Appendices — Town of Gray v. Tri-State Rubbish, Inc.

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APPENDIX A

Reporter of Decisions

Decision No. 6654

Law Docket No. Cum-93-45

MAINE SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT

TRI-STATE RUBBISH, INC.

Vv.

TOWN OF GRAY

and

REGIONAL WASTE SysTEMs, INC.

Argued September 9, 1993

Decided October 15, 1993

Before WATHEN, C.J., and ROBERTS, GLASSMAN,

CLIFFORD, COLLINS, RUDMAN and DANA, JJ.

RUDMAN, J.

Tri-State Rubbish, Inc. ( “Tri-State”), and Recyclables

Unlimited Services, Inc. (“RUSI’), appeal from the ad-

verse summary judgments entered in the Superior Court

(Cumberland County, Lipez, J.) on their claims for de-

claratory judgment and injunctive relief. The trial court

rejected contentions by Tri-State and RUSI that the Town

of Gray’s Solid Waste, Flow Control and Recycling Ordi-

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nance violates the Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitu-

tion *, denies Tri-State and RUSI equal protection of the

laws, and violates state and federal antitrust laws. Al-

though the equal protection and antitrust challenges are

without merit, genuine issues of material fact remain

whether the Ordinance violates the Commerce Clause.

We therefore vacate the judgments of the Superior Court.

Effective April 3, 1992, the Town of Gray (“Gray”)

adopted a Solid Waste, Flow Control and Recycling Ordi-

nance (“Ordinance”) which requires that all solid waste

generated in the Town of Gray be disposed of at the Port-

land facility of Regional Waste Systems, Inc. (“RWS”).

The avowed purpose of the Ordinance was to regulate

solid waste collection and disposal, encourage recycling,

and provide property owners with disposal facilities at a

reasonable cost. The Ordinance was authorized by state

law, 38 M.R.S.A. § 1304-B(2) (1989 & Supp. 1993)’,

and complied with the Waste Handling Agreement be-

tween Gray and RWS.

1“The Congress shall have Power ... To regulate Commerce

with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with

Indian Tribes.” U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8, cl. 3.

2 Flow Control. Subject to the provisions of Chapter 24 [MAINE

WASTE MANAGEMENT AGENCY 38 M.R.S.A. § 2101 (Supp.

1993) } municipalities are expressly authorized to enact ordinances

that control solid waste collection, its transportation or its delivery

to a specific facility, when the purpose and effect of such an ordi-

nance is to gain management control over said waste and enable

the reclamation of resources, including energy, from these wastes.

This authorization includes, but is not limited to, ordinances:

A. Requiring segregation of wastes;

B. Requiring delivery of wastes generated within the mu-

nicipality, or any portion of those wastes, to a designated dis-

posal or reclamation facility;

C. Designating certain materials as recyclable and exempt

from the provisions of paragraph B; and

D. Designating yard wastes as compost material and requiring

delivery of these wastes to a designated composting facility.

ee ee

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RWS operates a waste-to-energy plant located in Port-

land. Twenty-one member municipalities, including Gray,

pledged their full faith and credit to repay the bonds that

financed construction of the plant should RWS default on

its obligation to repay. In an effort to insure that RWS

remain financially viable, all member municipalities passed

ordinances similar to Gray’s, guaranteeing that all “ac-

ceptable waste” * generated within each municipality

would be funneled to RWS for incineration.

Tri-State, a Maine corporaiton, has engaged in the

business of commercial and residential trash collection in

the Town of Gray for almost twenty years. In the past,

Tri-State has generally disposed of the waste it collects at

either the facilities of Maine Energy Resources Corpora-

tion (“MERC”) in Biddeford, or Mid-Maine Waste Ac-

tion Corporation (“MMWAC”) in Auburn. MERC and

MMWAC would incinerate the waste to generate energy,

that would then be sold in interstate commerce. RUSI, a

Maine corporation, recycles glass, paper, and corrugated

board and sells the materials in interstate commerce.

Disposal facilities generally charge a “tipping fee” for

accepting waste. The Gray Ordinance, however, allows a

private waste generator to deposit its trash at the Gray

transfer station without payment of a tipping fee. Com-

mercial waste haulers, on the other hand, must transport

their waste to RWS for incineration. If a waste generator

segregates its waste in to recyclable/non-recyclable com-

ponents, and then hires a commercial hauler to remove

the waste, the hauler must take the recyclable components

to the Gray transfer station and the non-recyclable com-

ponents to RWS.

Tri-State objects to the Ordinance because of the in-

creased tipping fees that the law imposes on commercial

8 According to the Ordinance, acceptable waste includes “[o]rdi-

nary household, municipal, institutional, commercial and industrial

solid waste,” and excludes hazardous waste.

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haulers.* RUSI objects to the Ordinance because it cuts

off the flow of recyclable waste that RUSI processes in its

business.

Tri-State and RUSI contend that the Ordinance vio-

lates their right to equal protection of the laws, because

it discriminates against commercial enterprises. This con-

tention is meritless. City of Auburn v. Tri-State Rubbish,

Inc., No. 6625, slip op. at 10 (Me. Aug. 5, 1993). Simi-

larly, Tri-State and RUSI’s claim that the arrangement

violates antitrust laws is unsupportable. We recently ruled

that state action immunity to federal antitrust laws applies

to this type of arrangement. 7d. at 8. See also Tri-State

Rubbish, Inc. v. Waste Management Inc., 803 F. Supp.

451 (D. Me. 1992), aff'd in pertinent part, No. 92-2218

(1st Cir. July 19, 1993). The flow control ordinance

enabling act, 38 M.R.S.A. §1304-B(2), authorizes Gray’s

arrangement with RWS and therefore precludes any viola-

tion of state antitrust laws. See Beaulieu v. City of

Lewiston, 440 A.2d 334, 345 (Me. 1992) (specific legis-

lation controls general).

The Commerce Clause violation asserted by Tri-State

and RUSI, however, presents genuine issues of material

fact. Although the waste at issue is generated in-state and

largely disposed of in-state, it is an object of interstate

commerce. Fort Gratiot Sanitary Landfill, Inc. v. Michi-

gan Dep’t of Natural Resources, 112 S. Ct. 2019, 2023

(1992). The aggregate effect of ordinances similar to

Gray’s could have a substantial impact on interstate com-

merce. See Garcia v. San Antonio Metropolitan Transit

Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 537 (1985); Hodel v. Virginia

Surface Mining and Reclamation Ass'n. Inc., 452 U.S.

264, 277 (1981).

4RWS charged (as of July 1, 1992) forty-three dollars per ton

for municipal solid waste and sixty-one dollars per ton for com-

mercial solid waste. The tipping fees at MERC for the same time

period ranged from twenty-six to thirty-five dollars per ton.

inate

AS tll 4 oe a

Sa

In the City of Auburn case, the question whether a

plaintiff that did not seek to place trash in the interstate

market could challenge a similar ordinance on Commerce

Clause grounds was not squarely presented. Jd. at 11

n.13. The present case, however, presents the issue, which

we now answer affirmatively. Even if it is true that Tri-

State does not engage in interstate commerce itself, it has

standing to challenge the Ordinance on Commerce Clause

grounds. The Ordinance inflicts an injury in fact on Tri-

State, and as a hauler of solid waste, Tri-State falls within

the “zone of interests” protected by the Commerce Clause.

Diamond Waste, Inc. v. Monroe County, 796 F. Supp.

1511, 1516 (M.D. Ga. 1992). See also Boston Stock

Exchange v. State Tax Comm’n, 429 U.S. 318, 320 n.3

(1977); Government Suppliers Consolidating Servs., Inc.

v. Bayh, 753 F. Supp. 739, 761 (S.D. Ind. 1990), aff'd,

975 F.2d 1267, 1274-75 (7th Cir. 1992).

The “Dormant Commerce Clause”*® prohibits states

and their political subdivisions from “advanc[ing] their

own commercial interests by curtailing the movement of

articles of commerce, either into or out of the state.”

Fort Gratiot, 112 S. Ct. at 2023. A neutral regulation

that imposes only an incidental burden on interstate com-

merce is valid as long as that burden is not “clearly ex-

cessive in relation to the putative local benefits” the regu-

lation is designed to serve. Stephen D. DeVito, Jr. Truck-

ing v. Rhode Island Solid Waste Management Corp., 770

F. Supp. 775, 780 (D.R.I.) (citing Maine v. Taylor, 477

U.S. 131, 138 (1986), aff'd per curiam, 947 F.2d 1004

(Ist Cir. 1991)). On the other hand, if the interference

is nothing more than “economic protectionism,” benefit-

°“The dormant Commerce Clause, as the term ‘dormant’ implies,

limits the powers of the States in areas where Congress has not

affirmatively acted to either authorize or forbid the challenged state

activity.” Norfolk Southern Corp. v. Oberly, 822 F.2d 388, 392 (3d

Cir. 1987). See New Energy Co. v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269, 273

(1988) (referring to the “negative aspect” of the Commerce

Clause).

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ting in-state economic interests at the expense of out-of-

state competitors, the regulation is deemed unconstitu-

tional per se. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617,

624 (1978).

Gray’s Ordinance does not facially discriminate against

out-of-state interests, and so it escapes per se invalidity.

Rather, Gray’s Ordinance appears to pursue legitimate

local goals, by gaining control of the waste stream and

promoting recycling and energy recovery. The Ordinance,

however, has a discriminatory effect on interstate com-

merce by prohibiting waste that would otherwise be avail-

able for interstate trade from crossing the state line.

Waste Systems Corp. v. County of Martin, 784 F. Supp.

641, 645 (D. Minn. 1992). Gray and RWF must there-

fore show valid reasons for this Ordinance other than

economic protectionism and must also show that reason-

able alternatives to the Ordinance are unavailable. City

of Auburn, No. 6625, slip op. at 13 (citing Hunt v.

Washington State Apple Advertising Comm'n, 432 US.

333, 353) (1977)).

The entry is:

Judgment vacated. Remanded to the Superior Court

for further proceedings consistent with the opinion

herein.

7a

APPENDIX B

STATE OF MAINE

SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT

Sitting as the Law Court

Law Court Docket No. CUM-93-45

TRI-STATE RuBBISH, INC.

Vv.

TOWN OF GRAY and REGIONAL WASTE SysTEMS, INC.

MANDATE

The above-captioned cause having been brought before

this Court, sitting as the Law Court, from the Superior

Court in the County of Cumberland, and it having been

heard and maturely considered:

IT IS ORDERED that the Clerk of the Law Court

enter upon the Law Court Docket and certify to the Clerk

of the Superior Court in the County of Cumberland, the

following mandate therein:

Judgment vacated. Remanded to the Superior Court

for further proceedings consistent with the opinion

herein.

Dated: October 15, 1993

For the Court,

‘s/ Paul L. Rudman

Justice

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APPENDIX C

STATE OF MAINE

CUMBERLAND, SS.

SUPERIOR COURT

Civil Action Docket No. CV-92-719

TRI-STATE RUBBISH, INC. and

RECYCLABLES UNLIMITED SERVICES, INC.,

Plaintiffs

V.

TOWN OF GRAY,

Defendant

and

REGIONAL WASTE SYSTEMS, INC..,

Intervenor

ORDER

After hearing upon Regional Waste Systems, Inc.’s

Motion to Intervene, Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary

and Permanent Injunction, Defendant and Intervenor’s

Motion for Summary Judgment and Plaintiffs’ Cross-

Motion for Sunimary Judgment and for reasons stated on

the record during the hearing on these Motions, this

Court hereby Orders as follows:

1. The Motion to Intervene of Regional Waste Sys-

tems, Inc. (“RWS”) is granted.

2. The Plaintiffs’ Motion for Preliminary and Per-

manent Injunction is denied.

3. Defendant and Intervenor’s Motion for Summary

Judgment is granted.

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4. Plaintiffs Tri-State Rubbish, Inc. and Recyclables

Unlimited Services, Inc., their officers, directors, agents

employees, servants, and any other person or corporation

acting for or on behalf of Plaintiffs:

5.

a. be and hereby are enjoined, effective February 1,

1993, from violating the Solid Waste, Flow Control

and Recycling Ordinance of the Town of Gray,

Maine (the “Ordinance”), and unless by February

|, 1993 Tri-State Rubbish, Inc. submits a completed

application to the Town Clerk of the Town of Gray

(“Town”) for a commercial hauler’s license under

the Ordinance and diligently pursue that application

before the Town Council, they shall not haul, trans-

port, collect, remove or dispose of Acceptable Waste

generated within the Town for a fee, nor shall they

solicit new clients from within the Town for the

same services;

b. shall comply, effective February 1, 1993, with

the Ordinance and in particular, shall deposit all

Acceptable Waste generated within the Town and

collected by them at the RWS facility only in ac-

cordance with the Ordinance; and

c. shall, effective February 1, 1993, deposit at the

Town’s Recycling Facility located at the Town’s

Transfer Station any and all recyclable materials that

they or their customers choose to segregate from the

Acceptable Waste generated within the Town that

Plaintiffs haul, transport, collect, remove or dispose

of, with said depositing of recyclable materials at the

Town’s Recycling Facility to be in accordance with

the Town’s rules and regulations therefor.

Post-judgment attorneys’ fees and costs incurred in

the enforcement of Paragraph 4 of this Order shall be

awarded at the discretion of the Court based upon written

affidavits.

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6. Plaintiffs’ Objection to the Defendant and Inter-

venor’s Motion for Summary Judgment is, as Plaintiffs

stated, a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment on the

merits; Plaintiffs’ Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment is

denied.

7. This Order is an appealable final judgment on all

claims and counterclaims raised by the parties in this

action.

By:/s/ Kermit V. Lipez

KERMIT V. LIPEZ

Justice, Superior Court

Dated: January 26, 1993

lla

APPENDIX D

STATE OF MAINE

CUMBERLAND,

Ss.

SUPERIOR COURT CIVIL ACTION

Docket Number: CV-92-719

TRI-STATE RUBBISH, INC.

versus

TOWN OF GRAY

BEFORE:

The Honorable Kermit V. Lipez, Justice of the Su-

perior Court, at the Cumberland County Superior

Court, Portland, Maine, on January 12, 1993.

APPEARANCES:

Ralph A. Dyer, Esq.

Attorney for the Plaintiff

James N. Katsiaficas, Esq.

Emily A. Bloch, Esq.

Attorneys for the Defendant

[2] (This matter came for hearing before The Honor-

able Kermit V. Lipez, Justice of the Superior Court, at

the Cumberland County Superior Court, Portland, Maine,

on Tuesday, January 12, 1993.)

COURT: This next matter is Cumberland County

docket number 92-719. It’s the case of Tri-State Rubbish,

Inc., et al versus The Town of Gray, et al. Before we

get into the substance of all this, let me again just ask

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counsel to identify themselves for the record, and state

the party that they represent. We'll start with Mr. Dyer.

RALPH A. DYER, ESQ: For the plaintiff, your

Honor, Ralph Dyer.

JAMES N. KATSIAFICAS, ESQ.: For defendant

Town of Gray and for Intervenor Regional Waste Sys-

tems, Incorporated, James Kaisiaficas and Emily Bloch,

your Honor.

