Opposition Brief — Term Auto Sales, Inc. v. City of Cleveland

Supreme Court, U.S.

r F IL EOD

ae FEB 14 1996

No. 95-948

£ CLERK _ 4

In The

Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1995

+

TERM AUTO SALES, INC., et al.,

Petitioners,

VS.

THE CITY OF CLEVELAND, et al.,

Respondents.

6

On Petition For A Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Sixth Circuit

+

RESPONDENTS’ BRIEF IN OPPOSITION

°

SHARON SoOBOL JORDAN

Director of Law

*CHARLES E. HANNAN, JR.

Assistant Director of Law

Room 106 - City Hall

601 Lakeside Avenue

Cleveland, OH 44114

(216) 664-2800

Attorneys for Respondents

* Counsel of Record

COCKLE LAW BRIEF PRINTING CO., (800) 225-6964

OR CALL COLLECT (402) 342-2831

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

Whether the Court of Appeals correctly held that the

warrantless search of a business engaged in selling

used cars and salvaging wrecked or otherwise inoper-

able cars, conducted pursuant to a city ordinance

authorizing such inspections, was a permissible

administrative inspection of a closely regulated busi-

ness under New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987)?

ii

LIST OF PARTIES

Pursuant to Rule 29.6 of the Rules of the Supreme

Court of the United States, respondents hereby incorpo-

rate by reference the list of parties set forth on page ii of

the Petition for a Writ of Certiorari as an accurate state-

ment of the parties and any applicable corporate rela-

tions.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Page

QUESTION PRESENTED FOR REVIEW ............ i

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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION................... 1

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TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

Page

CAsEs:

Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981)............-.4. 4

New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. 691 (1987).......... passim

United States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311 (1972)........... 8

CONSTITUTION, STATUTES AND RULEs:

United States Constitution, Amendment IV...-....... 2

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SP ee er RS chp nxe Kee ddobie ei eerkvaverinssscess 2

BP ies te I 6 5 6.6kn nbn dudnccosdavcstouncurehens 2

ae RS ed nkvencsucensivacerbessiebesesrels 2

Pe te Gk. Oe ND Gcdksdecceukedhiecnuscunsssncnunad 2

Ohio Revised Code Section 4501.01 .................. 6

Cleveland Codified Ordinance § 601.15..... L & a» & 7

APPENDIX:

United States Constitution, Amendment IV...... App. 1

28 United States Code Section 1254............. App. 2

28 United States Code Section 1331............. App. 2

28 United States Code Section 1343............. App. 2

42 United States Code Section 1983 ............. App. 4

Ohio Revised Code Section 4501.01 ............. App. 5

Cleveland Codified Ordinance Section 601.15...App. 17

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

Petitioners challenged the constitutionality of

§ 601.15 of the codified ordinances of the City of Cleve-

land which authorized inspections at certain enumerated

business premises for the purpose of locating stolen

motor vehicles and motor vehicle parts.

On May 18, 1995, the United States Court of Appeals

for the Sixth Circuit upheld § 601.15 against the peti-

tioners’ facial challenge.

On July 12, 1995, the Court of Appeals denied the

petition for rehearing.

Petitioners invoke this Court's jurisdiction and seek a

writ of certiorari pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1254(1).

9

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Petitioners sold used cars and salvaged parts from

wrecked and otherwise inoperable cars from the same

business address.

On July 21, 1986, members of the auto theft unit of

the Cleveland police department made an unannounced

administrative inspection of the petitioners’ business

premises to determine whether there were any stolen

motor vehicles or motor vehicle parts on the premises.

The inspection was conducted pursuant to § 601.15 of the

codified ordinances of the City of Cleveland. Several

vehicles and vehicle parts were seized as suspected stolen

vehicles. A grand jury in Cuyahoga County, Ohio,

returned a twenty-one (21) count indictment against the

petitioners, but the charges were later dismissed on

motion of the prosecutor for Cuyahoga County.

Subsequently, on July 17, 1987, petitioners brought

this action in the United States District Court for the

Northern District of Ohio, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331

and 1343(3) and 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against the City of

Cleveland, former chief of police Howard Rudolph, and

several individual Cleveland police officers. Petitioners

challenged the constitutionality of Cleveland codified

ordinance § 601.15 which authorized the inspection of

motor vehicles and motor vehicle parts at petitioners’

business premises. Petitioners claimed that the search

and seizure by the Cleveland police violated their rights

under the Fourth Amendment to the United States Con-

stitution.

