Petition for Writ of Certiorari — New York State Department of Environmental Conservation v. Niagara Mohawk Power Corp.

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mn 93128 5-55 4994

IN THE

OFFICE OF THE CLERK

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1993

NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF El. "IRONMENTAL CONSERVA-

TION, COMMISSIONER THOMAS C. JORLING, and DEPUTY COMMIS-

SIONER AND GENERAL COUNSEL MARC S. GERSTMAN,

Petitioners,

against

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE

STATE OF NEw YORK

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

G. OLIVER KOPPELL

Attorney General of the State of New York

Attorney for Petitioners

The Capitol

Albany, NY 12224

(518) 474-4819

JERRY BOONE

Solicitor General

PETER H. SCHIFF

Deputy Selicitor General

KATHLEEN LiSTON MORRISON*

Assistant Attorney General

*Counse: of Record

THE Reporrer Company, Inc.—Walton, NY 13856—800-252-7181

Syracuse Office, University Building, Syracuse, NY 13202—315-426-1235

NYC Office—30 Vesey Si., New York, NY 10007—212-732-6978—800- 800-4264

(3725—1994)

Printed on Recycled Paper

eae

Question Presented

Whether the Denartment of Environmental Cnservation,

when evaluating h. droelectric projects under Section 401 of

the federal Clean Water Act, is limited to considering the

water quality standards approved by the United States Envi-

ronmental Protection Agency under § 303 of the Clean

Water Act.

Table of Contents

Page

Question Presented. ....ccccccctccsssctvsensceess i

Opinions Below .........ccccsccccccecscscvssese 2

PORIIGOD 6 vic tk cena ccepeentctst64ebercaneewen 3

Statutory Provisions Involved.............0+eeeeee 3

Statement of the Case ...cciccccscctcctscccvceces 3

Facts and Procedural Background ............. 3

Reasons for Granting the Petition

The Decision of the New York Court of Ap-

peals Conflicts With The Decision Issued By

The Supreme Court of Washington......... 5

1. The Plain Language And The Legislative His-

tory Of The Clean Water Act Support A

Broader View Of State Water Quality Re-

quirements Than Was Adopted By The New

York Court Of Appeals ............+-+-+- 7

2. The State Statutes Are Water Quality Related

And Come Within The Scope Of The Author-

ization Contained In Section 401 Of The

Ce WE AOS bv idccccacuvseevevnceas 9

Comes: 6 os ccccvctavascisesvacnis tines 19

Index to Appendix

APPENDIX A—Order of the New York State Court of

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APPENDIX B—Opinion of New York State Court of

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APPENDIX C—Reported Opinion of Appellate Divi-

SION, ThiTd Department. 2... cc ccccsccscccess

APPENDIX D—Original Opinion and Order of Appel-

late Division, Third Department...............

APPENDIX E—Memorandum Decision of New York

Supreme Court, Albany County...............

APPENDIX F—Order of New York Supreme Court,

SE SOU y bev cvaddevarecesdvesiaceeees

APPENDIX G—Environmental Conservation Law §§

15-0501, 15-0503, 15-0505 and 15-0507 .......

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES:

Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. ___.,, 112 S.Ct. 1046

eae Or Ge ad ews coke Wiebe ous

Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Resources Defense Coun-

ee i eee ew eens

Escondido Mutual Water Co. v. LaJolla Band of Mis-

sion Indians, 466 U.S. 765, 772-779 (1984).....

la

3a

14a

19a

25a

26a

34a

18

18

18

Page

PUD No. | of Jefferson County and City of Tacoma v.

State of Washington, Department of Ecology, De-

partment of Fisheries, and Department of

Wildlife, No. 92-1911, cert granted October 4,

1993, to be argued February 23, 1994, reported

below at 849 P.2d 646 (1993)............ 5, 16, 18

STATUTES:

Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1251 et seq........... 12

© CG er SR © Pik cv ks Kivcecucs 12, 16

SF PR ae es PEE we he d ovo cnsk wivkedcascns, 5

S Fureeey Oe Wee ROE OUED So kkk y vo bvcadcecene 14

£m ak Fe & , ” ) Re eee passim

§ 401(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1) ............... 8

§ 401(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(2) ............... 8

§ 401(a)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(3) ............00- 8

§ 401(a)(4), 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(4) ............... 8

§ 401(a)(S), 33 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(5) ...........000. 8

FO ae i 8 NID ok his va ccs 8

‘

j

i

:

Page

S$ 401(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1S4U(E) 0c cccccscvccvcccces 8

§ 401(@), 33 USC. § TSAHG)e vcs ccccccccscass passim

Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 84 Stat.91,

Pub. L. No. 91-224, Section 21(b)............. 7

Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 797 et seq....... 6, 18

New York State Environmental Conservation Law

(“ECL”):

ECL Article 8 (State Environmental Quality Review

| reer er Pere rr Tere. A veteweshenqures 4

ECL Article 11 (Fish and Wildlife Act)........... 4,12

ide Ee RUOEE cake eee entasenabauk nes tacedaens 15

ECL Article 15, Title 5 (Protection of Water) ....... 4

ae SE oo 0555 PEAS bs ve ve wnds O8bee5 3, 4, 12

eR ek | ere ere” bedveeus 12

ee Seats ccdewenedbavevenabivascus 3, 13

Se SS ci vavdceecdeduvensadédvewntokn ae

ee SPT aa cockb kt eveses councebuesess 3, 13, 14

Ee BE 6. bee in oR bes Ooh 4e0ba anes 14

ECL Article 15, Title 8 (Reservoir Releases)........ 12

SO PEAS Kebcs ¥a suede donk taeceseneine 3

re EES b0:0.c'u¥-b 0b 40040) kdowR woh Re 14

A RSS R pene Meccan Ph eaRihee P maa 14

ECL Article 24 (Freshwater Wetlands Act)........ 4,12

eS Prien rr rh Raves wrth Or 15

Se I 60.0 6ns 8cdee Ku wis eneee ee 15

ROS PD os eee ie Coe eee 15

a ie PPE so bind Gc uss vod av deunw bik 15

Revised Code of Washington (‘‘RCW’’)

ott occeg a. SEO eT Te OUT ES eal ee ne 6

REGULATIONS:

Federal

40 C.FR.

Vii.

Page

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PF BREN G seep NCL Ckdeseneeoabeese ¢abeavatieus 2, 16

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incised kek ae eke eee ee barkaw ehuesaeese 2

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SR Se es ee or ae ere 2, 14

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8, SRR Petey reser re mettre 2

New York State Code of Rules and Regulations, Title 6

(Conservation)

cg Sa IEE rae ee ene rear yne nar 15

eS osc ee kaee ds ved ceeeeeueaes 4, 14, 16

os a hob ae ub kad eo Os da e6 weno ens 16

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oe Page

Washington Administrative Code (‘‘WAC’’)

SiO TIONED oc vdsccccvcescveuseeves 6

MISCELLANEOUS:

S.R. Rep. No. 92-414, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted

in 2 U.S. Code Cong. and Admin. News 3735

GRRU See rk tobias ne seen eK Eee th 10

S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1236, 92nd Cong., 2d Sess.,

reprinted in 2 U.S. Code Cong. and Admin. News

PU RAPT vase denna baw canes dense 11

2 Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control

Act Amendments of 1972 p. 1204 (1973) ....... 9

No.

IN THE

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES

OCTOBER TERM, 1993.

New YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CON-

SERVATION, COMMISSIONER THOMAS C. JORLING, and

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AND GENERAL COUNSEL MARC

S. GERSTMAN,

Petitioners,

against

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION,

Respondent.

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI TO THE COURT OF

APPEALS OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

Petition for a Writ of Certiorari

Petitioners, the New York State Department of Environ-

mental Conservation, its Commissioner, Thomas C. Jorling,

and Deputy Commissioner and General Counsel Marc S.

Gerstman (collectively, ‘the Department”) respectfully re-

quest that this Court issue a writ of certiorari to review the

2

November 11, 1993, order issued by the New York State

Court of Appeals. The order of the Court of Appeals is set

forth as Appendix “A”.

The Court of Appeals affirmed a January 7, 1993 order of

the Appellate Division, Third Department, which held that

the Department was limited to considering the water quality

standards approved by the United States Environmental Pro-

tection Agency under § 303 of the Clean Water Act when

evaluating applications for water quality certifications un-

der § 401 of the Clean Water Act for hydroelectric proj-

ects.! The Court of Appeals rejected the Department's argu-

ment that the State could also consider State statutes

protective of water quality.

Opinions Below

The Court of Appeals rendered its opinion on November

11, 1993. The opinion is reported at 82 NY 2d 191, 624 NE

2d 146, 604 NYS 2d 18. It is set forth as Appendix “B”.

The Appellate Division, Third Department, rendered its

opinion and order on January 7, 1993. The opinion is re-

ported at 187 AD 2d 7, 592 NYS 2d 141 (3d Dept. 1993). It

is set forth as Appendix ‘“‘C’’. The original opinion and

order of the Appellate Division, Third Department, is set

forth as Appendix “D”’.

Water quality standards consist of: (1) designated uses and (2)

criteria necessary to protect them, together with (3) an antidegradation

policy which protects: (a) existing instream uses and the level of water

quality necessary to protect them, and (b) high quality waters -- those

whose quality meets or exceeds the levels necessary to support the

propagation of fish, shellfish, and wildlife and recreation in and on the

water. 40 C.F.R. §§ 131.2, 131.3, 131.6, 131.12, 131.12(a)(1),(2).

Ce Oe ee ee a Me. a ce

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BA OCS Oe Ot

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3

The Supreme Court, Albany County, rendered its opinion

on April 1, 1991. The opinion is not reported. It is set forth

as Appendix “‘E’’. The order and judgment of the Supreme

Court, Albany County, is set forth as Appendix “‘F’’.

Jurisdiction

The order of the Court of Appeals was entered on Novem-

ber 11, 1993. This petition for certiorari is filed within 90

days of November 11, 1993. The Court’s jurisdiction to

review the case rests upon 28 U.S.C. § 1257(a).

Statutory Provisions Involved

Clean Water Act § 401, 33 U.S.C. § 1341; New York

Environmental Conservation Law (‘“‘ECL’’) Articles 8, 11,

24; ECL §§ 15-0501, 15-0503, 15-0505, 15-0507, 15-0801,

et seq., 15-2700 et seq. The full text of § 401 is set out in

Appendix “G’’. ECL §§ 15-0501, 15-0503, 15-0505, and

15-0507 are also set forth in Appendix “‘G”’.

Statement of the Case

Facts and Procedural Background

This case involves the scope of the State’s authority when

acting under Section 401 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C.

§ 1341. Under that provision, federal agencies are prohib-

ited from issuing licenses for activities which may discharge

into navigable waters unless a State has issued a certifica-

tion that the activity will not contravene State water quality

requirements. Respondent Niagara Mohawk Power Corpo-

ration (“‘Niagara Mohawk’”’) owns and operates a number of

4

hydroelectric projects licensed by the Federal Energy Regu-

latory Commission (‘“‘“FERC’’) and therefore subject to the

certification provision when renewal of the license is

sought. Niagara Mohawk filed « May 24, 1990, administra-

tive petition with the petitioner Dep»*tment of Environmen-

tal Conservation requesting a declaratory ruling under the

State Administrative Procedure Act whether the Department

would, when considering applications for certifications, ap-

ply the provisions of ECL Article 15, Title 5 (§§ 15-0501 et

seq.). Petitioner Marc S. Gerstman responded on behalf of

the Department on August 27, 1990, that the Department

would apply that statute as well as several others: ECL

Article 24, Article 11, and Article 8, because they were

protective of water quality.

On December 21, 1990, Niagara Mohawk commenced

this lawsuit challenging the Department’s August 27, 1990

determination. The Department answered and interposed

objections. In a decision dated April 1, 1991, Supreme

Court, Albany County, granted Niagara Mohawk’s judicial

petition and annulled the Department’s determination. The

court held that the Department can consider only the water

chemistry standards set forth in Title 6 of the New York

Code of Rules and Regulations (““NYCRR’’), § 701.19 and

§ 704.22, but not the substantive provisions of various water

quality-related sections of the ECL.

On July 30, 1991, the Department served and filed a

timely notice of appeal. The Appellate Division, Third De-

partment, affirmed the lower court, holding that the Depart-

ment’s review of 401 certifications was limited to consider-

2The material then contained in § 701.19 is now contained in 701.1

through 701.9 and 703.1 through 703.5.

5

ing the water quality standards approved by the United

States Environmental Protection Agency (“EPA”) under

Section 303 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1313.

On December 15, 1993, the Department filed a timely

motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeals. On May

11, 1993, the Court of Appeals granted that motion. On

November 11, 1993, the Court of Appeals unanimously

affirmed the order issued previously by the Appellate Divi-

sion, Third Department.

REASONS FOR GRANTING THE PETITION

The Decision Of The New York Ccurt Of Appeals

Conflicts With The Decision Issued By The Supreme

Court of Washington

The decision issued by New York’s court of last resort,

the New York Court of Appeals, conflicts with the decision

issued by the State of Washington’s court of last resort, the

Supreme Court, in PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County and City

of Tacoma v. State of Washington, Department of Ecology,

Department of Fisheries, and Department of Wildlife, No.

