Appendix — Turner v. LaMarca

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In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1993

.

R. V. Turner, individually in his former capacity as

Superintendent of Glades Correctional Institution,

Chester Lambdin, in his official capacity as

Superintendent of Glades Correctional Institution,

Petitioners,

V.

Anthony LaMarca, Martin Saunders and Edwin Johnson,

individually and on behalf of all others similarly situated,

and David Aldred, Steve H. Bronson, Jr., Eddie Cobb,

Ron Durrance, and Billy Joe Harper, individually,

Respondents.

—

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiora:i To The

United States Court Of Appeals

For The Eleventh Circuit

+

APPENDIX TO

PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI

7

MicHaet B. Davis

Counsel of Record

PAXTON, Crow, BRAGG, SMITH &

Keyser, P.A.

Suite 500

1615 Forum Place

West Palm Beach, FL 33401

(407) 684-2121

Rospert A. BUTTERWORTH

Attorney General

SARALYN NEMSER

Assistant Attorney General

Suite 505 — South

4000 Hollywood Boulevard

Hollywood, FL 33031

(305) 985-4788

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

N

10.

INDEX

Page

Opinion, United States Court of Appeals, Elev-

enth Circuit, July 7, 1993....................... Al

Judgment, United States Court of Appeals, Elev-

enth Circuit, July 7, 1993..................... A53

Order of Magistrate, United States District

Court, Southern District of Florida, November

25, 1985 (denying demand for jury trial)....... A55

Order, United States District Court, Southern

District of Florida, December 2, 1985 (affirming

Magistrate’s denial of an? fe PR pret & A57

Order On Report And Recommendation of Mag-

istrate, United States District Court, Southern

District of Florida, June 4, 1987 (with Report and

Recommendation incorporated).............,.. A59

Order, United States Court of Appeals, Eleventh

Circuit, October 18, 1988 (dismissing first appeal

Wee Pe oso A234

Findings of Fact And Conclusions of Law,

United States District Court, Southern District of

Florida, Pe ER cose A236

Final Judgment, United States District Court

Southern District of Florida, April 30, 1990... A263

Order, United States District Court, Southern

District of Florida, September 21, 1987 (denying

post-trial motions to Phase I determination). . A269

Order on Petition For Rehearing, United States

Court of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit, October 4,

veige iE RL TOT PE eae nS A272

11.

13.

il

IN DE X —- Continued

Page

Order on Petition For Rehearing And Sugges-

tion of Rehearing En Banc, United States Court

of Appeals, Eleventh Circuit)................. A274

Appellants’ Petition For Rehearing, August 13,

1993 (directed to decision of the Court of

Appeals, Eleventh Circuit). .......00.e0cecees: A276

United States Constitution, Amendments

Asticte ViRb csc caccwe te wie ee ee ee A289

Artictes ATV, Secthow F occ uun ot tease A289

42 U.S.C. § 1008.33.05 eee A289

Al

Anthony LaMARCA, Martin Saunders and

Edwin Johnson, individually and on behalf of

all others similarly situated, and David

Aldred, Steve H. Bronson, Jr., Eddie Cobb, Ron

Durrance, Wayne Epprecht, Michael Gordon

and Billy Joe Harper, individually, Plaintiffs-

Appellees,

Vv.

R.V. TURNER, individually in his former

capacity as Superintendent of Glades Correc-

tional Institution, Chester Lambdin, in his

official capacity as Superintendent of Glades

Correctional Institution, Defendants-Appel-

lants.

No. 90-5909.

United States Court of Appeals,

Eleventh Circuit

July 7, 1993.

Before TJOFLAT, Chief Judge, DUBINA, Circuit

Judge, and WILLIAMS,’ Senior Circuit Judge.

TJOFLAT, Chief Judge.

This is a suit brought by ten present and former

inmates of Glades Correctional Institution (GCI), a Flor-

ida prison. They seek individually, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

(1988), money damages for cruel and unusual punish-

ment they allege they suffered because of the deliberate

indifference of a former superintendent of the institution,

Randall Turner. The plaintiffs still housed at GCI also

* Honorable Jerre S. Williams, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for the

Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation.

A 2

seek an injunction, on behalf of all present and future

inmates at the prison, against the current superintendent,

Chester Lambdin, to correct certain allegedly unconstitu-

tional conditions of confinement.

After the parties joined issue (on the plaintiffs’ third

amended complaint), the district court, having denied

Turner’s demand for a jury trial, tried the ten damages

claims and entered judgment for eight of them.! Turner

appealed, but we dismissed the appeal for want of a final

judgment as the district court had not disposed of the still

pending claim for injunctive relief. LaMarca v. Turner, 861

F.2d 724 (11th Cir.1988) (Table) (the first appeal). After

our order dismissing the appeal reached the district

court, Turner moved the court to reopen the record on the

plaintiffs’ damages claims so that he could introduce

some additional evidence on the issue of liability. The

court, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction to revisit

those claims, denied the motion. The court then turned to

the claim for injunctive relief.

After hearing five days of testimony relating to the

current conditions of confinement, the court identified

several areas of concern that “require[d its] attention.”

Although the challenged prison conditions had improved

considerably, the court concluded that injunctive relief

was necessary. The court’s final judgment therefore

granted injunctive relief and the money damages previ-

ously awarded, along with attorney’s fees under 42

U.S.C. § 1988 (1988). The instant appeal is from that final

' As we explain in the text infra, a magistrate judge actually

heard the claims; the district court disposed of them after con-

sidering de novo the former’s report and recommendation.

A 3

judgment. Turner appeals the damages awards; Lambdin

appeals the injunction.

We now vacate all of the damages awards and

remand them for further proceedings. We do so as to five

of the appellees because the court should have honored

Turner’s demand for a jury trial. As to the three remain-

ing appellees, the court applied the wrong legal standard

for Eighth Amendment damages liability and, moreover,

erred in concluding that it lacked jurisdiction (following

dismissal of the first appeal) to reopen the record and

entertain the evidence Turner proffered in defense of the

damages claims. Finally, we vacate in part the injunction

against Lambdin and remand the matter of equitable

relief for further proceedings.

Part I of this opinion outlines the case’s procedural

history and describes the facts underlying the damages

claims and the claim for injunctive relief. Part II rejects

Turner’s arguement that the plaintiffs failed to present

sufficient evidence to prevail, but holds that the district

court applied the wrong legal standard for Eighth

Amendment liability for money damages. Part III

addresses the district court’s grant of injunctive relief.

Part IV considers Turner’s Seventh Amendment jury

demand. Finally, part V reviews Turner’s attacks on the

trial court’s treatment of his motions to continue and to

augment the trial record.

A 4

I.

A.

On May 14, 1982, Anthony LaMarca, then an inmate at

GCI, filed a handwritten pro se complaint in the district court

stating that he had “been countlessly approached, threatened

with physical violence and assaulted by other inmates at

[GCI] because [he] refused to participate in homosexual

activities, or pay protection to be left alone.”? He alleged that

“a severe lack of protection” existed at GCI and that “the

institution seem[ed] unable or unwilling to handle the situa-

tion.” On September 21, 1983, LaMarca, having obtained

counsel, filed an amended complaint adding three other GCI

prisoners as plaintiffs, Martin Saunders, Edwin Johnson, and

Henry Rosenbaum.* Each prisoner sought damages under 42

U.S.C. § 1983, and, as class representatives, “injunctive relief

for all . . . present and future inmates of GCI.”4 On

2 A more detailed exposition of the facts supporting the

plaintiffs’ damages claims is set out in the magistrate judge’s

Report and Recommended Findings of Fact and Conclusions of

Law, LaMarca v. Turner, 662 F.Supp. 647, 667-717 (S.D.Fla.1987),

which the district court reviewed de novo and adopted in all

relevant parts, see id. at 650-667. The court’s subsequent order

granting injunctive relief was not published.

’ The court later severed Rosenbaum’s claim, and it is not

before us.

* On April 13, 1984, the district court certified a class of “all

those persons who are or will be incarcerated at the Glades

Correctional Institution located in Belle Glade Florida.” See

Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a), (b)(2).

A5

November 2, 1983, the defendants, Turner and Lambdin,

filed their answer to the first amended complaint.°

On August 26, 1985, more than a year and half after

the defendants answered the first amended complaint,

the plaintiffs moved the court to amend the complaint a

second time, adding seven plaintiffs, David Aldred, Steve

H. Bronson, Jr., Eddie Cobb, Ron Durrance, Wayne

Epprecht, Michael Gordon, and Keith Harris. Each

alleged that he was assaulted while an inmate at GCI, and

sought damages against Turner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

The defendants objected to the joinder of these addi-

tional plaintiffs, claiming that the joinder would unrea-

sonably burden their preparation for trial which was then

set for November 4, 1985. Nevertheless, the magistrate

judge who was to hear the case granted plaintiffs’ motion

to amend.® The defendants immediately requested a con-

tinuance of the trial, arguing that in light of the presence

of the seven new plaintiffs, they required at least ninety

days for additional discovery and trial preparation. The

magistrate judge granted the defendants a one-month

continuance, resetting the trial for December 2, 1985, on

5 Actually, Turner answered the first amended complaint.

Lambdin was not made a defendant until he became superinten-

dent of GCI in December 1985. For convenience we refer to

Lambdin throughout the opinion as the defendant for the

injunctive relief claim.

6 The district court had referred the case to a magistrate

judge to conduct an evidentiary hearing on all claims and to

prepare a report and recommendation. See $.D.Fla.Mag.J.R. 1(f).

We refer to this hearing as the “trial” or the “damages trial.”

A 6

November 8, 1985, the defendants filed a demand for jury

trial “of all issues so triable.”7

On November 13, 1985, Turner and Lambdin

requested another continuance, claiming that they could

not complete discovery and prepare for trial by the

December 2 trial date. Two days later, before the court

could act on the motion, the plaintiffs moved the court

for leave ‘o file a third amended complaint, adding

another plaintiff, Billy Joe Harper, who sought damages

against Turner, and dropping Harris from the suit. The

court referred both motions to the magistrate judge. On

November 28, the magistrate judge gave the plaintiffs

leave to amend, but refused to grant the defendants a

continuance or a jury trial. The defendants, pursuant to

S.D.Fla.Mag.J.R. 4(a), immediately appealed the magis-

trate judge’s rulings to the district court. On December 2,

the court affirmed these rulings and the trial began.

To summarize, on December 2, the case proceeded to

trial on the allegations of the third amended complaint.

This complaint stated section 1983 claims for damages

against Turner, individually, by LaMarca, Saunders, and

Johnson (the original plaintiffs), and Aldred, Bronson,

Cobb, Durrance, Epprecht, Gordon, and Harper (the new

7 The defendants made their jury demand, but did not

answer the second amended complaint. Their failure to file an

answer became unimportant when, as the following text indi-

cates, the plaintiffs obtained leave to file a third amended com-

plaint. Because the parties, below and on appeal, have assumed

that the original jury demand was timely as to the third

amended complaint, we do not address whether the demand

actually was timely.

A 7

plaintiffs). The original plaintiffs also served as represen-

tatives for purposes of the class action claim for injunc-

tive relief against Lambdin in his official capacity as

superintendent of GCI.

B.

The magistrate judge, operating under

S.D.Fla.Mag.J.R. 1(f), commenced the bench trial. At the

plaintiffs’ request, the magistrate judge bifurcated the

proceeding, indefinitely postponing consideration of the

claim for injunctive relief. The trial, therefore, considered

only the damages claims against Turner. The following is

a brief statement of the facts the court found.®

The inmate assaults complained of occurred between

1981 and 1984, during Turner’s tenure as superintendent.

GCI had four dorms (“A”, “B”, “C”, “D”).9 The A and D

dorms each had two wings containing three rows of

twenty bunk beds. The B and C dorms were smaller, but

also had bunk beds arranged in three rows. Each dorm

had a shower, located at one end of the building, and a

“wicket,” or cage, located in the center of the dorm, that

provided officers with a vantage point from which to

observe the inmates. A guard’s view from the wicket into

the interior of the dorm and the shower area was

8 We recite the facts explicitly found by the magistrate

judge and adopted by the district court. We also recite facts that

we consider to have been implicitly found, because they were

not in dispute. Since we must vacate and remand the money

judgments for the plaintiffs, the district court's findings of fact

will not be binding in the subsequent proceedings in this case.

® GCI also had an “honor” dorm not relevant in this case.

A 8

obstructed by sheets and towels the inmates hung from

their bunk beds, the placement of bunk beds next to the

isles leading to the shower area, and opaque glass on the

shower door. While officers were supposed to patrol the

interiors of the dorms regularly, they did not.

The prison also maintained cells for disciplinary,

administrative, and protective confinements. This special

detention suffered from substandard conditions. The cells

lacked adequate ventilation, had poor lighting, and were

infested with roaches and vermin. Prisoners were

allowed little or no exercise, only three showers a week,

no canteen privileges, and only limited use of the law

library. Inmates in the general population could gain

access to the confinement area by crawling under a

poorly maintained fence or with the permission of the

guard in charge of the area. These confinements, there-

fore, failed to insulate inmates from their tormentors.

Finally, an inordinate number of inmates requested pro-

tective confinement, leading to overcrowding and indi-

cating that a serious problem existed in the general

population. The court found that the conditions in protec-

tive confinement were substandard, and therefore dis-

couraged inmates from remaining in this potential

safehaven.

Turner, in a July 16, 1981 letter to his superior,

described the prevailing atmosphere at GCI: “On an

almost daily basis I feel that our security staff is simply

being tolerated by the inmate population rather than

being in control of the operation of the institution.”

LaMarca, 662 F.Supp. at 673. The presence of contraband

(weapons, alcohol, and drugs), corruption of GCI’s staff,

A9

inmate violence, and homosexual activity were accepted

as part of prison life.

While a minimal level of contraband may be an

unavoidable aspect of prison life, excessive quantities of

contraband flowed freely into and within the prison.

Prison officials made “little or no effort . . . to control

illicit activity at GCI, resulting in readily-available con-

traband.” Id. at 657. Inmates carried knives and openly

used drugs. The contraband problem was compounded

by staff corruption, as prison officials contributed to, and

apparently profited from, the contraband, and utilized

prisoners to “control” and punish other prisoners.

GCl’s staff permitted regular, unsupervised showings

of hard-core pornographic movies. As Dr. Swanson, an

expert witness for the plaintiffs, testified, these movies

“would only serve to maximize the possibility of sexual

and other violence.” Indicative of this observation, dur-

ing the movies, “[s]ounds of inmates screaming and cry-

ing could be heard.”

When alerted to specific dangers, prison staff often

looked the other way rather than protect inmates. Rather

than offer to help, the staff suggested that the inmates

deal with their problems “like men,” that is, use physical

force against the aggressive inmate.'°

Several management problems persisted during

Turner’s tenure as superintendent: low morale among the

10 The acceptance of this condition might be best illustrated

by LaMarca’s story (taken as credible by the district court) that

when he asked a guard for protection, the guard gave him a

knife.

A 10

prison’s staff, high employee turnover (leading to a less

experienced staff), high vacancy rates for staff positions,

and inadequate supervision of employees.!! As Turner

confirmed, these problems had a direct effect on GCI’s

ability to maintain security. Certain of the prison’s stan-

dard operating procedures were insufficient to protect

prisoner safety. For example, the procedures for investi-

gating rapes, to the extent such procedures existed, were

not followed; some of the reported incidents were not

investigated at all. The lack of such procedures created an

atmosphere of tolerance of rape which enhanced the risk

that incidents would occur. id., at 678 (finding an atmo-

sphere where “inmates could rape other vulnerable

inmates without concern of being the detected or

deterred”).

Aggression was commonplace and exacerbated by

the readily available contraband and an excessively per-

missive atmosphere. While underfunding, overcrowding,

and a lack of security personnel no doubt contributed to

these problems, Turner could have controlled the permis-

sive atmosphere through proper supervision and could

'l In a survey, when GCI’s staff were asked, “ ‘Did you

receive instructions or guidelines on the responsibilities and

supervisory functions of your job when you became super-

visor?,’ they answered with a ‘resounding no.’ ” Id. at 674. The

Department of Corrections, Office of Inspector General

observed that “we fail to understand and appreciate laxity, in

some instances, the disregard for established procedures.” Id.

The court found that when staff engaged in egregious conduct,

“so gross that immediate action should have been taken.”

Turner did not act. Id. at 675. This “underscore[d] the day-to-

day operation of GCI with its staff not controlled by Superinten-

dent Turner.” Id. at 677.

A ll

have remedied the contraband problems with inexpen-

sive modifications to the prison’s procedures and physi-

cal plant. In sum, as the court concluded, “Turner’s

overall laxity in managing and controlling his staff”

directly contribute to an unconstitutional condition of -

confinement at GCI consisting of an undeterred atmo-

sphere of violence. Id. at 662, 684.

For purposes of this appeal, the appellants concede

the credibility of the plaintiffs’ accounts of the alleged

assaults. A group of inmates, one brandishing a bush ax,

~~ made an unsuccessful attempt sexually to assault

LaMarca in a dorm. Inmates raped Saunders in a small

bathroom adjacent to the confinement area; he reported

the incident but officials did not investigate and refused

his request for a medical examination. Inmates repeatedly

attacked Johnson while he was in protective confinement.

Inmates raped Aldred and Durrance in shower areas.

