laws which bear on water quality before granting a
certification. DEC declared the following laws to be applicable
in assessing issuance of the “certification” under a section 401
review:
(a) Protection of Waters: disturbance of stream
beds (ECL 15-0501);
(b) Protection of Waters: dam construction (ECL
15-0503);
(c) Protection of Waters: excavation or fill (ECL 15-
0505); -
(d) Dam Safety (ECL 15-0507),
(e) Reservoir Release (ECL 15-0801 et seq.);
(f) Wild, Scenic and Recreational River System
(ECL 15-2701 et seq.);
(g) Freshwater Wetlands (ECL art 24);
(h) Fish and Wildlife (ECL art 11); and
(i) Environmental Quality Review (ECL art 8).
Niagara Mohawk invoked CPLR article 78 review and
brought a declaratory judgment action seeking annulment of
DEC’s ruling. Its requested relief included a- determination
that the Clean Water Act § 401 certification process allows the
DEC, from the State law’s standpoint and involvement, ‘to
consider the water quality standards set forth only,:in 6
NYCRR 701.19 and 704.2. %
Supreme Court granted judgment to Niagara Mohawk, al-
lowing only a “ ‘determination that a proposed project will
meet the particular water quality standards for the applicable
8a
classification.’ ’ Supreme Court limited DEC to review under
6 NYCRR 701.19 and 704.2, recodified in substantially the
same form and contained within 6 NYCRR parts 701 to 704
(eff Sept. 1, 1991). The Appellate Division affirmed, holding
DEC was restricted to the application of turbidity and temper-
ature change as specified by 6 NYCRR 701 to 704 and conclud-
ing that it could not impose additional water quality analysis
conditions to its section 401 certification.
Il.
We agree with the Appellate Division that the Federal
Power Act establishes a comprehensive scheme of Federal
regulation of hydroelectric projects that essentially preempts
State regulation of hydroelectric facilities within the Federal
Energy Regulatory Commission’s jurisdiction. Settled law in
New York has consistently supported the view that section
401 gives the State regulatory entity only a limited role of
review, based on requirements affecting water quality, not on
all State water quality provisions. Review by State agencies
that would overlap or duplicate the Federal purview and
prerogatives was not contemplated and would infringe on and
potentially conflict with an area of the law dominated by the
nationally uniform Federal statutory scheme. . = '
Niagara Mohawk’s hydroelectric projects are subject to
regulation under part I of the Federal Power Act, which vests
in the FERC comprehensive authority over the. construction,
operation and maintenance of hydroelectric facilities located
on the navigable waters of the United States (16 USC § 797
{e]; § 817 [1]. FERC is required to evaluate and ensure that a
given project is founded on a comprehensive plan for the
adequate protection and enhancement of wildlife and benefi-
cial public uses, including irrigation, flood control and recre-
ational use (16 USC § 803 [a] [1]; § 797 [e]; Electric Consumers
Protection Act, added by Pub L 99-495, 100 US Stat 1243). °
In addition, Niagara Mohawk’s projects are controlled by
the Clean Water Act, which in “anticipat{ing) a partnership
between the States and the Federal Government” (Arkansas vu
Oklahoma, 503 US —, —, 112 S Ct 1046, 1054), establishes a
system for effluent restrictions applicable to different catego-
ries of sources of water pollution (33 USC §§ 1311, 1312, 1313,
1316 and 1317), and defines the role for the States in control-
ling water pollution. p Ava
Under section 303 of the Clean Water Act (33 USC § 1313),
9a
States are authorized to establish “water quality standards”
consisting of the “designated uses of the navigable waters
involved and the water quality criteria for such waters based
upon such uses” (33 USC § 1313 [c] [2] [A]. DEC concedes that
in New York the water quality standards promulgated pursu-
ant to Clean Water Act § 303 are found only in 6 NYCRR
parts 701 to 704. That tie-in is highly relevant.
Section 401 of the Clean Water Act also serves as the
conduit for the incorporation of relevant State water quality
standards in this otherwise Federally filled universe. An appli-
cant for a Federal license or permit authorizing an activity
that may result in a discharge into navigable waters must
provide “a certification from the State in which the discharge
originates or will originate * * * that any such discharge will
comply with the applicable provisions of sections 301, 302,
303, 306, and 307 of [the Clean Water Act]” (33 USC § 1341 [a]
(1}). The State must act on a request for certification within a
reasonable time of receipt, and if the State denies the certifi-
cation, the Federal agency may not issue the license or
permit.
III.
In 1973, Matter of de Rham v Diamond (32 NY2d 34) held
that section 21 (b) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act
(33 USC former § 1171 [b)):
“{RJelinquishes only one element of the otherwise
exclusive jurisdiction granted the Power Commis-
sion by the Federal Power Act. It authorizes States
to: determine and certify only the narrow question
whether there is ‘reasonable assurance’ that the
construction and operation of a proposed project
‘will: not violate applicable water quality stan-
dards’ * * * Congress did not empower the States
to reconsider matters, unrelated to their water
quality standards” (id., at 44).
Nevertheless, DEC relies heavily on a replacement of sec-
tion 21 by the Federal’ Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
ments, later codified as section 401 of the Clean Water Act (33
USC § 1341), as indicating a new and different approach. by
Congress. It suggests that Congress was shifting focus: away
from the quality of a given body of water to a greater empha-
sis on regulating the discharge of effluent and pollution at its
‘ source, and somehow that this was designed to release some of
10a
the exclusive Federal power to the States. These amendments
in 1972, however, had no impact on this Court’s decision in de
Rham. Nor did these amendments impress this Court 10 years
later in 1983, when, in Matter of Power Auth. v Williams (60
NY2d 315, 326-327), we again held that the new section 401
certification process is still accomplished by a determination
that a proposed project will meet the particular water quality
standards related to the applicable classification (see also,
Matter of Long Lake Energy Corp. v New York State Dept. of
Envtl. Conservation, 164 AD2d 396, 401-403). Thus, the Appel-
late Division correctly noted that under settled New York law,
such a broad reach is beyond DEC’s limited delegated powers..
The DEC determination of August 27, 1990, under review in
this case, would have a section 401 applicant supply informa-
tion only indirectly related to water quality. It seeks to
change the thrust of analysis and the force of our precedents
by asserting that section 401 today is different in its impact
and relationship to the States because of the Clean Water Act.
In effect, DEC asks this Court to open the dam of section 303
with respect to the section 401 certification process. DEC
insists that by altering the wording of section 1341 in 1972
and then again in 1977 when creating the Clean Water Act,
Congress returned to the States plenary power over water
quality, eliminating its earlier preemption prerogatives under
the 1935 Federal Power Act. Part of its argument turns on the
fact that Congress’s decision not to include a limiting refer-
ence to section 303 (water quality standards) in section 401 (d),
which deals with a State’s power to impose conditions on a
certification, indicates that Congress did not mean to restrict
conditions on certifications only to those necessary to assure
compliance with section 303 water quality standards. This is
especially so, it argues, since Congress did reference section
303 in section .401 (a) (1), (3), (4) and (5) and omitted it from
section 401 (d). = aie
To support this highly significant turnabout in law and
policy and in the distribution of exclusive and complementary
Federal-States power, DEC also points us to State of Washing-
ton v Public Utility Dist. No. 1 (121 Wash 2d 179, 849 P2d 646
[1993], cert granted — US —, 114 S Ct 55). To be sure, the
Washington Supreme Court, in construing section 401 (d), has
enunciated a broader view of its State’s authority under that
provision. The Supreme Court of Washington considered the
language Congress chose within the context of the Clean
Water Act itself, noting Congress’s “broad purpose” in enact-
lla
ing the Clean Water Act “to restore and maintain the chemi-
cal, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters”
(id., 121 Wash 2d, at 189, 849 P2d, at 651). The court, there-
fore, broadly construed the power granted to the States under
its view of section 401 because the Clean Water Act stated its
purpose in broad terms. “This broad purpose suggests that
what state laws qualify as ‘appropriate’ for purposes of section
401 (d) should also be understood broadly” (id., 121 Wash 2d,
at 189, 849 P2d, at 651-652). The court then noted:
“If Congress intended to refer only to state water
quality standards [in section 401 (d)], it could have
specifically referred to them. That Congress did
not do so is evidence that it intended the phrase
‘any other appropriate requirement of State law’
to refer broadly to all state water quality-related
laws, not just to state water quality standards
adopted pursuant to section 303 [of the Clean
Water Act, 33 USC § 1313)” (id., 121 Wash 2d, at
190, 849 P2d, at 652).