92-1911, cert. pet. granted October 4, 1993, awaiting argu-

ment before this Court on February 23. In that case, in an

alternative holding, the Washington court upheld the State’s

reliance on a State statute, not included within the State’s

water quality standards approved by EPA, to support the

State’s imposition of a minimum streamflow condition in a

6

water quality certification for a hydroelectric project.? The

Washington statute mandated retention of a base flow in a

river in order to protect the water’s “‘uses and values ae

propagation of fish and wildlife, recreational purposes .. .

and [its] use for navigation’. Revised Code of Washington

(“RCW”) 90.54.020(3)(a). The State’s designated use of

the river, under Washington’s EPA-approved water quality

standards, was fish migration, rearing, spawning, and har-

vesting. Washington Administrative Code (‘‘WAC’’)

173-201-045(1)(b)(iii). Washington issued the certification

but imposed a condition, authorized by Clean Water Act

§ 401(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1341(d), requiring a minimum

streamflow. The hydroelectric project applicant sued, argu-

ing that Washington exceeded its authority under the Clean

Water Act because the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. § 797

et seq., gave FERC exclusive jurisdiction over streamflow

regulation.

In contrast to Washington’s highest court, New York’s

highest court held that the State cannot rely on a State

statute not approved by EPA and therefore not a water

quality standard when evaluating applications for water

quality certifications. This Court should grant the writ and

resolve the conflict.

3In its primary holding, the Washington court upheld the State’s

imposition of a minimum streamflow requirement because it was neces-

sary to assure compliance with Washington's EPA-approved water qual-

ity standards. Washington’s EPA-approved water quality standards in-

cluded an antidegradation policy which prohibited degradation of

existing instream uses and, in the absence of a minimum streamflow

requirement, the existing fisheries use would be degraded. 849 P. 2d

646, 650.

7

The New York Court of Appeals erred in limiting the

State to considering water quality standards because Clean

Water Act § 401, as amended in 1972, authorizes States to

assure compliance with water quality requirements, not just

EPA-approved water quality standards. The State statutes on

which New York wishes to rely are water quality require-

ments because they are protective of water quality. In addi-

tion, § 401(d) expressly authorizes States (and EPA when it

acts in place of a State or in certain interstate situations) to

impose conditions on certifications based on “any other

appropriate requirements of State law’’, and the State stat-

utes are such “‘appropriate requirements of State law”’.

1. The Plain Language And The Legislative History Of The

Clean Water Act Support A Broader View Of State Water

Quality Requirements Than Was Adopted By The New

York Court Of Appeals

State water quality-protective statutes are “‘water quality

requirements” within the meaning of Section 401 of the

Clean Water Act, as amended in 1972. Consequently, a State

may look to and rely on such a statute when evaluating an

application for a water quality certification.

Originally enacted as Section 21(b) of the Water Quality

Improvement Act of 1970 and limited to water quality

standards, the certification requirement was amended by the

Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972

to change the operative language from “standards” to “‘re-

quirements” and thus broaden the State’s authority. Water

Quality Improvement Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-224,

§ 21(b), 84 Stat. 91 (1970); Pub. L. No. 92-500, 86 Stat. 816

(1972). Furthermore, the amended Section 401 contains a

provision for which there was no precedent in Section 21,

8

Section 401(d), and that provision is not only not limited to

water quality standards, a term it does not mention, but

contains the broadest language of all. See, 33 U.S.C.

§ 1341(d).

The 1972 amendments, incorporating Congress’ moving

away from focussing on water quality standards and taking a

broader view of water pollution, substituted the term “water

quality requirements” for the term “water quality stand-

ards” found in Section 21(b). Compare, former 33 U.S.C.

§ 1171(b), referred to as “Section 21(b)”, with existing 33

U.S.C. § 1341, referred to as “Section 401”. With changes

in the language from “water quality standards’’ to “water

quality requirements”’, Section 21(b)(1) corresponds to Sec-

tion 401(a)(1); Section 21(b)(2) corresponds to Section

401(a)(2); Section 21(b)(3) corresponds to Section

401(a)(3); Section 21(b)(4) corresponds to Section

401(a)(4); Section 21(b)(5) corresponds to Section

401(a)(5); Section 21(c) corresponds to Section 401(b);

Section 21(d) corresponds to Section 401(c).

The term ‘“‘water quality requirement” is not defined in

the Clean Water Act. A request that it be defined narrowly

was rejected. Then-EPA Administrator William

Ruckelshaus, in a 1971 statement to the House Committee

on Public Works, suggested that the term “applicable water

quality requirement” (the phrase then contained in the ver-

sion previously passed by the Senate) be defined to mean:

any applicable effluent limitations under Section 301

or 302 of this Act, or prohibition, effluent standard,

or pretreatment standard under Section 307 of this

Act, or any more stringent water quality requirement

9

under State law as provided in Section 510 of this

Act.4

2 Legislative History of the Water Pollution Control Act

Amendments of 1972 p. 1204 (1973). The Committee chose

not to adopt the definition. In addition, after consultations

between both houses, Congress agreed to pass the House

version, which substituted the broad phrase, ‘“‘any other

appropriate requirement of State law’’ for the phrase ‘any

applicable water quality requirement’’. bid. Rejection of

the suggestion that a narrow definition be codified and

adoption of even broader language is evidence that Con-

gress did not intend such a narrow construction.

2. The State Statutes Are Water Quality Related And Come

Within The Scope Of The Authorization Contained In

Section 401 Of The Clean Water Act

Section 401(d) authorizes imposition of conditions on

certifications based on “‘any other appropriate requirements

of State law’’. In addition to being water quality require-

ments, the water quality protective statutes upon which New

York relies are also “appropriate requirements of State

law”. Section 401(d) provides:

Any certification provided under this section shall

set forth any effluent limitations and other limita-

tions, and monitoring requirements necessary to as-

“Section 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370, provides that nothing in the Clean

Water Act “shall (1) preclude or deny the right of any State...to adopt or

enforce...any requirement respecting control or abatement of pollu-

tion...or (2) be construed as impairing or in any manner affecting any

right or jurisdiction of the states with respect to the waters...of such

States.”

10

sure that any applicant for a Federal license or permit

will comply with any applicable effluent limitation

and other limitations, under section 301 or 302 of

this Act, standard of performance under section 306

of this Act, or prohibition, effluent standard, or pre-

treatment standard under section 307 of this Act, and

with any other,appropriate requirement of State law

set forth in such certification, and shall become a

condition on any Federal license or permit subject to

the provisions of this section.

The 1972 Senate Committee Report described the enact-

ment of § 401(d) as follows:

[T]he provision makes clear that any water quality

requirements established under State law, more strin-

gent than those requirements established under this

Act, also shall through certification become condi-

tions on any Federal license or permit. The purpose

of the certification mechanism provided in this law

is to assure that Federal licensing or permitting agen-

cies cannot override State water quality

requirements.

S. R. Rep. No. 92-414, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., reprinted in 2

U.S. Code Cong. and Admin. News 3735 (1972) (emphasis

added). The Senate Conference Report also stated:

Subsection (d), which requires a certification to set

forth effluent limitations, other limitations, and

monitoring requirements necessary to insure compli-

ance with sections 301, 302, 306, and 307, of this

Act, has been expanded to also require compliance

11

with any other appropriate requirement of State law

which is set forth in the certification.

S. Conf. Rep. No. 92-1236, 92nd Cong., 2nd Sess., re-

printed in 2 U.S. Code Cong. & Admin. News 3815 (1972)

(emphasis added).

Unlike Congress, the New York Court of Appeals failed

to recognize that water quality is broader than mere water

quality standards alone. Water quality standards alone, no

matter how broadly drafted, do not provide sufficient pro-

tection for the State’s water resources and the uses of those

resources when hydroelectric facilities are involved. Dis-

solved oxygen and bacteria content, for example, by them-

selves are only technical measurements and only indirectly

reflect the fundamental values of water quality protection.

The Clean Water Act’s purpose of improving and maintain-

ing the quality of the nation’s waters is not fulfilled by a

State simply applying its water quality standards to a hydro-

electric project. Adoption of the narrow view expressed by

the court below reduces the State’s involvement in the water

quality certification process to that of a laboratory techni-

cian. This is not what Congress had in mind when it enacted

the Clean Water Act to protect and improve water quality.

The objective of this Act is to restore and maintain

the chemical, physical and biological integrity of the

Nation’s waters. In order to achieve this objective, it

is hereby declared that, consistent with the provi-

sions of this Act...

12

(2) it is the national goal that whenever attain-

able, an interim goal of water quality which pro-

vides for the protection and propagation of fish,

shellfish and wildlife and provides for recreation

in and on the water be achieved by July 1, 1983

33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (emphasis added).

The substantive water quality requirements of ECL Arti-

cles 11, 15, and 24 are important factors for the Depart-

ment’s determination a hydroelectric project will comply

with State water quality requirements. Each of these statutes

contains provisions protective of water quality and contrib-

utes to the fulfillment of the Department’s responsibility to

protect the State’s water quality. They protect the State’s

water quality by providing a basis for the Department to

review proposed projects that may affect water quality in a

variety of ways.

ECL § 15-0501, entitled, “Protection of Waters: Stream

Disturbance”, generally regulates projects which will dis-

turb stream beds and thereby affect the water quality of the

stream. Where an application for a Section 401 certification

for a hydroelectric project is involved, the substantive pro-

visions of the statute enable the Department to review an

applicant’s plans so as to minimize the disturbance of a

stream and prevent erosion and increased turbidity of the

waters. See, ECL § 15-0501(3)(b). Each is a water quality

concern.

Dam construction, repair, or reconstruction activities may

affect the waters of the State through the discharge of

13

pollutants into the water, including materials used-during

the construction, repair, or reconstruction. These activities

also have the potential to affect aspects of the State’s water

quality by causing turbidity, erosion, temperature change,

and the destruction of wetlands which improve and maintain

water quality by cleansing the waters.5 Because these are

water quality concerns, the Department considers the sub-

stantive provisions of ECL § 15-0503, entitled “Protection

of Waters: Dam Construction, Repair, or Reconstruction”

when reviewing Section 401 certification requests.®

Hydroelectric projects usually require excavation and/or

fill as a part of construction, repair, or reconstruction activi-

ties. Excavation and fill may affect the waters of the State

through the discharge of pollutants into the waters, the

creation of turbidity, erosion, and temperature changes, and

the impact on protected freshwater wetlands. These are

water quality concerns. Consequently, the Department con-

siders the substantive provisions of ECL § 15-0505, entitled

‘Protection of Waters: Excavation and Fill”’.

ECL § 15-0507, entitled ‘‘Structures Impounding Waters;

Inspection’’, empowers the Department to inspect dams and

order repair or reconstruction activities in order to “protect

5As discussed below, destruction of wetlands can affect water

quality.

“Turbidity and temperature change are the only categories for

which specific water chemistry standards have been promulgated. 6

NYCRR § 703.3; 6 NYCRR Part 704. The other concerns would thus

go unaddressed, even though they are valid water quality concerns, if

the Department's review were limited to applying the water chemistry

standards. They would thereby be excluded under the holding of the

court below, leaving a void rather than a framework for addressing

legitimate and serious water quality concerns.

14

the natural resources of the State”, including the waters of

the State. ECL § 15-0507(4). Remedial action undertaken

pursuant to this section can affect the waters of the State

through the discharge of pollutants, the creation of turbidity,

erosion, and temperature change, and the destruction of

wetlands. The Department, therefore, considers the substan-

tive provisions of ECL § 15-0507 when reviewing 401 cer-

tification applications because that section addresses water

quality concerns and protection of the waters of the State.

ECL § 15-0805, entitled “Regulation of Reservoir Re-

leases”, authorizes the Department to regulate reservoir

releases (i.e., the release of water from reservoirs) in order

to protect recreational uses of water and to insure sufficient

water supplies for drinking and power production uses. ECL

§ 15-0801(2). Since hydroelectric projects can affect the

safety of a water supply, the Department properly considers

the substantive provisions of ECL § 15-0805, entitled “*Res-

ervoir Releases’ when reviewing 401 certification applica-

tions. A reservoir is a designated protected use under the

system established by Congress in the Clean Water Act, the

regulations interpreting that statute by the United States

Environmental Protection Agency, and the Department’s

regulations. 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(2); 40 C.FR. § 131.10,

§ 131.11, and § 131.12; 6 NYCRR §§ 701.2-701.6.

The regulations promulgated to implement the Wild, Sce-

nic, and Recreational Rivers system under ECL § 15-2701

et seq., entitled “Wild, Scenic, and Recreational Rivers

Systems”, are designed to protect “outstanding natural,

scenic, ecological, recreational, aesthetic, botanical, geolog-

ical, hydrological, fish and wildlife, historical, cultural, ar-

chaeological and scientific values” by preserving the free

flowing condition of such rivers and protecting their imme-

15

diate environs for the benefit and enjoyment of present and

future generations. ECL § 15-2701; See also, 6 NYCRR

§ 666.1. The construction of hydroelectric projects on rivers

included in the Wild, Scenic, and Recreational Rivers Sys-

tem may result in unmitigatable adverse environmental im-

pacts to the very attributes that contribute to the protected

designation.

The construction of hydroelectric projects may have an

impact on protected freshwater wetlands and therefore may

result in the degradation of water quality. ECL § 24-0101 er

seq., the State’s Freshwater Wetlands Law, has as its express

purpose the preservation and protection of freshwater wet-

lands and the benefits derived from them. See, ECL

§ 24-0103. In enacting that statute, the Legislature stated

that freshwater wetlands are ‘“‘an invaluable resource for

flood protection, wildlife habitat, open space and water

resources”. ECL § 24-0105(1) (emphasis supplied.) The

Statute expressly recognizes that any loss of wetlands will

also result in the loss of subsurface water resources, envi-

ronmental provisions for watersheds, recharging areas for

ground water supplies, pollution treatment basins, erosion

control sedimentation areas, filtering basins, absorption

areas for silt and organic matters, sources of nutrients for

fish and wildlife, and wildlife habitat. ECL

§ 24-0105(7)(a)(i). Because loss of any of these may adver-

sely affect water quality, the Department takes the water

quality aspects of this statute into consideration.