On July 28, 1992, the district court denied summary

judgment to the individual Cleveland police officers who

claimed qualified immunity.

On June 28, 1993, the United States Court of Appeals

for the Sixth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling

and held that the individual police officers were entitled

to qualified immunity. The court remanded the matter for

further proceedings as to the remaining defendants,

respondents City of Cleveland and Howard Rudolph.

Following remand, the district court granted sum-

mary judgment to the respondents on August 10, 1993.

Petitioners requested relief from that judgment pursuant

to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b), but the district court denied

petitioners’ motion on December 14, 1993.

Petitioners appealed to the Sixth Circuit Court of

Appeals. On May 18, 1995, the court of appeals affirmed

the district court's judgment and held that Cleveland

codified ordinance § 601.15 was not unconstitutional in

violation of the Fourth Amendment.

The court of appeals denied the petitioners’ request

for rehearing on July 12, 1995.

S

ARGUMENT

The petition for a writ of certiorari should be denied

because the court of appeals correctly analyzed Cleveland

codified ordinance § 601.15 in accordance with the stan-

dards established in New York v. Burger, 482 US. 691

(1987). Nothing in the petition suggests that the court of

appeals’ decision in this case conflicts with a decision of

this Court or with the decision of another court of

appeals or state court of last resort. Similarly, nothing in

the petition indicates that the court of appeals departed

in any way from the accepted and usual course of judicial

proceedings. Because the court of appeals properly

applied the standards set forth in New York v. Burger to

Cleveland’s vehicle inspection ordinance, there is no rea-

son for this Court to revisit the issue presented by this

case. Accordingly, the petition should be denied.

In New York v. Burger, the Court held that a warrant-

less search of an automobile junk yard pursuant to a

statute authorizing such a search fell within the exception

to the warrant requirement for administrative inspections

of closely regulated businesses and therefore did not

violate the Fourth Amendment.’ Because owners and

operators of such closely regulated businesses have a

reduced expectation of privacy, a warrantless inspection

of such commercial premises will be deemed reasonable

so long as three criteria are met:

First, there must be a “substantial” government

interest that informs the regulatory scheme pur-

suant to which the inspection is made... .

Second, the warrantless inspections must be

“necessary to further [the] regulatory

scheme.” . . . Finally, “the statute’s inspection

program, in terms of the certainty and regularity

of its application, [must] provid[e] a constitu-

tionally adequate substitute for a warrant.”

New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. at 702-703 (quoting Donovan

v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594 (1981)).

With regard to the last requirement, the regulatory

statute must perform the two basic functions of a war-

rant. First, it must be sufficiently comprehensive and

defined so that the owner of commercial property cannot

help but be aware that the property will be subject to

periodic inspections undertaken for specific purposes

and that the search is being made pursuant to the law.

1 The Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution

states:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons,

houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable

searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no

Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,

supported by oath or affirmation, and particularly

describing the place to be searched, and the persons

or things to be seized.

New York v. Burger, 482 U.S. at 703. Additionally, the

discretion of the inspecting officers must be carefully

limited in time, place and scope. Id.

The Burger court found that there was a substantial

government interest in close regulation of the vehicle-

dismantling and automobile-junkyard industry because

of the extent of motor vehicle theft that is associated with

this industry. Id., 482 U.S. at 708-709. The Court further

determined that warrantless administrative inspections of

such premises were necessary to serve the substantial

interest in eradicating automobile theft. Id. at 709-710.

Finally, the Burger court ruled that the regulatory

statute provided a constitutionally adequate substitute

for a warrant. Id., 482 U.S. at 711-712. The statute suffi-

ciently informed the operator of a vehicle dismantling

business that regular inspections would occur pursuant

to the statute. The statute identified who was authorized

to conduct the inspection and limited the scope of the

inspection so the business operator had notice as to how

to comply with the statute. And the inspection was lim-

ited as to time, place and scope in that the inspections of

vehicle-dismantling and related industries could occur

only during regular and usual business hours and the

items to be inspected were narrowly defined to include

records, vehicles, or vehicle parts that were on the prem-

ises and that were subject to the law’s requirements.