This same type of analysis has been followed by the Oregon
intermediate appellate court in Arnold Irrigation Dist. v
Department of Envtl. Quality (79 Ore App 136, 717 P2d 1274,
1279, review denied 301 Ore 765, 726 P2d 377 [1986]. What-
ever the outcome in the Supreme Court of the United States,
we respectfully reach a different conclusion from those courts
based on our analysis and our precedents.
DEC claims that the replacement of section 21 by section
401 (d) by Congress in 1972 which changed the phrase “appli-
cable water quality standards” to the broader phrase “any
other appropriate requirement of State law” (33 USC § 1341
(d); see also, Senate Conference Report No. 92-1236 accompa-
nying S'2770 [enacted as Pub L 92-500], reprinted in 1972 US
Code Cong & Admin News 3776, 3815) dictates a conclusion
that a section 401 review encompasses all applicable State
water quality standards. One initial problem with this phase
of the argument that persuades us to reject this view is that
section 401 (d) does not control the analysis or outcome here.
That subdivision applies only to the conditioning authority on
a certificate issued by DEC. DEC’s enlarged reading of “appro-
priate requirement of State law” under section 401 (d) would
enable DEC to impose onerous conditions that could contradict
or undermine Federal licensing by superimposing unrelated
conditions not within the EPA mandates and specifications.
12a
Such a strained construction would countermand the carefully
worded authority of section 401 (a) (1). To permit: DEC,
through the conditioning power of subdivision (d), to usurp the
authority that Congress reserved for FERC under the Federal
Power Act, over issues beyond water quality standards di-
rectly relevant to the section 401 certification process, is not
justified and would constitute unfounded statutory construc-
tion.
The Clean Water Act reads simply that a certification shall
issue if a-determination is reached “that any such discharge
will comply with the applicable provisions of sections 301, 302,
303, 306, and 307 of this Act” (83 USC § 1341 [a] [1]). Unlike
the EPA-issued effluent limitations and new source perfor-
mance standards mentioned in section 401 (a) (1) (see, 33 USC
§§ 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317), section 303 water quality standards
are promulgated by each State (see, 33 USC § 1313), but even
section 303 standards must be approved by EPA through a
process delineated in section 303 (33 USC § 1313 [c)).
DEC concedes that in New York the water quality stan-
dards promulgated pursuant to section 303 are linked and
found only in 6 NYCRR parts 701 to 704. Thus, there is
nothing in the new language or legislative history of section
401 that would empower DEC to deny certification on the
basis of broader environmental provisions of New York law or
regulation, nor is there adequate support for DEC’s contention
that the operation and reach of section 401 has been altered
in a way that requires this Court to upset its settled analysis
and resolution of the interrelated questions in Matter of de
Rham v Diamond (32 NY2d 34, supra) and Matter of Power
Auth. v Williams (60 NY2d 315, supra).
Additional support for our conclusion may be found in the
Congressional expression when it amended section 401 in the
Senate Report that “it is reasonable to require that Federal
permits and licenses should take into account State water
quality plans, standards and requirements adopted under
section 303 to assure maintenance of water quality in the
respective States” (Senate Report No. 95-370, accompanying S
1952 [Pub L 95-217], at 72-73, reprinted in 1977 US Code Cong
& Admin News 4397-4398).
Therefore, while DEC is correct that Congress sought in
section 401 to preserve the States’ role in maintaining water
quality, ‘Congress simultaneously maintained essentially
preemptive Federal control by restricting State certification to
SS SpA Pc pe
PERRO EDL CIT NEIL INN ETERS
gt
13a
compliance with requirements issued or approved by EPA.
Congress envisioned that the States’ role would be fulfilled
through the water quality standards adopted in harmony with
and under Clean Water Act § 303 (Matter of Power Auth. v
Williams, 60 NY2d, at 326-327, supra) and therefore, in this
case, only in relation to 6 NYCRR parts 701 to 704.
We have considered all arguments advanced by the parties
and conclude that an affirmance is warranted.
Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be
affirmed, with costs.
Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Simons, TITONE, SMITH and
LEVINE concur; Judge HANCOCK, JR., taking no part.
Order affirmed, with costs.
l4a
APPENDIX C—Reported Opinion of Appellate
Division, Third Department.
In the Matter of NIAGARA Mouawk Power CORPORATION,
Respondent, v New York STate DEPARTMENT OF ENvI-
RONMENTAL CONSERVATION et al., Appellants.
Third Department, January 7, 1993
SUMMARY
APPEAL from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Harold J.
Hughes, Jr., J.), entered July 1, 1991 in Albany County,
which, in a combined proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78
and action for declaratory judgment, granted a petition to
review a determination of respondent Department of Environ-
mental Conservation that, inter alia, certain provisions of ECL
article 15 are applicable to petitioner’s hydroelectric project.
HEADNOTE
Environmental Conservation — Water Quality Certification — Hydro-
electric Power Projects — Federal Preemption
Petitioner utility company, in conjunction with its application to the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) for licenses enabling it to
construct new hydroelectric facilities and perform dam repair or reconstruc-
tion work on existing ones, sought, pursuant to section 401 of the Federal
will issue the certification, Supreme Court Properly determined that Federal
Preemption precluded DEC from requiring a project subject to section 401
aspects of water quality, such as turbidity and temperature change, that are
addressed in regulations promulgated by DEC in accordance with the Clean
FERC-regulated projects well beyond that intended by Congress. The actual
provisions of the ECL which DEC seeks to invoke address the very matters
that have been reserved by the FPA for determination at the Federal level;
environmental and conservation factors of concern to a State are to be
weighed at the Federal level, and to allow them to serve as a predicate for a
State “veto” of the Project is indefensible for it would effectively undermine
15a
TOTAL CLIENT-SERVICE LIBRARY® REFERENCES
By the Publisher's Editorial Staff
Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law, §74; Public Utilities,
§ 292.
16 USCS § 791a; 33 USCS § 1341.
NY Jur 2d, Constitutional Law, § 104; Environmental
Rights and Remedies, § 143.
ANNOTATION REFERENCE -
See ALR Index under Federal Power Act and Commission;
Hydroelectric Power; Pre-emption.
APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL
Robert Abrams, Attorney-General, Albany (Kathleen Liston
Morrison, Peter H. Schiff, Val E. Washington and Maureen F
Leary of counsel), for appellants.
Brian K. Billinson, Syracuse, and Hiscock & Barclay, Al-
bany (Timothy P. Sheehan of counsel), for respondent.
OPINION OF THE COURT
YESAWICH JR., J.
Petitioner, a private, investor-owned utility company which
owns and operates hydroelectric facilities throughout the
State, recently applied to the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (hereinafter FERC) for licenses enabling it to
construct several new facilities and to perform dam repair or
reconstruction work on existing ones, and anticipates filing
similar additional applications in the near future. Section 401
of the Federal Clean Water Act (33 USC § 1341) provides that
when such proposed construction or repair will result in any
discharge into navigable waters, the applicant must obtain,
from the State in which the discharge originates, a certifica-
tion that the discharge meets certain Federal and State water
quality requirements (see, 33 USC § 1341 [a]. In response to
insistence by respondent Department of Environmental Con-
servation (hereinafter DEC) that the projects proposed by
petitioner must satisfy many different provisions of the ECL
(all of which ostensibly, directly or indirectly, affect water
quality), including the regulatory requirements of the State
Environmental Quality Review Act (ECL art 8; hereinafter
SEQRA) before it will issue the requisite certification, peti-
16a
tioner applied to DEC for a declaratory ruling that the Fed-
eral Power Act (hereinafter FPA; 16 USC §791la et seq.)
preempts DEC’s authority to require compliance with these
State laws. On August 27, 1990, DEC ruled that by enacting
section 401 of the Clean Water Act, Congress intended the
States to have authority to exact compliance with all State
laws which bear on water quality before granting a certifica-
tion, or to condition that certification upon such compliance.