Aldred reported the incident to an officer, but there was

no investigation. Bronson was sexually assaulted with the

handle of a baseball bat on GCI’s recreation field. Cobb

was stabbed by an inmate who, because of his coopera-

tion with guards in conducting illicit activities, was pro-

tected.

af

On January 8, 1986, after the parties had filed pro-

posed findings of fact and conclusions of law, and had

argued them before the magistrate judge, the magistrate

judge issued a 135-page “Report and Recommendation”

recommending a specific damages award for each of the

ten plaintiffs. The district court reviewed the magistrate

A 12

judge’s report de novo, see Federal Magistrate’s Act, 28

U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1988); S.D.Fla.Magis.J.R. 4(b), and

adopted his recommendations in all relevant detail as to

eight of the plaintiffs.'12 The court entered judgment

accordingly on June 4, 1987.}%

As noted earlier, although the district court had nei-

ther addressed nor disposed of the claim for injunctive

relief, Turner appealed to this court. We dismissed the

appeal for want of a final judgment and returned the case

to the district court for further proceedings on that claim.

D.

On the first day of trial before the district court on

the claim for injunctive relief, David M. Lipman, counsel

for the inmate class, conceded that the atmosphere at GCI

had changed “in such a manner that as to [many] condi-

tions and practices, [the class] no longer [sought] injunc-

tive relief.”'4 Although the district court observed that

12 The court concluded, however, that two plaintiffs,

Epprecht and Gordon, had not proven that Turner’s deliberate

indifference to their need for safety caused their injuries.

LaMarca, 662 F.Supp. at 665. Epprecht and Gordon have not

appealed.

‘3 The court granted monetary awards to Anthony

LaMarca, $9,000, Edwin Johnson, $13,000, Eddie Cobb, $6,500,

and Martin Saunders, David Aldred, Steve H. Bronson, Ron

Durrance, and Billy Joe Harper, each $30,000. LaMarca, 662

F.Supp. at 667, 715.

'4 Lipman was still concerned about the adequacy of the

security GCI’s staff was providing the inmates, the conditions

surrounding the protective confinement cells, the ready avail-

ability of counseling for inmates who had been raped, and the

presence of contraband, in particular weapons and drugs.

NNN

A 13

Superintendent Lambdin “appears to be a dedicated pub-

lic servant,” and that physical conditions at GCI were

“generally satisfactory,” the court found “ample room for

improvement in the conditions at GCI.” In the court’s

view, the superintendent and his staff still did not take

the threat of inmate violence seriously enough. In partic-

ular, they failed to ensure that GCI’s policies designed to

protect prisoners, including regular security patrols, were

properly carried out. Finally, the court concluded that

GCl’s failure to make adequate psychological counseling

available to rape victims constituted cruel and unusual

punishment because it constituted deliberate indifference

to a serious medical need.!5 See generally Estelle v. Gamble,

429 U.S. 97, S.Ct. 285, 50 L.Ed.2d 251 (1976).

Concluding that Lambdin had not shown that “the

wrongs of the past could not reasonably be expected to

recur,” the court ordered injunctive relief. On October 6,

1990, the court entered a final judgment (1) providing

such relief, (2) incorporating by reference the judgment it

had entered on June 4, 1987, which awarded eight of the

plaintiffs money damages against Turner, and (3) award-

ing the plaintiffs attorney’s fees.

If.

Turner challenges the court’s determination that he

was deliberately indifferent to the plaintiffs’ safety in

'S The court cited as evidence of GCI’s indifference to this

medical need the testimony of GCI’s staff psychiatrist, who

stated that in his 15 years on the staff he had never been consul-

ted regarding an inmate who had been sexually assaulted.

sehreneearee eat

A 14

violation of the Eighth Amendment and 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

He asserts that the plaintiffs failed to make out a case of

liability against him — in particular, he claims that the

evidence does not support the district court’s findings of

fact — and that the court applied the wrong legal standard

in determining liability. We conclude that although the

record contains sufficient evidence upon which the dis-

trict court could find liability, the court failed to make

certain essential findings of fact and erred in its legal

analysis. Consequently, we return this case to the district

court for further consideration.

In subpart A, we review the elements necessary to

establish Turner’s liability for money damages under sec-

tion 1983 and the sufficiency of the evidence presented as

to each element. We review the evidence presented at

trial in the light most favorable to the plaintiffs. Whitley v.

Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 322, 106 S.Ct. 1078, 1085, 89 L.Ed.2d

251 (1986). Because we conclude that the evidence was

sufficient as to each element, in subpart B we address

Turner’s specific challenges to the legal standard the

district court employed. As discussed in part IV, Turner

was entitled to a jury trial as to the new plaintiffs’ claims;

we, therefore, only review these challenges in the context

of the original plaintiffs’ claims.

A.

The plaintiffs claim that Turner failed to provide

them with reasonable protection from prison violence in

violation of the Eighth Amendment. The plaintiffs do not

argue that Turner knew of specific threats to their safety.

—————

A 15

Rather, they argue that Turner failed to ensure their pro-

tection from the general danger arising from a prison

environment that both stimulated and condoned vio-

lence. This theory of liability creates substantial, but, as

we shall see, not insurmountable obstacles to the plain-

tiffs’ claims.

To prevail on their Eighth Amendment claim for

damages brought under section 1983, the plaintiffs must

prove three elements:'® (1) a condition of confinement

that inflicted unnecessary pain or suffering, Rhodes v.

Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2399, 69

L.Ed.2d 59 (1981), (2) the defendant’s “deliberate indif-

ference” to that condition, Wilson v. Seiter, __. U.S. __,

111 S.Ct. 2321, 2327, 115 L.Ed.2d 271 (1991), and (3)

causation, Williams v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1389-90 (11th

Cir.1982).!7 For our purposes, the Eighth Amendment

defines the contours of the first two elements and section

1983 delimits the third.

1.

First, the condition must have inflicted unnecessary

pain or suffering upon the prisoner. This objective stan-

dard “embodies ‘broad and idealistic concepts of dignity,

© Section 1983, upon which this action is based, also

requires that the defendant act “under color of state law.” 42

U.S.C. § 1983. This element is not at issue in this case.

'7 The Supreme Court recently confirmed that the first two

elements of an Eighth Amendment claim, the “objective” and

“subjective” elements, must both be satisfied. See Hudson v.

McMillian, __ U.S. __, __, 112 S.Ct. 995, 999-1000, 117 L.Ed.2d

156 (1992).

a

A 16

civilized standards, humanity, and decency ... ,’” but

must be balanced against competing penological goals.

Gamble, 429 U.S. at 102, 97 S.Ct. at 290 (quoting Jackson v.

Bishop, 404 F.2d 571, 579 (8th Cir.1968)). The evidence

presented at trial of an unjustified constant and unrea-

sonable exposure to violence at GCI, as described in part

I.B., clearly satisfies this standard. Zatler v. Wainwright,

802 F.2d 397, 400 (11th Cir.1986); Williams, 689 F.2d at

1376; see Wilson, __ U.S. at __, 111 S.Ct. at 2326-27; Jones

v. Diamond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1374 (5th Cir.) (“When prison

officials have failed to control or separate prisoners who

endanger the physical safety of other prisoners and the

level of violence has become so high . . . it constitutes

cruel and unusual punishment... . ”), cert. dismissed, 453

U.S. 950, 102 S.Ct. 27, 69 L.Ed.2d 1033 (1981), and over-

ruled on other grounds by International Woodworkers of Am.

v. Champion Intern. Corp., 790 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir.1986);'®

Gates v. Collier, 501 F.2d 1291, 1308-10 (5th Cir.1974).

y J

Second, the plaintiffs must show the defendant's

deliberate indifference to the condition. The Supreme

Court recently held that the Eighth Amendment contains

a subjective component: whether the defendant wantonly

permitted the constitutionally infirm condition to persist.

Wilson, __ U.S. at __, 111 S.Ct. at 2323; see also Gamble,

429 US. at 104, 97 S.Ct. at 291. In prison condition cases,

18 In Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th

Cir.1981) (en banc), this court adopted as binding precedent all

decisions of the former Fifth Circuit handed down prior to

October 1, 1981.

A 17

“deliberate indifference” constitutes wantonness. Wilson,

__ Us. a0 .... 133 Sh at gaa,

To be deliberately indifferent, a prison official must

knowingly or recklessly disregard an inmate’s basic

needs so that knowledge can be inferred. Duckworth v.

Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 652 (7th Cir.1985), cert. denied, 479

U.S. 816, 107 S.Ct. 71, 93 L.Ed.2d 28 (1986). Because the

Eighth Amendment requires a subjective standard, to

demonstrate an official’s deliberate indifference, a plain-

tiff must prove that the official possessed knowledge both

of the infirm condition and of the means to cure that

condition, “so that a conscious, culpable refusal to pre-

vent the harm can be inferred from the defendant's fail-

ure to prevent it.” Duckworth, 780 F.2d at 653. Thus, if an

official attempts to remedy a constitutionally deficient

prison condition, but fails in that endeavor, he cannot be

deliberately indifferent unless he knows of, but disre-

gards, an appropriate and sufficient alternative.!*

19 The Seventh Circuit in McGill v. Duckworth, 944 F.2d 344

(7th Cir.1991), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 112 S.Ct. 1265, 117

L.Ed.2d 493 (1992), noted a difference between “when [a state]

acts because of [an] effect,” in which case the state intends a

consequence, and “when it acts in spite of an effect,” in which

case the state lacks the requisite intent. Id. at 344 (citing Person-

nel Adm'r v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256, 279, 99 S.Ct. 2282, 2296, 60

L.Ed.2d 870 (1979)). If such a standard were applicable to Eighth

Amendment claims, the burden upon plaintiffs would become

even more formidable. Yet, the requisite intent for deliberate

indifference is unlike that for demonstrating a legislature’s dis-

criminatory intent under equal protection jurisprudence, as in

Feeney. The McGill court’s approach apparently provides offi-

cials a safe refuge from liability, much like a bystander is pro-

vided at common law. By doing so, the McGill court overlooks

the significance of an official’s duty not to impose cruel and

|

A 18

In this case, the plaintiffs presented incident reports,

internal staff reports, and reports by external investiga-

tors each supporting a finding that Turner knew that an

unreasonable risk of violence existed at GCI and knew of

alternative means that would have brought that risk to

within constitutional norms.?° For example, a January 30,

1980 Palm Beach County Grand Jury Presentment identi-

fied evidence of “lax security precautions,” and recom-

mended procedural changes in light of “accusations of

drugs, alcohol, and other contraband, gambling, theft,

confiscation, and payoffs among the inmates and person-

nel of GCI.” Similarly, and external management review

of GCI conducted from August 26 to 29, 1980, concluded

that “[t]he assault trend, both inmate on inmate and

unusual punishment upon prisoners — a duty firmly established

in the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence. A

state —- and similarly its officials —- can be deliberately indifferent

if it acts in spite of a condition violating the objective prong

described above unless such actions are justified by countervail-

ing penological objectives.

20 Turner testified as to additional sources through which

he gained knowledge of the conditions at GCI. These included

monthly meetings with key staff members, attendance at

monthly meetings of each department, regular meetings with

prisoner organizations, and his general practice of wandering

through the prison compound.

Turner argues that the district court relied on notice created

through telephone conversations between Turner and Saunders’

mother. See LaMarca, 662 F.Supp. at 696. These conversations

arguably showed general indifference on Turners’ part toward

inmates. Yet, because the conversations occurred after the

alleged incidents, they were not relevant to Turner’s pre-assault

knowledge of unsafe conditions at the prison and were only

marginally relevant to his alleged indifference to prisoner safety

at the time of the alleged incidents.

=“

A 19

inmate on staff, from July 1979, through June 1980, has

increased.” Finally, Turner’s July 16, 1981 letter to his

superiors evidenced his knowledge of a lack of

control of the operation of the institution. .

Many of the officers that we have assigned to

very sensitive security posts are so inex-

perienced or else have so little capability in this

business that they simply do not realize the

seriousness of dealing with the type of person-

nel that we are receiving.

The plaintiffs’ evidence painted a dark picture of life

at GCI; a picture that would be apparent to any knowl-

edgeable observer, and certainly to an official in Turner’s

position.*! An inference can be drawn from this evidence

that Turner did know that GCI failed to provide inmates

with reasonable protection from violence.

Mere knowledge of the infirm conditions persisting

at GCI does not establish deliberate indifference. The

plaintiffs must also demonstrate that, with knowledge of

the infirm conditions, Turner knowingly or recklessly

2? In Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 375-76, 96 S.Ct. 598, 606, 46

L.Ed.2d 561 (1976), the Supreme Court rejected a plaintiff's

§ 1983 claim based on pervasive unconstitutional police prac-

tices. “[T]he Court disapproved the imposition of liability for

the officials’ failure to act in the face of a statistical pattern of

police misconduct absent proof that the supervisory defendants

had ‘direct [] responsibility for the actions’ of those police officers

who had engaged in this misconduct.” Williams, 689 F.2d at 1381

(quoting Rizzo, 423 U.S. at 375-76, 96 S.Ct. at 606). In this case,

the trial court did not rely solely on statistical patterns. More-

over, Turner’s supervisory role and the insular character of

prison communities provided strong support for the court’s

conclusion that Turner must have known of these conditions.

A 20

declined to take actions that would have improved the

conditions.

Turner points to evidence of his actions to improve

safety conditions at GCI to illustrate his affirmative

efforts to improve the conditions of the confinement

there. Turner testified that he attempted to secure addi-

tional funds, make improvements to GCI’s physical plant,

expand recruitment efforts, and institute policies that

would have reduced the risk of violence if his staff had

followed them.?? Turner argues that he was unable to

ameliorate further the unsafe conditions at GCI; he did all

he could within the budgetary constraints he faced, and,

therefore, was not deliberately indifferent.

22 Turner generally improved GCI’s physical plant, mod-

ernized the prison’s infirmary, decreased staff overtime,

increased the number of confinement cells, and made a signifi-

cant effort to document incidents at GCI (an effort necessary to

proper management and safety). He also appeared before state

legislative committees, wrote letters to Secretary Wainwright of

the Department of Corrections, and identified the problems at

GCI in his monthly reports.

Turner also appears to have made substantial efforts to

improve recruiting of staff, a critical problem for GCI during

Turner’s tenure as superintendent. He testified that he sought to

increase salaries (and was minimally successful), acquired a van

for staff car-pooling from more distant locations (reducing the

staff’s transportation expenses), appeared at high school career

days, and set up a program with the Florida State Employment

Service. To control contraband, he attempted to utilize mari-

juana-sniffing dogs, but this proved ineffective in light of the

confusing effluvium at GCI. The evidence does not indicate

whether Turner intended that these actions resolve GCI’s prob-

lem with prisoner safety.

eB

A 21

In rebuttal, the plaintiffs presented evidence (1) that

Turner failed to ensure that his direct subordinates fol-

lowed the policies he established, and (2) of specific, low-

cost actions that Turner could have taken and that his

successors successfully undertook. This evidence sup-

ports a finding that Turner knowingly “failled] ade-

quately to supervise correctional officers up to the

iccttenant levell,] result[ing] in corruption and incompe-

t-Ace among the officers and a lack of reasonable protec-

tion of inmates.” LaMarca, 662 F.Supp. at 665; see Harris v.

Thigpen, 941 F.2d 1495, 1505 (11th Cir.1991) (suggesting

that inadequate staffing may rise to deliberate indif-

ference as to prisoner safety (citing Ramos v. Lamm, 639

F.2d 559, 575 (10th Cir.1980, cert. denied, 450 U.S. 1041, 101

S.Ct. 1759, 68 L.Ed.2d 239 (1981)); cf. Jordan v. Gardner, 986

F.2d 1521, 1530 (9th Cir.1993) (en banc) (“It is simply not

enough to say .. . that [the official] gave the issue a great

deal of thought. The ‘sufficiently culpable state of mind’

necessary to find deliberate indifference has more mean-

ing than that.”).

Determining whether Turner otherwise lacked the

means to correct GCI’s failure adequately to protect

inmates requires a more detailed analysis. In Williams, we

held that an official “may not escape liability solely

because of the legislature’s failure to appropriate

requested [and necessary] funds.” 689 F.2d at 1387.23

Where, as here, the lack of funds contributed to the

condition, the plaintiffs must “demonstrate that a particu-

lar defendant [nevertheless] had the capability (authority

** In Wilson, the Court declined to address the applicability

of an insufficient funds defense. ___. U.S. at__, 111 S.Ct. at 2327.

A 22

and means) to provide adequate security and did not do

so.” Id. at 1389.

To circumvent Turner’s “insufficient funds defense,”

the plaintiffs presented evidence of Turner’s capacity,

within budgetary constraints, to improve prison safety.

We agree with the district court that the plaintiffs’ evi-

dence supports the findings that Turner could have, but

did not, take steps to minimize at least the following

problems at GCI:

(1) improper and inadequate staff training... ,

(2) a staff out of control who did not report

rapes, assaults, and illegal activities up through

the chain of command, (3) [Turner’s] failure to

supervise staff and administer measures which

would “minimize the chance of error and maxi-

mize the full satisfaction of constitutional pro-

tection,” in (i) not stationing officers to patrol

throughout the dormitories, particularly at

night, and leave the wicket cage, and in (ii)

permitting the obscuring of vision of the officers

in the wicket by allowing inmates to hang

sheets ..., (4) [Turner’s] shocking failure to

employ any standard procedure to investigate

incidents of alleged rapes, [(5)] [Turner’s] fail-

ure to provide inmate movement controls thus

reducing the casual egress and ingress of

aggressive assailant wolves within the open dor-

mitories, and [(6)] [Turner’s] failure to transfer

know|[n] assailants or inmates who should have

been known to be assailants out of GCI.

