Appendices — Town of Gray v. Tri-State Rubbish, Inc.
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APPENDIX A
Reporter of Decisions
Decision No. 6654
Law Docket No. Cum-93-45
MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
TRI-STATE RUBBISH, INC.
Vv.
TOWN OF GRAY
and
REGIONAL WASTE SysTEMs, INC.
Argued September 9, 1993
Decided October 15, 1993
Before WATHEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, GLASSMAN,
CLIFFORD, COLLINS, RUDMAN and DANA, JJ.
RUDMAN, J.
Tri-State Rubbish, Inc. ( “Tri-State”), and Recyclables
Unlimited Services, Inc. (“RUSI’), appeal from the ad-
verse summary judgments entered in the Superior Court
(Cumberland County, Lipez, J.) on their claims for de-
claratory judgment and injunctive relief. The trial court
rejected contentions by Tri-State and RUSI that the Town
of Gray’s Solid Waste, Flow Control and Recycling Ordi-
2a
nance violates the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitu-
tion *, denies Tri-State and RUSI equal protection of the
laws, and violates state and federal antitrust laws. Al-
though the equal protection and antitrust challenges are
without merit, genuine issues of material fact remain
whether the Ordinance violates the Commerce Clause.
We therefore vacate the judgments of the Superior Court.
Effective April 3, 1992, the Town of Gray (“Gray”)
adopted a Solid Waste, Flow Control and Recycling Ordi-
nance (“Ordinance”) which requires that all solid waste
generated in the Town of Gray be disposed of at the Port-
land facility of Regional Waste Systems, Inc. (“RWS”).
The avowed purpose of the Ordinance was to regulate
solid waste collection and disposal, encourage recycling,
and provide property owners with disposal facilities at a
reasonable cost. The Ordinance was authorized by state
law, 38 M.R.S.A. § 1304-B(2) (1989 & Supp. 1993)’,
and complied with the Waste Handling Agreement be-
tween Gray and RWS.
1“The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with
Indian Tribes.” U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
2 Flow Control. Subject to the provisions of Chapter 24 [MAINE
WASTE MANAGEMENT AGENCY 38 M.R.S.A. § 2101 (Supp.
1993) } municipalities are expressly authorized to enact ordinances
that control solid waste collection, its transportation or its delivery
to a specific facility, when the purpose and effect of such an ordi-
nance is to gain management control over said waste and enable
the reclamation of resources, including energy, from these wastes.
This authorization includes, but is not limited to, ordinances:
A. Requiring segregation of wastes;
B. Requiring delivery of wastes generated within the mu-
nicipality, or any portion of those wastes, to a designated dis-
posal or reclamation facility;
C. Designating certain materials as recyclable and exempt
from the provisions of paragraph B; and
D. Designating yard wastes as compost material and requiring
delivery of these wastes to a designated composting facility.
ee ee
3a
RWS operates a waste-to-energy plant located in Port-
land. Twenty-one member municipalities, including Gray,
pledged their full faith and credit to repay the bonds that
financed construction of the plant should RWS default on
its obligation to repay. In an effort to insure that RWS
remain financially viable, all member municipalities passed
ordinances similar to Gray’s, guaranteeing that all “ac-
ceptable waste” * generated within each municipality
would be funneled to RWS for incineration.
Tri-State, a Maine corporaiton, has engaged in the
business of commercial and residential trash collection in
the Town of Gray for almost twenty years. In the past,
Tri-State has generally disposed of the waste it collects at
either the facilities of Maine Energy Resources Corpora-
tion (“MERC”) in Biddeford, or Mid-Maine Waste Ac-
tion Corporation (“MMWAC”) in Auburn. MERC and
MMWAC would incinerate the waste to generate energy,
that would then be sold in interstate commerce. RUSI, a
Maine corporation, recycles glass, paper, and corrugated
board and sells the materials in interstate commerce.
Disposal facilities generally charge a “tipping fee” for
accepting waste. The Gray Ordinance, however, allows a
private waste generator to deposit its trash at the Gray
transfer station without payment of a tipping fee. Com-
mercial waste haulers, on the other hand, must transport
their waste to RWS for incineration. If a waste generator
segregates its waste in to recyclable/non-recyclable com-
ponents, and then hires a commercial hauler to remove
the waste, the hauler must take the recyclable components
to the Gray transfer station and the non-recyclable com-
ponents to RWS.
Tri-State objects to the Ordinance because of the in-
creased tipping fees that the law imposes on commercial
8 According to the Ordinance, acceptable waste includes “[o]rdi-
nary household, municipal, institutional, commercial and industrial
solid waste,” and excludes hazardous waste.
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haulers.* RUSI objects to the Ordinance because it cuts
off the flow of recyclable waste that RUSI processes in its
business.
Tri-State and RUSI contend that the Ordinance vio-
lates their right to equal protection of the laws, because
it discriminates against commercial enterprises. This con-
tention is meritless. City of Auburn v. Tri-State Rubbish,
Inc., No. 6625, slip op. at 10 (Me. Aug. 5, 1993). Simi-
larly, Tri-State and RUSI’s claim that the arrangement
violates antitrust laws is unsupportable. We recently ruled
that state action immunity to federal antitrust laws applies
to this type of arrangement. 7d. at 8. See also Tri-State
Rubbish, Inc. v. Waste Management Inc., 803 F. Supp.
451 (D. Me. 1992), aff'd in pertinent part, No. 92-2218
(1st Cir. July 19, 1993). The flow control ordinance
enabling act, 38 M.R.S.A. §1304-B(2), authorizes Gray’s
arrangement with RWS and therefore precludes any viola-
tion of state antitrust laws. See Beaulieu v. City of
Lewiston, 440 A.2d 334, 345 (Me. 1992) (specific legis-
lation controls general).
The Commerce Clause violation asserted by Tri-State
and RUSI, however, presents genuine issues of material
fact. Although the waste at issue is generated in-state and
largely disposed of in-state, it is an object of interstate
commerce. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michi-
gan Dep’t of Natural Resources, 112 S. Ct. 2019, 2023
(1992). The aggregate effect of ordinances similar to
Gray’s could have a substantial impact on interstate com-
merce. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit
Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 537 (1985); Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n. Inc., 452 U.S.
264, 277 (1981).
4RWS charged (as of July 1, 1992) forty-three dollars per ton
for municipal solid waste and sixty-one dollars per ton for com-
mercial solid waste. The tipping fees at MERC for the same time
period ranged from twenty-six to thirty-five dollars per ton.
inate
AS tll 4 oe a
Sa
In the City of Auburn case, the question whether a
plaintiff that did not seek to place trash in the interstate
market could challenge a similar ordinance on Commerce
Clause grounds was not squarely presented. Jd. at 11
n.13. The present case, however, presents the issue, which
we now answer affirmatively. Even if it is true that Tri-
State does not engage in interstate commerce itself, it has
standing to challenge the Ordinance on Commerce Clause
grounds. The Ordinance inflicts an injury in fact on Tri-
State, and as a hauler of solid waste, Tri-State falls within
the “zone of interests” protected by the Commerce Clause.
Diamond Waste, Inc. v. Monroe County, 796 F. Supp.
1511, 1516 (M.D. Ga. 1992). See also Boston Stock
Exchange v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 320 n.3
(1977); Government Suppliers Consolidating Servs., Inc.
v. Bayh, 753 F. Supp. 739, 761 (S.D. Ind. 1990), aff'd,
975 F.2d 1267, 1274-75 (7th Cir. 1992).
The “Dormant Commerce Clause”*® prohibits states
and their political subdivisions from “advanc[ing] their
own commercial interests by curtailing the movement of
articles of commerce, either into or out of the state.”
Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2023. A neutral regulation
that imposes only an incidental burden on interstate com-
merce is valid as long as that burden is not “clearly ex-
cessive in relation to the putative local benefits” the regu-
lation is designed to serve. Stephen D. DeVito, Jr. Truck-
ing v. Rhode Island Solid Waste Management Corp., 770
F. Supp. 775, 780 (D.R.I.) (citing Maine v. Taylor, 477
U.S. 131, 138 (1986), aff'd per curiam, 947 F.2d 1004
(Ist Cir. 1991)). On the other hand, if the interference
is nothing more than “economic protectionism,” benefit-
°“The dormant Commerce Clause, as the term ‘dormant’ implies,
limits the powers of the States in areas where Congress has not
affirmatively acted to either authorize or forbid the challenged state
activity.” Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Oberly, 822 F.2d 388, 392 (3d
Cir. 1987). See New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273
(1988) (referring to the “negative aspect” of the Commerce
Clause).
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ting in-state economic interests at the expense of out-of-
state competitors, the regulation is deemed unconstitu-
tional per se. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617,
624 (1978).
Gray’s Ordinance does not facially discriminate against
out-of-state interests, and so it escapes per se invalidity.
Rather, Gray’s Ordinance appears to pursue legitimate
local goals, by gaining control of the waste stream and
promoting recycling and energy recovery. The Ordinance,
however, has a discriminatory effect on interstate com-
merce by prohibiting waste that would otherwise be avail-
able for interstate trade from crossing the state line.
Waste Systems Corp. v. County of Martin, 784 F. Supp.
641, 645 (D. Minn. 1992). Gray and RWF must there-
fore show valid reasons for this Ordinance other than
economic protectionism and must also show that reason-
able alternatives to the Ordinance are unavailable. City
of Auburn, No. 6625, slip op. at 13 (citing Hunt v.
Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 US.
333, 353) (1977)).
The entry is:
Judgment vacated. Remanded to the Superior Court
for further proceedings consistent with the opinion
herein.
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APPENDIX B
STATE OF MAINE
SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT
Sitting as the Law Court
Law Court Docket No. CUM-93-45
TRI-STATE RuBBISH, INC.
Vv.
TOWN OF GRAY and REGIONAL WASTE SysTEMS, INC.
MANDATE
The above-captioned cause having been brought before
this Court, sitting as the Law Court, from the Superior
Court in the County of Cumberland, and it having been
heard and maturely considered:
IT IS ORDERED that the Clerk of the Law Court
enter upon the Law Court Docket and certify to the Clerk
of the Superior Court in the County of Cumberland, the
following mandate therein:
Judgment vacated. Remanded to the Superior Court
for further proceedings consistent with the opinion
herein.
Dated: October 15, 1993
For the Court,
‘s/ Paul L. Rudman
Justice
8a
APPENDIX C
STATE OF MAINE
CUMBERLAND, SS.
SUPERIOR COURT
Civil Action Docket No. CV-92-719
TRI-STATE RUBBISH, INC. and
RECYCLABLES UNLIMITED SERVICES, INC.,
Plaintiffs
V.
TOWN OF GRAY,
Defendant
and
REGIONAL WASTE SYSTEMS, INC..,
Intervenor
ORDER
After hearing upon Regional Waste Systems, Inc.’s
Motion to Intervene, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary
and Permanent Injunction, Defendant and Intervenor’s
Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs’ Cross-
Motion for Sunimary Judgment and for reasons stated on
the record during the hearing on these Motions, this
Court hereby Orders as follows:
1. The Motion to Intervene of Regional Waste Sys-
tems, Inc. (“RWS”) is granted.
2. The Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary and Per-
manent Injunction is denied.
3. Defendant and Intervenor’s Motion for Summary
Judgment is granted.
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4. Plaintiffs Tri-State Rubbish, Inc. and Recyclables
Unlimited Services, Inc., their officers, directors, agents
employees, servants, and any other person or corporation
acting for or on behalf of Plaintiffs:
5.
a. be and hereby are enjoined, effective February 1,
1993, from violating the Solid Waste, Flow Control
and Recycling Ordinance of the Town of Gray,
Maine (the “Ordinance”), and unless by February
|, 1993 Tri-State Rubbish, Inc. submits a completed
application to the Town Clerk of the Town of Gray
(“Town”) for a commercial hauler’s license under
the Ordinance and diligently pursue that application
before the Town Council, they shall not haul, trans-
port, collect, remove or dispose of Acceptable Waste
generated within the Town for a fee, nor shall they
solicit new clients from within the Town for the
same services;
b. shall comply, effective February 1, 1993, with
the Ordinance and in particular, shall deposit all
Acceptable Waste generated within the Town and
collected by them at the RWS facility only in ac-
cordance with the Ordinance; and
c. shall, effective February 1, 1993, deposit at the
Town’s Recycling Facility located at the Town’s
Transfer Station any and all recyclable materials that
they or their customers choose to segregate from the
Acceptable Waste generated within the Town that
Plaintiffs haul, transport, collect, remove or dispose
of, with said depositing of recyclable materials at the
Town’s Recycling Facility to be in accordance with
the Town’s rules and regulations therefor.
Post-judgment attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in
the enforcement of Paragraph 4 of this Order shall be
awarded at the discretion of the Court based upon written
affidavits.
10a
6. Plaintiffs’ Objection to the Defendant and Inter-
venor’s Motion for Summary Judgment is, as Plaintiffs
stated, a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on the
merits; Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is
denied.
7. This Order is an appealable final judgment on all
claims and counterclaims raised by the parties in this
action.
By:/s/ Kermit V. Lipez
KERMIT V. LIPEZ
Justice, Superior Court
Dated: January 26, 1993
lla
APPENDIX D
STATE OF MAINE
CUMBERLAND,
Ss.
SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION
Docket Number: CV-92-719
TRI-STATE RUBBISH, INC.
versus
TOWN OF GRAY
BEFORE:
The Honorable Kermit V. Lipez, Justice of the Su-
perior Court, at the Cumberland County Superior
Court, Portland, Maine, on January 12, 1993.
APPEARANCES:
Ralph A. Dyer, Esq.
Attorney for the Plaintiff
James N. Katsiaficas, Esq.
Emily A. Bloch, Esq.
Attorneys for the Defendant
[2] (This matter came for hearing before The Honor-
able Kermit V. Lipez, Justice of the Superior Court, at
the Cumberland County Superior Court, Portland, Maine,
on Tuesday, January 12, 1993.)
COURT: This next matter is Cumberland County
docket number 92-719. It’s the case of Tri-State Rubbish,
Inc., et al versus The Town of Gray, et al. Before we
get into the substance of all this, let me again just ask
12a
counsel to identify themselves for the record, and state
the party that they represent. We'll start with Mr. Dyer.
RALPH A. DYER, ESQ: For the plaintiff, your
Honor, Ralph Dyer.
JAMES N. KATSIAFICAS, ESQ.: For defendant
Town of Gray and for Intervenor Regional Waste Sys-
tems, Incorporated, James Kaisiaficas and Emily Bloch,
your Honor.
COURT: The fist matter we should discuss is the
motion of Regional Waste Svstems to intervene. IT gather
that issue remains unresolved. And Mr. Dyer has indi-
cated that he has no objection to the intervention of
Regional Waste Systems. He acknowledges their interest
in this proceedine, but is troubled by a conflict that he
foresees or sees now if both The Town of Gray and Re-
gional Waste Systems are represented by the law firm. I’m
not sure, Mr. Dyer, I understand how that problem affects
the ability of your client to put forth his position in this
forum. You seem to suggest that in some [3] way, that
conflict, as you see it, impacts in some way on your
clients. I’m not sure I understand that.
