Opposition Brief — Riggin v. Office of Senate Fair Employment Practices

FI

LED

DEC 14 #9

No. 95-695

CLERK

In the Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1995

KENNETH D. RIGGIN, et al., Petitioners,

v.

OFFICE OF SENATE

FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES, et al., Respondents.

On Petition For Writ Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Federal Circuit

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE U.S.

SENATE SERGEANT AT ARMS IN OPPOSITION

Jean M. Manning Senate Hart Building, Room 143

Counsel of Record Washington, D.C. 20510

Senate Chief Counsel (202) 224-5424

for Employment

Toby R. Hyman Counsel for Respondent Office of

Timothy W. Millett the United States Senate

Carolyn M. Plump Sergeant At Arms

Robert S. Whitman

Assistant Senate Counsels

for Employment

QUESTIONS PRESENTED

I.

Whether the Court of Appeals properly held that the

Government Employee Rights Act of 1991 did not implicitly

repeal the Capitol Police Retirement Act.

IT.

Whether the Court of Appeals properly exercised its

jurisdiction to consider and to reject Petitioners’

constitutional claim.

Ne See ae FS ETE SIT ELE EN EE, Td iin ——

TABLE OF CONTENTS

COUNTER-STATEMENT OF THE CASE ........ l

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT .......... 5

IIT.

NO COMPELLING REASON EXISTS TO

GRANT THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF

CERTRIRAME os 6 tees Cl oe 8 ee 5

THE PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED

BECAUSE THE COURT OF APPEALS

CORRECTLY APPLIED WELL-ESTABLISHED

PRECEDENT OF THIS COURT TO FIND THAT

THE GERA DID NOT IMPLICITLY REPEAL

THE MANDATORY RETIREMENT

PROVISIONS OF THE CPRA ............ 6

THE PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED

BECAUSE THE COURT OF APPEALS

PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS JURISDICTION TO

CONSIDER AND TO REJECT PETITIONERS'

CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM. ........... 11

CONCLUGION ..occesweebu veces a baeEeS 13

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

CASES

Bowman v. United States Department of Justice,

510 F. Supp. 1183 (E.D. Va. 1981), aff'd, 679

F.2d 876 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 459 U.S.

eB A ee ees ee TG Lalas 10

City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451 (1978) ....... 12

Colorado River Water Conservation District v.

United States, 424 U.S. 800 (1976) .............. 12

Francke v. United States Department of the

Treasury, 721 F. Supp. 47 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) ........ 10

Hawaii Housing Authority v. Midkiff, 467

OEE A a ee 13

Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp.,

pp RE 13

Johnson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 472 U.S. 353

ES gt ST a peep ica OC aD Bes | os 9 passim

Mahoney v. Trabucco, 738 F.2d 35 (1st Cir.), cert.

denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984).................. 10

Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia,

UNE CUPUOD, os cn no cen w wwe Sele Gs atom 12

Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) ......... 7,8

il

———eeaeae

Orzel v. Wauwatosa Fire Department, 697 F.2d

743 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.

ONE CIGESE oka ili eee Oe Ce eer 10

Palmer v. Ticcione, 576 F.2d 459, (2d Cir.

1978) cert. denied, 440 U.S. 945 (1979) .......... 10

Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co., 426

US MR” 6). | eR ee eee Pra ere te ae 7

Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman,

BIZ U.S, GIG Hee sic ke eV ow Ree ee es Oe 11, 12

Riggin v. Office of Senate Fair Employment

Practices, 61 F.3d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1995) ...... 4 passim

Stewart v. Smith, 673 F.2d 485 (D.C. Cir. 1982) ..... 10

Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535 th) RS STE 6

Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979) ........-45. 12

STATUTES

pik Toh beeen emery e wor cre Sa ea 2

2USC. $10) NS ei ieee 3 |

Eis to > Serre OT ret ec. 3 |

ZUSL. © UBD ove sc cee uvcnsvigewt evs 3 passim

2ZUSC..§ 1301 023 oh 2 UIA SRO 7 6

DI Se ne iio os oe ed Sn 6

Ce a i no a oe 2

RS ero ieee eer ee 1

ER Se Re eerie rae er wre 2

Pub. L. No. 101-428 § 2(b)(1)(A), 104 Stat.