Petitioner thereupon instituted this combined CPLR article
78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action, seeking an-
nulment of DEC’s declaratory ruling and a declaration that
the section 401 certification process only allows DEC, with
respect to State law, to consider the water quality standards
set forth in 6 NYCRR parts 701-704. Respondents answered
and moved to dismiss. Supreme Court determined that Fed-
eral preemption precluded DEC from requiring a project
subject to section 401 certification to undergo the sweeping
review sought by DEC. Respondents appeal.
There is no dispute that the FPA establishes a comprehen-
sive scheme pursuant to which all hydroelectric projects are to
be licensed and regulated by FERC, and that this legislation
generally preempts the application of State law, including
licensing and permitting requirements, to such projects (see,
First Iowa Coop. v Power Commn., 328 US 152, 167-168, 181;
Matter of deRham v Diamond, 32 NY2d 34, 44). However, the
Clean Water Act contains a narrow exception to FERC’s
exclusive jurisdiction, insofar as it empowers States to certify
whether a project complies with its water quality require-
ments and makes such a State certification necessary before a
license may be granted (see, 33 USC § 1341 [a]). At issue here
is the breadth of a State’s power engendered by this exception.
Recently, we held that DEC’s authority in this area, which
has been likened to a veto power, encompassed the right to
request certain information from the applicant (Matter of
Long Lake Energy Corp. v New York State Dept. of Envitl.
Conservation, 164 AD2d 396, 401-403); significantly, the infor-
mation sought bore on aspects of water quality, such as
turbidity and temperature change, that were addressed in the
regulations, found at 6 NYCRR parts 701-704,* which DEC
promulgated in accordance with the Clean Water Act. In so
* The water quality standards set forth in 6 NYCRR parts 701-704 relate
to taste, color, odor, turbidity, suspended and dissolved solids, pH, dissolved
oxygen, coliform, thermal discharges, and other chemicals and substances.
17a
doing, we explicitly recognized the “very limited nature of the
activity left by 33 USC § 1341 (Clean Water Act § 401] to State
action”, and noted that “ ‘the standards adopted by [DEC] and
Federally approved * * * relating to such things as turbidity
and temperature change’ ” were the basis for DEC’s request
for information, including plans for the proposed facility
(supra, at 402-403 [emphasis in original]). We are now asked
by respondents to declare that other statutory and regulatory
provisions, more indirectly related to water quality, may be
used as a basis for review under section -401. Because we
believe that to do so would extend DEC’s “veto power” over
FERC-regulated projects well beyond that intended by Con-
gress, we affirm the judgment of Supreme Court.
Respondents have attempted to justify DEC’s consideration
of various sections of the ECL, including ECL 15-0501 (distur-
bance of stream beds), 15-0503 (dam construction), 15-0507
(dam safety), 15-0801 et seg. (reservoir releases), 15-2701 et seq.
(wild, scenic, and recreational rivers), article 24 (freshwater
wetlands), article 11 (fish and wildlife), and article 8 (environ-
mental quality review), as part of the certification process on
the ground that the language of section 401 (d) of the Clean
Water Act (33 USC § 1341 [d]) allows State certification to be
conditioned on compliance with “any other appropriate re-
quirement of State law”; but this merely begs the question as
to which laws are “appropriate”. Respondents argue that any
provision protective of water quality, in any manner, may be
applied. To support their contention, respondents submit a
letter from the Federal Environmental Protection Agency
(hereinafter EPA), the agency charged with administering the
Clean Water Act, to FERC wherein the EPA observes that
“water quality involves far more than just addressing water
chemistry”. However, the EPA acknowledges that State water
quality standards, adopted in accordance with the guidelines
of section 303 of the Clean Water Act (33 USC § 1313) (i.e., use
designations and quality standards to preserve the designated
uses), “form the backbone” of the certification process set
forth in section 401 of the Clean Water Act (33 USC § 1341),
and goes on to note that these water quality standards are not
limited to “chemical-specific criteria”, but rather that States
are encouraged to adopt both narrative and numerical crite-
ria, and will shortly be required to include biological criteria.
Thus, even the EPA recognizes that the proper mechanism by
which a State may apply water quality provisions to a project
licensed under the FPA is by adopting standards under sec-
18a
tion 303, which, if Federally approved, may then be enforced
as part of the certification procedure (see also, Matter of Power
Auth. uv Williams, 60 NY2d 315, 327, n 3).
When the actual provisions of the ECL which DEC seeks to
invoke are examined, it is clear that they address the very
matters that have been reserved by the FPA for determina-
tion at the Federal level—dam safety, general balancing of
economic and other concerns, the effect on wildlife, recre-
ational opportunities and the like. The 1986 amendments to
the FPA, which require FERC to consider fish and wildlife
habitats, recreational opportunities and environmental quality
in general as part of the licensing process, indicate that
Congress intended such matters to remain within the Federal
domain, as factors to be balanced against other concerns, such
as the power and development purposes of the proposed
facility for which a license is sought (see, 16 USC § 797 [e}). It
is also noteworthy that Congress has provided that FERC
must consider any comprehensive plan prepared by a State,
and must solicit and entertain recommendations of State
agencies regarding flood control, recreation, navigation, and
fish or wildlife concerns (see, 16 USC § 803); indeed, a consulta-
tion procedure exists which insures that States will have an
opportunity to have input in this regard (see, 18 CFR 4.38).
This is a further indication that environmental and conserva-
tion factors of concern to a State are to be weighed at the
Federal level; to allow them to serve as a predicate for a State
“veto” of the project is indefensible for it would effectively
undermine the intent of Congress (see, Calvert Cliffs’ Coordi-
nating Comm. v United States Atomic Energy Commn., 449
F2d 1109, 1123).
Weiss, P. J., Mercure, Crew III and Casey, JJ., concur.
Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.
19a
APPENDIX D—Original Opinion and Order of
Appellate Division, Third Department.
SUPREME COURT—APPELLATE DIVISION
THIRD JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Decided and Entered: January 7, 1993
*
IN THE MATTER OF NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER
CORPORATION,
Respondent,
v
NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
CONSERVATION et al.,
Appellants.
65306
*
OPINION AND ORDER
Calendar Date: November 19, 1992
Before: Weiss, P.J., Yesawich Jr., Mercure, Crew III and
Casey, J.J.
Robert Abrams, Attorney-General (Kathleen Liston Mor-
rison of counsel), Albany, for appellants.
Brian K. Billinson, Syracuse, for respondent.
Yesawich Jr., J.
Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Hughes,
J.), entered July 1, 1991 in Albany County, which granted
20a
petitioner’s application, in a combined proceeding pursuant
to CPLR article 78 and action for declaratory judgment, to
review a determination of respondent Department of Envi-
ronmental Conservation that, inter alia, certain provisions
of ECL article 15 are applicable to petitioner’s hydroelectric
project.
Petitioner, a private, investor-owned utility company
which owns and operates hydroelectric facilities throughout
the State, recently applied to the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (hereinafter FERC) for licenses enabling it to
construct several new facilities and to perform dam repair or
reconstruction work on existing ones, and anticipates filing
similar additional applications in the near future. Section
401 of the Federal Clean Water Act (33 USC § 1341)
provides that when such proposed construction or repair
will result in any discharge into navigable waters, the appli-
cant must obtain, from the state in which the discharge
originates, a certification that the discharge meets certain
Federal and State water quality requirements (see, 33 USC §
1341 [a]). In response to insistence by respondent Depart-
ment of Environmental Conservation (hereinafter DEC) that
the projects proposed by petitioner must satisfy many differ-
ent provisions of the ECL (all of which ostensibly, directly
or indirectly, affect water quality), including the regulatory
requirements of the State Environmental Quality Review
Act (ECL art 8) (hereinafter SEQRA) before it will issue the
requisite certification, petitioner applied to DEC for a de-
claratory ruling that the Federal Power Act (hereinafter
FPA) (16 USC § 791a et seq.) preempts DEC’s authority to
require compliance with these State laws. On August 27,
1990, DEC ruled that by enacting section 401 of the Clean
Water Act, Congress intended the states to have authority to
exact compliance with all state laws which bear on water
2la
quality before granting a certification, or to condition that
certification upon such compliance.