Accordingly, a warrantless search conducted pur-

suant to such a regulatory statute fell within the excep-

tion to the warrant requirement for administrative

inspections of “closely regulated” businesses and did not

violate the Fourth Amendment.

In the instant case, the petitioners have not disputed

that Cleveland codified ordinance § 601.15 was predi-

cated on the substantial government interest of detecting

motor vehicle theft. The petitioners conceded below that

they were engaged in a closely regulated business. The

petitioners likewise have not challenged that warrantless

inspections are necessary to further this regulatory

scheme.

The petitioners’ only apparent disagreement here is

with the court of appeals’ conclusion that § 601.15 pro-

vided a constitutionally adequate substitute for a warrant

in a manner consistent with that upheld in New York v.

Burger. But a review of § 601.15, the full text of which is

set forth at App. 17-18, vindicates the court of appeals’

determination that Cleveland’s vehicle inspection ordi-

nance meets the standard announced in New York v. Bur-

ger.

Cleveland’s ordinance expressly states that the pur-

pose of the inspections is “to establish the rightful owner-

ship or possession of the vehicle or vehicle part” that is

subject to such inspections. § 601.15(a).

The ordinance specifies that the only persons autho-

rized to make such inspections are the chief of police or

an authorized representative of the chief of police.

§ 601.15(a),(b).

The ordinance further specifies that the items subject

to inspection are: (1) any motor vehicle, as defined in

Section 4501.01 of the Ohio Revised Code; (2) any motor

vehicle part that has been marked with an identifying

number by the manufacturer; and (3) the title, registra-

tion, vehicle identification number, or license plates of

such vehicle. § 601.15(a). Inspections may also be made of

any implements of husbandry and construction equip-

ment. § 601.15(b).

The items subject to inspection are limited to those

items that are “situated in the City of Cleveland in any

public garage, community garage, storage garage, service

garage, repair shop, parking lot, auto sales lot, vehicle

leasing or rental lot, motor vehicle salvage facility, scrap

metal processing facility, auto wrecking yard, junk yard,

or other similar establishment.” § 601.15(a).

The ordinance further provides that whenever possi-

ble, such inspections “shall be conducted at a time and in

a manner so as to minimize any interference with, or

delay of business operations.” § 601.15(c).

In short, Cleveland’s inspection ordinance identifies

the who, what, when, where and why for limited motor

vehicle inspections. Any discretion is sufficiently cur-

tailed by the ordinance’s limitations as to time, place and

scope.

Under these circumstances, there is no basis to con-

clude that a business like these petitioners could be

unaware that motor vehicles and motor vehicle parts on

their business premises would be subject to inspection

pursuant to § 601.15. Because it was conceded in the

lower court that petitioners were engaged in a “closely

regulated business,” the court of appeals properly deter-

mined that petitioners lacked legal standing to complain

that the ordinance could conceivably be enforced against

other than closely regulated businesses.

Petitioners make no claim that this ordinance was

applied to them in an unconstitutional manner. Under

eee

these circumstances, the court of appeals correctly con-

cluded that Cleveland’s ordinance regulating this closely

regulated business was sufficiently comprehensive and

defined to be a constitutionally adequate substitute for a

warrant.

While the petitioners insist that Cleveland’s ordi-

nance is constitutionally flawed because it does not spec-

ify the frequency or regularity of such inspections, the

deterrent value of the inspections would be largely

negated absent some element of surprise. In New York v.

Burger, this Court observed:

Because stolen cars and parts often pass quickly

through an automobile junk yard, “frequent”

and “unannounced” inspections are necessary

in order to detect them. In sum, surprise is

crucial if the regulatory scheme aimed at reme-

dying this major social problem is to function at

all.

Id., 482 U.S. at 710. See also United States v. Biswell, 406

U.S. 311, 316 (1972) (“[I]f inspection is to be effective and

serve as a credible deterrent, unannounced, even fre-

quent, inspections are essential.”).

As the court of appeals found, Cleveland’s ordinance

in this case was “close enough in. . . scope, intent, and

purpose” to the statute upheld in New York v. Burger to

withstand the petitioners’ facial challenge.