ST Shas eae coke akg gine Sites aie Aaya he I

Pub. L. No. 102-397, § 202, 106 Stat. 1949 (1992) ....8

Pub. L. No. 103-283, § 307(a), 108 Stat.

1441 (1994) (codified as amended at 5

0 7 odie 5 ENGI SR aga Creer s gee ara” earl 2, 8

LEGISLATIVE HISTORY

140 Cong. Rec. $7045 (daily ed. June 16, 1994) ...... &

H.R. 4910, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992) ........... &

H.R. Rep. No. 314, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1993) .... 8

S. 1984, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994) ............. 8

No. 95-695

In the Supreme Court of the United States

October Term, 1995

KENNETH D. RIGGIN, et al., Petitioners,

v.

OFFICE OF SENATE

FAIR EMPLOYMENT PRACTICES, et al., Respondents.

On Petition For Wnt Of Certiorari

To The United States Court Of Appeals

For The Federal Circuit

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT OFFICE OF THE U.S.

SENATE SERGEANT AT ARMS IN OPPOSITION

Respondent Office of the United States Senate

Sergeant At Arms (the "SAA") submits this brief in

opposition to the Petition for Writ Of Certiorari filed by

Kenneth D. Riggin and nine other retired officers of the

United States Capitol Police ("USCP").

COUNTER-STATEMENT OF THE CASE

In 1990, Congress enacted the Capitol Police

Retirement Act ("CPRA"), Pub. L. No. 101-428 § 2(b)(1)(A),

Be ee ee

104 Stat. 928 (1990), which aligned the retirement system of

the USCP with the retirement systems of other federal law

enforcement agencies. The CPRA amended 5 U.S.C. § 8335

which, since 1974, had subjected federal law enforcement

officers, other than the Capitol Police, to minimum and

maximum age limits. The CPRA, as enacted in 1990,

required any Capitol Police officer who was at least 55 years

of age and had completed 20 years of service to retire unless

the Capitol Police Board granted the officer a special

exemption from automatic separation because the public

interest so required.'

Petitioners are former Capitol Police officers on the

Senate payroll who were required to retire pursuant to the

mandatory retirement provisions of the CPRA. Opposing

their mandatory retirement, the officers filed a charge with

the Office of Senate Fair Employment Practices, in

accordance with the Government Employee Rights Act of

1991 (the "GERA"), 2 U.S.C. § 1201 (1991). The GERA

provides, inter alia, that all employment actions affecting

employees of Senate offices shall be taken free from any

discrimination based on age, as defined by section 15 of the

Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, (the

"ADEA"), 29 U.S.C. § 633a. USCP officers are employees

of Respondent SAA, and thus they are entitled to the

protections of the GERA. In their charges, Petitioners argued

that the mandatory retirement provisions of the CPRA

violated the age discrimination prohibitions of the GERA.

Petitioners also claimed that their mandatory retirement

' The effective date of the CPRA was postponed two

years; it became effective in 1992. In 1994 the CPRA was

amended to raise the mandatory retirement age to 57. See

Pub. L. No. 103-283, § 307(a), 108 Stat. 1441-42 (1994)

(codified as amended at 5 U.S.C. § 8335(d)).

2

violated the equal protection component of the Due Process

Clause of the Fifth Amendment.

Petitioners’ cases were consolidated and an

independent hearing board was appointed to consider their

complaints in accordance with section 307(b) of the GERA,

2 U.S.C. § 1207(b). On the first day of the hearing, the

hearing board granted the SAAs motion for summary

judgment and dismissed the Petitioners’ claims. The hearing

board determined that the CPRA does not violate the GERA.

Further, the board found nothing to indicate that Congress

intended in 1991 to repeal by implication the mandatory

retirement provisions of the CPRA, which had been enacted

one year earlier.” (A at 37) The hearing board also found

that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction of Petitioners’

constitutional claim. (A at 39)

Petitioners requested review of the hearing board's

decision by the Senate Select Committee on Ethics ("Ethics

Committee") pursuant to section 308 of the GERA, 2 U.S.C.