Petitioner thereupon instituted this combined CPLR arti-
cle 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action, seeking
annulment of DEC’s declaratory ruling and a declaration
that the section 401 certification process only allows DEC,
with respect to State law, to consider the water quality
standards set forth in 6 NYCRR parts 701-704. Respondents
answered and moved to dismiss. Supreme Court determined
that Federal preemption precluded DEC from requiring a
project subject to section 401 certification to undergo the
Sweeping review sought by DEC. Respondents appeal.
There is no dispute that the FPA establishes a comprehen-
sive scheme pursuant to which all hydroelectric projects are
to be licensed and regulated by FERC, and that this legisla-
tion generally preempts the application of state law, includ-
ing licensing and permitting requirements, to such projects
(see, First lowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v Federal Power
Commn., 328 US 152, 167-168, 181, Matter of de Rham v
Diamond, 32 NY2d 34, 44). However, the Clean Water Act
contains a narrow exception to FERC’s exclusive jurisdic-
tion, insofar as it empowers states to certify whether a
project complies with its water quality requirements and
makes such a state certification necessary before a license
may be granted (see, 33 USC § 1341 [a]). At issue here is
the breadth of a state’s power engendered by this exception.
Recently, we held that DEC’s authority in this area, which
has been likened to a veto power, encompassed the right to
request certain information from the applicant (Matter of
Long Lake Energy Corp. v New York State Dept. of Envtl.
Conservation, 164 AD2d 396, 401-403); significantly, the
information sought bore on aspects of water quality, such as
turbidity and temperature change, that were addressed in the
22a
regulations, found at 6 NYCRR parts 701-704!, which DEC
promulgated in accordance with the Clean Water Act. In so
doing, we explicitly recognized the “very limited nature of
the activity left by 33 USC § 1341 [Clean Water Act § 401]
to State action”, and noted that “the standards adopted by
[DEC] and Federally approved *** relating to such things as
turbidity and temperature change” were the basis for DEC’s
request for information, including plans for the proposed
facility (id., at 402-403 [emphasis in original]). We are now
asked by respondents to declare that other statutory and
regulatory provisions, more indirectly related to water qual-
ity, may be used as a basis for review under section 401.
Because we believe that to do so would extend DEC’s “‘veto
power” over FERC-regulated projects well beyond that
intended by Congress, we affirm the judgment of Supreme
Court.
Respondents have attempted to justify DEC’s considera-
tion of various sections of the ECL, including ECL
§ 15-0501 (disturbance of stream beds), ECL 15-0503 (dam
construction), ECL 15-0507 (dam safety), ECL 15-0801 et
seq. (reservoir releases), ECL 15-2701 et seq. (wild, scenic,
and recreational rivers), ECL article 24 (freshwater wet-
lands), ECL article 11 (fish and wildlife), and ECL article 8
(environmental quality review), as part of the certification
process on the ground that the language of section 401 (d) of
the Clean Water Act (33 USC § 1341 [d]) allows state
certification to be conditioned on compliance with “any
other appropriate requirement of State law’’; but this merely
begs the question as to which laws are “appropriate”. Re-
spondents argue that any provision protective of water qual-
'The water quality standards set forth in 6 NYCRR parts 701-704
relate to taste, color, odor, turbidity, suspended and dissolved solids,
pH, dissolved oxygen, coliform, thermal discharges, and other chemi-
cals and substances.
23a
ity, in any manner, may be applied. To support their conten-
tion, respondents submit a letter from the Federal Environ-
mental Protection Agency (hereinafter EPA), the agency
charged with administering the Clean Water Act, to FERC
wherein the EPA observes that “‘water quality involves far
more than just addressing water chemistry”. However, the
EPA acknowledges that state water quality standards,
adopted in accordance with the guidelines of section 303 of
the Clean Water Act (33 USC § 1313) (i.e., use designations
and quality standards to preserve the designated uses),
“form the backbone”’ of the certification process set forth
in section 401 of the Clean Water Act (33 USC § 1341), and
goes on to note that these water quality standards are not
limited to “‘chemical-specific criteria’, but rather that
States are encouraged to adopt both narrative and numerical
criteria, and will shortly be required to include biological
criteria. Thus, even the EPA recognizes that the proper
mechanism by which a state may apply water quality provi-
sions to a project licensed under the FPA is by adopting
standards under section 303, which, if Federally approved,
may then be enforced as part of the certification procedure
(see also, Matter of Power Auth. of State of N.Y. v Williams,
60 NY2d 315, 327 n 3).
When the actual provisions of the ECL which DEC seeks
to invoke are examined, it is clear that they address the very
matters that have been reserved by the FPA for determina-
tion at the Federal level—dam safety, general balancing of
economic and other concerns, the effect on wildlife, recre-
ational opportunities and the like. The 1986 amendments to
the FPA, which require FERC to consider fish and wildlife
habitats, recreational opportunities and environmental qual-
ity in general as part of the licensing process, indicate that
Congress intended such matters to remain within the Federal
domain, as factors to be balanced against other concerns,
24a
such as the power and development purposes of the pro-
posed facility for which a license is sought (see, 16 USC §
797 [e]). It is also noteworthy that Congress has provided
that FERC must consider any comprehensive plan prepared
by a state, and must solicit and entertain recommendations
of state agencies regarding flood control, recreation, naviga-
tion, and fish or wildlife concerns (see, 16 USC § 803);
indeed, a consultation procedure exists which insures that
states will have an opportunity to have input in this regard
(see, 18 CFR 4.38). This is a further indication that environ-
mental and conservation factors of concern to a state are to
be weighed at the Federal level; to allow them to serve as a
predicate for a state “veto” of the project is indefensible for
it would effectively undermine the intent of Congress (see,
Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm. v United States Atomic
Energy Commn., 449 F2d 1109, 1123).
Weiss, P.J., Mercure, Crew III and Casey, JJ., concur.
ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.
ENTER:
/S/MICHAEL J. NOVACK
MICHAEL J. NOVACK
Clerk
Sai al lly a od aN ted NY
- 2 t . - 5
LO te a SO en Coe a 2 teers St eee ee Ceara
ak BD A Nelly hea 8 Dott it adh
BaRin Fe He Otay eb de eh ek Cl Bh ol areal ARNE? Baia WeK ace ce naw mopl
25a
APPENDIX E—Memorandum Decision of New York
Supreme Court, Albany County.
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF ALBANY
In the Matter of the Application of
NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
against
NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CON-
SERVATION, COMMISSIONER THOMAS G. JORLING and
DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AND GENERAL COUNSEL MARC
S. GERSTMAN,
Respondents.
(Supreme Court, Albany County, Special Term,
February 15, 1991)
(RJI No. 0191-ST2860)
(JUSTICE HAROLD J. HUGHES, Presiding)
Appearances:
Brian K. Billinson, Esq., Attorney for Petitioner, 300 Erie
Boulevard West, Syracuse, New York 13202.
Hon. Robert Abrams, Attorney General of New York
State, Attorney for Respondents, (Maureen F. Leary, Esq.,
of Counsel), NYS Department of Law, The Capitol, Albany,
New York 12224
26a
HUGHES, J.:
Petitioner seeks ‘‘a judgment pursuant to CPLR Article
78 determining that the Respondents’ decision dated August
27, 1990 in response to a request for a certain declaratory
ruling is erroneous as a matter of law, arbitrary and capri-
cious; that the Federal Power Act preempts the New York
State Department of Environmental Conservation (““DEC’’)
from applying the substantive provisions of Environmental
Conservation Law §§15-0501, 15-0503, 15-0505, 15-0507,
15-0801 et seq., 15-2701 et seq. and Articles 8, 11 and 24 to
hydroelectric projects such as those undertaken and planned
by Niagara, that the Section 401 Certification process only
allows the DEC, with respect to State Law, to consider the
water quality standards set forth in 6 NYCRR §§701.19 and
704.2”. The respondents have served both a motion to
dismiss the petition upon objections in point of law, as well
as an answer containing objections in point of law and a
return.