MR. DYER: Well, it’s our position, your Honor,
that what Mr. Hart proposes to do, in terms of recycling
of waste and how he proposes to handle it, are really
consistent with what the objectives of the population of
The Town of Gray want. He is retrieving waste, or in-
tends to retrieve valuable parts of the waste stream and
reuse them or make available for others to reuse. This
runs in direct conflict with what RWS wants to do. RWS
is motivated to burn that garbage and to promote a legal
argument to satisfy that end. And my position is that
when I come forward here and say to you that we’re
really doing something that benefits The Town of Gray
and is consistent with the basic underlying purpose of the
ordinance, that I'm met with two people who are standing
up, saying, “No, that’s not true.” And I think that my
client is prejudiced by having that happen.
COURT: Mr. Katsiaficas?
emanate
13a
MR. KATSIAFICAS: Your Honor, RWS is a crea-
ture of the communities that formed it. Gray is one of
them. Each municipality that belongs to RWS is under
an obligation to dispose of all the solid waste generated
within its borders, generated by commercial and residen-
tial entities. That obligation is why RWS exists. RWS
has to dispose of it in accordance with the state law.
The state law requires each [4] municipality to reduce the
amount of solid waste it generates. Gray is doing that;
RWS is assisting in those efforts. RWS has the silver
bullet recycling containers that you see in all the munici-
palities in the immediate area. It has—it under—RWS
understands it has the same obligation as its constituent
municipalities, to take care of solid waste while also pro-
moting recycling of waste that is capable of being re-
cycled. There’s no difference, here. There’s no divergence
of interest. RWS and Gray have identical interests, and
therefore, it’s reasonable that the same law firm can rep-
resent both. The conflict of interest is something that the
client should raise with its own attorney. That hasn’t
been raised here. Both clients are aware of the dual rep-
resentation and consent to it, because their interests are
identical.
COURT: Yeah. I—Mr. Dyer, do you—
MR. DYER: I just want to point out, just to remind
the Court that in our brief we cited §S—38, MRSA,
§ 1304(A)—(4)(A)(a), which says that all contracts
which mandate the delivery of recyclable waste is part
of the waste stream to RWS are now abrogated. That
obligation no longer is enforceable. RWS’ contract with
Gray provides that it shall deliver all solid waste. or
actually, all acceptable waste to RWS, except those por-
tions of the waste which were being recycled, both in
terms of quantity and type, at the time that contract was
signed. And RWS’ claim is that they have a right to all
other material, [5] and they make the decision whether
to recycle or not. 1304(B)(4)(A)(a) says that provision
is no longer enforceable and the municipality should have
leneeneneiieeememunieninn
14a
the right to decide its own recycling programs. And that
is the heart of the conflict here, your Honor.
COURT: Well, I—my conclusion, Mr. Dyer, is that
that is an issue for The Town of Gray and for RWS to
worry about. It seems to be your feeling that if different
counsel were involved, perhaps on the part of The Town
of Gray, that might be more sympathetic to your position,
rather than joining RWS in antagonism to it. But I don’t
see, in that possibility, to the extent it might have a basis
in fact in any way precludes this law firm from represent-
ing these two clients who certainly, I believe, understand
the issues and the stakes as well as you do. I see no rea-
son why they cannot choose to proceed, both of them,
with counsel of their choice. So, for that reason, I do
grant the Motion to Intervene. And both entities can pro-
ceed, since that appears to be their choice, with present
counsel. Let’s—
MR. DYER: Your Honor, let me just clarify one—
COURT: —sure.
MR. DYER: It’s not that I’m looking for Gray to
te sympathetic to our position. It—my concern is it’s the
double whammy [sic] in expressing a point of view to the
Court or ultimately, at best, if appropriate, to a jury.
[6] COURT: Sure. I understand. Okay. All right.
Let’s move on, now, to the merits. And there is so much
here that it’s, frankly, hard to know where to begin. But
let’s begin in this fashion. Mr. Dyer, I’d like to begin with
you. Did you want to say something initially? I did have
some questions, but—
MR. DYER: Perhaps we can streamline this a little
bit, your Honor.
COURT: —sure.
MR. DYER: This—the motions before us today
started with a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. And
let me say this to the Court about your Motion for a
Preliminary Injunction. There are two reasons why it was
filed, one reason being that we think we’re entitled to the
relief, anyway, or we wouldn’t have brought the motion in
an ieeneeenitaieiaa iain
15a
the first place. The second motion is that there is some
dicta in some Maine cases which indicate that in these
types of situations where there are continuing—there’s
continuing exposure to fines being assessed on a daily
basis, that one should bring a preliminary injunction mo-
tion at the outset of the case, in order to curtail the
running of the fines and to establish that as a precedent.
That is a prudent thing to do in this kind of a case, and
that’s what—that is one of the moving reasons why we
brought the Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. Now,
this motion was met by the Motion for Summary Judg-
ment.
[7] COURT: Right.
MR. DYER: And, in fact, although we haven't
phrased it as a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, it
is believed by us that the essential issues in this case are
legal issues and not factual issues. And perhaps if we
started by addressing the Motion for Summary Judgment,
a lot of these other issues would fall into line.
COURT: Sure. I agree with that. I think that makes
good sense. The—in that regard, Mr. Dyer, I would like
to understand exactly why you feel that this ordinance—
and I’ve—I think I understand how the ordinance works
and how it alters the prior practices. I would like to
understand why you feel that this ordinance denies your
clients the equal protection of the laws, given what I
believe is the standard that I have to apply, here, and
that is whether the distinction that has been drawn, here,
bears a rational relationship to a legitimate exercise of
the Town’s power in this area, the Town’s authority.
What—could you state for me, as clearly and concisely
as you can, what is the nature of the unlawful discrimina-
tion, if you will, unlawful distinctions that you see here?
MR. DYER: Well, there are—setting aside the defini-
tion of solid waste for just a moment, and just focusing
on the ordinance, I think I might have anticipated your
question to some extent. And last night, I sat down and
said, “What is the procedure of this particular ordinance
16a
that has an adverse [8] impact upon my client?” And
what I did is I said that let’s start with §(7)(G) of the
ordinance, which says that, “All agreements for trash and
waste removal shall be by private contract, and the Town
shall have no responsibility for those contracts.” Now,
that’s important because that’s what Mr. Hart’s company,
Tri-State Rubbish, does, that enter into private contracts
with residential customers and with commercial custom-
ers. So that sets the stage in entering the ordinance, if
you will. We then go to § (6)(E), which says—and
also, a parallel provision, (7)(D), which says that, “Non-
segregated waste shall be taken by the hauler to RWS.”
And that’s all acceptable waste, as defined by § (7)(D).
And what that says is that if Mr. Hart and his company,
Tri-State Rubbish, pick up residential waste or com-
mercial waste, if it’s non-segregated, that is, co-mingled
food waste, paper, what have you, that has to go to RWS
at his expense. And he has to pay $58 a ton to drop
that material. To digress just for one or two sentences,
here, there is a two-rate structure at RWS, $58 per ton
for commercial waste, and a lesser amount, which I think
is $41 a ton, for residential waste. When Mr. Hart and
Tri-State bring that waste to RWS, they pay the $58,
regardless of where it comes from, on the basis that it is
impossible for RWS or the community to determine which
is which, so they just charge the higher rate across the
board. Then that leaves us with a question, what do we
do with the segregated waste, the [9] recycled material?
There is no provision in the ordinance which deals with
the question of segregated waste hauled by private con-
tract. § (4)(A) says that, “Only residents can use the
transfer station.” And in that—by that definition, the
Town excludes commercial haulers or private contractors
from that definition, and haulers are not permitted to
enter the transfer station to unload anything. § (7)(H)
says that, “Any private contract shall require that all
recyclables shall be brought to the Town in marketable
condition.” It doesn’t indicate who is to bring that
17a
material to the Town. But we do know that the disposal
point is the transfer station, and we do know that the
hauler is not permitted to enter the transfer station, which
leads us to the inevitable conclusion that it is only the
generator of the waste who can bring it in. And that is
consistent with provision (4)(B), which says that, “All
resegregated, recyclable material shall be brought to the
transfer station only by the generator.” And that leads
us to a couple of questions. The impact of that system
is that Tri-State cannot engage in a contract to pick up
recyclable materials for its customers. Its customers, if
they are to recycle, have to bring their own waste to the
dump, or their own recoverable, recyclable waste to the
Town transfer station. And Mr. Hart cannot do that.
Mr. Hart is absolutely barred and prohibited from enter-
ing into that business by the terms of this ordinance.
Secondly, it is our position that if a person is [10] to
use a private contractor to haul his waste, he must bear,
indirectly, the cost of the tipping [sic] fee. And the
letter—the May 11th. 1992 letter from the Town, which
we've attached, which sets forth their reasons for their
Statute clearly indicates, by reference and by direct state-
ment, that the purpose is to force people to recycle and
to bring their material to the transfer station. And if
a person doesn’t do that, then they’re going to have to
bear their cost of tipping. Now, we don’t understand why
Mr. Hart’s customers, or Mr. Hart himself. acting for
those customers, should be barred from the transfer sta-
tion, simply because they have signed a private contract.
It is the same people in the community who are gener-
ating waste, whether residential or commercial. Those
people can have access to the facilities, but they are in-
directly barred from using those facilities if they employ
Mr. Hart. The result of that is that Mr. Hart’s business
has been decimated because he has had to raise his fees
to cover the cost of tipping. Mr. Hart’s testimony in his
affidavit—and if the Court desires, he can testify. I have
him here today—to testify that when this ordinance
18a
passed, he had approximately three hundred residential
customers in Gray. He’s now down to a hundred and
fifty customers in Gray, and he’s losing $8,500 a year,
after having raised the fees. And it is a declining spiral,
that what Gray is doing is saying that, “We don’t want
private contractors in this town. We don’t want [11] you
doing business in this town. We want to control all the
waste.” And that is the discrimination that is happening
with Mr. Hart, and it’s discrimination under the due
process clause, it’s discrimination—it’s a taking of his
business, it’s discrimination under the—it’s a violation of
the commerce clause, and if we go on—ultimately, when
we get into the definition of solid waste, it violates the
antitrust laws, because it’s inconsistent with State policy,
as well as what I believe to be the real true municipal
policy, here.
COURT: Mr. Dyer, the—that’s a very good and very
clear explanation of what’s—of what the issue is, here,
as you see it. The— it’s clear that, at least in part—well,
let me do this. Rather than have me state it, I'd like, at
this point, to ask Mr. Katsiaficas, number one, if he
agrees with your analysis of what the ordinance does, and
if not, I'd like to know why. But then, to the extent
that’s accurate, I’d like to know what purposes, from the
Town's perspective, that scheme that Mr. Dyer has just
described, serves? Mr. Katsiaficas?
MR. KATSIAFICAS: Thank you, your Honor. As
the Court has noted, this is a very difficult burden for
the plaintiff to overcome, in that the equal protection
clause challenge must overcome an argument of presump-
tive validity on the part of the municipal ordinance, num-
ber one, and number two, with regard to these, you have
to simply show that—you have to show that there’s no
rational relationship under any circumstances, any [12]
set of circumstances between this ordinance and legiti-
mate State ends. We believe that the legitimate legisla-
tive ends of the Town Council, in adopting this ordinance,
are to ease the administrative and enforcement burden
on the Town. And that’s not a mere summary. It’s
19a
simply—if Tri-State and the other four private haulers that
do business in the town were to take their solid waste
that they collect from businesses and from residences to
the transfer station, the Town will have to police it, to
police the transfer station to make sure that only Gray
waste is being accepted, and to make sure that there
isn’t unacceptable waste being brought in.
COURT: Now, it would have to police that because
of its contractual relationship with RWS and the obliga-
tions that the Town has to RWS in light of that contrac-
tual relationship, is that correct?
MR. KATSIAFICAS: In that regard, and also be-
cause The Town of Gray, as it had been doing, was
underwriting the tipping fee for everything placed at the
transfer station. It wouldn’t want to be underwriting tip-
ping fees for trash collected in New Gloucester, for ex-
ample, and brought into town by Tri-State. We're not
alleging that they’ve actually done this, but simply there’s
a potential for doing that. And we ask the Court to take
note that there have been allegations of problems of
waste diversion. It’s not unthinkable. It’s something that
the Town would have to police, [13] would have to ad-
minister. There’s a cost to that. We’re trying to minimize
that cost and the Town’s tipping fees.
COURT: Right. But until this new ordinance was
passed, how was the Town—and under that prior rela-
tionship, Mr. Hart, his business—I mean, they could pick
up waste directly from a residence or commercial estab-
lishment and take it directly to RWS, is that correct?
MR. KATSIAFICAS: To—they would take it, as I
understand it, to the Town’s transfer station.
COURT: Okay.
MR. KATSIAFICAS: And the Town would then
charge $10 per ton. And then the Town would pay for
transportation of all of the waste collected—
COURT: Okay. So they—
MR. KATSIAFICAS: —whether you, yourself,
brought it or whether Tri-State brought it.
20a
COURT: —okay. So, under the prior relationship,
Mr. Hart could not take it directly to RWS, is that cor-
rect?
MR. KATSIAFICAS: As I understand it, he did not.
He was to take it to the transfer station and then the
Town would take it to RWS and pay the transportation
costs, as well as the $40 per ton tipping fee. Since the
Town was paying 40 and only charging 10, in effect,
Tri-State’s costs were being subsidized by the Town.
COURT: Well, obviously, in that rel—in that situa-
tion, [14] they could charge their own customers a lot less,
because they only had to pay the $10 to the Town, is that
correct? That was—
MR. KATSIAFICAS: | That’s correct.
COURT: —right.
MR. KATSIAFICAS: What this ordinance now does
is say to any hauler collecting residential and commer-
cial waste within the Town, “You have to bring that waste
directly to RWS and pay RWS the tipping fee.” That
tipping fee for municipal waste is $43, for private—for
commercial waste, $61. So there’s a differential there.
They're responsible—that becomes a cost of doing busi-
ness. It’s not just a cost of doing business, however, for
Tri-State. It’s a cost of doing business for the four haulers
that are licensed to do business, and actually do business
in the town. And those haulers are identified in Town
Manager's Aubert’s [sic] affidavit, So there are other en-
tities doing business in the town. It’s not—I don’t—
whether it’s decimated Tri-State’s business, I don’t know.
But there are other haulers that are licensed and are do-
ing business.
COURT: Okay. But, now in this situation, if Mr.
Hart can now take waste generated in The Town of Gray
directly to RWS, how does the Town keep track of what
is going directly from The Town of Gray to RWS? I
mean, the Town does have an obligation, does it not, to
still make sure that all its [15] acceptable waste, exclud-
ing some recyclable material that can be taken out, it still
2la
has an obligation to make sure it all goes to RWS, isn’t
that correct?