ECL § 11-0101 et seq., the State’s Fish and Wildlife Law,

authorizes the Department to protect and manage fish and

wildlife resources within the State. A primary purpose be-

hind enactment of the Clean Water Act was restoration of

the quality of the nation’s waters so that they would be

16

‘““ishable, swimmable waters’’ by 1983. See, 33 U.S.C.

§ 1251(a)(2), where § 101(a)(2) of the Clean Water Act

states that its objective is to “restore and maintain the

chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s

waters”’. 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a). In its regulations interpreting

the Clean Water Act, and specifically interpreting the

“‘water quality standards’’ portion of the Clean Water Act,

EPA has taken the position, on which New York relies, that

the standards provide for the protection and propagation of

fish. 40 C.F.R. § 131.2; 6 NYCRR §§ 701.3-701.8. Hydro-

electric projects have the potential to disrupt not only fish

and wildlife habitats, but the ““minimum flows” or quantity

of water needed for fish and wildlife survival. Water passing

through a particular river reach can be greatly affected

because of the diversion of water into turbines to create

power. Wildlife habitat and endangered species can be de-

stroyed if insufficient flow protection for fish and wildlife

are not included in a hydroelectric project design plan.

Consequently, depending upon the particular factual record

developed in a particular case, New York may wish, for

example, to impose conditions regulating flow levels in its

certifications where necessary to attain or prevent impair-

ment of the designated uses for waters whose designated

uses include the survival and propagation of fish, as did the

State of Washington in the PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County

and City of Tacoma v. State of Washington Department of

Ecology, Department of Fisheries, and Department of

Wildlife case now awaiting argument before this Court.

The Department’s approach to Section 401 certification is

consistent with the position taken by the EPA that the pro-

tection of water quality involves more than just addressing

the water quality standards contained in 6 NYCRR Parts

701-704, and that States should address ‘‘aquatic life,

17

wildlife, wetlands and other aquatic habitat, vegetation and

hydrology required to maintain the aquatic system...toxicity

and bioaccumulation of pollutants, diversity and composi-

tion of aquatic species, entrapment of pollutants in sedi-

ment, stormwater and nonpoint source impacts, habitat loss,

and hydrologic changes”’. See also, 40 C.F.R. §§ 130, 131,

and especially § 130.3, wherein EPA describes “water qual-

ity standards” as defining the water quality goals of a water

body, or portion thereof, by designating the use or uses to be

made of the water and by setting criteria necessary to pro-

tect the uses’’.

In a letter to FERC, EPA has noted that:

protection of water quality involves far more than

just addressing water chemistry. Rather, protection

of water quality includes protection of multiple ele-

ments which together make up aquatic systems in-

cluding the aquatic life, wildlife, wetlands and other

aquatic habitat, vegetation, and hydrology required

to maintain the aquatic system. Relevant water qual-

ity issues include the toxicity and bioaccumulation of

pollutants, the diversity and composition of the

aquatic species, entrapment of pollutants in sedi-

ment, stormwater and nonpoint source impacts, hab-

itat loss, and hydrologic changes. A State may need

to address any one or combination of these factors in

particular circumstances in order to meet the man-

dates of the Clean Water Act articulated in section

101(a) ‘to restore and maintain the chemical, physi-

cal, and biological integrity of the nation’s waters’ .

(emphasis added). EPA’s interpretation, as the agency re-

sponsible for administration of the Clean Water Act, is

18

entitled to deference. Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. —_,

112 S.Ct. 1046, 1060 (1992); Chevron U.S.A. v. Natural

Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1983).

Finally, the New York Court of Appeals’ opinion turned

on the court’s belief that the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C.

§ 797 et seq., preempts the State from applying its State

water quality statutes during the water quality certification

process for hydroelectric facilities licensed by the Federal

Energy Regulatory Commission. The Court was wrong in

finding preemption because the Commission has not acted.

Thus, any finding of preemption is not ripe. See, brief filed

for the United States as amicus curiae supporting affirm-

ance in PUD No. | of Jefferson County and City of Tacoma

v. State of Washington, Department of Ecology, Department

of Fisheries, and Department of Wildlife, No. 92-1911, pp.

22-29, to be argued February 23, 1994. Once the Commis-

sion has acted, assuming its determination conflicts with

that of the State, its “‘determination can be judicially re-

viewed based on a full administrative record and a concrete

controversy. Compare, Escondido Mutual Water Co. v. La-

Jolla Band of Mission Indians, 466 U.S. 765, 772-779

(1984).” Br. for the United States as amicus curiae, p. 29.

19

Conclusion

This case raises an important issue which was wrongly

decided by New York’s highest court. The Court of Ap-

peals’ construction of Section 401 of the Clean Water Act

conflicts with the construction given that statute by the State

of Washington’s highest court, the Supreme Court. For the

reasons stated, this Court should grant the writ.

Respectfully submitted,

G. OLIVER KOPPELL

Attorney General of the State

of New York

Attorney for Petitioner

The Capitol

Albany, New York 12224

(518) 474-4819

JERRY BOONE

Solicitor General

PETER H. SCHIFF

Deputy Solicitor General

KATHLEEN LISTON MORRISON*

Assistant Attorney General

*Counsel of Record

la

APPENDIX A—Order of the New York State Court of

Appeals.

COURT OF APPEALS

STATE OF NEW YORK

The Hon. Judith S. Kaye, Chief Judge, Presiding

3 No. 214

a

In the Matter of

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION,

Respondent,

Vv.

NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL

CONSERVATION, ef al.,

Appellants.

The appellants in the above entitled appeal appeared by

Hon. Robert Abrams, Attorney General of the State of New

York; the respondent appeared by Hiscock & Barclay, Esqs.,

Brian K. Billinson, Esq., Senior Counsel, Niagara Mohawk

2a

and Swidler & Berlin; and amicus curiae appeared by Rich-

ard Roos-Collins, Esq.

The Court, after due deliberation, orders and adjudges

that the order is affirmed, with costs. Opinion by Judge

Bellacosa. Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Simons, Titone,

Smith and Levine concur. Judge Hancock took no part.

The Court further orders that this record of the proceed-

ings in this Court be remitted to the Supreme Court, Albany

County, there to be proceeded upon according to law.

I certify that the preceding contains a correct record of

the proceedings in this appeal in the Court of Appeals and

that the papers required to be filed are attached.

/s/DONALD M. SHERAW

Clerk of the Court

Court of Appeals, Clerk’s Office, Albany, November 11,

1993.

3a

APPENDIX B—Opinion of New York State Court of

Appeals.

In the Matter of NiaAGARA MonHawk Power CORPORATION,

Respondent, v New York State DEPARTMENT OF ENVI-

RONMENTAL CONSERVATION et al., Appellants.

Argued October 7, 1993; decided November 11, 1993

SUMMARY

APPEAL, by permission of the Court of Appeals, from an

order of the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court in the

Third Judicial Department, entered January 7, 1993, which

affirmed a judgment of the Supreme Court (Harold J. Hughes,

Jr., J.), entered in Albany County in a combined proceeding

pursuant to CPLR article 78 and action for a declaratory

judgment, denying a motion by respondents to dismiss the

petition on objections in point of law, converting the CPLR

article 78 proceeding to a declaratory judgment action, annull-

ing a ruling of respondent New York State Department of

Environmental Conservation that certain provisions of ECL

article 15 are applicable in assessing issuance of a Clean

Water Act § 401 certification, preempting respondents from

applying those provisions of ECL article 15 as well as ECL

articles 8, 11 and 24 in assessing such certification applica-

tions, and limiting respondents to considering only the water

quality standards set forth in 6 NYCRR 701.19 and 704.2 in

assessing such applications.

Matter of Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v New York State

Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 187 AD2d 7, affirmed. .

HEADNOTE

Environmental Conservation — Water Quality Certification — Hydroe-

lectric Power Projects — Federal Preemption — Scope of Review

of Department of Environmental Conservation

For purposes of issuance of a Clean Water Act § 401 (33 USC § 1341) State

certification that any discharge into navigable waters will comply with the

applicable provisions of the Clean Water Act, the New York State Depart-

ment of Environmental Conservation (DEC) is limited to considering the

water quality standards set forth by the State and approved by the United

States Environmental Protection Agency under section 303 of the Clean

Water Act (33 USC § 1313), which are found only in 6 NYCRR parts 701-

704. Accordingly, with respect to section 401 certification of certain hydroe-

lectric facilities, DEC may not broaden its scope of review under the Clean

Water Act to include aspects of ECL article 15.

4a

TOTAL CLIENT-SERVICE LIBRARY® REFERENCES

: By the Publisher's Editorial Staff

AM JuR 2d, Pollution Control, §§ 141, 154.

CLS, ECL art 15.

33 USCS §§ 1313, 1341.

NY Jur 2d, Environmental Rights and Remedies, §§ 106-

120.

ANNOTATION REFERENCE

See ALR Index under Federal Water Pollution Control

Act; Water Pollution.

POINTS OF COUNSEL

Robert Abrams, Attorney-General, Albany (Kathleen Liston

Morrison, Jerry Boone and Peter H. Schiff of counsel), for

appellants. The Department has the power to consider water

quality impacts beyond water chemistry standards when eval-

uating applications for water quality certifications under sec-

tion 401 of the Clean Water Act. (Monongahela Power Co. v

Marsh, 809 F2d 41, 484 US 816; Keating v Federal Energy

Regulatory Commn., 927 F2d 616; United States v Marathon

Dev. Corp., 867 F2d 96; Matter of Long Lake Energy Corp. v

New York State Dept. of Enutl. Conservation, 164 AD2d 396;

Lake Erie Alliance for Protection of Coastal Corridor v U. S.

Army Corps of Engrs., 526 F Supp 1063, 707 F2d 1392, 464 US

915; Roosevelt Campobello Intl. Park Commn. v United States

Envtl. Protection Agency, 684 F2d 1041; United States Dept. of

Interior v Federal Energy Regulatory Commn., 952 F2d 538.)

Brian K. Billinson, Syracuse, Hiscock & Barclay, Albany

(Timothy P. Sheehan of counsel), and Swidler & Berlin (Ken-

neth G. Jaffe and Joel deJesus of counsel, of the District of

Columbia Bar, admitted pro hac vice), for respondent. I. The

Court below correctly held that the Federal Power Act estab-

lishes a comprehensive scheme of Federal regulation of hy-

.droelectric. projects that, with limited exceptions, preempts

State regulation of hydroelectric facilities within the Federal

Energy Regulatory Commission’s jurisdiction. (First Iowa v

Power Commn., 328 US 152; Udall v Federal Power Commn.,

387 US 428; Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm. v United

States Atomic Energy Commn., 449 F2d 1109; California v

Sa

Federal Energy Regulatory Commn., 495 US 490; Sayles Hydro

Assocs. vu Maughan, 985 F2d 451; Matter of Power Auth. v

Williams, 60 NY2d 315.) II. The Court below correctly held

that the “very limited” authority delegated to the States

under section 401 of the Clean Water Act does not extend the

myriad State law provisions that DEC has sought to apply.

(Matter of Power Auth. v Williams, 60 NY2d 315; Cleveland v

United States, 329 US 14; People v Shapiro, 50 NY2d 747;

Matter of de Rham v Diamond, 32 NY2d 34; Fourth Branch

Assocs. v Department of Envtl. Conservation, “146 Misc 2d 334;

Matter of Long Lake Energy Corp. v Department of Envtl.

Conservation, 164 AD2d 396.) III. The panoply of statutes and

regulations that DEC seeks to apply are not water quality

standards under section 303 of the Federal Water Pollution

Control Act and, therefore, are outside the scope of section

401. (Matter of Power Auth. v Williams, 60 NY2d 315; Califor-

nia vu Federal Energy Regulatory Commn., 495 US 490; Matter

of Jackson v New York State Urban Dev. Corp., 67 NY2d 400;

National Fuel Gas Supply Corp. v Public Serv. Commn., 894

F2d 571, 497 US 1004.)

Richard Roos-Collins and Jessica Notini, of the California

Bar, admitted pro hac vice, for New York Rivers United and

others, amici curiae. I. The Federal Power Act does not

preempt DEC’s enforcement of water quality standards. II.

The Court below erred in holding that fish, ‘wildlife, and

recreation are not regulated under the Clean Water Act.

(Matter of de Rham v Diamond, 32 NY2d 34; Fourth Branch

Assocs. v Department of Envtl. Conservation, 146 Misc 2d 334;

Matter of Long Lake Energy Corp. v New York State Depart-

ment of Envtl. Conservation, 164 AD2d 396; Matter of Power

Auth. v Williams, 60 NY2d 315.) II. The Co:>-t below erred in

holding that section 401 (d) conditions ow certification are

limited to Federally approved State laws.

OPINION OF THE COURT

BELLACOSA, J.