The petition asserts that as part of its operation as a public
electric and gas utility Niagara Mohawk owns and operates
73 hydroelectric generating facilities on navigable waters in
New York State. It is alleged that under to the Federal Power
Act (FPA) the Federal Energy Regulation Commission
(FERC) has exclusive jurisdiction to issue licenses for the
construction and operation of hydroelectric generating
plants located on navigable waters. It is allegec that pur-
suant to section 401 of the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 USC
§1341, FERC will not issue a license or permit until the
state involved has certified that the project will not contra-
vene that state’s water quality standards. In New York State
the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) is
the State agency which issues the section 401 approval. It is
alleged that DEC has been subjecting Niagara Mohawk’s
27a
section 401 certification applications to review under article
15 of the Environmental Conservation Law in violation of
the FPA which preempts the field.
To eliminate that double review, Niagara Mohawk applied
to DEC pursuant to section 204 of the State Administrative
Procedure Act for a declaratory ruling that Article 15, Title
5, of the Environmental Conservation Law is not applicable
upon a request for section 401 certification as the FPA
preempts the field except for the issue of whether the project
will affect the State’s water quality standards. DEC issued a
declaratory ruling on August 27, 1990, stating that the ques-
tion of federal preemption cannot properly be resolved by
the use of a declaratory ruling, and further stating that in its
opinion applications for 401 certification were subject to
review under the following State laws:
“*(a) Protection of Water: disturbance of stream beds
[ECL §15-0501];
(b) Protection of Waters: dam construction [ECL
§15-0503];
(c) Protection of Waters: excavation or fill (ECL
15-0505];
(d) Dam Safety [ECL §15-0507};
(e) Reservoir Releases [ECL §15-0801 et seq.];
(f) Wild, Scenic and Recreational River System
[ECL 15-2700, et seq.};
(g) Freshwater Wetlands [ECL Article 24];
(h) Fish and Wildlife [ECL Article 11]; and
(i) Environmental Quality Review [ECL Article
oF
This article 78 proceeding ensued. The Court will address
the objections in point of law first. Although it is difficult to
determine what objections in point of law are being raised
28a
by the notice of motion dated February 7, 1991, one of them
appears to be that:
“A declaratory ruling in response to Niagara’s
petition would have forced NYSDEC to interpret the
FPA and its relationship to the CWA and State law. I
determined that issuing a declaratory ruling that in-
terpreted federal laws and regulations was clearly
outside the scope of the Department’s authority
granted to 6 NYCRR § 619.2 and was therefore an
inappropriate means of resolving the issues raised in
Niagara’s declaratory ruling petition” (paragraph 6
of the affidavit of Mark S. Gerstman sworn to Febru-
ary 8, 1991)”’.
It is obvious that Deputy Commissioner Gerstman felt
that the Department’s authority to issue declaratory rulings
was established by 6 NYCRR 619.2, and that this section
precluded interpreting federal statutes. The Deputy Com-
missioner is in error. The Legislature, although not dealing
with the issue of preemption, expressly determined in enact-
ing subdivision (2) of section 206 of the State Administra-
tive Procedure Act that:
“Any person subject to a requirement imposed by
a state statute or rule and to a similar requirement
imposed by the federal government, may pursuant to
section two hundred four of this chapter, petition the
agency administering the state requirement for a de-
claratory ruling as to whether compliance with the
federal requirement will be accepted as compliance
with the state requirement. Upon receipt of such
petition, the agency shall submit a copy thereof to
29a
the office of business permits and regulatory
assistance”.
This provision establishes that the Legislature intended
that federal statutes and rules can be interpreted by a state
agency in issuing an administrative ruling. To the extent that
6 NYCRR 619.3 conflicts with the legislative will, it must
yield. Although section 206 of the State Administrative
Procedure Act does not expressly deal with a preemption
question, its signals a legislative intent that a New York
resident subjected to similar federal and state laws can
obtain a declaratory ruling from the agency implementing
the state laws as to whether he has to comply with the state
or federal requirements. There appears to be no good reason
to exempt preemption from the declaratory ruling process
(see Matter of Power Auth. of State of N.Y. v New York State
Dept. of Environmental Conservation, 58 NY2d 427, 433,
434). A declaratory ruling by DEC upon a preemption issue
is subject to article 78 review (Matter of Northeast Mines,
Inc. v State of New York Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 113
AD2d 62).
30a
The next objection in point of law is that the petition is
barred by the four-month statute of limitations set forth in
CPLR section 217. That argument lacks merit, as this pro-
ceeding was brought within four months after the issuance
of the declaratory ruling. The Court has considered the
remaining objections in point of law and find that they lack
merit.
Turning to the merits, the Court of Appeals has held that
the “‘section 401 certification process is accomplished by a
determination that a proposed project will meet the particu-
lar water quality standards for the applicable classification”
(Matter of Power Auth. v Flacke, 60 NY2d 315, 326, 327).
In Fourth Branch Assocs. v Department of Envtl. Conserva-
tion, 146 Misc2d 334, Mr. Justice Harris held that the
review powers of DEC under a section 401 certification
request did not include subjecting the project to SEQRA
review. In the unreported decision of Fourth Branch Assocs.
v Department of Envtl. Conservation, Supreme Court, Al-
bany County Special Term, J. Harris, November 28, 1989,
Judge Harris held that federal preemption precluded sub-
jecting a 401 certification application to article 15 review.
This Court agrees with both holdings (see Matter of Long
Lake Energy Corp. v New York State Department of Envi-
ronmental Conservation, AD2d —_, Third Depart-
ment, decided December 6, 1990). To the extent necessary,
this proceeding will be converted to a declaratory judgment
action.
The petitioner will be awarded a judgment for the relief
requested in the notice of petition. Petitioner is directed to
submit a proposed judgment on notice.
Dated: April 1, 1991
3la
APPENDIX F—Order of New York Supreme Court,
Albany County
At a Special Term of the Supreme Court of the
State of New York, held in and for the County
of Albany, at the Albany County Courthouse,
Albany, New York, on the 15th day of Febru-
ary, 1991.
PRESENT:
HON. HAROLD J. HUGHES
SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK
COUNTY OF ALBANY
*
In the Matter of the Application of
NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION,
Petitioner,
- against -
THE NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL
CONSERVATION, THOMAS C. JORLING, COMMISSIONER, .
and MARC S. GERSTMAN, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AND
GENERAL COUNSEL,
Respondents.
Index No. 7218-90
RJI No. 0191-ST2860
Upon reading and filing of the notice of petition, dated
December 21, 1990, the verified petition, dated December
32a
19, 1990, and the memorandum of law submitted therewith
by petitioner Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation; and
The notice of motion to dismiss the petition on objections
in point of law, dated February 7, 1991, the affidavit of
Marc S. Gerstman, sworn to on February 8, 1991, the veri-
fied answer and certified return, dated February 8, 1991,
and the memorandum of law submitted therewith by re-
spondents, New York State Department of Environmental
Conservation, Commissioner Thomas C. Jorling, and Dep-
uty Commissioner and General Counsel Marc S. Gerstman;
and
The affidavit of Brian K. Billinson in opposition to re-
spondent’s motion to dismiss, sworn to on February 13,
1991; and
The matter having been heard at a Term of this Court
before the Honorable Harold J. Hughes on the 15th day of
February, 1991, and the petitioner having appeared by its
attorney, Brian K. Billinson, Esq., of counsel, and the re-
spondents having appeared by their attorney, Maureen F.