COURT: The fist matter we should discuss is the

motion of Regional Waste Svstems to intervene. IT gather

that issue remains unresolved. And Mr. Dyer has indi-

cated that he has no objection to the intervention of

Regional Waste Systems. He acknowledges their interest

in this proceedine, but is troubled by a conflict that he

foresees or sees now if both The Town of Gray and Re-

gional Waste Systems are represented by the law firm. I’m

not sure, Mr. Dyer, I understand how that problem affects

the ability of your client to put forth his position in this

forum. You seem to suggest that in some [3] way, that

conflict, as you see it, impacts in some way on your

clients. I’m not sure I understand that.

MR. DYER: Well, it’s our position, your Honor,

that what Mr. Hart proposes to do, in terms of recycling

of waste and how he proposes to handle it, are really

consistent with what the objectives of the population of

The Town of Gray want. He is retrieving waste, or in-

tends to retrieve valuable parts of the waste stream and

reuse them or make available for others to reuse. This

runs in direct conflict with what RWS wants to do. RWS

is motivated to burn that garbage and to promote a legal

argument to satisfy that end. And my position is that

when I come forward here and say to you that we’re

really doing something that benefits The Town of Gray

and is consistent with the basic underlying purpose of the

ordinance, that I'm met with two people who are standing

up, saying, “No, that’s not true.” And I think that my

client is prejudiced by having that happen.

COURT: Mr. Katsiaficas?

emanate

13a

MR. KATSIAFICAS: Your Honor, RWS is a crea-

ture of the communities that formed it. Gray is one of

them. Each municipality that belongs to RWS is under

an obligation to dispose of all the solid waste generated

within its borders, generated by commercial and residen-

tial entities. That obligation is why RWS exists. RWS

has to dispose of it in accordance with the state law.

The state law requires each [4] municipality to reduce the

amount of solid waste it generates. Gray is doing that;

RWS is assisting in those efforts. RWS has the silver

bullet recycling containers that you see in all the munici-

palities in the immediate area. It has—it under—RWS

understands it has the same obligation as its constituent

municipalities, to take care of solid waste while also pro-

moting recycling of waste that is capable of being re-

cycled. There’s no difference, here. There’s no divergence

of interest. RWS and Gray have identical interests, and

therefore, it’s reasonable that the same law firm can rep-

resent both. The conflict of interest is something that the

client should raise with its own attorney. That hasn’t

been raised here. Both clients are aware of the dual rep-

resentation and consent to it, because their interests are

identical.

COURT: Yeah. I—Mr. Dyer, do you—

MR. DYER: I just want to point out, just to remind

the Court that in our brief we cited §S—38, MRSA,

§ 1304(A)—(4)(A)(a), which says that all contracts

which mandate the delivery of recyclable waste is part

of the waste stream to RWS are now abrogated. That

obligation no longer is enforceable. RWS’ contract with

Gray provides that it shall deliver all solid waste. or

actually, all acceptable waste to RWS, except those por-

tions of the waste which were being recycled, both in

terms of quantity and type, at the time that contract was

signed. And RWS’ claim is that they have a right to all

other material, [5] and they make the decision whether

to recycle or not. 1304(B)(4)(A)(a) says that provision

is no longer enforceable and the municipality should have

leneeneneiieeememunieninn

14a

the right to decide its own recycling programs. And that

is the heart of the conflict here, your Honor.

COURT: Well, I—my conclusion, Mr. Dyer, is that

that is an issue for The Town of Gray and for RWS to

worry about. It seems to be your feeling that if different

counsel were involved, perhaps on the part of The Town

of Gray, that might be more sympathetic to your position,

rather than joining RWS in antagonism to it. But I don’t

see, in that possibility, to the extent it might have a basis

in fact in any way precludes this law firm from represent-

ing these two clients who certainly, I believe, understand

the issues and the stakes as well as you do. I see no rea-

son why they cannot choose to proceed, both of them,

with counsel of their choice. So, for that reason, I do

grant the Motion to Intervene. And both entities can pro-

ceed, since that appears to be their choice, with present

counsel. Let’s—

MR. DYER: Your Honor, let me just clarify one—

COURT: —sure.

MR. DYER: It’s not that I’m looking for Gray to

te sympathetic to our position. It—my concern is it’s the

double whammy [sic] in expressing a point of view to the

Court or ultimately, at best, if appropriate, to a jury.

[6] COURT: Sure. I understand. Okay. All right.

Let’s move on, now, to the merits. And there is so much

here that it’s, frankly, hard to know where to begin. But

let’s begin in this fashion. Mr. Dyer, I’d like to begin with

you. Did you want to say something initially? I did have

some questions, but—

MR. DYER: Perhaps we can streamline this a little

bit, your Honor.

COURT: —sure.

MR. DYER: This—the motions before us today

started with a Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. And

let me say this to the Court about your Motion for a

Preliminary Injunction. There are two reasons why it was

filed, one reason being that we think we’re entitled to the

relief, anyway, or we wouldn’t have brought the motion in

an ieeneeenitaieiaa iain

15a

the first place. The second motion is that there is some

dicta in some Maine cases which indicate that in these

types of situations where there are continuing—there’s

continuing exposure to fines being assessed on a daily

basis, that one should bring a preliminary injunction mo-

tion at the outset of the case, in order to curtail the

running of the fines and to establish that as a precedent.

That is a prudent thing to do in this kind of a case, and

that’s what—that is one of the moving reasons why we

brought the Motion for a Preliminary Injunction. Now,

this motion was met by the Motion for Summary Judg-

ment.

[7] COURT: Right.

MR. DYER: And, in fact, although we haven't

phrased it as a Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment, it

is believed by us that the essential issues in this case are

legal issues and not factual issues. And perhaps if we

started by addressing the Motion for Summary Judgment,

a lot of these other issues would fall into line.

COURT: Sure. I agree with that. I think that makes

good sense. The—in that regard, Mr. Dyer, I would like

to understand exactly why you feel that this ordinance—

and I’ve—I think I understand how the ordinance works

and how it alters the prior practices. I would like to

understand why you feel that this ordinance denies your

clients the equal protection of the laws, given what I

believe is the standard that I have to apply, here, and

that is whether the distinction that has been drawn, here,

bears a rational relationship to a legitimate exercise of

the Town’s power in this area, the Town’s authority.

What—could you state for me, as clearly and concisely

as you can, what is the nature of the unlawful discrimina-

tion, if you will, unlawful distinctions that you see here?

MR. DYER: Well, there are—setting aside the defini-

tion of solid waste for just a moment, and just focusing

on the ordinance, I think I might have anticipated your

question to some extent. And last night, I sat down and

said, “What is the procedure of this particular ordinance

16a

that has an adverse [8] impact upon my client?” And

what I did is I said that let’s start with §(7)(G) of the

ordinance, which says that, “All agreements for trash and

waste removal shall be by private contract, and the Town

shall have no responsibility for those contracts.” Now,

that’s important because that’s what Mr. Hart’s company,

Tri-State Rubbish, does, that enter into private contracts

with residential customers and with commercial custom-

ers. So that sets the stage in entering the ordinance, if

you will. We then go to § (6)(E), which says—and

also, a parallel provision, (7)(D), which says that, “Non-

segregated waste shall be taken by the hauler to RWS.”

And that’s all acceptable waste, as defined by § (7)(D).

And what that says is that if Mr. Hart and his company,

Tri-State Rubbish, pick up residential waste or com-

mercial waste, if it’s non-segregated, that is, co-mingled

food waste, paper, what have you, that has to go to RWS

at his expense. And he has to pay $58 a ton to drop

that material. To digress just for one or two sentences,

here, there is a two-rate structure at RWS, $58 per ton

for commercial waste, and a lesser amount, which I think

is $41 a ton, for residential waste. When Mr. Hart and

Tri-State bring that waste to RWS, they pay the $58,

regardless of where it comes from, on the basis that it is

impossible for RWS or the community to determine which

is which, so they just charge the higher rate across the

board. Then that leaves us with a question, what do we

do with the segregated waste, the [9] recycled material?

There is no provision in the ordinance which deals with

the question of segregated waste hauled by private con-

tract. § (4)(A) says that, “Only residents can use the

transfer station.” And in that—by that definition, the

Town excludes commercial haulers or private contractors

from that definition, and haulers are not permitted to

enter the transfer station to unload anything. § (7)(H)

says that, “Any private contract shall require that all

recyclables shall be brought to the Town in marketable

condition.” It doesn’t indicate who is to bring that

17a

material to the Town. But we do know that the disposal

point is the transfer station, and we do know that the

hauler is not permitted to enter the transfer station, which

leads us to the inevitable conclusion that it is only the

generator of the waste who can bring it in. And that is

consistent with provision (4)(B), which says that, “All

resegregated, recyclable material shall be brought to the

transfer station only by the generator.” And that leads

us to a couple of questions. The impact of that system

is that Tri-State cannot engage in a contract to pick up

recyclable materials for its customers. Its customers, if

they are to recycle, have to bring their own waste to the

dump, or their own recoverable, recyclable waste to the

Town transfer station. And Mr. Hart cannot do that.

Mr. Hart is absolutely barred and prohibited from enter-

ing into that business by the terms of this ordinance.

Secondly, it is our position that if a person is [10] to

use a private contractor to haul his waste, he must bear,

indirectly, the cost of the tipping [sic] fee. And the

letter—the May 11th. 1992 letter from the Town, which

we've attached, which sets forth their reasons for their

Statute clearly indicates, by reference and by direct state-

ment, that the purpose is to force people to recycle and

to bring their material to the transfer station. And if

a person doesn’t do that, then they’re going to have to

bear their cost of tipping. Now, we don’t understand why

Mr. Hart’s customers, or Mr. Hart himself. acting for

those customers, should be barred from the transfer sta-

tion, simply because they have signed a private contract.

It is the same people in the community who are gener-

ating waste, whether residential or commercial. Those

people can have access to the facilities, but they are in-

directly barred from using those facilities if they employ

Mr. Hart. The result of that is that Mr. Hart’s business

has been decimated because he has had to raise his fees

to cover the cost of tipping. Mr. Hart’s testimony in his

affidavit—and if the Court desires, he can testify. I have

him here today—to testify that when this ordinance

18a

passed, he had approximately three hundred residential

customers in Gray. He’s now down to a hundred and

fifty customers in Gray, and he’s losing $8,500 a year,

after having raised the fees. And it is a declining spiral,

that what Gray is doing is saying that, “We don’t want

private contractors in this town. We don’t want [11] you

doing business in this town. We want to control all the

waste.” And that is the discrimination that is happening

with Mr. Hart, and it’s discrimination under the due

process clause, it’s discrimination—it’s a taking of his

business, it’s discrimination under the—it’s a violation of

the commerce clause, and if we go on—ultimately, when

we get into the definition of solid waste, it violates the

antitrust laws, because it’s inconsistent with State policy,

as well as what I believe to be the real true municipal

policy, here.

COURT: Mr. Dyer, the—that’s a very good and very

clear explanation of what’s—of what the issue is, here,

as you see it. The— it’s clear that, at least in part—well,

let me do this. Rather than have me state it, I'd like, at

this point, to ask Mr. Katsiaficas, number one, if he

agrees with your analysis of what the ordinance does, and

if not, I'd like to know why. But then, to the extent

that’s accurate, I’d like to know what purposes, from the

Town's perspective, that scheme that Mr. Dyer has just

described, serves? Mr. Katsiaficas?

MR. KATSIAFICAS: Thank you, your Honor. As

the Court has noted, this is a very difficult burden for

the plaintiff to overcome, in that the equal protection

clause challenge must overcome an argument of presump-

tive validity on the part of the municipal ordinance, num-

ber one, and number two, with regard to these, you have

to simply show that—you have to show that there’s no

rational relationship under any circumstances, any [12]

set of circumstances between this ordinance and legiti-

mate State ends. We believe that the legitimate legisla-

tive ends of the Town Council, in adopting this ordinance,

are to ease the administrative and enforcement burden

on the Town. And that’s not a mere summary. It’s

19a

simply—if Tri-State and the other four private haulers that

do business in the town were to take their solid waste

that they collect from businesses and from residences to

the transfer station, the Town will have to police it, to

police the transfer station to make sure that only Gray

waste is being accepted, and to make sure that there

isn’t unacceptable waste being brought in.

COURT: Now, it would have to police that because

of its contractual relationship with RWS and the obliga-

tions that the Town has to RWS in light of that contrac-

tual relationship, is that correct?

MR. KATSIAFICAS: In that regard, and also be-

cause The Town of Gray, as it had been doing, was

underwriting the tipping fee for everything placed at the

transfer station. It wouldn’t want to be underwriting tip-

ping fees for trash collected in New Gloucester, for ex-

ample, and brought into town by Tri-State. We're not

alleging that they’ve actually done this, but simply there’s

a potential for doing that. And we ask the Court to take

note that there have been allegations of problems of

waste diversion. It’s not unthinkable. It’s something that

the Town would have to police, [13] would have to ad-

minister. There’s a cost to that. We’re trying to minimize

that cost and the Town’s tipping fees.

COURT: Right. But until this new ordinance was

passed, how was the Town—and under that prior rela-

tionship, Mr. Hart, his business—I mean, they could pick

up waste directly from a residence or commercial estab-

lishment and take it directly to RWS, is that correct?

MR. KATSIAFICAS: To—they would take it, as I

understand it, to the Town’s transfer station.

COURT: Okay.

MR. KATSIAFICAS: And the Town would then

charge $10 per ton. And then the Town would pay for

transportation of all of the waste collected—

COURT: Okay. So they—

MR. KATSIAFICAS: —whether you, yourself,

brought it or whether Tri-State brought it.

20a

COURT: —okay. So, under the prior relationship,

Mr. Hart could not take it directly to RWS, is that cor-

rect?

MR. KATSIAFICAS: As I understand it, he did not.

He was to take it to the transfer station and then the

Town would take it to RWS and pay the transportation

costs, as well as the $40 per ton tipping fee. Since the

Town was paying 40 and only charging 10, in effect,

Tri-State’s costs were being subsidized by the Town.

COURT: Well, obviously, in that rel—in that situa-

tion, [14] they could charge their own customers a lot less,

because they only had to pay the $10 to the Town, is that

correct? That was—

MR. KATSIAFICAS: | That’s correct.

COURT: —right.

MR. KATSIAFICAS: What this ordinance now does

is say to any hauler collecting residential and commer-

cial waste within the Town, “You have to bring that waste

directly to RWS and pay RWS the tipping fee.” That

tipping fee for municipal waste is $43, for private—for

commercial waste, $61. So there’s a differential there.

They're responsible—that becomes a cost of doing busi-

ness. It’s not just a cost of doing business, however, for

Tri-State. It’s a cost of doing business for the four haulers

that are licensed to do business, and actually do business

in the town. And those haulers are identified in Town

Manager's Aubert’s [sic] affidavit, So there are other en-

tities doing business in the town. It’s not—I don’t—

whether it’s decimated Tri-State’s business, I don’t know.

But there are other haulers that are licensed and are do-

ing business.

COURT: Okay. But, now in this situation, if Mr.