The New York State Department of Environmental Conser-

vation (DEC) appeals by leave granted from this Court to

review the Appellate Division’s order affirming Supreme

Court’s judgment in favor of Niagara Mohawk Power Corpora-

tion. We agree with both courts that the DEC’s effort to

broaden its scope of review under the Clean Water Act to

include aspects of ECL article 15 is unfounded. For purposes

6a

of issuance of a Clean Water Act § 401 (833 USC § 1341) State

certification, DEC is limited to considering the water quality

standards set forth by the State and approved by the United

States Environmental Protection Agency under section 303 of

the Clean Water Act (33 USC § 1313). We are satisfied that

Federal preemption principles and policies along with settled

precedents interpreting the complementary statutory scheme

of Federal-State regulatory authority support an affirmance of

the Appellate Division order.

I.

Niagara Mohawk, a private investor-owned utility company

licensed under the Federal Power Act, owns and operates

hydroelectric facilities throughout the State. It applied to the

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) for a license

to approve construction of several new facilities, dam repair

and reconstruction work on existing dams and anticipates

filing similar applications in the future.

Under section 401 of the Federal Clean Water Act, before

‘approval of a Federal license, a facility must obtain a “certifi-

cation” from the State regulatory entity—in this case, the

DEC—that the discharge from the new or altered facility

meets with relevant State water quality standards. Basically,

water quality standards are provisions of State and Federal

law, which define the quality goals of a water body or some

portion of it, by designating the use or uses to be made of the

water, by setting criteria necessary to protect the uses, and by

incorporating an antidegradation policy designed to prevent

the gradual deterioration of the quality of the water body.

These criteria are elements of State water quality standards,

expressed as constituent levels or narrative statements, repre-

senting a quality of water that supports a particular use.

States adopt a broad array of water quality standards to

protect the public health or welfare, enhance the quality of

water and serve the purposes of the Clean Water Act, which,

in turn, serve to protect fish, wildlife, recreational use and,

ultimately, aid in the use of the water for public water supply.

Niagara Mohawk did not apply for a State section 401

certification and, instead, initiated a threshold challenge alleg-

ing that DEC has officially declared its intent and jurisdiction

to review Niagara Mohawk’s applications under ECL article

15 in super arrogation of the Federal Power Act. Niagara

Mohawk proceeded by application to DEC in May 1990 pursu-

7a

ant to section 204 of the State Administrative Procedure Act

for a declaratory ruling that ECL article 15, title 5 is not

applicable to a section 401 certification, and that the Federal

Power Act (16 USC § 791a et seq.) preempts and limits DEC’s

reviewing scrutiny to specific-State provisions as they pertain

to the question of whether the project will affect the State’s

water quality as prescribed in 6 NYCRR parts 701 to 704.

By letter opinion dated August 27, 1990, DEC declared that

projects proposed by Niagara Mohawk must also satisfy multi-

ple provisions of the Environmental Conservation Law, includ-

ing the regulatory requirements of the State Environmental

Quality Review Act (ECL art 8) before it will issue the

requisite Clean Water Act § 401 certification.

DEC opined that by enacting section 401, Congress intended

the States to have authority to exact compliance with all

State laws which bear on water quality before granting a

certification. DEC declared the following laws to be applicable

in assessing issuance of the “certification” under a section 401

review:

(a) Protection of Waters: disturbance of stream

beds (ECL 15-0501);

(b) Protection of Waters: dam construction (ECL

15-0503);

(c) Protection of Waters: excavation or fill (ECL 15-

0505); -

(d) Dam Safety (ECL 15-0507),

(e) Reservoir Release (ECL 15-0801 et seq.);

(f) Wild, Scenic and Recreational River System

(ECL 15-2701 et seq.);

(g) Freshwater Wetlands (ECL art 24);

(h) Fish and Wildlife (ECL art 11); and

(i) Environmental Quality Review (ECL art 8).

Niagara Mohawk invoked CPLR article 78 review and

brought a declaratory judgment action seeking annulment of

DEC’s ruling. Its requested relief included a- determination

that the Clean Water Act § 401 certification process allows the

DEC, from the State law’s standpoint and involvement, ‘to

consider the water quality standards set forth only,:in 6

NYCRR 701.19 and 704.2. %

Supreme Court granted judgment to Niagara Mohawk, al-

lowing only a “ ‘determination that a proposed project will

meet the particular water quality standards for the applicable

8a

classification.’ ’ Supreme Court limited DEC to review under

6 NYCRR 701.19 and 704.2, recodified in substantially the

same form and contained within 6 NYCRR parts 701 to 704

(eff Sept. 1, 1991). The Appellate Division affirmed, holding

DEC was restricted to the application of turbidity and temper-

ature change as specified by 6 NYCRR 701 to 704 and conclud-

ing that it could not impose additional water quality analysis

conditions to its section 401 certification.

Il.

We agree with the Appellate Division that the Federal

Power Act establishes a comprehensive scheme of Federal

regulation of hydroelectric projects that essentially preempts

State regulation of hydroelectric facilities within the Federal

Energy Regulatory Commission’s jurisdiction. Settled law in

New York has consistently supported the view that section

401 gives the State regulatory entity only a limited role of

review, based on requirements affecting water quality, not on

all State water quality provisions. Review by State agencies

that would overlap or duplicate the Federal purview and

prerogatives was not contemplated and would infringe on and

potentially conflict with an area of the law dominated by the

nationally uniform Federal statutory scheme. . = '

Niagara Mohawk’s hydroelectric projects are subject to

regulation under part I of the Federal Power Act, which vests

in the FERC comprehensive authority over the. construction,

operation and maintenance of hydroelectric facilities located

on the navigable waters of the United States (16 USC § 797

{e]; § 817 [1]. FERC is required to evaluate and ensure that a

given project is founded on a comprehensive plan for the

adequate protection and enhancement of wildlife and benefi-

cial public uses, including irrigation, flood control and recre-

ational use (16 USC § 803 [a] [1]; § 797 [e]; Electric Consumers

Protection Act, added by Pub L 99-495, 100 US Stat 1243). °

In addition, Niagara Mohawk’s projects are controlled by

the Clean Water Act, which in “anticipat{ing) a partnership

between the States and the Federal Government” (Arkansas vu

Oklahoma, 503 US —, —, 112 S Ct 1046, 1054), establishes a

system for effluent restrictions applicable to different catego-

ries of sources of water pollution (33 USC §§ 1311, 1312, 1313,

1316 and 1317), and defines the role for the States in control-

ling water pollution. p Ava

Under section 303 of the Clean Water Act (33 USC § 1313),

9a

States are authorized to establish “water quality standards”

consisting of the “designated uses of the navigable waters

involved and the water quality criteria for such waters based

upon such uses” (33 USC § 1313 [c] [2] [A]. DEC concedes that

in New York the water quality standards promulgated pursu-

ant to Clean Water Act § 303 are found only in 6 NYCRR

parts 701 to 704. That tie-in is highly relevant.

Section 401 of the Clean Water Act also serves as the

conduit for the incorporation of relevant State water quality

standards in this otherwise Federally filled universe. An appli-

cant for a Federal license or permit authorizing an activity

that may result in a discharge into navigable waters must

provide “a certification from the State in which the discharge

originates or will originate * * * that any such discharge will

comply with the applicable provisions of sections 301, 302,

303, 306, and 307 of [the Clean Water Act]” (33 USC § 1341 [a]

(1}). The State must act on a request for certification within a

reasonable time of receipt, and if the State denies the certifi-

cation, the Federal agency may not issue the license or

permit.

III.

In 1973, Matter of de Rham v Diamond (32 NY2d 34) held

that section 21 (b) of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act

(33 USC former § 1171 [b)):

“{RJelinquishes only one element of the otherwise

exclusive jurisdiction granted the Power Commis-

sion by the Federal Power Act. It authorizes States

to: determine and certify only the narrow question

whether there is ‘reasonable assurance’ that the

construction and operation of a proposed project

‘will: not violate applicable water quality stan-

dards’ * * * Congress did not empower the States

to reconsider matters, unrelated to their water

quality standards” (id., at 44).

Nevertheless, DEC relies heavily on a replacement of sec-

tion 21 by the Federal’ Water Pollution Control Act Amend-

ments, later codified as section 401 of the Clean Water Act (33

USC § 1341), as indicating a new and different approach. by

Congress. It suggests that Congress was shifting focus: away

from the quality of a given body of water to a greater empha-

sis on regulating the discharge of effluent and pollution at its

‘ source, and somehow that this was designed to release some of

10a

the exclusive Federal power to the States. These amendments

in 1972, however, had no impact on this Court’s decision in de

Rham. Nor did these amendments impress this Court 10 years

later in 1983, when, in Matter of Power Auth. v Williams (60

NY2d 315, 326-327), we again held that the new section 401

certification process is still accomplished by a determination

that a proposed project will meet the particular water quality

standards related to the applicable classification (see also,

Matter of Long Lake Energy Corp. v New York State Dept. of

Envtl. Conservation, 164 AD2d 396, 401-403). Thus, the Appel-

late Division correctly noted that under settled New York law,

such a broad reach is beyond DEC’s limited delegated powers..

The DEC determination of August 27, 1990, under review in

this case, would have a section 401 applicant supply informa-

tion only indirectly related to water quality. It seeks to

change the thrust of analysis and the force of our precedents

by asserting that section 401 today is different in its impact

and relationship to the States because of the Clean Water Act.

In effect, DEC asks this Court to open the dam of section 303

with respect to the section 401 certification process. DEC

insists that by altering the wording of section 1341 in 1972

and then again in 1977 when creating the Clean Water Act,

Congress returned to the States plenary power over water

quality, eliminating its earlier preemption prerogatives under

the 1935 Federal Power Act. Part of its argument turns on the

fact that Congress’s decision not to include a limiting refer-

ence to section 303 (water quality standards) in section 401 (d),

which deals with a State’s power to impose conditions on a

certification, indicates that Congress did not mean to restrict

conditions on certifications only to those necessary to assure

compliance with section 303 water quality standards. This is

especially so, it argues, since Congress did reference section

303 in section .401 (a) (1), (3), (4) and (5) and omitted it from

section 401 (d). = aie

To support this highly significant turnabout in law and

policy and in the distribution of exclusive and complementary

Federal-States power, DEC also points us to State of Washing-

ton v Public Utility Dist. No. 1 (121 Wash 2d 179, 849 P2d 646

[1993], cert granted — US —, 114 S Ct 55). To be sure, the

Washington Supreme Court, in construing section 401 (d), has

enunciated a broader view of its State’s authority under that

provision. The Supreme Court of Washington considered the

language Congress chose within the context of the Clean

Water Act itself, noting Congress’s “broad purpose” in enact-

lla

ing the Clean Water Act “to restore and maintain the chemi-

cal, physical, and biological integrity of the Nation’s waters”

(id., 121 Wash 2d, at 189, 849 P2d, at 651). The court, there-

fore, broadly construed the power granted to the States under

its view of section 401 because the Clean Water Act stated its

purpose in broad terms. “This broad purpose suggests that

what state laws qualify as ‘appropriate’ for purposes of section

401 (d) should also be understood broadly” (id., 121 Wash 2d,

at 189, 849 P2d, at 651-652). The court then noted:

“If Congress intended to refer only to state water

quality standards [in section 401 (d)], it could have

specifically referred to them. That Congress did

not do so is evidence that it intended the phrase

‘any other appropriate requirement of State law’

to refer broadly to all state water quality-related

laws, not just to state water quality standards

adopted pursuant to section 303 [of the Clean

Water Act, 33 USC § 1313)” (id., 121 Wash 2d, at

190, 849 P2d, at 652).

This same type of analysis has been followed by the Oregon

intermediate appellate court in Arnold Irrigation Dist. v

Department of Envtl. Quality (79 Ore App 136, 717 P2d 1274,

1279, review denied 301 Ore 765, 726 P2d 377 [1986]. What-

ever the outcome in the Supreme Court of the United States,

we respectfully reach a different conclusion from those courts

based on our analysis and our precedents.

DEC claims that the replacement of section 21 by section

401 (d) by Congress in 1972 which changed the phrase “appli-

cable water quality standards” to the broader phrase “any

other appropriate requirement of State law” (33 USC § 1341

(d); see also, Senate Conference Report No. 92-1236 accompa-

nying S'2770 [enacted as Pub L 92-500], reprinted in 1972 US

Code Cong & Admin News 3776, 3815) dictates a conclusion

that a section 401 review encompasses all applicable State

water quality standards. One initial problem with this phase

of the argument that persuades us to reject this view is that

section 401 (d) does not control the analysis or outcome here.

That subdivision applies only to the conditioning authority on

a certificate issued by DEC. DEC’s enlarged reading of “appro-

priate requirement of State law” under section 401 (d) would

enable DEC to impose onerous conditions that could contradict

or undermine Federal licensing by superimposing unrelated

conditions not within the EPA mandates and specifications.

12a

Such a strained construction would countermand the carefully

worded authority of section 401 (a) (1). To permit: DEC,

through the conditioning power of subdivision (d), to usurp the

authority that Congress reserved for FERC under the Federal

Power Act, over issues beyond water quality standards di-

rectly relevant to the section 401 certification process, is not

justified and would constitute unfounded statutory construc-

tion.

The Clean Water Act reads simply that a certification shall

issue if a-determination is reached “that any such discharge

will comply with the applicable provisions of sections 301, 302,

303, 306, and 307 of this Act” (83 USC § 1341 [a] [1]). Unlike

the EPA-issued effluent limitations and new source perfor-

mance standards mentioned in section 401 (a) (1) (see, 33 USC

§§ 1311, 1312, 1316, 1317), section 303 water quality standards

are promulgated by each State (see, 33 USC § 1313), but even

section 303 standards must be approved by EPA through a

process delineated in section 303 (33 USC § 1313 [c)).