LaMarca, 662 F.Supp. at 708 (citations omitted).

Consideration of such evidence comes perilously

close to second-guessing the difficult choices that prison

A 23

officials must face and of improperly extending deliber-

ate indifference standards to mere “inadvertence or

error(s] in good faith.” Wilson, ___ U.S. at ii Un ee

2324 (citing Whitley v. Albers, 475 U.S. 312, 319, 106 S.Ct.

1078, 1084, 89 L.Ed.2d 251 (1986)). Nevertheless, such

evidence is probative of the means available to Turner

and must be considered. This evidence directly addresses

the question of whether monetary restraints frustrated

Turner’s good faith efforts, or whether he knowingly or

recklessly disregarded solutions within his means.24

While much of the record indicates that Turner did make

good faith efforts to resolve the dilemmas facing GCI,25

the evidence does support the plaintiffs’ position that

Turner recklessly disregarded the necessary means to

protect inmate safety.

a

Third, section 1983 “requires proof of an affirmative

causal connection between the actions taken by a particu-

lar person ‘under color of state law’ and the constitu-

tional deprivation.” Williams, 689 F.2d at 1380 (citing

Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 439 U.S. 658, 692, 98

S.Ct. 2018, 2036, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978)); Redman v. County

24 The district court did not address this point, and, there-

fore, did not determine whether Turner knew of, or recklessly

disregarded, the solution suggested by the plaintiffs. On

remand, the district court must reconsider whether Turner was

deliberately indifferent to prisoner safety at the time of each

incident for which an award of money damages is sought.

*° For example, Turner’s July 16, 1981 letter suggests a deep

concern for, and helplessness regarding, the state of affairs at

GCI.

A 24

of San Diego, 942 F.2d 1435, 1439 (9th Cir.1991) (en banc)

(requiring an act or omission causing the constitutional

deprivation), cert. denied, __ U.S. __, 112 S.Ct. 972, 117

L.Ed.2d 137 (1992). Section 1983 thus focuses our inquiry

on whether an official’s acts or omissions were the cause

—not merely a contributing factor — of the constitutionally

infirm condition.

“A causal connection may be established by proving

that the official was personally involved in the acts that

resulted in the constitutional deprivation.” Zatler v. Wain-

wright, 802 F.2d 397, 401 (11th Cir.1986). Because the

analysis focuses on the defendant’s conduct, the doctrine

of respondeat superior does not apply. Whether a defendant

actually controls, or fails properly to supervise a subordi-

nate, however, may prove to be relevant inquiries. See

Rizzo, 423 U.S. 375-76, 96 S.Ct. at 606.

If a plaintiff establishes a causal link between the

defendant’s acts or omissions and the infirm condition,

the defendant is “precluded from contending that the

unconstitutional condition was not at least a proximate

cause of .. . injuries” that arose from that condition.

Williams, 689 F.2d at 1389. This is not to say that a plain-

tiff need not show a causal link between the constitu-

tionally infirm condition and the alleged injuries. Rather,

the finding that a prison condition offends the Eighth

Amendment presupposes the distinct likelihood that the

harm threatened will result. The wrong in Eighth Amend-

ment cases is the deliberate indifference to a constitu-

tionally infirm condition; that wrong must, in turn, have

been the proximate cause of the plaintiffs’ injuries, here

the injuries brought about by the assaults.

A 25

In Doe v. Sullivan County, 956 F.2d 545 (6th Cir.), cert.

denied, ___ U.S. __, 113 S.Ct. 187, 121 L.Ed.2d 131 (1992),

the Sixth Circuit addressed causation under section 1983

arising from allegations of “systematic deficiencies” in a

Prison’s protection of inmates similar to those in the

instant case. The plaintiff presented evidence of over-

crowding, dark cells, insufficient staff, lack of mental and

physical evaluations, and inadequate surveillance. Id. at

550. Additionally, a penological expert testifying for the

plaintiff concluded that there was a pattern of violence

among inmates at the prison and that because of the

plaintiff's slight build and mental disability, prison offi-

cials should have placed him in protective custody. Id. at

549. In reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to show

causation, the Sixth Circuit concluded “that more is

required than [a] naked assertion that the assault would

not have occurred but for the offensive conditions. To

hold otherwise would effectively transform the causality

requirement from a substantive element of proof into one

of pleading.” Id. at 550. In this case, the plaintiffs pre-

sented evidence to support their allegations that Turner

“was in a position to take steps that could have averted”

the alleged unconstitutional condition at GCI, “but,

through [deliberate] indifference, [he] failed to do so.”

Williams, 689 F.2d at 1384.

The plaintiffs presented evidence supporting five

conditions of confinement that were under Turner’s con-

trol and that together created an unconstitutional risk of

violence at GCI: (1) a “prevalence of .. . weapons” at GCI,

(2) the lack of adequate patrols, (3) the lack of adequate

reporting procedures for rapes and assaults, (4) the pres-

ence of “obvious and rampant indicia of homosexual

A 26

activity,” (5) a lack of supervision of officers leading to

corruption and incompetence. LaMarca, 662 F.Supp. at

664-65. The evidence supports the plaintiffs’ assertion

that Turner could have brought GCI within constitutional

norms through more diligent supervision of his officers,

by establishing and enforcing rules and procedures to

eliminate specific sources of danger to prisoners, and

through low-cost modifications to GCI’s physical plant.

in particular, Turner could have taken significant steps to

eliminate the highly permissive atmosphere at GCI both

as to officers shirking their duties and as to prisoners

engaging in extortion, harassment, sexual activity, and

sexual and other assaults.

As we discussed in part II.A.2., the evidence strongly

supports a finding that, even within the constraints he

faced, Turner had the means substantially to improve

prisoner safety at GCI. This evidence also supports find-

ings that Turner knew that the actions he undertook

would be insufficient to provide inmates with reasonable

protection from violence, and that other means were

available to him which he nevertheless disregarded. Such

evidence provides the necessary causal link between

Turner and the infirm conditions at GCI.

Finally, the evidence shows a link between the

unconstitutional conditions and the plaintiffs’ injuries.

The record supports the district court’s finding “that due

to [their] very nature as acts of violence, the rapes that

occurred are not isolated incidents of sexual conduct, but

rather flow directly from the lawless prison conditions at

GCI. .. . [These conditions created] the background and

climate which . . . preordained homosexual rapes and

other inmate assault[s].” LaMarca, 662 F.Supp. at 687. The

A 27

evidence thus permits a finding of a causal link between

the objectively intolerable conditions at GCI and the

plaintiffs’ injuries.

B.

Having determined that the plaintiffs presented suffi-

cient evidence to establish liability on their damages

claims against Turner, we turn to Turner’s specific chal-

lenges to the legal standard the district court employed in

assessing liability. Turner contends that the district court

clearly erred in its analysis of (1) his deliberate indif-

ference to the constitutionally infirm injury producing

conditions, and (2) causation. We disagree.26

1.

Turner challenges the district court's finding that he

knew of several problems at GCI that contributed to the

constitutionally infirm conditions.2”7 He argues that

6 Turner has not challenged the district court's finding that

GCI failed to provide inmates with reasonable protection from

violence. We therefore assume that the plaintiffs satisfied the

Eighth Amendment's objective component as to each incident

for which money damages was sought.

*7 On appeal, Turner draws our attention to nine factors

identified by the district court as contributing to the unconstitu-

tional conditions at GCI: (1) a lack of weapons training, mar-

ginally indicating a more general failure by Turner to train his

staff, (2) the staff’s failure to report rapes, (3) the staff's failure

to report other illegal activity, (4) the staff’s failure regularly to

patrol dorms, (5) the staff’s failure to ensure maximum visibility

in the dormitories, (6) the lack of standard procedures for inves-

tigating rapes, (7) Turner’s failure to avail himself of outside

A 28

without this finding, the district court might not have

concluded that he knew of the infirm conditions and thus

that he had been deliberately indifferent to the plaintiffs’

safety.?8

Turner points to specific language in the district

court’s opinion indicating that the court applied a negli-

gence standard to determine his knowledge of the infirm

conditions and the problems that caused them. For

instance, in its discussion of Turner’s indifference to pris-

oner safety, the court stated that “[a] section 1983 plaintiff

must prove either that the official knew or should have

known that his action infringed a clearly established con-

stitutional right of the plaintiff, regardless of the officials’

subjective intent. . . . ” LaMarca, 662 F.Supp. at 663

(emphasis added) (internal quotations and citations omit-

ted); see also id. at 658, 678-79 (relying on knowledge

“discernable to any prudent prison administrator”). In

light of Wilson, which has clarified that a subjective stan-

dard must be applied to Eighth Amendment claims, the

district court’s resort to such an objective standard was

erroneous.

The court also erred by inquiring as to Turner’s

knowledge during the “relevant time period of Plaintiffs’

agencies for investigating rapes and assaults, (8) Turner’s fail-

ure to establish inmate movement controls, and (9) Turner's

failure to transfer problem inmates.

28 This argument conflicts with Turner’s earlier contention

that he was not deliberately indifferent because he took affirma-

tive steps to improve prisoner safety. Yet, Turner could not

actively seek to remedy a situation of which he was unaware.

Turner’s earlier arguments thus indicate an awareness of the

infirm conditions.

A 29

damage claims,” instead of making a directed inquiry

into Turner’s knowledge at the time of each incident. See,

e.g., LaMarca, 662 F.Supp. at 708-09 (“Plaintiffs’ claims are

not isolated incidents. They stem from a far ranging and

serious failure of Defendant Turner to properly manage{]

GCI.”). The alleged assaults occurred over a three-year

period, and, as one would expect, Turner’s knowledge

ripened during this period. The district court failed to

determine properly whether Turner possessed the requi-

site knowledge at the time of each incident.

As we have already discussed, the evidence as a

whole, and, in particular Turner’s July 16, 1991 letter,

provide strong support for the court’s ultimate conclu-

sion that Turner knew of the pervasively and obviously

unsafe conditions at GCI. The district court, however, did

not rely solely on such evidence. We therefore cannot

conclude as a matter of law that Turner had a sufficient

awareness of the infirm conditions to satisfy Wilson's

subjective standard. Thus, while sufficient evidence exists

upon which to find knowledge of the conditions, see supra

part II.A, the court must reconsider its findings as to

whether Turner had knowledge of or recklessly disre-

garded the constitutionally infirm conditions at the time

of each incident.

,

&.

Turner also challenges the court's findings as to cau-

sation, i.e., whether his deliberate indifference caused the

alleged constitutionally infirm condition, and whether

the condition caused the assaults. The district court incor-

rectly stated that an official must “accomplish{] what

A 30

[can] be accomplished within the limits of his authority.”

LaMarca, 662 F.Supp. at 664 (citing Williams, 689 F.2d at

1388). As our discussion of Turner’s deliberate indif-

ference and causation indicates, see supra parts II.A.2 & 3,

merely showing that an official had the means to correct a

constitutional infirmity will not suffice. For the plaintiffs

to demonstrate the requisite causal nexus, Turner must

not only have had the means to correct the alleged consti-

tutional infirmities, but also must have at least recklessly

disregarded the inadequacy of the approach he took, the

availability of other approaches, and their capacity to

provide a cure. As we have already noted, it is, after all,

““obduracy and wantonness, not inadvertence or error in

good faith, that characterize the conduct prohibited by

the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause... .‘” Wilson

__ U.S. at ___, 11 S.Ct. at 2324 (quoting Whitley, 475 U.S

at 319, 106 S.Ct. at 1084) (citations omitted; internal quo-

tations omitted; emphasis omitted); cf. Fernandez v. United

States, 941 F.2d 1488, 1494 (11th Cir.1991) (“To establish a

valid eighth amendment claim, ‘a prisoner must allege

acts or omissions sufficiently harmful to evidence [the]

deliberate indifference [of prison officials]. ...’” (quot-

ing Gamble, 429 U.S at 106, 97 S.Ct. at 292)). This approach

ensures that we do not question the direction taken by

officials in performing the complex and arduous task of

running prisons. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 492,

93 S.Ct. 1827, 1837, 36 L.Ed.2d 439 (1973) (“Since these

internal problems of state prisons involve issues so pecu-

liarly within state authority and expertise, the States have

an important interest in not being bypassed in the correc-

tion of those problems.”). Thus, we must revisit our anal-

ysis of Turner’s subjective intent to ensure that only

A 31

evidence probative of causation in the Eighth Amend-

ment context will be considered.

The district court did not identify the potential solu-

tions that Turner actually or recklessly disregarded.

Additionally, the court’s causation inquiry was not cir-

cumscribed by the knowledge Turner possessed at the

time of each alleged assault, a particularly important

consideration since the district court found that condi-

tions slowly, but continuously, improved during Turner’s

tenure as superintendent. Instead, the court assumed that

Turner actually knew, or should have known, of these

measures. Thus, even though the plaintiffs’ evidence sup-

ports a finding of causation, see supra part II.A.3, the

court's finding that the solutions available to Turner were

sufficient may have erroneously charged him with an

Eighth Amendment duty he did not have. The court

must, therefore, reconsider the issue of causation and

determine whether Turner knowingly or recklessly disre-

garded any corrective measures. If he did, the court must

then determine whether, taken as a whole, these mea-

sures would have eliminated the infirm conditions for

which he was responsible.

III.

We now shift our focus from the retrospective anal-

ysis of the plaintiffs’ damages claims against Turner to

the prospective relief sought by the class of present and

future inmates of GCI. Three challenges to the court’s

order granting injunctive relief merit discussion: (1) the

conditions at GCI had improved, and, therefore, injunc-

tive relief was no longer required, (2) Lambdin, GCI’s

A 32

current superintendent, had not been deliberately indif-

ferent to prisoner safety, and (3) the district court’s equi-

table grant unnecessarily intruded upon GCI’s

management.

A.

First, Lambdin argues that because GCI reasonably

protected inmates from violence at the time of trial, the

court erred in granting injunctive relief. We disagree.

Subsequent events, such as improvements in the

allegedly infirm conditions of confinement, while poten-

tially relevant, are not determinative. When a defendant

corrects the alleged infirmity after suit has been filed, a

court may nevertheless grant injunctive relief unless the

defendant shows that absent an injunction, the institution

would not return to its former, unconstitutionally defi-

cient state. Jones, 636 F.2d at 1375; Ciudadanos Unidos de

San Juan v. Hidalgo County Grand Jury Comm'rs, 622 F.2d

807, 822 (5th Cir.1980) (finding that “the defendant [must]

demonstrate that there is no reasonable expectation that

the wrong will be repeated” (internal quotations omit-

ted)), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 964, 101 S.Ct. 1479, 67 L.Ed.2d

613 (1981). We have held that

[j)urisdiction may abate if there is no reasonable

expectation the alleged violations will recur and

if intervening events have completely and irre-

vocably eradicated the effects of the alleged vio-

lations. To defeat jurisdiction on this basis,

however, defendants must offer more than their

mere profession that the conduct has ceased and

will not be revived.

a

A 33

Hall v. Board of School Comm'rs, 656 F.2d 999, 1000-01 (5th

Cir. Unit B 1981) (citations omitted). The burden is thus

“a heavy one.” United States v. W.T. Grant Co., 345 U.S.

629, 633, 73 S.Ct. 894, 897, 97 L.Ed. 1303 (1953).

The district court, in the damages phase of the case,

found that GCI failed to provide inmates with reasonable

protection from violence. On appeal, Lambdin has not

challenged this determination, but has instead relied on

GCI's elimination of the infirm conditions to defeat the

court’s grant of injunctive relief.2? The district court,

however, concluded that Lambdin had not taken suffi-

cient steps to ensure that GCI’s past wrongs would not be

repeated. The record supports this finding. It was, there-

fore, appropriate for the court to consider granting the

plaintiffs’ request for injunctive relief.

B.

Second, relying on the court’s observation that

Lambdin “appears to be a dedicated public servant who

is trying very hard to make GCI an efficient and effective

correctional institution,” Lambdin argues that the court

erred in ordering injunctive relief. In essence, he asserts

that the court should have focused on his deliberate

indifference, instead of the institution’s historical indif-

ference. The Supreme Court in Kentucky v. Graham, 473

*” On remand, Turner may challenge the district court’s

findings as to the objective unreasonableness of conditions at

GCI at the time of the incidents underlying the original plain-

tiffs’ damages claims. We recognize that this does create a

potential for inconsistent findings in the damages and injunc-

tive phases of the case.

A 34

U.S. 159, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985), explained

the significance of suits against state officials in their

official capacities:

Official-capacity suits .. . “generally represent

only another way of pleading an action against

an entity of which an officer is an agent.” As

long as the government entity receives notice

and an opportunity to respond, an official-

capacity suit is, in all respects other than name,

to be treated as a suit against the entity. It is net

a suit against the official personally, for the real

party in interest is the entity.

Id. at 165-66, 105 S.Ct. at 3105 (citations omitted); see also

Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71, 109

S.Ct. 2304, 2311, 105 L.Ed.2d 45 (1989) (“[A] suit against a

state official in his or her official capacity is not a suit

against the official but rather is a suit against the official's

office.” (citing Brandon v. Holt, 469 US 464, 471, 105 S.Ct.