Leary, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, of counsel, and the
Court having heard the arguments of counsel; and
Upon due deliberation and in accordance with the Court’s
April 1, 1991 decision, a copy of which is annexed hereto
and incorporated herein, it is hereby
ORDERED, that Respondents’ motion to dismiss the
petition on objections in point of law is hereby denied; and
it is further
ORDERED, that this proceeding is hereby converted to a
declaratory judgment action pursuant to CPLR § 103; and it
is further
ORDERED, that judgment as requested in the Petition is
hereby awarded to Petitioners annulling Respondents’
August 27, 1990 ruling; preempting Respondents from ap-
plying the substantive provisions of ECL §§ 15-0501,
33a
15-0503, 15-0505, 15-0507, 15-0801, et seq., 15-2701, et
~seg.- and Articles 8, 11 and 24 of the Environmental Conser-
vation Law to hydroelectric projects by Petitioner and li-
censed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission un-
der the Federal Power Act; and limiting Respondents to
considering only the water quality standards set forth in 6
NYCRR § 701.19 and 704.2 during Respondents’ Clean
Water Act § 401 of hydroelectric projects undertaken by
Petitioner and licensed by the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission under the Federal Power Act.
Signed this 19th day of June, 1991.
ENTER:
/sfHAROLD J. HUGHES
HON. HAROLD J. HUGHES
Justice of the Supreme Court
34a
APPENDIX G—Environmental Conservation Law
$§ 15-0501, 15-0503, 15-0505 and 15-0507.
TITLE 5—PROTECTION OF WATER
§ 15-0501. Protection of certain streams; disturbances of
stream beds; permit
1. Except as provided in subdivisions 4, 5, 6 and 7 of this
section, no person or public corporation shall change, modify or
disturb the course, channel or bed of any stream as defined in
subdivision 2, or remove any sand, gravel or other material from
the bed or banks of such a stream without a permit issued pur-
suant to subdivision 3 of this section.
2. For the purposes of this section, stream shall mean that
portion of any fresh surface watercourse, except lakes or ponds
having a surface area greater than ten acres at mean low water
level, for which the department has adopted or may hereafter
adopt pursuant to section 17-0301, any of the following classi-
fications or standards:
AA and AA(T),
A and A(T),
B and B(T),
C(T).
Small ponds or lakes with a surface area at mean low water
level of ten acres or less, located in the course of a stream, shall
be considered a part of the stream and subject to regulation under
this section.
3. Permit.
a. Before granting a permit, a permit renewal or a permit
modification pursuant to this section, the department shall ascer-
tain the probable effect on the health, safety and welfare of the
people of the state, and the effect on the natural resources of the
state, including soil, forests, water, fish and aquatic resources
therein, likely to result from the proposed project or work.
b. In order to minimize the disturbance of a stream and in
order to prevent unreasonable erosion of soil, increased turbidity
of the waters, irregular variations in velocity, temperature and
level of waters, the loss of fish and aquatic wildlife and the
destruction of natural habitat thereof, and the danger of flood or
pollution, the department shall review the permit application or
request for renewal or modification of an existing permit and may
approve the manner and the extent to which the stream bed or
channel may be changed, altered or modified and may limit the
quantity of sand, gravel or other material to be removed, desig-
nate the location in the bed, channel or banks of the stream from
which the sand, gravel or other material may be removed, or it
may deny the permit or request.
c. The rules and regulations adopted by the department to
implement this section and the provisions of article 70 of this
chapter and rules and regulations adopted thereunder shall govern
the processing of permit applications, renewals, modifications,
suspensions and revocations under this section.
4. No permit under this section shall be required of any local
public corporation which has entered into a written memorandum
of understanding with the department establishing the plan of
operation to be followed in carrying out projects or work affect-
ing water courses so as to afford proper protection to the public
beneficial uses of such water courses.
36a
5. No permit under this section shall be required of any state
department or state public corporation. State departments and
state public corporations may enter into a written memorandum
of understanding with the department concerning projects or
work of the type for which a permit would be required under this
section if the project or work were undertaken by a person or
local public corporation. The memorandum may establish pro-
cedures for review by the department of the plans for such
projects or work and for written recommendations by the depart-
ment with respect thereto.
6. No permit under this section shall be required for emer-
gency work in a stream or on its banks which is immediately
necessary to protect the health, safety and well-being of any
person or persons or to prevent damage to personal or real prop-
erty, provided that the department is given written notification by
registered mail or telegraph within forty-eight hours after the
commencement of the work and within forty-eight hours follow-
ing the completion of such work. Whenever emergency work is
performed as provided in this subdivision, it shall be performed
in a manner that will cause the least change, modification, distur-
bance or damage to the course or bed of the stream and its banks.
7. No permit under this section shall be required for certain
agricultural activities of persons and «urporations actively culti-
vating land devoted to agriculture whether or not the same be
along a stream or watercourse as described in subdivision 2;
providing that these agricultural activities consist only of cross-
ing and recrossing of such streams or watercourses by livestock
or by wheeled farm equipment normally used for traditional
agricultural purposes; or the use of such stream or watercourse
for withdrawal of water for irrigation where such withdrawal
does not require altering the bed, banks or course of the stream in
any manner.
37a
8. The requirements of this section shall be in addition to those
specified in section 15-0505 of this title, provided however, that
the department may, by rule and regulation, provide that only one
application for a permit or request for renewal or modification of
an existing permit need be filed with the proposed project or
work requires a department permit under this section and section
15-0505 of this title.
(L.1972, c. 664, § 2; amended L.1973, c. 489, § 1; L.1976, c.
301, § 1; L.1979, c. 233, § 1.)
§ 15-0503. Protection of water bodies; permit
1. Except as provided in subdivision 4 of this section
a. No dam or impoundment structure, including any artificial
obstruction, temporary or permanent, in or across a natural stream
or water course, shall be erected, constructed, reconstructed or
repaired by any person or local public corporation without a
permit issued pursuant to subdivision 3 of this section.
od. Except where a lease or other appropriate conveyance of an
interest authorizing the use and occupancy of state-owned lands
underwater has been obtained from the commissioner of general
Services pursuant to subdivision seven of section seventy-five of
the public lands law, no dock, wharf, platform, breakwater, moor-
ing, or other structure in, on or above waters shall be erected,
placed, constructed, reconstructed, or expanded after the effec-
tive date of this paragraph by any person or local public corpora-
tion without a permit issued pursuant to subdivision 3 of this
section. The term “reconstructed” as used in this section shall
mean the substantial rebuilding of structures or facilities and shall
not apply to ordinary maintenance or repair of existing functional
structures or facilities, such as repainting, redriving pilings or
replacing broken boards in docks.
38a
c. A city, town, village or county may submit to the commis-
sioner a local law or ordinance regulating docks or other struc-
tures as described in paragraph b of this subdivision. The com-
missioner shall review such law or ordinance to determine
whether it provides environmental protection comparable to, or
greater than, the provisions of such paragraph and any regulations
promulgated thereunder. If the commissioner determines that the
local law or ordinance submitted meets such requirements, the
commissioner may delegate, upon such terms and conditions as
he or she deems appropriate, to the local government the
authority to administer the permit program and to charge a fee for
permit processing. Any delegation may be revoked by the com-
missioner if he or she finds that the local government has failed to
carry out the program in accordance with the terms of the
delegation.
2. For the purposes of this section, a dam or impoundment
structure shall include, but shall not be limited to, earth fiils, with
or without controllable outlet gates, and roads, bridges or fords
which unduly impede the flow of water.
3. Permits. a. Before granting a permit, a permit renewal or a
permit modification pursuant to this section, the department shall
ascertain the probable effect on the health, safety and welfare of
the people of the state, and the effect on the natural resources of
the state likely to result from the proposed project or work.
b. The department shall review the permit application or re-
quest for renewal or modification of an existing permit and may
approve the manner and extent to which the waters of the state or
the banks and shore thereof will be affected by the proposed
project or work and may grant or deny the permit or request, or
may grant the permit or request with such conditions as might
appear necessary to safeguard life, property and natural resources
during and after the execution of the proposed project or work.