MR. KATSIAFICAS: Well, that’s one reason for
these counterclaims, because, in fact, we understand from
the pleadings here it’s not going to RWS. Acceptable
waste and the recyclable portions of the acceptable waste,
according to the affidavits, are all going to West Paris,
being separated—
COURT: Right. But—so how do you—but how
would—
MR. KATSIAFICAS: —I underst—
COURT: —but how do you make sure? How do—
you talk about the burden of policing. How do you po-
lice—if you have the commercial haulers dealing-—tak-
ing waste directly from a generator to RWS without any
intervention by the Town at its transfer station, how do
you make sure that waste generated in The Town of
Gray is getting to RWS?
M®. KATSIAFICAS: —well, we avoid—we don’t
know. I mean, we have to take it on faith that—
COURT: I mean, they have to do that, under their—
I mean, they’re now licensed, is that correct?
MR. KATSIAFICAS: —well, they haven’t—they have
not—
COURT: But they’re supposed to be?
MR. KATSIAFICAS: —but they’re supposed to be.
And if they were, that would be their obligation—
COURT: Okay.
[16] MR. KATSIAFICAS: —and on penalty for not
doing that, they could have their license revoked.
COURT: Right.
MR. KATSIAFICAS: We would have to police it in
that sense.
COURT: Sure.
MR. KATSIAFICAS: But we don’t believe that the
obligation is as onerous as posting an extra person at the
transfer station or doing the manifest system, as we find
with State and Federal hazardous waste laws.
22a
COURT: Okay.
MR. KATSIAFICAS: Another reason, though, we're
trying to simply cut the costs of solid waste disposal for
the towns. As we know, the State law posits all the re-
sponsibility on the municipality. The municipality has
normally pledged its full faith and credit, but it also has
to pay—it is paying for all of the tipping fees for waste
brought to it. In other words, if you have a residence or
a commercial entity in The Town of Gray, and you're will-
ing to bring your own waste over to the transfer station,
the Town will pay the tipipng fee, as long as you segre-
gate the waste into recyclable and non-recyclable quan-
tities. That is to promote recycling. The Town has an
obligation under State law to promote recycling to reach
State goals, and there’s a penalty for failure to make rea-
sonable efforts to do so.
COURT: Okay. Okay. Now, why—Mr. Dyer says
that, under [17] the Town’s scheme, only the generator
of the waste can segregate in the way that you describe,
and then bring the waste to the transfer station. Mr.
Hart could not perform that function. Is Mr. Dyer cor-
rect in that regard?
MR. KATSIAFICAS: | I don’t read the ordinance that
way. I think we're dealing with something speculative,
in that, number one, I don’t believe Mr. Hart has ever
tried to bring recyclables to the transfer station, and, two,
I believe that his intent is to be able to sell those to other
entities. So I don’t think that question is—in—at issue
is really before the Court at this time. It’s only in the
abstract. But also, I—as I read §’s—well, the sections
that were cited with regard to bringing commercial waste,
commercial entities bringing their own, doesn’t deal with
—don’t deal with haulers. It’s simply a store operator,
commercial entity. You can bring your own waste if it’s
segregated into recyclable and non-recyclable. You can
bring it to the transfer station and there’s no cost. Other-
wise, you have to pay a $10 fee.
COURT: Well, you’re—
MR. KATSIAFICAS: As to—I'm sorry, your Honor.
eS ea
23a
COURT: —I gather you're Suggesting that there’s
something that—it doesn’t—and this seems to be borne
out by some of Mr. Dyer’s arguments. I mean, Mr. Hart,
for perfectly legitimate business reasons, I guess, would
like to be able to deal with recyclable material in some
way that might be more [18] advantageous to him in
terms of the market. I mean, if he has to just bring it—
if he just hauls it—
MR. KATSIAFICAS: | Right.
COURT: —to the transfer station to be disposed of
as waste, that doesn’t, I suppose, do him much good,
when there might be a market out there, arguably, for
this recyclable material. That—he’d like to get into the
market, is your position, with that recyclable material?
MR. KATSIAFICAS: Well, apparently. That’s what
he says. And what I’m saying is §’s (7)(G) and (H)
talk about—(7)(G), “Any agreement for the collection,
transportation and disposal of residential, commercial or
industrial solid waste and recyclable materials shall be by
private contract between the person and the commercial
hauler,” et cetera, and then (H), “Any agreements for
the removal and collection of recyclable materials must
provide that the materials will be received by the Town
or its designee in marketplace condition.” What I’m say-
ing is that out of the universe of solid waste, we have
recyclable materials. They're not Separate and apart.
Recyclables are within solid waste.
COURT: Right.
MR. KATSIAFICAS: And that was the decision of
the Federal District Court in The Town of Auburn versus
—excuse me—Tri-State versus The Waste Management
Company. All of this material belongs to the Town and
is pledged to RWS. If there’s [19] any recycling to be
done, it’s through the Town. I don’t read the ordinance
to say that the hauler can’t bring recyclables there. The
question hasn’t been raised, and it’s not before the Court,
because, in fact, Tri-State hasn’t been bringing them there
24a
and hasn’t made any attempt to bring them there, as I
understand it.
MR. DYER: Well, I’m going to object to that last
comment, your Honor. There’s nothing in the record to
that effect, and if that fact is being asserted by Mr.
Katsiaficas, I’d like to have the opportunity to have Mr.
Hart testify that, in fact, he has spoken to Town officials
on that very point, and has been denied access to the
Town.
MR. KATSIAFICAS: All right. What is in the rec-
ord is that since July 1, 1992, there has been no delivery
of recyclable materials under this new ordinance to the
transfer facility, and that’s in the affidavit of Public
Works Director Neal LaValley [sic]. And I'll simply rest
on that. But I think that the ordinance is susceptible of
allowing these people to bring their recyclable materials
here. And we'll see where that goes. Finally, there’s
not only the cost of avoidance, there’s not only the avoid-
ance of administrative enforcement costs, but there’s also
the State recyclable requirements. First of all, we don’t
read the waste handling agreement as having been abro-
gated by 38, MRSA, § 1304(B), sub (4)(a). It simply
provides that that agreement, the waste handling [20]
agreement can’t prevent the municipality from recycling
more if it wishes to do so. The municipality wishes to
recycle more. It was recycling 240 tons per year, ap-
proximately, at the time of the waste handling agreement.
There is now an amendment to that waste handling agree-
ment dated April 21st, 1992, and it’s in the file, which
allows the Town, by July of next year—of this year, ex-
cuse me, to recycle up to 550 tons per year, more than
double what it had been recycling before. It—-that’s what
the Town wants to do. RWS is its entity. RWS allowed
that. And so there’s no abrogation, here.
COURT: But that is, in fact—in order for the Town
to do that, because it does have the effect of excluding
waste in that amount from going to RWS—
MR. KATSIAFICAS: That’s correct.
ieee iii aati lial
25a
COURT: —I mean, RWS had to agree to that, is
that correct? To allow the Town to increase its recycl-
able waste in that amount?
MR. KATSIAFICAS: That’s correct. your Honor.
COURT: Okay.
MR. KATSIAFICAS: And that has been done. And
that’s—in order to help this city, the Town reached those
recyclable goals set by the State. So those are the three
reasons that the Town had in adopting this ordinance.
We believe that that ordinance is rationally, reasonably
related to those legitimate ends. It—people may differ
as to whether it’s the ideal [21] ordinance to effect that,
but we’re not looking for ideals, just that it be rationally
related, and we think that it is.
COURT: Okay. All right. Mr. Dyer, you make the
further argument that this scheme violates the commerce
clause. And I’m trying to understand in what way that
occurs, since it seems that most of the case law in this
area, at least that has reached the Federal Courts and the
U.S. Supreme Court, has involved efforts by states to re-
Strict or put a heavy burden on the importation of waste
into the state. And I’m trying to understand how that—
those kinds of cases relate to this situation.
MR. DYER: Well, except for the DeVito [sic] case,
which talked about taking waste from Rhode Island to
Massachusetts to burn, as opposed to putting it in a
landfill. And Rhode Island said, “We wanted a landfill.
You can’t burn it.” So that’s—there’s a little bit of a
twist on that particular case. But our position on the
commerce clause is this, in the Port Raddio [sic] cases,
Chemical Waste Management versus Hunt [sic], and the
Port Raddio Landfill case, the U.S. Supreme Court said
that, unequivocally, garbage is now a commodity. It’s
a valuable commodity being exchanged in trade through-
out the United States. It has recoverable components in
it which are of great value. And even without the re-
coverable components, as we have in this Case, it is raw
material for the generation of electricity which is sold
26a
in [22] interstate commerce. So it is unequivocally a
commodity traded in commerce. The question now is,
in this particular case, I submit, would be the extent of
the effect on interstate commerce, which is occasioned by
this particular ordinance. Is this a serious impact or is
it a marginal impact? And that’s a factual question to
be decided by the Court after hearing the evidence, and
in hearing about how much material is being dealt with.
In terms of EMWAC [sic], I can suggest to the Court
that it appears that we're talking about 16,000 tons of
recyclables a year. We're talking about 64,000 tons a
year of waste generally. In RWS, we're talking a much
larger amount of material. So we're talking, in the RWS
context, in terms of controlling waste, we're talking a
significant amount of material. What happens is when
you have this restriction on where waste can be taken,
which is an essential element in every one of these cases
that’s been decided, the Shelley [sic] case, the DeVito
case, the Fillaberro [sic] case, the issue is does a state
have the right to regulate where you take that material?
And the most recent case, which is the Rhode Island
case, DeVito, said, “You can regulate, as long as there’s
a rational reason for it.” And it has to be something
more than purely economic. It cannot—and in Rhode
Island, it was—the question was whether they had to have
the waste because they had to pay the bonds to develop
the landfill. And that was considered to be insufficient
by that particular [23] Court. So what we have here is
a question in which we're torn. Are we taking the waste
to RWS as part of a commercial project to supply inven-
tory or fuel for the generation of electricity, or are we
taking it to RWS and the transfer station in order to
promote recycling and the reduction of waste? And I
submit that what Gray is doing in this particular case is
oriented towards a reduction of the waste stream and re-
cycling. It has nothing to do with fueling RWS. In fact,
RW—Gray is reducing that fuel stream.
ee
27a
COURT: Well, but it's—I mean, it’s both. I mean,
you've acknowledged this—these goals that, to some ex-
tent, are in conflict. The RWS was conceived, in large
part, as an enterprise that would allow communities to
solve their landfill problems, their solid waste disposal
problems.
MR. DYER: That’s correct. That’s correct.
COURT: And it involves an alternative way of dis-
posing of solid waste, and it becomes economically viable,
in part, because the energy generated can be used to
generate electricity and so forth. So there is an obliga-
tion to make this solid waste available to RWS, to meet
its contractual commitments, to allow it to be financially
viable. That was the initial impulse.
MR. DYER: That’ right.
COURT: Now a few years down the road, there
becomes this recognition that, even with these inciner-
ators, we still [24] have a disposal problem. But yet—
MR. DYER: And we also have a continuing pollu-
tion problem.
COURT: —and—exactly. And so, it makes a lot of
sense to try to recycle waste, as well. And that is some-
what counter to the interests of RWS, which lives off
waste. So now you have to try to reconcile these two
goals. And what you see, as Mr. Katsiaficas is describing,
is the Town, pursuant to a State scheme, trying to try to
balance. My point is those are both, are they not, legiti-
mate objectives? Trying to get waste to RWS—
MR. DYER: Yes, they are.
COURT: —and at the same time, try to meet recy-
cling goals. Those are rational objectives, and they're
difficult to juggle. So what—even as you state the propo-
sition, what is impermissible about the State—the Town
trying to further those two objectives?
MR. DYER: Well, the commerce clause presents a
very good focusing point, if you will, because what hap-
pense here in this contest between RWS and the Town,
28a
between fuel and recycling, which—and that—those pri-
orities, by the way, have been codified in Chapter 24,
that incineration is now the fifth highest or next-to-last
priority for disposal of waste. What happens in those—
in that situation is that the Town is trying to control the
waste stream in order to match the State recycling goals,
and to make—honor its supply of fuel to RWS [25] by
putting the waste hauler in the middle. They're taking
an established business that’s been around for twenty
years, and they’re saying, “We're going to make you the
garbage policeman, and we're going to attach economic
sanctions or taxes to your business in order_to force the
general public to recycle.” And we're saying, “Wait a
minute. Under the commerce clause, it may be a valid
way to go—that the object may be valid. which is to
create recycling, but to interfere in the commerce stream
and interfere in business by achieving this is not right.”
That’s not what—that’s not the easiest or b°st alternative
to go about doing that. There are several other ways.
The Town’s stated objectives for the ordinance, which are
less than candid, I think, because they say that thev
want to preserve their administrative cost and they want
to force people to recycle. But the fact—let’s take those
as valid. When you're talking about administrative costs,
they’re say—there’s no—they’re saying, “We have a sense
that Mr. Hart will use the free tipping as a way to sub-
sidize the rest of his business., and we don’t want that to
happen.” As a matter of fact, that’s a criminal offense,
according to Chief Chitwood and RWS. That’s a crimi-
nal offense. It’s diversion, it’s embezzlement. it’s oper-
ating under false pretenses, all that sort of thing. There
are also sanctions applied to that, in terms of fines, loss
of license. Those are the things that have operability.
Those are the ways to go about controlling that sort of
situation, [26] as opposed to saying to somebody. “I’m
mot going to go about doing this in this wav.” Now.
relevant here is what other towns do and how thev deal
with the problem. which is considerably different than
what Gray is doing. For example, in most other towns—
29a
MR. KATSIAFICAS: We would object. We don’t
have any evidence on the record as to what other towns
are doing in this, your Honor.
MR. DYER: Well—
COURT: Well, let me—
MR. DYER: —they represent all the other towns,
so—
COURT: —-well, let me—I don’t—that might be
interesting, but what I want you to tell me, Mr. Dyer, is
what is it that you want your client to be able to do?
What is it that, given his druthers, he would like to be
able to do that he cannot do under this scheme?
MR. DYER: —okay. Under Commercial accounts,
what he would like to do with commercial accounts is
he would like to say, “Okay. Let me put out two con-
tainers, one for recyclable materials and one for solid
waste, in the true sense. Stuff that has been discarded.
It’s unwanted, unused,, unwanted, unneeded. And it is
material that is solid waste in every sense. The other
barrel, let me call that recyclable materials. Give me the
option to take those recyclable materials to the transfer
station and tip them for free. Or [27] let me take those
materials to my own station, my own recycling process—
or processing center, and recover the value myself.” And
we distinguish between the solid waste and the recyclable
materials, and I can go into a long argument about solid
waste and the authority of the State, but that’s what he
would like to do.
COURT: Now, if he’s allowed to do that—well, first
of all, even under the existing scheme, he was not al-
lowed to do that, isn’t that correct, because he can’t—the
Town has its own contractual commitment to RWS about
what’s going to happen to solid waste generated in the
Town of Gray. He couldn’t do that before this ordinance,
isn’t that correct? I mean, he can’t—
MR.DYER: Well, yes—
30a
COURT: —in other words, he can’t just take it—he
can’t take solid waste generated in the Town of Gray
wherever he wants to?