§ 1208. The Ethics Committee affirmed the hearing board's

decision, finding that "the CPRA was not repealed by and

does not violate the [GERA]." (A at 28)

Thereafter, Petitioners sought review of the Ethics

Committee's decision by the Court of Appeals for the Federal

Circuit pursuant to section 309 of the GERA, 2 U.S.C. §

1209. In the Court of Appeals, Petitioners renewed their

claim that the mandatory retirement provisions of the CPRA

violated the age discrimination prohibitions of the GERA.

Petitioners also contended that the hearing board had

jurisdiction of Petitioners’ Fifth Amendment claim, and they

> "A __" refers to the Appendix to the Petition for

Writ of Certiorari in the instant case.

3

sought remand on that claim. Finally, Petitioners argued that

the Ethics Committee violated their due process rights by not

providing a detailed written opinion.

In a unanimous opinion, the Federal Circuit rejected

Petitioners’ arguments and affirmed the decision below.

Riggin v. Office of Senate Fair Employment Practices, 61

F.3d 1563 (Fed. Cir. 1995). In reconciling the GERA and

the CPRA, the court applied well-established rules of

statutory construction and carefully reviewed the legislative

history and background of the GERA and the mandatory

retirement provisions of the CPRA. The court found

compelling legislative evidence that the GERA should not be

read to override the mandatory retirement provisions of the

CPRA. Accordingly, the court held that "the CPRA and the

GERA can and should be read compatibly, that Congress did

not intend the GERA to repeal the CPRA, and that the

petitioners are subject to the CPRA's mandatory retirement

provisions." /d. at 1569. The court found that the SAA

correctly applied the mandatory retirement provisions to the

officers. The court also held that, although the hearing board

had jurisdiction to consider Petitioners’ equal protection

claim, the failure to do so did not require remand. In

rejecting Petitioners’ claim and denying remand, the court

found that the issue was purely a question of law within the

court's jurisdiction to “decide all relevant questions of law

and interpret constitutiona! and statutory provisions." 61

F.3d at 1571 (citing 2 U.S.C. § 1209(c)). Moreover, the

court found, the issue was straightforward and did not justify

remand. 61 F.3d at 1571. Finally, the court rejected

Petitioners’ claim that the Ethics Committee violated

Petitioners’ due process rights by not providing a detailed

written statement of its reasons for upholding the hearing

board's decision. /d. The court held that the opinion of the

Ethics Committee satisfied the requirements imposed by the

=

GERA, the Ethics Committee's rules, and the Due Process

Clause. /d.

REASONS FOR DENYING THE WRIT

I. NO COMPELLING REASON E USTS TO

GRANT THE PETITION FOR WRIT OF

CERTIORARL.

Petitioners have presented no compelling reason, as

required by Rule 10 of the Supreme Court Rules, to support

their Petition for Writ of Certiorari. Petitioners do not

contend, nor could they, that the decision below conflicts

with the decision of another United States court of appeals or

with relevant decisions of this Court. See Sup. Ct. R.

10(a)(c).

Petitioners contend, rather, that this Court should

review the decision of the Federal Circuit because it

misapplied the law in this case. Petitioners also imply that

the decision below involves issues of federal law that have

not been, but should be, decided by this Court.

As explained below, the Federal Circuit properly

applied the law in this case, consistent with relevant

decisions of this Court. Also, the decision below does not

raise an important issue of federal law that has not been

decided by this Court. There is no reason, compelling or

otherwise, to grant the Petition for Writ of Certiorari in this

case.

i eal ic aii i

Il. THE PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED

BECAUSE THE COURT OF APPEALS

CORRECTLY APPLIED WELL-

ESTABLISHED PRECEDENT OF THIS

COURT TO FIND THAT THE 4;ERA DID

NOT IMPLICITLY REPEAL THE

MANDATORY RETIREMENT PROVISIONS |

OF THE CPRA.