39a
c. The rules and regulations adopted by the commissioner to
implement this section and the provisions of article 70 of this
chapter and rules and regulations adopted thereunder shall govern
permit applications, renewals, modifications, suspensions and
revocations under this section.
d. The requirements of this section shall be in addition to those
specified in sections 15-0501 and 15-0505 of this title, provided
however, that the department may, by rule and regulation, pro-
vide that only one application for a permit or request for renewal
or modification of an existing permit need be filed when the
proposed project or work requires a department permit under this
section and any other section of this title.
4. The requirement of a permit pursuant to this section shall
not apply to the following facilities:
a. A structure used for impounding water where the area drain-
ing into the pond or other body of impounded water formed
thereby does not exceed one square mile, unless (1) the impound-
ing structure is more than ten feet in height above the bed of the
stream at any point or (2) unless the quantity of water which the
structure impounds exceeds one million gallons; or
b. A farm pond erected upon lands devoted to farming for the
purpose of soil conservation, propagation of fish, irrigation, wa-
tering of livestock, maintenance of wildlife or general farm use
which is formed by an earth embankment with an all-earth vege-
tated spillway and other accessory structures, unless (1) the
height of earth embankment, measured from the top thereof to the
lowest point of the excavation in the reservoir area, exceeds
fifteen feet; or (2) the capacity of the farm pond exceeds one
million five hundred thousand gallons measured as the total
volume of water which would be impounded if the surface of the
water were at the bottom of the spillway at its highest point; or (3)
the area draining into the farm pond exceeds two hundred acres;
40a
or (4) the pond comprises more than ten acres of surface water
when full; or (5) the water to said farm pond is diverted into said
pond by an artificial obstruction in or across a natural stream or
water course.
¢. A dock, pier, wharf or other structure used solely as a
landing place on water providing dockage for five or fewer boats
and encompassing within its outer perimeter an area less than
four thousand square feet;
d. A mooring facility providing mooring for fewer than ten
boats;
e. Seasonal replacement or reinstallation of structures installed
prior to the effective date of this paragraph.
5. The design, preparation of plans, estimates and specifica-
tions and the supervision of the erection, construction, recon-
struction and repair of all the structures hereinbefore referred to
shall be done by a licensed professional engineer, or in the case of
farm ponds for which a permit is required, by an engineer or
conservationist employed by a governmental agency cooperating
with a soil conservation district, or by an engineer employed by
the department.
6. Notwithstanding the provisions of this or any other chapter
or law to the contrary, no reservoirs for any purpose shall hereaf-
ter be constructed on the Upper Hudson River in the Adirondack
park between Luzerne and the river’s source; the Boreas river
from its mouth to Durgin Brook; the Indian river from its mouth
to Abanakee Dam; and the Cedar river from its mouth to Cedar
River Flow, by the state or by any river regulating board.
(L.1972, c. 664, § 2; amended L.1975, c. 184, §§ 1, 2; L.1979, c.
233, § 2; L.1983, c. 442, § 1, As amended L.1992, c. 791, §§ 5,
6.)
4la
§ 15-0505. Protection of navigable waters; excavation or fill;
permit
1. No person, local public corporation or interstate authority
shall excavate or place fill below the mean high water level in any
of the navigable waters of the state, or in marshes, estuaries, tidal
marshes and wetlands that are adjacent to and contiguous at any
point to any of the navigable waters of the state and that are
inundated at mean high water level or tide, without a permit
issued pursuant to subdivision 3 of this section. For the purposes
of this section, fill shall include, but shall not be limited to, earth,
clay, silt, sand, gravel, stone, rock, shale, concrete (whole or
fragmentary), ashes, cinders, slag, metal, or any other similar
material whether or not enclosed or contained by (1) crib work of
wood, timber, logs, concrete or metal, (2) bulkheads and coffer-
dams of timber sheeting, bracing and piling or steel sheet piling
or steel H piling, separated or in combination. Nothing contained
in this section is intended to be, nor shall be construed to limit,
impair or affect the memorandum of understanding which any
State department enters into with the Department cf Environmen-
tal Conservation or the general powers and duties of the Depart-
ment of Transportation relating to canals or the general powers
and duties of the Department of Environmental Conservation
relating to flood control.
2. A permit application or request for a permit renewal or
modification shall be made on forms provided by the department
and shall consist of a description of the character and extent of
the proposed project or work, drawings, plans and specifications
providing the location and details of the proposed project or
work, and such additional information as the department may
require.
3. Before granting a permit, a permit renewal or a permit
modification pursuant to this section the department shall ascer-
tain the probable effect on the use of such waters for navigation,
42a
the health, safety and welfare of the people of the state and the
effect on the natural resources of the state, including soil, forests,
water, fish and aquatic resources therein, likely to result from the
proposed project or work.
4. The department shall review the permit application or re-
quest for renewal or modification of an existing permit and may
grant or deny the permit or request, or may grant the permit with
such conditions as will safeguard life or property against danger
or destruction and as will make the navigable waters safe for use
by the public.
5. The rules and regulations adopted by the department to
implement this section and the provisions of article 70 of this
chapter and rules and regulations adopted thereunder shall govern
the processing of permit applications, renewals, modifications,
suspensions and revocations under this section.
6. The provisions of subdivisions 1, 2, 3 and 4 of this section
shall not apply to emergency work in waters described in subdivi-
sion 1 of this section which is immediately necessary to protect
the health, safety and well-being of any person or persons or to
prevent damage to personal or real property, provided that the
department is given written notification by registered mail or
telegraph within forty-eight hours after the commencement of the
work and within forty-eight hours following the completion of
the work. Whenever such emergency work is performed as pro-
vided in this subdivision, it shall be performed in a manner that
will cause the lease change, modification, disturbance or damage
to the environment.
7. The requirements of this section shall be in addition to those
specified in section 15-0501 of this title, provided however, that
the department may, by rule and regulation, provide that only one
application for a permit or request for renewal or modification of
an existing permit need be filed when the proposed project or
43a
work requires a department permit under this section and section
15-0501 of this title.
(L.1972, c. 664, § 2; amended L.1975, c. 271, § 1; L.1975, c.
349, § 1; L.1979, c. 233, § 3.)
§ 15-0507. Structures impounding waters; inspection
1. Whenever in the judgment of the department public safety
requires, the department shall investigate dams and other struc-
tures impounding waters in the state, and docks, piers and wharfs
extending into such waters.
2. The department shall have the power, after hearing on due
notice, to make and serve an order, setting forth the findings of
fact and conclusions therefrom, directing any person or local
public corporation, erecting, reconstructing, repairing, maintain-
ing or using any such structures to either remove the said struc-
ture or to erect, reconstruct or repair the same within such reason-
able time and in such manner as shall be specified in said order,
and it shall be the duty of every such person or local public
corporation to obey, observe and comply with such order and
with the conditions therein prescribed. The provisions of title 9 of
this article with respect to administrative procedures shall be
applicable to hearings under this section.
3. It shall be unlawful for any person or local public corpora-
tion to fail, omit or neglect to comply with such order or to fail to
remove, erect, reconstruct or repair the same as provided in the
order within a reasonable time as designated by the department.
4. Upon the violation of any such order, the department shall
have power to enter upon the lands and waters where such
structures are located for the purpose of removing, repairing or
reconstructing the same and to take such other and further pre-
cautions which it may deem necessary to safeguard life or prop-
44a
erty or protect the natural resources of the state against danger
occasioned by the presence of such structures. In removing,
repairing and reconstructing such structures or other properties so
affected the department shall not deviate from the method, man-
ner and specifications contained in the original order.
5. The department shall certify the amount of the costs and
expenses incurred by the department and any state departments
for the removal, repair or reconstruction aforesaid in anywise
connected therewith to the county legislative body of the county
or counties in which the said lands and waters are located,
whereupon it shall be the duty of such county legislative body of
each county to add the amount so certified to the assessment rolls
of such locality or localities as a charge against the real property
upon which the dam, dock or other structure is located, desig-
nated or described by the department as chargeable therewith,
and to issue its warrant or warrants for the collection thereof.