MR. DYER: —oh, no, no, no, no. No. He'd have
to take it to RWS under the program which other towns
have implemented and which we're suggesting here. He
would take that solid waste to RWS and pay the tipping
fee of $58 a ton for that commercial waste.
COURT: Oh, but it’s the recyclable stuff he’d like
to take where he wants?
MR. DYER: The recyclable stuff, which gives him
an [28] opportunity, and his customers an opportunity, to
recoup and reduce their costs by recycling, which is just
exactly what the State and Gray want to achieve, here.
As it stands now, he can’t do that. There is no place for
him that is legal to take the recyclable materials. The
only person that can recover and reuse and dispose and
sell those recyclable materials is the generator, who must
take them himself to the Town transfer station, where
they have the exclusive right to handle that material.
COURT: Well, the Town says that what that—that
only—I think this is what the Town says, only in that
fashion are they able to quantify what’s happening to
recyclable material and therefore, document the efforts
they’re making to meet the goals that the State says that
these towns are to meet.
MR. DYER: No. That’s not true. What—
COURT: That’s not what they’re saying, or that’s
not—
MR. DYER: —I don’t believe that to be a true state-
ment. They’re saying that, “We have to have a toll sta-
tion where all the waste goes through so we can count
and see what happens.” Well, that may be the bureau-
cratic way to go about doing it, but it’s not the business
way to go about doing it. We're faced with two disposal
opportunities, here, generally speaking. We're faced with
RWS, in which we have a quantified, known amount of
waste which was dropped last year at RWS from The
eect i a aie nie
3la
Town of Gray. We know, for example, that if 100,000
tons of [29] solid waste went to RWS, that’s documented.
The rest of the material—and the goal talks about waste
reduction. It doesn’t talk about counting. It talks about
waste reduction. So we know, if you take that 100,000
tons that went to RWS last year, and we reduce it down
to 50,000 tons, we’ve met the goal, because the rest has
to be recycled, or it’s winding up on the back roads
somewhere. And that recyclable waste and that recycla-
ble activity is easily monitored that way. You don’t have
to have a toll booth to take everything through. It’s man-
agement by exception. We don’t need to interfere with
commerce to that extent.
COURT: Okay. All right.
MR. DYER: With residential customers, Mr. Hart
and his customers should have the same rights that every
other residential person has. No other town that I know
of imposes upon a resident the obligation to pay for his
own tipping. In fact, I believe that flies in the face of
§ 1305—I think it’s 1305—correct me if I’m wrong—
which says that every town has an affirmative duty to
provide waste disposal for its residents. And I think
that it is—if you're going to charge some residents for
the use of a mandated facility and not charge others,
that’s wrong. And what I’m Saying with the residents
is Mr. Hart should be able to pick up that material, solid
waste, take it to RWS and have it paid for, just like
anybody else. And it’s easy to see whether or not he’s
comingling commercial [30] waste with that material.
And other towns monitor at the RWS and EMWAC and
every other landfill to make sure that the materials com-
ing in bear some resemblance to the town. If you're
taking Gray material in, and all of a sudden. somebody
comes in with garbage and it’s got all the mail addressed
to Freeport, or it’s got material that indicates that it
came from Freeport in it, which is easily done—people
do this all the time, then you can tell that somebody’s
cheating. And that’s what’s going on in RWS today.
32a
Chief Chitwood and those people are doing that today.
But he should be able to use that—Mr. Hart and his
residential customers should be able to use RWS on the
same basis as anybody else.
COURT: Mr. Dyer, it would seem to me that the—
what Gray is doing is very similar to what the Town of
Auburn was doing in the case that’s been cited by the
Town, here.
MR. DYER: Not entirely.
COURT: Okay. What is—
MR. DYER: Not entirely. In Auburn, we don’t have
the question of residential waste, because Auburn has its
own municipal pick-up. So we don’t have that issue. We
do have the commercial waste question, and that argu-
ment was—the Auburn case was argued before the Maine
Supreme Court yesterday. And Chief Justice Wathen
pointed out—he said—lI think it was Justice Wathen
pointed out that there’s—Judge Clifford said, “When
somebody puts material in a container, that’s [31] gar-
bage, and that’s the end of it.” And was the key—one
of the key parts in Judge Delahanty’s decision. And I’ve
taken issue with that as a factual basis in that particular
case, saying there’s no evidence in the record to support
that kind of a conclusion. If the Court drew that con-
clusion sua sponte, that’s not right. People today are—
I mean, years ago—one argument made yesterday was
that butcher shops and grocery stores used to set aside
a box, and you put all the meat bones in it, and the
rendering company would come by and pick those up.
Now that’s been going on for a hundred years. Now we
have people setting—and they are statutorily mandated, in
some cases, to set aside high-grade paper, to set aside
corrogated board, and to do all these things. And to sug-
gest that somebody, by throwing it away, is saying, “I
am discarding it and I have no further use for it” is
wrong, because in most of those instances which I’ve just
mentioned to you, the generator is paid for the material
or he barters a lower cost of disposal for that material.
33a
And newspaper, for example, is now $15 a ton. And it
can be sold for that, at $15 a ton. Now, it dosen't pay
a hauler to come in and pay somebody for that news-
paper, because he can’t get enough money out of it to
cover his hauling cost. But it is a useful discount to the
price to be able to get that material. And those are the
kinds of issue in the Auburn case which we argued yes-
terday, and which we believe the Law Court will—I hope
the Law Court will agree [32] with our position on that,
that we've got to look at the evolution of the statute from
1985, when RWS was first formed, through 1991 when
these amendments and priorities were set by the State
Statute.
COURT: Finally, Mr. Dyer, in terms of your posi-
tions, the antitrust monopoly arguments that you make,
1t—
MR. DYER: That hangs on one issue. What's the
definition of solid waste? The antitrust issue is does the
State, in Chapter—in Title 30-A. intend to give the towns
the exclusive right to handle all recyclable waste, regard-
less of the value? Does the town have the right to go into
your house and say, “When you put the Cola Cola can
down, it’s discarded. It’s now ours and we take the five
cents.” Does the town have the right to go to a sawmill
and say, “You have to give us the sawdust.” Those kinds
of issues, and if the State definition of solid waste does
allow that kind of activity, then we have no antitrust
violation. If, however, Mr. Hart is permited to take re-
cyclables and the State statute permits him to do that.
and Gray intercedes and intervenes and says, “We want
it,” then we have an antitrust violation.
COURT: Okay.
MR. DYER: And a similar argument is made with
taking, same kind of argument would apply there.
COURT: Okay. Mr. Katsiaficas, do you want to re-
spond bricfly to those points, the commerce cause and the
monopoly, [33] and then I'll tell you what I’ve—what I’m
inclined to do. Go ahead. I know you've done that in
your brief. Why don’t you just briefly restate it?
34a
MR. KATSIAFICAS: Well, I will try to briefly re-
state that, your Honor. I—just for the big picture, there
is a requirement that each municipality provide solid
waste disposal services for domestic and commercial solid
waste generated in the boundaries. It isn’t a requirement
that we provide it free of charge to all commercial and
residential accounts within the town. We're not trying—
The Town of Gray and RWS are not trying to put Tri-
State or anyone out of business. It’s simply trying to
legitimately regulate those businesses. When we get to
the commerce clause argument and the challenge to that
regultory authority, first of all, there’s no allegation here
that Tri-State is engaging in interstate commerce. Tri-
State is doing the collection, the disposal, the alleged re-
cycling, whatever. They are the ones who we're looking
at in this case. We're looking at what their actions are.
There’s no interstate commerce that’s even indirectly
implicated by what they do. There’s no standing to bring
those interstate commerce claims. Even if they did have
standing to bring them, even if somehow interstate com-
merce were implicated, we believe that the cases cited by
the plaintiffs, the Port Raddio, the Alabama case, are in-
apposite here because those cases deal with a prohibition
on waste [34] entering a state, not a designation ordi-
nance such as this. With regard to the Rhode Island
case, again, that was a ban—that was an eccnomic
regulation that was designed to keep tipping rates artifi-
cially low for the municipalities by putting the burden
on commercial waste and preventing it from leaving the
state. We don’t have that situation here. There are
legitimate State ends being furthered, here. There’s a
tension between those State ends, but the Town is trying
to do that in a way that balances everyone’s interests,
and in a fair way, and one that’s rationally related to
those ends. So, therefore, it’s—it is not in violation of
the commerce clause. With regard to antitrust, the defi-
nition of solid waste couldn’t be clearer. It includes those
items that are useless, discarded or unwanted, regardless
—————
35a
of whether they still have any value. That was decided
by Judge Carter, in his decision where he found, under
the very similar Auburn ordinance, using the State defini-
tion, that there was no violation of antitrust law. And
with that, we'd just rest on the briefs, your Honor.
COURT: All right.
MR. DYER: Your Honor, my—perhaps I could
make a suggestion at this point in time. It is obvious,
from the arguments given to you by myself and by Mr.
Katsiaficas in the last couple of moments. that many of
the issues in this case will rest on the definition of solid
waste. And it seems to me that since the Law Court
heard this argument yesterday and is going [35] to be
providing guidance—or hopefully, will be providing
guidance in this area, that maybe the issues dealing with
the affirmative defenses to the case or the affirmative
claims in the case for antitrust violations and so forth
Should be deferred until the Law Court has spoken on
that. And that would be for judicial economy, the
avoidance of conflicting decisions and all those sorts of
issues. And maybe what we could do is focus on—simply
on the ordinance itself as to whether that is constitution-
ally defective, in terms of the access that Mr. Hart is to
have to the transfer station and the ability to be treated
equally under those things. And perhaps-—I’m not sure
that the Court can do this, but I think it can, make a
division line in the case along those lines.
MR. KATSIAFICAS: If I may, your Honor?
COURT: Sure.
MR. KATSIAFICAS: | Sorry.
COURT: Mr. Katsiaficas?
MR. KATSIAFICAS: I don’t see that a division line
can be drawn, here. But I would say that there are three
counterclaims, one of them the licensing. It’s very
straightforward. There’s no dispute as to that. There's
no dispute that they’re diverting acceptable waste. If
there’s any dispute over the definition of recyclable mate-
rials and whether those are exempt from full control, that
36a
might be answered by the Law Court, perhaps that might
be held in abeyance. But it’s very clear [36] as to the
first two counts of the counterclaim that we're entitled to
summary judgment. There’s no dispute of genuine issue
of material fact.
MR. DYER: I think we can deal with the licensing
question in terms of whether or not the application form
is a bar to becoming licensed. And I think we can deal
with that, and I’m prepared to argue that.
COURT: Well, let me tell you the dilemma that I
have on this, gentlemen. And, Mr. Dyer, I have to say
I think you’re—you are doing a very good job arguing
a very difficult position. I—and I'll be very candid with
you that I feel that even on further reflection, I'm going
to find it very difficult to accept your arguments. I mean,
I don’t want to shortchange you or your client in terms
of the consideration that is given to this. What I'm say-
ing is that if I take this under advisement for the purpose
of giving a fully articulated response, it’s going to be
three months before I get this out, because I’ve got such
a—frankly, a huge backlog of cases. And I’n. saying to
myself, given the reservations I have about your position,
am I just taking all that time to try to give a more fully
articulated statement of what I think the conclusion
should be? Now, I can do that. The down side for you
all is that you don’t have a decision from me for all of
that time. If I go forward now with a bench decision,
it will not be, obviously, as fully articulated as it ideally
[37] should be, and I’m concerned that your client may
feel that he’s been given short shrift, although I—I mean,
I have read all this stuff, and I think I understand it. The
—so, in a sense, I’m just sharing with you my own
thought process as I decide what to do, here. I feel as
that, frankly, in fairness to you all, is I should decide
this here and now. And in doing that, I will not do it
as fully as I might like, as I would like, but it allows you
to know where you stand. And if I really felt there was
a lot of uncertainty, here, I wouldn't do this. But I’m
37a
going to tell you where I come out on all of this. And
what that does is allow you to all move forward from
there and perhaps get this more quickly to the forum
where it ultimately has got to be decided. Where I come
out on this, Mr. Dyer, and this will not be good news
to you or your client, is that I begin with the proposition
that this area of solid waste has been traditionally, for
decades, an area where the municipality has had a great
deal of authority to regulate, and to regulate in ways
that have traditionally been monopolistic. I recently
looked at some very old Maine cases going back to the
turn of the century, where some of the very same argu-
ments that you're raising now were raised about the au-
thority of the town to basically grant a monopoly to a
private enterprise to deal with offal and swill, as they
called it then. And the Law Court was very clear that,
in the town’s exercise of its police power, that it could,
in effect, [38] grant a monopoly to a business to Carry out
the function of disposing of the offal and the swill. My
point is that—and I’m sure this must be very hard for
Mr. Hart to accept, that he is conducting his business in
an area which traditionally has been, and increasingly is
becoming even more so, subject to heavy regulation.
And, in a way, the stakes for the municipalities and the
public interest become greater and greater all the time
because of the increasing problems of solid waste. It
seems to me what we have here is The Town of Gray,
pursuant to its home rule powers, which are very sub-
stantial, and pursuant to the exercise of its police power,
an area where it has a great deal of discretion, it is exer-
cising its home rule powers and its police powers, to try
to come up with a rational scheme for dealing with two
not easily compatible objectives, number one, solving its
landfill problems by meeting its obligations to RWS, and
at the same time, meeting State-imposed obligations and
mandates with respect to recycling more and more of its
waste. And to meet those objectives in a way that is
consistent with the Town’s own limited financial re-
38a
sources. And to some extent, Mr. Hart and others do
find themselves in the middle of al! of this, and it un-
questionably is having an impact on the business of Mr.
Hart and others, no question about that. But because
they are conducting a business in this area, I’m afraid
that that is a price that they are being asked to pay
legitimately [39] by government regulation. I simply do
not see anything in the Town’s ordinance that violates
equal protection, because, given the standard that ap-
plies, here, it seems to me that the Town has arrived
at a rational scheme for addressing administrative costs,
for trying to police the way in which waste is handled
in The Town of Gray, in a fashion that is not unduly
burdensome for them, and in a way that will help them
meet their recycling goals. Now, you may say, as you
have, that there are other ways that they could do that.
And there probably are other ways that they could do it.
And maybe even other ways that are more sensible, from
a businessman’s point of view. But I don’t think that I,
as a Court, have the authority to simply tell the Town
that they ought to do it differently. They're doing it
rationally to meet legitimate objectives, and I think they
have the authority to do that. In terms of the commerce
clause issues, I just—I mean, I recognize the grand scope
of the commerce clause, and I’m reluctant to say that
what the Town is doing does not have some effect on
interstate commerce. But I can’t imagine that what the
Town is doing is having such an effect on interstate com-
merce that it violates applicable constitutional standards.