Petitioners assert that the Federal Circuit erred in

finding that the mandatory retirement provisions of the CPRA

do not conflict with the GERA's prohibition of age

discrimination. (Petition at 7)’ In essence, Petitioners have

renewed their contention that the GERA implicitly repealed

the mandatory retirement provisions of the CPRA.

The Federal Circuit correctly applied controlling

precedent of this Court in determining that the GERA did not

implicitly repeal the mandatory retirement provisions of the

CPRA. The court first noted that a cardinal rule of statutory

construction is that repeals by implication are disfavored.

See, e.g., Traynor v. Turnage, 485 U.S. 535, 547 (1988).

> “Petition " refers to the Petition for Writ of

Certiorari. Petitioners also contend that the mandatory

retirement provisions of the CPRA violate the age

discrimination provisions of the Congressional Accountability

Act of 1995 ("CAA"), 2 U.S.C. § 1301. (Petition at 8)

However, as the Court of Appeals correctly noted, the

GERA, and not the CAA, provides the exclusive remedy for

age discrimination claims of Senate employees when such

claims accrue before January 23, 1996, the effective date of

most of the provisions of the CAA. See 2 USC. §§

1311(d), 1435(a)(1).

The court further stated that this Court has consistently held

that when two statutes appear to conflict

courts will endeavor to read them consistently

and will not find a narrow statute "submerged

by a later enacted statute covering a more

generalized spectrum" unless the later statute

"expressly contradict[s] the original act" or

unless such construction "is absolutely

necessary" in order for the later statute to

have any meaning at all.

61 F.3d at 1566 (citing Radzanower v. Touche Ross & Co.,

426 U.S. 148, 153 (1976)).

Relying on this precedent, the court found that the

"task of reconciling" the GERA and the CPRA "is not a

difficult one." Jd. The court found that the GERA, which

protects employees of Senate offices from employment

discrimination in general, is more general than the mandatory

retirement provisions of the CPRA, which addresses a

specific issue, mandatory retirement, that applies to a limited

number of employees of Senate offices. /d. Furthermore,

the court found that the GERA and the CPRA could be easily

reconciled because “the mandatory retirement provisions of

the CPRA simply establish a narrow exception to the general

rule, set forth in the GERA, that Senate employees are

protected against age discrimination in employment." /d.

In so ruling, the court appropriately deferred to this

Court's decision in Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974),

which provides a close analogy to this case. In Morton, this

Court found that a specific statute, the Indian Reorganization

Act, which provided employment preferences to a limited

group, Native Americans, was not implicitly repealed by a

later-enacted more general statute, the Equal Employment

Opportunity Act of 1972. This Court held that, "Where there

is no clear intention otherwise, a specific statute will not be

controlled or nullified by a general one, regardless of the

priority of enactment." /d. at 550-51.

The Federal Circuit also carefully examined the

legislative background of the GERA and the CPRA and

determined that Congress has clearly indicated that it has not

repealed the mandatory retirement provisions of the CPRA.

The court found "compelling legislative evidence" of this:

Congress twice amended the CPRA's mandatory retirement

provisions after the enactment of the GERA, and on

numerous other occasions subsequent to the enactment of the

GERA Congress considered legislation relating to the

CPRA's mandatory retirement provisions or otherwise

acknowledged that such provisions are still in effect.* /d. at

1568-69.

* See Pub. L. No. 103-283, § 307, 108 Stat. 1441-42

(amendment to CPRA to increase mandatory retirement age

from 55 to 57); Pub. L. No. 102-397, § 202, 106 Stat. 1949,

1951 (1992) (authorization for lump-sum payments of

accrued leave for Capitol Police officers facing mandatory

retirement under the CPRA); H.R. 4910, 102d Cong., 2d

Sess. (1992) (legislation introduced to extend effective date

of the mandatory retirement provisions of the CPRA by three

years); H.R. Rep. No. 314, 103d Cong., Ist Sess. 3 (1993)

(House Committee report on bill to amend the ADEA which

acknowledged that the Capitol Police were subject to

mandatory retirement); S. 1984, 103d Cong., 2d Sess. (1994)

(Senate bill introduced to repeal the mandatory retirement

provisions of the CPRA); 140 Cong. Rec. $7045 (daily ed.