Moreover, the petitioners provide no grounds for this

Court to grant certiorari in this case. The court of appeals

applied the law of New York v. Burger and petitioners have

made no showing that the lower court’s constitutional

analysis was demonstrably flawed or is in conflict with

any other decision. Even if this case we» marginally

distinguishable from New York v. Burger due to slightly

different statutory provisions, any distinction would not

be of such constitutional magnitude that demands further

review by this Court, much less that should lead to a

different result. New York v. Burger remains determinative

under these circumstances and nothing about the instant

case provides any reason to re-examine the issue again.

Accordingly, the petition for a writ of certiorari

should be denied.

CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated, Respondents City of Cleve-

land and Howard Rudolph respectfully request that the

petition for a writ of certiorari to the United States Court

of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

SHARON SOBOL JORDAN

Director of Law

CHarces E. HANNAN, Jr.

Assistant Director of Law

Counsel of Record

Room 106 - City Hall

601 Lakeside Avenue

Cleveland, Ohio 44114

(216) 664-4333

Attorneys for Respondents

APPENDIX

App. 1

APPENDIX A

United States Constitution, Amendment IV:

The right of the people to be secure in their

persons, houses, papers, and effects, against

unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be

violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon

probable cause, supported by oath or affirma-

tion, and particularly describing the place to be

searched, and the persons or things to be seized.

App. 2

APPENDIX B

28 United States Code Section 1254:

§ 1254. Courts of appeals; certiorari, certified

questions

Cases in the courts of appeals may be reviewed

by the Supreme Court by the following

methods:

(1) By writ of certiorari granted upon the peti-

tion of any party to any civil or criminal

case, before or after rendition of judgment

or decree;

(2) By certification at any time by a court of

appeals of any question of law in any civil

or criminal case as to which instructions are

desired, and upon such certification the

Supreme Court may give binding instruc-

tions or require the entire record to be sent

up for decision of the entire matter in con-

troversy.

28 United States Code Section 1331:

§ 1331. Federal question

The district courts shall have original jurisdic-

tion of all civil actions arising under the Consti-

tution, laws, or treaties of the United States.

28 United States Code Section 1343:

§ 1343. Civil rights and elective franchise

(a) The district courts shall have original

jurisdiction of any civil action autho-

rized by law to be commenced by any

person:

App. 3

(1) To recover damages for injury to

his person or property, or because

of the deprivation of any right or

privilege of a citizen of the United

States, by any act done in fur-

therance of any conspiracy men-

tioned in section 1985 of Title 42;

(2) To recover damages from any per-

son who fails to prevent or to aid

in preventing any wrongs men-

tioned in section 1985 of Title 42

which he had knowledge were

about to occur and power to pre-

vent;

(3) To redress the deprivation, under

color of any State law, statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom or

usage, of any right, privilege or

immunity secured by the Consti-

tution of the United States or by

any Act of Congress providing for

equal rights of citizens or of all

persons within the jurisdiction of

the United States;

(4) To recover damages or to secure

equitable or other relief under any

Act of Congress providing for the

protection of civil rights, includ-

ing the right to vote.

(b) For purposes of this section —

(1) The District of Columbia shall be

considered to be a State; and

(2) any Act of Congress applicable

exclusively to the District of

Columbia shall be considered to

App. 4

be a statute of the District of

Columbia.

42 United States Code Section 1983:

§ 1983 Civil action for deprivation of rights

Every person who, under color of any statute,

ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any

State or Territory or the District of Columbia,

subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of

the United States or other person within the

jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any

rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the

Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the

party injured in an action at law, suit in equity,

or other proper proceeding for redress. For the

purposes of this section, any Act of Congress

applicable exclusively to the District of Colum-

bia shall be considered to be a statute of the

District of Columbia.

App. 5

APPENDIX C

Ohio Revised Code

§ 4501.01 Definitions

As used in this chapter and Chapters 4503., 4505.,

4507., 4509., 4511., 4513., 4515., and 4517. of the Revised

Code, and in the penal laws, except as otherwise pro-

vided:

(A) “Vehicles” means everything on wheels or run-

ners, including motorized bicycles, but does not mean

vehicles that are operated exclusively on rails or tracks or

from overhead electric trolley wires and vehicles that

belong to any police department, municipal fire depart-

ment, or volunteer fire department, or that are used by

such a department in the discharge of its functions.