The point is, again, that it seems to me they are pursuing
a rational objective, and it does require, to some extent,
that they control the destination of the waste. And in
that sense, yes, it restricts the free flow of commerce,
taking the view, as you have, correctly, [40] that waste
is a commodity. Clearly, it is. And I believe, for all the
reasons I’ve already stated, they can control the destina-
tion of that waste, and they're doing it for perfectly
legitimate and rational reasons. I also take the view that
39a
solid waste does have the broad definition that has been
attributed to it by Judge Carter, and I believe, in the
Auburn decision, as well, by Justice Delahanty, and that
what we have here is the municipality acting pursuant
to a clearly articulated and broadly stated State policy
as to how these communities are to deal with solid waste,
broadly defined. And becaues the Town is acting pur-
suant to that clearly articulated and broadly stated State
policy, that, in effect, the Town is immune from these
monopoly, these antitrust arguments that you're raising.
It is the State action immunity, if you will, that applies
in this area. I realize that you have raised other ai'gu-
ments, as well. I believe those are the primary ones, and
'm not going to try to address every one that you've
raised, other than to say that I have reviewed them. and
[ do not—I did not feel that they ultimately had merit.
Believe me, if I thought that taking this under further
advisement and thinking about it and studying it was
going to change those conclusions, I would not have done
—made the decision that I now make. But I just know
it won't, and therefore, it seemed to me that I had an
obligation to you to state where I come out. to try to
move this along. Now, [41] having reached those con-
clusions, I’m going to have to memorialize this other than
just on the tape. I’m going to ask Mr. Katsiaficas to pre-
pare an order that—and what I'm suggesting, Mr. Kat-
siaficas, I don’t want you to try to sort of reproduce what
I've tried to explain here. I mean, I want the record to
Stand for that. But what I think is needed now is an
order that addresses what happens in light of those con-
clusions, I mean, because what we have here are—this
all begins with Mr. Dyer’s action on behalf of his clients,
and obviously, this means that I am denying any request
for injunctive relief. And I am ruling favorably on your
counterclaim and basically giving you summary judgment
on your counterclaim. Now, what that all—what that
means further, frankiy, in terms of the relief that you're
seeking, I’m not sure. Maybe you can tell me now what
40a
that means, from your perspective. I mean, it—I mean,
the real effect of this would be a ruling that Mr. Hart has
to be licensed, that he has to comply with the ordinance
and all of those things. And I assume that’s the kind of
language that you would want in the order, making clear
Mr. Hart’s obligation to comply. Are you seeking more
than that? Are you trying to look back, and are there
claims for fines in here, and things like that? What is
your—what are you seeking?
MR. KATSIAFICAS: ‘e’re simply—in this Motion
for Summary Judgment, seeking to have Mr. Hart con-
form his conduct to the [42] requirements of the ordi-
nance, to be licensed, to bring acceptable waste to RWS
directly, and not to divert his recyclable materials, to not
sell them to third parties or whatever. Those are the
Town’s properties, its solid waste.
COURT: Okay. So you’re—
MR. KATSIAFICAS: We're not seeking fines.
COURT: —so you're looking for something prospec-
tive, then? I mean, this is what—
MR. KATSIAFICAS: _ Right.
COURT: -—this is what Mr. Hart would now have
to do, is that correct? |
MR. KATSIAFICAS: | That's correct.
COURT: Okay.
MR. KATSIAFICAS: And we are not seeking fines.
COURT: All right. Okay. All right. Well, that’s
helpful to know—
MR. DYER: Well, I have a question.
COURT: —sure. '
MR. DYER: He says he dosen’t want recyclables di- |
verted. Where’s Mr. Hart supposed to take them?
COURT: Do you want to respond to that, Mr. Kat-
Siaficas?
MR. KATSIAFICAS: | I’ve suggested earlier that those
could be taken to the Town’s municipal recycling facility
at the transfer station, and—
nine a
4la
MR. DYER: _ He’s been refused permission to go there.
[43] COURT: Well, that’s something I guess you'll
have to look into, Mr. Katsiaficas.
MR. KATSIAFICAS: —TI'll have to look into that,
but that would be reflected in the draft order that I pre-
pare.
COURT: Right. Okay.
MR. DYER: Now, I also assume that this is going
to apply to every single other waste hauler in the com-
munity, because there are other waste haulers who are
not doing that. They are not taking their recyclables to
the transfer station.
COURT: Well, I'm sure that any policy that’s re-
flected in this order would have to be uniformly appli-
cable. I mean, that—
MR. KATSIAFICAS: That's right. I’m not aware of
what other haulers are doing at this time, and any policy
that is adopted here would have to be applied across the
board in order to be fair.
MR. DYER: Well, we pointed this out to them, that
within one hundred feet of the front door to the Town
Hall is a waste management recycling bin which is not
being taken to the transfer station.
COURT: Hmmm? Okay. Well, that’s something that
clearly bears examination, Mr. Katsiaficas.
MR. KATSIAFICAS: Certainly, your Honor. That
will be examined before I draft the prepared order.
COURT: Okay. Mr. Dyer, from your point of view,
is there [44] understanding, sort of where ultimately I’m
coming out on this? Is there anything that you feel
should be—in terms of dispositive provisions of the or-
der that has to be addressed, just so your client knows
where he stands for purposes of appeal land all of that.
What—
MR. DYER: Well, I have a couple of questions for
appeal, which f like to raise.
COURT: —sure.
MR. DYER: I've restrained myself from continuing
the argument this morning, but—
42a
COURT: I understand.
MR. DYER: —obviously, we're going to need some
sort of a record to take up on appeal.
COURT: Sure.
MR. DYER: We can either take this transcript this
morning, or we could have findings of facts and conclu-
sions of law.
COURT: Well, see, what—that’s—I—mean, I’m just
not comfortable—I never have been—asking counsel to
give me those to—it just doesn’t—it just never seems to
work for me. And I was hoping to—what I have asked
you to do, it seems to me, is—I’ve tried to give a bench
decision which explains where I’m coming from, at least
without undue cost. That portion, it seems to me, could
be obtained—
MR. DYER: All right. So you would have us rely
on the [45] record?
COURT: —right.
MR. DYER: Fine.
COURT: So what I’m really doing is—and obviously,
you can have this whole colloquy reproduced if you think
that’s helpful, but what I’m suggesting to Mr. Katsiaficas
is, for the—basically for the reasons stated on the record,
and then the transcript would be that, and then these—
and I haven’t made factual findings, because I have—I
mean, you all started out with a proposition which seemed
very clear to me that these are really legal issues. There’s
—now, there seems to be some dispute about how the
Town might be applying one provision of the ordinance
you've just referred to. But I never saw this as a—where
there’s much factually in dispute at all, really nothing.
I mean, these are legal issues, as you’ve said right along.
So I don’t think there’s a need to make any factual find-
ings. As least, I’ve proceeded on that assumption. And
so I just tried to give you a summary of my legal conclu-
sions, if you will, and that’s now on the record. So I
would prefer to just have an order which deals with the
respective claims, and indicates how those are disposed of,
aa ed
43a
make sure they’re all disposed of so you have a final
judgment, and you can proceed accordingly.
COURT: Now, I also assume—well, I understand that
there are no fines that are being assessed at this point in
time?
[46] COURT: That’s what Mr. Katsiaficas just said.
Right.
MR. DYER: All right. Now, obviously, I’m going to
ask for the Court to stay the order, pending appeal. There
are some appealable issues here, which I—
COURT: Sure. Absolutely.
MR. DYER: —the California reduction case, which
I think you were talking about earlier, being those old
turn of the century California cases decided by the U.S.
Supreme Court—
COURT: Well, I—actually, I was thinking of some
Marine cases, at least in terms of monopoly—the monop-
Oly probiem. Yeah.
MR. DYER: —there is an old—TI think a rendering
plant case of some sort in Maine, if I’m not mistaken,
which is about the same time as the U.S. Supreme Court
cases.
COURT: Yeah. Okay.
MR. DYER: And the question of whether or not this
is a regulated industry, I will—I tend to take exception
to that.
COURT: Sure.
MR. DYER: And disagree—I understand your posi-
tion, and I don’t mean to be disrespectful here in any way.
But—
COURT: That’s—that’s—I mean, I’m—these are dif-
ficult issues, and I think, as I said, it made point—it made
sense to me to get this resolved so you can get it decided
where it ultimately has to be decided. So—
MR. DYER: —my position would be essentially that
recyclables [47] is a new industry. And the recent Su-
preme Court cases this year indicating that they are com-
modities, that they are valuable items, and the recent cases
44a
dealing with commerce clause issues all point out the fact
that this recyclable industry is very critical. And when
you start saying, “Yes, we'll take the broad definition of
solid waste,” then you start impacting metals processors,
newspaper processers, the bottled glass people, all of these
industries are going to be impacted one way or another
by these kinds of—by this definition. And therefore, we
would like to have some relief during the course of this
appeal, that I under—TI assume that you have no sense of
allowing Mr. Hart to continue taking the matevial to the
least costly disposal facility. You are going to require,
under any set of circumstances, he take the acceptable
waste to RWS. However, we would like to have the op-
portunity to be able to take the recyclable materials to
a third party processor, if, in fact, it proves to be more
economical to do that. And it may very well turn out not
to be economical because of the volume of recyclable ma-
terials being generated. It may be easier just to tip it,
rather than to truck it to West Paris in separate trips
and so forth. But we would like to have the opportunity
to—at least to try and protect that economic situation
during the course of the appeal.
COURT: Well, I wonder if we—it’s—we’ve all been
at this [48] a long time, and I wonder if maybe we ought
to just schedule a separate hearing on the issue of whether
a stay should be—whether there should—that—we should
—I think maybe that would make—
MR. DYER: And I could phrase it in writing and—
COURT: —-yeah.
MR. DYER: —give you a proposed order of spe-
cifically what we want?
COURT: Why don’t we do that? I'd just as soon—
that’s obviously also an important issue, and I think I’d
rather give separate consideration to that. So why don’t
we get the—see if, in light of what I’ve indicated, you and
Mr. Katsiaficas can agree on the terms of the order to
reflect these rulings, and then after you’ve done that, I'll
make myself available promptly to hear the issue of the
stay. I mean, I guess what you'd want to do is—maybe
— EEEOEOEOEOEOOeOO”
45a
at the time that you submit the order, you could also sub-
mit your—each submit your position on the issue of the
Stay.
MR. DYER: All right.
COURT: And then I’ll—
MR. DYER: And what I will do, Judge, if it’s all
right with you, I will phrase the request for relief broadly,
on the basis that it’s better to ask for too much than too
—for too little.
COURT: —well, I—
[49] MR. DYER: And you can strike whatever—
COURT: _ yeah.
MR. DYER: —-you deem to be appropriate.
COURT: Okay. And then I won't sign or enter the
order until we’ve had the hearing on the stay, okay?
MR. DYER: All right. Fine.
COURT: And—all right. Why don’t we do that?
And just so the Clerk can keep track of this, how long
do you think you would need to prepare the order and,
at the same time, have your respective positions on the
stay? A couple of weeks? A week? I don’t know.
MR. KATSIAFICAS: I would think that a week
would be sufficient, your Honor.
“OURT: Okay. All right. Why don’t you do that,
and then I’ll—after I get that, I'll have Amanda, the
sec—I’ll check with you, we'll set up a time, then, for
the hearing on the stay. I think we’ll—you’ll want to
argue that, I assume, is that right?
MR. KATSIAFICAS: Yes, your Honor. We will.
COURT: Okay. Then we’ll—
MR. DYER: As a matter of housekeeping, is it all
right if we agree to exchange pleadings by close of busi-
ness on Monday and file on Tuesday, a week from today?
MR. KATSIAFICAS: Well, we'll try to get, actually,
a draft order before that, to you.
[50] MR. DYER: Well, all right. So that I have an
opportunity to look at them (indiscernible).
MR. KATSIAFICAS: Well, we certainly—we want
—we have to agree to an order, I believe.
46a
COURT: Im asking you to try to—I think—that
part, I don’t think should be difficult.
MR. KATSIAFICAS: And I’m going to try to—I
would think not, your Honor.
COURT: Yes, I’m just asking you to dispose of the
—all the claims. I think the stay issue would be the diffi-
cult one, so—
MR. KATSIAFICAS: — That’s right.
COURT: —all right. Thank you.
MR. KATSIAFICAS: Thank you, your Honor.
END OF HEARING
47a
APPENDIX E
TOWN OF GRAY
SOLID WASTE, FLOW CONTROL
AND RECYCLING ORDINANCE
AN ORDINANCE OF THE TOWN OF GRAY, CUM-
BERLAND COUNTY, STATE OF MAINE REGULA-
TING THE COLLECTION, STORAGE, TRANSPORT,
DISPOSAL REDUCTION, RECYCLING AND REUSE
OF SOLID WASTE IN THE TOWN AND PROVID-
ING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION OF SAID
ORDINANCE.
WHEREAS, the Legislature of the State of Maine has
caused certain statutes to be enacted which govern or
delegate to the Maine Department of Environmental Pro-
tection the responsibility for promulgation of rules and
regulations regarding the disposal of solid waste and au-
thorize municipalities to regulate solid waste disposal on
municipal property; and
WHEREAS, the Council of the Town of Gray pursuant
to the authority vested in it, desires to enact an ordinance
regulating the collection, storage, transport, salvaging and
disposal of garbage, rubbish, refuse, and other solid waste
materials in said Town; and
WHEREAS, the Town of Gray has the authority pur-
scuant to 30-A M.R.S.A. section 3001 et seq., and 38
M.R.S.A. section 1301 et seq. as amended from time to
time, to enter into contracts for the collection, transpor-
tation, storage, processing, salvaging or disposal of solid
waste and to designate certain categories of solid waste
as recyclable or reusable material and to require the seg-
regation of waste into categories; and
WHEREAS, reduction, recycling and reusing is a wise
and prudent solid waste management technique that saves
tipping fees, saves energy, reduces pollution and environ-
48a
mental degradation, keeps usable manufacturing material
in the economy and signifies a developing sense of waste
awareness; therefore, the Town of Gray wishes to en-
courage reduction, recycling and reusing to the maximum
extent possible; and
WHEREAS, the Gray Landfill will be permanently closed
December 31, 1991; and,
WHEREAS, the Council desires to gain management
control over solid waste and enable the reclamation of
resources, including energy, from those wastes; and
WHEREAS, the Council desires to provide adequate,
efficient services and facilities for the disposal of solid
waste without creating an undo financial burden on prop-
erty owners;
THEREFORE, be it enacted and ordained by the Town
of Gray, Cumberland County, Maine and it is hereby
enacted and ordained by authority of the same as follows:
SECTION I
SCOPE:
This Ordinance applies to all generators of solid waste
in the Town of Gray, including but not limited to, resi-
dential, commerical, industrial and governmental pro-
ducers of solid waste in the Town of Gray.
SECTION II
DEFINITIONS:
The following words and terms as used in the Ordinance
shall have the meaning ascribed thereto, unless the con-
text indicates a different meaning. Further definitions
may be found in Bureau of Solid Waste Management
06-096 CMR 400. |
“Abandoned Vehicle’—Any gasoline, diesel or electric
powered equipment, or part thereof, originally designed
:
4
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for carrying persons or goods for commercial, business,
private or recreational purposes which is:
|. No longer used for the purpose originally in-
tended,
Has not been converted to another commercial,
business, private or recreational vehicular use,
tr
3. Is not exempted or regulated by existing State or
Federal Laws, or
4. Has been left out in the elements to deteriorate.
It includes, but is not limited to, automobiles, trucks,
buses, campers, trailers, boats, snowmobiles, jet skis and
ATVs.