Hart can now take waste generated in The Town of Gray

directly to RWS, how does the Town keep track of what

is going directly from The Town of Gray to RWS? I

mean, the Town does have an obligation, does it not, to

still make sure that all its [15] acceptable waste, exclud-

ing some recyclable material that can be taken out, it still

2la

has an obligation to make sure it all goes to RWS, isn’t

that correct?

MR. KATSIAFICAS: Well, that’s one reason for

these counterclaims, because, in fact, we understand from

the pleadings here it’s not going to RWS. Acceptable

waste and the recyclable portions of the acceptable waste,

according to the affidavits, are all going to West Paris,

being separated—

COURT: Right. But—so how do you—but how

would—

MR. KATSIAFICAS: —I underst—

COURT: —but how do you make sure? How do—

you talk about the burden of policing. How do you po-

lice—if you have the commercial haulers dealing-—tak-

ing waste directly from a generator to RWS without any

intervention by the Town at its transfer station, how do

you make sure that waste generated in The Town of

Gray is getting to RWS?

M®. KATSIAFICAS: —well, we avoid—we don’t

know. I mean, we have to take it on faith that—

COURT: I mean, they have to do that, under their—

I mean, they’re now licensed, is that correct?

MR. KATSIAFICAS: —well, they haven’t—they have

not—

COURT: But they’re supposed to be?

MR. KATSIAFICAS: —but they’re supposed to be.

And if they were, that would be their obligation—

COURT: Okay.

[16] MR. KATSIAFICAS: —and on penalty for not

doing that, they could have their license revoked.

COURT: Right.

MR. KATSIAFICAS: We would have to police it in

that sense.

COURT: Sure.

MR. KATSIAFICAS: But we don’t believe that the

obligation is as onerous as posting an extra person at the

transfer station or doing the manifest system, as we find

with State and Federal hazardous waste laws.

22a

COURT: Okay.

MR. KATSIAFICAS: Another reason, though, we're

trying to simply cut the costs of solid waste disposal for

the towns. As we know, the State law posits all the re-

sponsibility on the municipality. The municipality has

normally pledged its full faith and credit, but it also has

to pay—it is paying for all of the tipping fees for waste

brought to it. In other words, if you have a residence or

a commercial entity in The Town of Gray, and you're will-

ing to bring your own waste over to the transfer station,

the Town will pay the tipipng fee, as long as you segre-

gate the waste into recyclable and non-recyclable quan-

tities. That is to promote recycling. The Town has an

obligation under State law to promote recycling to reach

State goals, and there’s a penalty for failure to make rea-

sonable efforts to do so.

COURT: Okay. Okay. Now, why—Mr. Dyer says

that, under [17] the Town’s scheme, only the generator

of the waste can segregate in the way that you describe,

and then bring the waste to the transfer station. Mr.

Hart could not perform that function. Is Mr. Dyer cor-

rect in that regard?

MR. KATSIAFICAS: | I don’t read the ordinance that

way. I think we're dealing with something speculative,

in that, number one, I don’t believe Mr. Hart has ever

tried to bring recyclables to the transfer station, and, two,

I believe that his intent is to be able to sell those to other

entities. So I don’t think that question is—in—at issue

is really before the Court at this time. It’s only in the

abstract. But also, I—as I read §’s—well, the sections

that were cited with regard to bringing commercial waste,

commercial entities bringing their own, doesn’t deal with

—don’t deal with haulers. It’s simply a store operator,

commercial entity. You can bring your own waste if it’s

segregated into recyclable and non-recyclable. You can

bring it to the transfer station and there’s no cost. Other-

wise, you have to pay a $10 fee.

COURT: Well, you’re—

MR. KATSIAFICAS: As to—I'm sorry, your Honor.

eS ea

23a

COURT: —I gather you're Suggesting that there’s

something that—it doesn’t—and this seems to be borne

out by some of Mr. Dyer’s arguments. I mean, Mr. Hart,

for perfectly legitimate business reasons, I guess, would

like to be able to deal with recyclable material in some

way that might be more [18] advantageous to him in

terms of the market. I mean, if he has to just bring it—

if he just hauls it—

MR. KATSIAFICAS: | Right.

COURT: —to the transfer station to be disposed of

as waste, that doesn’t, I suppose, do him much good,

when there might be a market out there, arguably, for

this recyclable material. That—he’d like to get into the

market, is your position, with that recyclable material?

MR. KATSIAFICAS: Well, apparently. That’s what

he says. And what I’m saying is §’s (7)(G) and (H)

talk about—(7)(G), “Any agreement for the collection,

transportation and disposal of residential, commercial or

industrial solid waste and recyclable materials shall be by

private contract between the person and the commercial

hauler,” et cetera, and then (H), “Any agreements for

the removal and collection of recyclable materials must

provide that the materials will be received by the Town

or its designee in marketplace condition.” What I’m say-

ing is that out of the universe of solid waste, we have

recyclable materials. They're not Separate and apart.

Recyclables are within solid waste.

COURT: Right.

MR. KATSIAFICAS: And that was the decision of

the Federal District Court in The Town of Auburn versus

—excuse me—Tri-State versus The Waste Management

Company. All of this material belongs to the Town and

is pledged to RWS. If there’s [19] any recycling to be

done, it’s through the Town. I don’t read the ordinance

to say that the hauler can’t bring recyclables there. The

question hasn’t been raised, and it’s not before the Court,

because, in fact, Tri-State hasn’t been bringing them there

24a

and hasn’t made any attempt to bring them there, as I

understand it.

MR. DYER: Well, I’m going to object to that last

comment, your Honor. There’s nothing in the record to

that effect, and if that fact is being asserted by Mr.

Katsiaficas, I’d like to have the opportunity to have Mr.

Hart testify that, in fact, he has spoken to Town officials

on that very point, and has been denied access to the

Town.

MR. KATSIAFICAS: All right. What is in the rec-

ord is that since July 1, 1992, there has been no delivery

of recyclable materials under this new ordinance to the

transfer facility, and that’s in the affidavit of Public

Works Director Neal LaValley [sic]. And I'll simply rest

on that. But I think that the ordinance is susceptible of

allowing these people to bring their recyclable materials

here. And we'll see where that goes. Finally, there’s

not only the cost of avoidance, there’s not only the avoid-

ance of administrative enforcement costs, but there’s also

the State recyclable requirements. First of all, we don’t

read the waste handling agreement as having been abro-

gated by 38, MRSA, § 1304(B), sub (4)(a). It simply

provides that that agreement, the waste handling [20]

agreement can’t prevent the municipality from recycling

more if it wishes to do so. The municipality wishes to

recycle more. It was recycling 240 tons per year, ap-

proximately, at the time of the waste handling agreement.

There is now an amendment to that waste handling agree-

ment dated April 21st, 1992, and it’s in the file, which

allows the Town, by July of next year—of this year, ex-

cuse me, to recycle up to 550 tons per year, more than

double what it had been recycling before. It—-that’s what

the Town wants to do. RWS is its entity. RWS allowed

that. And so there’s no abrogation, here.

COURT: But that is, in fact—in order for the Town

to do that, because it does have the effect of excluding

waste in that amount from going to RWS—

MR. KATSIAFICAS: That’s correct.

ieee iii aati lial

25a

COURT: —I mean, RWS had to agree to that, is

that correct? To allow the Town to increase its recycl-

able waste in that amount?

MR. KATSIAFICAS: That’s correct. your Honor.

COURT: Okay.

MR. KATSIAFICAS: And that has been done. And

that’s—in order to help this city, the Town reached those

recyclable goals set by the State. So those are the three

reasons that the Town had in adopting this ordinance.

We believe that that ordinance is rationally, reasonably

related to those legitimate ends. It—people may differ

as to whether it’s the ideal [21] ordinance to effect that,

but we’re not looking for ideals, just that it be rationally

related, and we think that it is.

COURT: Okay. All right. Mr. Dyer, you make the

further argument that this scheme violates the commerce

clause. And I’m trying to understand in what way that

occurs, since it seems that most of the case law in this

area, at least that has reached the Federal Courts and the

U.S. Supreme Court, has involved efforts by states to re-

Strict or put a heavy burden on the importation of waste

into the state. And I’m trying to understand how that—

those kinds of cases relate to this situation.

MR. DYER: Well, except for the DeVito [sic] case,

which talked about taking waste from Rhode Island to

Massachusetts to burn, as opposed to putting it in a

landfill. And Rhode Island said, “We wanted a landfill.

You can’t burn it.” So that’s—there’s a little bit of a

twist on that particular case. But our position on the

commerce clause is this, in the Port Raddio [sic] cases,

Chemical Waste Management versus Hunt [sic], and the

Port Raddio Landfill case, the U.S. Supreme Court said

that, unequivocally, garbage is now a commodity. It’s

a valuable commodity being exchanged in trade through-

out the United States. It has recoverable components in

it which are of great value. And even without the re-

coverable components, as we have in this Case, it is raw

material for the generation of electricity which is sold

26a

in [22] interstate commerce. So it is unequivocally a

commodity traded in commerce. The question now is,

in this particular case, I submit, would be the extent of

the effect on interstate commerce, which is occasioned by

this particular ordinance. Is this a serious impact or is

it a marginal impact? And that’s a factual question to

be decided by the Court after hearing the evidence, and

in hearing about how much material is being dealt with.

In terms of EMWAC [sic], I can suggest to the Court

that it appears that we're talking about 16,000 tons of

recyclables a year. We're talking about 64,000 tons a

year of waste generally. In RWS, we're talking a much

larger amount of material. So we're talking, in the RWS

context, in terms of controlling waste, we're talking a

significant amount of material. What happens is when

you have this restriction on where waste can be taken,

which is an essential element in every one of these cases

that’s been decided, the Shelley [sic] case, the DeVito

case, the Fillaberro [sic] case, the issue is does a state

have the right to regulate where you take that material?

And the most recent case, which is the Rhode Island

case, DeVito, said, “You can regulate, as long as there’s

a rational reason for it.” And it has to be something

more than purely economic. It cannot—and in Rhode

Island, it was—the question was whether they had to have

the waste because they had to pay the bonds to develop

the landfill. And that was considered to be insufficient

by that particular [23] Court. So what we have here is

a question in which we're torn. Are we taking the waste

to RWS as part of a commercial project to supply inven-

tory or fuel for the generation of electricity, or are we

taking it to RWS and the transfer station in order to

promote recycling and the reduction of waste? And I

submit that what Gray is doing in this particular case is

oriented towards a reduction of the waste stream and re-

cycling. It has nothing to do with fueling RWS. In fact,

RW—Gray is reducing that fuel stream.

ee

27a

COURT: Well, but it's—I mean, it’s both. I mean,

you've acknowledged this—these goals that, to some ex-

tent, are in conflict. The RWS was conceived, in large

part, as an enterprise that would allow communities to

solve their landfill problems, their solid waste disposal

problems.

MR. DYER: That’s correct. That’s correct.

COURT: And it involves an alternative way of dis-

posing of solid waste, and it becomes economically viable,

in part, because the energy generated can be used to

generate electricity and so forth. So there is an obliga-

tion to make this solid waste available to RWS, to meet

its contractual commitments, to allow it to be financially

viable. That was the initial impulse.

MR. DYER: That’ right.

COURT: Now a few years down the road, there

becomes this recognition that, even with these inciner-

ators, we still [24] have a disposal problem. But yet—

MR. DYER: And we also have a continuing pollu-

tion problem.

COURT: —and—exactly. And so, it makes a lot of

sense to try to recycle waste, as well. And that is some-

what counter to the interests of RWS, which lives off

waste. So now you have to try to reconcile these two

goals. And what you see, as Mr. Katsiaficas is describing,

is the Town, pursuant to a State scheme, trying to try to

balance. My point is those are both, are they not, legiti-

mate objectives? Trying to get waste to RWS—

MR. DYER: Yes, they are.

COURT: —and at the same time, try to meet recy-

cling goals. Those are rational objectives, and they're

difficult to juggle. So what—even as you state the propo-

sition, what is impermissible about the State—the Town

trying to further those two objectives?

MR. DYER: Well, the commerce clause presents a

very good focusing point, if you will, because what hap-

pense here in this contest between RWS and the Town,

28a

between fuel and recycling, which—and that—those pri-

orities, by the way, have been codified in Chapter 24,

that incineration is now the fifth highest or next-to-last

priority for disposal of waste. What happens in those—

in that situation is that the Town is trying to control the

waste stream in order to match the State recycling goals,

and to make—honor its supply of fuel to RWS [25] by

putting the waste hauler in the middle. They're taking

an established business that’s been around for twenty

years, and they’re saying, “We're going to make you the

garbage policeman, and we're going to attach economic

sanctions or taxes to your business in order_to force the

general public to recycle.” And we're saying, “Wait a

minute. Under the commerce clause, it may be a valid

way to go—that the object may be valid. which is to

create recycling, but to interfere in the commerce stream

and interfere in business by achieving this is not right.”

That’s not what—that’s not the easiest or b°st alternative

to go about doing that. There are several other ways.

The Town’s stated objectives for the ordinance, which are

less than candid, I think, because they say that thev

want to preserve their administrative cost and they want

to force people to recycle. But the fact—let’s take those

as valid. When you're talking about administrative costs,

they’re say—there’s no—they’re saying, “We have a sense

that Mr. Hart will use the free tipping as a way to sub-

sidize the rest of his business., and we don’t want that to

happen.” As a matter of fact, that’s a criminal offense,

according to Chief Chitwood and RWS. That’s a crimi-

nal offense. It’s diversion, it’s embezzlement. it’s oper-

ating under false pretenses, all that sort of thing. There

are also sanctions applied to that, in terms of fines, loss

of license. Those are the things that have operability.

Those are the ways to go about controlling that sort of

situation, [26] as opposed to saying to somebody. “I’m

mot going to go about doing this in this wav.” Now.

relevant here is what other towns do and how thev deal

with the problem. which is considerably different than

what Gray is doing. For example, in most other towns—

29a

MR. KATSIAFICAS: We would object. We don’t

have any evidence on the record as to what other towns

are doing in this, your Honor.

MR. DYER: Well—

COURT: Well, let me—

MR. DYER: —they represent all the other towns,

so—

COURT: —-well, let me—I don’t—that might be

interesting, but what I want you to tell me, Mr. Dyer, is

what is it that you want your client to be able to do?

What is it that, given his druthers, he would like to be

able to do that he cannot do under this scheme?

MR. DYER: —okay. Under Commercial accounts,

what he would like to do with commercial accounts is

he would like to say, “Okay. Let me put out two con-

tainers, one for recyclable materials and one for solid

waste, in the true sense. Stuff that has been discarded.

It’s unwanted, unused,, unwanted, unneeded. And it is

material that is solid waste in every sense. The other

barrel, let me call that recyclable materials. Give me the

option to take those recyclable materials to the transfer

station and tip them for free. Or [27] let me take those

materials to my own station, my own recycling process—

or processing center, and recover the value myself.” And

we distinguish between the solid waste and the recyclable

materials, and I can go into a long argument about solid

waste and the authority of the State, but that’s what he

would like to do.

COURT: Now, if he’s allowed to do that—well, first

of all, even under the existing scheme, he was not al-

lowed to do that, isn’t that correct, because he can’t—the

Town has its own contractual commitment to RWS about

what’s going to happen to solid waste generated in the

Town of Gray. He couldn’t do that before this ordinance,

isn’t that correct? I mean, he can’t—

MR.DYER: Well, yes—

30a

COURT: —in other words, he can’t just take it—he

can’t take solid waste generated in the Town of Gray

wherever he wants to?