DEC concedes that in New York the water quality stan-

dards promulgated pursuant to section 303 are linked and

found only in 6 NYCRR parts 701 to 704. Thus, there is

nothing in the new language or legislative history of section

401 that would empower DEC to deny certification on the

basis of broader environmental provisions of New York law or

regulation, nor is there adequate support for DEC’s contention

that the operation and reach of section 401 has been altered

in a way that requires this Court to upset its settled analysis

and resolution of the interrelated questions in Matter of de

Rham v Diamond (32 NY2d 34, supra) and Matter of Power

Auth. v Williams (60 NY2d 315, supra).

Additional support for our conclusion may be found in the

Congressional expression when it amended section 401 in the

Senate Report that “it is reasonable to require that Federal

permits and licenses should take into account State water

quality plans, standards and requirements adopted under

section 303 to assure maintenance of water quality in the

respective States” (Senate Report No. 95-370, accompanying S

1952 [Pub L 95-217], at 72-73, reprinted in 1977 US Code Cong

& Admin News 4397-4398).

Therefore, while DEC is correct that Congress sought in

section 401 to preserve the States’ role in maintaining water

quality, ‘Congress simultaneously maintained essentially

preemptive Federal control by restricting State certification to

SS SpA Pc pe

PERRO EDL CIT NEIL INN ETERS

gt

13a

compliance with requirements issued or approved by EPA.

Congress envisioned that the States’ role would be fulfilled

through the water quality standards adopted in harmony with

and under Clean Water Act § 303 (Matter of Power Auth. v

Williams, 60 NY2d, at 326-327, supra) and therefore, in this

case, only in relation to 6 NYCRR parts 701 to 704.

We have considered all arguments advanced by the parties

and conclude that an affirmance is warranted.

Accordingly, the order of the Appellate Division should be

affirmed, with costs.

Chief Judge Kaye and Judges Simons, TITONE, SMITH and

LEVINE concur; Judge HANCOCK, JR., taking no part.

Order affirmed, with costs.

l4a

APPENDIX C—Reported Opinion of Appellate

Division, Third Department.

In the Matter of NIAGARA Mouawk Power CORPORATION,

Respondent, v New York STate DEPARTMENT OF ENvI-

RONMENTAL CONSERVATION et al., Appellants.

Third Department, January 7, 1993

SUMMARY

APPEAL from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Harold J.

Hughes, Jr., J.), entered July 1, 1991 in Albany County,

which, in a combined proceeding pursuant to CPLR article 78

and action for declaratory judgment, granted a petition to

review a determination of respondent Department of Environ-

mental Conservation that, inter alia, certain provisions of ECL

article 15 are applicable to petitioner’s hydroelectric project.

HEADNOTE

Environmental Conservation — Water Quality Certification — Hydro-

electric Power Projects — Federal Preemption

Petitioner utility company, in conjunction with its application to the

Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC) for licenses enabling it to

construct new hydroelectric facilities and perform dam repair or reconstruc-

tion work on existing ones, sought, pursuant to section 401 of the Federal

will issue the certification, Supreme Court Properly determined that Federal

Preemption precluded DEC from requiring a project subject to section 401

aspects of water quality, such as turbidity and temperature change, that are

addressed in regulations promulgated by DEC in accordance with the Clean

FERC-regulated projects well beyond that intended by Congress. The actual

provisions of the ECL which DEC seeks to invoke address the very matters

that have been reserved by the FPA for determination at the Federal level;

environmental and conservation factors of concern to a State are to be

weighed at the Federal level, and to allow them to serve as a predicate for a

State “veto” of the Project is indefensible for it would effectively undermine

15a

TOTAL CLIENT-SERVICE LIBRARY® REFERENCES

By the Publisher's Editorial Staff

Am Jur 2d, Constitutional Law, §74; Public Utilities,

§ 292.

16 USCS § 791a; 33 USCS § 1341.

NY Jur 2d, Constitutional Law, § 104; Environmental

Rights and Remedies, § 143.

ANNOTATION REFERENCE -

See ALR Index under Federal Power Act and Commission;

Hydroelectric Power; Pre-emption.

APPEARANCES OF COUNSEL

Robert Abrams, Attorney-General, Albany (Kathleen Liston

Morrison, Peter H. Schiff, Val E. Washington and Maureen F

Leary of counsel), for appellants.

Brian K. Billinson, Syracuse, and Hiscock & Barclay, Al-

bany (Timothy P. Sheehan of counsel), for respondent.

OPINION OF THE COURT

YESAWICH JR., J.

Petitioner, a private, investor-owned utility company which

owns and operates hydroelectric facilities throughout the

State, recently applied to the Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission (hereinafter FERC) for licenses enabling it to

construct several new facilities and to perform dam repair or

reconstruction work on existing ones, and anticipates filing

similar additional applications in the near future. Section 401

of the Federal Clean Water Act (33 USC § 1341) provides that

when such proposed construction or repair will result in any

discharge into navigable waters, the applicant must obtain,

from the State in which the discharge originates, a certifica-

tion that the discharge meets certain Federal and State water

quality requirements (see, 33 USC § 1341 [a]. In response to

insistence by respondent Department of Environmental Con-

servation (hereinafter DEC) that the projects proposed by

petitioner must satisfy many different provisions of the ECL

(all of which ostensibly, directly or indirectly, affect water

quality), including the regulatory requirements of the State

Environmental Quality Review Act (ECL art 8; hereinafter

SEQRA) before it will issue the requisite certification, peti-

16a

tioner applied to DEC for a declaratory ruling that the Fed-

eral Power Act (hereinafter FPA; 16 USC §791la et seq.)

preempts DEC’s authority to require compliance with these

State laws. On August 27, 1990, DEC ruled that by enacting

section 401 of the Clean Water Act, Congress intended the

States to have authority to exact compliance with all State

laws which bear on water quality before granting a certifica-

tion, or to condition that certification upon such compliance.

Petitioner thereupon instituted this combined CPLR article

78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action, seeking an-

nulment of DEC’s declaratory ruling and a declaration that

the section 401 certification process only allows DEC, with

respect to State law, to consider the water quality standards

set forth in 6 NYCRR parts 701-704. Respondents answered

and moved to dismiss. Supreme Court determined that Fed-

eral preemption precluded DEC from requiring a project

subject to section 401 certification to undergo the sweeping

review sought by DEC. Respondents appeal.

There is no dispute that the FPA establishes a comprehen-

sive scheme pursuant to which all hydroelectric projects are to

be licensed and regulated by FERC, and that this legislation

generally preempts the application of State law, including

licensing and permitting requirements, to such projects (see,

First Iowa Coop. v Power Commn., 328 US 152, 167-168, 181;

Matter of deRham v Diamond, 32 NY2d 34, 44). However, the

Clean Water Act contains a narrow exception to FERC’s

exclusive jurisdiction, insofar as it empowers States to certify

whether a project complies with its water quality require-

ments and makes such a State certification necessary before a

license may be granted (see, 33 USC § 1341 [a]). At issue here

is the breadth of a State’s power engendered by this exception.

Recently, we held that DEC’s authority in this area, which

has been likened to a veto power, encompassed the right to

request certain information from the applicant (Matter of

Long Lake Energy Corp. v New York State Dept. of Envitl.

Conservation, 164 AD2d 396, 401-403); significantly, the infor-

mation sought bore on aspects of water quality, such as

turbidity and temperature change, that were addressed in the

regulations, found at 6 NYCRR parts 701-704,* which DEC

promulgated in accordance with the Clean Water Act. In so

* The water quality standards set forth in 6 NYCRR parts 701-704 relate

to taste, color, odor, turbidity, suspended and dissolved solids, pH, dissolved

oxygen, coliform, thermal discharges, and other chemicals and substances.

17a

doing, we explicitly recognized the “very limited nature of the

activity left by 33 USC § 1341 (Clean Water Act § 401] to State

action”, and noted that “ ‘the standards adopted by [DEC] and

Federally approved * * * relating to such things as turbidity

and temperature change’ ” were the basis for DEC’s request

for information, including plans for the proposed facility

(supra, at 402-403 [emphasis in original]). We are now asked

by respondents to declare that other statutory and regulatory

provisions, more indirectly related to water quality, may be

used as a basis for review under section -401. Because we

believe that to do so would extend DEC’s “veto power” over

FERC-regulated projects well beyond that intended by Con-

gress, we affirm the judgment of Supreme Court.

Respondents have attempted to justify DEC’s consideration

of various sections of the ECL, including ECL 15-0501 (distur-

bance of stream beds), 15-0503 (dam construction), 15-0507

(dam safety), 15-0801 et seg. (reservoir releases), 15-2701 et seq.

(wild, scenic, and recreational rivers), article 24 (freshwater

wetlands), article 11 (fish and wildlife), and article 8 (environ-

mental quality review), as part of the certification process on

the ground that the language of section 401 (d) of the Clean

Water Act (33 USC § 1341 [d]) allows State certification to be

conditioned on compliance with “any other appropriate re-

quirement of State law”; but this merely begs the question as

to which laws are “appropriate”. Respondents argue that any

provision protective of water quality, in any manner, may be

applied. To support their contention, respondents submit a

letter from the Federal Environmental Protection Agency

(hereinafter EPA), the agency charged with administering the

Clean Water Act, to FERC wherein the EPA observes that

“water quality involves far more than just addressing water

chemistry”. However, the EPA acknowledges that State water

quality standards, adopted in accordance with the guidelines

of section 303 of the Clean Water Act (33 USC § 1313) (i.e., use

designations and quality standards to preserve the designated

uses), “form the backbone” of the certification process set

forth in section 401 of the Clean Water Act (33 USC § 1341),

and goes on to note that these water quality standards are not

limited to “chemical-specific criteria”, but rather that States

are encouraged to adopt both narrative and numerical crite-

ria, and will shortly be required to include biological criteria.

Thus, even the EPA recognizes that the proper mechanism by

which a State may apply water quality provisions to a project

licensed under the FPA is by adopting standards under sec-

18a

tion 303, which, if Federally approved, may then be enforced

as part of the certification procedure (see also, Matter of Power

Auth. uv Williams, 60 NY2d 315, 327, n 3).

When the actual provisions of the ECL which DEC seeks to

invoke are examined, it is clear that they address the very

matters that have been reserved by the FPA for determina-

tion at the Federal level—dam safety, general balancing of

economic and other concerns, the effect on wildlife, recre-

ational opportunities and the like. The 1986 amendments to

the FPA, which require FERC to consider fish and wildlife

habitats, recreational opportunities and environmental quality

in general as part of the licensing process, indicate that

Congress intended such matters to remain within the Federal

domain, as factors to be balanced against other concerns, such

as the power and development purposes of the proposed

facility for which a license is sought (see, 16 USC § 797 [e}). It

is also noteworthy that Congress has provided that FERC

must consider any comprehensive plan prepared by a State,

and must solicit and entertain recommendations of State

agencies regarding flood control, recreation, navigation, and

fish or wildlife concerns (see, 16 USC § 803); indeed, a consulta-

tion procedure exists which insures that States will have an

opportunity to have input in this regard (see, 18 CFR 4.38).

This is a further indication that environmental and conserva-

tion factors of concern to a State are to be weighed at the

Federal level; to allow them to serve as a predicate for a State

“veto” of the project is indefensible for it would effectively

undermine the intent of Congress (see, Calvert Cliffs’ Coordi-

nating Comm. v United States Atomic Energy Commn., 449

F2d 1109, 1123).

Weiss, P. J., Mercure, Crew III and Casey, JJ., concur.

Ordered that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

19a

APPENDIX D—Original Opinion and Order of

Appellate Division, Third Department.

SUPREME COURT—APPELLATE DIVISION

THIRD JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT

Decided and Entered: January 7, 1993

*

IN THE MATTER OF NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER

CORPORATION,

Respondent,

v

NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL

CONSERVATION et al.,

Appellants.

65306

*

OPINION AND ORDER

Calendar Date: November 19, 1992

Before: Weiss, P.J., Yesawich Jr., Mercure, Crew III and

Casey, J.J.

Robert Abrams, Attorney-General (Kathleen Liston Mor-

rison of counsel), Albany, for appellants.

Brian K. Billinson, Syracuse, for respondent.

Yesawich Jr., J.

Appeal from a judgment of the Supreme Court (Hughes,

J.), entered July 1, 1991 in Albany County, which granted

20a

petitioner’s application, in a combined proceeding pursuant

to CPLR article 78 and action for declaratory judgment, to

review a determination of respondent Department of Envi-

ronmental Conservation that, inter alia, certain provisions

of ECL article 15 are applicable to petitioner’s hydroelectric

project.

Petitioner, a private, investor-owned utility company

which owns and operates hydroelectric facilities throughout

the State, recently applied to the Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission (hereinafter FERC) for licenses enabling it to

construct several new facilities and to perform dam repair or

reconstruction work on existing ones, and anticipates filing

similar additional applications in the near future. Section

401 of the Federal Clean Water Act (33 USC § 1341)

provides that when such proposed construction or repair

will result in any discharge into navigable waters, the appli-

cant must obtain, from the state in which the discharge

originates, a certification that the discharge meets certain

Federal and State water quality requirements (see, 33 USC §

1341 [a]). In response to insistence by respondent Depart-

ment of Environmental Conservation (hereinafter DEC) that

the projects proposed by petitioner must satisfy many differ-

ent provisions of the ECL (all of which ostensibly, directly

or indirectly, affect water quality), including the regulatory

requirements of the State Environmental Quality Review

Act (ECL art 8) (hereinafter SEQRA) before it will issue the

requisite certification, petitioner applied to DEC for a de-

claratory ruling that the Federal Power Act (hereinafter

FPA) (16 USC § 791a et seq.) preempts DEC’s authority to

require compliance with these State laws. On August 27,

1990, DEC ruled that by enacting section 401 of the Clean

Water Act, Congress intended the states to have authority to

exact compliance with all state laws which bear on water

2la

quality before granting a certification, or to condition that

certification upon such compliance.