873, 877, 83 L.Ed.2d 878 (1985))); Owens v. Fulton County,

877 F.2d 947, 951 n. 5 (11th Cir.1989). Thus, while changes

in circumstances may change the nature of, or necessity

for, injunctive relief, substitution of Lambdin as the

named official does not bar such relief. See Graham, 473

U.S. at 166 n. 11, 105 S.Ct. at 3105 n. 11.

.

Third, Lambdin challenges the scope of the district

court’s order. We must therefore determine whether the

relief granted by the court squares with the alleged harm.

The court’s order dealt with three conditions of confine-

ment: (1) GCI’s protection of inmates, (2) conditions in

Pine eeieenaniniaitenininiens seers

A 35

protective confinement, and (3) counseling of rape vic-

tims. The later two conditions, although tangentially

related to prisoner safety, required a separate constitu-

tional foundation. We address each below.

l.

We have so far assumed, as the parties have, that at

the time of the second trial (on the claim for injunctive

relief), GCI provided inmates with reasonable, and con-

stitutionally adequate, protection from violence.

Although the district court did not reach this issue, we

are satisfied, after reviewing the record, that this assump-

tion is correct.

Absent an existing constitutional violation, the dis-

trict court’s power to grant equitable relief was limited to

ensuring that GCI continued to provide inmates with

adequate protection. Cf. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg

Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S.1, 16, 91 S.Ct. 1267, 1276, 28 L.Ed.2d

554 (1971) (“[T]he nature of the violation determines the

scope of the remedy.”) While district courts have broad

discretion to fashion equitable relief, such relief must

target the existing wrong. Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267,

282, 97 S.Ct. 2749, 2758, 53 L.Ed.2d 745 (1977) (“[Flederal-

court decrees exceed appropriate limits if they are aimed

at eliminating a condition that does not violate the Con-

stitution or does not flow from such a violation. ... ”).

Here, the wrong was the risk that GCI would once again

disregard the safety of its inmates.

In Jones, we considered the appropriate form of relief

when, during the pendency of the court’s proceedings,

A 36

the defendants cured the constitutionally infirm condi-

tions alleged by inmate-plaintiffs. We stated that

Judges are neither correctional officers nor

penologists. Even if we had the expertise to

analyze the practical and theoretical implica-

tions of the conditions of incarceration, we

would have no warrant to impose our views, for

a legislature — state or federal — is not required

by the Constitution to operate penal institutions

in accordance with criminological doctrine or to

employ only experts in their management... .

Moreover, we are aware that we should not, “in

the name of the Constitution, become .

enmeshed in the minutiae of prison operations.”

636 F.2d at 1368 (quoting Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520, 562,

99 S.Ct. 1861, 1886, 60 L.Ed.2d 447 (1974)). In keeping

with the mandate of Bell v. Wolfish, we prescribed only

general constraints designed to ensure that the prison

would continue to operate in a constitutional manner.

In this case, the district court ordered Lambdin to

maintain policies requiring (1) that the dorms and con-

finement areas be regularly patrolled and that patrols

have clear views of the relevant areas, (2) the use and

maintenance of metal detectors, (3) regular shakedowns,

and (4) the disciplining of prisoners found in possession

of contraband. These aspects of the court’s order, while

not comprehensive, target GCI’s potential to slacken its

efforts to protect its inmates.

To effectuate its prescribed policies, however, the

court also ordered Lambdin to discipline his guards,

detailing the type of sanctions and the conditions under

A 37

which they should be employed. We find that this unnec-

essarily intrudes on GCI’s operations. See Bell, 441 U.S. at

547, 99 S.Ct. at 1878; Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 351,

101 S.Ct. 2392, 2401, 69 L.Ed.2d 59 (1981). The court

should have “accorded wide-ranging deference in the

adoption and execution of ruticies and practices that in

[the prison official’s] judgment are needed to preserve

internal order and discipline and to maintain institutional

security.” Bell, 441 U.S. at 547, 99 S.Ct. at 1878. It was

sufficient that the court enjoined Lambdin to ensure that

the specific policies were carried out. Going beyond this

to restrict the methods by which Lambdin effectuated

these policies was an inappropriate use of the court's

equity powers.

2.

The district court’s injunctive order also addressed

conditions in protective confinement. The court deter-

mined that during Turner’s tenure, conditions in protec-

tive confinement were punitive in nature. By the time of

the second trial, however, this was no longer the case.

The Court, therefore, should have limited its order to

ensuring that the conditions continued to conform with

the Eighth Amendment standards. Instead, the court fine-

tuned the existing conditions by (1) eliminating double-

bunking, (2) precluding stays in protective confinement

in excess of thirty days, (3) requiring the transfer of

inmates in protective confinement who could not be

returned to the general prison population, and (4) ensur-

ing that the lighting in protective confinement conforms

A 38

to American Correctional Association guidelines.*° The

conditions targeted here, whether taken singularly or

together, do not constitute cruel and unusual punishment

and do not ensure that the prior infirm conditions will

US. at —, 111 S.Ct. at 2327

(Separate failures of prison administration designed to

not recur. See Wilson, __

protect inmates “may establish an Eighth Amendment

violation ‘in combination’ when each would not do so

alone, but only when they have mutually enforcing effect

that produces the deprivation of single, identifiable

human need... . ”). We, therefore, vacate the district

court’s injunction and remand the claim for injunctive

relief so that the court may determine whether an injunc-

tion is necessary to ensure the continuance of currently

constitutionally adequate conditions in protective con-

finement.

XJ

Finally, the district court ordered psychological coun-

seling of rape victims. The court found that GCI unneces-

sarily and wantonly inflicted pain upon prisoners by

failing to provide them with post-rape psychological or

30 The Supreme Court has rejected Eighth Amendment

challenges to double-bunking. See Bell, 441 U.S at 542, 99 S.Ct. at

1875 (rejecting any “sort of ‘one man, one cell’ principle”).

Similarly, the district court’s order precluding long-duration

stays in protective confinement, and requiring timely transfers

of inmates who cannot return to protective confinement, does

not address a constitutional violation. See Meriwether v. Faulkner,

821 F.2d 408, 415-16 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 484 U.S. 935, 108 S.Ct.

311, 98 L.Ed.2d 269 (1987).

A 39

psychiatric counseling. This aspect of the court's injunc-

tion was based on independent findings of fact that

inmates are systematically denied access to such treat-

ment, cf. Harris, 941 F.2d at 1505, and that such denials

constitute deliberate indifference to a serious medical

need, see Gamble, 429 U.S. at 104, 97 S.Ct. at 291; Greason v.

Kemp, 891 F.2d 829, 834 (11th Cir.1990). These findings are

well supported by the record. The court enjoined

Lambdin to (1) provide training to all prison guards in

the handling of rape complaints, (2) require special train-

ing for the staff psychiatrist and the staff psychologist,

and (3) “promulgate an official referral procedure for all

rape victims to the resident psychiatrist or psychologist

for evaluation.” We affirm these aspects of the injunction.

IV.

A.

Turner appeals the district court’s ruling that he

waived his Seventh Amendment right to jury trial as to

the new plaintiffs’ claims.*! See Fed.R.Civ.P. 38(b), (d).

The right to “trial by jury is a vital and cherished right,

integral in our judicial system,” City of Morgantown v.

Royal Ins. Co., 337 U.S. 254, 258, 69 S.Ct. 1067, 1069, 93

L.Ed. 1347 (1949), and a waiver of this right must be

meaningful, In re Zweibon, 565 F.2d 742, 746 (D.C.Cir.1977)

(Rule 38 was not “intended to diminish” the constitu-

tional right to a trial by jury in civil cases, “and should be

31 The Seventh Amendment preserves, “{i]n Suits at com-

mon law. ... the right of trial by jury. .. .” U.S. Const. amend.

VII.

A 40

interpreted, where possible, to avoid giving effect to

dubious waivers of rights.”). Moreover, “as the right of

jury trial is fundamental, [we must] indulge every reason-

able presumption against waiver.” Aetna Ins. Co. v. Ken-

nedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393, 57 S.Ct. 809, 811-12, 81 L.Ed. 1177

(1937); Borgh v. Gentry, 953 F.2d 1309, 1311 (11th Cir.1992)

(“[A] court’s discretion [to deny a jury trial] is very

narrowly limited and must, wherever possible, be exer-

cised to preserve jury trial.” (quoting Beacon Theatres, Inc.

v. Westover, 359 U.S. 500, 510, 79 S.Ct. 948, 956, 3 L.Ed.2d

988 (1959))). We therefore review the district court's

denial of a jury trial with “the most exacting scrutiny.”

City of Morgantown, 337 U.S. at 258, 69 S.Ct. at 1070.

Unless the error is harmless, we must reverse judgment

founded upon an unconstitutional denial of a jury trial.

Western Elec. Co. v. Milgo Elec. Corp., 573 F.2d 255, 257 (5th

Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 895, 99 S.Ct. 255, 58 L.Ed.2d 241

(1978).

The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that

“(t]he right to trial by jury as declared By the Seventh

Amendment to the Constitution . . . shall be preserved to

the parties inviolate.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 38(a). A party may,

however, waive this right by failing to make a timely

demand upon the courts. Under Rule 38, as to “any issue

triable of right by a jury,” waiver occurs ten days after

“service of the last pleading directed to such issue.”

~. Fed.R.Civ.P. 38(b), (d); See Guajardo v. Estelle, 580 F.2d 748,

752-53 (Sth Cir.1978). Such waivers apply only to the

issues raised by the pleadings; subsequent amendments

to the pleadings can raise “new issues” for which the

right to a jury remains.

A 41

In this case, Turner did not demand a jury trial

within ten days of his answer to the first amended com-

plaint. He therefore waived his right to jury trial as to

issues raised in that complaint. He argues, however, that

he did not waive his right to jury trial as to the new

plaintiffs’ claims.

The district court, in rejecting Turner’s demand for a

jury trial, concentrated on Rule 38’s use of the term

“issue,” which the court noted refers to those issues

“raised in the original complaint.” LaMarca, 662 F.Supp.

at 652; Rosen v. Dick, 639 F.2d 82, 94 (2d Cir.1980) (“[T]he

term ‘issue’ means something more than the evidence

offered and the legal theories pursued. . . . [One must ask

whether] the ultimate issue for decision is different.”).

The court concluded that no new issues were raised by

the amended pleadings and struck Turner’s jury demand.

The district court’s approach illustrates the difference

between the jury’s role in resolving specific factual issues,

and the application of such determinations to legal theo-

ries. Guajardo, 580 F.2d at 753. New facts that “merely

clarif[y] ‘the same general issues’ raised in the original

complaint” do not create new issues of fact upon which

to assert a jury demand. Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F.2d

1277, 1310 (2d Cir.1973) (en banc) (quoting Moore v.

United States, 196 F.2d 906, 908 (5th Cir.1952)); id. (The

“underlying facts and basic legal theory [must be]

changed by the amendments” in order to create new

issues.). Amendments to pleadings thus may contain new

facts which do not create new issues triable by a jury. Id.

These basic principles for identifying new issues

were developed in cases where all relevant parties were

a

A 42

before the trial court at the time of the initial waiver. In

such cases, a trial court applies these principles to deter-

mine the extent of a demanding party’s prior waiver. In

this case, however, the second amended complaint added

seven new plaintiffs permissively joined under

Fed.R.Civ.P. 20(a).52 Each new plaintiff asserted an indi-

vidual claim for damages arising from a separate incident

at GCI. Moreover, the incidents alleged by three of the

new plaintiffs (Cobb, Durrance, and Aldred) had not

occurred at the time Turner waived jury trial as to the

issues raised by the first amended complaint. Turner

asserts that waivers under Rule 38 do not apply in such

circumstances. We agree.

The plaintiffs do not directly address whether the

district court’s approach of identifying new issues pro-

vides the proper analysis when newly joined parties raise

unique claims. Instead, they tenaciously argue (as they

successfully did below) that all issues raised in the sec-

ond and third amended complaints arose from the same

“general area” of dispute or involve the “same matrix of

facts” identified in the first amended complaint. See

Lanza, 479 F.2d at 1310. Thus, they contend that the sec-

ond and third amended complaints do not raise new

issues revitalizing Turner’s right to jury trial.

32 The original plaintiffs’ motion for leave to file a second

amended complaint states that the addition of the new plaintiffs

was consistent with Fed.R.Civ.P. 15(a). Since the new plaintiffs’

claims raise independent causes of action, however, Fed.R.Civ.P.

20(a) controlled the insertion of these parties into the suit.

33 The plaintiffs point to, but do not discuss, three cases in

which new plaintiffs were added after waiver, but, nevertheless,

the right to a jury was not revived. See Commonwealth of Penn. v.

A 43

Underlying the plaintiffs’ resistance to Turner’s jury

demand is their mistaken belief that this case involved

only “one prison civil rights suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”

This case involved eleven separate actions: ten indepen-

dent damages actions and one class action for injunctive

relief. Each of these actions raised distinct factual issues.

Turner was not “put on notice [as to these claims] by the

original round of pleadings in this case.” Cedars-Sinai

Medical Ctr. v. Revlon, Inc., 111 F.R.D. 24, 30 (D.Del.1986).

All he could have anticipated at the time of his waiver

was that evidence of the incidents underlying the new

plaintiffs’ claims might be presented at trial. Even under

its analysis, the district court erred by striking Turner’s

jury demand.

Turner raises an alternative approach to analyzing

his right to jury trial which determines which issues

Sincavage, 439 F.2d 1133 (3rd Cir.1971); Barr v. Arco Chem. Corp.,

529 F.Supp. 1275 (S.D.Tex. 1982); Ed Brawley, Inc. v. Gaffney, 399

F.Supp. 115 (N.D.Cal.1975). These cases did not involve a jury

demand by a defendant after the joinder of plaintiffs with dis-

tinct claims. Rather, each case involved a jury demand by an

intervening plaintiff. Sincavage, 439 F.2d at 1134 (requiring

plaintiff-intervenor to take case “in the status in which she

found it”); Barr, 529 F.Supp. at 1276 (“new plaintiff merely reas-

serted rights alleged in the original complaint,” and was joined

to correct prior pleadings); Ed Brawley, 399 F.Supp. at 118 (same

rights asserted by original and new plaintiffs). These cases sug-

gest no justification for precluding Turner’s jury demand.

4 The new issues included, at least, (1) whether each

assault actually occurred, (2) the damages stemming from such

assault, (3) the protection afforded to inmates at the time of each

assault, (4) Turner’s deliberate indifference to the unconstitu-

tional condition at the time of each assault, and (5) the causal

nexus between his indifference and the condition.

A 44

must, on remand, be tried before a jury. He observes that

if the new plaintiffs had brought separate suits, an effec-

tive waiver under Rule 38 in one suit would not extend to

the others. Under the district court’s approach, however,

permissive joinder provides a means to bypass a party’s

right to jury trial, thus making this fundamental right

contingent upon the procedural mechanism through

which a claim comes before a trial court. When such

processes are within the sole control of one side of a

dispute - here the plaintiffs - and subject only to the

discretion of the trial court, application of the Federal

Rules cannot extirpate a party’s constitutional right to

jury trial.

In this case, three and one-half years after LaMarca

filed his pro se complaint, and only two months before

trial, Turner demanded a jury trial as to all issues raised

in the new plaintiffs’ claims. The plaintiffs stress these

dates as indicative of the frivolousness of Turner’s posi-

tion. Yet, the plaintiffs created this issue by seeking to

join the new plaintiffs in the heat of trial preparation, and

then insisting that Turner relinquish his right to present

his case to a jury. Turner objected to the joinder of the

new plaintiffs and stressed his intent to demand a jury

trial on all issues raised by the new claims. Nevertheless,

the court permitted joinder of the new claimants, and did

so without preserving Turner’s right to a jury trial.

Turner’s right to a jury trial thus fell victim to the trial

court’s discretionary decision to permit joinder of the

new claimants.*5 Notwithstanding any common thread

35 Richland v. Crandall, 259 F.Supp. 274 (S.D.N.Y.1966),

illustrates another procedural rule, consolidation, which, if

osc Tete Seals

ay liad. ee Sm

A 45

that may have existed between the original and amended

complaints, even if to a “sickening proportion,” LaMarca,

662 F.Supp. at 653, we cannot sanction such a result. We

improperly applied in the Rule 38 context, can be used by

bypass a party’s Seventh Amendment right. In Richland,

shareholders brought four suits derivatively, individually, and

as class actions, against 20 defendants (officers, directors, and

corporations) for violations of the Securities Exchange Act.

Before consolidation, at least one of the 20 defendants had

answered three of the four complaints. Id. at 281 & n. 9. The

plaintiffs filed a demand for a jury trial within 10 days of service

of the answers to the consolidated complaint by some of the

defendants. The defendants in Richland argued that by not

making a timely demand for a jury trial after the early answers

to the original complaints, the plaintiffs waived their right to a

jury as to the issues presented in each of the four original

complaints. The court, however, observed that the

“[djefendants ignore[d] the fact that the defendants who

answered some of the [original complaints . . . constitute[{d] only

3 out of the 20 parties named as defendants in one or more of the

underlying complaints and in the consolidated complaint, and

that the issue was not joined as to the other 17 defendants until

[the answers to the consolidated complaint had been filed].” Id.

at 28.

The distinction noted by the Richland court is critical. Even

though all claims involved the same transaction and there was

substantial similarity of issues, the plaintiffs’ Rule 38 jury

demand was timely as to the claims by the 17 defendants who

had not answered the original complaints.