MR. DYER: —oh, no, no, no, no. No. He'd have

to take it to RWS under the program which other towns

have implemented and which we're suggesting here. He

would take that solid waste to RWS and pay the tipping

fee of $58 a ton for that commercial waste.

COURT: Oh, but it’s the recyclable stuff he’d like

to take where he wants?

MR. DYER: The recyclable stuff, which gives him

an [28] opportunity, and his customers an opportunity, to

recoup and reduce their costs by recycling, which is just

exactly what the State and Gray want to achieve, here.

As it stands now, he can’t do that. There is no place for

him that is legal to take the recyclable materials. The

only person that can recover and reuse and dispose and

sell those recyclable materials is the generator, who must

take them himself to the Town transfer station, where

they have the exclusive right to handle that material.

COURT: Well, the Town says that what that—that

only—I think this is what the Town says, only in that

fashion are they able to quantify what’s happening to

recyclable material and therefore, document the efforts

they’re making to meet the goals that the State says that

these towns are to meet.

MR. DYER: No. That’s not true. What—

COURT: That’s not what they’re saying, or that’s

not—

MR. DYER: —I don’t believe that to be a true state-

ment. They’re saying that, “We have to have a toll sta-

tion where all the waste goes through so we can count

and see what happens.” Well, that may be the bureau-

cratic way to go about doing it, but it’s not the business

way to go about doing it. We're faced with two disposal

opportunities, here, generally speaking. We're faced with

RWS, in which we have a quantified, known amount of

waste which was dropped last year at RWS from The

eect i a aie nie

3la

Town of Gray. We know, for example, that if 100,000

tons of [29] solid waste went to RWS, that’s documented.

The rest of the material—and the goal talks about waste

reduction. It doesn’t talk about counting. It talks about

waste reduction. So we know, if you take that 100,000

tons that went to RWS last year, and we reduce it down

to 50,000 tons, we’ve met the goal, because the rest has

to be recycled, or it’s winding up on the back roads

somewhere. And that recyclable waste and that recycla-

ble activity is easily monitored that way. You don’t have

to have a toll booth to take everything through. It’s man-

agement by exception. We don’t need to interfere with

commerce to that extent.

COURT: Okay. All right.

MR. DYER: With residential customers, Mr. Hart

and his customers should have the same rights that every

other residential person has. No other town that I know

of imposes upon a resident the obligation to pay for his

own tipping. In fact, I believe that flies in the face of

§ 1305—I think it’s 1305—correct me if I’m wrong—

which says that every town has an affirmative duty to

provide waste disposal for its residents. And I think

that it is—if you're going to charge some residents for

the use of a mandated facility and not charge others,

that’s wrong. And what I’m Saying with the residents

is Mr. Hart should be able to pick up that material, solid

waste, take it to RWS and have it paid for, just like

anybody else. And it’s easy to see whether or not he’s

comingling commercial [30] waste with that material.

And other towns monitor at the RWS and EMWAC and

every other landfill to make sure that the materials com-

ing in bear some resemblance to the town. If you're

taking Gray material in, and all of a sudden. somebody

comes in with garbage and it’s got all the mail addressed

to Freeport, or it’s got material that indicates that it

came from Freeport in it, which is easily done—people

do this all the time, then you can tell that somebody’s

cheating. And that’s what’s going on in RWS today.

32a

Chief Chitwood and those people are doing that today.

But he should be able to use that—Mr. Hart and his

residential customers should be able to use RWS on the

same basis as anybody else.

COURT: Mr. Dyer, it would seem to me that the—

what Gray is doing is very similar to what the Town of

Auburn was doing in the case that’s been cited by the

Town, here.

MR. DYER: Not entirely.

COURT: Okay. What is—

MR. DYER: Not entirely. In Auburn, we don’t have

the question of residential waste, because Auburn has its

own municipal pick-up. So we don’t have that issue. We

do have the commercial waste question, and that argu-

ment was—the Auburn case was argued before the Maine

Supreme Court yesterday. And Chief Justice Wathen

pointed out—he said—lI think it was Justice Wathen

pointed out that there’s—Judge Clifford said, “When

somebody puts material in a container, that’s [31] gar-

bage, and that’s the end of it.” And was the key—one

of the key parts in Judge Delahanty’s decision. And I’ve

taken issue with that as a factual basis in that particular

case, saying there’s no evidence in the record to support

that kind of a conclusion. If the Court drew that con-

clusion sua sponte, that’s not right. People today are—

I mean, years ago—one argument made yesterday was

that butcher shops and grocery stores used to set aside

a box, and you put all the meat bones in it, and the

rendering company would come by and pick those up.

Now that’s been going on for a hundred years. Now we

have people setting—and they are statutorily mandated, in

some cases, to set aside high-grade paper, to set aside

corrogated board, and to do all these things. And to sug-

gest that somebody, by throwing it away, is saying, “I

am discarding it and I have no further use for it” is

wrong, because in most of those instances which I’ve just

mentioned to you, the generator is paid for the material

or he barters a lower cost of disposal for that material.

33a

And newspaper, for example, is now $15 a ton. And it

can be sold for that, at $15 a ton. Now, it dosen't pay

a hauler to come in and pay somebody for that news-

paper, because he can’t get enough money out of it to

cover his hauling cost. But it is a useful discount to the

price to be able to get that material. And those are the

kinds of issue in the Auburn case which we argued yes-

terday, and which we believe the Law Court will—I hope

the Law Court will agree [32] with our position on that,

that we've got to look at the evolution of the statute from

1985, when RWS was first formed, through 1991 when

these amendments and priorities were set by the State

Statute.

COURT: Finally, Mr. Dyer, in terms of your posi-

tions, the antitrust monopoly arguments that you make,

1t—

MR. DYER: That hangs on one issue. What's the

definition of solid waste? The antitrust issue is does the

State, in Chapter—in Title 30-A. intend to give the towns

the exclusive right to handle all recyclable waste, regard-

less of the value? Does the town have the right to go into

your house and say, “When you put the Cola Cola can

down, it’s discarded. It’s now ours and we take the five

cents.” Does the town have the right to go to a sawmill

and say, “You have to give us the sawdust.” Those kinds

of issues, and if the State definition of solid waste does

allow that kind of activity, then we have no antitrust

violation. If, however, Mr. Hart is permited to take re-

cyclables and the State statute permits him to do that.

and Gray intercedes and intervenes and says, “We want

it,” then we have an antitrust violation.

COURT: Okay.

MR. DYER: And a similar argument is made with

taking, same kind of argument would apply there.

COURT: Okay. Mr. Katsiaficas, do you want to re-

spond bricfly to those points, the commerce cause and the

monopoly, [33] and then I'll tell you what I’ve—what I’m

inclined to do. Go ahead. I know you've done that in

your brief. Why don’t you just briefly restate it?

34a

MR. KATSIAFICAS: Well, I will try to briefly re-

state that, your Honor. I—just for the big picture, there

is a requirement that each municipality provide solid

waste disposal services for domestic and commercial solid

waste generated in the boundaries. It isn’t a requirement

that we provide it free of charge to all commercial and

residential accounts within the town. We're not trying—

The Town of Gray and RWS are not trying to put Tri-

State or anyone out of business. It’s simply trying to

legitimately regulate those businesses. When we get to

the commerce clause argument and the challenge to that

regultory authority, first of all, there’s no allegation here

that Tri-State is engaging in interstate commerce. Tri-

State is doing the collection, the disposal, the alleged re-

cycling, whatever. They are the ones who we're looking

at in this case. We're looking at what their actions are.

There’s no interstate commerce that’s even indirectly

implicated by what they do. There’s no standing to bring

those interstate commerce claims. Even if they did have

standing to bring them, even if somehow interstate com-

merce were implicated, we believe that the cases cited by

the plaintiffs, the Port Raddio, the Alabama case, are in-

apposite here because those cases deal with a prohibition

on waste [34] entering a state, not a designation ordi-

nance such as this. With regard to the Rhode Island

case, again, that was a ban—that was an eccnomic

regulation that was designed to keep tipping rates artifi-

cially low for the municipalities by putting the burden

on commercial waste and preventing it from leaving the

state. We don’t have that situation here. There are

legitimate State ends being furthered, here. There’s a

tension between those State ends, but the Town is trying

to do that in a way that balances everyone’s interests,

and in a fair way, and one that’s rationally related to

those ends. So, therefore, it’s—it is not in violation of

the commerce clause. With regard to antitrust, the defi-

nition of solid waste couldn’t be clearer. It includes those

items that are useless, discarded or unwanted, regardless

—————

35a

of whether they still have any value. That was decided

by Judge Carter, in his decision where he found, under

the very similar Auburn ordinance, using the State defini-

tion, that there was no violation of antitrust law. And

with that, we'd just rest on the briefs, your Honor.

COURT: All right.

MR. DYER: Your Honor, my—perhaps I could

make a suggestion at this point in time. It is obvious,

from the arguments given to you by myself and by Mr.

Katsiaficas in the last couple of moments. that many of

the issues in this case will rest on the definition of solid

waste. And it seems to me that since the Law Court

heard this argument yesterday and is going [35] to be

providing guidance—or hopefully, will be providing

guidance in this area, that maybe the issues dealing with

the affirmative defenses to the case or the affirmative

claims in the case for antitrust violations and so forth

Should be deferred until the Law Court has spoken on

that. And that would be for judicial economy, the

avoidance of conflicting decisions and all those sorts of

issues. And maybe what we could do is focus on—simply

on the ordinance itself as to whether that is constitution-

ally defective, in terms of the access that Mr. Hart is to

have to the transfer station and the ability to be treated

equally under those things. And perhaps-—I’m not sure

that the Court can do this, but I think it can, make a

division line in the case along those lines.

MR. KATSIAFICAS: If I may, your Honor?

COURT: Sure.

MR. KATSIAFICAS: | Sorry.

COURT: Mr. Katsiaficas?

MR. KATSIAFICAS: I don’t see that a division line

can be drawn, here. But I would say that there are three

counterclaims, one of them the licensing. It’s very

straightforward. There’s no dispute as to that. There's

no dispute that they’re diverting acceptable waste. If

there’s any dispute over the definition of recyclable mate-

rials and whether those are exempt from full control, that

36a

might be answered by the Law Court, perhaps that might

be held in abeyance. But it’s very clear [36] as to the

first two counts of the counterclaim that we're entitled to

summary judgment. There’s no dispute of genuine issue

of material fact.

MR. DYER: I think we can deal with the licensing

question in terms of whether or not the application form

is a bar to becoming licensed. And I think we can deal

with that, and I’m prepared to argue that.

COURT: Well, let me tell you the dilemma that I

have on this, gentlemen. And, Mr. Dyer, I have to say

I think you’re—you are doing a very good job arguing

a very difficult position. I—and I'll be very candid with

you that I feel that even on further reflection, I'm going

to find it very difficult to accept your arguments. I mean,

I don’t want to shortchange you or your client in terms

of the consideration that is given to this. What I'm say-

ing is that if I take this under advisement for the purpose

of giving a fully articulated response, it’s going to be

three months before I get this out, because I’ve got such

a—frankly, a huge backlog of cases. And I’n. saying to

myself, given the reservations I have about your position,

am I just taking all that time to try to give a more fully

articulated statement of what I think the conclusion

should be? Now, I can do that. The down side for you

all is that you don’t have a decision from me for all of

that time. If I go forward now with a bench decision,

it will not be, obviously, as fully articulated as it ideally

[37] should be, and I’m concerned that your client may

feel that he’s been given short shrift, although I—I mean,

I have read all this stuff, and I think I understand it. The

—so, in a sense, I’m just sharing with you my own

thought process as I decide what to do, here. I feel as

that, frankly, in fairness to you all, is I should decide

this here and now. And in doing that, I will not do it

as fully as I might like, as I would like, but it allows you

to know where you stand. And if I really felt there was

a lot of uncertainty, here, I wouldn't do this. But I’m

37a

going to tell you where I come out on all of this. And

what that does is allow you to all move forward from

there and perhaps get this more quickly to the forum

where it ultimately has got to be decided. Where I come

out on this, Mr. Dyer, and this will not be good news

to you or your client, is that I begin with the proposition

that this area of solid waste has been traditionally, for

decades, an area where the municipality has had a great

deal of authority to regulate, and to regulate in ways

that have traditionally been monopolistic. I recently

looked at some very old Maine cases going back to the

turn of the century, where some of the very same argu-

ments that you're raising now were raised about the au-

thority of the town to basically grant a monopoly to a

private enterprise to deal with offal and swill, as they

called it then. And the Law Court was very clear that,

in the town’s exercise of its police power, that it could,

in effect, [38] grant a monopoly to a business to Carry out

the function of disposing of the offal and the swill. My

point is that—and I’m sure this must be very hard for

Mr. Hart to accept, that he is conducting his business in

an area which traditionally has been, and increasingly is

becoming even more so, subject to heavy regulation.

And, in a way, the stakes for the municipalities and the

public interest become greater and greater all the time

because of the increasing problems of solid waste. It

seems to me what we have here is The Town of Gray,

pursuant to its home rule powers, which are very sub-

stantial, and pursuant to the exercise of its police power,

an area where it has a great deal of discretion, it is exer-

cising its home rule powers and its police powers, to try

to come up with a rational scheme for dealing with two

not easily compatible objectives, number one, solving its

landfill problems by meeting its obligations to RWS, and

at the same time, meeting State-imposed obligations and

mandates with respect to recycling more and more of its

waste. And to meet those objectives in a way that is

consistent with the Town’s own limited financial re-

38a

sources. And to some extent, Mr. Hart and others do

find themselves in the middle of al! of this, and it un-

questionably is having an impact on the business of Mr.

Hart and others, no question about that. But because

they are conducting a business in this area, I’m afraid

that that is a price that they are being asked to pay

legitimately [39] by government regulation. I simply do

not see anything in the Town’s ordinance that violates

equal protection, because, given the standard that ap-

plies, here, it seems to me that the Town has arrived

at a rational scheme for addressing administrative costs,

for trying to police the way in which waste is handled

in The Town of Gray, in a fashion that is not unduly

burdensome for them, and in a way that will help them

meet their recycling goals. Now, you may say, as you

have, that there are other ways that they could do that.

And there probably are other ways that they could do it.

And maybe even other ways that are more sensible, from

a businessman’s point of view. But I don’t think that I,

as a Court, have the authority to simply tell the Town

that they ought to do it differently. They're doing it

rationally to meet legitimate objectives, and I think they

have the authority to do that. In terms of the commerce

clause issues, I just—I mean, I recognize the grand scope

of the commerce clause, and I’m reluctant to say that

what the Town is doing does not have some effect on

interstate commerce. But I can’t imagine that what the

Town is doing is having such an effect on interstate com-

merce that it violates applicable constitutional standards.