Thereupon it shall become the duty of such locality or localities
through their proper officers to collect the amount so certified in
the same manner as other taxes are collected in such locality or
localities and when collected to pay the same to the department,
who shall thereupon, pay the same into the State Treasury. Any
amount so levied shall thereupon become and be a lien upon the
real property affected thereby to the same extent as any tax levy
becomes and is a lien thereon.
(L.1972, c. 664, § 2.)
45a
Section 401 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1341, provides:
§ 1341. Certification
(a) Compliance with applicable requirements;
application; procedures; license suspension
(1) Any applicant for a Federal license or
permit to conduct any activity including, but not
limited to, the construction or operation of facili-
ties, which may result in any discharge into the
navigable waters, shall provide the licensing or
permitting agency a certification from the State
in which the discharge originates or will origi-
nate, or, if appropriate, from the interstate water
pollution control agency having jurisdiction over
the navigable waters at the point where the dis-
charge originates or will originate, that any such
discharge will comply with the applicable provi-
sions of sections 1311, 1312, 1313, 1316, and
1317 of this title. In the case of any such activ-
ity for which there is not an applicable effluent
limitation or other limitation under sections
1311(b) and 1312 of this title, and there is not
an applicable standard under sections 1316 and
1317 of this title, the State shall so certify, ex-
cept that any such certification shall not be
deemed to satisfy section 1371(c) of this title.
Such State or interstate agency shall establish
procedures for public notice in the case of all
applications for certification by it and, to the ex-
tent it deems appropriate, procedures for public
hearings in connection with specific applications.
In any case where a State or interstate agency
has no authority to give such a certification, such
certification shall be from the Administrator. If
the State, interstate agency, or Administrator, as
46a
the case may be, fails or refuses to act on a re-
quest for certification, within a reasonable period
of time (which shall not exceed one year) after
receipt of such request, the certification require-
ments of this subsection shall be waived with
respect to such Federal application. No license
or permit shall be granted until the certification
required by this section has been obtained or has
been waived as provided in the preceding sen-
tence. No license or permit shall be granted if
certification has been denied by the State, inter-
state agency, or the Administrator, as the case
may be.
(2) Upon receipt of such application and cer-
tification the licensing or permitting agency shall
immediately notify the Administrator of such
application and certification. Whenever such a
discharge may affect, as determined by the Ad-
ministrator, the quality of the waters of any
other State, the Administrator within thirty days
of the date of notice of application for such Fed-
eral license or permit shall so notify such other
State, the licensing or permitting agency, and the
applicant. If, within sixty days after receipt of
such notification, such other State determines
that such discharge will affect the quality of its
waters so as to violate any water quality require-
ments in such State, and within such sixty-day
period notifies the Administrator and the licens-
ing or permitting agency in writing of its objec-
tion to the issuance of such license or permit and
requests a public hearing on such objection, the
licensing or permitting agency shall hold such a
hearing. The Administrator shall at such hearing
submit his evaluation and recommendations with
respect to any such objection to the licensing or
permitting agency. Such agency, based upon the
47a
recommendations of such State, the Administra-
tor, and upon any additional evidence, if any,
presented to the agency at the hearing, shall con-
dition such license or permit in such manner as
may be necessary to insure compliance with ap-
plicable water quality requirements. If the im-
position of conditions cannot insure such compli-
ance such agency shall not issue such license or
permit.
(3) The certification obtained pursuant to
paragraph (1) of this subsection with respect
to the construction of any facility shall fulfill the
requirements of this subsection with respect to
certification in connection with any other Fed-
eral license or permit required for the operation
of such facility unless, after notice to the certify-
ing State, agency, or Administrator, as the case
may be, which shall be given by the Federal
agency to whom application is made for such
operating license or permit, the State, or if ap-
propriate, the interstate agency or the Adminis-
trator, notifies such agency within sixty days
after receipt of such notice that there is no longer
reasonable assurance that there will be compli-
ance with the applicable provisions of sections
1311, 1312, 1313, 1316, and 1317 of this title
because of changes since the construction license
or permit certification was issued in (A) the con-
struction or operation of the facility, (B) the
characteristics of the waters into which such dis-
charge is made, (C) the water quality criteria
applicable to such waters or (D) applicable ef-
fluent limitations or other requirements. This
paragraph shall be inapplicable in any case where
the applicant for such operating license or permit
has failed to provide the certifying State, or, if
appropriate, the interstate agency or the Admin-
48a
istrator, with notice of any proposed changes in
the construction or operation of the facility with
respect to which a construction license or permit
has been granted, which changes may result in
violation of section 1311, 1312, 1313, 1316, or
1317 of this title.
(4) Prior to the initial operation of any fed-
erally licensed or permitted facility or activity
which may result in any discharge into the
navigable waters and with respect to which a
certification has been obtained pursuant to para-
graph (1) of this subsection, which facility or
activity is not subject to a Federal operating
license or permit, the licensee or permittee shall
provide an opportunity for such certifying State,
or, if appropriate, the interstate agency or the
Administrator to review the manner in which the
facility or activity shall be operated or conducted
for the purposes of assuring that applicable ef-
fluent limitations or other limitations or other
applicable water quality requirements wil! not be
violated. Upon notification by the certifying
State, or if appropriate, the interstate agency or
the Administrator that the operation of any such
federally licensed or permitted facility or activity
will violate applicable effluent limitations or other
limitations or other water quality requirements
such Federal agency may, after public hearing,
suspend such license or permit. If such license
or permit is suspended, it shall remain suspended
until notification is received from the certifying
State, agency, or Administrator, as the case may
be, that there is reasonable assurance that such
facility or activity will not violate the applicable
provisions of section 1311, 1312, 1313, 1316, or
1317 of this title.
49a
(5) Any Federal license or permit with re-
spect to which a certification has been obtained
under paragraph (1) of this subsection may be
suspended or revoked by the Federal agency is-
suing such license or permit upon the entering of
a judgment under this chapter that such facility
or activity has been operated in violation of the
applicable provisions of section 1311, 1312, 1313,
1316, or 1317 of this title.
(6) Except with respect to a permit issued
under section 1342 of this title, in any case where
actual construction of a facility has been lawfully
commenced prior to April 3, 1970, no certifica-
tion shall be required under this subsection for
a license or permit issued after April 3, 1970,
to operate such facility, except that any such
license or permit issued without certification
shall terminate April 3, 1973, unless prior to
such termination date the person having such
license or permit submits to the Federal agency
which issued such license or permit a certifica-
tion and otherwise meets the requirements of
this section.
(b) Compliance with other provisions of law set-
ting applicable water quality requirements
Nothing in this section shall be construed to
limit the authority of any department or agency
pursuant to any other provisions of law to re-
quire compliance with any applicable water qual-
ity requirements. The Administrator shall, upon
the request of any Federal department or agency,
or State or interstate agency, or applicant, pro-
vide, for the purpose of this section, any relevant
information on applicable effluent limitations, or
other limitations, standards, regulations, or re-
quirements, or water quality criteria, and shall,
50a
when requested by any such department or
agency or State or interstate agency, or appli-
cant, comment on any methods to comply with
such limitations, standards, regulations, require-
ments, or criteria.
(c) Authority of Secretary of the Army to per-
mit use of spoil disposal areas by Federal
licensees or permittees
In order to implement the provisions of this
section, the Secretary of the Army, acting
through the Chief of Engineers, is authorized,
if he deems it to be in the public interest, to per-
mit the use of spoil disposal areas under his
jurisdiction by Federal licensees or permittees,
and to make an appropriate charge for such use.
Moneys received from such licensees or permit-
tees shall be deposited in the Treasury as mis-
cellaneous receipts.
(d) Limitations and monitoring requirements of
certification
Any certification provided under this section
shall set forth any effluent limitations and other
limitations, and monitoring requirements neces-
sary to assure that any applicant for a Federal
license or permit will comply with any applica-
ble effluent limitations and other limitations, un-
der section 1311 or 1312 of this title, standard
or performance under section 1316 of this title,
or prohibition, effluent standard, or pretreatment
standard under section-1317 of this title, and
with any other appropriate requirement of State
law set forth in such certification, and shall be-
come a condition on any Federal license or per-
mit subject to the provisions of this section.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.