We find the Richland court's analysis persuasive. The only

relevant distinction between Richland and this case is the

procedural mechanism through which the independent claims

were joined; in Richland separate suits were filed and then

consolidated; in the instant case, plaintiffs sought and obtained

leave to join new parties with independent claims.

A 46

hold, therefore, that Turner was entitled to a jury trial as

to the new plaintiffs’ claims.*

B.

Turner argues that his right to jury trial as to the new

plaintiffs’ claims trumps his waiver as to common issues

raised by the original plaintiffs’ claims,*” see In re Kaiser

Steel Corp., 911 F.2d 380, 388 (10th Cir.1990) (holding, in

case with multiple parties, that waiver of common issue

does not occur until ten days following the last pleading

by any party), and therefore that he is entitled to a jury as

to all claims. Turner concedes, however, that he know-

ingly waived his right to a jury as to the original plain-

tiffs’ claims. Without a constitutional underpinning upon

which to rest, Turner must demonstrate that the district

court erred in its application of Rule 38 and that he was

harmed by this error. Cf. id., (holding amendments to

pleadings do not revive the right to jury trial as to issues

already framed). Because he has not done so, Turner’s

initial waiver as to the original plaintiffs’ claims remains

effective.

%¢ The plaintiffs’ assertion that the original class action suit

for injunctive relief incorporated the potential claims of the new

plaintiffs is patently meritless.

37 Consistent with his other arguments, Turner maintains

that the original and new plaintiffs’ claims have few, and per-

haps only one, common issue: “whether the prison conditions

during the time frame relevant to their claims were in violation

of the 8th and 14th Amendments.”

Se

- ———=—) . - i-

A 47

V.

Turner next appeals (1) the district court's refusal to

continue the December 2, 1985 trial; (2) the court’s refusal

following the trial to consider, as part of the trial record,

several depositions taken during and shortly after the

trial; and (3) the court’s refusal to reopen the record of

the trial to receive some additional evidence Turner

obtained while the first appeal (of the damages awards)

was pending in this court. We review these rulings for

abuse of discretion. Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Breslin,

332 F.2d 928, 932 (5th Cir.1964).

As indicated earlier, after the plaintiffs filed their

second amended complaint (which added seven plaintiffs

to the case) on August 26, 1985, the defendants moved for

a continuance of the trial which had been set for Novem-

ber 4, 1985. The district court granted their motion on

November 10, continuing the trial until December 2. The

defendants wanted more time for discovery and to pre-

pare for trial; we cannot say, however, that the court

abused its discretion in giving them the extra time allot-

ted. See Edward Leasing Corp. v. Uhlig & Assocs., 785 F.2d

877, 881-82 (11th Cir.1986); Menendez v. Perishable Dis-

tribs., Inc., 763 F.2d 1374, 1379 (11th Cir.1985).38

38 We reach this result even though the record indicates that the

plaintiffs erroneously represented to the court that they were “ready

for trial.” In fact, their own expert witnesses were unprepared at the

time of the December 2, 1985 trial. Dr. Swanson, for instance, admit-

ted on cross-examination that he bypassed potentially relevant

sources of information because of severe time pressures. The district

court postponed consideration of the injunction claim because Dr.

Swanson was not fully prepared.

A 48

The defendants renewed their motion for a continu-

ance on November 13, stating that they would not be able

to complete their discovery by the scheduled trial date.

According to the defendants, they needed to depose sev-

eral witnesses who had been identified by the new plain-

tiffs when the defendants took their depositions.

Whatever may have been the defendants’ need for a

continuance at that time, the need increased when, as the

trial was about to begin, the district court gave the plain-

tiffs leave to file their third amended complaint adding

Billy Joe Harper’s damages claim.

Believing that Harper’s claim raised no new issues,

and thus created no need for additional discovery, the

district court refused to grant a continuance. The court's

belief was unfounded; Harper’s claim raised several new

issues requiring discovery. See supra note 34. After the

trial began, the magistrate judge apparently had second

thoughts about the defendants’ need for a continuance;

he permitted them to take discovery depositions both

during and after the trial with the understanding that

The plaintiffs’ counsel further skewed the court’s percep-

tion of the defendants’ discovery problems by representing to

the court that certain witnesses identified by the new plaintiffs

in their depositions were not “actual” witnesses whom Turner

might require time to contact. Plaintiffs’ counsel stated that “I

[have] never seen a deposition taken, particularly prisoners, [in

an] inmate setting, where a deponent does not offer under

skilled examination, such as defendants’ counsel, a name of

somebody that was a potential witness to an incident, a name of

ani alleged perpetrator, a name of somebody in the next cell who

may have heard or seen [something].” (It seems apparent that

Turner’s counsel placed more stock in the credibility of the

prisoners’ stories than plaintiffs’ counsel did.)

J ee Oe

A 49

these depositions could be made a part of the trial record

at a later date. The defendants accepted this arrangement,

evidently believing that it would eliminate any prejudice

the denial of the continuance otherwise might have occa-

sioned. Given this acceptance by the defendants, we find

that the defendants effectively waived their objection to

the December 2 trial date.

The trial of the damages claims against Turner ended

on December 16, 1985. That day, the magistrate judge

instructed counsel to file their proposed findings of fact

and conclusions of law by December 23, and scheduled

oral argument for December 27. Oral argument was held

that day, and the magistrate judge indicated in his report

to the district court that he would find for the plaintiffs.

On January 8, 1986, the plaintiffs moved the magistrate

judge to exclude from the record seven depositions that

defendants had taken with the permission of the plain-

tiffs and the court. Plaintiffs’ counsel argued that the

depositions should be excluded because the defendants

had denied counsel access to the deponents’ prison

records and thus a meaningful opportunity to cross-

examine the witnesses. The magistrate judge granted the

motion, and the district court, after considering the mag-

istrate judge’s report and recommendation, affirmed.

In his brief to us, Turner does not explain how the

exclusion of the seven depositions from the record preju-

diced his case. Accordingly, Turner has shown no abuse

of discretion.

Finally, while the district court's disposition of the

plaintiffs’ damages claims was before us on appeal,

A 50

Turner’s counsel searched for evidence to rebut Dr. Swan-

son’s testimony as to the conditions prevailing at GCI

during Turner’s tenure.*?7They uncovered documentary

evidence, that Turner represents, undermines the court's

findings.*° After we dismissed the first appeal and

returned the case to the district court, Turner moved the

court to “reopen” the record of the damages trial and

consider the new evidence. The court, believing that it

lacked jurisdiction to do so, refused.*!

** The court’s extensive reliance on Dr. Swanson’s testi-

mony demonstrates the importance of this witness. Yet, Dr.

Swanson did not begin his investigation until after October 4,

1985, and did not complete his interviews with the plaintiffs

until December 1, 1985, the day before the damages trial began.

4° Turner described this evidence, in part, as more than 100

investigations were undertaken from 1980-84 . . . in respect to

sexual assaults, non-sexual assaults and batteries, possession of

weapons, possession of drugs or alcohol and introduction of

contraband; they reflect that, in virtually all instances, the Palm

Beach County Sheriff’s office was involved in the investiga-

tions; that prosecutions were undertaken; that, in respect to

alleged sexual assault, rape kit tests were administered when

appropriate; that there was an established procedure for investi-

gation and handling of such claims.

41 The court stated that

[i]f this Court’s order was incorrect earlier in that

respect in that we denied motions for continuance,

and I think there was perhaps more than one of these,

why, it seems to me .. . that I may not have jurisdic-

tion at this time since an appeal has been taken.

[Counsel for Turner] asserts that we still do, and per-

haps he is right, but it seems to me it is better to go

ahead and stick with that earlier ruling, and let the

appellate court review that point as well as this order

which I am now making denying the motion. . . .

> (ibe

A 51

The district court plainly had the authority to reopen

the record and to consider the new evidence. The court

had such authority at least until, on October 6, 1990,

when it entered the final judgment. See Fed.R.Civ.Pro. 59;

S.D.Fla.Magis.R. 4(b) (A district court is free to “receive

further evidence, recall witnesses, or recommit the matter

to the Magistrate Judge with instructions.”); La Fever, Inc.

v. All-Star Ins. Corp., 571 F.2d 1367, 1368 (5th Cir.1978).

Prior to the entry of judgment (and the denial of the

defendants’ motion for a new trial), the court had the

power to revisit the entire case.

Since we remand the damages claims of the new

plaintiffs for trial before a jury, the district court’s action

in refusing to consider the new evidence only affects the

claims brought by LaMarca, Saunders, and Johnson.

Because the court might have considered Turner’s new

evidence, had it thought it had the power to do so, we

instruct the court to consider Turner’s proffer. We inti-

mate no view, however, as to whether the court should

accept it and reopen the proceedings as to these three

plaintiffs.

VI.

Turner retained the right to trial by jury as to the new

plaintiffs’ claims. We therefore vacate the money judg-

ments for Durrance, Cobb, Bronson, Aldred, and Harper,

and remand their claims for a new trial. We remand the

judgments favoring LaMarca, Johnson, and Saunders for

reconsideration in light of our discussions in parts II and

V. We remand the court’s grant of injunctive relief for

A 52

further preceedings consistent with part III of our opin-

ion. Finally, in light of these holdings, we must vacate the

court’s attorneys’ fees award.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

A 53

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS

——_—_——— FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT

No. 90-F°09

District Court No. 82-8196-CIV

ANTHONY LaMARCA, MARTIN SAUNDERS and

EDWIN JOHNSON, individually and on behalf of

all others similarly situated, and DAVID ALDRED,

STEVE H. BRONSON, JR., EDDIE COBB, RON

DURRANCE, WAYNE EPPRECHT, MICHAEL “a

GORDON and BILLY JOE HARPER, individually,

Plaintiffs-Appellees,

versus

R. V. TURNER, individually in his former capacity

as Superintendent of Glades Correctional

Institution, CHESTER LAMBDIN, in his official

capacity as Superintendent of Glades Correctional

Institution,

Defendants-Appellants.

Appeal from the United States District Court

for the Southern District of Florida

Before TJOFLAT, Chief Judge, DUBINA, Circuit Judge,

and WILLIAMS*, Senior Circuit Judge.

* Honorable Jerre S. Williams, Senior U.S. Circuit Judge for

the Fifth Circuit, sitting by designation.

A 54

JUDGMENT

(Filed July 7, 1993)

This cause came to be heard on the transcript of the

record from the United States District Court for the

Southern District of Florida, and was argued by counsel;

UPON CONSIDERATION WHEREOF, it is now

hereby ordered and adjudged by this Court that the

money judgments of the said District Court in this cause

be and the same are hereby VACATED and REMANDED

- to said District Court for a new trial as to plaintiffs

Durrance, Cobb, Bronson, Aldred and Harper; the judg-

ments favoring plaintiffs LaMarca, Johnson and Saunders

are hereby REMANDED for reconsideration in accor-

dance with part II and V of this Court’s opinion; the

District Court’s grant of injunctive relief as to defendant

Lambdin is hereby REMANDED for further proceedings

consistent with Part III of this Court’s opinion; the award

of attorneys’ fees is hereby VACATED, in accordance

with the opinion of this Court.

Enterid: fuly 7, 1993

For the Cewr:: Miguel J. Cortez, Clerk

By: Karleen Illegible

Deputy Clerk

ISSUED AS MANDATE: NOV 10 1993

oe At

A 55

UNITED STATES DISTRICT CQ.!RT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLOXIDA

CASE NO. 82-8196-Civ-PAINE

ANTHONY LA MARCA,

et al., ORDER

V. (Filed

R. V. TURNER, et al. Nov. 25, 1985)

/

For reasons recited in open Court, it was ORDERED

as follows:

1. Plaintiffs’ Motion to file a Third Amended Com-

plaint is GRANTED nunc pro tunc November 14, 1985.

The Court makes no present ruling, however, regarding

the recoverability of attorneys’ fees or the presence of the

State of Florida as a Defendant for that purpose.

2. Defendants’ Jury-Demand is DENIED. The

Motion for further Continuance of Trial is DENIED, with-

out prejudice. Upon their Motion to Strike, the Court

RESERVES. The parties are cautioned that the Court

expects that any expert witness will have been made

available for deposition before that expert’s testimony is

tendered to the Court. If there is any issue upon which

Defendants require a brief adjournment after the court

has begun the frial next week, their right to adjournment

can be further considered at that time.

A 56

ORDERED in Miami, Florida, November 25, 1985.

/s/ Peter L. Nimkoff

PETER L. NIMKOFF

UNITED STATES

MAGISTRATE

Copies:

Walter M. MegInnis, Esq.

David M. Lipman, Esq.

William M. Amlong, Esq.

Michael B. Davis, Esq.

A 57

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF FLORIDA

CASE NO. 82-8196-CIV-PAINE

ANTHONY LAMARCA, MARTIN

SAUNDERS, and EDWIN

JOHNSON, individually and on ORDER

behalf of all others similarly

situated, and DAVID ALDRED,

STEVE H. BRONSON, JR., EDDIE

COBB, RON DURRANCE, WAYNE

EPPRECHT, MICHAEL GORDON,

and BILLY JOE HARPER,

Plaintiffs,

V.

R. V. TURNER, Individually, and

RANDALL MUSIC, as

Superintendent of Glades

Correctional Institution,

Defendants.

/

This cause is before the Court on the Appeal from

Magistrate’s Order and Petition For Emergency Hearing

filed by the Defendants R. V. TURNER, RANDALL

MUSIC and the State of Florida. The Court has also

received the Plaintiff’s Response to Defendants’ Appeal

from Magistrate’s Order and Petition for Emergency

Hearing.

The Court has read and considered these submissions

of counsel with respect to the ruling made by Magistrate

Nimkoff on November 25, 1985. It appears that the ruling

A 58

is not clearly erroneous. The Magistrate adequately con-

sidered the issues and his ruling is therefore AFFIRMED.

Accordingly, it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED that the Appeal from

Magistrate’s Order and Petition for Emergency Hearing is

DENIED.

DONE and ORDERED this 2nd day of December,

1985, in Miami, Florida.

/s/ James C. Paine

UNITED STATES

DISTRICT JUDGE

JAMES C. PAINE

cc: All counsel of record

A 59

Anthony LaMARCA, Martin Saunders, and

Edwin Johnson, individually and on behalf of

all others Similarly situated, and David

Aldred, Steve H. Bronson, Jr., Eddie Cobb, Ron

Durrance, Wayne Epprecht, Michael Gordon,

and Billy Joe Harper, individually, Plaintiffs,

V.

R. V. TURNER, individually in his former offi-

cial capacity as Superintendent of Glades Cor-

rectional Institution, Chester Lambdin, in his

official capacity as Superintendent of Glades

Correctional Institution, and the State of

Florida, Defendants.

No. 82-8196-Civ.

United States District Court,

S.D. Florida.

June 4, 1987.

David M. Lipman and Robert E. Weisberg, of Lipman

& Weisberg, Miami, Fla., and William Amlong of Hall &

Amlong, Fort Lauderdale, Fla., for plaintiffs.

Walter M. Meginniss, Asst. Atty. Gen., Tallahassee,

Fla., and Michael B. Davis, of Davis, Critton, Hoy &

Diamond, West Palm Beach, Fla., for defendants.

ORDER ON REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

OF MAGISTRATE

PAINE, District Judge.

This cause comes before the court on the report and

recommendation of the Magistrate (DE 128), defendants’

A 60

amended response and objections (DE 155), and plain-

tiffs’ reply (DE 170). The court has studied these submis-

sions and has reviewed the voluminous transcripts,

exhibits, and other materials in the case file as well as the

relevant authorities. Now being fully advised, the court

renders the following memorandum and order.

I.

BACKGROUND

This class action for damages and injunctive relief

was brought by inmates who claim that their federal

constitutional rights were violated when they were gang

raped or otherwise assaulted while incarcerated at the

Glades Correctional Institution (GCI), a state prison in

Belle Glade, Florida. The procedural history of the case is

set out at length by the Magistrate. Briefly, this litigation

was commenced on May 14, 1982 with the handwritten

pro se complaint of Anthony LaMarca, who alleged that

he was subjected to ongoing physical violence and

harassment by other GCI inmates because he refused to

participate in homosexual activity and that prison offi-

cials failed to act to alleviate the situation (DE 1). As the

lawsuit continued, counsel was obtained and the com-

plaint was amended several times (DE 23, 62, 93, 129,

131). On April 13, 1984, the undersigned district judge

ordered that for purposes of injunctive relief the case

proceed as a class action defined as those persons within

the Florida prison system who are or will be incarcerated

at GCI (DE 47).

A 61

The third amended complaint contains claims for

damages by ten inmates. Named plaintiffs LaMarca, Sau-

nders and Johnson also seek equitable remedies on behalf

of the class. Defendant Turner is sued in his individual!

capacity as former superintendent of GCI. Defendant

Lambdin, the current superintendent, is sued solely in his

official capacity for purposes of injunctive and equitable

relief (DE 129). The State of Florida is a defendant for

purposes of attorneys’ fees and expenses.

The district court referred the case to United States

Magistrate Peter Nimkoff for a report and recommenda-

tion pursuant to Magistrate Rule 1(f) of the Local Rules of

the Southern District of Florida. The Magistrate con-

ducted two weeks of evidentiary hearings, reviewed

deposition testimony and numerous exhibits, and heard

oral argument. The Magistrate then filed a 135-page

report and recommendation containing findings of fact

and conclusions of law (DE 128) which found Turner

liable to the ten named plaintiffs in the aggregate amount

of $201,500 and recommended the creation of two com-

mittees to assist the court in formulating specific injunc-

tive relief.