Petitioner thereupon instituted this combined CPLR arti-

cle 78 proceeding and declaratory judgment action, seeking

annulment of DEC’s declaratory ruling and a declaration

that the section 401 certification process only allows DEC,

with respect to State law, to consider the water quality

standards set forth in 6 NYCRR parts 701-704. Respondents

answered and moved to dismiss. Supreme Court determined

that Federal preemption precluded DEC from requiring a

project subject to section 401 certification to undergo the

Sweeping review sought by DEC. Respondents appeal.

There is no dispute that the FPA establishes a comprehen-

sive scheme pursuant to which all hydroelectric projects are

to be licensed and regulated by FERC, and that this legisla-

tion generally preempts the application of state law, includ-

ing licensing and permitting requirements, to such projects

(see, First lowa Hydro-Elec. Coop. v Federal Power

Commn., 328 US 152, 167-168, 181, Matter of de Rham v

Diamond, 32 NY2d 34, 44). However, the Clean Water Act

contains a narrow exception to FERC’s exclusive jurisdic-

tion, insofar as it empowers states to certify whether a

project complies with its water quality requirements and

makes such a state certification necessary before a license

may be granted (see, 33 USC § 1341 [a]). At issue here is

the breadth of a state’s power engendered by this exception.

Recently, we held that DEC’s authority in this area, which

has been likened to a veto power, encompassed the right to

request certain information from the applicant (Matter of

Long Lake Energy Corp. v New York State Dept. of Envtl.

Conservation, 164 AD2d 396, 401-403); significantly, the

information sought bore on aspects of water quality, such as

turbidity and temperature change, that were addressed in the

22a

regulations, found at 6 NYCRR parts 701-704!, which DEC

promulgated in accordance with the Clean Water Act. In so

doing, we explicitly recognized the “very limited nature of

the activity left by 33 USC § 1341 [Clean Water Act § 401]

to State action”, and noted that “the standards adopted by

[DEC] and Federally approved *** relating to such things as

turbidity and temperature change” were the basis for DEC’s

request for information, including plans for the proposed

facility (id., at 402-403 [emphasis in original]). We are now

asked by respondents to declare that other statutory and

regulatory provisions, more indirectly related to water qual-

ity, may be used as a basis for review under section 401.

Because we believe that to do so would extend DEC’s “‘veto

power” over FERC-regulated projects well beyond that

intended by Congress, we affirm the judgment of Supreme

Court.

Respondents have attempted to justify DEC’s considera-

tion of various sections of the ECL, including ECL

§ 15-0501 (disturbance of stream beds), ECL 15-0503 (dam

construction), ECL 15-0507 (dam safety), ECL 15-0801 et

seq. (reservoir releases), ECL 15-2701 et seq. (wild, scenic,

and recreational rivers), ECL article 24 (freshwater wet-

lands), ECL article 11 (fish and wildlife), and ECL article 8

(environmental quality review), as part of the certification

process on the ground that the language of section 401 (d) of

the Clean Water Act (33 USC § 1341 [d]) allows state

certification to be conditioned on compliance with “any

other appropriate requirement of State law’’; but this merely

begs the question as to which laws are “appropriate”. Re-

spondents argue that any provision protective of water qual-

'The water quality standards set forth in 6 NYCRR parts 701-704

relate to taste, color, odor, turbidity, suspended and dissolved solids,

pH, dissolved oxygen, coliform, thermal discharges, and other chemi-

cals and substances.

23a

ity, in any manner, may be applied. To support their conten-

tion, respondents submit a letter from the Federal Environ-

mental Protection Agency (hereinafter EPA), the agency

charged with administering the Clean Water Act, to FERC

wherein the EPA observes that “‘water quality involves far

more than just addressing water chemistry”. However, the

EPA acknowledges that state water quality standards,

adopted in accordance with the guidelines of section 303 of

the Clean Water Act (33 USC § 1313) (i.e., use designations

and quality standards to preserve the designated uses),

“form the backbone”’ of the certification process set forth

in section 401 of the Clean Water Act (33 USC § 1341), and

goes on to note that these water quality standards are not

limited to “‘chemical-specific criteria’, but rather that

States are encouraged to adopt both narrative and numerical

criteria, and will shortly be required to include biological

criteria. Thus, even the EPA recognizes that the proper

mechanism by which a state may apply water quality provi-

sions to a project licensed under the FPA is by adopting

standards under section 303, which, if Federally approved,

may then be enforced as part of the certification procedure

(see also, Matter of Power Auth. of State of N.Y. v Williams,

60 NY2d 315, 327 n 3).

When the actual provisions of the ECL which DEC seeks

to invoke are examined, it is clear that they address the very

matters that have been reserved by the FPA for determina-

tion at the Federal level—dam safety, general balancing of

economic and other concerns, the effect on wildlife, recre-

ational opportunities and the like. The 1986 amendments to

the FPA, which require FERC to consider fish and wildlife

habitats, recreational opportunities and environmental qual-

ity in general as part of the licensing process, indicate that

Congress intended such matters to remain within the Federal

domain, as factors to be balanced against other concerns,

24a

such as the power and development purposes of the pro-

posed facility for which a license is sought (see, 16 USC §

797 [e]). It is also noteworthy that Congress has provided

that FERC must consider any comprehensive plan prepared

by a state, and must solicit and entertain recommendations

of state agencies regarding flood control, recreation, naviga-

tion, and fish or wildlife concerns (see, 16 USC § 803);

indeed, a consultation procedure exists which insures that

states will have an opportunity to have input in this regard

(see, 18 CFR 4.38). This is a further indication that environ-

mental and conservation factors of concern to a state are to

be weighed at the Federal level; to allow them to serve as a

predicate for a state “veto” of the project is indefensible for

it would effectively undermine the intent of Congress (see,

Calvert Cliffs’ Coordinating Comm. v United States Atomic

Energy Commn., 449 F2d 1109, 1123).

Weiss, P.J., Mercure, Crew III and Casey, JJ., concur.

ORDERED that the judgment is affirmed, without costs.

ENTER:

/S/MICHAEL J. NOVACK

MICHAEL J. NOVACK

Clerk

Sai al lly a od aN ted NY

- 2 t . - 5

LO te a SO en Coe a 2 teers St eee ee Ceara

ak BD A Nelly hea 8 Dott it adh

BaRin Fe He Otay eb de eh ek Cl Bh ol areal ARNE? Baia WeK ace ce naw mopl

25a

APPENDIX E—Memorandum Decision of New York

Supreme Court, Albany County.

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

COUNTY OF ALBANY

In the Matter of the Application of

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

against

NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL CON-

SERVATION, COMMISSIONER THOMAS G. JORLING and

DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AND GENERAL COUNSEL MARC

S. GERSTMAN,

Respondents.

(Supreme Court, Albany County, Special Term,

February 15, 1991)

(RJI No. 0191-ST2860)

(JUSTICE HAROLD J. HUGHES, Presiding)

Appearances:

Brian K. Billinson, Esq., Attorney for Petitioner, 300 Erie

Boulevard West, Syracuse, New York 13202.

Hon. Robert Abrams, Attorney General of New York

State, Attorney for Respondents, (Maureen F. Leary, Esq.,

of Counsel), NYS Department of Law, The Capitol, Albany,

New York 12224

26a

HUGHES, J.:

Petitioner seeks ‘‘a judgment pursuant to CPLR Article

78 determining that the Respondents’ decision dated August

27, 1990 in response to a request for a certain declaratory

ruling is erroneous as a matter of law, arbitrary and capri-

cious; that the Federal Power Act preempts the New York

State Department of Environmental Conservation (““DEC’’)

from applying the substantive provisions of Environmental

Conservation Law §§15-0501, 15-0503, 15-0505, 15-0507,

15-0801 et seq., 15-2701 et seq. and Articles 8, 11 and 24 to

hydroelectric projects such as those undertaken and planned

by Niagara, that the Section 401 Certification process only

allows the DEC, with respect to State Law, to consider the

water quality standards set forth in 6 NYCRR §§701.19 and

704.2”. The respondents have served both a motion to

dismiss the petition upon objections in point of law, as well

as an answer containing objections in point of law and a

return.

The petition asserts that as part of its operation as a public

electric and gas utility Niagara Mohawk owns and operates

73 hydroelectric generating facilities on navigable waters in

New York State. It is alleged that under to the Federal Power

Act (FPA) the Federal Energy Regulation Commission

(FERC) has exclusive jurisdiction to issue licenses for the

construction and operation of hydroelectric generating

plants located on navigable waters. It is allegec that pur-

suant to section 401 of the Clean Water Act (CWA), 33 USC

§1341, FERC will not issue a license or permit until the

state involved has certified that the project will not contra-

vene that state’s water quality standards. In New York State

the Department of Environmental Conservation (DEC) is

the State agency which issues the section 401 approval. It is

alleged that DEC has been subjecting Niagara Mohawk’s

27a

section 401 certification applications to review under article

15 of the Environmental Conservation Law in violation of

the FPA which preempts the field.

To eliminate that double review, Niagara Mohawk applied

to DEC pursuant to section 204 of the State Administrative

Procedure Act for a declaratory ruling that Article 15, Title

5, of the Environmental Conservation Law is not applicable

upon a request for section 401 certification as the FPA

preempts the field except for the issue of whether the project

will affect the State’s water quality standards. DEC issued a

declaratory ruling on August 27, 1990, stating that the ques-

tion of federal preemption cannot properly be resolved by

the use of a declaratory ruling, and further stating that in its

opinion applications for 401 certification were subject to

review under the following State laws:

“*(a) Protection of Water: disturbance of stream beds

[ECL §15-0501];

(b) Protection of Waters: dam construction [ECL

§15-0503];

(c) Protection of Waters: excavation or fill (ECL

15-0505];

(d) Dam Safety [ECL §15-0507};

(e) Reservoir Releases [ECL §15-0801 et seq.];

(f) Wild, Scenic and Recreational River System

[ECL 15-2700, et seq.};

(g) Freshwater Wetlands [ECL Article 24];

(h) Fish and Wildlife [ECL Article 11]; and

(i) Environmental Quality Review [ECL Article

oF

This article 78 proceeding ensued. The Court will address

the objections in point of law first. Although it is difficult to

determine what objections in point of law are being raised

28a

by the notice of motion dated February 7, 1991, one of them

appears to be that:

“A declaratory ruling in response to Niagara’s

petition would have forced NYSDEC to interpret the

FPA and its relationship to the CWA and State law. I

determined that issuing a declaratory ruling that in-

terpreted federal laws and regulations was clearly

outside the scope of the Department’s authority

granted to 6 NYCRR § 619.2 and was therefore an

inappropriate means of resolving the issues raised in

Niagara’s declaratory ruling petition” (paragraph 6

of the affidavit of Mark S. Gerstman sworn to Febru-

ary 8, 1991)”’.

It is obvious that Deputy Commissioner Gerstman felt

that the Department’s authority to issue declaratory rulings

was established by 6 NYCRR 619.2, and that this section

precluded interpreting federal statutes. The Deputy Com-

missioner is in error. The Legislature, although not dealing

with the issue of preemption, expressly determined in enact-

ing subdivision (2) of section 206 of the State Administra-

tive Procedure Act that:

“Any person subject to a requirement imposed by

a state statute or rule and to a similar requirement

imposed by the federal government, may pursuant to

section two hundred four of this chapter, petition the

agency administering the state requirement for a de-

claratory ruling as to whether compliance with the

federal requirement will be accepted as compliance

with the state requirement. Upon receipt of such

petition, the agency shall submit a copy thereof to

29a

the office of business permits and regulatory

assistance”.

This provision establishes that the Legislature intended

that federal statutes and rules can be interpreted by a state

agency in issuing an administrative ruling. To the extent that

6 NYCRR 619.3 conflicts with the legislative will, it must

yield. Although section 206 of the State Administrative

Procedure Act does not expressly deal with a preemption

question, its signals a legislative intent that a New York

resident subjected to similar federal and state laws can

obtain a declaratory ruling from the agency implementing

the state laws as to whether he has to comply with the state

or federal requirements. There appears to be no good reason

to exempt preemption from the declaratory ruling process

(see Matter of Power Auth. of State of N.Y. v New York State

Dept. of Environmental Conservation, 58 NY2d 427, 433,

434). A declaratory ruling by DEC upon a preemption issue

is subject to article 78 review (Matter of Northeast Mines,

Inc. v State of New York Dept. of Envtl. Conservation, 113

AD2d 62).

30a

The next objection in point of law is that the petition is

barred by the four-month statute of limitations set forth in

CPLR section 217. That argument lacks merit, as this pro-

ceeding was brought within four months after the issuance

of the declaratory ruling. The Court has considered the

remaining objections in point of law and find that they lack

merit.

Turning to the merits, the Court of Appeals has held that

the “‘section 401 certification process is accomplished by a

determination that a proposed project will meet the particu-

lar water quality standards for the applicable classification”

(Matter of Power Auth. v Flacke, 60 NY2d 315, 326, 327).