June 16, 1994) (request by Senator Jeffords to bar use of

funds to enforce mandatory retirement of Capitol Police).

8

Petitioners contend that the holding of the Federal

Circuit “was made in the absence of any Congressional

indication" that the CPRA establishes a narrow exception to

the GERA. (Petition at 7) Petitioners imply that Congress

has decided that all mandatory retirement schemes for law

enforcement officers are incompatible with the ADEA

because Congress allowed to expire an ADEA exemption that

permitted compulsory retirement of state and local law

enforcement officers. Jd. Petitioners’ argument is specious

for two reasons. First, it ignores the finding of the Federal

Circuit that compelling legislative evidence exists of

Congress's intent that the mandatory retirement provisions of

the CPRA are extant and must be read consistently with the

GERA. 61 F.3d at 1568-69. Second, Petitioners’ contention

ignores that Congress has, for nearly 50 years, enacted

legislation governing the retirement rights of federal law

enforcement personnel that is entirely separate and distinct

from the mandatory retirement provisions applicable to

nonfederal law enforcement officers. As this Court

recognized in Johnson v. Mayor of Baltimore, 472 U.S. 353

(1985), which involved an ADEA challenge to the mandatory

retirement scheme of a local government, "Congress is not

always required to treat federal and nonfederal employees in

the same way." /d. at 365 n.10.

Petitioners also contend that the Federal Circuit did

not properly address the issue of whether the CPRA satisfies

the bona fide occupational qualification test ("BFOQ") of the

ADEA. In fact, the court addressed the issue by holding that

the mandatory retirement provisions of the CPRA establish

a narrow exception to the age discrimination prohibitions of

the ADEA incorporated into the GERA. 61 F.3d at 1566.

Relying on Johnson, however, Petitioners argue that this

Court has found that the federal mandatory retirement scheme

is not an exception to the age discrimination prohibitions of

the ADEA. (Petition at 6) Petitioners misconstrue Johnson.

At issue in Johnson was whether Congress's establishment of

a mandatory retirement age of 55 for federal firefighters a

fortiori established age as a BFOQ, within the meaning of

the ADEA, for non-federal firefighters. The Court found that

it did not because Congress has “uncontested authority to

exempt federal employees from the requirements of federal

regulatory statutes," such as the ADEA. 472 US. at 363-70

(1985). Thus, contrary to Petitioners’ assertion, the Court in

Johnson did not hold that the federal mandatory retirement

statute is not an exception to the age prohibitions of the

ADEA.° Finally, the Federal Circuit explained in the instant

case, "it would make no sense to hold that the mandatory

retirement schemes for other law enforcement officers can

co-exist with the [ADEA], while the mandatory retirement

scheme for the Capitol Police casi." 61 F.3d at 1568.

> Other courts also have unanimously found that

schemes mandating age restrictions for federal employees can

be read compatibly with the ADEA. Mahoney v. Trabucco,

738 F.2d 35, 41 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 1036 (1984)

(ADEA co-exists with mandatory retirement provisions for

federal law enforcement officers); Orzel v. Wauwatosa Fire

Dep't, 697 F.2d 743, 749 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S.

992 (1983) (same); Palmer v. Ticcione, 576 F.2d 459, 465

n.7 (2d Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 945 (1979) (same);

Bowman v. United States Dep't of Justice, 510 F. Supp.

1183, 1186 (E.D. Va.), aff'd, 679 F.2d 876 (4th Cir. 1981),

cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1072 (1982):(same). See also Stewart

v. Smith, 673 F.2d 485, 493 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (maximum

hiring age limits for federal law enforcement officers are not

subject to the ADEA's BFOQ test); Francke v. United States

Dep't of the Treasury, 721 F. Supp. 47, 50 n.3 (S.D.N.Y.

1989) (same).

10

In summary, the Petition should be denied because the

Federal Circuit correctly applied well-established precedent

of this Court. Furthermore, contrary to Petitioners’

assertions, this case does not present an issue unresolved by

this Court in Johnson.