(B) “Motor vehicle” means any vehicle, including

manufactured homes and recreational vehicles, that is

propelled or drawn by power other than muscular power

or power collected from overhead electric trolley wires,

except motorized bicycles, road rollers, traction engines,

power shovels, power cranes, and other equipment used

in construction work and not designed for or employed

in general highway transportation, well-drilling machin-

ery, ditch-digging machinery, farm machinery, trailers

that are used to transport agricultural produce or agri-

cultural production materials between a local place of

storage or supply and the farm when drawn or towed on

a public road or highway at a speed of twenty-five miles

per hour or less, threshing machinery, hay-baling machin-

ery, corn sheller, hammermill and agricultural tractors,

App. 6

machinery used in the production of horticultural, agri-

cultural, and vegetable products, and trailers that are

designed and used exclusively to transport a boat

between a place of storage and a marina, or in and

around a marina, when drawn or towed on a public road

or highway for a distance of no more than ten miles and

at a speed of twenty-five miles per hour or less.

(C) “Agricultural tractor” and “traction engine”

mean any self-propelling vehicle that is designed or used

for drawing other vehicles or wheeled machinery, but has

no provisions for carrying loads independently of such

other vehicles, and that is used principally for agri-

cultural purposes.

(D) “Commercial tractor,” except as defined in divi-

sion (C) of this section, means any motor vehicle that has

motive power and either is designed or used for drawing

other motor vehicles, or is designed or used for drawing

another motor vehicle while carrying a portion of the

other motor vehicle or its load, or both.

(E) “Passenger car” means any motor vehicle that is

designed and used for carrying not more than nine per-

sons and includes any motor vehicle that is designed and

used for carrying not more than fifteen persons in a

ridesharing arrangement. |

(F) “Collector’s vehicle” means any motor vehicle |

or agricultural tractor or traction engine that is of special |

interest, that has a fair market value of one hundred

dollars or more, whether operable or not, and that is

owned, operated, collected, preserved, restored, main-

tained, or used essentially as a collector’s item, leisure

pursuit, or investment, but not as the owner’s principal

App. 7

means of transportation. “Licensed collector’s vehicle”

means a collector’s vehicle, other than an agricultural

tractor or traction engine, that displays current, valid

license tags issued under section 4503.45 of the Revised

Code, or a similar type of motor vehicle that displays

current, valid license tags issued under substantially

equivalent provisions in the laws of other states.

(G) “Historical motor vehicle” means any motor

vehicle that is over twenty-five years old and is owned

solely as a collector’s item and for participation in club

activities, exhibitions, tours, parades, and similar uses,

but that in no event is used for general transportation.

(H) “Noncommercial motor vehicle” means any

motor vehicle, including a farm truck as defined in sec-

tion 4503.04 of the Revised Code, that is designed by the

manufacturer to carry a load of no more than one ton and

is used exclusively for purposes other than engaging in

business for profit.

(I) “Motor bus” means any motor vehicle that has

motor power and is designed and used for carrying more

than nine passengers, except any motor vehicle that is

designed and used for carrying not more than fifteen

passengers in a ridesharing arrangement.

(J) “Commercial car” means any motor vehicle that

has motor power and is designed and used for carrying

merchandise or freight, or that is used as a commercial

tractor.

(K) “Bicycle” means every device, other than a tri-

cycle that is designed solely for use as a play vehicle by a

child, that is propelled solely by human power upon

App. 8

which any person may ride, and that has either two

tandem wheels, or one wheel in front and two wheels in

the rear, any of which is more than fourteen inches in

diameter.

(L) “Motorized bicycle” means any vehicle that has

either two tandem wheels or one wheel in the front and

two wheels in the rear, that is capable of being pedaled,

and that its equipped with a helper motor of not more

than fifty cubic centimeters piston displacement that pro-

duces no more than one brake horsepower and is capable

of propelling the vehicle at a speed of no greater than

twenty miles per hour on a level surface.