In Fourth Branch Assocs. v Department of Envtl. Conserva-

tion, 146 Misc2d 334, Mr. Justice Harris held that the

review powers of DEC under a section 401 certification

request did not include subjecting the project to SEQRA

review. In the unreported decision of Fourth Branch Assocs.

v Department of Envtl. Conservation, Supreme Court, Al-

bany County Special Term, J. Harris, November 28, 1989,

Judge Harris held that federal preemption precluded sub-

jecting a 401 certification application to article 15 review.

This Court agrees with both holdings (see Matter of Long

Lake Energy Corp. v New York State Department of Envi-

ronmental Conservation, AD2d —_, Third Depart-

ment, decided December 6, 1990). To the extent necessary,

this proceeding will be converted to a declaratory judgment

action.

The petitioner will be awarded a judgment for the relief

requested in the notice of petition. Petitioner is directed to

submit a proposed judgment on notice.

Dated: April 1, 1991

3la

APPENDIX F—Order of New York Supreme Court,

Albany County

At a Special Term of the Supreme Court of the

State of New York, held in and for the County

of Albany, at the Albany County Courthouse,

Albany, New York, on the 15th day of Febru-

ary, 1991.

PRESENT:

HON. HAROLD J. HUGHES

SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEW YORK

COUNTY OF ALBANY

*

In the Matter of the Application of

NIAGARA MOHAWK POWER CORPORATION,

Petitioner,

- against -

THE NEW YORK STATE DEPARTMENT OF ENVIRONMENTAL

CONSERVATION, THOMAS C. JORLING, COMMISSIONER, .

and MARC S. GERSTMAN, DEPUTY COMMISSIONER AND

GENERAL COUNSEL,

Respondents.

Index No. 7218-90

RJI No. 0191-ST2860

Upon reading and filing of the notice of petition, dated

December 21, 1990, the verified petition, dated December

32a

19, 1990, and the memorandum of law submitted therewith

by petitioner Niagara Mohawk Power Corporation; and

The notice of motion to dismiss the petition on objections

in point of law, dated February 7, 1991, the affidavit of

Marc S. Gerstman, sworn to on February 8, 1991, the veri-

fied answer and certified return, dated February 8, 1991,

and the memorandum of law submitted therewith by re-

spondents, New York State Department of Environmental

Conservation, Commissioner Thomas C. Jorling, and Dep-

uty Commissioner and General Counsel Marc S. Gerstman;

and

The affidavit of Brian K. Billinson in opposition to re-

spondent’s motion to dismiss, sworn to on February 13,

1991; and

The matter having been heard at a Term of this Court

before the Honorable Harold J. Hughes on the 15th day of

February, 1991, and the petitioner having appeared by its

attorney, Brian K. Billinson, Esq., of counsel, and the re-

spondents having appeared by their attorney, Maureen F.

Leary, Esq., Assistant Attorney General, of counsel, and the

Court having heard the arguments of counsel; and

Upon due deliberation and in accordance with the Court’s

April 1, 1991 decision, a copy of which is annexed hereto

and incorporated herein, it is hereby

ORDERED, that Respondents’ motion to dismiss the

petition on objections in point of law is hereby denied; and

it is further

ORDERED, that this proceeding is hereby converted to a

declaratory judgment action pursuant to CPLR § 103; and it

is further

ORDERED, that judgment as requested in the Petition is

hereby awarded to Petitioners annulling Respondents’

August 27, 1990 ruling; preempting Respondents from ap-

plying the substantive provisions of ECL §§ 15-0501,

33a

15-0503, 15-0505, 15-0507, 15-0801, et seq., 15-2701, et

~seg.- and Articles 8, 11 and 24 of the Environmental Conser-

vation Law to hydroelectric projects by Petitioner and li-

censed by the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission un-

der the Federal Power Act; and limiting Respondents to

considering only the water quality standards set forth in 6

NYCRR § 701.19 and 704.2 during Respondents’ Clean

Water Act § 401 of hydroelectric projects undertaken by

Petitioner and licensed by the Federal Energy Regulatory

Commission under the Federal Power Act.

Signed this 19th day of June, 1991.

ENTER:

/sfHAROLD J. HUGHES

HON. HAROLD J. HUGHES

Justice of the Supreme Court

34a

APPENDIX G—Environmental Conservation Law

$§ 15-0501, 15-0503, 15-0505 and 15-0507.

TITLE 5—PROTECTION OF WATER

§ 15-0501. Protection of certain streams; disturbances of

stream beds; permit

1. Except as provided in subdivisions 4, 5, 6 and 7 of this

section, no person or public corporation shall change, modify or

disturb the course, channel or bed of any stream as defined in

subdivision 2, or remove any sand, gravel or other material from

the bed or banks of such a stream without a permit issued pur-

suant to subdivision 3 of this section.

2. For the purposes of this section, stream shall mean that

portion of any fresh surface watercourse, except lakes or ponds

having a surface area greater than ten acres at mean low water

level, for which the department has adopted or may hereafter

adopt pursuant to section 17-0301, any of the following classi-

fications or standards:

AA and AA(T),

A and A(T),

B and B(T),

C(T).

Small ponds or lakes with a surface area at mean low water

level of ten acres or less, located in the course of a stream, shall

be considered a part of the stream and subject to regulation under

this section.

3. Permit.

a. Before granting a permit, a permit renewal or a permit

modification pursuant to this section, the department shall ascer-

tain the probable effect on the health, safety and welfare of the

people of the state, and the effect on the natural resources of the

state, including soil, forests, water, fish and aquatic resources

therein, likely to result from the proposed project or work.

b. In order to minimize the disturbance of a stream and in

order to prevent unreasonable erosion of soil, increased turbidity

of the waters, irregular variations in velocity, temperature and

level of waters, the loss of fish and aquatic wildlife and the

destruction of natural habitat thereof, and the danger of flood or

pollution, the department shall review the permit application or

request for renewal or modification of an existing permit and may

approve the manner and the extent to which the stream bed or

channel may be changed, altered or modified and may limit the

quantity of sand, gravel or other material to be removed, desig-

nate the location in the bed, channel or banks of the stream from

which the sand, gravel or other material may be removed, or it

may deny the permit or request.

c. The rules and regulations adopted by the department to

implement this section and the provisions of article 70 of this

chapter and rules and regulations adopted thereunder shall govern

the processing of permit applications, renewals, modifications,

suspensions and revocations under this section.

4. No permit under this section shall be required of any local

public corporation which has entered into a written memorandum

of understanding with the department establishing the plan of

operation to be followed in carrying out projects or work affect-

ing water courses so as to afford proper protection to the public

beneficial uses of such water courses.

36a

5. No permit under this section shall be required of any state

department or state public corporation. State departments and

state public corporations may enter into a written memorandum

of understanding with the department concerning projects or

work of the type for which a permit would be required under this

section if the project or work were undertaken by a person or

local public corporation. The memorandum may establish pro-

cedures for review by the department of the plans for such

projects or work and for written recommendations by the depart-

ment with respect thereto.

6. No permit under this section shall be required for emer-

gency work in a stream or on its banks which is immediately

necessary to protect the health, safety and well-being of any

person or persons or to prevent damage to personal or real prop-

erty, provided that the department is given written notification by

registered mail or telegraph within forty-eight hours after the

commencement of the work and within forty-eight hours follow-

ing the completion of such work. Whenever emergency work is

performed as provided in this subdivision, it shall be performed

in a manner that will cause the least change, modification, distur-

bance or damage to the course or bed of the stream and its banks.

7. No permit under this section shall be required for certain

agricultural activities of persons and «urporations actively culti-

vating land devoted to agriculture whether or not the same be

along a stream or watercourse as described in subdivision 2;

providing that these agricultural activities consist only of cross-

ing and recrossing of such streams or watercourses by livestock

or by wheeled farm equipment normally used for traditional

agricultural purposes; or the use of such stream or watercourse

for withdrawal of water for irrigation where such withdrawal

does not require altering the bed, banks or course of the stream in

any manner.

37a

8. The requirements of this section shall be in addition to those

specified in section 15-0505 of this title, provided however, that

the department may, by rule and regulation, provide that only one

application for a permit or request for renewal or modification of

an existing permit need be filed with the proposed project or

work requires a department permit under this section and section

15-0505 of this title.

(L.1972, c. 664, § 2; amended L.1973, c. 489, § 1; L.1976, c.

301, § 1; L.1979, c. 233, § 1.)

§ 15-0503. Protection of water bodies; permit

1. Except as provided in subdivision 4 of this section

a. No dam or impoundment structure, including any artificial

obstruction, temporary or permanent, in or across a natural stream

or water course, shall be erected, constructed, reconstructed or

repaired by any person or local public corporation without a

permit issued pursuant to subdivision 3 of this section.

od. Except where a lease or other appropriate conveyance of an

interest authorizing the use and occupancy of state-owned lands

underwater has been obtained from the commissioner of general

Services pursuant to subdivision seven of section seventy-five of

the public lands law, no dock, wharf, platform, breakwater, moor-

ing, or other structure in, on or above waters shall be erected,

placed, constructed, reconstructed, or expanded after the effec-

tive date of this paragraph by any person or local public corpora-

tion without a permit issued pursuant to subdivision 3 of this

section. The term “reconstructed” as used in this section shall

mean the substantial rebuilding of structures or facilities and shall

not apply to ordinary maintenance or repair of existing functional

structures or facilities, such as repainting, redriving pilings or

replacing broken boards in docks.

38a

c. A city, town, village or county may submit to the commis-

sioner a local law or ordinance regulating docks or other struc-

tures as described in paragraph b of this subdivision. The com-

missioner shall review such law or ordinance to determine

whether it provides environmental protection comparable to, or

greater than, the provisions of such paragraph and any regulations

promulgated thereunder. If the commissioner determines that the

local law or ordinance submitted meets such requirements, the

commissioner may delegate, upon such terms and conditions as

he or she deems appropriate, to the local government the

authority to administer the permit program and to charge a fee for

permit processing. Any delegation may be revoked by the com-

missioner if he or she finds that the local government has failed to

carry out the program in accordance with the terms of the

delegation.

2. For the purposes of this section, a dam or impoundment

structure shall include, but shall not be limited to, earth fiils, with

or without controllable outlet gates, and roads, bridges or fords

which unduly impede the flow of water.

3. Permits. a. Before granting a permit, a permit renewal or a

permit modification pursuant to this section, the department shall

ascertain the probable effect on the health, safety and welfare of

the people of the state, and the effect on the natural resources of

the state likely to result from the proposed project or work.

b. The department shall review the permit application or re-

quest for renewal or modification of an existing permit and may

approve the manner and extent to which the waters of the state or

the banks and shore thereof will be affected by the proposed

project or work and may grant or deny the permit or request, or

may grant the permit or request with such conditions as might

appear necessary to safeguard life, property and natural resources

during and after the execution of the proposed project or work.

39a

c. The rules and regulations adopted by the commissioner to

implement this section and the provisions of article 70 of this

chapter and rules and regulations adopted thereunder shall govern

permit applications, renewals, modifications, suspensions and

revocations under this section.

d. The requirements of this section shall be in addition to those

specified in sections 15-0501 and 15-0505 of this title, provided

however, that the department may, by rule and regulation, pro-

vide that only one application for a permit or request for renewal

or modification of an existing permit need be filed when the

proposed project or work requires a department permit under this

section and any other section of this title.

4. The requirement of a permit pursuant to this section shall

not apply to the following facilities:

a. A structure used for impounding water where the area drain-

ing into the pond or other body of impounded water formed

thereby does not exceed one square mile, unless (1) the impound-

ing structure is more than ten feet in height above the bed of the

stream at any point or (2) unless the quantity of water which the

structure impounds exceeds one million gallons; or

b. A farm pond erected upon lands devoted to farming for the

purpose of soil conservation, propagation of fish, irrigation, wa-

tering of livestock, maintenance of wildlife or general farm use

which is formed by an earth embankment with an all-earth vege-

tated spillway and other accessory structures, unless (1) the

height of earth embankment, measured from the top thereof to the

lowest point of the excavation in the reservoir area, exceeds

fifteen feet; or (2) the capacity of the farm pond exceeds one

million five hundred thousand gallons measured as the total

volume of water which would be impounded if the surface of the

water were at the bottom of the spillway at its highest point; or (3)

the area draining into the farm pond exceeds two hundred acres;

40a

or (4) the pond comprises more than ten acres of surface water

when full; or (5) the water to said farm pond is diverted into said

pond by an artificial obstruction in or across a natural stream or

water course.

¢. A dock, pier, wharf or other structure used solely as a

landing place on water providing dockage for five or fewer boats

and encompassing within its outer perimeter an area less than

four thousand square feet;

d. A mooring facility providing mooring for fewer than ten

boats;

e. Seasonal replacement or reinstallation of structures installed

prior to the effective date of this paragraph.

5. The design, preparation of plans, estimates and specifica-

tions and the supervision of the erection, construction, recon-

struction and repair of all the structures hereinbefore referred to

shall be done by a licensed professional engineer, or in the case of

farm ponds for which a permit is required, by an engineer or

conservationist employed by a governmental agency cooperating

with a soil conservation district, or by an engineer employed by

the department.

6. Notwithstanding the provisions of this or any other chapter

or law to the contrary, no reservoirs for any purpose shall hereaf-

ter be constructed on the Upper Hudson River in the Adirondack

park between Luzerne and the river’s source; the Boreas river

from its mouth to Durgin Brook; the Indian river from its mouth

to Abanakee Dam; and the Cedar river from its mouth to Cedar

River Flow, by the state or by any river regulating board.