Defendants filed extensive objections to the Magis-

trate’s report in accordance with Local Magistrate Rule

4(b) (DE 155). Defendants dispute the Magistrate’s failure

to grant a continuance, to grant a jury trial, and to recuse

himself from the proceedings, and also lodge numerous

objections to specific findings of fact and conclusions of

law. Plaintiffs submitted an equally extensive reply (DE

170).

A 62

II.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The court’s review of the Magistrate’s findings and

recommendations is governed by a de novo standard:

A District Judge shall make a de novo deter-

mination of those portions of the report or speci-

fied proposed findings or recommendations to

which objection is made and may accept, reject,

or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or

recommendations made by the Magistrate. The

District Judge, however, need conduct a new

hearing only in his discretion or where required

by law, and may consider the record developed

before the Magistrate, making his own deter-

mination of the basis of that record. The District

Judge may also receive further evidence, recall

witnesses, or recommit the matter to the Magis-

trate with instructions.

Magistrate Rule 4(b), Local Rules of the Southern District

of Florida; accord 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1) (1982).

The Supreme Court has held that, in providing for a

de novo “determination” rather than a de novo hearing,

“Congress intended to permit whatever reliance a district

judge, in the exercise of sound judicial discretion, chose

to place on a Magistrate’s proposed findings and recom-

mendations.” United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 676,

100 S.Ct. 2406, 2413, 65 L.Ed.2d 424 (1980). The former

Fifth Circuit has held that, in situations involving the

constitutional rights of a criminal defendant, a district

court should not enter an order inconsistent with the

Magistrate’s credibility determinations without person-

ally hearing the live testimony of the witnesses whose

testimony is determinative. Louis v. Blackburn, 630 F.2d

A 63

1105, 1109 (5th Cir.1980).1 Although the Louis court

expressly limited its holding to criminal cases, see id. n. 3,

the exercise of sound judicial discretion compels this

court to extend substantial deference to the Magistrate’s

credibility choices absent counterveiling considerations.

In a criminal case which preceded Louis, the Fifth Circuit

stated:

In our view it would be a rare case in which a

district judge could resolve credibility choices

contrary to the recommendations of the magis-

trate without himself having had an opportunity

to see and hear the witnesses testify. Certainly,

in such a rare case there should be found in the

transcript an articulable basis for rejecting the

magistrate’s original resolution of credibility

and that basis should be articulated by the dis-

trict judge.

United States v. Marshall, 609 F.2d 152, 155 (Sth Cir.1980).

Il.

FAILURE TO GRANT JURY TRIAL

Defendants first object to the Magistrate’s failure to

grant a jury trial. The Magistrate found that defendants

waived that right by failing to make a demand within ten

days of November 2, 1983, when they filed an answer to

the first amended complaint (DE 23, 41). Defendants first

demanded a jury trial on November 8, 1985, over two

' Decisions of the former Fifth Circuit filed prior to October

1, 1981 constitute binding precedent in the Eleventh Circuit.

Bonner v. City of Prichard, 661 F.2d 1206, 1209 (11th Cir.1981) (en

banc).

A 64

years later, in response to the second amended complaint

(DE 62, 69, 83). Following the Magistrate’s denial of a jury

trial (DE 105), defendants filed an emergency appeal with

the district court (DE 104), which the undersigned denied

(DE 112).

Defendants again argue that the second and third

amended complaints introduced new issues into the law-

suit which merited a jury trial and that therefore their

demand was timely. As the Magistrate correctly con-

cluded, the right to jury trial is waived by a failure to

make a demand within ten days of the “last pleading

directed to such issue.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 38(b). If the original

pleadings effectively waive jury trial, the right cannot be

revived by amending the original pleadings. Walton v.

Eaton Corp., 563 F.2d 66, 71 (3d Cir.1977). A jury trial may

be demanded, however, for any “new issues” in the

amended pleadings. Amendments not introducing new

issues do not give rise to a demand for jury trial. Guajardo

v. Estelle, 580 F.2d 748, 753 (5th Cir.1978).2

What constitutes a “new issue” is the bone of conten-

tion. The court’s review of the law on this subject has

yielded less than clear results. The former Fifth Circuit

has said that “[t]he term ‘new issues’ has been inter-

preted to mean new issues of fact and not new theories of

recovery.” Id. at 753. Notwithstanding, not every new fact

question has been held to give rise to a jury trial. For

2 Although Fed.R.Civ.P. 39(b) permits a court in its discre-

tion to grant a jury trial after the period for a timely demand has

run, defendants insist that they were entitled to a jury trial as of

right and that therefore a Rule 39(b) analysis is inappropriate

(DE 155, at 5).

_A 65

example, in Lanza v. Drexel & Co., 479 F2d 1277 (2d

Cir.1973) (en banc), a securities case, the court held that a

claim for punitive damages and an allegation of willful-

ness were not new issues within the meaning of Rule 38:

The willfulness and falsity as of a particular

date merely clarified “the same general issues”

raised in the original complaint. Moore v. United

States, 196 F.2d 906, 908 (5th Cir.1952). Kircher

had been put on notice of the underlying facts and

basic legal theory — fraud — upon which plaintiffs

sought relief, and the character of the suit was in

no way changed by the amendments.

Id. at 1310 (emphasis added). One district court has artic-

ulated the following standard:

The test to be employed by a court in ruling ona

motion to strike a jury demand is whether the

“new issues” alleged in the amendments

“touch , . . the same general issues” raised by the

original pleadings, Roth v. Hyer, 142 F.2d 227,

228 (5th Cir.1944), or whether the issues con-

tained in the amended complaints “were in any

material way different from those presented by

the original [complaint].” Connecticut General

Life Insurance Co. v. Breslin, 332 F.2d 928, 931 (5th

Cir.1964).

Reading & Bates Construction Co. v. Baker Energy Resources

Corp., 96 F.R.D. 564, 565 (S.D.Tex.1983) (emphasis added).

In this case, the second and third amended com-

plaints introduced claims for damages by seven new

plaintiffs. As defendants contend, each of these claims

requires proof as to whether the alleged incidents

occurred, whether the evidence establishes a causal con-

nection with defendants’ conduct, and whether damages

A 66

have been sustained. All of these questions raise “new”

factual issues in the plainest sense of the word.

The peculiar circumstances of this case, however,

suggest a contrary result. First, the record of the evidenti-

ary hearings conducte« by the Magistrate provides the

court with 20/20 hindsigh? 5n the nature and materiality

of the new factual issues. Second, a class action posture

requires that the plaintiffs raise common questions of fact.

See Fed.R.Civ.P. 23(a). Of particular relevance is the testi-

mony of the named plaintiffs and of Dr. Richard M.

Swanson, plaintiffs’ expert witness in the field of correc-

tional psychology. Considered as a whole, this evidence

shows that plaintiffs’ claims possess a factual congruity

of sickening proportion. Their stories are strikingly simi-

lar, reflecting common experiences of harassment,

threats, attack, official indifference, and resulting dam-

age. The similarity of the factual questions is particularly

apparent in the court’s analysis of the causal connection

between Turner’s acts or omissions and plaintiffs’ claims.

See, infra at 681-682.

Thus, the issues raised by the seven new plaintiffs in

the second amended complaint “touch . . . the same

general issues” raised in the first amended complaint,

Roth v. Hyer, 142 F.2d 227, 228 (5th Cir.1944), and are not

materially different from the original issues, see Connecti-

cut General Life Insurance Co. v. Breslin, 332 F.2d 928, 931

(5th Cir.1964); see also Reading & Bates, 96 F.R.D. at 565.

The first amended complaint put defendants “on notice

of the underlying facts and basic legal theory . . . upon

which plaintiffs sought relief, and the character of the

suit was in no way changed by the amendments.” Lanza,

479 F.2d at 1310. Having failed timely to demand a jury

|

A 67

trial in response to the first amended complaint, defen-

dants effectively waived their right to such a trial, and

their objection is overruled.

IV.

FAILURE TO GRANT CONTINUANCE

Defendants next object to the Magistrate’s failure to

grant a continuance of the evidentiary hearings. This

court has previously denied defendants’ emergency

appeal of the Magistrate’s ruling (DE 104, 112).

Orders concerning the conduct of a trial, such as

continuances, “are peculiarly within the jurisdiction of

the trial court” and “will not be disturbed except upon a

showing of abuse of discretion, and then only upon a

showing that such abuse of discretion resulted in sub-

stantial harm to the parties seeking relief.” Edward Leasing

Corp. v. Uhlig & Associates, Inc., 785 F.2d 877, 881-82 (11th

Cir.1986).

Defendants principally assert that they were not pre-

pared to defend against the damage claims because cir-

cumstances forced them to depose the seven new

plaintiffs as well as plaintiffs’ expert witnesses at the last

minute. Further, defendants contend that these deposi-

tions revealed the names of new witnesses with knowl-

edge of plaintiffs’ claims but defendants had no

opportunity to depose them.

The court is not persuaded that these circumstances

justify a continuance. Defendants had already been

granted one continuance from November 4, 1985 to a

special setting on December 2, 1985. In that order the

A 68

Magistrate pointed out that defendants had had notice of

the claims of the seven new plaintiffs at least since Sep-

tember 1 (DE 80). While it is true that discovery contin-

ued after the evidentiary hearings had begun, such a

schedule does not appear to have dampened the energy

and enthusiasm of competent counsel for both sides.

Defendants were able to depose the seven new plaintiffs

on November 13-15. Defendants do not explain, however,

why this accelerated discovery schedule precluded them

from deposing the newly-revealed witnesses before or

after the commencement of trial on December 2, partic-

ularly considering that these new witnesses appear to be

prisoners in defendants’ custody. Defendants’ assertion

that they were unprepared to try this case, moreover, is

belied by their effective crossexamination of plaintiffs’

witnesses. Most important, defendants have demon-

strated no actual prejudice. Accordingly, defendants’

objection to the Magistrate’s failure to continue the trial is

overruled.

V.

FAILURE OF MAGISTRATE TO ENTER RECUSAL

During the testimony of Dr. Swanson, defendants

first became aware that the Magistrate had visited GCI in

the early stages of this litigation. Judge Nimkoff told

counsel that in 1982 he had conducted an informal hear-

ing of LaMarca’s claim, as was often his custom in pris-

oner cases. Also present at the unrecorded proceeding

were Joe Belitsky of the Attorney General’s Office, repre-

senting the State, and GCI Assistant Superintendent

Arline. LaMarca related to the court his concern for other

A 69

inmates who had been abused. Belitsky and Arline

assured the Magistrate that a full investigation would

take place. No such inquiry ever occurred, and Turner

testified that he was unaware that these assurances were

made to the court (DE 128, at 30-31). At trial defendants

requested Judge Nimkoff to recuse himself, but the Mag-

istrate denied that he would become a witness in the suit

and accordingly refused the request.

Se eile! Deed

A judicial officer is required to disqualify himself in a

proceeding in which he has personal knowledge of dis-

puted evidentiary facts concerning the proceeding. ABA

Code of Judicial Conduct Canon 3(C)(1)(a) and (d)(iv); 28

U.S.C. § 455 (1982). Defendants argue that the Magistrate

relied upon these events as evidence establishing either

Turner’s knowledge of alleged conditions at GCI or his

failure to act on those conditions after he he [sic] was put

on notice.

As defendants point out, the 1982 proceedings con-

ducted at GCI were nonrecord, and no witness testified

concerning the Magistrate’s recollection of the events.

Notwithstanding, knowledge acquired by a judge while

he performs judicial duties does not constitute grounds

for disqualification. United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384

U.S. 563, 583, 86 S.Ct. 1698, 1710, 16 L.Ed.2d 778 (1966).

Where it is alleged that a judge has personal knowledge

of disputed evidentiary facts concerning a proceeding

such that he should recuse himself pursuant to 28 U.S.C.

§ 455, the information or knowledge must stem from an

extrajudicial source to warrant disqualification. United

States v. Coven, 662 F.2d 162, 168 (2d Cir.1981), cert. denied,

456 U.S. 916, 102 S.Ct. 1771, 72 L.Ed.2d 176 (1982). Judge

Nimkoff’s 1982 visit to GCI was undisputedly conducted

A 70

as part of the instant proceeding and occurred in the

presence of counsel for the State. See United States v. State

of Washington, 459 F.Supp. 1020, 1093-97 (W.D.Wash.1978),

aff'd, 645 F.2d 749 (9th Cir.1981). Defendants, moreover,

conceivably could have called Belitsky or Arline to testify

to their memory of the proceeding.

Defendants finally argue that the Magistrate was

inclined to rely on the 1982 hearing as evidence tending

to establish notice to Turner or Turner’s failure to act. The

transcripts disclose that the Magistrate asked questions of

several witnesses regarding that hearing. In his report

and recommendation, however, the Magistrate states that

those events serve “merely to underscore Plaintiffs’ posi-

tion that GCI, under the Turner administration, was an

institution not under the control of that Defendant” (DE

128, at 31). Thus, the Magistrate did not accord those

events with dispositive weight. Cf. State of Washington,

459 F.Supp. at 1095. In any event, disregarding the

account of the 1982 hearing, the record contains more

than enough evidence to support the Magistrate’s find-

ings and conclusions regarding Turner’s control of GCI.

The objection is overruled.

VI.

OBJECTIONS TO FINDINGS OF FACT

The court next will address in turn each of defen-

dants’ objections to the Magistrate’s findings of fact and

will analyze their significance to the overall disposition

of the case. The numbers preceding each paragraph corre-

spond to the paragraph numbering in the report and

recommendation.

Raed ae ee retlri Fn Ske

A 71

{1 31. As plaintiffs concede, defendants’ objection

should be sustained. Turner was superintendent of GCI

from mid-1976 to his retirement on July 31, 1984.

{ 32. The racial breakdown of the GCI inmate popu-

lation in 1985 is somewhat relevant to the issue of injunc-

tive relief. The Magistrate’s finding that approximately

sixty percent of the population was Black and the remain-

der White or Hispanic is generally supported by the

evidence which concededly was not the most competent

proof. Although the documentary evidence contains no

support for the conclusion that the figure for Whites

included Hispanics, there was testimony to that effect.

Objection overruled.

{ 33. Although defendants are correct that Music

estimated the Hispanic population at seven percent

(Music, DE 160, at 133), the evidence supports the infer-

ence that that percentage may have been higher at times.

Defendants also contest the definition of “close custody”

prisoners; however, the Magistrate did not define the

term. Objection sustained in part and overruled in part;

the Magistrate’s finding is modified accordingly.

1 36. Defendants protest the Magistrate’s overall

characterization of factors present at GCI such as “whole-

sale manufacture of prison wine,” “regular screenings of

sexually explicit videotapes,” and “maintenance of an ill-

assorted guard corps whose members the inmates per-

ceived as regularly trafficking-in contraband, extortion

and neglect.” Defendants admit that instances of these

factors appear in the record but far less frequently than

the Magistrate implied. The record supports findings that

prison wine was prevalent at GCI, that sexually-explicit

A 72

films were shown, and that many of the guards were

perceived as corrupt or at least neglectful. Although the

Magistrate’s language is somewhat hyperbolic, the objec-

tion is overruled.

{ 38-39. Defendants argue that the Magistrate

implied that Turner was aware of all of the conditions at

GCI relating to plaintiffs’ claims and that two letters

Turner wrote to Louie L. Wainwright, secretary of the

Florida Department of Corrections (DOC), constitute

admissions of GCI’s unsafeness. It is apparent from the

letters in evidence, however, that Turner’s comments

must be viewed in the context of his reporting a staffing

shortage to his superior. Objection overruled.

Defendants make much of the relevance to this litiga-

tion of the accreditation of prisons and GCI in particular

by the American Correctional Association. The Magis-

trate found that the GCI accreditation had “virtually no

significance” to this lawsuit because accredited prisons

have been found unconstitutional by courts. Having con-

sidered the GCI accreditation along with the remainder of

the evidence, the undersigned district court finds it of

marginal relevance in this case. Objection overruled.

q 40. On January 30, 1980, the Palm Beach County

Grand Jury issued a presentment regarding conditions at

GCI (Pltf.ex. 4). Although the investigation was appar-

ently provoked by shortages in meat supply, other secu-

rity issues were addressed. Defendants’ objection to the

report’s admissibility in evidence on the ground of hear-

say is overruled pursuant to Fed.R.Evid. 803(8)(C) and is

also overruled on the basis of relevance because the

report is germane at least to the question of notice to

Turner.

toe entateenitelagy

A 73

Defendants again complain about the Magistrate’s

use of the phrase “a free flow of contraband.” The grand

jury heard testimony of lax security at GCI as well as

“many allegations and accusations of drugs, alcohol, and

other contraband, gambling, theft, confiscation, and pay-

offs among the inmates and personnel of GCI.” The

report stated that alcohol use and its manufacture was

apparently “prevalent.” Pltf.ex. 4, at 6. That such contra-

band was freely flowing at GCI is a reasonable construc-

tion of the grand jury’s findings, and the objection is

overruled.

142. On August 26-29, 1980, the DOC Office of the

Inspector General issued a report on its management

review of GCI (pltf.ex. 4). Among other things, the report

noted a serious lack of supervision on the compound due

to staffing shortages. The Magistrate simply cited this

portion of the report and did not seem to hold Turner

personally responsible for staff shortages. Accordingly,

the objection is overruled.