The point is, again, that it seems to me they are pursuing

a rational objective, and it does require, to some extent,

that they control the destination of the waste. And in

that sense, yes, it restricts the free flow of commerce,

taking the view, as you have, correctly, [40] that waste

is a commodity. Clearly, it is. And I believe, for all the

reasons I’ve already stated, they can control the destina-

tion of that waste, and they're doing it for perfectly

legitimate and rational reasons. I also take the view that

39a

solid waste does have the broad definition that has been

attributed to it by Judge Carter, and I believe, in the

Auburn decision, as well, by Justice Delahanty, and that

what we have here is the municipality acting pursuant

to a clearly articulated and broadly stated State policy

as to how these communities are to deal with solid waste,

broadly defined. And becaues the Town is acting pur-

suant to that clearly articulated and broadly stated State

policy, that, in effect, the Town is immune from these

monopoly, these antitrust arguments that you're raising.

It is the State action immunity, if you will, that applies

in this area. I realize that you have raised other ai'gu-

ments, as well. I believe those are the primary ones, and

'm not going to try to address every one that you've

raised, other than to say that I have reviewed them. and

[ do not—I did not feel that they ultimately had merit.

Believe me, if I thought that taking this under further

advisement and thinking about it and studying it was

going to change those conclusions, I would not have done

—made the decision that I now make. But I just know

it won't, and therefore, it seemed to me that I had an

obligation to you to state where I come out. to try to

move this along. Now, [41] having reached those con-

clusions, I’m going to have to memorialize this other than

just on the tape. I’m going to ask Mr. Katsiaficas to pre-

pare an order that—and what I'm suggesting, Mr. Kat-

siaficas, I don’t want you to try to sort of reproduce what

I've tried to explain here. I mean, I want the record to

Stand for that. But what I think is needed now is an

order that addresses what happens in light of those con-

clusions, I mean, because what we have here are—this

all begins with Mr. Dyer’s action on behalf of his clients,

and obviously, this means that I am denying any request

for injunctive relief. And I am ruling favorably on your

counterclaim and basically giving you summary judgment

on your counterclaim. Now, what that all—what that

means further, frankiy, in terms of the relief that you're

seeking, I’m not sure. Maybe you can tell me now what

40a

that means, from your perspective. I mean, it—I mean,

the real effect of this would be a ruling that Mr. Hart has

to be licensed, that he has to comply with the ordinance

and all of those things. And I assume that’s the kind of

language that you would want in the order, making clear

Mr. Hart’s obligation to comply. Are you seeking more

than that? Are you trying to look back, and are there

claims for fines in here, and things like that? What is

your—what are you seeking?

MR. KATSIAFICAS: ‘e’re simply—in this Motion

for Summary Judgment, seeking to have Mr. Hart con-

form his conduct to the [42] requirements of the ordi-

nance, to be licensed, to bring acceptable waste to RWS

directly, and not to divert his recyclable materials, to not

sell them to third parties or whatever. Those are the

Town’s properties, its solid waste.

COURT: Okay. So you’re—

MR. KATSIAFICAS: We're not seeking fines.

COURT: —so you're looking for something prospec-

tive, then? I mean, this is what—

MR. KATSIAFICAS: _ Right.

COURT: -—this is what Mr. Hart would now have

to do, is that correct? |

MR. KATSIAFICAS: | That's correct.

COURT: Okay.

MR. KATSIAFICAS: And we are not seeking fines.

COURT: All right. Okay. All right. Well, that’s

helpful to know—

MR. DYER: Well, I have a question.

COURT: —sure. '

MR. DYER: He says he dosen’t want recyclables di- |

verted. Where’s Mr. Hart supposed to take them?

COURT: Do you want to respond to that, Mr. Kat-

Siaficas?

MR. KATSIAFICAS: | I’ve suggested earlier that those

could be taken to the Town’s municipal recycling facility

at the transfer station, and—

nine a

4la

MR. DYER: _ He’s been refused permission to go there.

[43] COURT: Well, that’s something I guess you'll

have to look into, Mr. Katsiaficas.

MR. KATSIAFICAS: —TI'll have to look into that,

but that would be reflected in the draft order that I pre-

pare.

COURT: Right. Okay.

MR. DYER: Now, I also assume that this is going

to apply to every single other waste hauler in the com-

munity, because there are other waste haulers who are

not doing that. They are not taking their recyclables to

the transfer station.

COURT: Well, I'm sure that any policy that’s re-

flected in this order would have to be uniformly appli-

cable. I mean, that—

MR. KATSIAFICAS: That's right. I’m not aware of

what other haulers are doing at this time, and any policy

that is adopted here would have to be applied across the

board in order to be fair.

MR. DYER: Well, we pointed this out to them, that

within one hundred feet of the front door to the Town

Hall is a waste management recycling bin which is not

being taken to the transfer station.

COURT: Hmmm? Okay. Well, that’s something that

clearly bears examination, Mr. Katsiaficas.

MR. KATSIAFICAS: Certainly, your Honor. That

will be examined before I draft the prepared order.

COURT: Okay. Mr. Dyer, from your point of view,

is there [44] understanding, sort of where ultimately I’m

coming out on this? Is there anything that you feel

should be—in terms of dispositive provisions of the or-

der that has to be addressed, just so your client knows

where he stands for purposes of appeal land all of that.

What—

MR. DYER: Well, I have a couple of questions for

appeal, which f like to raise.

COURT: —sure.

MR. DYER: I've restrained myself from continuing

the argument this morning, but—

42a

COURT: I understand.

MR. DYER: —obviously, we're going to need some

sort of a record to take up on appeal.

COURT: Sure.

MR. DYER: We can either take this transcript this

morning, or we could have findings of facts and conclu-

sions of law.

COURT: Well, see, what—that’s—I—mean, I’m just

not comfortable—I never have been—asking counsel to

give me those to—it just doesn’t—it just never seems to

work for me. And I was hoping to—what I have asked

you to do, it seems to me, is—I’ve tried to give a bench

decision which explains where I’m coming from, at least

without undue cost. That portion, it seems to me, could

be obtained—

MR. DYER: All right. So you would have us rely

on the [45] record?

COURT: —right.

MR. DYER: Fine.

COURT: So what I’m really doing is—and obviously,

you can have this whole colloquy reproduced if you think

that’s helpful, but what I’m suggesting to Mr. Katsiaficas

is, for the—basically for the reasons stated on the record,

and then the transcript would be that, and then these—

and I haven’t made factual findings, because I have—I

mean, you all started out with a proposition which seemed

very clear to me that these are really legal issues. There’s

—now, there seems to be some dispute about how the

Town might be applying one provision of the ordinance

you've just referred to. But I never saw this as a—where

there’s much factually in dispute at all, really nothing.

I mean, these are legal issues, as you’ve said right along.

So I don’t think there’s a need to make any factual find-

ings. As least, I’ve proceeded on that assumption. And

so I just tried to give you a summary of my legal conclu-

sions, if you will, and that’s now on the record. So I

would prefer to just have an order which deals with the

respective claims, and indicates how those are disposed of,

aa ed

43a

make sure they’re all disposed of so you have a final

judgment, and you can proceed accordingly.

COURT: Now, I also assume—well, I understand that

there are no fines that are being assessed at this point in

time?

[46] COURT: That’s what Mr. Katsiaficas just said.

Right.

MR. DYER: All right. Now, obviously, I’m going to

ask for the Court to stay the order, pending appeal. There

are some appealable issues here, which I—

COURT: Sure. Absolutely.

MR. DYER: —the California reduction case, which

I think you were talking about earlier, being those old

turn of the century California cases decided by the U.S.

Supreme Court—

COURT: Well, I—actually, I was thinking of some

Marine cases, at least in terms of monopoly—the monop-

Oly probiem. Yeah.

MR. DYER: —there is an old—TI think a rendering

plant case of some sort in Maine, if I’m not mistaken,

which is about the same time as the U.S. Supreme Court

cases.

COURT: Yeah. Okay.

MR. DYER: And the question of whether or not this

is a regulated industry, I will—I tend to take exception

to that.

COURT: Sure.

MR. DYER: And disagree—I understand your posi-

tion, and I don’t mean to be disrespectful here in any way.

But—

COURT: That’s—that’s—I mean, I’m—these are dif-

ficult issues, and I think, as I said, it made point—it made

sense to me to get this resolved so you can get it decided

where it ultimately has to be decided. So—

MR. DYER: —my position would be essentially that

recyclables [47] is a new industry. And the recent Su-

preme Court cases this year indicating that they are com-

modities, that they are valuable items, and the recent cases

44a

dealing with commerce clause issues all point out the fact

that this recyclable industry is very critical. And when

you start saying, “Yes, we'll take the broad definition of

solid waste,” then you start impacting metals processors,

newspaper processers, the bottled glass people, all of these

industries are going to be impacted one way or another

by these kinds of—by this definition. And therefore, we

would like to have some relief during the course of this

appeal, that I under—TI assume that you have no sense of

allowing Mr. Hart to continue taking the matevial to the

least costly disposal facility. You are going to require,

under any set of circumstances, he take the acceptable

waste to RWS. However, we would like to have the op-

portunity to be able to take the recyclable materials to

a third party processor, if, in fact, it proves to be more

economical to do that. And it may very well turn out not

to be economical because of the volume of recyclable ma-

terials being generated. It may be easier just to tip it,

rather than to truck it to West Paris in separate trips

and so forth. But we would like to have the opportunity

to—at least to try and protect that economic situation

during the course of the appeal.

COURT: Well, I wonder if we—it’s—we’ve all been

at this [48] a long time, and I wonder if maybe we ought

to just schedule a separate hearing on the issue of whether

a stay should be—whether there should—that—we should

—I think maybe that would make—

MR. DYER: And I could phrase it in writing and—

COURT: —-yeah.

MR. DYER: —give you a proposed order of spe-

cifically what we want?

COURT: Why don’t we do that? I'd just as soon—

that’s obviously also an important issue, and I think I’d

rather give separate consideration to that. So why don’t

we get the—see if, in light of what I’ve indicated, you and

Mr. Katsiaficas can agree on the terms of the order to

reflect these rulings, and then after you’ve done that, I'll

make myself available promptly to hear the issue of the

stay. I mean, I guess what you'd want to do is—maybe

— EEEOEOEOEOEOOeOO”

45a

at the time that you submit the order, you could also sub-

mit your—each submit your position on the issue of the

Stay.

MR. DYER: All right.

COURT: And then I’ll—

MR. DYER: And what I will do, Judge, if it’s all

right with you, I will phrase the request for relief broadly,

on the basis that it’s better to ask for too much than too

—for too little.

COURT: —well, I—

[49] MR. DYER: And you can strike whatever—

COURT: _ yeah.

MR. DYER: —-you deem to be appropriate.

COURT: Okay. And then I won't sign or enter the

order until we’ve had the hearing on the stay, okay?

MR. DYER: All right. Fine.

COURT: And—all right. Why don’t we do that?

And just so the Clerk can keep track of this, how long

do you think you would need to prepare the order and,

at the same time, have your respective positions on the

stay? A couple of weeks? A week? I don’t know.

MR. KATSIAFICAS: I would think that a week

would be sufficient, your Honor.

“OURT: Okay. All right. Why don’t you do that,

and then I’ll—after I get that, I'll have Amanda, the

sec—I’ll check with you, we'll set up a time, then, for

the hearing on the stay. I think we’ll—you’ll want to

argue that, I assume, is that right?

MR. KATSIAFICAS: Yes, your Honor. We will.

COURT: Okay. Then we’ll—

MR. DYER: As a matter of housekeeping, is it all

right if we agree to exchange pleadings by close of busi-

ness on Monday and file on Tuesday, a week from today?

MR. KATSIAFICAS: Well, we'll try to get, actually,

a draft order before that, to you.

[50] MR. DYER: Well, all right. So that I have an

opportunity to look at them (indiscernible).

MR. KATSIAFICAS: Well, we certainly—we want

—we have to agree to an order, I believe.

46a

COURT: Im asking you to try to—I think—that

part, I don’t think should be difficult.

MR. KATSIAFICAS: And I’m going to try to—I

would think not, your Honor.

COURT: Yes, I’m just asking you to dispose of the

—all the claims. I think the stay issue would be the diffi-

cult one, so—

MR. KATSIAFICAS: — That’s right.

COURT: —all right. Thank you.

MR. KATSIAFICAS: Thank you, your Honor.

END OF HEARING

47a

APPENDIX E

TOWN OF GRAY

SOLID WASTE, FLOW CONTROL

AND RECYCLING ORDINANCE

AN ORDINANCE OF THE TOWN OF GRAY, CUM-

BERLAND COUNTY, STATE OF MAINE REGULA-

TING THE COLLECTION, STORAGE, TRANSPORT,

DISPOSAL REDUCTION, RECYCLING AND REUSE

OF SOLID WASTE IN THE TOWN AND PROVID-

ING PENALTIES FOR THE VIOLATION OF SAID

ORDINANCE.

WHEREAS, the Legislature of the State of Maine has

caused certain statutes to be enacted which govern or

delegate to the Maine Department of Environmental Pro-

tection the responsibility for promulgation of rules and

regulations regarding the disposal of solid waste and au-

thorize municipalities to regulate solid waste disposal on

municipal property; and

WHEREAS, the Council of the Town of Gray pursuant

to the authority vested in it, desires to enact an ordinance

regulating the collection, storage, transport, salvaging and

disposal of garbage, rubbish, refuse, and other solid waste

materials in said Town; and

WHEREAS, the Town of Gray has the authority pur-

scuant to 30-A M.R.S.A. section 3001 et seq., and 38

M.R.S.A. section 1301 et seq. as amended from time to

time, to enter into contracts for the collection, transpor-

tation, storage, processing, salvaging or disposal of solid

waste and to designate certain categories of solid waste

as recyclable or reusable material and to require the seg-

regation of waste into categories; and

WHEREAS, reduction, recycling and reusing is a wise

and prudent solid waste management technique that saves

tipping fees, saves energy, reduces pollution and environ-

48a

mental degradation, keeps usable manufacturing material

in the economy and signifies a developing sense of waste

awareness; therefore, the Town of Gray wishes to en-

courage reduction, recycling and reusing to the maximum

extent possible; and

WHEREAS, the Gray Landfill will be permanently closed

December 31, 1991; and,

WHEREAS, the Council desires to gain management

control over solid waste and enable the reclamation of

resources, including energy, from those wastes; and

WHEREAS, the Council desires to provide adequate,

efficient services and facilities for the disposal of solid

waste without creating an undo financial burden on prop-

erty owners;

THEREFORE, be it enacted and ordained by the Town

of Gray, Cumberland County, Maine and it is hereby

enacted and ordained by authority of the same as follows:

SECTION I

SCOPE:

This Ordinance applies to all generators of solid waste

in the Town of Gray, including but not limited to, resi-

dential, commerical, industrial and governmental pro-

ducers of solid waste in the Town of Gray.

SECTION II

DEFINITIONS:

The following words and terms as used in the Ordinance

shall have the meaning ascribed thereto, unless the con-

text indicates a different meaning. Further definitions

may be found in Bureau of Solid Waste Management

06-096 CMR 400. |

“Abandoned Vehicle’—Any gasoline, diesel or electric

powered equipment, or part thereof, originally designed

:

4

49a

for carrying persons or goods for commercial, business,

private or recreational purposes which is:

|. No longer used for the purpose originally in-

tended,

Has not been converted to another commercial,

business, private or recreational vehicular use,

tr

3. Is not exempted or regulated by existing State or

Federal Laws, or

4. Has been left out in the elements to deteriorate.

It includes, but is not limited to, automobiles, trucks,

buses, campers, trailers, boats, snowmobiles, jet skis and

ATVs.