(L.1972, c. 664, § 2; amended L.1975, c. 184, §§ 1, 2; L.1979, c.

233, § 2; L.1983, c. 442, § 1, As amended L.1992, c. 791, §§ 5,

6.)

4la

§ 15-0505. Protection of navigable waters; excavation or fill;

permit

1. No person, local public corporation or interstate authority

shall excavate or place fill below the mean high water level in any

of the navigable waters of the state, or in marshes, estuaries, tidal

marshes and wetlands that are adjacent to and contiguous at any

point to any of the navigable waters of the state and that are

inundated at mean high water level or tide, without a permit

issued pursuant to subdivision 3 of this section. For the purposes

of this section, fill shall include, but shall not be limited to, earth,

clay, silt, sand, gravel, stone, rock, shale, concrete (whole or

fragmentary), ashes, cinders, slag, metal, or any other similar

material whether or not enclosed or contained by (1) crib work of

wood, timber, logs, concrete or metal, (2) bulkheads and coffer-

dams of timber sheeting, bracing and piling or steel sheet piling

or steel H piling, separated or in combination. Nothing contained

in this section is intended to be, nor shall be construed to limit,

impair or affect the memorandum of understanding which any

State department enters into with the Department cf Environmen-

tal Conservation or the general powers and duties of the Depart-

ment of Transportation relating to canals or the general powers

and duties of the Department of Environmental Conservation

relating to flood control.

2. A permit application or request for a permit renewal or

modification shall be made on forms provided by the department

and shall consist of a description of the character and extent of

the proposed project or work, drawings, plans and specifications

providing the location and details of the proposed project or

work, and such additional information as the department may

require.

3. Before granting a permit, a permit renewal or a permit

modification pursuant to this section the department shall ascer-

tain the probable effect on the use of such waters for navigation,

42a

the health, safety and welfare of the people of the state and the

effect on the natural resources of the state, including soil, forests,

water, fish and aquatic resources therein, likely to result from the

proposed project or work.

4. The department shall review the permit application or re-

quest for renewal or modification of an existing permit and may

grant or deny the permit or request, or may grant the permit with

such conditions as will safeguard life or property against danger

or destruction and as will make the navigable waters safe for use

by the public.

5. The rules and regulations adopted by the department to

implement this section and the provisions of article 70 of this

chapter and rules and regulations adopted thereunder shall govern

the processing of permit applications, renewals, modifications,

suspensions and revocations under this section.

6. The provisions of subdivisions 1, 2, 3 and 4 of this section

shall not apply to emergency work in waters described in subdivi-

sion 1 of this section which is immediately necessary to protect

the health, safety and well-being of any person or persons or to

prevent damage to personal or real property, provided that the

department is given written notification by registered mail or

telegraph within forty-eight hours after the commencement of the

work and within forty-eight hours following the completion of

the work. Whenever such emergency work is performed as pro-

vided in this subdivision, it shall be performed in a manner that

will cause the lease change, modification, disturbance or damage

to the environment.

7. The requirements of this section shall be in addition to those

specified in section 15-0501 of this title, provided however, that

the department may, by rule and regulation, provide that only one

application for a permit or request for renewal or modification of

an existing permit need be filed when the proposed project or

43a

work requires a department permit under this section and section

15-0501 of this title.

(L.1972, c. 664, § 2; amended L.1975, c. 271, § 1; L.1975, c.

349, § 1; L.1979, c. 233, § 3.)

§ 15-0507. Structures impounding waters; inspection

1. Whenever in the judgment of the department public safety

requires, the department shall investigate dams and other struc-

tures impounding waters in the state, and docks, piers and wharfs

extending into such waters.

2. The department shall have the power, after hearing on due

notice, to make and serve an order, setting forth the findings of

fact and conclusions therefrom, directing any person or local

public corporation, erecting, reconstructing, repairing, maintain-

ing or using any such structures to either remove the said struc-

ture or to erect, reconstruct or repair the same within such reason-

able time and in such manner as shall be specified in said order,

and it shall be the duty of every such person or local public

corporation to obey, observe and comply with such order and

with the conditions therein prescribed. The provisions of title 9 of

this article with respect to administrative procedures shall be

applicable to hearings under this section.

3. It shall be unlawful for any person or local public corpora-

tion to fail, omit or neglect to comply with such order or to fail to

remove, erect, reconstruct or repair the same as provided in the

order within a reasonable time as designated by the department.

4. Upon the violation of any such order, the department shall

have power to enter upon the lands and waters where such

structures are located for the purpose of removing, repairing or

reconstructing the same and to take such other and further pre-

cautions which it may deem necessary to safeguard life or prop-

44a

erty or protect the natural resources of the state against danger

occasioned by the presence of such structures. In removing,

repairing and reconstructing such structures or other properties so

affected the department shall not deviate from the method, man-

ner and specifications contained in the original order.

5. The department shall certify the amount of the costs and

expenses incurred by the department and any state departments

for the removal, repair or reconstruction aforesaid in anywise

connected therewith to the county legislative body of the county

or counties in which the said lands and waters are located,

whereupon it shall be the duty of such county legislative body of

each county to add the amount so certified to the assessment rolls

of such locality or localities as a charge against the real property

upon which the dam, dock or other structure is located, desig-

nated or described by the department as chargeable therewith,

and to issue its warrant or warrants for the collection thereof.

Thereupon it shall become the duty of such locality or localities

through their proper officers to collect the amount so certified in

the same manner as other taxes are collected in such locality or

localities and when collected to pay the same to the department,

who shall thereupon, pay the same into the State Treasury. Any

amount so levied shall thereupon become and be a lien upon the

real property affected thereby to the same extent as any tax levy

becomes and is a lien thereon.

(L.1972, c. 664, § 2.)

45a

Section 401 of the Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. 1341, provides:

§ 1341. Certification

(a) Compliance with applicable requirements;

application; procedures; license suspension

(1) Any applicant for a Federal license or

permit to conduct any activity including, but not

limited to, the construction or operation of facili-

ties, which may result in any discharge into the

navigable waters, shall provide the licensing or

permitting agency a certification from the State

in which the discharge originates or will origi-

nate, or, if appropriate, from the interstate water

pollution control agency having jurisdiction over

the navigable waters at the point where the dis-

charge originates or will originate, that any such

discharge will comply with the applicable provi-

sions of sections 1311, 1312, 1313, 1316, and

1317 of this title. In the case of any such activ-

ity for which there is not an applicable effluent

limitation or other limitation under sections

1311(b) and 1312 of this title, and there is not

an applicable standard under sections 1316 and

1317 of this title, the State shall so certify, ex-

cept that any such certification shall not be

deemed to satisfy section 1371(c) of this title.

Such State or interstate agency shall establish

procedures for public notice in the case of all

applications for certification by it and, to the ex-

tent it deems appropriate, procedures for public

hearings in connection with specific applications.

In any case where a State or interstate agency

has no authority to give such a certification, such

certification shall be from the Administrator. If

the State, interstate agency, or Administrator, as

46a

the case may be, fails or refuses to act on a re-

quest for certification, within a reasonable period

of time (which shall not exceed one year) after

receipt of such request, the certification require-

ments of this subsection shall be waived with

respect to such Federal application. No license

or permit shall be granted until the certification

required by this section has been obtained or has

been waived as provided in the preceding sen-

tence. No license or permit shall be granted if

certification has been denied by the State, inter-

state agency, or the Administrator, as the case

may be.

(2) Upon receipt of such application and cer-

tification the licensing or permitting agency shall

immediately notify the Administrator of such

application and certification. Whenever such a

discharge may affect, as determined by the Ad-

ministrator, the quality of the waters of any

other State, the Administrator within thirty days

of the date of notice of application for such Fed-

eral license or permit shall so notify such other

State, the licensing or permitting agency, and the

applicant. If, within sixty days after receipt of

such notification, such other State determines

that such discharge will affect the quality of its

waters so as to violate any water quality require-

ments in such State, and within such sixty-day

period notifies the Administrator and the licens-

ing or permitting agency in writing of its objec-

tion to the issuance of such license or permit and

requests a public hearing on such objection, the

licensing or permitting agency shall hold such a

hearing. The Administrator shall at such hearing

submit his evaluation and recommendations with

respect to any such objection to the licensing or

permitting agency. Such agency, based upon the

47a

recommendations of such State, the Administra-

tor, and upon any additional evidence, if any,

presented to the agency at the hearing, shall con-

dition such license or permit in such manner as

may be necessary to insure compliance with ap-

plicable water quality requirements. If the im-

position of conditions cannot insure such compli-

ance such agency shall not issue such license or

permit.

(3) The certification obtained pursuant to

paragraph (1) of this subsection with respect

to the construction of any facility shall fulfill the

requirements of this subsection with respect to

certification in connection with any other Fed-

eral license or permit required for the operation

of such facility unless, after notice to the certify-

ing State, agency, or Administrator, as the case

may be, which shall be given by the Federal

agency to whom application is made for such

operating license or permit, the State, or if ap-

propriate, the interstate agency or the Adminis-

trator, notifies such agency within sixty days

after receipt of such notice that there is no longer

reasonable assurance that there will be compli-

ance with the applicable provisions of sections

1311, 1312, 1313, 1316, and 1317 of this title

because of changes since the construction license

or permit certification was issued in (A) the con-

struction or operation of the facility, (B) the

characteristics of the waters into which such dis-

charge is made, (C) the water quality criteria

applicable to such waters or (D) applicable ef-

fluent limitations or other requirements. This

paragraph shall be inapplicable in any case where

the applicant for such operating license or permit

has failed to provide the certifying State, or, if

appropriate, the interstate agency or the Admin-

48a

istrator, with notice of any proposed changes in

the construction or operation of the facility with

respect to which a construction license or permit

has been granted, which changes may result in

violation of section 1311, 1312, 1313, 1316, or

1317 of this title.

(4) Prior to the initial operation of any fed-

erally licensed or permitted facility or activity

which may result in any discharge into the

navigable waters and with respect to which a

certification has been obtained pursuant to para-

graph (1) of this subsection, which facility or

activity is not subject to a Federal operating

license or permit, the licensee or permittee shall

provide an opportunity for such certifying State,

or, if appropriate, the interstate agency or the

Administrator to review the manner in which the

facility or activity shall be operated or conducted

for the purposes of assuring that applicable ef-

fluent limitations or other limitations or other

applicable water quality requirements wil! not be

violated. Upon notification by the certifying

State, or if appropriate, the interstate agency or

the Administrator that the operation of any such

federally licensed or permitted facility or activity

will violate applicable effluent limitations or other

limitations or other water quality requirements

such Federal agency may, after public hearing,

suspend such license or permit. If such license

or permit is suspended, it shall remain suspended

until notification is received from the certifying

State, agency, or Administrator, as the case may

be, that there is reasonable assurance that such

facility or activity will not violate the applicable

provisions of section 1311, 1312, 1313, 1316, or

1317 of this title.

49a

(5) Any Federal license or permit with re-

spect to which a certification has been obtained

under paragraph (1) of this subsection may be

suspended or revoked by the Federal agency is-

suing such license or permit upon the entering of

a judgment under this chapter that such facility

or activity has been operated in violation of the

applicable provisions of section 1311, 1312, 1313,

1316, or 1317 of this title.

(6) Except with respect to a permit issued

under section 1342 of this title, in any case where

actual construction of a facility has been lawfully

commenced prior to April 3, 1970, no certifica-

tion shall be required under this subsection for

a license or permit issued after April 3, 1970,

to operate such facility, except that any such

license or permit issued without certification

shall terminate April 3, 1973, unless prior to

such termination date the person having such

license or permit submits to the Federal agency

which issued such license or permit a certifica-

tion and otherwise meets the requirements of

this section.

(b) Compliance with other provisions of law set-

ting applicable water quality requirements

Nothing in this section shall be construed to

limit the authority of any department or agency

pursuant to any other provisions of law to re-

quire compliance with any applicable water qual-

ity requirements. The Administrator shall, upon

the request of any Federal department or agency,

or State or interstate agency, or applicant, pro-

vide, for the purpose of this section, any relevant

information on applicable effluent limitations, or

other limitations, standards, regulations, or re-

quirements, or water quality criteria, and shall,

50a

when requested by any such department or

agency or State or interstate agency, or appli-

cant, comment on any methods to comply with

such limitations, standards, regulations, require-

ments, or criteria.

(c) Authority of Secretary of the Army to per-

mit use of spoil disposal areas by Federal

licensees or permittees

In order to implement the provisions of this

section, the Secretary of the Army, acting

through the Chief of Engineers, is authorized,

if he deems it to be in the public interest, to per-

mit the use of spoil disposal areas under his

jurisdiction by Federal licensees or permittees,

and to make an appropriate charge for such use.

Moneys received from such licensees or permit-

tees shall be deposited in the Treasury as mis-

cellaneous receipts.

(d) Limitations and monitoring requirements of

certification

Any certification provided under this section

shall set forth any effluent limitations and other

limitations, and monitoring requirements neces-

sary to assure that any applicant for a Federal

license or permit will comply with any applica-

ble effluent limitations and other limitations, un-

der section 1311 or 1312 of this title, standard

or performance under section 1316 of this title,

or prohibition, effluent standard, or pretreatment

standard under section-1317 of this title, and

with any other appropriate requirement of State

law set forth in such certification, and shall be-

come a condition on any Federal license or per-

mit subject to the provisions of this section.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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