144. Defendants dispute the magistrate’s finding of

low morale among GCI staff. The district court believes

the record contains sufficient evidence to support this

finding. This evidence includes an employee question-

naire which reflected that staff members felt that on-job

training and the number of available staff were inade-

quate as well as the various witnesses’ perception of staff

apathy. Objection overruled.

1 45. The Office of the Inspection General issued a

second GCI management report approximately three

years later, on September 19-21, 1983 (pltf.ex. 6). The

management report supports the Magistrate’s finding of

A 74

some laxity in security, which included improper control

and supervision of inmate movement from one location

to another and inadequate staffing of the perimeter posts

(id. at 8-9). Objection overruled.

Wi 46-50. The Magistrate found that the use of

excessive force by Lieutenant William Barrett when he

was acting chief correctional officer at GCI was relevant

to Turner’s management of GCI. In brief, Barrett was

summoned from a local festival in Belle Glade to the

prison after a fight broke out in a dormitory. Barrett was

accompanied by Sergeant Rickey Hayes and Lieutenant

L.A. Peters, GCI’s internal inspector. All three had been

drinking. Barrett and Hayes had their faces made up like

clowns. Although the incident had been largely quelled,

Barrett took a loaded shotgun into the compound and

used it to beat several inmates in the back of the head.

As plaintiffs emphasize, the Barrett incident is rele-

vant not as a showing of improper use of force but as an

illustration of Turner’s reaction to the situation. The inci-

dent report of the Office of the Inspector General states

that on the night of the incident Turner advised Barrett to

go home and rest and that Turner did not feel the situa-

tion warranted notification of a prison inspector (pltf.ex.

9, at 5). Defendants are correct to add that Turner eventu-

ally notified the inspector general, who sent a team to

GCI within three days of the incident (Swanson, DE 117,

at 213-14). Swanson criticized Turner for not immediately

suspending Barrett and taking away his gun and badge

rather than merely telling him to go home and rest.

Significantly, defendants do not object to the Magistrate’s

finding at J 49 that Barrett remained functioning as a

te OE alt all .

A 75

correctional officer for at least a full week after the inci-

dent. It is clear that the Magistrate did not attribute

undue weight to the Barrett incident. Objection over-

ruled.

The Magistrate also related Swanson’s testimony con-

cerning the transcript of Turner’s interview with one of

Barrett’s victims (pltf.ex. 9, subex. 13). The Magistrate

quoted Swanson’s testimony that the inmate’s reporting

of wine-drinking among the prisoners did not appear to

surprise Turner. Contrary to defendants’ assertion, the

district court does not believe that the Magistrate found

that Turner “failed to register appropriate outrage” at this

revelation. The Magistrate simply quoted Swanson’s

opinion in a footnote and did not comment on it in any

way. Objection overruled.

W7 51-52. Defendants also challenge as irrelevant

the magistrate’s findings regarding the investigation? and

eventual dismissal and arrest of GCI correctional officer

Clarence Dixon. As defendants note, Turner did testify

that, although the investigation was hindered by several

obstacles, he ordered it to continue. Turner’s persistence,

however, does not negate the Magistrate’s finding that if

Dixon's employment application had been properly

screened he probably would not have been hired at all.

Objection overruled.

153. Defendants again protest the Magistrate’s use

of the phrase “wholesale staff corruption.” The Barrett

* The investigation occurred in mid-1984 rather than 1974,

a probable typographical error in the report and recommenda-

tion.

A 76

and Dixon reports and the testimony of alleged inmate-

enforcer Larry Pryor obviously do not in themselves

impugn the integrity, of the entire GCI security staff.

Barrett, however, was one of GCI’s top-ranked security

officers. Further, the testimony of the inmate-witnesses

discloses the perception of extensive staff corruption.

Objection overruled.

456. The Magistrate agreed with Swanson’s conclu-

sion that the GCI staff or administration took little or no

effort to control the extensive contraband at the prison.

Defendants complain that the Magistrate ignored their

evidence of substantial measures to control the flow of

contraband during Turner’s regime. Both sides have done

a heroic job of providing citations to the evidence sup-

porting their respective positions. The district court has

considered all the evidence as well as the possible biases

of the witnesses. The record as a whole supports the

Magistrate’s conclusion that little or no effort was taken

to control illicit activity at GCI, resulting in readily avail-

able contraband. Objection overruled.

417 57-58. The Magistrate found that evidence of

several incidents involving use of firearms tended to

show inadequate staff training. Defendants claim that the

Magistrate exaggerated the significance of these occur-

rences and that the GCI staff was in fact well-trained. The

district court finds that the firearms incidents bear some-

what on the issue of staff training. Objection overruled.

7 59. Defendants’ objection to the finding of low

moral among staff is overruled for the reasons stated in

supra ¥ 44.

A 77

The district court agrees with defendants’ assertion

that Turner is not solely to blame for high staff turnover

and vacancies. As plaintiffs and defendants note, the staff

turnover and vacancy rates declined in 1982 and contin-

ued to decline through 1984. The relevancy of these

observations, however, is not critical to the resolution of

this case, because six of the ten individual plaintiffs were

raped or assaulted after the turnover and vacancy rates

had declined in 1983 and 1984. The Magistrate’s findings

are modified in accordance with the district court’s obser-

vations in this paragraph.

{ 61. Defendants take issue with the finding that

the individual plaintiff’s claims are directly related to the

lack of staff supervision due to Turner’s failure to station

the officers properly. The objection is overruled for the

reasons stated in infra J] 62 and 63.

7 62. During the Turner administration, GCI

inmates were in the habit of hanging sheets, towels,

clothes, and personal lockers from the bunk beds. These

obstructions obscured activity in the bunks from the view

of the officer stationed in the cage or “wicket” at the front

of each dorm. The showers at the back of the dormitories

were obscured from the officers’ view by these obstruc-

tions and also by double-bunking the middle row of beds.

Defendants point to testimony that an officer stationed in

the wicket could not see into parts of the shower even if

these obstacles were removed. This does not change the

fact that visibility was greatly improved with the removal

of these obstructions in one of the dormitories under one

of Turner’s successors, Superintendent Randall Music.

Objection overruled.

A 78

{ 63. Although the officers were supposed to be on

constant patrol of the dorms, the Magistrate found that

this did not occur. The Magistrate’s finding that routine

patrol did not in fact take place is supported by the

weight of the evidence, particularly the testimony that

gang rapes in the showers or beds endured for fifteen to

forty minutes. Objection overruled.

The Magistrate also found that Turner could recall no

action taken against an officer for failure to patrol the

dormitories. Turner actually testified that such action

may have been taken but that he could not recall a

specific instance.* Objection overruled.

{ 64. Defendants take issue with the Magistrate’s

finding that GCI’s chief investigator, Lieutenant Peters,

testified that GCI had no standard operating procedure

for investigating rapes (Peters, DE 162, at 444). Peters

later testified to a procedure he had used to investigate a

rape (id. at 464-65). From this testimony defendants allege

that the Magistrate misrepresented the evidence. The

court disagrees. Peters stated that no formal procedure in

4 Mr. Lipman: During your tenure, Mr. Turner, were any

officers ever suspended or disciplined for failure to walk the

areas of the dormitory outside of their wicket during their duty

hours?

Mr. Turner: I’m iess sure of that one, Mr. Lipman. There

probably could have been some disciplinary action taken con-

cerning officers not properly performing those types of duties.

There certainly could have been, yes, sir.

Mr. Lipman: Can you recite one specific instance where

that occurred, sir?

Mr. Turner: No, sir, I cannot.

Turner, DE 164 at 732-22.

A 79

fact existed and later recounted his own methodology.

Peters testified, as defendants note, that no procedure

existed for line officers to report rapes directly to him, the

prison investigator, but that line officers were supposed

to pass on the information to their superiors. The individ-

ual plaintiffs’ stories, which the Magistrate found cred-

ible, demonstrate that the passing of rape reports to

superior officers did not produce competent or thorough

investigations of those reports. Objection overruled.

{ 65. DOC Inspector General Brierton testified that,

in a prison rape investigation, at a minimum (1) medical

evidence should be secured, (2) a full victim statement

should be taken, and (3) the matter should be referred to

a local prosecutor. These steps were not followed at GCI

with respect to the individual plaintiffs. Defendants ques-

tion whether the individual plaintiffs were actually raped

and, if they were, whether the rapes were reported.

Again, the Magistrate found credible plaintiffs’ accounts

of their rapes and the ensuing events. The district court

sees no reason to doubt this finding, and the objection is

overruled.

{ 66. Both Turner and Peters specifically testified to

only one prosecution for a rape at GCI. Peters remem-

bered that it occurred in 1984. Although it is true that

internal GCI statistical reports note five sexual assaults

from 1980-84 (pltf.ex. 31), no incident reports regarding

these attacks were introduced. The Magistrate’s finding is

so modified.

q{ 71. The Magistrate found that various factors,

considered in combination, should have made it apparent

to a prudent administrator that rapes were occurring, and

A 80

that, considering this knowledge, the failure to promul-

gate and adhere to the most rudimentary investigative

and preventative procedures constitutes a deliberate

indifference toward inmate security. The objection is

overruled for the reasons stated in infra {J 72 and 73 and

elsewhere in this memorandum and order.

q 72. The Magistrate found that the background of

contraband, violence, and other illegal activity at GCI

was compatible with the existence of violent sexual

assaults. Defendants’ objection that contraband was not

free-flowing is overruled for reasons stated previously.

Defendants’ further objection that there is no connection

between contraband and rape is belied by the plaintiffs’

testimony evidencing the presence of weapons, drugs,

and alcohol when they were raped. Objection overruled.

{I 73. The Magistrate found that the disproportio-

nate numbers of White inmates who received protective

confinement should have put Turner on notice that these

inmates felt in danger in the population. As defendants

note, inmates may request protective confinement for

reasons unrelated to fears for their safety. The district

court makes two observations. First, if protective confine-

ment houses twenty Whites to one Black in a population

where Blacks outnumber Whites (pltf.ex. 6), a prudent

administrator should at least have inquired why this was

the case. Second, the evidence as a whole supports the

inference that Whites who requested protective confine-

ment did so out of fear of sexual or other assault. Again,

a prudent administrator would have investigated. Objec-

tion overruled.

A 81

1 75. Defendants criticize the Magistrate’s finding

that conditions in protective confinement were “punitive”

because certain physical problems such as lighting, ven-

tilation, and overcrowding were out of Turner’s fiscal

control. Those conditions, however, comprised only part

of the reason that protective confinement was punitive.

For example, the cells were infested with waste and ver-

min, inmates were harassed by inmates in nearby disci-

plinary confinement and the compound, no exercise was

afforded, only three brief showers a week were allowed,

and canteen and often library privileges were lost. Objec-

tion overruled.

1 76. The fact that some inmates elected to remain

in protective confinement for months was found to be

evidence that those inmates experienced high anxiety in

the compound. Overcrowded conditions in confinement

supports an inference of a high inmate demand for pro-

tection. Defendants state only that other reasons could

have contributed to the overcrowding, such as increase in

inmate population, the nationwide rise in number of

inmates in protective confinement, and inclusion of disci-

plinary and administrative confinement detainees. The

Magistrate’s finding is modified accordingly.

1 77. An experience repeated over and over in the

testimony is the “wolfing”5 and cat-calling by Black

inmates to White inmates upon the arrival of the latter

> “Wolf” is a slang term for a violent, coercive homosexual

or for a particularly assaultive inmate.

A 82

group at GCI. Contrary to defendants’ assertion, the Mag-

istrate found only that Swanson testified that the corrobo-

ration of this experience by inmates unknown to each

other and presently incarcerated in different institutions

enhances the probability of its occurrence. Objection

overruled.

q{ 78. The Magistrate found other indicia of sexual

activity at GCI such as sheets hung from bunk beds,

inmates moaning in their beds, and the showing of por-

nographic movies in a trailer where cries and moans were

heard. Defendants object that reasons other than sexual

activity existed for these occurrences and that there was

no evidence that Turner knew of these phenomena. Such

reasoning does not comport with the totality of the evi-

dence including the inmate testimony that cries, moans,

and screams were frequently heard emanating from the

showers and from bunks concealed by sheets.

Further, defendants’ protest that “a superintendent

with all of his other responsibilities cannot screen each

movie shown in the prison” is almost disingenuous.

Uncontradicted evidence shows that sexually-explicit

videotapes - with graphic depictions of intercourse -

were regularly shown in a trailer on the compound, that

these movies were unsupervised, and that sounds consis-

tent with human sexual activity could be heard from the

trailer. Several witnesses provided more lurid accounts of

the scene inside the trailer itself. Plaintiffs’ expert wit-

nesses rendered their opinion that such films are inap-

propriate for a prison audience. Defense witness Brierton

acknowledged that a different school of thought exists

which holds that adult movies may be appropriate for

adult prison audiences. Brierton, however, was adamant

A 83

that group events such as movies should always be super-

vised.

Defendants also point to the lack of evidence that

Turner saw the hanging sheets, heard the cries, moans,

and screams suggestive of sexual activity, or saw or

selected the videotapes. A prudent administrator, how-

ever, should have been aware of these occurrences,®

which the evidence shows to have been a prevalent and

unmistakable part of life at GCI. Objection overruled.

{ 79. The Magistrate found that some rapes were

reported and that this should have signalled a problem to

a prudent administrator. There is no reason to question

the finding that rapes were reported to GCI officers. That

these reports never made their way to Turner or to the

prison investigator, considering the totality of the evi-

dence, shows not Turner’s exculpatory ignorance but

rather his liability. Objection overruled.

{ 81. Objection overruled for the reasons stated in

supra ¥ 64.

{ 82. The record contains no evidence that the

rapes, which the Magistrate found to have occurred, were

even minimally investigated. Defendants’ objection is

overruled for the reasons set forth in supra JJ 64 and 79.

© A former superintendent, Brierton testified that, although

he did not personally select the movies, he discovered that

inappropriate films were being shown when he stopped by the

prison one night to see what the movie was (Brierton, DE 185, at

103).

A 84

{1 83. The objection regarding rape prosecutions is

overruled for the reasons stated in supra | 66. The objec-

tion regarding weapons prosecutions is sustained as fol-

lows: the last sentence of the Magistrate’s finding is

deleted and replaced with the following: “There was no

evidence that during Turner’s administration a State

prosecution was initiated for any weapons possessed by

any inmate at GCI (Peters).”

q 84. The Magistrate found that during Turner's

administration inmates bent on violence “roamed the

compound with impunity.” This finding is supported by

the evidence that during Turner’s reign inmates were free

to wander the compound and dormitories other than the

one to which they were assigned. The procedure whereby

inmates need passes to move about the compound was

instituted by a successor superintendent, Randall Music

(Music, DE 160, at 146). Objection overruled.

The Magistrate further found that Turner refused to

seek assistance from federal and state prosecutors and

investigators to cope with the crimes committed on the

compound. The record, however, contains some evidence

of outside prosecutions initiated by Turner. The evidence

does fairly show that outside state and federal criminal

justice remedies were grossly underutilized during

Turner’s administration considering the crime-ridden

atmosphere at GCI. The Magistrate’s finding is modified

accordingly.

{ 86. The Magistrate found that the rapes of plain-

tiffs Aldred, Saunders, and Harper were reported to

prison authorities, and the record contains no articulable

reason for the district court to disregard this credibility

A 85

determination. This finding supports an inference that

the rapes were never investigated at least partially due to

the lack of an established procedure for reporting rapes

to the prison investigator. Objection overruled.

{ 87. The Magistrate found that Turner also failed

to avail himself of or underutilized other possible investi-

gative arms of the government such as the State Attorney

General's Office, State Attorney’s Office, and the Federal

Bureau of Investigation. Whether or not these agencies

could have assisted in improving the conditions at GCI,

the record does not show that Turner requested assistance

from other agencies, on a consistent or persistent basis, in

order to alleviate GCI’s problems. Defendants also note

that there was no evidence that GCI’s internal inspectors

were unwilling or unable to investigate matters brought

to their attention. These assertions ring hollow consider-

ing that, because of inadequate reporting procedures,

many grave matters were never brought to their atten-

tion. Objection overruled.

{7 89. The district court does not doubt the evidence

cited by defendants that sometimes inmates were disci-

plined for being in an area in which they were not autho-

rized to be. This proof, however, does little to mitigate

the testimony which shows that inmate movement about

the prison was inadequately controlled. See, e.g., supra

q 84. Objection overruled.

{ 92. The objections are overruled for reasons previ-

ously addressed.

{ 93. The Magistrate found that, even though parts

of the dormitcries were concealed from the view of an

officer stationed in the wicket, “Turner never initiated

A 86

any administrative policy that officers patrol the dormi-

tory on a regular basis” (DE 128, at 45). As defendants

note, Turner did testify that posted orders required offi-

cers to patrol (Turner, DE 164, at 643). The weight of the

evidence, notwithstanding, shows that the guards did not

regularly patrol. The Magistrate’s finding is so modified.

{ 94. Succeeding superintendent Music was able to

increase visibility by single-bunking the middle row of

beds in one of the dormitories. Defendants argue that this

modification was not cost-free, because $7,000 was

expended for new lockers (Music, DE 160, at 141-42). The

district court is unable to determine from the record

whether new lockers were an essential element of the

single-bunking or simply an added security measure for

inmate property. Even if the $7,000 was a necessary

expenditure, there is no significant evidence that Turner

possessed or tried to obtain funds for that purpose.