“Acceptable Waste” shall mean ordinary household,
municipal, institutional, commercial and industrial Solid
Waste including, but not limited to, the following:
(1) Garbage, trash, rubbish, paper and cardboard, plas-
tics, refuse, beds, mattresses, sofas, refrigerators, washing
machines, bicycles, baby carriages and automobile or
small vehicle tires, to the extent that Regional Waste
Systems, Inc. (RWS) determines that the air emission
criteria and standards applicable to and at the RWS Dis-
posal Facility are not violated; and
(2) Processible portions of commercial and industrial
Solid Waste; and
(3) Wood and lumber, tree limbs, branches, ties, logs
and trees, if no more than four and one-half (4 1 2) feet
long and eight (8) inches in diameter, and leaves. twigs,
grass and plant cuttings, provided that the Municipality
shall not be obligated to deliver or cause to be delivered
any items listed in this subpart (3) to the RWS Dis-
posal Facility, and further provided that such items may
be delivered to the RWS Disposal Facility by or on be-
half of the Municipality on an irregular basis only and
shall represent an insignificant portion of the total Waste
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delivered to the RWS Disposal Facility by or on behalf
of the Municipality within any Calendar Year; and
Notwithstanding any provisions to the contrary, Unac-
ceptable Waste, including Hazardous Waste, shall not be
“Acceptable Waste” and is explicitly excluded therefrom.
Furthermore, any substances which as of the date of a
certain Waste Handling Agreement between the Munici-
pality and Regional Waste Systems, Inc. (RWS) are in-
cluded as “Acceptable Waste”, by which are later deter-
mined to be harmful, toxic, dangerous or hazardous by
any governmental agency or unit having appropriate ju-
risdiction, shall not be “Acceptable Waste” under the
terms of this Ordinance. However, any substances which
as of the date of said Waste Handling Agreement are not
included within the definition of “Acceptable Waste” be-
cause they are considered harmful, toxic, dangerous or
hazardous and which are later determined not to be harm-
ful, toxic, dangerous or hazardous by any governmental
agency or unit having appropriate jurisdiction, shall be
considered “Acceptable Waste” unless a contrary deter-
mination has been or is made by any other governmental
agency or unit having appropriate jurisdiction or unless
such substances are otherwise considered “Unacceptable
Waste” or “Hazardous Waste”.
“Agricultural Waste” also referred to as “waste resulting
from agricultural activities” in 38 MRSA Section 1303.
(16), means wastes which result from agricultural activi-
ties defined in Section 361-A (1-B), which are returned
to the soils as fertilizers. It includes waste pesticides
when generated by a farmer, provided that he she triple
rinses each emptied pesticide container in accordance
with departmental rules and disposes of the pesticide resi-
dues in a manner consistent with the disposal instructions
on the pesticide label. It does not include any materials
regulated as a residual under Chapter 567 of the De-
partment’s Regulations.
S5la
“Ashes”—the residue remaining after the combustion of
a material such as wood, coal, coke or other combustible
material.
“Brown Goods”—small household appliances including,
but not limited to, radios, televisions, sound systems and
other small electric or electronic appliances or devices.
“Commercial Hauler—Any person, firm, partnership,
association, municipality, cooperation, or other legal en-
tity who collects, transports, and disposes of solid waste
for a fee as herein prescribed.
“Commercial Waste”—solid wastes generated by stores,
Offices, restaurants, warehouses and other non-manufac-
turing, non-processing activities; but it does not include
residential, household, process, industrial or special
wastes.
“Composting”—the biological decomposition and stabili-
zation of organic matter under controlled aerobic con-
ditions of high temperature.
“Construction/Demolition Debris’—the debris resulting
from construction, remodeling, repair and demolition of
structures. It includes but is not limited to building ma-
terials, asphalt, wall board, pipes, metal conduits, mat-
tresses, household furniture, fish nets, rope, hose, wire
and cable, fencing, carpeting and underlay. It excludes
asbestos, gypsum board, asphalt shingles, plastics, cans,
containers which stored asphalt, paint thinners or other
similar materials and material that contains or is com-
bined with residential refuse, rubbish, garbage, hazardous
or special wastes, as that term is defined by Chapter 400
of the Maine Department of Environmental Protection's
Solid Waste Rules.
“Demolition Debris’—see “Constructon/Demolition De-
bris.”
“Disposal”—the discharge, deposit, dumping or placing
of any solid waste into or on any land or body of water,
or the incineration of any solid waste.
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“Disposal Facility’—any land or structure or combina-
tion of land area and land structures, including dumps,
recycling centers, and transfer stations used for storing,
salvaging, reducing, incinerating or disposing of solid
wastes, including any transfer station or similar facility
which may be constructed by the Town in connection
with the use of any disposal facilities.
“Garbage”—all table refuse, animal and vegetable mat-
ter, offal from meat, fish and fowls, vegetables and fruits
and parts thereof, and other articles and materials ordi-
narily used for food and which have become unfit for
such use or composting for which reasons they are dis-
carded.
“Hazardous Waste’—a waste substance or material, in
any physical state, designated as hazardous by the Board
under 38 M.R.S.A. Section 1303-A et seq. The fact a
hazardous waste or a part or a constituent may have
value or other use or may be sold or exchanged does not
exclude it from this definition.
“Industrial Waste”—solid wastes generated by manufac-
turing or processing activities; but it does not include
residential, household, commercial or special wastes.
“Inert Fill’—a clean solid material, rocks, bricks, and
cured concrete, which are not mixed with other solid or
liquid waste, and which are not derived from an ore min-
ing activity.
“Infectious Waste”’—those wastes so defined by the Solid
Waste Management Regulations promulgated by the De-
partment of Environmental Protection pursuant to Title
38 M.R.S.A. section 1304.
“Land Clearing Debris”—solid wastes resulting from the
clearing of land and consisting solely of brush, stumps,
soil material and rocks.
“Landscape Refuse”—grass, leaves, shrubs, branches,
trees and wood, whether finished or unfinished; but it
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does not include construction/demolition debris, land
clearing debris, plastic bags or other plastic containers
used to collect, store or transport landscape refuse.
“Person”’—any individual, partnership, association, firm,
company, corporation, department, agency, group, includ-
ing a city, town, county, State, Federal or other govern-
mental unit, or any other entity responsible in any way
for an activity subject to these rules.
“Recyclable Waste”—waste, which when properly segre-
gated, can be recovered, reused. or recycled. This shall
include with limitation, newspapers, corrugated box mu-
terial, glass and metal containers, scrap metal, waste oil,
mixed paper, automotive batteries, white goods, brown
goods and other materials deemed recyclable by the
Town.
“Recycling Center’—a portion of the Transfer Station
set aside for the collection, segregation, processing, stor-
age and distribution of recyclable and reusable solid
waste,
“Refuse’-—all combustible refuse and incombustible ref-
use referred to collectively.
“RWS or Regional Waste Systems, Inc.”—shall mean Re-
gional Waste Systems, Inc., a non-capital stock, non-
profit corporation created pursuant to Title 30, Chapter
203 and Title 13, Chapter 81 of the Maine Revised
Statutes.
“Residential Waste”—solid wastes generated by a resi-
dence during normal household activities; but it does not
include commercial, process, industrial, landscape, con-
struction ‘demolition debris or special wastes.
“Resource Recovery’—the recovery of materials or sub-
stances that still have useful physical or chemical proper-
ties after serving a specific purpose and can be reused or
recycled for the same or other purposes.
54a
“Rubbish”—all miscellaneous waste material, not other-
wise included herein, resulting from the ordinary conduct
of business or housekeeping.
“Solid Waste”—useless, unwanted or discarded solid ma-
terial with insufficient liquid content to be free flowing,
including by way of example, and not by limitation, rub-
bish, garbage, refuse derived fuel, scrap materials, junk,
refuse, inert fill material, and landscape refuse. “Solid
Waste” shall in no case include sludges from air or water
pollution control facilities, septic tank sludge or agricul-
tural waste. The fact a solid waste, or a part of or con-
Stituent of the waste, may have value or other use or
may be sold or exchanged does not exclude it from the
definition of “Solid Waste”.
“Special Wastes’-——as defined in 38 M.R.S.A. Section
1303 (10-B) means any non-hazardous waste generated
by sources other than domestic and typical commercial
establishments that exist in such an unusual quantity or
in such a chemical or physical state, or any combination
thereof, which may disrupt or impair effective waste man-
agement or threaten the public health, human safety or
the environment and requires special handling, transpor-
tation and disposal procedures. Special waste includes,
but is not limited to:
a. Oil, coal, wood and multifuel boiler and incinerator
ash;
b. Industrial and industrial prices waste;
c. Wastewater treatment plant sludge, paper mill sludge
and other sludge waste;
d. Debris and residuals from nonhazardous chemical
spills and cleanup of those spills;
e. Contaminated soils and dredge spoils;
Asbestos and asbestos-containing waste;
g. Sand blast grit and nonliquid paint waste;
55a
h. Medical and other potentially infectious or pathogenic
waste;
i. High and low pH waste;
j. Spent filter media residue;
k. Shredder residue; and
1. Other waste designated by the board, by rule.
“Town”’—the Town of Gray, Cumberland County, State
of Maine.
“Transfer Station’—Transfer Station means any waste
facility constructed and managed for storage and place-
ment of municipal solid waste in large containers or ve-
hicles for movement to another waste facility.
“Unacceptable Waste’”—that portion of solid waste which
is not acceptable waste and includes, but is not limited
to, sewage and its derivatives, special nuclear or by-
product materials within the meaning of the Atomic
Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and Hazardous Waste,
and Special Waste.
“Waste”—items, materials or substances delivered to a
disposal Facility by the Town, its employees, agents or
contractors.
“White Goods’—all large appliances, including, but not
limited to, stoves, refrigerators, freezers, washing ma-
chines, clothes dryers, dishwashers, air conditioners and
metal artifacts such as swing sets, bicycles and lawn mow-
ers free of all oil and gasoline. White goods shall not
include white goods generated by an owner or operator
of a commercial or industrial use or activity.
SECTION III
DISPOSAL FACILITY:
A. To preserve and protect environmental resources, to
protect the health, safety, and welfare of the public, to
56a
enhance the quailty and character of life in the Town
and to improve efforts to recover and reuse valuable re-
sources currently being wasted, it shall be uniawful to
dispose of acceptable waste generated within the Town
at any location other than the Town Transfer Station,
RWS facility at 64 Blueberry Road in Portland, Maine,
or other licensed facility designated by the Town Council.
B. The Town shall inform all persons of the location of
the Transfer Station by adequate public notice in writing
or in print. Furthermere, the Town shall inform all per-
sons authorized to use the Transfer Station of the proper
location for disposing of the various components of their
solid waste including, but not limited to, recyclable ma-
terials, reusable materials, white goods, brown goods,
landscape refuse, construction/demolition debris, land
clearing debris, tires, ashes, spent motor oil and all other
solid wastes.
C. Property Rights
Any solid waste deposited within the boundary of the
Town shall become the property of the Town or Regional
Waste Systems, Inc., pursuant to the terms of a Waste
Handling Agreement entered into between RWS and the
Town and amendments thereto. No one shall salvage, re-
move or carry off any such deposited solid waste without
prior approval of the Public Works Director or his
designee.
D. From and after the effective date of this ordinance, it
shall be unlawful for any person or firm to accumulate,
or permanently dispose of within the corporate limits of
the Town, abandoned vehicles, garbage, refuse, rubbish,
combustible or incombustible refuse, white goods, brown
goods, recyclable or reusable material or other solid waste
generated within said Town excepting inert fill material,
compost and other material for which specific permission
has been granted by the Town. Failure to remove any
existing accumulation of garbage, refuse, recyclable ma-
terials, rubbish, abandoned vehicles or other solid waste
57a
: materials within thirty (30) days after the effective date
of this ordinance shall be deemed in violation of this
section of the ordinance.
E. Nothing in this subsection shall proh. t a®y person
from composting vegetable and plant materials on his ‘her
property for noncommercial use.
F. The owner of any lot, or any other person with the
permission of the lot owner and Code Enforcement Offi-
cer, may deposit or dump inert substances such as earth,
rocks, concrete or similar material for fill purposes only,
subject to State and/or local Land Use Regulations.
G. Certain materials may be excluded by Town Council
Regulation from those solid waste materials which may
be deposited at the Transfer Station. These excluded ma-
terials may include white goods, brown goods, tires,
ashes, ties, spent motor oil, commercial waste, industrial
waste, land clearing debris, landscape refuse, construc-
tion/demolition debris, abandoned vehicles and bulky or
special waste which may require special processing prior
to disposal.
H. Except for licensed disposal of hazardous, special or
infectious wastes, it shall be unlawful for any person to
burn or incinerate any solid waste within the Town other
than wood products, trees, tree limbs, branches, ties, logs,
leaves, twigs, grass and plant cuttings, other than in an
approved incinerator. Ref: State of Maine Rules and
Guidelines for Open Burning, 38 M.R.S.A, Section 599
and Department of Conservation, Bureau of Forestry 12
M.R.S.A. sections 9301 and 9324.
SECTION IV
AUTHORIZED USE OF THE TRANSFER STATION:
A. The avaitability and use of the portions of the Trans-
fer Station located within the Town shall be limited to
the residents of the Town, both permanent and seasonal,
58a
for the sole purpose of disposing of solid waste generated
within the Town. As a means of use control, the Town
may distribute vehicle permits to authorized users which
shall be affixed to use vehicles. Failure to exhibit such
permit shall result in denial of use of the facilities.
B. Waste generated at a commercial activity which has
been segregated into recyclable, reusable and non-recycla-
ble categories, and is hauled by the generator of the
waste, may be deposited at the Transfer Station.
SECTION V
TRANSFER STATION USER CHARGES:
Upon reviewing recommendations made by the Town
Manager and Public Works Director, the Town Council
may establish by order schedules of waste disposal
charges, operating hours, delivery times and other oper-
ating regulations for the use of the Transfer Station or
any portion thereof located within the Town, which
schedules may include different waste disposal charges,
operating hours, delivery times and other operating reg-
ulations for residents of the Town, businesses located
within the Town and commercial refuse collectors collect-
ing solid waste within the Town and may include differ-
ent sched: #s ‘%* disposal of different kinds of solid
waste. Ali schecules to be or ‘die in the Town Clerk’s
office.
SECTION VI
RESTRICTIONS:
A. Hazardous Waste cannot be deposited at the Trans-
fer Station. The Town shall not be responsible for any
costs or liabilities incurred with the disposal of Hazardous
Waste.
B. Special Waste cannot be deposited at the Transfer
Station. The Town shall not be responsible for any costs
or liabilities incurred with the disposal of Special Waste.
59a
C. Infectious Waste cannot be deposited at the T:ausfer
Station. The Town shall not be responsible for any costs
or liabilities incurred with the disposal of Infectious
Waste.