“Acceptable Waste” shall mean ordinary household,

municipal, institutional, commercial and industrial Solid

Waste including, but not limited to, the following:

(1) Garbage, trash, rubbish, paper and cardboard, plas-

tics, refuse, beds, mattresses, sofas, refrigerators, washing

machines, bicycles, baby carriages and automobile or

small vehicle tires, to the extent that Regional Waste

Systems, Inc. (RWS) determines that the air emission

criteria and standards applicable to and at the RWS Dis-

posal Facility are not violated; and

(2) Processible portions of commercial and industrial

Solid Waste; and

(3) Wood and lumber, tree limbs, branches, ties, logs

and trees, if no more than four and one-half (4 1 2) feet

long and eight (8) inches in diameter, and leaves. twigs,

grass and plant cuttings, provided that the Municipality

shall not be obligated to deliver or cause to be delivered

any items listed in this subpart (3) to the RWS Dis-

posal Facility, and further provided that such items may

be delivered to the RWS Disposal Facility by or on be-

half of the Municipality on an irregular basis only and

shall represent an insignificant portion of the total Waste

50a

delivered to the RWS Disposal Facility by or on behalf

of the Municipality within any Calendar Year; and

Notwithstanding any provisions to the contrary, Unac-

ceptable Waste, including Hazardous Waste, shall not be

“Acceptable Waste” and is explicitly excluded therefrom.

Furthermore, any substances which as of the date of a

certain Waste Handling Agreement between the Munici-

pality and Regional Waste Systems, Inc. (RWS) are in-

cluded as “Acceptable Waste”, by which are later deter-

mined to be harmful, toxic, dangerous or hazardous by

any governmental agency or unit having appropriate ju-

risdiction, shall not be “Acceptable Waste” under the

terms of this Ordinance. However, any substances which

as of the date of said Waste Handling Agreement are not

included within the definition of “Acceptable Waste” be-

cause they are considered harmful, toxic, dangerous or

hazardous and which are later determined not to be harm-

ful, toxic, dangerous or hazardous by any governmental

agency or unit having appropriate jurisdiction, shall be

considered “Acceptable Waste” unless a contrary deter-

mination has been or is made by any other governmental

agency or unit having appropriate jurisdiction or unless

such substances are otherwise considered “Unacceptable

Waste” or “Hazardous Waste”.

“Agricultural Waste” also referred to as “waste resulting

from agricultural activities” in 38 MRSA Section 1303.

(16), means wastes which result from agricultural activi-

ties defined in Section 361-A (1-B), which are returned

to the soils as fertilizers. It includes waste pesticides

when generated by a farmer, provided that he she triple

rinses each emptied pesticide container in accordance

with departmental rules and disposes of the pesticide resi-

dues in a manner consistent with the disposal instructions

on the pesticide label. It does not include any materials

regulated as a residual under Chapter 567 of the De-

partment’s Regulations.

S5la

“Ashes”—the residue remaining after the combustion of

a material such as wood, coal, coke or other combustible

material.

“Brown Goods”—small household appliances including,

but not limited to, radios, televisions, sound systems and

other small electric or electronic appliances or devices.

“Commercial Hauler—Any person, firm, partnership,

association, municipality, cooperation, or other legal en-

tity who collects, transports, and disposes of solid waste

for a fee as herein prescribed.

“Commercial Waste”—solid wastes generated by stores,

Offices, restaurants, warehouses and other non-manufac-

turing, non-processing activities; but it does not include

residential, household, process, industrial or special

wastes.

“Composting”—the biological decomposition and stabili-

zation of organic matter under controlled aerobic con-

ditions of high temperature.

“Construction/Demolition Debris’—the debris resulting

from construction, remodeling, repair and demolition of

structures. It includes but is not limited to building ma-

terials, asphalt, wall board, pipes, metal conduits, mat-

tresses, household furniture, fish nets, rope, hose, wire

and cable, fencing, carpeting and underlay. It excludes

asbestos, gypsum board, asphalt shingles, plastics, cans,

containers which stored asphalt, paint thinners or other

similar materials and material that contains or is com-

bined with residential refuse, rubbish, garbage, hazardous

or special wastes, as that term is defined by Chapter 400

of the Maine Department of Environmental Protection's

Solid Waste Rules.

“Demolition Debris’—see “Constructon/Demolition De-

bris.”

“Disposal”—the discharge, deposit, dumping or placing

of any solid waste into or on any land or body of water,

or the incineration of any solid waste.

52a

“Disposal Facility’—any land or structure or combina-

tion of land area and land structures, including dumps,

recycling centers, and transfer stations used for storing,

salvaging, reducing, incinerating or disposing of solid

wastes, including any transfer station or similar facility

which may be constructed by the Town in connection

with the use of any disposal facilities.

“Garbage”—all table refuse, animal and vegetable mat-

ter, offal from meat, fish and fowls, vegetables and fruits

and parts thereof, and other articles and materials ordi-

narily used for food and which have become unfit for

such use or composting for which reasons they are dis-

carded.

“Hazardous Waste’—a waste substance or material, in

any physical state, designated as hazardous by the Board

under 38 M.R.S.A. Section 1303-A et seq. The fact a

hazardous waste or a part or a constituent may have

value or other use or may be sold or exchanged does not

exclude it from this definition.

“Industrial Waste”—solid wastes generated by manufac-

turing or processing activities; but it does not include

residential, household, commercial or special wastes.

“Inert Fill’—a clean solid material, rocks, bricks, and

cured concrete, which are not mixed with other solid or

liquid waste, and which are not derived from an ore min-

ing activity.

“Infectious Waste”’—those wastes so defined by the Solid

Waste Management Regulations promulgated by the De-

partment of Environmental Protection pursuant to Title

38 M.R.S.A. section 1304.

“Land Clearing Debris”—solid wastes resulting from the

clearing of land and consisting solely of brush, stumps,

soil material and rocks.

“Landscape Refuse”—grass, leaves, shrubs, branches,

trees and wood, whether finished or unfinished; but it

53a

does not include construction/demolition debris, land

clearing debris, plastic bags or other plastic containers

used to collect, store or transport landscape refuse.

“Person”’—any individual, partnership, association, firm,

company, corporation, department, agency, group, includ-

ing a city, town, county, State, Federal or other govern-

mental unit, or any other entity responsible in any way

for an activity subject to these rules.

“Recyclable Waste”—waste, which when properly segre-

gated, can be recovered, reused. or recycled. This shall

include with limitation, newspapers, corrugated box mu-

terial, glass and metal containers, scrap metal, waste oil,

mixed paper, automotive batteries, white goods, brown

goods and other materials deemed recyclable by the

Town.

“Recycling Center’—a portion of the Transfer Station

set aside for the collection, segregation, processing, stor-

age and distribution of recyclable and reusable solid

waste,

“Refuse’-—all combustible refuse and incombustible ref-

use referred to collectively.

“RWS or Regional Waste Systems, Inc.”—shall mean Re-

gional Waste Systems, Inc., a non-capital stock, non-

profit corporation created pursuant to Title 30, Chapter

203 and Title 13, Chapter 81 of the Maine Revised

Statutes.

“Residential Waste”—solid wastes generated by a resi-

dence during normal household activities; but it does not

include commercial, process, industrial, landscape, con-

struction ‘demolition debris or special wastes.

“Resource Recovery’—the recovery of materials or sub-

stances that still have useful physical or chemical proper-

ties after serving a specific purpose and can be reused or

recycled for the same or other purposes.

54a

“Rubbish”—all miscellaneous waste material, not other-

wise included herein, resulting from the ordinary conduct

of business or housekeeping.

“Solid Waste”—useless, unwanted or discarded solid ma-

terial with insufficient liquid content to be free flowing,

including by way of example, and not by limitation, rub-

bish, garbage, refuse derived fuel, scrap materials, junk,

refuse, inert fill material, and landscape refuse. “Solid

Waste” shall in no case include sludges from air or water

pollution control facilities, septic tank sludge or agricul-

tural waste. The fact a solid waste, or a part of or con-

Stituent of the waste, may have value or other use or

may be sold or exchanged does not exclude it from the

definition of “Solid Waste”.

“Special Wastes’-——as defined in 38 M.R.S.A. Section

1303 (10-B) means any non-hazardous waste generated

by sources other than domestic and typical commercial

establishments that exist in such an unusual quantity or

in such a chemical or physical state, or any combination

thereof, which may disrupt or impair effective waste man-

agement or threaten the public health, human safety or

the environment and requires special handling, transpor-

tation and disposal procedures. Special waste includes,

but is not limited to:

a. Oil, coal, wood and multifuel boiler and incinerator

ash;

b. Industrial and industrial prices waste;

c. Wastewater treatment plant sludge, paper mill sludge

and other sludge waste;

d. Debris and residuals from nonhazardous chemical

spills and cleanup of those spills;

e. Contaminated soils and dredge spoils;

Asbestos and asbestos-containing waste;

g. Sand blast grit and nonliquid paint waste;

55a

h. Medical and other potentially infectious or pathogenic

waste;

i. High and low pH waste;

j. Spent filter media residue;

k. Shredder residue; and

1. Other waste designated by the board, by rule.

“Town”’—the Town of Gray, Cumberland County, State

of Maine.

“Transfer Station’—Transfer Station means any waste

facility constructed and managed for storage and place-

ment of municipal solid waste in large containers or ve-

hicles for movement to another waste facility.

“Unacceptable Waste’”—that portion of solid waste which

is not acceptable waste and includes, but is not limited

to, sewage and its derivatives, special nuclear or by-

product materials within the meaning of the Atomic

Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and Hazardous Waste,

and Special Waste.

“Waste”—items, materials or substances delivered to a

disposal Facility by the Town, its employees, agents or

contractors.

“White Goods’—all large appliances, including, but not

limited to, stoves, refrigerators, freezers, washing ma-

chines, clothes dryers, dishwashers, air conditioners and

metal artifacts such as swing sets, bicycles and lawn mow-

ers free of all oil and gasoline. White goods shall not

include white goods generated by an owner or operator

of a commercial or industrial use or activity.

SECTION III

DISPOSAL FACILITY:

A. To preserve and protect environmental resources, to

protect the health, safety, and welfare of the public, to

56a

enhance the quailty and character of life in the Town

and to improve efforts to recover and reuse valuable re-

sources currently being wasted, it shall be uniawful to

dispose of acceptable waste generated within the Town

at any location other than the Town Transfer Station,

RWS facility at 64 Blueberry Road in Portland, Maine,

or other licensed facility designated by the Town Council.

B. The Town shall inform all persons of the location of

the Transfer Station by adequate public notice in writing

or in print. Furthermere, the Town shall inform all per-

sons authorized to use the Transfer Station of the proper

location for disposing of the various components of their

solid waste including, but not limited to, recyclable ma-

terials, reusable materials, white goods, brown goods,

landscape refuse, construction/demolition debris, land

clearing debris, tires, ashes, spent motor oil and all other

solid wastes.

C. Property Rights

Any solid waste deposited within the boundary of the

Town shall become the property of the Town or Regional

Waste Systems, Inc., pursuant to the terms of a Waste

Handling Agreement entered into between RWS and the

Town and amendments thereto. No one shall salvage, re-

move or carry off any such deposited solid waste without

prior approval of the Public Works Director or his

designee.

D. From and after the effective date of this ordinance, it

shall be unlawful for any person or firm to accumulate,

or permanently dispose of within the corporate limits of

the Town, abandoned vehicles, garbage, refuse, rubbish,

combustible or incombustible refuse, white goods, brown

goods, recyclable or reusable material or other solid waste

generated within said Town excepting inert fill material,

compost and other material for which specific permission

has been granted by the Town. Failure to remove any

existing accumulation of garbage, refuse, recyclable ma-

terials, rubbish, abandoned vehicles or other solid waste

57a

: materials within thirty (30) days after the effective date

of this ordinance shall be deemed in violation of this

section of the ordinance.

E. Nothing in this subsection shall proh. t a®y person

from composting vegetable and plant materials on his ‘her

property for noncommercial use.

F. The owner of any lot, or any other person with the

permission of the lot owner and Code Enforcement Offi-

cer, may deposit or dump inert substances such as earth,

rocks, concrete or similar material for fill purposes only,

subject to State and/or local Land Use Regulations.

G. Certain materials may be excluded by Town Council

Regulation from those solid waste materials which may

be deposited at the Transfer Station. These excluded ma-

terials may include white goods, brown goods, tires,

ashes, ties, spent motor oil, commercial waste, industrial

waste, land clearing debris, landscape refuse, construc-

tion/demolition debris, abandoned vehicles and bulky or

special waste which may require special processing prior

to disposal.

H. Except for licensed disposal of hazardous, special or

infectious wastes, it shall be unlawful for any person to

burn or incinerate any solid waste within the Town other

than wood products, trees, tree limbs, branches, ties, logs,

leaves, twigs, grass and plant cuttings, other than in an

approved incinerator. Ref: State of Maine Rules and

Guidelines for Open Burning, 38 M.R.S.A, Section 599

and Department of Conservation, Bureau of Forestry 12

M.R.S.A. sections 9301 and 9324.

SECTION IV

AUTHORIZED USE OF THE TRANSFER STATION:

A. The avaitability and use of the portions of the Trans-

fer Station located within the Town shall be limited to

the residents of the Town, both permanent and seasonal,

58a

for the sole purpose of disposing of solid waste generated

within the Town. As a means of use control, the Town

may distribute vehicle permits to authorized users which

shall be affixed to use vehicles. Failure to exhibit such

permit shall result in denial of use of the facilities.

B. Waste generated at a commercial activity which has

been segregated into recyclable, reusable and non-recycla-

ble categories, and is hauled by the generator of the

waste, may be deposited at the Transfer Station.

SECTION V

TRANSFER STATION USER CHARGES:

Upon reviewing recommendations made by the Town

Manager and Public Works Director, the Town Council

may establish by order schedules of waste disposal

charges, operating hours, delivery times and other oper-

ating regulations for the use of the Transfer Station or

any portion thereof located within the Town, which

schedules may include different waste disposal charges,

operating hours, delivery times and other operating reg-

ulations for residents of the Town, businesses located

within the Town and commercial refuse collectors collect-

ing solid waste within the Town and may include differ-

ent sched: #s ‘%* disposal of different kinds of solid

waste. Ali schecules to be or ‘die in the Town Clerk’s

office.

SECTION VI

RESTRICTIONS:

A. Hazardous Waste cannot be deposited at the Trans-

fer Station. The Town shall not be responsible for any

costs or liabilities incurred with the disposal of Hazardous

Waste.

B. Special Waste cannot be deposited at the Transfer

Station. The Town shall not be responsible for any costs

or liabilities incurred with the disposal of Special Waste.

59a

C. Infectious Waste cannot be deposited at the T:ausfer

Station. The Town shall not be responsible for any costs

or liabilities incurred with the disposal of Infectious

Waste.