(M) “Trailer” means any vehicle without motive

power that is designed or used for carrying property or

persons wholly on its own structure and for being drawn

by a motor vehicle, and includes any such vehicle that is

formed by or operated as a combination of a semitrailer

and a vehicle of the dolly type such as that commonly

known as a trailer dolly, a vehicle used to transport

agricultural produce or agricultural production materials

between a local place of storage or supply and the farm

when drawn or towed on a public road or highway at a

speed greater than twenty-five miles per hour, and a

vehicle that is designed and used exclusively to transport

a boat between a place of storage and a marina, or in and

around a marina, when drawn or towed on a public road

or highway for a distance of more than ten miles or at a

speed of more than twenty-five miles per hour. “Trailer”

does not include a manufactured home or travel trailer.

(N) “Noncommercial trailer” means any trailer,

except a travel trailer or trailer that is used to transport a

ee

App. 9

boat as described in division (B) of this section, but,

where applicable, includes a vehicle that is used to trans-

port a boat as described in division (M) of this section,

that has a gross weight of no more than three thousand

pounds, and that is used exclusively for purposes other

than engaging in business for a profit.

(QO) “Manufactured home” means any nonself-pro-

pelled vehicle transportable in one or more sections,

which, in the traveling mode, is eight body feet or more

in width or forty body feet or more in length or, when

erected on site, is three hundred twenty or more square

feet, and which is built on a permanent chassis and

designed to be used as a dwelling with or without a

permanent foundation when connected to the required

utilities, and includes the plumbing, heating, air condi-

tioning, and electrical systems contained therein. Calcula-

tions used to determine the number of square feet in a

structure are based on the structure’s exterior dimensions

measured at the largest horizontal projections when

erected on site. These dimensions include all expandable

rooms, cabinets, and other projections containing interior

space, but do not include bay windows.

(P) “Semitrailer” means any vehicle of the trailer

type that does not have motive power and is so designed

or used with another and separate motor vehicle that in

operation a part of its own weight or that of its load, or

both, rests upon and is carried by the other vehicle fur-

nishing the motive power for propelling itself and the

vehicle referred to in this division, and includes, for the

purpose only of registration and taxation under those

chapters, any vehicle of the dolly type, such as a trailer

App. 10

dolly, that is designed or used for the conversion of a

semitrailer into a trailer.

(Q) “Recreational vehicle” means a vehicular porta-

ble structure that is designed and constructed to be used

as a temporary dwelling for travel, recreational, and

vacation uses and is classed as follows:

(1) “Travel trailer” means a nonself-propelled recre-

ational vehicle that does not exceed an overall length of

thirty-five feet, exclusive of bumper and tongue or coup-

ling, and includes a tent-type fold-out camping trailer as

defined in section 4517.01 of the Revised Code.

(2) “Motor home” means a self-propelled recre-

ational vehicle that is constructed with permanently

installed facilities for cold storage, cooking and consum-

ing of food, and for sleeping.

(3) “Truck camper” means a nonself-propelled rec-

reational vehicle that does not have wheels for road use

and is designed to be placed upon and attached to a

motor vehicle. “Truck camper” does not include truck

covers that consist of walls and a roof, but do not have

floors and facilities enabling them to be used as a dwell-

ing.

(4) “Fifth wheel trailer” means a vehicle that is of

such size and weight as to be movable without a special

highway permit, that has a gross trailer area of four

hundred square feet or less, that is constructed with a

raised forward section that allows a bi-level floor plan,

and that is designed to be towed by a vehicle equipped

with a fifth-wheel hitch ordinarily installed in the bed of

a truck.

App. 11

(5) “Park trailer” means a vehicle that is commonly

known as a park model recreational vehicle, meets the

American national standard institute standard A119.5

(1988) for park trailers, is built on a single chassis, has a

gross trailer area of four hundred square feet or less

when set up, is designed for seasonal or temporary living

quarters, and may be connected to utilities necessary for

the operation of installed features and appliances.

(R) “Pneumatic tires” means tires of rubber and

fabric or tires of similar material, that are inflated with

alr.

(S) “Solid tires” means tires of rubber or similar

elastic material that are not dependent upon confined air

for support of the load.

(T) “Solid tire vehicle” means any vehicle that is

equipped with two or more solid tires.