D. Agricultural Waste . annot be deposited at the Trans-
fer Station. The Town shall not be responsible for any
costs or liabilities incurred with the disposal of Agricul-
tural Waste.
E. Commercial Waste, hauled by the generator of the
waste, which has not becw segregated into recyclable, re-
usable and nonrecyclable categories shall be deposited at
RWS or other licensed facility designated by the Town
Council. The Town shall not be responsible for any costs
incurred with the disposal of nonsegregated Commercial
Waste hauled by the generator.
F. Construction/Demolition debris can be deposited at
the Transfer Station or other location designated by the
Town until an alternate Construction/Demolition Debris
site is in operation. The Town shall not be responsible
for any costs or liabilities incurred with the collection,
storage, transport, or disposal of Construction/Demoli-
tion Debris.
G. Land Clearing Debris can be deposited at the Trans-
fer Station or other location designated by the Town
until an alternate Construction/Demolition site is in oper-
ation. The Town shali not be responsible for any costs
or liabilities incurred with the collection, storage, trans-
port or disposal or Land Clearing Debris.
H. Landscape Refuse can be deposited at the Transfer
Station or other location designated by the Town until
an alternate Construction/Demolition Site is in operation.
The Town shall not be responsible for any costs or liabil-
ities incurred with the collection, storage, transport or
disposal of Landscape Refuse.
I. Owners or operators of a commercial or industrial
use or activity cannot deposit white goods or brown
60a
goods at the Transfer Station. The Town shall not be
responsible for any costs or liabilities incurred with the
collection, storage, transport or disposal of white goods
or brown goods from a commercial use or activity.
J. Industrial waste cannot be deposited at the Transfer
Station. The Town shall not be responsible for any costs
or liabilities incurred with the collection, storage, trans-
port or disposal of industrial waste.
K. It shall be unlawful for any person to place, leave or
deposit at the entrance of, or along the perimeter fence
of the Transfer Station, any garbage, refuse, recyclable
materials, rubbish, white goods or other solid waste ma-
terials during, or outside of the hours of the day and the
days of the week which the Town Council has determined
those facilities open for the disposal of solid waste
materials.
SECTION VII
REGULATION OF COMMERCIAL HAULERS:
A. It shall be unlawful for any person to haul, transport,
collect, remove and dispose of garbage, refuse, recycla-
ble/reusable materials, rubbish, white goods, brown
goods, or other acceptable waste generated within the
Town for a fee without first securing a commercial haul-
er’s license. The Town, upon application and after in-
vestigation, may issue a commercial hauler’s license for
a period of one (1) year.
B. The fee for a hauler’s license shall be established by
Town Council Order. Any person desiring to secure such
a license shall present a written application accompanied
by the fee, to the Town Clerk; such license shall be issued
only after due and proper investigation and recommenda-
tion of the Public Works Director and Public Safety Offi-
cer and after approval by the Town Council.
C. An application for an annual or a limited commercial
hauler’s license shall contain the following information:
6la
a
The name of the applicant,
nN
The applicant’s residence,
The address of the applicant’s place of business,
A description of equipment to be used,
A collection route and schedule,
Place(s) of deposit of solid waste,
Cf -?
A Certificate of Insurance for:
a. Workers Compensation Insurance covering all
employees,
b. Vehicle Liability for a minimum of $1,000,000.00,
c. Comprehensive General Liability for a minimum of
$1,000,000.00.
D. The Commercial Hauler shall deposit all residential,
commercial and industrial acceptable waste generated
within the boundaries of the Town at the Regional Waste
Systems, Inc. facility or at any other licensed solid waste
facility or facilities as may be designated by the Town
Council. The Town shall not be responsible for the col-
lection, transport or disposal of any residential, commer-
cial or industrial acceptable or non-acceptable waste.
E. Trucks or other vehicles used for the transportation of
garbage or other garbage mixed with refuse shall be of the
compactor type, water tight, with an enclosed cargo space.
Collection of dry refuse, rubbish, recyclable, and other
solid waste materials is permitted in open trucks which
shall be covered. No trucks or other vehicles shall be
permitted to scatter any of the contents on any of the
streets, highways, or roads of the Town. Trucks used to
haul garbage refuse, recyclable materials, rubbish, or other
soild waste materials over the streets of the Town must be
maintained in a clean and sanitary condition and shall
meet all the requirements of the Town or appropriate State
agency where applicable. The trucks may be inspected at
aaa naam aaias —_
62a
any time during normal collection hours by the Public
Works Director or his designee. Any deficiencies must be
corrected within 48 hours by the commercial hauler.
Trucks must be cleaned before handling recyclable
materials.
F. With prior notice and hearing, licenses and renewals of
licenses may be denied and any license issued pursuant to
the provisions of this ordinance may be revoked by the
Town Council upon failure of the licensee to comply with
any of the provisions of this ordinance, or with any of the
regulations of the State of Maine, Department of Environ-
mental Protection, relating to the collection and disposal
of garbage, refuse, recyclable materials, rubbish, white
goods or any other solid waste materials. License fees are
non-refundable. An aggrieved party may appeal a license
denial or revocation to Superior Court pursuant to Rule
80B within 30 days of such denial or revocation.
G. Any agreement for the collection, transportation and
disposal of residential, commercial or industrial solid waste
and recyclable materials shall be by private contract be-
tween the Person and the Commercial Hauler licensed
for the purpose of collecting, removing, hauling and dis-
posal of such garbage, recyclable materials, refuse, rub-
bish, white goods, brown goods, and other solid waste
materials.
H. Any agreements for the removal and collection of
recyclable materials must provide that the materials will
be received by the Town or its designee in marketable
condition.
SECTION VIII
DISPOSAL OF CONSTRUCTION/DEMOLITION DE-
BRIS, LAND CLEARING DEBRIS AND LANDSCAPE
REFUSE
A. Only residents of the Town and owners of property
located within the Town may dispose of Construction/
Demolition Debris, Land Clearing Debris and Landscape
63a
Refuse at the Transfer Station or at any other licensed
location designated by the Town.
B. Disposal shall occur in accordance with regulations
determined from time to time by vote of the Town Council
and only in the presence of a Town employee or agent.
C. Contaminated Construction/Demolition Debris, Land
Clearing Debris and Landscape Refuse, cannot be de-
posited at the Transfer Station. The Town shall not be
responsible for any costs incurred with the disposal of
Contaminated Construction/Demolition Debris, Land
Clearing Debris and Landscape Refuse.
SECTION 1X
ADMINISTRATION:
A. The Town Council may establish by order the rules
and regulations governing the availability and use of the
Transfer Station. The operation of the Transfer Station
shall conform to all pertinent regulations and directives
of all local, county, state or federal agencies which may
have jurisdiction.
B. It shall be the duty of the Director of Public Works
to enforce the provisions of this ordinance.
SECTION X
PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION:
Any person or firm who shall violate or fail to comply
with any of the provisions of this ordinance shall:
A. Be punished by a fine, as established by Town Coun-
cil Order, per violation plus costs which fine shall be re-
covered on complaint to the use of the Town. Each day
upon which any continuing violation of any provision of
this Ordinance shall occur shall constitute a separate vio-
lation, and each incident of disposal of Solid Waste in
violation of this Ordinance shal! constitute a separate vio-
64a
lation. In addition, the Town may seek equitable relief,
including but not limited to injunctive relief and indemnifi-
cation of the Town’s liquidated damages to RWS, and
attorney’s fees and costs to ensure compliance with the
terms of this Ordinance.
B. Pay the actual costs to remove and dispose of solid
waste.
C. Pay for any damages to the Town’s facilities or
equipment caused by said violation.
D. Be prohibited from using the Transfer Station, after
notice and hearing for a period of six (6) months by the
Town Manager upon recommendation of the Director of
Public Works or his/her designee. An appeal to this
prohibition may be made to the Town Council within
fourteen (14) days from the notice upon request. Fur-
thermore, an aggrieved party may appeal to Superior
Court pursuant to Rule 80B.
SECTION XI
SEVERABILITY:
If any sentence, clause, or section or part of this ordi-
nance is for any reason found to be unconstitutional, il-
legal, or invalid, such unconstitutionality, illegality, or in-
validity shall not affect or impair any of the remaining
provisions, sentences, clauses, or sections or parts of this
ordinance. It is hereby declared as the intent of the
Town that this ordinance would have been adopted had
such unconstitutional, illegal, or invalid sentence, clause,
section part thereof, not been included herein.
SECTION XII
AMENDMENTS:
This ordinance may be amended as provided by vote of
the Town Council.
65a
SECTION XIlll
EFFECTIVE DATE:
This ordinance shall become effective April 3, 1992 and
immediately upon becoming effective the Town’s current
Flow Control Ordinance shall be repealed.
Adopted by the Gray Town Council on March 3, 1992
and amended on June 2, 1992.
A True Copy
Attest: /s/ Paul Bird |
PAUL BiRD
Town Clerk
September 28, 1992
66a
APPENDIX F
§ 1304-B. Delivery of solid wastes to specific waste
facilities
1. Findings and purpose. The Legislature makes the
following findings of fact. Subject to the provisions of
chapter 24’, the State requires each municipality to pro-
vide for disposal services for domestic and commercial
solid waste generated within the municipality. Solid waste
contains valuable recoverable resources, including energy.
Many municipalities have found that energy recovery re-
duces the cost of solid waste disposal. Energy recovery
technology is complex and the equipment requires a
steady supply of waste to operate efficiently. Because of
the complicated technology, most energy recovery facili-
ties have high capital costs and long payback periods. In
order to remain cost effective throughout their lives, these
energy recovery facilities require a guaranteed, steady
supply of waste. Consequently, municipalities utilizing
energy recovery facilities are usually required to enter
long-term agreements to provide the facilities with spe-
cific amounts of waste. In order to make these energy
recovery facilities financially feasible, and thereby simul-
taneously improve the environmental impacts and the
economics of municipal solid waste disposal, municipali-
ties shall have the legal authority to control the handling
of solid waste generated within their borders.
The purpose of this section is to promote the recovery of
resources from solid waste by creating one of the con-
ditions which make energy recovery economically feasi-
ble, assuring municipalities the authority to guarantee a
steady supply of solid waste to specific waste facilities.
2. Flow control. Subject to the provisions of chapter
24%, municipalities are expressly authorized to enact or-
dinances that control solid waste collection, its transpor-
tation or its delivery to a specific facility, when the pur-
pose and effect of such an ordinance is to gain manage-
67a
ment montrol over solid waste and enable the reclama-
tion of resources, including energy, from these wastes.
This authorization includes, but is not limited to, ordi-
nances:
A. Requiring segregation of wastes;
B. Requiring delivery of wastes generated within
the municipality, or any portion of those wastes, to
a designated disposal or reclamation facility;
C. Designating certain materials as recyclable and
exempt from the provisions of paragraph B; and
D. Designating yard wastes as compost material
and requiring delivery of these wastes to a desig-
nated composting facility.
3. Repealed. Laws 1989, c. 585, § 14.
4. Contracts. In order to encourage and facilitate the
financing and development of solid waste facilities, in-
cluding, but not limited to, facilities for resource recov-
ery, municipalities shall have the following powers, not-
withstanding any law, charter, ordinance provision or
limitation to the contrary:
A. To contract with a corporation described in sub-
section 5 or a refuse disposal district organized un-
der chapter 17° or any person, including, but not
limited to, the owner or operator of any waste facil-
ity, for the collection, transportation, storage, proc-
essing, salvaging or disposal of waste. Any such
contract may be for such term of years and may con-
tain such other provisions as the municipality may
approve. Any such contract may provide that, in
consideration for the obligation of the facility owner
or operator to handle all or any portion of the solid
waste generated in the municipality, the municipality
shall pay to the facility owner or operator such fees,
assessments and other payments as shall be estab-
lished in accordance with the contract.
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B. Without limiting the generality of the powers
conferred in paragraph A, to agree in such a con-
tract to pay fees, assessments or other payments in
such amounts as may be reasonably necessary to
pay:
(1) Costs associated with financing, develop-
ing, constructing, repairing, maintaining and
operating all or any one or more of the waste
facilities owned or operated by the facility
owner or operator, including, but not limited
to, the payment of debt service and the main-
tenance of reasonable reserves or sinking funds
in connection with the financing or operation of
any such waste facilities;
(2) Any other costs incurred by the facility
owner or operator in connection with the han-
dling of solid waste, whether performed at any
waste facility referred to in subparagraph (! )
or at another such facility differently owned
and operated; and
(3) Any deficiencies arising by virtue of the
failure of any other municipality so agreeing to
meet its obligations to pay the costs set forth in
subparagraphs (1) and (2) in accordance with
any similar agreement with the same facility
owner; and
C. To pledge the full faith and credit of the munici-
pality for the payment of fees, assessments and other
payments, as provided in paragraphs A and B, and
to levy upon and raise from taxable estates within
the municipality by general taxes the amounts re-
quired to pay these fees, assessments and payments
or to raise those amounts by means of any fee, user
charge or other cost-sharing or assessment mechan-
ism duly adopted and authorized by the municipality
or to borrow those amounts by issuance of general
obligation bonds or notes.
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Any contract complying with the requirements of this
subsection and subsection 6 shall be a properly author-
ized, legal, valid, binding and enforceable obligation of
the municipality, regardless of whether the agreement was
authorized, executed or delivered prior to or after the
effective date of this subsection.
4-A. Contract limitations. Any contract, including
any contract in existence on the effective date of this sub-
section, for the provision of waste disposal, transportation
or handling services to municipalities is subject to the
following limitations.
A. No contract for waste disposal, transportation or
handling services may prevent a municipality from
recyling any portion of its solid waste, provided that
any minimum BTU content level and minimum ton-
nage level required by that contract is maintained by
the municipality.
B. No contract for waste disposal, transportation or
handling services may prevent a municipality from
meeting its obligations to supply a minimum BTU
content level and minimum tonnage level required by
that contract using solid waste generated outside its
borders, provided that:
(1) The municipality is or will be unable, as
the direct result of recycling or source reduction
efforts, to meet the obligations using solid waste
generated within its jurisdiction; and
(2) The municipality is liable for any damages
caused by any solid waste it relies upon to
satisfy the provisions of its contract.
C. For those waste disposal, transportation or han-
dling services contracts which do not principally rely
upon requiring minimum BTU content level or mini-
mum tonnage level to secure solid waste for the
waste disposal facility, but which instead rely upon
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a requirement that the municipality provide all or
most of its solid waste to the waste disposal facility,
no such contract may prohibit a municipality during
the term of the contract from recycling those mate-
rials which the municipality determines to be re-
cyclable.
D. A municipality which anticipetes that it will be
unable to meet its contract obligation to supply a
minimum BTU content level or minimum tonnage
due to waste reduction or recycling programs and is
unable to reach an agreement with the incinerator
for the anticipated reduction may request the agency
to intercede. The agency shall assist the incinerator
in soliciting solid waste to mitigate any anticipated
shortfall in minimum BTU content level or minimum
tonnage. If no agreement on mitigation of an an-
ticipated shortfall is reached, the terms of the origi-
nal contract shall prevail, except as otherwise pro-
vided in this chapter.