Il. THE PETITION SHOULD BE DENIED

BECAUSE THE COURT OF APPEALS

PROPERLY EXERCISED ITS JURISDICTION

TO CONSIDER AND TO REJECT

PETITIONERS’ CONSTITUTIONAL CLAIM.

Petitioners maintain that the Federal Circuit

unnecessarily intruded on the prerogatives of Congress when

it decided the merits of Petitioners’ equal protection claim

without letting the Ethics Committee consider the claim in

the first instance. (Petition at 10) Petitioners’ argument is

belied by the fact that Congress expressly gave the Federal

Circuit jurisdiction to "decide all relevant questions of law

and interpret constitutional and statutory provisions" in

reviewing GERA appeals. 2 U.S.C. § 1209(c). Furthermore,

the Federal Circuit correctly stated that Petitioners’ equal

protection claim "is a straightforward and simple one that

would not justify the time and effort involved in a remand."

61 F.3d at 1571. Because appellate courts have the authority

to address such constitutional issues in the first instance, see

28 U.S.C. § 2106, the Federal Circuit did not err in not

remanding the equal protection claim. Further, it would have

been a waste of judicial and congressional resources for the

court to have remanded Petitioners’ constitutional claim only

to have the parties return to the Federal Circuit at a later date

to present an issue that the court has already decided.

Petitioners further contend that the doctrine announced

by this Court in Railroad Commission of Texas v. Pullman,

312 U.S. 496 (1941), supports a finding that the Federal

Circuit erred in ruling on Petitioners’ constitutional claim

rather than remanding it to the Ethics Committee. The

Pullman abstention doctrine provides that in cases where

there is an unsettled question of state law that may obviate

the need to decide a federal constitutional question, a federal

court should abstain until the state court has resolved the

state question. /d. at 501-02. The doctrine reflects the desire

to preserve harmonious federal-state relations by preventing

an "unnecessary ruling by a federal court that is supplanted

by a controlling decision of a state court." /d. at 500.

Petitioners’ attempt to invoke the Pullman abstention doctrine

in this case is flawed in several respects. First, no authority

suggests that Pullman-type abstention should be applied to

preserve harmonious relationships between coordinate

branches of the federal government rather than between

federal and state courts. Second, even if Pullman-type

abstention could be applied by analogy to coordinate

branches of the federal government, the doctrine would not

apply in this case. No unsettled questions of law existed for

the hearing board or Ethics Committee to resolve in this case.

See City of Houston v. Hill, 482 U.S. 451, 468 (1978)

(Pullman-type abstention requires that there be "an unsettled

question of state law"). As the Federal Circuit explained, no

plausible basis exists for distinguishing the instant case from

Massachusetts Board of Retirement v. Murgia, 427 U.S. 307

(1976), and Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93 (1979), in which

this Court rejected equal protection challenges to state and

federal mandatory retirement statutes. 61 F.3d at 1571.

Finally, this Court has emphasized that "[abstention] from the

exercise of federal jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule."

Colorado River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States,

424 US. 800, 813 (1976). Abstention is particularly

inappropriate when, as in this case, "the naked question"

merely involves an issue of constitutional interpretation. See

12

Hawaii Housing Auth. v. Midkiff, 467 U.S. 229, 236 (1984).

For this reason, the Federal Circuit properly held that

Petitioners’ equal protection claim did not justify remand.

See Hostetter v. Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 US.

324 (1964) (Pullman-type abstention is not warranted when

litigation has been long-delayed).

CONCLUSION

The Petition for Writ of Certiorari should be denied.

Respectfully submitted,

Jean M. Manning

Counsel of Record

Senate Chief Counsel for

Employment

Toby R. Hyman

Timothy W. Millett

Carolyn M. Plump

Robert S. Whitman

Assistant Senate Counsels

for Employment

Senate Hart Building, Room 143

Washington, D.C. 20510

202) 224-5424

Counsel for Respondent

Office of the U.S. Senate

Sergeant At Arms

December 14, 1995

13