(U) “Farm machinery” means all machines and

tools that are used in the production, harvesting, and care

of farm products, and includes trailers that are used to

transport agricultural produce or agricultural production

materials between a local place of storage or supply and

the farm when drawn or towed on a public road or

highway at a speed of twenty-five miles per hour or less.

(V) “Owner” includes any person, firm, or corpora-

tion other than a manufacturer or dealer that has title to a

motor vehicle, except that in sections 4505.01 to 4505.19

of the Revised Code, “owner” includes in addition manu-

facturers and dealers.

(W) “Manufacturer” and “dealer” include all per-

sons, firms, and corporations that are regularly engaged

‘Nii

App. 12

in the business of manufacturing, selling, displaying,

offering for sale, or dealing in motor vehicles, at an

established place of business that is used exclusively for

the purpose of manufacturing, selling, displaying, offer-

ing for sale, or dealing in motor vehicles. A place of

business that is used for manufacturing, selling, display-

ing, offering for sale, or dealing in motor vehicles shall be

deemed to be used exclusively for those purposes even

though snowmobiles or all-purpose vehicles are sold or

displayed for sale thereat, even though farm machinery is

sold or displayed for sale thereat, or even though repair,

accessory, gasoline and oil, storage, parts, service, or

paint departments are maintained thereat, or, in any

county having a population of less than seventy-five

thousand persons at the last federal census, even though

a department in a place of business is used to dismantle

salvage, or rebuild motor vehicles by means of used

parts, if such departments are operated for the purpose of

furthering and assisting in the business of manufacturing,

selling, displaying, offering for sale, or dealing in motor

vehicles. Places of business or departments in a place of

business used to dismantle, salvage, or rebuild motor

vehicles by means of using used parts are not considered

as being maintained for the purpose of assisting or fur-

thering the manufacturing, selling, displaying, and offer-

ing for sale or dealing in motor vehicles.

(X) “Operator” includes any person who drives or

operates a motor vehicle upon the public highways.

(Y) “Chauffeur” means any operator who operates

a motor vehicle, other than a taxicab, as an employee for

hire; or any operator whether or not the owner of a motor

vehicle, other than a taxicab, who operates such vehicle

App. 13

for transporting, for gain, compensation, or profit, either

persons or property owned by another. Any operator of a

motor vehicle who is voluntarily involved in a rideshar-

ing arrangement is not considered an employee for hire

or operating such vehicle for gain, compensation, or

profit.

(Z) “State” includes the territories and federal dis-

tricts of the United States and the provinces of Canada.

(AA) “Public roads and highways” for vehicles

includes all public thoroughfares, bridges, and culverts.

(BB) “Manufacturer’s number” means the manufac-

turer’s original serial number that is affixed to or

imprinted upon the chassis or other part of the motor

vehicle.

(CC) “Motor number” means the manufacturer’s

original number that is affixed to er imprinted upon the

engine or motor of the vehicle.

(DD) “Bill of sale” means the written statement or

document of transfer or conveyance required prior to

January 1, 1938, to be executed and delivered by the

corporation, partnership, association, or person selling,

giving away, transferring, or passing title to a motor

vehicle.

(EE) “Distributor” means any person who is autho-

rized by a motor vehicle manufacturer to distribute new

motor vehicles to licensed motor vehicle dealers at an

established place of business that is used exclusively for

the purpose of distributing new motor vehicles to

App. 14

licensed motor vehicle dealers, except when the distribu-

tor also is a new motor vehicle dealer, in which case he

may distribute at the location of his licensed dealership.

(FF) “Ridesharing arrangement” means the trans-

portation of persons in a motor vehicle where the trans-

portation is incidental to another purpose of a volunteer

driver and includes ridesharing arrangements known as

carpools, vanpools, and buspools.

(GG) “Apportionable vehicle” means any vehicle

that is used or intended for use in two or more interna-

tional registration plan member jurisdictions that allocate

or proportionally register vehicles, that is used for the

transportation of persons for hire or designed, used, or

maintained primarily for the transportation of property,

and that meets any of the following qualifications:

(1) Is a power unit having a gross vehicle weight in

excess of twenty-six thousand pounds;

(2) Is a power unit having three or more axles,

regardless of the gross vehicle weight;

(3) Is a combination vehicle with a gross vehicle

weight in excess of twenty-six thousand pounds.