D. Agricultural Waste . annot be deposited at the Trans-

fer Station. The Town shall not be responsible for any

costs or liabilities incurred with the disposal of Agricul-

tural Waste.

E. Commercial Waste, hauled by the generator of the

waste, which has not becw segregated into recyclable, re-

usable and nonrecyclable categories shall be deposited at

RWS or other licensed facility designated by the Town

Council. The Town shall not be responsible for any costs

incurred with the disposal of nonsegregated Commercial

Waste hauled by the generator.

F. Construction/Demolition debris can be deposited at

the Transfer Station or other location designated by the

Town until an alternate Construction/Demolition Debris

site is in operation. The Town shall not be responsible

for any costs or liabilities incurred with the collection,

storage, transport, or disposal of Construction/Demoli-

tion Debris.

G. Land Clearing Debris can be deposited at the Trans-

fer Station or other location designated by the Town

until an alternate Construction/Demolition site is in oper-

ation. The Town shali not be responsible for any costs

or liabilities incurred with the collection, storage, trans-

port or disposal or Land Clearing Debris.

H. Landscape Refuse can be deposited at the Transfer

Station or other location designated by the Town until

an alternate Construction/Demolition Site is in operation.

The Town shall not be responsible for any costs or liabil-

ities incurred with the collection, storage, transport or

disposal of Landscape Refuse.

I. Owners or operators of a commercial or industrial

use or activity cannot deposit white goods or brown

60a

goods at the Transfer Station. The Town shall not be

responsible for any costs or liabilities incurred with the

collection, storage, transport or disposal of white goods

or brown goods from a commercial use or activity.

J. Industrial waste cannot be deposited at the Transfer

Station. The Town shall not be responsible for any costs

or liabilities incurred with the collection, storage, trans-

port or disposal of industrial waste.

K. It shall be unlawful for any person to place, leave or

deposit at the entrance of, or along the perimeter fence

of the Transfer Station, any garbage, refuse, recyclable

materials, rubbish, white goods or other solid waste ma-

terials during, or outside of the hours of the day and the

days of the week which the Town Council has determined

those facilities open for the disposal of solid waste

materials.

SECTION VII

REGULATION OF COMMERCIAL HAULERS:

A. It shall be unlawful for any person to haul, transport,

collect, remove and dispose of garbage, refuse, recycla-

ble/reusable materials, rubbish, white goods, brown

goods, or other acceptable waste generated within the

Town for a fee without first securing a commercial haul-

er’s license. The Town, upon application and after in-

vestigation, may issue a commercial hauler’s license for

a period of one (1) year.

B. The fee for a hauler’s license shall be established by

Town Council Order. Any person desiring to secure such

a license shall present a written application accompanied

by the fee, to the Town Clerk; such license shall be issued

only after due and proper investigation and recommenda-

tion of the Public Works Director and Public Safety Offi-

cer and after approval by the Town Council.

C. An application for an annual or a limited commercial

hauler’s license shall contain the following information:

6la

a

The name of the applicant,

nN

The applicant’s residence,

The address of the applicant’s place of business,

A description of equipment to be used,

A collection route and schedule,

Place(s) of deposit of solid waste,

Cf -?

A Certificate of Insurance for:

a. Workers Compensation Insurance covering all

employees,

b. Vehicle Liability for a minimum of $1,000,000.00,

c. Comprehensive General Liability for a minimum of

$1,000,000.00.

D. The Commercial Hauler shall deposit all residential,

commercial and industrial acceptable waste generated

within the boundaries of the Town at the Regional Waste

Systems, Inc. facility or at any other licensed solid waste

facility or facilities as may be designated by the Town

Council. The Town shall not be responsible for the col-

lection, transport or disposal of any residential, commer-

cial or industrial acceptable or non-acceptable waste.

E. Trucks or other vehicles used for the transportation of

garbage or other garbage mixed with refuse shall be of the

compactor type, water tight, with an enclosed cargo space.

Collection of dry refuse, rubbish, recyclable, and other

solid waste materials is permitted in open trucks which

shall be covered. No trucks or other vehicles shall be

permitted to scatter any of the contents on any of the

streets, highways, or roads of the Town. Trucks used to

haul garbage refuse, recyclable materials, rubbish, or other

soild waste materials over the streets of the Town must be

maintained in a clean and sanitary condition and shall

meet all the requirements of the Town or appropriate State

agency where applicable. The trucks may be inspected at

aaa naam aaias —_

62a

any time during normal collection hours by the Public

Works Director or his designee. Any deficiencies must be

corrected within 48 hours by the commercial hauler.

Trucks must be cleaned before handling recyclable

materials.

F. With prior notice and hearing, licenses and renewals of

licenses may be denied and any license issued pursuant to

the provisions of this ordinance may be revoked by the

Town Council upon failure of the licensee to comply with

any of the provisions of this ordinance, or with any of the

regulations of the State of Maine, Department of Environ-

mental Protection, relating to the collection and disposal

of garbage, refuse, recyclable materials, rubbish, white

goods or any other solid waste materials. License fees are

non-refundable. An aggrieved party may appeal a license

denial or revocation to Superior Court pursuant to Rule

80B within 30 days of such denial or revocation.

G. Any agreement for the collection, transportation and

disposal of residential, commercial or industrial solid waste

and recyclable materials shall be by private contract be-

tween the Person and the Commercial Hauler licensed

for the purpose of collecting, removing, hauling and dis-

posal of such garbage, recyclable materials, refuse, rub-

bish, white goods, brown goods, and other solid waste

materials.

H. Any agreements for the removal and collection of

recyclable materials must provide that the materials will

be received by the Town or its designee in marketable

condition.

SECTION VIII

DISPOSAL OF CONSTRUCTION/DEMOLITION DE-

BRIS, LAND CLEARING DEBRIS AND LANDSCAPE

REFUSE

A. Only residents of the Town and owners of property

located within the Town may dispose of Construction/

Demolition Debris, Land Clearing Debris and Landscape

63a

Refuse at the Transfer Station or at any other licensed

location designated by the Town.

B. Disposal shall occur in accordance with regulations

determined from time to time by vote of the Town Council

and only in the presence of a Town employee or agent.

C. Contaminated Construction/Demolition Debris, Land

Clearing Debris and Landscape Refuse, cannot be de-

posited at the Transfer Station. The Town shall not be

responsible for any costs incurred with the disposal of

Contaminated Construction/Demolition Debris, Land

Clearing Debris and Landscape Refuse.

SECTION 1X

ADMINISTRATION:

A. The Town Council may establish by order the rules

and regulations governing the availability and use of the

Transfer Station. The operation of the Transfer Station

shall conform to all pertinent regulations and directives

of all local, county, state or federal agencies which may

have jurisdiction.

B. It shall be the duty of the Director of Public Works

to enforce the provisions of this ordinance.

SECTION X

PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION:

Any person or firm who shall violate or fail to comply

with any of the provisions of this ordinance shall:

A. Be punished by a fine, as established by Town Coun-

cil Order, per violation plus costs which fine shall be re-

covered on complaint to the use of the Town. Each day

upon which any continuing violation of any provision of

this Ordinance shall occur shall constitute a separate vio-

lation, and each incident of disposal of Solid Waste in

violation of this Ordinance shal! constitute a separate vio-

64a

lation. In addition, the Town may seek equitable relief,

including but not limited to injunctive relief and indemnifi-

cation of the Town’s liquidated damages to RWS, and

attorney’s fees and costs to ensure compliance with the

terms of this Ordinance.

B. Pay the actual costs to remove and dispose of solid

waste.

C. Pay for any damages to the Town’s facilities or

equipment caused by said violation.

D. Be prohibited from using the Transfer Station, after

notice and hearing for a period of six (6) months by the

Town Manager upon recommendation of the Director of

Public Works or his/her designee. An appeal to this

prohibition may be made to the Town Council within

fourteen (14) days from the notice upon request. Fur-

thermore, an aggrieved party may appeal to Superior

Court pursuant to Rule 80B.

SECTION XI

SEVERABILITY:

If any sentence, clause, or section or part of this ordi-

nance is for any reason found to be unconstitutional, il-

legal, or invalid, such unconstitutionality, illegality, or in-

validity shall not affect or impair any of the remaining

provisions, sentences, clauses, or sections or parts of this

ordinance. It is hereby declared as the intent of the

Town that this ordinance would have been adopted had

such unconstitutional, illegal, or invalid sentence, clause,

section part thereof, not been included herein.

SECTION XII

AMENDMENTS:

This ordinance may be amended as provided by vote of

the Town Council.

65a

SECTION XIlll

EFFECTIVE DATE:

This ordinance shall become effective April 3, 1992 and

immediately upon becoming effective the Town’s current

Flow Control Ordinance shall be repealed.

Adopted by the Gray Town Council on March 3, 1992

and amended on June 2, 1992.

A True Copy

Attest: /s/ Paul Bird |

PAUL BiRD

Town Clerk

September 28, 1992

66a

APPENDIX F

§ 1304-B. Delivery of solid wastes to specific waste

facilities

1. Findings and purpose. The Legislature makes the

following findings of fact. Subject to the provisions of

chapter 24’, the State requires each municipality to pro-

vide for disposal services for domestic and commercial

solid waste generated within the municipality. Solid waste

contains valuable recoverable resources, including energy.

Many municipalities have found that energy recovery re-

duces the cost of solid waste disposal. Energy recovery

technology is complex and the equipment requires a

steady supply of waste to operate efficiently. Because of

the complicated technology, most energy recovery facili-

ties have high capital costs and long payback periods. In

order to remain cost effective throughout their lives, these

energy recovery facilities require a guaranteed, steady

supply of waste. Consequently, municipalities utilizing

energy recovery facilities are usually required to enter

long-term agreements to provide the facilities with spe-

cific amounts of waste. In order to make these energy

recovery facilities financially feasible, and thereby simul-

taneously improve the environmental impacts and the

economics of municipal solid waste disposal, municipali-

ties shall have the legal authority to control the handling

of solid waste generated within their borders.

The purpose of this section is to promote the recovery of

resources from solid waste by creating one of the con-

ditions which make energy recovery economically feasi-

ble, assuring municipalities the authority to guarantee a

steady supply of solid waste to specific waste facilities.

2. Flow control. Subject to the provisions of chapter

24%, municipalities are expressly authorized to enact or-

dinances that control solid waste collection, its transpor-

tation or its delivery to a specific facility, when the pur-

pose and effect of such an ordinance is to gain manage-

67a

ment montrol over solid waste and enable the reclama-

tion of resources, including energy, from these wastes.

This authorization includes, but is not limited to, ordi-

nances:

A. Requiring segregation of wastes;

B. Requiring delivery of wastes generated within

the municipality, or any portion of those wastes, to

a designated disposal or reclamation facility;

C. Designating certain materials as recyclable and

exempt from the provisions of paragraph B; and

D. Designating yard wastes as compost material

and requiring delivery of these wastes to a desig-

nated composting facility.

3. Repealed. Laws 1989, c. 585, § 14.

4. Contracts. In order to encourage and facilitate the

financing and development of solid waste facilities, in-

cluding, but not limited to, facilities for resource recov-

ery, municipalities shall have the following powers, not-

withstanding any law, charter, ordinance provision or

limitation to the contrary:

A. To contract with a corporation described in sub-

section 5 or a refuse disposal district organized un-

der chapter 17° or any person, including, but not

limited to, the owner or operator of any waste facil-

ity, for the collection, transportation, storage, proc-

essing, salvaging or disposal of waste. Any such

contract may be for such term of years and may con-

tain such other provisions as the municipality may

approve. Any such contract may provide that, in

consideration for the obligation of the facility owner

or operator to handle all or any portion of the solid

waste generated in the municipality, the municipality

shall pay to the facility owner or operator such fees,

assessments and other payments as shall be estab-

lished in accordance with the contract.

ARa

B. Without limiting the generality of the powers

conferred in paragraph A, to agree in such a con-

tract to pay fees, assessments or other payments in

such amounts as may be reasonably necessary to

pay:

(1) Costs associated with financing, develop-

ing, constructing, repairing, maintaining and

operating all or any one or more of the waste

facilities owned or operated by the facility

owner or operator, including, but not limited

to, the payment of debt service and the main-

tenance of reasonable reserves or sinking funds

in connection with the financing or operation of

any such waste facilities;

(2) Any other costs incurred by the facility

owner or operator in connection with the han-

dling of solid waste, whether performed at any

waste facility referred to in subparagraph (! )

or at another such facility differently owned

and operated; and

(3) Any deficiencies arising by virtue of the

failure of any other municipality so agreeing to

meet its obligations to pay the costs set forth in

subparagraphs (1) and (2) in accordance with

any similar agreement with the same facility

owner; and

C. To pledge the full faith and credit of the munici-

pality for the payment of fees, assessments and other

payments, as provided in paragraphs A and B, and

to levy upon and raise from taxable estates within

the municipality by general taxes the amounts re-

quired to pay these fees, assessments and payments

or to raise those amounts by means of any fee, user

charge or other cost-sharing or assessment mechan-

ism duly adopted and authorized by the municipality

or to borrow those amounts by issuance of general

obligation bonds or notes.

69a

Any contract complying with the requirements of this

subsection and subsection 6 shall be a properly author-

ized, legal, valid, binding and enforceable obligation of

the municipality, regardless of whether the agreement was

authorized, executed or delivered prior to or after the

effective date of this subsection.

4-A. Contract limitations. Any contract, including

any contract in existence on the effective date of this sub-

section, for the provision of waste disposal, transportation

or handling services to municipalities is subject to the

following limitations.

A. No contract for waste disposal, transportation or

handling services may prevent a municipality from

recyling any portion of its solid waste, provided that

any minimum BTU content level and minimum ton-

nage level required by that contract is maintained by

the municipality.

B. No contract for waste disposal, transportation or

handling services may prevent a municipality from

meeting its obligations to supply a minimum BTU

content level and minimum tonnage level required by

that contract using solid waste generated outside its

borders, provided that:

(1) The municipality is or will be unable, as

the direct result of recycling or source reduction

efforts, to meet the obligations using solid waste

generated within its jurisdiction; and

(2) The municipality is liable for any damages

caused by any solid waste it relies upon to

satisfy the provisions of its contract.

C. For those waste disposal, transportation or han-

dling services contracts which do not principally rely

upon requiring minimum BTU content level or mini-

mum tonnage level to secure solid waste for the

waste disposal facility, but which instead rely upon

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a requirement that the municipality provide all or

most of its solid waste to the waste disposal facility,

no such contract may prohibit a municipality during

the term of the contract from recycling those mate-

rials which the municipality determines to be re-

cyclable.

D. A municipality which anticipetes that it will be

unable to meet its contract obligation to supply a

minimum BTU content level or minimum tonnage

due to waste reduction or recycling programs and is

unable to reach an agreement with the incinerator

for the anticipated reduction may request the agency

to intercede. The agency shall assist the incinerator

in soliciting solid waste to mitigate any anticipated

shortfall in minimum BTU content level or minimum

tonnage. If no agreement on mitigation of an an-

ticipated shortfall is reached, the terms of the origi-

nal contract shall prevail, except as otherwise pro-

vided in this chapter.