5. Public waste disposal corporations. Notwithstand-
ing any law, charter, ordinance provision or limitation to
the contrary, pursuant to any interlocal agreement en-
tered into in accordance with Title 30-A, chapter 115,”
any 2 or more municipalities may organize or cause to
be organized or may participate in one or more corpora-
tions organized as nonprofit corporations under Title 13,
chapter 81,° or Title 13-B for the purpose, among other
permissible purposes, of owning or operating any one or
more waste facilities described in subsection 4, paragraph
A, and a subscribing municipality may agree in any such
interlocal agreement to pay fees, assessments or other
payments as described in subsection 4, paragraph B, for
such term of years and on such other terms as the inter-
local agreement may provide and may pledge the full
faith and credit of the municipality to the same extent
provided in subsection 4, paragraph C. The applicable
interlocal agreement or the articles of incorporation or
bylaws of the corporation must provide that:
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A. The corporation shall be organized and con-
tinuously thereafter operated as a nonprofit corpora-
tion, no part of the net earnings of which may inure
to the benefit of any member, director, officer or
other private person;
B. The directors of the corporation shall be elected
by the municipal officers of the municipalities par-
ticipating in the corporation; and
C. Upon dissolution or liquidation of the corpora-
tion, title to all of its property shall vest in one or
more of the municipalities participating in the cor-
poration.
Any interlocal agreement complying with the require-
ments of this subsection and subsection 6 must be a
properly authorized, legal, valid, binding and enforceable
obligation of the municipality, regardless of whether the
agreement was authorized, executed or delivered prior to
or after the effective date of this subsection. Any corpora-
tion organized in a manner that satisfies the requirements set
forth in this subsection and subsection 6, whether or-
ganized prior to or after the effective date of this sub-
section, shall be deemed for all purposes as organized
pursuant to this subsection. If so provided in the appli-
cable interlocal agreement, any such corporation shall
have the power, in addition to any other powers that
may be delegated under Title 30-A, chapter 115, to issue,
on behalf of one or more of the municipalities participat-
ing in the corporation, in order to finance the facilities,
revenue obligation securities issued in accordance with
Title 10, chapter 110, subchapter IV,‘ and any other
bonds, notes or debt obligations which municipalities are
authorized to issue by applicable law. For these purposes,
the term “municipal officers” as used in Title 10, chapter
110, subchapter IV, means the board of directors of any
corporation described in this subsection. Title 10, section
1064, subsection 6, may not be construed to prohibit
the assignment or pledge as collateral security of any
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contract of a municipality authorized by this section or
of any or all of the payments under this section, regard-
less of whether the provisions of subsection 4, paragraph
C, are applicable to the contract or payments. The pro-
visions of Title 10, sections 1063 and 1064, subsection
1, paragraph A and paragraph C, subparagraph (4) do
not apply to revenue obligation securities issued by any
public waste disposal corporation described in this sub-
section.
6. Relationship to other laws. The obligation of a
municipality to pay any fees, assessments or other pay-
ments in accordance with any agreement entered into
pursuant to subsection 4 or any interlocal agreement re-
ferred to in subsection 5 shall not constitute a “debt” or
“indebtedness” of the municipality within the meaning of
any statutory, charter or ordinance provision limiting the
incurrence or the amount of municipal indebtedness nor
shall the authorization or incurrence of the obligation or
any municipal action to raise funds to meet the obligation
by any means set forth in subsection 4, paragraph C, re-
quire or be subject to any voter referendum or approval
under any law or any charter or ordinance provision.
A. A municipality may agree to make payments in
accordance with subsection 4, paragraph B, or in
accordance with the provisions of any interlocal
agreement referred to in subsection 5 with regard to
all or any portion of debt incurred or to be incurred
for the financing of one or more waste facilities, pro-
vided that no such payments shall be made with re-
spect to debt or any portion of debt which, when
incurred, would cause the total principal balance of
all then outstanding debt or portions of debt to which
the payments apply to exceed:
(1) Three percent of the last full state valuation
of the municipality; minus
(2) The municipality’s then obtaining allocable
share of any debt or portions of debt described
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in paragraph B with regard to which it is obliged
to make payments.
B. Notwithstanding paragraph A, 2 or more munici-
palities may agree to make payments in accordance
with subsection 4, paragraph B, or in accordance
with any interlocal agreement referred to in subsec-
tion 5 with regard to all or any portion of debt in-
curred or to be incurred for the financing of one or
more waste facilities, provided that no such payments
may be made with respect to debt or any portions of
debts which, when incurred, would cause the total
principal balance of all then outstanding debt or por-
tions of debt to which the payments apply to exceed:
(1) Three percent of the sum of the last full
state valuation of all municipalities so agreeing;
minus
(2) Any amounts of debt or portions of debt
described in paragraph A in connection with
which any such municipality is obliged to make
payments.
The limitations set forth in paragraphs A and B shall
only apply to agreements by which a municipality or
group of municipalities have agreed to make pay-
ments directly based, among other things, on a facil-
ity owner’s costs of debt service and other costs of
financing and shall not be construed to apply to con-
tract payments calculated on any other basis, even if
the facility owner uses the payments to meet its debt
service obligations.
The obligation of the municipality to pay fees, assess-
ments and other payments in accordance with subsection
4 or any interlocal agreement referred to in subsection 5
shall be binding upon and enforceable against the munici-
pality without regard to whether all or any one or more
of the waste facilities referred to in subsection 4, para-
graph B, subparagraph (1), becomes operational or was
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or will be in operation during the period for which the
fees, assessments or other payments are so charged.
No contract entered into in accordance with subsection 4
nor any ordinance adopted under the authority of subsec-
tion 2 may be deemed a contract in restraint of trade or
otherwise unlawful under Title 10, chapter 201.°
Notwithstanding any law, charter or ordinance provisions
to the contrary, the powers conferred upon a municipality
pursuant to subsections 4 and 5 and this subsection may
be exercised by the municipal officers as defined in Title
30-A, section 2001, including the assessors of a plantation,
only when authorized, in the case of a municipality with
a city or town council, by action of the council and, in
the case of a municipality without such a council, by ac-
tion of the town meeting. This paragraph shall apply
whether or not the action of the city council, town council
or town meeting was taken before or after March 21,
1986.
Nothing in this section may be construed to be a limitation
on the Home Rule powers granted to municipalities under
Title 30-A, section 3001, or on the ability of communities
to jointly exercise their powers as is recognized in Title
30-A, section 2201. This section provides an additional
and alternative method for carrying out this subchapter.
7. Subjugation. Notwithstanding any provision of this
section to the contrary, the exercise of any power or
authority granted under this section is subject to the provi-
sions of chapter 24.’
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APPENDIX G
ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTH LEGISLATURE
Legislative Document No. 1903
STATE OF MAINE
IN THE YEAR OF OUR LORD
NINETEEN HUNDRED SEVENTY-THREE
AN ACT Relating to Solid Waste Disposal
Be it enacted by the People of the State of Maine, as
follows:
R. S., T. 38, c. 13, additional. Title 38 of the Revised
Statutes is amended by adding a new chapter 13, to read
as follows:
CHAPTER 13
SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT
§ 1301. Short title
This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the
“Maine Solid Waste Management Act.”
§ 1302. Declaration of policy
The Legislature declares it to be the policy of the State
of Maine consistent with its responsibility to protect the
health, safety and welfare of its citizens, enhance and
maintain the quality of the environment, conserve natural
resources and prevent water and air pollution, that it shall
encourage solid waste programs, public or private, which
will reduce the volume of solid waste production, improve
efforts to reuse and recover valuable resources currently
being wasted and which will not adversely affect the pub-
lic health, safety and welfare of the citizens nor degrade
the environment.
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The Legislature also finds and declares that economic,
efficient and environmentally sound method of waste dis-
posal is of the highest priority. Municipalities are gen-
erating increasing amounts of solid waste with no sys-
tematic or consistent methods being used to reduce the
volume of waste or to soundly dispose of it. Failure to
plan properly for future solid waste may further deplete
already taxed natural resources and aggravate environ-
mental and public health problems resulting from present
inadequate practices of resource recovery and solid waste
disposal.
§ 1303. Definitions
The following words when used in this chapter shall
have the following meanings unless the context in which
they are used clearly shows a different meaning:
1. Board. “Board” means the Board of Environmen-
tal Protection.
2. Commissioner. “Commissioner” means the Commis-
sioner of the Department of Environmental Protection.
4. Municipality. “Municipality” means a city or town.
5. Person. “Person” means an individual, firm, cor-
poration, partnership, association, municipality, quasi-
municipal corporation, state agency or any other legal
entity.
6. Recoverable resources. “Recoverable resources”
means materials that still have useful physical or chemical!
properties after serving a specific purpose and can be re-
used or recycled for the same or other purposes.
7. Solid waste. “Solid waste” means useless, un-
wanted or discarded solid material with insufficient liquid
content to be free flewing. inc'uding by way of example,
and not by limitation, rubbish, garbage, scrap materials,
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junk, refuse, inert fill material and landscape refuse, but
shall not include septic tank sludge or agricultural wastes.
8. Solid waste disposal facility. “Solid waste disposal
facility” means any land area or structure or combination
of land area and structures, including dumps, used for
storing, salvaging, processing, reducing, incinerating or
disposing of solid wastes.
9. Solid waste management. “Solid waste manage-
ment” means purposeful, systematic and unified control of
the collection, storage, transportation, processing, salvag-
ing and disposal of solid waste.
§ 1304. Department; powers and duties
1. Rules and regulations. The board may adopt,
amend and enforce such rules and regulations as it deems
necessary governing solid waste management, including
the location, establishment, construction and alteration of
solid waste facilities. Such regulations shall be designed to
encourage logical utilization of recoverable resources, to
minimize pollution of the state’s air, land and water re-
sources, prevent the spread of disease or other health
hazards, prevent contamination of drinking water supplies
and protect public health and safety. In adopting such
regulations, the board shall also consider economic im-
pact, technical feasibility and such differences between
municipalities as are created by population, waste volume
and geographic location. Regulations shall be promul-
gated in the manner provided by section 361. The mu-
nicipal officers of all municipalities shall be notified, in
writing, at least 30 days prior to any hearing. Regulations
adopted pursuant to this section shall not become effective
until July 1, 1975, thereby affording ample opportunity
for the Legislature to modify, expand or reject such regu-
lations as deemed appropriate.
No regulation adopted pursuant to this section shall ex-
ceed air quality standards authorized by Title 38, chapter
4.
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2. Site location. The board may provide by regula-
tion that no person may locate, establish, construct, alter
or operate any solid waste disposal facility unless ap-
proved by the board under sections 481 to 488.
3. Municipal status reports. The department shall re-
view reports submitted by municipalities as required by
section 1305. Report forms shall be prepared and dis-
tributed by the department. Required information shall
include, but not be limited to, the following:
A. Location of solid waste disposal facility sites
within the municipality whether publicly or privately
owned or operated, their mode of operation and
anticipated useful life;
B. Ordinances or regulations adopted by or pro-
posed for the municipality which regulate the use of
waste disposal facilities within the municipality;
C. All legal arrangements established by municipali-
ties for providing a solid waste disposal facility for
solid waste generated within the municipality;
D. Any plan for solid waste management officially
adopted by the municipality.
4. Technical assistance. The department is author-
ized to establish guidelines for effective solid waste man-
agement, to provide technical assistance to persons plan-
ning, constructing or operating solid waste disposal facili-
ties, and to conduct applied research activities in the field
of solid waste management, including methods of recy-
cling solid waste items.
5. Planning grants. The department is authorized to
receive funds, public and private, to use such funds for
the administration of this chapter and to make grants
from such funds to municipalities and regional planning
agencies or their agents as designated by the municipality,
for the purpose of planning and implementing solid waste
management activities and solid waste disposal facilities
pursuant to guidelines established by the board,
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§ 1305. Municipalities; powers and duties
1. Disposal facilities. Each municipality shall pro-
vide a solid waste disposal facility for domestic and com-
mercial solid waste generated within the municipality and
may provide such a facility for industrial wastes and
sewage treatment plant sludge.
2. Ordinances. This chapter shall not be construed
as limiting the authority of any municipality to enact ordi-
nances for the regulation of solid waste disposal, provided
that such ordinances are not less stringent than or incon-
sistent with the provisions of this chapter or the regula-
tions adopted thereunder.
3. Contracts. Municipalities may contract with any
person for the collection, transportation, storage, process-
ing, salvaging or disposal of solid wastes.
4. Municipal status reports. The municipal officers of
each municipality shall, on or before the first day oi
November, 1973, and on or before the first day of June
each year thereafter, submit on forms prepared by the
department, information relating to solid waste manage-
ment within the municipality.
5. Municipal permits. All permits issued pursuant to
Title 30, sections 2451 to 2460 shall, in addition to re-
quirements imposed by those sections, be conditioned on
compliance with rules and regulations adopted by the
board concerning the operation of solid waste disposal
facilities. Copies of permits issued by the municipality
shall be submitted to the department within 30 days of
issue.
§ 1306. Prohibited acts
It shall be unlawful for any person to establish, con-
struct, alter or operate any waste disposal facility or to
store, collect, transport, process or dispose of solid waste
contrary to regulations prewiuigated by the department.
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§ 1307. Violations
Any person violating any provision of this chapter or
the rules or regulations promulgated thereunder shall be
punished by a fine of not more than $500 for each day a
violation exists. The Superior Court shall have jurisdic-
tion to enjoin any violation of this chapter or the rules or
regulations promulgated thereunder.
§ 1308. Exemptions
Rules and regulations adopted pursuant to this chapter
concerning the location, establishment and construction of
solid waste disposal facilities, but not concerning altera-
tion or operation, shall not affect such facilities in ex-
istence prior to the effective date of this Act.
STATEMENT OF FACT
The purpose of this Act is to designate the Department
of Environmental Protection as the State agency respon-
sible for developing guidelines and regulations relating to
the collection, storage, processing, salvaging and disposal
of solid wastes. The Department would be empowered to
enact uniform regulations designed to prevent environ-
mental harm and public health hazards, however, such
regulations will not become effective until July 1, 1975,
thereby affording the 107th Legislature to modify, ex-
pand or reject such regulations as deemed appropriate.
This Act also requires municipalities to assume responsi-
bility for the orderly disposal of solid waste except that
generated by industry and waste water treatment plant
sludge. |
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STATE OF MAINE
SENATE
106TH LEGISLATURE
SENATE AMENDMENT “A” to H.P. 1478, L.D.
1903, Bill, “AN ACT Relating to Solid Waste Disposal.”
Amend said Bill in that part designated “§ 1308.” by
adding at the end of new sentence to read as follows:
‘Landscape refuse and fill disposal sites established
in connection with public works projects and com-
monly known as “stump dumps” are exempt from
this chapter.’
Statement of Fact
The purpose of this amendment is to exempt “stump
dumps” from the bill.
Name: #/s/ [Illegible]
(Schulten )
County: Sagadahoc.
Reproduced and distributed pursuant to Senate Rule
No. 11 A.
This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.