“Apportionable vehicle” does not include recre-

ational vehicles, vehicles displaying restricted plates, city

pick-up and delivery vehicles, buses used for the trans-

portation of chartered parties, or vehicles owned and

operated by the United States, this state, or any political

subdivisions thereof.

(HH) “Chartered party” means a group of persons

who contract as a group to acquire the exclusive use of a

passenger-carrying motor vehicle at a fixed charge for the

App. 15

vehicle in accordance with the carrier’s tariff, lawfully on

file with the interstate commerce commission, for the

purpose of group travel to a specified destination or for a

particular itinerary, either agreed upon in advance or

modified by the chartered group after having left the

place of origin.

(II) “International registration plan” means a recip-

rocal agreement of member jurisdictions that is endorsed

by the American association of motor vehicle administra-

tors, and that promotes and encourages the fullest

possible use of the highway system by authorizing appor-

tioned registration of fleets of vehicles and recognizing

registration of vehicles apportioned in member jurisdic-

tions.

(JJ) “Restricted plate” means a license plate that has

a restriction of time, geographic area, mileage, or com-

modity, and includes license plates issued to farm trucks

under division (K) of section 4503.04 of the Revised Code.

(KK) “Gross vehicle weight,” with regard to any

commercial car, trailer, semitrailer, or bus that is taxed at

the rates established under section 4503.042 of the

Revised Code, means the unladen weight of the vehicle

fully equipped plus the maximum weight of the load to

be carried on the vehicle.

(LL) “Combined gross vehicle weight” with regard

to any combination of a commercial car, trailer, and semi-

trailer, that is taxed at the rates established under section

4503.042 of the Revised Code, means the total unladen

weight of the combination of vehicles fully equipped plus

the maximum weight of the load to be carried on that

combination of vehicles.

App. 16

(MM) “Chauffeured limousine” means a motor

vehicle that is designed to carry fewer than nine pas-

sengers and is operated for hire on an hourly basis pur-

suant to a prearranged contract for the transportation of

passengers on public roads and highways along a route

under the control of the person hiring the vehicle and not

over a defined and regular route. “Prearranged contract”

means an agreement, made in advance of boarding, to

provide transportation from a specific location in a chauf-

feured limousine at a fixed rate per hour or trip. “Chauf-

feured limousine” does not include any vehicle that is

used exclusively in the business of funeral directing.

App. 17

APPENDIX D

Cleveland Codified Ordinance Section 601.15:

Section 601.15 Inspection of Vehicles for the

(a)

(b)

Purpose of Locating Stolen

Motor Vehicles and/or Stolen

Parts

For the purpose of locating stolen

motor vehicles and/or stolen motor

vehicle parts, the Chief of Police, or his

authorized representative, may inspect

any motor vehicle, as defined in Sec-

tion 4501.01 of the Revised Code and

may inspect any motor vehicle part

that has been marked with an identify-

ing number by the manufacturer, situ-

ated in the City of Cleveland in any

public garage, community garage, stor-

age garage, service garage, repair shop,

parking lot, auto sales lot, vehicle leas-

ing or rental lot, motor vehicle salvage

facility, scrap metal processing facility,

auto wrecking yard, junk yard, or other

similar establishment, and may inspect

the title, registration, vehicle identifica-

tion number, or license plates of the

vehicle in order to establish the right-

ful ownership or possession of the

vehicle or vehicle part.

For the purpose of locating a stolen

vehicle, the Chief of Police, or his

authorized representative, may inspect

implements of husbandry and con-

struction equipment in places

described in division (a) of this section.

App. 18

(c) Whenever possible, inspections con-

ducted pursuant to division (a) or (b)

of this section shall be conducted at a

time and in a manner so as to minimize

any interference with, or delay of, busi-

ness operations.

(d) No person, without privilege to do so

and with purpose to prevent, obstruct,

or delay the performance of a police

officer from inspecting any place

described in division (a), shall do any

act which hampers or impedes a police

officer from making an inspection pur-

suant to this Section.

Whoever violates this Section is guilty

of obstructing vehicle inspections, a

misdemeanor of the second degree.

(Ord. No. 137-86. Passed 1-13-86, eff. 1-16-86)