5. Public waste disposal corporations. Notwithstand-

ing any law, charter, ordinance provision or limitation to

the contrary, pursuant to any interlocal agreement en-

tered into in accordance with Title 30-A, chapter 115,”

any 2 or more municipalities may organize or cause to

be organized or may participate in one or more corpora-

tions organized as nonprofit corporations under Title 13,

chapter 81,° or Title 13-B for the purpose, among other

permissible purposes, of owning or operating any one or

more waste facilities described in subsection 4, paragraph

A, and a subscribing municipality may agree in any such

interlocal agreement to pay fees, assessments or other

payments as described in subsection 4, paragraph B, for

such term of years and on such other terms as the inter-

local agreement may provide and may pledge the full

faith and credit of the municipality to the same extent

provided in subsection 4, paragraph C. The applicable

interlocal agreement or the articles of incorporation or

bylaws of the corporation must provide that:

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A. The corporation shall be organized and con-

tinuously thereafter operated as a nonprofit corpora-

tion, no part of the net earnings of which may inure

to the benefit of any member, director, officer or

other private person;

B. The directors of the corporation shall be elected

by the municipal officers of the municipalities par-

ticipating in the corporation; and

C. Upon dissolution or liquidation of the corpora-

tion, title to all of its property shall vest in one or

more of the municipalities participating in the cor-

poration.

Any interlocal agreement complying with the require-

ments of this subsection and subsection 6 must be a

properly authorized, legal, valid, binding and enforceable

obligation of the municipality, regardless of whether the

agreement was authorized, executed or delivered prior to

or after the effective date of this subsection. Any corpora-

tion organized in a manner that satisfies the requirements set

forth in this subsection and subsection 6, whether or-

ganized prior to or after the effective date of this sub-

section, shall be deemed for all purposes as organized

pursuant to this subsection. If so provided in the appli-

cable interlocal agreement, any such corporation shall

have the power, in addition to any other powers that

may be delegated under Title 30-A, chapter 115, to issue,

on behalf of one or more of the municipalities participat-

ing in the corporation, in order to finance the facilities,

revenue obligation securities issued in accordance with

Title 10, chapter 110, subchapter IV,‘ and any other

bonds, notes or debt obligations which municipalities are

authorized to issue by applicable law. For these purposes,

the term “municipal officers” as used in Title 10, chapter

110, subchapter IV, means the board of directors of any

corporation described in this subsection. Title 10, section

1064, subsection 6, may not be construed to prohibit

the assignment or pledge as collateral security of any

72a

contract of a municipality authorized by this section or

of any or all of the payments under this section, regard-

less of whether the provisions of subsection 4, paragraph

C, are applicable to the contract or payments. The pro-

visions of Title 10, sections 1063 and 1064, subsection

1, paragraph A and paragraph C, subparagraph (4) do

not apply to revenue obligation securities issued by any

public waste disposal corporation described in this sub-

section.

6. Relationship to other laws. The obligation of a

municipality to pay any fees, assessments or other pay-

ments in accordance with any agreement entered into

pursuant to subsection 4 or any interlocal agreement re-

ferred to in subsection 5 shall not constitute a “debt” or

“indebtedness” of the municipality within the meaning of

any statutory, charter or ordinance provision limiting the

incurrence or the amount of municipal indebtedness nor

shall the authorization or incurrence of the obligation or

any municipal action to raise funds to meet the obligation

by any means set forth in subsection 4, paragraph C, re-

quire or be subject to any voter referendum or approval

under any law or any charter or ordinance provision.

A. A municipality may agree to make payments in

accordance with subsection 4, paragraph B, or in

accordance with the provisions of any interlocal

agreement referred to in subsection 5 with regard to

all or any portion of debt incurred or to be incurred

for the financing of one or more waste facilities, pro-

vided that no such payments shall be made with re-

spect to debt or any portion of debt which, when

incurred, would cause the total principal balance of

all then outstanding debt or portions of debt to which

the payments apply to exceed:

(1) Three percent of the last full state valuation

of the municipality; minus

(2) The municipality’s then obtaining allocable

share of any debt or portions of debt described

73a

in paragraph B with regard to which it is obliged

to make payments.

B. Notwithstanding paragraph A, 2 or more munici-

palities may agree to make payments in accordance

with subsection 4, paragraph B, or in accordance

with any interlocal agreement referred to in subsec-

tion 5 with regard to all or any portion of debt in-

curred or to be incurred for the financing of one or

more waste facilities, provided that no such payments

may be made with respect to debt or any portions of

debts which, when incurred, would cause the total

principal balance of all then outstanding debt or por-

tions of debt to which the payments apply to exceed:

(1) Three percent of the sum of the last full

state valuation of all municipalities so agreeing;

minus

(2) Any amounts of debt or portions of debt

described in paragraph A in connection with

which any such municipality is obliged to make

payments.

The limitations set forth in paragraphs A and B shall

only apply to agreements by which a municipality or

group of municipalities have agreed to make pay-

ments directly based, among other things, on a facil-

ity owner’s costs of debt service and other costs of

financing and shall not be construed to apply to con-

tract payments calculated on any other basis, even if

the facility owner uses the payments to meet its debt

service obligations.

The obligation of the municipality to pay fees, assess-

ments and other payments in accordance with subsection

4 or any interlocal agreement referred to in subsection 5

shall be binding upon and enforceable against the munici-

pality without regard to whether all or any one or more

of the waste facilities referred to in subsection 4, para-

graph B, subparagraph (1), becomes operational or was

74a

or will be in operation during the period for which the

fees, assessments or other payments are so charged.

No contract entered into in accordance with subsection 4

nor any ordinance adopted under the authority of subsec-

tion 2 may be deemed a contract in restraint of trade or

otherwise unlawful under Title 10, chapter 201.°

Notwithstanding any law, charter or ordinance provisions

to the contrary, the powers conferred upon a municipality

pursuant to subsections 4 and 5 and this subsection may

be exercised by the municipal officers as defined in Title

30-A, section 2001, including the assessors of a plantation,

only when authorized, in the case of a municipality with

a city or town council, by action of the council and, in

the case of a municipality without such a council, by ac-

tion of the town meeting. This paragraph shall apply

whether or not the action of the city council, town council

or town meeting was taken before or after March 21,

1986.

Nothing in this section may be construed to be a limitation

on the Home Rule powers granted to municipalities under

Title 30-A, section 3001, or on the ability of communities

to jointly exercise their powers as is recognized in Title

30-A, section 2201. This section provides an additional

and alternative method for carrying out this subchapter.

7. Subjugation. Notwithstanding any provision of this

section to the contrary, the exercise of any power or

authority granted under this section is subject to the provi-

sions of chapter 24.’

75a

APPENDIX G

ONE HUNDRED AND SIXTH LEGISLATURE

Legislative Document No. 1903

STATE OF MAINE

IN THE YEAR OF OUR LORD

NINETEEN HUNDRED SEVENTY-THREE

AN ACT Relating to Solid Waste Disposal

Be it enacted by the People of the State of Maine, as

follows:

R. S., T. 38, c. 13, additional. Title 38 of the Revised

Statutes is amended by adding a new chapter 13, to read

as follows:

CHAPTER 13

SOLID WASTE MANAGEMENT

§ 1301. Short title

This chapter shall be known and may be cited as the

“Maine Solid Waste Management Act.”

§ 1302. Declaration of policy

The Legislature declares it to be the policy of the State

of Maine consistent with its responsibility to protect the

health, safety and welfare of its citizens, enhance and

maintain the quality of the environment, conserve natural

resources and prevent water and air pollution, that it shall

encourage solid waste programs, public or private, which

will reduce the volume of solid waste production, improve

efforts to reuse and recover valuable resources currently

being wasted and which will not adversely affect the pub-

lic health, safety and welfare of the citizens nor degrade

the environment.

76a

The Legislature also finds and declares that economic,

efficient and environmentally sound method of waste dis-

posal is of the highest priority. Municipalities are gen-

erating increasing amounts of solid waste with no sys-

tematic or consistent methods being used to reduce the

volume of waste or to soundly dispose of it. Failure to

plan properly for future solid waste may further deplete

already taxed natural resources and aggravate environ-

mental and public health problems resulting from present

inadequate practices of resource recovery and solid waste

disposal.

§ 1303. Definitions

The following words when used in this chapter shall

have the following meanings unless the context in which

they are used clearly shows a different meaning:

1. Board. “Board” means the Board of Environmen-

tal Protection.

2. Commissioner. “Commissioner” means the Commis-

sioner of the Department of Environmental Protection.

4. Municipality. “Municipality” means a city or town.

5. Person. “Person” means an individual, firm, cor-

poration, partnership, association, municipality, quasi-

municipal corporation, state agency or any other legal

entity.

6. Recoverable resources. “Recoverable resources”

means materials that still have useful physical or chemical!

properties after serving a specific purpose and can be re-

used or recycled for the same or other purposes.

7. Solid waste. “Solid waste” means useless, un-

wanted or discarded solid material with insufficient liquid

content to be free flewing. inc'uding by way of example,

and not by limitation, rubbish, garbage, scrap materials,

77a

junk, refuse, inert fill material and landscape refuse, but

shall not include septic tank sludge or agricultural wastes.

8. Solid waste disposal facility. “Solid waste disposal

facility” means any land area or structure or combination

of land area and structures, including dumps, used for

storing, salvaging, processing, reducing, incinerating or

disposing of solid wastes.

9. Solid waste management. “Solid waste manage-

ment” means purposeful, systematic and unified control of

the collection, storage, transportation, processing, salvag-

ing and disposal of solid waste.

§ 1304. Department; powers and duties

1. Rules and regulations. The board may adopt,

amend and enforce such rules and regulations as it deems

necessary governing solid waste management, including

the location, establishment, construction and alteration of

solid waste facilities. Such regulations shall be designed to

encourage logical utilization of recoverable resources, to

minimize pollution of the state’s air, land and water re-

sources, prevent the spread of disease or other health

hazards, prevent contamination of drinking water supplies

and protect public health and safety. In adopting such

regulations, the board shall also consider economic im-

pact, technical feasibility and such differences between

municipalities as are created by population, waste volume

and geographic location. Regulations shall be promul-

gated in the manner provided by section 361. The mu-

nicipal officers of all municipalities shall be notified, in

writing, at least 30 days prior to any hearing. Regulations

adopted pursuant to this section shall not become effective

until July 1, 1975, thereby affording ample opportunity

for the Legislature to modify, expand or reject such regu-

lations as deemed appropriate.

No regulation adopted pursuant to this section shall ex-

ceed air quality standards authorized by Title 38, chapter

4.

78a

2. Site location. The board may provide by regula-

tion that no person may locate, establish, construct, alter

or operate any solid waste disposal facility unless ap-

proved by the board under sections 481 to 488.

3. Municipal status reports. The department shall re-

view reports submitted by municipalities as required by

section 1305. Report forms shall be prepared and dis-

tributed by the department. Required information shall

include, but not be limited to, the following:

A. Location of solid waste disposal facility sites

within the municipality whether publicly or privately

owned or operated, their mode of operation and

anticipated useful life;

B. Ordinances or regulations adopted by or pro-

posed for the municipality which regulate the use of

waste disposal facilities within the municipality;

C. All legal arrangements established by municipali-

ties for providing a solid waste disposal facility for

solid waste generated within the municipality;

D. Any plan for solid waste management officially

adopted by the municipality.

4. Technical assistance. The department is author-

ized to establish guidelines for effective solid waste man-

agement, to provide technical assistance to persons plan-

ning, constructing or operating solid waste disposal facili-

ties, and to conduct applied research activities in the field

of solid waste management, including methods of recy-

cling solid waste items.

5. Planning grants. The department is authorized to

receive funds, public and private, to use such funds for

the administration of this chapter and to make grants

from such funds to municipalities and regional planning

agencies or their agents as designated by the municipality,

for the purpose of planning and implementing solid waste

management activities and solid waste disposal facilities

pursuant to guidelines established by the board,

79a

§ 1305. Municipalities; powers and duties

1. Disposal facilities. Each municipality shall pro-

vide a solid waste disposal facility for domestic and com-

mercial solid waste generated within the municipality and

may provide such a facility for industrial wastes and

sewage treatment plant sludge.

2. Ordinances. This chapter shall not be construed

as limiting the authority of any municipality to enact ordi-

nances for the regulation of solid waste disposal, provided

that such ordinances are not less stringent than or incon-

sistent with the provisions of this chapter or the regula-

tions adopted thereunder.

3. Contracts. Municipalities may contract with any

person for the collection, transportation, storage, process-

ing, salvaging or disposal of solid wastes.

4. Municipal status reports. The municipal officers of

each municipality shall, on or before the first day oi

November, 1973, and on or before the first day of June

each year thereafter, submit on forms prepared by the

department, information relating to solid waste manage-

ment within the municipality.

5. Municipal permits. All permits issued pursuant to

Title 30, sections 2451 to 2460 shall, in addition to re-

quirements imposed by those sections, be conditioned on

compliance with rules and regulations adopted by the

board concerning the operation of solid waste disposal

facilities. Copies of permits issued by the municipality

shall be submitted to the department within 30 days of

issue.

§ 1306. Prohibited acts

It shall be unlawful for any person to establish, con-

struct, alter or operate any waste disposal facility or to

store, collect, transport, process or dispose of solid waste

contrary to regulations prewiuigated by the department.

80a

§ 1307. Violations

Any person violating any provision of this chapter or

the rules or regulations promulgated thereunder shall be

punished by a fine of not more than $500 for each day a

violation exists. The Superior Court shall have jurisdic-

tion to enjoin any violation of this chapter or the rules or

regulations promulgated thereunder.

§ 1308. Exemptions

Rules and regulations adopted pursuant to this chapter

concerning the location, establishment and construction of

solid waste disposal facilities, but not concerning altera-

tion or operation, shall not affect such facilities in ex-

istence prior to the effective date of this Act.

STATEMENT OF FACT

The purpose of this Act is to designate the Department

of Environmental Protection as the State agency respon-

sible for developing guidelines and regulations relating to

the collection, storage, processing, salvaging and disposal

of solid wastes. The Department would be empowered to

enact uniform regulations designed to prevent environ-

mental harm and public health hazards, however, such

regulations will not become effective until July 1, 1975,

thereby affording the 107th Legislature to modify, ex-

pand or reject such regulations as deemed appropriate.

This Act also requires municipalities to assume responsi-

bility for the orderly disposal of solid waste except that

generated by industry and waste water treatment plant

sludge. |

8la

STATE OF MAINE

SENATE

106TH LEGISLATURE

SENATE AMENDMENT “A” to H.P. 1478, L.D.

1903, Bill, “AN ACT Relating to Solid Waste Disposal.”

Amend said Bill in that part designated “§ 1308.” by

adding at the end of new sentence to read as follows:

‘Landscape refuse and fill disposal sites established

in connection with public works projects and com-

monly known as “stump dumps” are exempt from

this chapter.’

Statement of Fact

The purpose of this amendment is to exempt “stump

dumps” from the bill.

Name: #/s/ [Illegible]

(Schulten )

County: Sagadahoc.

Reproduced and distributed pursuant to Senate Rule

No. 11 A.

This is a copy of a public record, reproduced as it was published. It is not legal advice, and it may not be the version a court would rely on. Check the official source before you cite it.

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