Objection overruled.

q 96-97. The Magistrate compared Turner’s practice

in managing the transfer out of GCI of problem inmates

with that of successors Jones and Music. “Problem

inmates” includes both aggressive inmate “wolves” and

especially vulnerable inmates. There was evidence that

Turner often achieved the difficult goal of transferring

problem inmates out of GCI. Successor superintendent

Jones transferred out forty to forty-five inmates in less

than three months. Music transferred five a month over a

six-month period. Defendants point to instances where

Turner moved seven inmates on one occasion and twelve

on another, although his monthly average of such trans-

fers is not in evidence. There is other compelling proof,

A 87

however, that Turner was not zealous enough in transfer-

ring problem inmates: for example, Peters’ admission,

found credible by the Magistrate, that Turner did not

view “wolves” as problem inmates; the chronicles con-

cerning “wolves” Larry Pryor, Willie Dock, and Levi

Fisher (DE 128, at 42-44); and the length of time the

vulnerable plaintiffs were effectively forced to endure

protective confinement before transfers took place. In the

district court’s view, the record shows that Turner could

have exercised much more diligence in attempting to

transfer problem inmates from GCI and that this failure

constitutes evidence of deliberate or callous indifference

to inmate safety. Objections overruled.

11 98-100. Defendants challenge the Magistrate’s

findings regarding inmate-wolves Pryor, Dock, and

Fisher with minor discrepancies in the evidence. The

Magistrate’s findings are ultimately grounded in cred-

ibility determinations which the district court sees no

reason to disturb. Objection overruled.

{ 101. The objections are overruled for the reasons

set forth at length in supra | 78.

{ 103. The Magistrate’s analysis of the relationship

between financial feasibility and the constitutional obli-

gations of a prison superintendent comports with the

prevailing law in the Eleventh Circuit (see infra at 38-39).

Objection overruled.

q 105. The Magistrate’s detailed specific measures

which were inexpensive or cost-free, which were ignored

or rejected by Turner, which were within his control, and

which would have minimized or eliminated the likeli-

hood of rapes and other assaults at GCI.

A 88

(i) Defendants claim that there was no evidence that

Turner failed to discipline staff for failure to patrol the

dorms, that staff in fact failed to patrol, or that Turner

was made aware of any such failure. To the contrary, the

district court can discern no significant evidence that the

staff did patrol the dorms or that Turner disciplined staff

for not patrolling. Further, there is no evidence explain-

ing why Turner was not aware of this failure. Objection

overruled.

(ii) The record reflects extensive contraband at GCI

which was often provided or at least tolerated by

Turner’s staff, prevalent extortion activities by inmates

which were not redressed by officers who were made

aware of it, several instances of extortion activities by

staff, and the tolerance of obvious consensual and non-

consensual sexual activity by inmates. Each of these mat-

ters is addressed elsewhere in this memorandum and

order and in the report and recommendation. Turner’s

overall laxity in managing and controlling his staff can be

inferred from the prevalence and apparent obviousness of

these conditions and from the absence of substantial evi-

dence of disciplinary action directed to staff. Objection

overruled.

(iii) The weight of the evidence supports the find-

ing that during the Turner administration it was common

practice for inmates to hang sheets and other objects from

their bunks, thereby obstructing visibility in the dormito-

ries. The inference is inescapable that a prudent adminis-

trator would have been aware of this problem. Objection

overruled.

A 89

(iv) The district court has previously addressed the

lack of adequate procedures for the reporting and investi-

gation of rapes (supra |] 64-66). Objection overruled.

(v) Defendants’ arguments have been rejected else-

where (supra {{ 37, 66), and the objections are overruled.

(vi) These assertions also have been rejected previ-

ously (supra J 84). The objection is overruled.

(vii) The court has already addressed Turner’s lack

of zeal at transferring problem inmates (supra JJ 96-100).

Objection overruled.

{ 108. Swanson utilized various methodologies to

evaluate plaintiffs’ accounts of their rapes. Defendants’

objection appears to be a semantical one and is overruled.

{ 109. The Magistrate found the expert opinion tes-

timony of Dr. Caddy to be credible, and the district court

does not question this finding. Objection overruled.

{ 111. The Magistrate’s credibility finding will not

be overturned. Objection overruled.

7 118. The Magistrate’s essential finding that the

atmosphere of undeterred violence at GCI was conducive

to acts of rape is supported by the weight of the evidence.

Objection overruled.

q 121. The record does not support defendants’

assertion that rectal examinations were actually used at

GCI upon the reporting of a rape. Objection overruled.

77 122-195. The gravamen of defendants’ objections

turn on credibility determinations which the district court

finds no reason to disturb. The objections are overruled.

A 90

71 196-199. The district court finds persuasive and

supported by the evidence the Magistrate’s observations

on the overall integrity of plaintiffs’ case. Objection over-

ruled.

VII.

OBJECTIONS TO CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Defendants’ objections to the Magistrate’s conclu-

sions of law reflect a general agreement with the prevail-

ing legal standards but dispute the application of the

facts to those standards. In particular, defendants argue

with the Magistrate’s conclusion that plaintiffs have put

forth sufficient proof of violation of their civil rights.

As the Magistrate concluded, the following legal

standards apply. A prisoner has a right to be protected

from the constant threat of violence and from sexual

assault. When prison officials have failed to control or

segregate prisoners who endanger the physical safety of

other prisoners, resulting in a high level of violence, it

constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. Jones v. Dia-

mond, 636 F.2d 1364, 1373-74 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert.

dismissed, 453 U.S. 950, 102 S.Ct. 27, 69 L.Ed.2d 1033

(1981); see also Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 82 S.Ct.

1417, 8 L.Ed.2d 758 (1962) (eighth amendment ban on

cruel and unusual punishment made applicable to states

by fourteenth amendment due process clause).

To hold a prison official liable in a civil rights action

under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) based on cruel and unusual

punishment, plaintiffs must show that the official’s con-

duct constitutes an intentional or callous indifference to

A 91

the prisoner’s right to reasonable protection from vio-

lence. Wiliams [sic] v. Bennett, 689 F.2d 1370, 1380-81 (11th

Cir.1982), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 932, 104 S.Ct. 335, 78

L.Ed.2d 305 (1983). Plaintiffs must prove deliberate indif-

ference on the part of the defendant official rather than

simple negligence. Section 1983 further requires “proof of

an affirmative causal connection between the actions

taken by a particular person ‘under color of state law’

and the constitutional deprivation.” id. at 1380. Where the

defendants hold supervisory positions, vicarious liability

will not suffice. See Monell v. Department of Social Services,

436 U.S. 658, 98 S.Ct. 2018, 56 L.Ed.2d 611 (1978) (munici-

pality not vicariously liable for acts of employees absent

proof that execution of official policy inflicts injury).

Supervisory defendants may be held liable if they have

direct responsibility for the actions of the employees who

engage in misconduct. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362, 375-76,

96 S.Ct. 598, 606, 46 L.Ed.2d 561 (1976). the Eleventh

Circuit has stated that “the inquiry into causation must be

a directed one, focusing on the duties and responsibilities

of each of the individual defendants whose acts or omis-

sions are alleged to have resulted in a constitutional

deprivation.” Williams, 689 F.2d at 1381.

The district court first examines whether Turner’s

conduct rose to a level of intentional or callous indif-

ference to the plaintiffs’ right to “reasonable protection

from violence.” Id. at 1380. The former Fifth Circuit elabo-

rated on the elements of this requirement of intent in

Gullatte v. Potts, 654 F.2d 1007, 1012 (5th Cir.1981). A

section 1983 plaintiff seeking to sue prison officials must

prove either that “the official knew or should have known

A 92

that his action infringed a clearly established constitu-

tional right of the plaintiff,” Douthit v. Jones, 619 F.2d 527,

534 (5th Cir.1980), regardless of the officials’ subjective

intent, Bogard v. Cook, 586 F.2d 399, 411 (5th Cir.1978), cert.

denied, 444 U.S. 883, 100 S.Ct. 173, 62 L.Ed.2d 113 (1979),

or that the “official either actually intended to do harm to

the plaintiff, or took an action which, although not

intended to do harm, was so likely to produce injury that

the harm can be characterized as substantially certain to

result,” id. at 412.

The Magistrate found that Turner knew or should

have known that his acts or omissions infringed plain-

tiffs’ constitutional right to reasonable safety. Evidence

that Turner knew of serious security problems included

official documents such as Turner’s letters to Wainwright,

the 1980 grand jury presentment, the management

reports of the DOC inspector general, the Barrett and

Dixon incidents of staff corruption, and knowledge from

various sources of the prevalence of contraband. The

Magistrate further found that a prudent administrator

should have known of widespread extortion activities by

inmates often in collusion with officers and wide-spread

rape and physical assaults by inmates on inmates (see

supra 4] 77-78). The extensive findings of fact cited by

the Magistrate provide adequate support for his conclu-

sion that Turner’s conduct constituted callous indif-

ference to plaintiffs’ right to reasonable protection from

violence. Thus, plaintiffs have satisfied the objective test

of Bogard, that Turner knew or should have known that

his actions violated a clearly defined constitutional right,

as well as Bogard’s subjective test, that Turner took an

action which was so likely to produce injury that the

A 93

harm can be characterized as substantially certain to

result.

A defendant cannot have the requisite intent for cal-

lous indifference if full compliance with constitutional

norms is beyond his control and if he can show that he

accomplished what could be accomplished within the

limits of his authority. Williams, 689 F.2d at 1388. Over

defendants’ persistent protest that Turner’s means were

limited, the Magistrate identified administrative mea-

sures within Turner’s control which imposed little or no

financial limitation. These include measures Turner could

have taken to identify and remedy his staff's failings at

weapons training, the reporting of rapes, assaults, and

other illegal activities through the chain of command,

patrolling of the dormitories, and ensuring maximum

visibility in the dormitories. Turner also could have

implemented a standard operating procedure for investi-

gation of rapes and assaults, availed himself of outside

agencies in that regard, established inmate movement

controls, and intensified his efforts to transfer partic-

ularly aggressive or vulnerable inmates from GCI. The

fact that succeeding superintendents Jones and Music

were able to achieve or at least take preliminary steps

toward these goals attests to their feasibility. Thus, the

district court is convinced that the means to satisfy con-

stitutional minimums were within Turner’s control.

Accordingly, the court overrules the objection to the Mag-

istrate’s conclusion that plaintiffs failed to prove callous

indifference.”

7 The Magistrate alternatively found section 1983 liability

based on Turner’s breach of a duty imposed by state law which

A 94

Defendants more strenuously object to the Magis-

trate’s conclusion that Turner’s actions constituted a legal

cause of plaintiffs’ constitutional deprivation. The critical

causation inquiry is whether Turner “was in a position to

take steps that could have averted” the attacks on plain-

tiffs “but, through callous indifference, failed to do so.

Resolution of this issue necessarily entails a very individ-

ualized approach, taking into account the duties, discre-

tion, and means” of the defendant. Id. at 1384. Defendants

essentially maintain that the Magistrate painted with

such broad strokes that he failed to analyze whether the

conditions at GCI which were under Turner’s control

proximately caused the injuries to the particular plaintiffs

at the particular times of each occurrence.

The district court is not persuaded. The following

conditions which were under Turner’s control provide

direct causal links to plaintiffs’ injuries. First, every plain-

tiff was attacked or threatened with a weapon, typically a

knife. The evidence establishes the prevalence of such

weapons and Turner’s failure to take reasonable mea-

sures designed to control such contraband. Second, the

long duration of several of the attacks, the places in

which they occurred, and possibly the fact that they

occurred in the first place, are functions of Turner’s fail-

ure to take even minimal steps to ensure that GCI was

caused plaintiff’s constitutional injury. See Williams, 689 F.2d at

1381. The parties agree, however, that Turner could not have

breached a duty imposed by Fla.Stat.Ann. § 20.315(1)(c) (West

1987 Supp.), the statute relied on by the Magistrate, because that

statute on its face applies only to the DOC and not to individual

superintendents. The objection is sustained, and Magistrate's

conclusion in this regard (DE 128, at 111-13) is rejected.

ae

adequately patrolled (Aldred raped in shower for fifteen

to twenty minutes; Durrance led away at knifepoint from

place between bunks which was concealed by hanging

blanket; Bronson raped with baseball bat on recreation

field in broad daylight; Saunders raped in bathroom for

twenty-five to thirty minutes; Harper raped in top bunk;

Cobb stabbed in front of canteen in fight lasting ten to

twelve minutes). Third, Turner’s failure to implement

adequate reporting procedures for rapes and assaults was

a legal cause of plaintiffs’ psychological and possibly

physical damage (Aldred reported rape to several officers

with no results; Aldred not given protective confinement;

Durrance and Bronson did not report out of fear of conse-

) quences; Sanders raped by two inmates who previously

had attacked him; Saunders reported rape and received

inadequate treatment and no investigation; inmates iden-

tified as assailants by LaMarca were not confined for

investigation and continued to assault him; classification

officer told Johnson to take protective confinement or to

get a weapon and fight back). Fourth, Turner’s callous

indifference to the obvious and rampant indicia of homo-

; sexual activity was the proximate cause of rapes, attacks,

4 or repeated harassment (Aldred, Durrance, Bronson,

Saunders, and Harper raped; Bronson forced to commit

nonconsensual sexual act in movie trailer; Johnson sexu-

ally harassed and later attacked four times; constant

threats and sexual solicitation caused LaMarca to escape,

take protective confinement, and receive disciplinary

reports; Cobb injured in fight over homosexual). Fifth,

Turner’s failure adequately to supervise correctional offi-

cers up to the lieutenant level resulted in corruption and

incompetence among the officers and a lack of reasonable

A 95

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A 96

protection of inmates (Cobb’s assailant worked as an

“enforcer” with GCI staff and was protected by them;

LaMarca complained to Barrett about threats and assaults

and was given a knife by Barrett; Bronson afraid to report

rape because he had witnessed inmates exchanging

money and drugs with guards). The Magistrate’s find-

ings, supported by the record, contain more examples of

how Turner’s callous indifference proximately caused the

injuries to Aldred, Durrance, Bronson, Saunders, Harper,

Johnson, Cobb, and LaMarca.

The district court is not satisfied, however, that the

requisite causal connection has been established with

respect to the claims of Epprecht and Gordon. When

Epprecht was assaulted with a pipe in the dormitory, he

could see no guard in the wicket. Because there is no

other evidence regarding the attack, such as its length,

the district court is unable to determine whether the lapse

in supervision was merely accidental or whether it

flowed from Turner’s actions. The fact that the attack was

provoked because Epprecht possessed cash money also

does not establish causation because a cash money sys-

tem in prison does not in itself prove callous indifference.

Similarly, with respect to Gordon, the evidence shows

only that he was assaulted three times at GCI. He was

knocked unconscious once in front of the canteen, his

buttocks were burned when inmates who had been drink-

ing prison-made wine set his polyester underwear on

fire, and he was hit in the head with a pipe in a robbery.

The eighth amendment entitles a prisoner only to reason-

able protection from violence. Williams, 689 F.2d at 1380.

The district court fears that, were it to find Turner liable

for the damage sustained by Epprecht and Gordon,

a

A 97

Turner might become an insurer for every attack on an

inmate which occurred during his tenure. The recom-

j mended $17,000 award of compensatory damages to

Epprecht and the $6,000 to Gordon must therefore be

rejected.

In summary, the facts and the law support the Magis-

trate’s conclusions that certain of defendant Turner’s

actions and inactions in running GCI constituted callous

indifference to plaintiffs’ eighth amendment right to rea-

sonable protection from violence. The evidence further

establishes that, with respect to all of the plaintiffs except

Epprecht and Gordon, Turner was in a position to take

steps that could have averted the attacks on these plain-

tiffs but, through his callous indifference, failed to do so.

The record finally establishes that these constitutional

deprivations were a legal cause of plaintiffs’ damages.

Under the prevailing law in this circuit, see id. at 1381,

plaintiffs Aldred, Durrance, Bronson, Saunders, Harper,

Johnson, Cobb, and LaMarca should prevail against

defendant Turner under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

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: VIII.

:

| OBJECTIONS TO INJUNCTIVE RELIEF

'

The Magistrate found that, although defendants had

instituted improvements of unconstitutional conditions at

GCI, there was a reasonable expectation that the viola-

tions would recur. Accordingly, the Magistrate held that

defendants’ efforts at correcting deficiencies at GCI did

not deprive the court of the power to order injunctive

relief. See County of Los Angeles v. Davis, 440 U.S. 625, 631,

A 98

99 S.Ct. 1379, 1383, 59 L.Ed.2d 642 (1979). He recom-

mended the creation of two committees, one of penolo-

gists and the other of psychologists or psychiatrists, to

advise the court in the formulation of specific injunctive

relief. The charter of the committee of penologists is to

ferret out other rape victims at GCI who were not identi-

fied through this litigation so that they might be provided

with therapeutic assistance and to review and develop

procedures at GCI to minimize future assaults, extortions,

and rapes. The charter of the committee of psychologists

or psychiatrists is to prescribe a treatment plan for the

plaintiffs and witnesses in this action who remain incar-

cerated and to develop procedures at GCI to provide rape

victims with support similar to that received by unincar-

cerated rape victims from rape crisis centers.

Defendants argue that the establishment of the c

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Appendix — Turner v. LaMarca · 510 U.S. 1164 | Frix